PFR Cases

#1
April 24, 1985, G.R. No. L-63915
Tañada vs. Tuvera

FACTS:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter
of implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on
matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders is necessary before its enforcement.
RULING:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity
date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity,
which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general
applicability” is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

2. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
CITATION: G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954
FACTS:
The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US
checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to
the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette
only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265
sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for
it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:
It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and
regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation
should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before
the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically
informed of such contents including its penalties.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the
appellant, with costs de oficio.
-http://hyperjetsetter.blogspot.com/2011/04/people-vs-que-po-lay.html

#3 Phil. International Trading Corp. vs. Judge Angeles G.R. No. 108461, October
21, 1996
Justice Torres Jr.

FACTS: The Petitioner Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) issued

Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the
PITC for importation from the People's Republic of China (PROC, for brevity) must
be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to
PROC carried out by the improper himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate
importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being
applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.

Private respondents Remington and Firestone individually applied for authority to

import from PROC with the petitioner. They were granted such authority after
satisfying the requirements for importers, and after they executed respective
undertakings. Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit
export credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications
were withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter were
both barred from importing goods from PROC. As a result, the private respondents
filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against the PITC.
The court ruled that declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the
same was not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order issued by PITC is null and void on the
ground that it was not published in accordance with Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

HELD: Yes. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is

invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. . . .

The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the
respondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The fact that the amendments to
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the
UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect
related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order
under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.

#4
March 31, 1923, G.R. No. L-19826
LUCIANO DELGADO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
EDUARDO ALONSO DUQUE VALGONA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
In November of the year 1917 Alonso purchased twelve parcels of land in the
municipality of Goa from one Stickney. On February 1, 1918, Alonso conveyed the
same property to Luciano Delgado; and in order to secure the payment of the purchase
money Delgado contemporaneously executed a mortgage in favor of the defendant
upon the same land and also upon two other large parcels already owned by the
plaintiff situated in the municipality of Tinambac, of the Province of Camarines Sur.
A simple calculation shows that the interest agreed to be paid upon the purchase price
of the land which had thus been bought by Delgado was at a rate well above fifteen
per centum per annum. This mortgage therefore offends against the provisions of the
Usury Law, which limits the rate that can ordinarily be secured by mortgage upon real
property to twelve per centum per annum (Act No. 2655-2). Delgado filed a complaint
against Alonso to recover the sum of P2,625 paid upon February 1, 1919, by way of
interest. To this complaint the defendant answered with a general denial; and by way
of special defense he alleged that the contract in question had been entered into by
him innocently and in total ignorance on his part of the existence of the Usury Law
and, further, that he had been maliciously inveigled into said contract by the plaintiff,
with full knowledge on the part of the latter of the illegality of the stipulation for
usurious interest, and with the design of taking advantages of the Usury Law to the
prejudice of the defendant.

ISSUE:
Whether the defendant is justified in raising ignorance of the usury law as
defense to escape its legal consequences.

RULING:

No. The defendant cannot use ignorance as an excuse. However, both parties were
victims, at once of their own ignorance and of economic practices inherited from the
past; and ignorance of the provisions of the Usury Law does not relieve either
from the legal consequences of the contract into which they voluntarily entered.

#5 People vs. Bitdu 58 Phil. 817

FACTS:

Mora Bidtu was first married to Moro Halid in accordance with Mohammedan
customs and about twelve years later, she got married to Moro Hajirol before a Hadji.
Likewise, the second marriage was in accordance with Mohammedan customs. The
second marriage contracted by her with Hajiro took place after she had been divorced
from her first husband Halid, having taken place before Datu Cuevas of Isabela,
Basilan.

ISSUE:

WON the divorce is legal.

HELD:

No. The defense presented no evidence to show that the conditions prescribed by the
Koran had been complied with by the parties when they obtained their divorce before
Datu Cuevas. The divorce between the defendant and Halid does not satisfy the
conditions prescribed by the Koran. In the Philippine islands, we have a law (Act No.
2710) enumerating the causes and the conditions under which divorce may be secured
and granted. A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the State has
conferred jurisdiction, and the only for these causes and with those formalities which
the State has statute prescribed.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from the following decision of Judge A. Horilleno in the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga:
"There is no dispute between the prosecution and the defense as to the fact that Mora
Bitdu was married to Moro Halid before an Imam in Lamitan of this Province of
Zamboanga in accordance with Mohammedan rites more than twelve years ago, and
that about seven months ago she was also married to Moro Hajirol before a Hadji in
accordance with Mohammedan customs.

"It is therefore a fact admitted by both the prosecution and the defense that the
accused contracted two marriages, one with Halid and another with Hajirol. She
claims, however, that the second marriage contracted by her with Hajirol took place
after she had been divorced from her first husband Halid in accordance with
Mohammedan customs, said divorce having taken place before Datu Gavino Cuevas,
of Isabela de Basilan.

"With this defense, two very important questions are raised before this court: first
whether or not the alleged divorce took place in accordance with Mohammedan
customs, and second, assuming that the divorce took place in accordance with such
customs, is such divorce legal?

"With reference to the first question, two witnesses testified, one for the prosecution
and the other for the defense. The first witness testified that the divorce between
Mohammedans in Mindanao may be obtained before any person designated and
agreed upon by the parties. The second testified that divorce, like any other act
relative to marriage and separation of Mohammedan spouses, is obtained under certain
conditions, to wit, the interested parties or the spouses intending to secure a divorce
select the person before whom the divorce is to take place, and both parties are
represented by persons designated by them.

"Chapter IV, section 35 of the Koran says:

" '35. And if you fear a breach between the two, then appoint a judge from his people
and a judge from Her people; if they both desire agreement, Allah will effect harmony
between them; surely Allah is knowing; Aware.'

"The court is inclined to believe that the testimony of the witness for the defense on
this question is more in harmony with the doctrines of the Koran than that of the
witness for the prosecution.
"Now, has the defense established that the divorce took place in accordance with the
commandments of the Koran? The defense presented no evidence to show that the
conditions prescribed by the Koran had been complied with by the parties when they
obtained their divorce before Datu Cuevas. Said divorce therefore between the
defendant and Halid does not satisfy the conditions prescribed by the Koran and
consequently said divorce seems to be of doubtful religious validity.

"However, even admitting that this divorce was secured in accordance with the
conditions prescribed by Mohammedan doctrines, is such divorce legal? The laws
governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they are laws
relating to public policy. In the Philippine Islands we have a law (Act No. 2710)
enumerating the causes and the conditions under which divorce may be secured and
granted. Any divorce obtained in the Philippine Islands for causes and under
conditions other than those enumerated in said law, would have no legal effect. The
habits and customs of a people, the dogmas or doctrines of a religion cannot be
superior to or have precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated
above laws relating to marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they
affect public policy.

"The court therefore is of the opinion that even if the divorce alleged by the defense
was secured in conformity with Mohammedan doctrines, such divorce cannot prevail
against the Divorce Law of the Philippine Islands prescribing the causes and
conditions under which divorce may be obtained. In this case, as above demonstrated,
the divorce in question has not been obtained in accordance with the law.

"Examined from whatever angle, the divorce alleged by the defense cannot be
accepted by this court for the reasons above set forth.

"In view of the foregoing facts and considerations, we cannot escape the conclusion
that the defendant herein contracted a second marriage without her former marriage
having been first dissolved.

"In the consideration of this case, however, the court cannot but take into account that
the defendant is a Mohammedan woman; and being a follower of Mohammedan
doctrines she no doubt contracted the second marriage honestly believing that in doing
so she was not committing any violation of the law, although of course her belief does
not justify her act.

"In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the defendant is only seventeen years
of age and therefore in the opinion of the court it would be more convenient for her to
be sent to the Philippine Training School in Mandaluyong, Manila, (Rizal), it is
ordered that the accused be sent to said institution, to be kept there until she reaches
the age of majority, all the proceedings in this case being hereby suspended."
The attorney for the appellant alleges that the lower court erred in finding that the
accused committed the crime of bigamy, and in ordering her to be sent to the
Philippine Training School in Mandaluyong, Rizal.

Appellant's attorney admits that the appellant was twice married as alleged in the
information, but contends that she was divorced from her first husband in accordance
with Mohammedan religious practices, and that said divorce was valid; that if it be
true that said divorce is not in accordance with Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature, the appellant is nevertheless not guilty of bigamy, because she believed
that she had been validly divorced and had no criminal intent when she contracted the
second marriage.

The Solicitor-General agrees with the attorney for the appellant, and is of the opinion
that the divorce was granted in accordance with the precepts of the Koran and Moro
customs and traditions; that fraudulent or criminal intent is an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, and that since the appellant believed that her first marriage had been
legally dissolved because she had been granted a divorce under the Mohammedan
laws, she cannot be considered guilty of the crime with which she is charged.

The Solicitor-General further argues that since it is the practice of the Government not
to interfere with the customs of the Moros, especially their religious customs, divorces
among them granted in accordance with the Koran ought to be recognized as a matter
of public policy.

There is little to add to the well considered decision of the trial judge. It seems to us
unnecessary to determine whether or not the divorce in question was granted in
accordance with the Mohammedan religious practices, as to which there seems to
exist considerable uncertainty, because in our view of the case a valid divorce can be
granted only by the courts and for the reasons specified in Act No. 2710. It is not
claimed that the appellant was divorced from her first husband in accordance with said
Act.

In the case of Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42), it was held that in the Philippines the
causes for divorce are prescribed by statute or Act No. 2710 and that the grounds for
divorce are two only: Adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of
the husband.

In the recent decision of People vs. Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil., 23), where the
defendant and a Moro woman were married by a datu according to Moro customs and
usages and afterwards divorced by the datu according to the same customs and usages,
it was held that the marriage performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan
religion was valid, and assumed, for the purpose of that case, that the defendant and
his wife were not legally divorced.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between
Mohammedans may be performed in accordance with the rites or practices of their
religion, but there is no provision of law which authorizes the granting of divorces in
accordance with the rites or practices of their religion.

A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred
jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with those formalities which the state
has by statute prescribed (19 C. J., 19).

It is conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of
society require that the marriage relation should be surrounded with every safeguard
and its severance allowed only in the manner prescribed and for the causes specified
by law. And the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings
(19 C. J., 20).

With respect to the contention that the appellant acted in good faith in contracting the
second marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from her first husband,
it is sufficient to say that every one is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one
does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from
the consequences thereof. The case of the United States vs. Enriquez (32 Phil., 202),
cited by the Solicitor-General is not in point. In that case the defendant left his wife in
the municipality of Orion, Province of Bataan, in the year 1895, going to the Province
of Laguna as a postal employee. When he returned in 1901, after the revolution, he
could not find his wife or obtain the slightest information as to her whereabouts
notwithstanding his persistent and diligent search. Believing her to be dead, he
contracted a second marriage in Orion on February 1st, 1905. In December, 1913, his
first wife made her appearance in Orion. She had been in Manila, Tarlac, and Victoria
from 1895 to 1913. The defendant was acquitted on appeal to this court because no
fraudulent intent could be charged to him. He believed that his first wife was dead,
and that was a well-founded belief, although it was subsequently proved to be
erroneous. It was a mistake of fact and not of law.

The decisions of American courts, cited by the Solicitor-General, sustaining the

validity of divorces granted to members of Indian tribes according to the customs and
usages thereof, are likewise not in point. The various Indian tribes in the United States
were dealt with by the Government of the United States as independent nations and
treaties were made with them.

As to the suggestion of the Solicitor-General that divorces among the Moros

according to their religious practices should be recognized as valid as a matter of
public policy, because in the contrary case "there would be no end of criminal
prosecutions, for polygamy still abounds among them, and the remarriages of people
divorced under the Koran are the order of the day," that is a matter for the
consideration of the Legislature and the Governor-General.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Street, Malcolm, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

#6 G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993 (Co vs. Court of Appeals)
Chief Justice Narvasa

FACTS:

Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check

drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, post-dated November 30, 1983 in the
sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was
dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being:
"CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime
charged.

He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1,
1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People
on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee
for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement
made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.

ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied retroactively to the
prejudice of the accused.

HELD: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also
subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar
legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The
rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law
usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and hence, is unconstitutional

The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's
decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a
check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless
covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of
the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the
Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
#7 D.M. Consuji VS CA 357 SCRA 249
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.

Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He
was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo at
around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
According to investigation and police report by PO3 Rogelio Villanueva dated
November 25, 1990 that Jose Juergo, construction worker of D.M. Consuji Inc., along
with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board a platform
at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building. Jose
fell and crushed to his death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the
pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and
platform but without safety lock. Jessie and Delso on the otherhand were able to jump
to safety.
Maria Juergo, widow of Jose, filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the
RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from D.M. Consuji Inc
amounting to P 644, 000.00.
D.M. Consuji Inc. seeks reversal of the decision on the defense that widow already
availed of the benefits from the State Insurance Funds(SIF).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Maria Juergo could still claim benefits from D.M. Consuji Inc apart
from that received from SIF.

RULING:
Yes, she can still receive benefits from D.M. Consuji Inc. She was unaware of the
petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from SIF. The
court’s ruling is based on Floresca VS Philex Mining Corporation where the claimant
who has already been paid under the workmen’s compensation act may still sue for
damages under the civil code on the basis of supervening facts or developments
occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do
not indicate the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC,
although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment
representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial
monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total
monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive
from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the
trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such
determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC,
payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be
deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in
Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.

#8
Cui vs. Arellano University
G.R. No. L-15127
May 30, 1961
Ponente: Concepcion, J.

FACTS:
The plaintiff, Emerito Cui, a law student and a scholar of the defendant Arellano
University, transfers to Abad Santos University on his final year in law school. After
completing his studies in the latter and to secure permission to take the bar exams on
1953, Cui requested for his transcript from the defendant. Defendant then said that
before the release of his transcript of records, the plaintiff must first pay a sum of
P1,033.87 as the sum of Cui’s tuition fees during his stay in the defendant university.
The defendant cited that this is under the scholarship contract signed by both parties
where the plaintiff waived his right to transfer schools unless he pays the total tuition
fee during his stay in the institution. Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the
scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following contract
covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive
my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University
(defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash. “
Plaintiff paid the amount to be issued the transcript. In May 30, 1961, Cui requested to
be refunded the said amount from the school. The Director of Private Schools also
upheld the plaintiff’s request and advised Arellano University to refund the said sum
following a memorandum issued by the said office on 1949 on Scholarships stating
that, “The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should
not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school
or to transfer to another institution.” The lower court ruled in favor of the defendant,
and thus case was brought to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the contract signed by both plaintiff and defendant is enough basis to
waive the right of the plaintiff to transfer to another school without paying the cost of
his education in former school.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower court. The stipulation in
question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer
before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy, and good morals. It also
undermines the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest
thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well
as the costs and dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.

