G.R. No.
L-68470 October 8, 1985 American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set
aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P,
issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion
for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the
Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located
in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now
the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject
to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would
then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have
given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the
1
established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the
acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or
relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street,
San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to
agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were
neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of
Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno,
Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] modifying that
of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City[2] declaring respondent
2
Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property she and
the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy
from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
Paula) were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines
Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula
stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District
Court, Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was
granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar
of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate
and the line for the fathers name was left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the
couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the
United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily
maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in
accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding
their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute
Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate
from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was
witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public
Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory
judgment of divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia
had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who
did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
 From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. [15] Their
twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed
Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized
by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and
lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal
properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties
whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-
Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras,
Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua,
Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real
properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal
properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could
only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and
Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the
order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic)
without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions
heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the
Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R.
Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and
bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines
Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo
moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.[18]
3
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator
Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted
the will to probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition [22] for letters of
administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos
surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that
Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on
her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave
due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol
Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the
late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being
so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is
denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will
especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which
is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so
declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void
and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal
properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of
the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the
remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased,
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor
upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a
return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to
the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all
debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or
required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the court
within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all
orders of this court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be
granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but
modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or
otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. [29] Amending its decision of
May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of
Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of
the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the
trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at
the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4)
death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign
law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
4
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit
the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine,
where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine
law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently
proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that
American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when determining
the validity of Lorenzos will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the
union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can
therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.[39] Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called
for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions
in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw
the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2)
of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
 In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided
they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once
proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from
petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose
her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula
was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this
divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by
her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since
he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and
legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact,
the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of
successional rights to the decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
5
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego,
made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional
rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of
Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly
committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in
matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order 1 dated September 30,
1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati
Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of
marriage, and (b) the order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration.
The assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-
1389, for the purpose of resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses
and the custody of their children.
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany.
Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros
Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18,
1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition 5 for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an
order8 dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and
remanded the case to the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
The decree provides in part:
[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through
Judge van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held
on 4 Nov. 1997:
The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of
Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
The parental custody for the children
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
is granted to the father.
The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as
a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and
private respondent.
On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to
dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the
case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the
petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the
marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had
already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce
had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the
implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code,10 endowing the petitioner
with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside
her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of
the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said
order provides:
6
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by
petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive
Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her
alien spouse though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she
had obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering
further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50
and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the
spouses, and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is
partially set aside with respect to these matters which may be ventilated in this Court.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by
respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12
Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:
1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not
allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had
recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg,
Germany.14
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets
alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the
custody of the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15
Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order
dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and
retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already
obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely
inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim,
deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
 The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied
upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim,
denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated
July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s
motion for reconsideration.
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may
deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the
judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or
final order accordingly.
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule
appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in
controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial
or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment
or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case
that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can
still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16we held that the court could
modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts
and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more
compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg,
Germany.
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
7
Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has
not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody,
even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private
respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the
award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable
in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the
children, must still be determined by our courts.23 Before our courts can give the effect of res
judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German
court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now
Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to
the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order
for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our
Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.24
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment
as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two
children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of
private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain
unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the
proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office. 26 Unlike petitioner
who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said
proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of
the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three
years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as
to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to
obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to
determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best
interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth
Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody. 28
On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the
bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property
relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted
in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed
with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not
acquired any conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their
marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court
shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof.30 Given the factual admission by
the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge
has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in
controversy.
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the
custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent.
Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property
relations of the parties, which is not at issue.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby
declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has
parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly
to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor
and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
8
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N.
Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions
of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March
5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she
was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time
adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred
Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any
interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account
and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia,
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should
be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary
thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children,
one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged
that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements
are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California,
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent
should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having
been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes
legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and
of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity
of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with
which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the
right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate,
77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in
page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed
various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE
INHERITANCE.
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING
FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of
his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:
9
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1,
1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school
in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in
1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces
in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l",
"MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there
for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very
rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never
to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he
would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something
more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California
when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in
the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and
the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.
This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his
Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place
of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning.
Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a
place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his
time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which
would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up
his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of
choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply
requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however,
is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the
most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of
the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens
only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law.
So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee
that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the
form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,
which is as follows:
10
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on
the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is
correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a
citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited
case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was
a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of therenvoi, the question of the validity of
the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's
domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum
refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal
rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of
Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi,
that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to
Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule
looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so
often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely
to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there
seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law
rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a
merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoitheory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law.
Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to
internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the
fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute
the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had
been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for
the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the
Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce
case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus,
a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property
in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to
be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict
of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural
thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions,
or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So
on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action:
(a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that
this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow
the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter
back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term
for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the
operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning
the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoiis that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of therenvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
11
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-
1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign
laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as
regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined
by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question
occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of
them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question
to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile,
he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon
death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would
make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law —
he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of
laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but
Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of
matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of
the owner.
 When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will
directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was
domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the
will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of
land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate
in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary
has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason
for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the
doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a
dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is
one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one
of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process
of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and
justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp.
442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for
those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California
internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules
for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are
bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of
California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply
the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the
national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the
question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article
946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back
and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen
and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children
while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural
children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and
12
Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not
possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case
does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is
the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art.
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States."
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward
A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed
that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable
estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two
items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first
and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September
15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to
the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies,
or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting
partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and
filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein
it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of
the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal
portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second
marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes
as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower
court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art.
16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas
law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June
11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must
apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said
doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile
of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming Texas has a
conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern,
the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer
to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi
13
would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different
from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated,
they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their
case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation
to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating
that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new
Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of
the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the
national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court
ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national
law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that
Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-
appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA
BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose,
presiding, dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and
Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said
project.
On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding,
admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23,
1944 in Manila. In the said order, the court made the following findings:
According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore
a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are
located. This contention in untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent
in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he continued and remained to
be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest
of his days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States
depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and
therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his
domicile or permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right.
14
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a
citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and
testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits
the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of
the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of
P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it may
enter upon the execution and performance of its trust. (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.).
It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. The executor
filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions
of the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers
and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of
testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies; (2)
the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister,
Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of
shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000
each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to
be paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00;
Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration
expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of
all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same
amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the
testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that
they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan,
should be entitled to received. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the
testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce
secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce
should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the case of Querubin vs.Querubin, 87
Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852,
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court below
refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which
the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him
to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925
provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all
his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the
testator's debts.
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the
testator's estafa had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June
19, 1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records, Court of First Instance), which had become final, as
Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity.
On December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000
from the funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, (See pp.
294-297, Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance), and the court in its said error found that
there exists no community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time
the decree of divorce was issued. As already and Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer
question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was no community property acquired by
the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were
married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that
sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was
subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance
in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already
found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan,
the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who
had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given
their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-
thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the testator to give his children two-
thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the
forum valid?
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944,
expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is found. (par. 2,
Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the
testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and
his permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue
is whether the estementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of
the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that
the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905,
Complied Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the
project of partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the
executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts
in the form and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and
15
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found
that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for
withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled
Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2" (See
pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said laws
presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during
the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court
of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled
Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having
been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary
dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided
and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada,
already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his
will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in
accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellants.
G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993
ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This petition assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-GR CV No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S. Baltao, plaintiff-appellee vs. Albenson Enterprises
Corporation, et al, defendants-appellants", which modified the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII in Civil Case No. Q-40920 and ordered petitioner to pay
private respondent, among others, the sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages and attorney's
fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
The facts are not disputed.
In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation
(Albenson for short) delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at
3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As
part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in
the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks (Rollo, p. 148).
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed."
Thereafter, petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check.
From the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered
that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one
"Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade
and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the
name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Pacific
Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject
check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao."
After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial
demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace
and/or make good the dishonored check.
Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature
appearing thereon is his. He further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence,
could not have transacted business with Albenson.
On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a
complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to
support said charges was an affidavit of petitioner Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of
Albenson. In said affidavit, the above-mentioned circumstances were stated.
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who
manages a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the Baltao
Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same business address of
Guaranteed.
On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against
Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said information,
Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit
controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have
waived his right.
Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he
had been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by
Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson or Benjamin Mendiona,
consequently, the check for which he has been accused of having issued without funds was
not issued by him and the signature in said check was not his.
On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of
Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to
move for dismissal of the information filed against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found
that the signature in PBC Check No. 136361 is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. He
16
also found that there is no showing in the records of the preliminary investigation that
Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice of the said investigation. Fiscal Castro then
castigated Fiscal Sumaway for failing to exercise care and prudence in the performance of his
duties, thereby causing injustice to respondent who was not properly notified of the
complaint against him and of the requirement to submit his counter evidence.
Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a
check which bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of
P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint
for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and
Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.
In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E.L.
Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President.
Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since
1975. . . . . The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of
plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao Building located on V. Mapa Street,
that the defendants may have been dealing with . . . ." (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
The dispositive portion of the trial court 's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants
ordering the latter to pay plaintiff jointly and severally:
1. actual or compensatory damages of P133,350.00;
2. moral damages of P1,000,000.00 (1 million pesos);
3. exemplary damages of P200,000.00;
4. attorney's fees of P100,000.00;
5 costs.
