DKC Holdings v.

CA
G.R. No. 118248. April 5, 2000

On March 16, 1998, petitioner DKC Holdings Corporation (DKC) entered into a
Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion Bartolome, decedent herein,
whereby petitioner was given the option to lease or lease with purchase the
subject land.

Encarnacion died. Thereafter, petitioner coursed its payment to private respondent

Victor Bartolome, being the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to
accept these payments. On March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor, via
registered mail, notice that it was exercising its option to lease the property,
tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent. Again, Victor refused to accept the
tendered rental fee and to surrender possession of the property to petitioner. On
April 23, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages against Victor and the Register of Deeds

ISSUE: Whether or not the rights under a Contact of Lease with Option to Buy
were transmissible.

YES. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by
their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising
therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of
law. The Court held that there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision
making the rights and obligations under the lease contract intransmissible. More
importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their nature,
transmissible.

In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is a lease, which is a property
right. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which
involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the
personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused
by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject
matter of the contract.

Therefore, Victor is bound by the subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.
NERI v. AKUTIN

GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943

74 PHIL 185

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title
to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his
first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the
testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the inheritance,
particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which registration was
denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the
respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there
disinheritance in this case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground
that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without
expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had
given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his second
marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the
institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.
SEANGIO v. REYES

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006

FACTS:

Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio, praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special
administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. Petitioners, all surnamed
Seangio, opposed the petition, contending, among others, that Segundo left a holographic will,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause.

Subsequently, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed by petitioners.

Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground
that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition
of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the
Civil Code.

According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to
intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is
called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the
intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face
of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.

The RTC dismissed the petition for probate proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

Whether or not there was preterition.

RULING:

1.

Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself.

In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo
in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession.
All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when
the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert,
taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the
intention of the testator.

In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis
ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance
cannot be given effect.

2.

With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct
line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did
not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name
of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal
heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose
of his property may be rendered nugatory.

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO
VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO

4 SCRA 550

FACTS:

Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising
and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Faustina ½ of all his real and personal
properties giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto.

Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the
widow’s death, she became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed
under clause 7 pursuant to its 8th clause of the will.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death
of Dona Faustina.

HELD:

The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his
wife Doňa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doňa Fausta shall forfeit the
properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having begotten any
children with the deceased then it means that Doňa Fausta never acquired ownership
over the property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership over the
property, the said properties are not included in her estate. Those properties actually
belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator. Otherwise, if the testator
wanted to give the properties to Doňa Fausta then he should have
specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doňa Fausta
without mentioning any condition.
TESTATE ESTATE OF LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. PARISH
PRIEST OF ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA v. BELINA RIGOR, GR No.
L-22036, 1979-04-30
Facts:
ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty-four
hectares. That devise was made in the will of... the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native
of Victoria, Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood.
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will
executed on October 29, 1933
Named as devisces in the will were the testator's nearest relatives, namely, his three
sisters:
Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The
testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19,
1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition
praying for the appointment of a new administrator
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957
praying that the bequest be declared inoperative and that they be adjudged as the
persons entitled to the said ricelands
Issues:
efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands
Ruling:
From the... testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to
devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was
forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he... discontinued his studies
for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who
would be obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the
souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male
relative of the testator was studying... for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's
nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or
inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest... of
Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was likewise inoperative.
Principles:
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his
intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the
plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may... certainly appear that his
intention was different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil.
333).
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the testator's oral declarations
as to... his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the Philippines).
"In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be... living at the
moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art.
1025, Civil Code).
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old
Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and
those... in which the right of accretion exists"
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960(2),
which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all
that belongs to the testator". There being no substitution nor accretion as... to the said
ricelands, the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is
as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly testate, or that
there may be mixed succession.
Thus, if a conditional legacy... does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as
to the property covered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil.
267).
 Bellis vs Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Lessons Applicable: Divorce, Doctrine of Processual Presumption

Laws Applicable: Art. 16, 17 1039 NCC

Violet Kennedy (2nd wife)  Amos G. Bellis --- Mary E. Mallen (1st wife)
Legitimate Children: Legitimate Children:
Edward A. Bellis Amos Bellis, Jr.
George Bellis (pre-deceased) Maria Cristina Bellis
Henry A. Bellis Miriam Palma Bellis
Alexander Bellis
Anna Bellis Allsman

FACTS:
 Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
 By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate children: Edward
A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman
 By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
 August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his estate as
follows:
1. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen
2. P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis
3. remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives
 July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A
 September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on
 People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will directed
 Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
 Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will

HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed

 Doctrine of Processual Presumption:
 The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof,
otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.
 In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from ours. Apply Philippine laws.
 Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
 ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
 ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
 The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes
that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his
son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:

Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;

(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;

(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;

(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence

causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit
such child or descendant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
JULIANA BAGTAS v. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL.G.R. No. L-6801, March 14, 1912, TRENT, J.Perfect
soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity. Neither age, nor sickness,nor extreme
distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficientintelligence remains.

Facts:The last will and testament executed by Pioquinto Paguio who died a year and five
monthsfrom the execution, was propounded by by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of Paguio.
ButPaguio’s son and several grandchildren by a former marriage opposed the probate asserting
thatPaguio was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the
mentalcapacity necessary to execute a valid will. According to them, Paguio suffered from a paralysis
of theleft side of his body. This resulted to the impairment of his hearing, lost of the power of speech
anduncontrolled saliva discharge. Despite the paralysis, Paguio retained the use of his right hand
andwas able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs Paguio was able to indicate his wishes
tohis wife and to the other members of his family.

Issue:Whether or not paralysis would establish mental incapacity that would disqualify thetestator
from executing a valid will.

Ruling:No. Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect thecapacity
to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The law does not require that a personshall continue
in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order toexecute a valid
will. Perfect soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity. Even thefailure of memory
is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to hisimmediate family or
property because if such were the legal standard, few indeed would be thenumber of wills that
could meet such exacting requirements. The presumption of law is in favor ofthe mental capacity of
the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove thelack of testamentary
capacity. On the case at hand, it does not appear that Paguio’s conduct wasirrational in any
particular and he seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of thebusiness was in which
he was engaged. Therefore, mental incapacity which renders the will invalid,cannot be established.