#9 Juan Miciano vs. Andre Brimo

50 Phils. 867
November 1, 1927

FACTS: The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Joseph Brimo, filed a
scheme of partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said
partition.

According to the scheme and its provision, that the deceased requests that all his
relatives respect his wishes, otherwise those who opposed the same shall be cancelled
in said disposition in favor of the oppositor.

The appellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that
the deceased was a Turkish citizen, that his disposition should be in accordance with
the laws of his nationality.

ISSUE: WON the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws

WON there shall be cancellation of disposition/s in favor of the appellant-oppositor

RULING: No, although the disposition provides an express provision that it shall be
governed by Philippine Laws and those who opposed the condition of the provisions
given shall be cancelled from the disposition, the fact is that the condition itself is void
for being contrary to law. Article 792 of the Civil Code provides:

“Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered
as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.”

#10
March 7, 1933, G.R. No. L-37048
BARRETO GONZALES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, defendant-appellant.
AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, Jr., ET AL., intervenors-appellees.

FACTS:
The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived
together from January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary
separated & have not lived together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children
together.
After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff)
for her & her children’s support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to be
increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of certain properties be put
in her name.
Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), went to Reno, Nevada &
secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated
November 28, 1927. On that same date he went through the forms of marriage with
another Filipino citizen as well & had 3 children with her.
When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay
monthly for the support of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the
payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto
brought an action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of
divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is
requested to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what
would have been due to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had
their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage
existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to
pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred in
educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed as intervenors in
the case.
After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff &
intervenors, but reduced the attorneys fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs
of the action against the defendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the
lower court erred in their decision.
ISSUE:
WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be
recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which
the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.
RULING:
NO. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce,
because:
The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the
divorce done in Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this
jurisdiction on the question of divorce.
Its clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos
Rueda that the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the
case was submitted praying the ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a
circumvention of the law regarding divorce & will be done under conditions not
authorized by our laws.
The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the
residence acquired by the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did
not confer jurisdiction upon the court of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in
which he had entered in 1919.
Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not
allow such to be done, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that
litigants cannot compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the
personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be affected by decrees of
divorce of foreign courts in manner which our government believes is contrary to
public order & good morals.
SC RULING:
The decision of CFI-Manila was REVERSED & Defendant is absolved from the
demands made against him in this action.
CONNECTION TO PERSONS, FAMILY RELATION / CIVIL CODE:
Article 9 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 15 says that Laws relating to family rights
& duties or to status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon
Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country
The last part of Art 11 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 17 also states ...the
prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts & their property, and those intended to
promote public order & good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any
foreign laws or judgements or by anything done or any agreements entered into in a
foreign country.
Divorce Laws of the PhilippinesThe hardships of existing divorce laws of the
Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of
the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say such laws are too strict or too liberal.
At the time this decision was rendered there was still absolute divorce in the
Philippines on the ground of Adultery on the part of the wife, and Concubinage on the
part of the husband; the divorce, however, could be granted only upon showing that
the defendant had been convicted by final judgement for the adultery or concubinage
as the case maybe. The new Civil Code has abolished absolute divorce, leaving only
legal separation, which is equivalent to relative divorce.
#11 IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents.
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653
FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and the respondent to
the case, and Erich Geiling, a German national, were married at Friedenweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling
initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983 while
Pilapil filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before
RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On
January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child, Isabella Pilapil
Geiling, was granted to petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery alleging that,while still married to respondent, petitioner had
an affair with a certain William Chia and Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983
respectively. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of
two complaints for adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in
both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September 8,
1987, respondent judge denied the motion to quash and also directed the arraignment
of both accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct
contempt and fined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery charges against the petitioner is still
valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.
HELD:
The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who
can legally file the complaint should only be the offended spouse. The fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country in 1983, is admitted. According to
Article 15 of the Civil Code, with relation to the status of Filipino citizens both here
and abroad, since the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent has been
finalized through the courts in Germany and the RTC in Manila, the marriage of the
couple were already finished, thus giving no merit to the charges the respondent filed
against the petitioner. Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner holds
no legal merit to commence the adultery case as the offended spouse at the time he
filed suit in 1986. The questioned order denying petitioner’s motion to quash is set
aside and the criminal case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case was made permanent.
#12 Wolfgang O. Roehr vs. Carmen Rodriguez

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR vs. CARMEN RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 142820. 20 June 2003
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine. Carmen filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati RTC. Meanwhile, Wolfgang
obtained a decree of divorce from Germany. The decree provides that the parental
custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang. Wolfgang filed a motion to
dismiss the nullity case as a divorce decree had already been promulgated, which was
granted by respondent Judge Salonga. Carmen filed a motion with a prayer that the
case should proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children
and the distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga
partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of support
and custody of their children.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the granting the motion to dismiss the nullity case valid; it is valid to
assume jurisdiction to tackle child custody and support.

HELD:
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality.
The court can modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable. Where
certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration
transpired after the judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognized in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, such as custody must still be determined by
our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment,
it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so. In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was
given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court. The trial court
was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody,
care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.
#13
October 2, 2001 G.R. No. 138322
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

FACTS:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on
March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was
issued by the Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Mr. Recio, the defendant,
became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, he entered into marriage with a Filipina,
the petitioner, on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On
March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of bigamy. Responded contended that his prior marriage had been validly
dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to
marry petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto
capacitated him to remarry.

RULING:
The Supreme Court remanded (return a case to a lower court) the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void
on the ground of bigamy. This is because based on the records, the court cannot
conclude if the respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioner’s prayer to
declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out
that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the
divorce decree.

#14. Bellis vs Bellis, G. R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had
divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3
illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his
distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal
shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was
admitted to probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an
executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
“Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where
it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of
stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate
children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition,
the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of
their legitimates as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof
at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule
providing that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling
for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi
would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine
of renvoi.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on
legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.

#15 ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific
Banking CorporationCheck was paid and drawn against the account of EL
Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for thereason “Account Closed.”
Company traced source of check and later discovered that the
signaturebelonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand
upon Baltao but latter deniedthat he issued the check or that the signature was his.
Company filed a complaint against Baltao forviolation of BP 22. It was later
discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, whomanages the
business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson
ofsuch information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against
Albenson.ISSUE:Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson
Enterprise.RULING:Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have
the intent to cause damage to therespondent or enrich themselves but just to collect
what was due to them. There was no abuse of right onthe part of Albenson on
accusing Baltao of BP 22.Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private
respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries: SEC records showed that
president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao Bank said signature belonged to EB
EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the
III. There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof
that: the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person and that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his
charges were falseand groundlessElements of abuse of right under Article 19:1. there
is a legal right or duty2. exercised in bad faith3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring anotherElements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:1. there is an act
which is legal2. but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public
policy3. it is done with intent to injureA person who has not been paid an obligation
owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtorto pay him. It was normal
for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amountthereof. In
the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages
cannot beawarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the
action wrongful and subjectthe actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not
have meant to impose a penalty on the right tolitigate.WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No.14948
dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
respondent Baltao.
FACTS:

Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc.

at Baltao Building mild steel plates which the latter ordered and as part of the
payment, a bouncing check was issued by one “Eugenio Baltao”.

Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of money due them, filed a criminal
complaint against private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter refused to
make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand. However, there was a
mistake of identity as there were two “Eugenio Baltaos” conducting business in the
same building – Eugenio S. Baltao and his son, Eugenio Baltao III.

It was found that the signature of the check was not of Eugenio S. Baltao and because
of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him, respondent Baltao filed a
complaint for damages anchored on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code against
petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been violated, resulting
in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law.

RULING:

No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of rights.
What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on
a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private
respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check.
Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at
first hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the
hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages.

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus,
anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty,
causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby.
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1)
There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.

There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the
filing of the case against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of
fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages.
#16 Magbanua VS IAC 137 SCRA 328
G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985
AGAPITO MAGBANUA, INENIAS MARTIZANO, CARLITO HERRERA,
SR., PAQUITO LOPEZ, AND FRANCISCO HERRERA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL CASES
DIVISION), EDUARDO, BUTCH, DIEGO AND NENA All Surnamed PEREZ,
respondents.
Romulo A. Deles for petitioner.
Jose Valmayor for respondents.

Facts:
Magbanua and the other petitioners are share tenants of an agricultural land owned by
the private respondents. The petitioners alleged in the case they filed in the trial court
that the private respondents diverted the free flow of water from their landholdings
which dried up their farm and wilted their palay crops. The trial court decided in favor
of the petitioners. They were maintained as agricultural lessees and granted each one
of them the amount of P10,000 as moral & exemplary damages and P5,000 for the
attorney’s fees to be paid by the private respondents. However, the private
respondents appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed
the decision of the trial court but removed the award of payment of damages and
attorney’s fees granted to the petitioners. The IAC said in removing the damages
award that there was no evidence that private respondents acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, and no reason either in the recovery of attorney’s fees under Art 2208, Civil
Code. And so the petitioners filed in the SC for the reinstatement of the damages and
attorney’s fees awarded by the trial court, on the ground that the IAC committed a
grave abuse of discretion in removing the said award.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to moral and exemplary damages and the
attorney’s fees which had been awarded by the trial court.

RULING:
Yes, plaintiffs were entitled to moral and exemplary damages. The SC granted the
reinstatement of the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees,
subject to modification of the amount. Art 2219, Civil Code states that moral
damages may be recovered when a person willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Under Art 2232, Civil
Code, “In contract and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.” Art 2208, Civil Code states that attorney’s fees can be recovered, among
others, when exemplary damages are awarded. The private respondents acted in an
oppressive manner in closing the free flow of water into the farm lots of the
petitioners in order to make the latter vacate their landholdings. The closure caused
losses on the petitioners’ palay crops. The foregoing entitled the petitioners to
payment of moral and exemplary damages, and as such, entitled them also to the
recovery of attorney’s fees. And so the SC granted the payment to each of the
petitioners in the amount of P1000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages,
and P1000 for attorney’s fees payable by the private respondents

# 17
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.

FACTS:

On the evening of 13 October 1994, Roberto Reyes popularly known as Amay Bisaya
alleged that while at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, his friend of several years Dr. Violeta
Filart, approached and invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in
celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. When Mr.
Reyes lined-up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready, he was stopped by Ruby
Lim, the Executive Secretary of Nikko Hotel and told him to leave the party in a loud
voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests. Mr. Reyes tried to
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however,
completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after, a
Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel like a common
criminal. Hence, Mr. Reyes asked for moral and/or exemplary damages.

Ruby Lim denied the allegations of Mr. Reyes claiming that she asked Mr. Reyes to
leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter.

After trial on the merits, the court rendered a decision in favor of Ms. Lim. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling and favored the testimony of Mr. Reyes.
Hence, this petition for review was filed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been
employed by the hotel for more than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be
polite at all times and very unlikely for her to make a scene in the party she was
managing. That would only make her look bad. On the other hand, Reyes brought
whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being
turned away, and thus being embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted.
Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and
that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present any supporting evidence
to support any of his claims. Since he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor
Nikko Hotel can be held liable for damages.

#18
April 3, 2002, G.R. No. L-142943
SPOUSES QUISUMBING, plaintiff-appellant
vs.
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), defendant-appellee

FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a
house located at Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3,
1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to
conduct a routine on spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house. .
Permission was granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. After the inspection, it was found
out that the meter has been tampered. The information was relayed to the secretary
who conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors brought the
meter to their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was
indeed tampered, the defendant has to temporarily disconnect the electric services.
After an hour, the inspectors returned and informed plaintiff of the findings of the
laboratory and asked the Quisumbing couple that unless they pay the amount of
P178, 875.01 representing the difference in the bill, their electric supply will be
disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE:
Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously an malevolent manner done without
due process, lack of regard for Quisumbing’s rights, feelings, social and business
reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.

HELD:
The Supreme court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to
pay respondent the billing differential of 0f P193, 332. 96. On the latter, MERALCO
was ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s
fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right
against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary
damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public.
The Supreme Court recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of
electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the
people. “Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) may immediately
disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the
discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law
or by duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulator Board”. During the
inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present.
Petitioners claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof an
was not granted for failure to supply proof and was premised only upon Lorna’s
testimony. These are compensation for an injury that will injure position where it was
injured before it was injured.

#19 University of the East vs. Jader

CITATION: GR No. 132344, February 7, 2000

FACTS:

Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During his last year, 1st
semester, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he
was given an incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the
incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He took
the exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave him a grade of 5.

The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In
the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of
absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in
FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not
able to take the bar exam.

Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights due to UE’s negligence.

ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing
JADER satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can
he claim moral damages?

HELD:

SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the
latter’s actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students
of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former.
However, respondent should not have been awarded moral damages though JADER
suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and
will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as what CA held because it’s also
respondent’s duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, he
should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in
relation with his academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar
examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but there are
other prerequisites such as documentation and submission of requirements which
prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per
annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The
award of moral damages is DELETED.

#20. GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA

219 SCRA 115

FACTS:
Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the
petitioner in Dagupan, he was an Iranian medical exchange student. He later courted
her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure
approval of her parents.
The petitioner forced the respondent to live with him in his apartment. She filed a
complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied
the respondent in the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at
one time became pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him
since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never
proposed marriage, neither sought consent and approval of Marliou’s parents. He
claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived
him by stealing money and his passport. The private respondent prayed for damages
and reimbursements of actual expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause claim for damages.
HELD:
Breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court held that
when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his
malicious desires, he commits fraud and wilfully injures the woman. In that instance,
the court found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender
her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to
have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the
wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard
of the laws of the country.

21. Globe Mackay & Radio Corp. vs. CA

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 81262. August 25, 1989
CORTES, J.:

Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the

engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several
thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and
to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the
report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week
forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a
“crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit
specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover,
petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the
lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and
from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias.
Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases
against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January

1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone
Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias
was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for
damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T.
Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay
him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and costs;
hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file
a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful
remarks about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against Tobias
(“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was
dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by
petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated
by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private
respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during
the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code.

