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PANGANIBAN, CJ, *
- versus - Chairman,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, **
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as CALLEJO, SR., and
Chief Presidential Legal CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Counsel and as Chairman of the
Presidential Commission on
Good Government, and
RONALDO ZAMORA, as Promulgated:
Executive Secretary,
Respondents. June 30, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 30 October 1998, respondent Elma was appointed and took his oath of
office as Chairman of the PCGG. Thereafter, on 11 January 1999, during his tenure
as PCGG Chairman, respondent Elma was appointed CPLC. He took his oath of
office as CPLC the following day, but he waived any remuneration that he may
receive as CPLC.[5]
The issue in this case is whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that
of the CPLC falls under the prohibition against multiple offices imposed by
Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, which provide that:
Art. VII .
xxxx
xxxx
To harmonize these two provisions, this Court, in the case of Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary,[11] construed the prohibition against multiple offices
contained in Section 7, Article IX-B and Section 13, Article VII in this manner:
[T]hus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during
their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of
their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In
other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general
rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits
an appointive official to hold more than one office only if allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position. In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta,[12] this Court
ruled that, [t]here is no legal objection to a government official occupying two
government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility. The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists
between two offices was laid out in People v. Green[13] - whether one office is
subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with
the other.
b. Review and/or draft legal orders referred to her by the President on the
following matters that are subject of decisions of the President;
As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his own
actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG
Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be
raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition
against holding incompatible offices.
Having thus ruled that Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
enjoins the concurrent appointments of respondent Elma as PCGG Chairman and
CPLC inasmuch as they are incompatible offices, this Court will proceed to
determine whether such appointments violate the other constitutional provision
regarding multiple offices, Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It is clear from the foregoing that the strict prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor
to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant
secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.
Granting that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is applicable to the present case, the defect in respondent Elmas
concurrent appointments to the incompatible offices of the PCGG Chairman and
the CPLC would even be magnified when seen through the more stringent
requirements imposed by the said constitutional provision. In
[17]
the aforecited case Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, the Court
stressed that the language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and unequivocal
negation of the privilege of holding multiple offices or employment. The Court
cautiously allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices: (1)
those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or (2) posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said officials office. The Court further
qualified that additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be
required by the officials primary functions. Moreover, the additional post must be
exercised in an ex-officio capacity, which denotes an act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office.[18] Thus, it will not suffice that no
additional compensation shall be received by virtue of the second appointment, it is
mandatory that the second post is required by the primary functions of the first
appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity.
With its forgoing qualifications, it is evident that even Section 13, Article
VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to the position of PCGG
Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice
versa. The primary functions of the PCGG Chairman involve the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family
and associates, the investigation of graft and corruption cases assigned to him by
the President, and the adoption of measures to prevent the occurrence of
corruption.[19] On the other hand, the primary functions of the CPLC encompass a
different matter, that is, the review and/or drafting of legal orders referred to him
by the President.[20] And while respondent Elma did not receive additional
compensation in connection with his position as CPLC, he did not act as either
CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an ex-officio capacity. The fact that a separate
appointment had to be made for respondent Elma to qualify as CPLC negates the
premise that he is acting in an ex-officio capacity.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
On Official Leave
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairman
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairman, First Division
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice