Question 1 -

The distinction between the hard law and soft law has been made with good reason, and based

on the merits and the demerits both have, it is better to maintain that distinction between the

two and continue to use both as an alternative to the other whenever deemed necessary. There

have been instances where the States as well as the private actors have had the chances to use

both kind of instruments, which were often of a harder, or a softer nature. Both these

instruments of international law have their own disadvantages and advantages as well,

depending upon the circumstances where they find themselves relevant in (Shaffer and Pollack,

2010). While at one hand, the Hard Law has been known to enable the States to commit greatly

to the international agreements, due to the ensuing costs and legal sanctions upon disregard

(Guzman, 2008), and the hard law instruments have also been known to be considerably more

credible, at the same time, the hard law creates formal commitments that tend to restrict the

rights of the state, and even often deteriorate their sovereignty (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). The

Soft Law, on the contrary, are easier and considerably less difficult to negotiate. The State tend

to resort to the soft law instruments whenever it is evident that the contracting costs are higher,

or there are prominent asymmetries (Abbott & Snidal, 2004). Both the hard and the soft laws

happen to provide the actors on the international platform with advantages, for different

contexts, and they cover a wide variety of factors that the actors tend to consider. Separately,

they are able to cover a wide range of situations, and it is up to the actors to decide which

instrument they will prefer in order to tackle any given situation. Using the soft law poses

several advantages, and they are not simply limited to the beneficial effects that are imminent,

rather the advantages also are able to stretch to the times in near future. The soft-law

instruments that have been developed by the actors, tend to be flexible in nature, and thus, it

makes it easier to adapt those soft-law instruments so that the actors are better able to cope up

with the uncertain natures that may emerge. IN addition, the soft-law instruments are also able
to cope up with the diversities in a relatively better manner, even the ones that emerge later on

with the passage of time.

Question 2 –

The managerial school believes that the compliance of the actors with the international

agreements is general good by default, and the root of their belief leads them to believe that the

role of enforcement in ensuring this compliance is negligible, or none whatsoever. Their belief

states that the root for compliance is not the threat of punishment to the parties, but rather a

healthy and clear interaction between the parties, with the intention to resolve the dispute. The

managerial school prefers to consider the instances of non-compliance as issues of breakdown

of the administrative machinery of the party, and not as a selfish attempt at the exploitation.

The managerial school denies the role of the enforcement, and holds firm on the belief that the

management approach is the one that holds the key to successfully ensure compliance in the

times to come. However, on the contrary, there is little evidence that would lead one to believe

that the compliance record till date has been able to be achieved entirely without the role of

enforcement. The enforcement model for compliance believes in the formation of formal

international agreements and other concrete sets of rules by which the parties shall have to

abide. Unlike the managerial school does not place reliance on the importance of values, but

rather, the enforcement approach advocates the setting down of repercussions upon non-

compliance. This much is pretty evident from the case of Syria as has been demonstrated by

Richard Price in his article regarding the use of the chemical weapons. The worldwide

condemnation of the chemical weapons was observed ever since the World War I, and every

ensuing conflict that followed that side-stepped the use of the chemical weapons in the wars.

This mutual dislike and aversion to the use of the chemical weapons had grown out from moral

and an equally political limitation, one which the states had imposed on the manners of wars.

However, the situation is rather different from what the managerial approach would suggest.
This is because despite the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and such detest towards the chemicals

being prevalent in the society, there is still a need for the reinforcement of these values. Unlike

what the managerial approach would suggest, there is a strict need for the enforcement

approach to be active. The enforcement approach seems to be the ideal school of thought in

this perspective. In regards to the Syrian scenario concerning the ban on the use of the chemical

weapons, the enforcement model best explains the chain of events, since despite their being a

mutual agreement as to the avoidance of the chemical weapons, and the instruments forbidding

the use of the same, there still was a need for proper repercussions to be put in place for

prohibiting the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian State.