The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee
should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects
flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for
damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners
clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving
the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the
Civil Code.

#22
PE vs. PE
5 SCRA 200

FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is
a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory.
Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of
Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family.
Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with
each other and conducted clandestine trysts and exchanged love notes The rumors
about their love affairs reached Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then
defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The
plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant. The affair between
defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared
from their house but her brothers and sisters found a note written by the defendant.

ISSUE:
Whether the defendant is liable according to Article 21 of the Civil Code

HELD:
Because of the frequency of his visits to the Lolita’s family who was allowed free
access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her
family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love
affairs. Even when the defendant is prohibited to see Lolita, the defendant continued
his love affairs with her until she disappeared from the parental home. The wrong he
has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
married man. Verily, he has committed an injury as contemplated in Article 21 of the
New Civil Code.Defendant is sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as
damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations.

#23. Wassmer vs. Velez 12 SCRA 648

FACTS:

Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez decided to get married. They applied and
acquired marriage license and set the wedding on September 4, 1954. Necessary
publication and preparations including sending off invitations were done.

Two days before the scheduled wedding, Francisco went home to his province without
properly notifying Beatriz. He sent a telegram that they have to postpone the wedding
because his mother opposes it. He gave an assurance that he will return but he never
did.

Beatriz sued for damages; Francisco filed no answer and was declared in default. The
Court ordered Francisco to pay for actual damages, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders and motion for a new
trial. The court then proposed for amicable settlement.

Francisco contended that his failure to marry Beatriz was due to fortuitous event and
circumstances beyond his control.

ISSUE:

Can a person be held liable for walking out of his own wedding?

HELD:

YES. Breech of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong however, that the
extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that “any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

Plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued and their wedding was set. Necessary preparation and publicity
were done only for the defendant to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized. This is contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. This Court’s opinion,
considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15, 000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

#24
#25 Constantino VS Mendez 209 SCRA 18

G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992

AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented
herein by the former, his mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioners.
Bienvinido D. Cariaga for private respondent.

FACTS:
Amelita Constantino, the petitioner, alleges that sometime in the month of August
1974 she met Ivan Mendez, the respondent, at Tony’s Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz
Manila where she worked as a waitress. The next day Ivan invited Amelita to have
dinner with him at Hotel Enrico where he was staying; he then proceeded to profess
his love for her and courted her. At around 11:00 P.M. Ivan brought Amelita to his
room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her; after which he confessed that he is a married man. Ivan and Amelita continued to
have contact in the months of September and November 1974 whenever Ivan is in
Manila which resulted in Amelita getting pregnant.
The petitioner filed, in the Court of First Instance of Davao, an action for support,
acknowledgment, and damages against respondent on June 5, 1975. In his answer,
respondent admitted that he met Amelita at Tony’s Cocktail lounge but denied to
having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He also prayed for dismissal of
the complaint for lack of action.
At the time of filing of complaint on June 5, 1975, petitioner was still pregnant with
the unborn child. She gave birth to Michael Constantino on August 3, 1975.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Michael Constantino should be acknowledged as an illegitimate child
of Ivan Mendez and if Amelita Constantino and Michael Constantino are entitled to
damages and monthly support.

RULING:
No because Amelita has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her evidence
that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Amelita's testimony on
cross-examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or
second week of November, 1974 is inconsistent with her response that she could not
remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November. Sexual contact of Ivan
and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that
was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had
sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November,
1974. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative allegations that
Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 193 & 214 of the
Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her
virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse
is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual
intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met
Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she
was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her
womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she
could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after
their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her
declaration that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they
repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged
promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.

#26 St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

Nov. 14, 1984.
133 SCRA 179

FACTS:
Dr. Conrad Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE
Ramon Magsayasy Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful
advertisement in the Sunday Times where St. Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his
house with that of Mr. Arcadio’s.
On December 15, 1968, St. Louis published an advertisement on the Sunday Times
with the heading “where the heart is”. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the
said advertisement, the house featured was Dr. Aramil’s not Mr. Arcadio’s with whom
the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. Dr. Aramil
noticed the mistake and a letter of protest to St. Louis Realty Corp. The letter was
received by Ernesto Magtoto, officer-in-charge of the advertisement. He stopped
publication of the advertisement. However, no rectification or apology was published.
Dr. Aramil’s counsel demanded actual, moral, and exemplary damages. On March
18, 1969, St. Louis Realty Corp. published an ad, now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house.
Dr. Aramil filed a complaint for the damages on March 29. On April 15, the notice of
rectification was published. Trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages,
P20,000 as moral damages, and P2,000 as attorney's fees.

With St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor
Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to
P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy. CA
affirmed that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21
and 26 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not St. Louis Realty Corp. is liable to pay damages to Dr.
Aramil.

RULING:

Yes. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the
Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday
Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the
mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ". The judgment of the
Appellate Court is affirmed.

#27 Tenchavez vs. Escano

CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belongs to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish
ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old
engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The
marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in
the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-
between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos
college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed
to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents.
However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new
marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back
to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved
she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which
was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.
She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu.
Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten
children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint
against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from
joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it
would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in
favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous
relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal
separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and
Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is
not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in
the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one
spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and
the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and
attorneys' fees.

#28 Spouses Yu vs. PCIB

CITATION: GR No. 147902, March 17, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and
participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in
favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank, respondent and highest bidder,
as security for the payment of a loan.

As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon,
respondent filed petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the
Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial
sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998.

Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the
highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City
on October 1, 1998. After two months before the expiration of the redemption period,
respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan.
Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to
strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC. Motion for
reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000 arguing that the complaint on
annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the filed ex-parte petition for
writ of possession, the resolution of which is determinative of propriety of the
issuance of a Writ of Possession.

ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate
of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil
case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which
can proceed separately and take their own direction independently of each other.

A prejudicial question is “one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because issue raised in
civil action would be determinative de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
a criminal case”.

29. TITLE: Donato vs. Luna

CITATION: GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988

FACTS:

An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23,
1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private
respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioner’s arraignment on September 28, 1979,
Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26,
1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the
marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no previous knowledge that
Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were
employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to
the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint
affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite
marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato
continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon
learning that Donato already previously married.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the
juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial
question.

HELD:

Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for
annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy
case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and
was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the
second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial
issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

REFERENCE: http://hyperjetsetter.blogspot.com/2011/04/donato-vs-luna.html?m=1

#30. Quimiguing vs. Icao

CARMEN QUIMIGUING vs. FELIX ICAO
G.R. No. 26795. July 31, 1970
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Facts:
The petitioner, Carmen Quimiguing, who was a student in Dapitan was intimidated
and forced by her neighbor, Felix Icao, a married man, to have a carnal intercourse.
As a result, she got pregnant and had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at
P120 per month, damages and attorney's fees. Since the complaint did not allege that
the child had been born, the lower court dismissed it for lack of cause of action.
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that she gave birth to a baby girl as a
result of the intercourse but the court ruled that "no amendment was allowable since
the original complaint averred no cause of action." So the plaintiff appealed directly to
this court.

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff has a right to claim support and damages
Ruling:
The orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. The Supreme Court ruled that "a
conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of
its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in the Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines". Another reason for reversing the order is that for a
married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the
damage caused. Says Article 21 of the same Code.

