Remman Enterprises Inc., petitioner vs. CA & Crispin E.

Lat

FACTS:

 Remman and Lat are adjoining landowners in Brgy. Bugtong na Pulo, Lipa City.
 Lat owns 1.8 hectares of agricultural land, planted mostly with fruit trees. While
Remman occupied 15 hectares of land devoted for his piggery business.
 Remman’s land is ½ meters higher in elevation than that of Lat.
 July 1984- Lat noticed that Remman’s waste disposal lagoon was overflowing
and flooding ¼ of his land. Lat made several representations with Remman but
fell on deaf ears.
 May 15, 1985- Almost 1 hectare of Lat’s plantation was already flooded with
water containing pig manure and as a result, trees growing on the flooded portion
started to wither and die.
 Lat then filed a complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction
alleging that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased beacause of the
overflow of water heavy with pig manure from Remman’s farm.
 REMMAN raised the defense that he adopted measures to contain the waste water
coming from its piggery to prevent any damage to the adjoining estates
 RTC conducted ocular inspection evaluating evidences of both parties. It found
out that:
o Waste water lagoon is overflowing flooding 1 hectares of Lat’s plantation
o Water was ankle-deep causing the death of
 1 jackfruit tree
 15 coconut trees
 122 coffee trees and
 Unspecified number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables
 RTC ordered Remman to indemnify Lat P186,975 for lost profits for 3 crop years
and P30,000 attorney’s fee.
 CA affirmed in toto.

ISSUE: WON appellant Remman is liable for damage.

HELD:

YES. Remman is liable for damage for negligence on his part in maintaining the level of
waste water in its lagoon which flooded Lat’s plantation with acidic, malodorous and
polluted water containing pig manure.

ART 637 of Civil Code:

Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and
without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well
as the stones or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede
this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works
which will increase the burden.

Similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No.1067), which
provides:

Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and
without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the
stone or earth which they carry with them.
 The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede
this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage;
neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase
this natural flow.

As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the lower
estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man
descend from higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a higher state
are those which are artificially collected in manmade lagoons, any damage occasioned
thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation.

PRIMITIVO LOVINA, and NELLY MONTILLA

vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and
BENJAMIN YONZON,

The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a
navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the said
Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his decision
dated 11 August 1959, ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of
Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the expense of the respondent.
After receipt of the decision, the respondent filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearing, granted a
permanent injunction, which is now the subject of the present appeal.

The respondents-appellants, Florencio Moreno, Secretary of Public Works and Communications,

and Benjamin Yonzon, investigator, question the jurisdiction of the trial court, and attribute to it the
following errors:

1. The trial court erred in holding in effect, that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional:

2. The trial court erred in receiving evidence de novo at the trial of the case;

3. The trial court erred in substituting its judgment for that of defendant Secretary of Public
Works and Communications and in reversing the latter's finding that the stream in question is
a navigable river which was illegally closed by plaintiffs;

4. The trial court erred in holding that the Sapang Bulati is a private stream; and

5. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiffs should first exhaust administrative
remedy before filing the instant petition.

The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was that Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with
sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river
or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive
as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an
alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

ISSUE: Whether or not the objections to the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an
undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and
arbitrary, tenable

RULING: No. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person
was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership
thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession.

It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination
of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but
these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power
granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and
authorities are clear that they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected
is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.

Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great value can not be
done except through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary abatements without
previous hearing, and are inapplicable to the case before us where the law provides, and the
investigator actually held, a hearing with notice to the complainants and the, appellees, who appeared
therein. It is noteworthy that Republic Act 2605 authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as
"public nuisances or as prohibited constructions" on public navigable streams, and those of appellees
clearly are in the latter class.
Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in matters within their
jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of
discretion, none of which has been shown to exist in this case, we agree with appellant that the court
below erred in rejecting the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

RATIO: The judicial power which may be exercises by administrative agencies is a restricted one, limited
to what is incidental and reasonably necessary to the proper and efficient administration of the statutes
that are committed to them for administration.
Arbitrary powers or uncontrolled discretion may not be conferred upon administrative agencies either in
the exercise of rule-making or adjuticatory functions.

In resume, we rule:

(1) That Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the
Secretary of Public Works;

(2) That absence of any mention of a navigable stream within a property covered by Torrens title
does not confer title to it nor preclude a subsequent investigation and determination of its existence;

(3) That the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works under Republic Act No. 2056 should be
respected in the absence of illegality, error of law, fraud, or imposition, so long as the said, findings
are supported by substantial evidence submitted to him.

(4) That ownership of a navigable stream or of its bed is not acquirable by prescription.

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

The case is a petition regarding Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board’s (DARAB) order of
compulsory acquisition of petitioner’s property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Sta. Rosa was the registered owner of two parcels of land in Cabuyao Laguna. According to
them, these lands are watersheds which provide clean and potable (drinkable) water to the Canlubang
community and that 90 light industries are located in that area. They were alleging respondents usurped
its rights over their property thereby destroying the ecosystem. Since the said land provides water to the
residents, respondents sought an easement of a right of a way to and from Barangay Castile, to which, by
counterclaim, Sta. Rosa sought ejectment against respondents. Respondents went to the DAR and filed a
case for compulsory acquisition of the Sta. Rosa Property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. Compulsory acquisition is the power of the government to acquire private rights in land without
the willing consent of its owner or occupant in order to benefit the society. The said land was inspected by
the Municipal and Agrarian Reform Officer, and upon consensus of the authorities concerned, they
decided that the said land must be placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioners filed an objection on
the ground that: The area is not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with
slopes 18% and above. (which falls under the exception in compulsory acquisition of CARP) The
occupants of the land were illegal settlers or (squatters) who by no means are entitled to the land as
beneficiaries. Another issue raised by the petitioners was that the DAR failed to follow the due process
because instead of paying just compensation, a trust account was made in favour of the petitioners.

Issues:

1. Whether these parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the
CARP?

2. Whether the petition of land conversion of the parcels of land may be granted?

Court Ruling:
1. Art. 67 of the Water Code: Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by DENR as a protected area. In this case, the DENR did
not declare the land as a protected area, In the past the municipality issued a resolution that the said land
is an agricultural land.

2. Although evidence of petitioners is strong, the Supreme Court opines that the area must be maintained
for watershed purposes for ecological and environmental considerations despite the 88 families who are
beneficiaries of the CARP. It is important that a larger view of the situation be taken because of the
thousands of residents downstream if the watershed will not be protected and maintained for its natural
purpose.

3. Despite Supreme Court’s strong opinion of protection of watersheds as an intergenerational

responsibility, they however ordered to DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the case since the said land
falls under exception.

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner of two parcels of land
with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which
provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community. Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its
rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents
filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from
Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private
respondents. After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian
Reform for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP. The landholding of
SRRDC was placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of
the property contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged
in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not
entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed
the decision of DARAB.

Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property
formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657

Held:

Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We cannot ignore the
fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed
purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and
the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds
is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.

Tanjay Water District v. Hon. Gabaton, et al., G.R. No.L-63742,Aprit 17, 1989

Facts: Tanjay Water District filed a case against the Municipality of Pamplona and its official to
prevent them from interfering in the management of the Tanjay Waterworks system. Judge
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, being water by virtue of
Presidential Decree 1067. In another case, Joseflrno Datuin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Tarlac Water District in the Department of Labor and Employment, which decided in
favor of Datuin. On appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), NLRC
reversed the decision and dismissed thr complaint for lack of jurisdiction holding that Tarlac
Water district is a corporation created by special law, its officers and employees belong to the
civil service and their separation should be governmed by Civil Service Rules and Regulations.

Issue: Whether water districts created under PD No. 198 are private corporations or govemment-
owned or controlled corporations

Supreme Court's Ruling: Both petitions are dismissed without prejudice to the Tanjay Water
District filing their complaint in the NWRC and Datuin seeking redress in the Civil Service
Commission. The Court has already ruled that water districts are quasi public corporations whose
employees belong to the civil service, hence, the dismissal of those employees shall be govemed
by the civil service law, rules and regulations. Inasmuch as PD No. 198, as amended, is the
original charter of Tanjay Water District and Tarlac Water District and all water districts in the
country, they come under the coverage of the civil service law, rules and regulations. PD 1067
likewise provided that NWRC has jurisdiction over all disputes relating to appropriation,
utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters. Regular
courts only have appellate jurisdiction.

the case should have been brought first to the National Water Resources Council in accordance with
Articles 88 and 89 of PD No. 1067,

4. 4. Metro Iloilo Water vs CA mar 31, 2005

DOCTRINE: The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws and
jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents’ actions violate petitioner’s rights as a
water district and justify an injunction. This issue does not so much provideoccasion to invoke the special
knowledge and expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention

FACTS: Petitioner is a water district organized under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198. It was
granted by the Local Water Utilities Administration Conditional Certificate of Conformance No. 71. Its
service areas encompass the entire territorial areas of Iloilo City etc.