#31

Geluz v. CA,
2 SCRA 801

FACTS:
Nita Villanueva & Antonio Geluz met in 1948 through Nita’s aunt. In 1950, she got
pregnant. To conceal her pregnancy from her parents, she had an abortion. When they
got married, she got pregnant again. Since she was an employee of COMELEC & her
pregnancy would be inconvenient to her, she had abortion in Oct 1953. She again
became pregnant after 2 years and had an abortion for the third and last time. The last
abortion constituted the plaintiff’s basis in filling an action for award of damages. CA
and trial court granted the award of damages.

ISSUE: W/N Geluz is entitled for damages

HELD: It is apparent that he consented to the previous abortions making his action
questionable for why he only filed for damages on his wife’s third abortion. Also, SC
held that the fetus wasn’t born yet so it has no juridical personality. The award for the
death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with
personality and incapable of having rights and obligations.

# 32
De Jesus v Syquia
58 Phil 866

Facts:
 This is an action by Antonia Loanco de Jesus, as mother of two infants, for the
purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia damages arising from (1)
breach of promise to marry, (2) to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael as his
natural child and pay maintenance for him. Cesar met Antonia at the barbershop
where she works as a cashier. Soon, she became pregnant. Cesar was a constant visitor
at her home, and wrote a letter to the priest saying that if the child was a boy, it will be
christened in his name. On his trip to China and Japan, he was writing letters to
Antonia cautioning her to keep in good condition so that “junior” will be strong.
When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a house where they lived
together for 1 year as a family, with expenses being shouldered by Syquia. She
became pregnant again, but soon Syquia left her to marry another woman.

Issue:
(1) WON there would be damages for the breach to marry.
(2) WON Syquia is compelled to recognize Ismael loanco as his natural child

Held:

The SC upheld the decision of the trial court in refusing to give damages to
Antonia for breach of promise to marry. The action for breach of promise to marry has
no standing in civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced
by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
As for the recognition of the child, the acknowledgment of paternity is satisfied by
the production of more than 1 document of indubitable authenticity.
#33

#34 Dumlao VS Quality Plastics G.R. No. L-27956

G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of
the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO
DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Castillo & Castillo for appellants.
Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.
Facts:

Herein petitioner Dionisio Dumlao, acting as the administrator of the testate of Pedro
Oria along with other heirs of Oria's estate, sued Quality Plastic Products Inc. for
auctioning the nine and six-tenths hectares’ land of Oria which was used as security.
In a previous case, dated February 28, 1962, the CFI of Pangasinan rendered
judgement ordering Oria along with other sureties to pay solidarity to Quality Plastic
Products, Inc., failure of which will result to the foreclosure of the surety bond. The
sale commenced on November 20, 1962.
The petitioners contend that QPPI does not have jurisdiction over the estate of Oria
because Oria died on April 23, 1959, long before June 13, 1960 when the case against
them was filed, therefore Oria did not have juridical capacity on the day the summons
was served.

Issue: Whether or not QPPI lacked jurisdiction on the contention that Oria lost his
juridical capacity upon death.

Ruling:

Yes, The CFI of Pangasinan's judgement against Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction
over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with
summons. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, was lost through death (Article 37 and 42, Civil Code). Consequently, the
execution sale of Oria's land is also void.

#35
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs Commissioner of Immigration

FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant, a temporary alien visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines
was to expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized by virtue of her marriage with
co-plaintiff, a Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes on the ground that the mere
marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter
Philippine citizenship, because record shows that the same does not possessed all the
qualifications required of applicants for naturalization (CA 473), even if she has
proven that she does not suffer any disqualification there under.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an alien who married a naturalized Filipino is lawfully
naturalized.

HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization
proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for
naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the
matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be
called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction
or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the
citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to
native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino
citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

#36

#37 Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 300
September 18, 1995
Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio
Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification for
the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an
amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to “since
childhood” in item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not
received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of the COMELEC
with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondent’s petition
for disqualification meritorious.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Marcos.

Held:
For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The
Court upheld the disqualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her
certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because
of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became
petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family
to Leyte; (b) domicile by origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a
new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and
positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed
to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because
the term “residence” in Civil law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when
the petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she
gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one
only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly
indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

#38 Tuason v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116607, 10 April 1996
FACTS:
On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuazon married petitioner Emilio Tuazon.
Due to the series of physical abuse against the respondent, the petitioner use of
prohibited drugs, cohabitating with three women, leaving the conjugal home and
giving minimal child support, abuse of conjugal property use and incurring of bank
debts without the respondent consent, respondent filed a petition for annulment of
marriage in 1989 on the ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of
administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.

Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was scheduled to present his
evidence. Counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement, however, petitioner failed
to appear. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of marriage and
awarding the custody of common children to respondent. No appeal was taken.

Thereafter, respondent filed Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains

and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties which was opposed by
petitioner. Petitioner filed a Petitioner from Relief of Judgment on the held decision.
The trial court denied the petition which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the absence of petitioner in the hearing, the court should have
ordered a prosecuting officer to intervene.

RULING:

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in

exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party
has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or
appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such
appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be
used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family
Code which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the
prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law looks with disfavor
upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default. He contends
that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have
ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason
for his non-appearance.

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60
of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court
for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the
cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the
proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of
private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to
assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of
the proceedings in the trial court.

# 39 Estrada Vs. Escritor 492 scra 1

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR

A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006
PUNO, J.:

Facts: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter in the Las Pinas Regional Trial Court
since 1999. She has been living for more than 25 years with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. and
had a son with him without the benefit of marriage prior to her husband’s death who
was living with another woman. Quilapio on the other hand is still legally married to
another woman when she joined the judiciary in 1999.
Complainant Alejandro Estrada requested the Judge of RTC, where Escritor is
employed, to investigate respondent. According to the complainant, respondent is
committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not
be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such
act.
Respondent asserts that their religion, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Trace Society, has permitted their union. Such proof of approval from their
union is backed with “Declartion of Faithfulness” which is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state could penalize respondent for such conjugal
arrangement.

Ruling: No. the state could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
the fundamental rights in our constitution. According to Jefferson, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition
cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to the sufficiently compelling to
outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the state has not evinced any
concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of
an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality
should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation or religious exercise as required the free
exercise clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interest.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that
the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitute
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

#40
November 2, 1916
G.R. No. 11263
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.

TRENT, J.:
FACTS:
Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos Rueda, defendant-appellee, were
legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915. They established their
residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for a month before
the plaintiff returned to the home of their parents. Goitia filed a complaint against the
defendant for support outside the conjugal home. The allegations include that the
defendant, one month after their marriage, demanded the plaintiff to perform unchaste
and lascivious acts on his genital organs on which the latter rejected the said demands.
With continuous rejections of the demands of the defendant by the plaintiff, the
former maltreated the latter by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lips, face
and different body parts. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant
desires and cease from maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Goitia can claim support from her husband outside the conjugal
domicile.
RULING:
Yes. Eloisa may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even
outside of the conjugal home. Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a
new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of
the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties
and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant,
who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a
fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the
option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant.

# 41
Balogbog v CA
269 scra 259

Facts:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are children of Basilio Balogbog
and Genoveva Arnival who died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They had an
older brother who died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. Private respondents
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting
against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in
the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners denied this and alleged that their brother
Gavino died single and without issues. Private respondent produced certificates that
the records of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina and the birth of Ramonito must be
presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war.
Issue:
WON the marriage of Gavino and Catalina is valid even without the marriage
certificate
WON Ramonito and Generoso are legitimate children of Gavino and Catalina
Held:
Yes. Under the rules of court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption
may be rebutted when there is a proof to the contrary. Although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not prof that no
marriage took place. Other evidences may be shown to prove the marriage.
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the fact that there was no record of birth in
the civil registry does not mean that the private respondents were not legitimate
children. The legitimacy was proven by the testimonies of the witnesses including
Catalina.

#42 Cosca VS Palaypayan A.M. No. MTJ 92-721

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and
APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B.
ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

FACTS:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo
Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively,
of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio
P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge
and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on
October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit:
(1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases;
(3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt
for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6)
requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the
simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence
of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga,
Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a
consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did
not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign
their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason
being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the
parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage
contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo,
who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of
marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to
proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the
employees of the court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon
Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers
that it was only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register
which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties
copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and
that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this
administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the
marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had
instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their
marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P.
Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt
from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant
Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with
the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the
spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and
executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar;
that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not
illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they
did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts
are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo
and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by
him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license; that the
marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the
requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to
their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains
unsigned up to the present.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriages enumerated are valid.
RULING:
Marriages are valid.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability
of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised
Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect,
or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall
be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law."9 This is of
course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on
respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of
illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but
actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal
effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other
offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree
of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to
ineludibly require a higher penalty.

#43

#44 – RODOLFO G. NAVARRO vs JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

FACTS:
Firstly, Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy, the respondent, officiated the
wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga on September 27, 1994,
despite being knowledgeable of the fact that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife, Ida Peñaranda. Secondly, he allegedly performed the marriage ceremony
between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario, outside of his
jurisdiction in the Municipality of Sta. Monica – Burgos and solemnized it at his
residence in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. The respondent seeks exculpation from both
acts, stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by Municipal Trial Judge of
Basey, Samar confirmin that Tagadan have not seen his first wife in seven years. With
regard to the second charge, he maintains that he did not violate Article 7paragraph 1
of the Family code and that Artcile 8 applies, as there was a written request, by
Gemma del Rosario, presented.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is viable of inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.

HELD:
Yes. The law provided that any marriage contacted by any person during
the substinence of a previous marrraige shall be null and void. Furthermore, if the
prior spouse have been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee. Albeit, Tagadan not seeing his first wife in 7 seven years, no summary of
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death was instituted. Absent of this
judicial declaration, Gaspar Tagadan remains married to Ida Peñaranda. The marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there
being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda. With regard
to the second charge, the responent claims he did not violate Article 7 of the Family
Code in regards to Artcile 8, in which it is provided that the officiate be requested in
writing by both parites that the marraige may be solemnize at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement ot that effect. Although a written request was
presented, it was signed only by Gemma del Rosario. In as much as respondent
judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of
his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding
of the basic principles of civil law.

#45 Aranas Vs. Judge Occiano

AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002
Facts: Merceditas Aranes charged Judge Occiano of gross ignorance of the law, when
the judge solemnized her marriage with Domionador Orobia where it was outside the
judge’s territorial jurisdiction. There kwas no record of the alleged marriage in the
Office of Civil Registrar General, as the judge only agreed with the promise to
solemnized their marriage if the couple can provide their license on that same day of
the ceremony, of which the couple were not able to.
Issue: Whether judge Occiano is guilty of officiating the ceremony without a duly
issued license to marry, and conducting it outside his jurisdiction.
Ruling: The court held that the judge has conducted the marriage outside his
jurisdiction, and not having a duly license to marry for the couple, has held the judge
liable, and ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 only.

#46 Laxamana vs. Baltazar

G.R. No. L-5955,
September 19, 1952

FACTS:
In July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended. The vice-mayor Jose
T. Salazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code. However, the provincial governor, acting under section 21 (a) of
the Revised Election Code (R.A. 180), with the consent of the provincial board
appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan, who immediately took the
corresponding official oath.
Hence, this quo warranto proceeding based solely on the petitioner’s proposition that
the section first mentioned has been repealed by the subsequent provision of the
Revised Election Code.

ISSUE:
Whether this petition should be granted, and Laxamana declared the lawful mayor of
Sexmoan.

RULING:
No. Because of section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code to wit: “Temporary
disability of the mayor. Upon the occasion of the absence, suspension, or other
temporary disability of the Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor,
or if there be no Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election
received the highest number of votes.”
In fact even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, the Department of the
Interior and the office of executive Secretary who are charged with the supervision of
provincial and municipal governments have “consistently held that in case of the
suspension or other temporary disability of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall, by
operation of law, assume the office of the mayor, and if the vice-mayor is not
available, the said office shall be discharged by the first councilor.”
This quo warranto petition is dismissed with costs. So ordered.

#47 People vs Jansenn

G.R. No. L-31763 December 27, 1929

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
H. JANSSEN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS :

On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before
Father H. Jansenn to have their name inscribed in the marriage registry, which was
done. On December 30, 1928, the banns were published in his parish in San Jose,
Antique. As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked the
defendant-appellant to marry them before the date. Upon petition of the defendant-
appellant, the Bishop of Jaro issued a dispensation of the marriage with the
understanding that no obstacle has been discovered in the investigation made or to be
made of the status and liberty of the contracting parties. On January 4, 1929, the
municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, issued an authority to solemnize marriage of
above contracting parties. By virtue of the above-quoted dispensation, and in view of
said authority of the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, the defendant-appellant
on January 6, 1929, solemnized the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña to Juana S. del
Rosario.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the defendant-appellant violated section 2 of Act No. 3412.

Whether or not the defendant-appellant cannot solemnize marriage without publishing
or proclaiming such marriage 10 days prior to the celebration thereof.

HELD / RULING :

The law does not impose upon priest or ministers of religion to investigate whether the
license was issued by an official duly authorized by law, that is, by the municipal
secretary of the municipality where the woman habitually resides. It is sufficient to
know that the license has been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed
from the issuance of said license that said official has complied with his duty of
ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides habitually in his
municipality.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is solemnized by a
church, sect, or religion whose rules and practices require proclamation or publicity, it
is not necessary that said proclamation be made during ten days, unless said rules or
practices so require.

The appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant is absolved from the
information, with costs de oficio.

#48 Lim Tanhu vs Ramolete

Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete

G.R. No. L-40098. August 29, 1975
BARREDO, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan,
who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory
Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim
Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere
employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed
complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son
Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their
son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and active
management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not only in
the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and
personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with
whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others
born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966
and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him
were all given to his legitimate wife and children.

Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the
drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter
sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as
investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of
the above-stated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it embarked in
the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement and
GI sheets and under huge profits.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-
law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a
foster child, Antonio Nunez.

ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim
from the company of the latter’s share.

HELD:
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, “the declaration of the contracting parties that
they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed
by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage.
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the
marriage contract”. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent
evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the
certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible
evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other
satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at
bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop,
Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence,
there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and,
indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly
signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is
not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify,
the same is hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received
P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law
marriage and promised not to interfere with each other’s affairs since they are
incompatible and not in the position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this
document not only proves that her relation was that of a common-law wife but had
also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held
in respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of
October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte
proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent
court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal
of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy
Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby
permanently enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave and except
as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.