Sometime between April and May of 1993, petitioner filed nine (9) individual yet identical petitions for
injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and / or temporary restraining order against herein
private respondents the pertinent portions of which read:

4. –That pursuant to the provisions of section 31 (a) of P.D. 198, as amended, the petitioner as a Water
District was authorized toadopt laws and regulations governing the drilling, maintenance and operation of
wells within its boundaries for purposes other than single family domestic use on overlying land, with
then provision that any well operated in violation of such regulations shall be deemed an interference
with the waters of the district;

Private respondents invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, contending that the cases were
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council (Water Council)
under Presidential Decree No. 1067, otherwise known as the Water Code of the Philippines (Water Code).
In addition, private respondents Emma Nava and Rebecca Berlin denied having extracted or withdrawn
water from the ground, much less sold the same

Additionally, he alleged the petitioner’s rules and regulations were not published in the Official Gazette
and hence petitioner had no causeof action. Meanwhile, private respondent Gerry Luzuriaga claimed that
he was not the real party in interest, but Shoemart, Inc. which hasthe control and possession of the
property where the alleged withdrawal of ground water was taking place.

The trial court dismissed the petitions, ruling that the controversy was within the original jurisdiction of
the Water Council, involving, as itdid, the appropriation, exploitation, and utilization of water, and factual
issues which were within the Water Council’s competence. Inaddition, the trial court held that petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the doctrine of “primary administrative jurisdiction.” MR
denied shortly thereafter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may entertain the positions

HELD: Petitioner anchors its claim on Section 31 (now 32) of PD 198, as amended, which reads: Sec. 32.
Protection of waters and Facilities of District. – A district shall have the right to:

(a) Commence, maintain, intervene in, defend and compromise actions or proceedings to prevent
interference with or deterioration of water quality or the natural flow of any surface, stream or ground
water supply which may be used or useful for any purpose of the district or be a common benefit to the
lands or its inhabitants. The ground water within a district is necessary to the performance of the
district’s powers and such districts hereby authorized to adopt rules and regulations subject to the
approval of the National Water Resources Council governing the drilling, maintenance and operation of
wells within its boundaries for purposes other than a singled family domestic use on overlying land. Any
well operated on violation of such regulations shall be deemed in interference with the waters of the
district.…

(c) Prohibit any person, firm or corporation from vending, selling, or otherwise disposing of water for
public purposes within the service area of the district where district facilities are available to provide such
service, or fix terms and conditions by permit for such sale or disposition of water.
By virtue of the above provisions, petitioner states that as a water district, it has the right to prevent
interference with the water of the district; and to enforce such right, it is given remedies of commencing,
maintaining, or intervening in, defending or entering into appropriate actions or proceedings. In asserting
the jurisdiction of the regular courts over its petitions and the propriety of its filing of the petitions before
the trial court, petitioner invokes the ruling of the Court in Amistoso v. Ong, as reiterated in Santos v.
Court of Appeals, that where the issue involved is not the settlement of a water rights dispute, but the
enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already granted, the regular court has
jurisdiction and not the Water Council.

A judicial question is raised when the determination of the questions involves the exercise of a judicial
function, i.e., the question involves the determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. As opposed to a moot question or one properly
decided by the executive or legislative branch, a judicial question is properly addressed to the courts.

The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws and jurisprudence
in order to determine whether private respondents’ actions violate petitioner’s rights as a water district
and justify an injunction. This issue does not so much provide occasion to invoke the special knowledge
and expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention. While initially it may appear
that there is a dimension to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the Water Council, i.e., the
appropriation of water which the Water Code defines as “the acquisition of rights over the use of waters
or the taking or diverting of waters from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose allowed by
law,” in reality the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust of the petitions.

The petitions having raised a judicial question, it follows that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, on the basis of which the petitions were dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
does not even come to play. The petition is remanded to the trial court.