#49 Vda de Chua vs IAC

January 5, 1994
G.R. No. 70909
CONCHITA T. VDA. DE CHUA, THELMA CHUA, assisted by her husband,
CHARLIE DY, CHARLITO CHUA, REYNALDO CHUA, SUSAN CHUA,
ALEX CHUA, EDDIE CHUA, SIMON CHUA, AND ERNESTO CHUA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, VICENTE GO, VICTORIA T.
GO, AND HERMINIGILDA HERRERA, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in 1950, defendant Herminigilda Herrera executed a Contract of Lease in
favor of Tian On (or Sy Tian On) whereby the former leased to the latter a couple of
lots in Cebu City, for a term of ten (10) years, renewable for another five (5) years.
The contract of lease contains a stipulation giving the lessee an option to buy the
leased property and that the lessor guarantees to leave the possession of said property
to the lessee for a period of ten (10) years or as long as the lessee faithfully fulfils the
terms and conditions of their contract. In accordance with the said contract of lease,
the lessee, Tian On, erected a residential house on the leased premises. Within 4 years
from the execution of the said contract of lease, the lessee, Sy Tian On, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale of Building in favor of Chua Bok, the predecessor-in-interest
of the plaintiffs herein, whereby the former sold to the latter the aforesaid residential
house for and in consideration of the sum of P8, 000.00. In the deed, it was said that
the sale was made with the knowledge and express consent of the lot-owner and
lessor, Herminigilda Herrera who is represented by her attorney-in-fact, Vicenta R. de
Reynes who hereby also honors the annulment of the lease made by Sy Tian On in
favor of Chua Bok, and promises and binds herself to respect and abide by all the
terms and conditions of the lease contract which is now assigned to the said Chua
Bok. After the expiration of the contract of lease in the plaintiffs herein, who are the
successors-in-interest of Chua Bok (who had died), continued possession of the
premises up to April 1978, with adjusted rental rate. On July 26, 1977, defendant
Herrera through her attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Luz M. Tormis, who was authorized with a
special power of attorney, sold the lots in question to defendants-spouses, Vicente
and Victoria Go. The defendants-spouses were able to have aforesaid sale registered
with the Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu and the titles to the two parcels of land
were transferred in their names. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed the instant case seeking the
annulment of the said sale between Herminigilda Herrera and spouses Vicente and
Victoria Go, alleging that the conveyance was in violation of the plaintiffs’ right of
option to buy the leased premises as provided in the Contract of Lease and that the
defendants-spouses acted in bad faith in purchasing the said lots knowing full well
that the said plaintiffs have the option to buy those lots.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants was in bad faith in the purchase of the lots knowing
that plaintiffs had the option to buy said lots.

HELD:
No. The lease contract, petitioners’ cause of action, involves the lease of real property
for a period of more than one year. The contract was entered into by the agent of the
lessor and not the lessor herself. In such a case, the law requires that the agent be
armed with a special power of attorney to lease the premises. Article 1878 of the New
Civil Code, in pertinent part, provides: "Special Powers of Attorney are necessary in
the following cases (8) To lease any real property to another person for more than one
year." It is true that respondent Herrera allowed petitioners to occupy the leased
premises after the expiration of the lease contract and under Article 1670 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, a tacit renewal of the lease is deemed to have taken place.
However, a tacit renewal is limited only to the terms of the contract which are
germane to the lessee’s right of continued enjoyment of the property and does not
extend to alien matters, like the option to buy the leased premises.
# 50
Republic v CA
236 scra 257

Facts:
Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without
the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Since the marriage was unknown to the parents of
Castro, the couple did not cohabit immediately. It was when Castro was already
pregnant that the couple lived together. The cohabitation only lasted for four months.
Thereafter they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother
with the consent of Cardenas.
The child was brought to US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her
daughter she wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving. She found out
that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage.
Thus, respondent filed a petition for the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage.
Issue:
WON the marriage is valid
Held:
The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a marriage license would render the
marriage void ab initio.
#51 Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on

March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was
issued by the Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian
citizen. Subsequently, Recio entered into marriage with Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on
January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a
complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Recio
contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce
obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry Garcia. The trial court
rendered the decision declaring the marriage between Garcia and Recio dissolved and
both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso facto
capacitated him to remarry.

HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on
the records, the court cannot conclude that Recio who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant
Garcia’s prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After
all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry Garcia
as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles;
a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree
obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

#52 Van Dorn VS Romillo 139 SCRA 139

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON
respondents.

FACTS:
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982;
and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting
of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to
Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in
the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is
now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce filed in Nevada United States should be recognized in our
Jurisdiction.
RULING:
Yes, divorce filed in Nevada United States should be recognized in our jurisdiction.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court
of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.

#53
HERBERT CANG VS CA
(G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998)

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's
extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a
divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3
minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children.
Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA
affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written
consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the
parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay
monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of
a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.
HELD:
Yes. The rule 99 of the rules of court provides that it shall be filed with the petition a
written consent to the adoption signed x x x by each of its known living parents who is
not insane, or hopelessly intemperate, or has not abandoned the child x x x. In the
instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the
petition or adoption. Petitioners consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless,
the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors the natural
father. However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his
consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child
becomes a proper issue for determination the issue of abandonment by the natural
parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon
failure of the natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not
abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.

#54 Republic Vs. Orbecido

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts: On May 24, 1981 Cipriano Orbecido III was married to Lady Myros
Villanueva. But in 1986 the wife left for US, brought one of their children, and
became naturalized US citizen and remarried after obtaining divorce paper in the US.
Cipriano on the other hand, filed a petition in the Philippine court to remarry as well.

Issue: Whether or not Cipriano can remarry.

Ruling: The court ruled that after one of the couple became naturalized foreign citizen
and obtaining a divorce decree in another country, that spouse is to be considered like
a foreigner at the time of marriage, and therefore the Filipino spouse must be allowed
to remarry as well.

#55

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MARELYN TANEDO MANALO

(G.R. No. 221029)

FACTS:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to Japanese national Minoru Yoshino. Manalo
filed for divorce and was granted in Japan on December 6, 2011. Manalo went to
court in Dagupan in the Philippines to have her divorce recognized here. The trial
court in Dagupan denied her petition. She then went to the Court of Appeals (CA),
where the CA reversed the decision of the lower court in 2014. The CA ruled that
Manalo should have the right to remarry. It applied the amended Article 26(2) of the
Family Code, which includes:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
The Philippine government, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), went
to the SC to try to reverse the CA's ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign divorce secured by a Filipino against a foreign spouse is also
considered valid in the Philippines, even if it is the Filipino spouse is the one who
filed for divorce abroad

RULING:
The Supreme Court (SC) en banc issued a landmark ruling, recognizing divorce in
marriages with foreigners.
Voting 10-3-1, the SC en banc ruled "that a foreign divorce secured by a Filipino
against a foreign spouse is also considered valid in the Philippines, even if it is the
Filipino spouse who files for divorce abroad."
With this ruling, the state now recognizes the divorce obtained by the Filipino, and
couples of the same circumstances of mixed-marriage will be considered not married
to each other under Philippine law.