Defendants' counterclaim against plaintiff and claim for damages against Mercantile
Insurance Co. on the bond for the issuance of the writ of attachment at the instance of
plaintiff are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. (Rollo, pp. 38-39).
On appeal, respondent court modified the trial court's decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the moral damages
awarded therein from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 and the attorney's fees from
P100,000.00 to P50,000.00, said decision being hereby affirmed in all its other aspects.
With costs against appellants. (Rollo, pp. 50-51)
Dissatisfied with the above ruling, petitioners Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap, and
Benjamin Mendiona filed the instant Petition, alleging that the appellate court erred in:
1. Concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious
prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil Code notwithstanding
the fact that the basis of a civil action for malicious prosecution is Article 2219 in relation
to Article 21 or Article 2176 of the Civil Code . . . .
2. Concluding that "hitting at and in effect maligning (private respondent) with an unjust
criminal case was, without more, a plain case of abuse of rights by misdirection" and "was
therefore, actionable by itself," and which "became inordinately blatant and grossly
aggravated when . . . (private respondent) was deprived of his basic right to notice and a fair
hearing in the so-called preliminary investigation . . . . "
3. Concluding that petitioner's "actuations in this case were coldly deliberate and
calculated", no evidence having been adduced to support such a sweeping statement.
4. Holding the petitioner corporation, petitioner Yap and petitioner Mendiona jointly and
severally liable without sufficient basis in law and in fact.
5. Awarding respondents —
5.1. P133,350.00 as actual or compensatory damages, even in the absence of sufficient
evidence to show that such was actually suffered.
5.2. P500,000.00 as moral damages considering that the evidence in this connection
merely involved private respondent's alleged celebrated status as a businessman, there
being no showing that the act complained of adversely affected private respondent's
reputation or that it resulted to material loss.
5.3. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages despite the fact that petitioners were duly
advised by counsel of their legal recourse.
5.4. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, no evidence having been adduced to justify such an
award (Rollo, pp. 4-6).
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious
prosecution. Citing the case ofMadera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that the
absence of malice on their part absolves them from any liability for malicious prosecution.
Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his complaint for Damages on Articles 19,
20, and 21 ** of the Civil Code.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also
in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to
give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes
the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
17
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right
is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is different, these
three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino
puts it: "With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law
on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any
malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles"
(Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72).
There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right
or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide for their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who,
whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to
another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with
acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2)
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done
with intent to injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another
may be made the basis for an award of damages.
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be
intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or
"negligently". The trial court as well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped
these three (3) articles together, and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages in
the civil complaint filed against petitioners, thus:
With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus, there is not much
difficulty in ascertaining the means by which appellants' first assigned error should be
resolved, given the admitted fact that when there was an attempt to collect the amount of
P2,575.00, the defendants were explicitly warned that plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not the
Eugenio Baltao defendants had been dealing with (supra, p. 5). When the defendants
nevertheless insisted and persisted in filing a case — a criminal case no less — against
plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the
Civil Code) cited by the lower court and heretofore quoted (supra).
Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly had the right to
complain. But that right is limited by certain constraints. Beyond that limit is the area of
 excess, of abuse of rights. (Rollo, pp.
44-45).
Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently of each
one, could be validly made the bases for an award of damages based on the principle of
"abuse of right", under the circumstances, We see no cogent reason for such an award of
damages to be made in favor of private respondent.
Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of
right. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a
bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent.
Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the
following results: from the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was
discovered that the President of Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates),
was one "Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed that
E.L. Woodworks, against whose account the check was drawn, was registered in the name of
one "Eugenio Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation,
revealed that the signature appearing on the check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".
In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private respondent
demanding that he make good the amount of the check. Counsel for private respondent wrote
back and denied, among others, that private respondent ever transacted business with
Albenson Enterprises Corporation; that he ever issued the check in question. Private
respondent's counsel even went further: he made a warning to defendants to check the
veracity of their claim. It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed
private respondent wanted to clear himself from the baseless accusation made against his
person, he should have made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons with the
same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao, Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and
Eugenio Baltao III (private respondent's son, who as it turned out later, was the issuer of the
check). He, however, failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing business in the same
building — Baltao Building — located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The mild
steel plates were ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which respondent Eugenio S. Baltao
is the president and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building. Thus, petitioners had every
reason to believe that the Eugenio Baltao who issued the bouncing check is respondent
Eugenio S. Baltao when their counsel wrote respondent to make good the amount of the
check and upon refusal, filed the complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22.
Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand.
Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless
petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages. The Court will
not countenance this devious scheme.
The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good
the amount of the bouncing check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of
petitioners to find the best possible means by which they could collect the sum of money due
them. A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to
compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer
18
of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud
or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does
not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio vs. Court of
Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were ordered
by and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing
check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private respondent conveyed to
petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting business in the same building — he
and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which received the goods in
payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in
good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted
by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by
the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act
of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Still,
private respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so
encompassing that it likewise includes liability for damages for malicious prosecution under
Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under
the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof.
In order that such a case can prosper, however, the following three (3) elements must be
present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was
himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That
in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was
actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]).
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved,
may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on
malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a complaint for damages based on malicious
prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the
case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that one
cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with
probable cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In
other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on
without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great
discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were
liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]).
The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In
the instant case, it is evident that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by
sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to
protect their rights when they filed the criminal complaint against private respondent.
 To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not
make one liable for malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the
action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and
preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or
humiliate private respondent by instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners
may have been negligent to some extent in determining the liability of private respondent for
the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith
warranting an award of damages.
The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It is
possible that with a more assiduous investigation, petitioners would have eventually
discovered that private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is not the "Eugenio Baltao" responsible
for the dishonored check. However, the record shows that petitioners did exert considerable
effort in order to determine the liability of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to
private respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored check as
the president of the debtor-corporation Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding
against the wrong individual was obviously in the nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot
be characterized as having been committed in bad faith. This error could have been
discovered if respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before investigating fiscal
Sumaway and was immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro upon discovery
thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation resulting in the dismissal of the complaint.
Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and
subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose
a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not be
charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an adverse decision does
not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs. Gonzales,
183 SCRA 72 [1990]).
Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in
good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque
injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).
Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory damages, the
records show that the same was based solely on his allegations without proof to substantiate
the same. He did not present proof of the cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to
have undergone as a result of the nervous breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of
the actual loss to his business caused by the unjust litigation against him. In determining
actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the
amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous
(Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]).
19
Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in
business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation — and the same must be proved,
otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs.
Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). For these reasons, it was gravely erroneous for
respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor of private respondent
in the absence of proof thereof.
Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless,
or oppressive manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical
Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the exception rather than
the general rule. Needless to say, the award of attorney's fees must be disallowed where the
award of exemplary damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of
Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of the fact that there was no malicious
prosecution against private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded him on that
ground.
In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad
faith in the filing of the case against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of
proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages
(Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 577 [1987]). No damages can be
awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights, or for
malicious prosecution. The questioned judgment in the instant case attests to the propensity
of trial judges to award damages without basis. Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew
against awarding unconscionable sums as damages without bases therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R.
C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
respondent Baltao.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996]
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA
and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH
181, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8,
1994 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.[1]
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way
was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R.
Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and
assigned to Branch 22 thereof.[2]
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during
the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and
children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated
at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to
acquire said property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora
Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded
by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Streetas the point of
reference, on the left side, going to plaintiffs property, the row of houses will be as follows:
That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos
and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and
then a Septic Tank (Exhibit D). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiffs property,
there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide
and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is
passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about
3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about
26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic
tank and with 5-6 meters in length has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises
and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February,
1982. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the
premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their
property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe
fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed
(Exhibit 1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. D for plaintiff, Exhs. 1-C, 1-D and I -E) And it was
then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina
Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her
daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment
along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the
front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang
their doors and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. x x x[3] (Italics in original text;
corrections in parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive
part:
20
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access - ingress
and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight
Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.[4]
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private
respondents, went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower
court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated,
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with
modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The
Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five
Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral
Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the
appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.[5]
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[6] Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues,
namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper, and
whether or not the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the
same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private
respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication
therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of
propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners
cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial
court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer
be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever
an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain
from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of
the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to
defeat the appellants claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can
assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a
quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to
maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or
modifying the judgment in the appellees favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.[7]
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages
has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that
the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa,
incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased
premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for
a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a
breach or wrong.[8]
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion
of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages
are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty.These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.[9] in order
that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it.[10] The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not
sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some
pain and suffering)[11]
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause
damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. [12]
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.[13] If, as may
happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person
or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law
does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.[14]
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the
claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of
abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil
Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant
should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2)
The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.[15]
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law.[16] It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose
and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that (e)very owner may enclose
or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any
other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
21
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any
servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by
law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said
passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of
way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave
private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation
and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and
their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in
the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have
been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by
petitioners is damnum absque injuria.[17]
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to
his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule,
therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a
lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable
loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.[18] When the owner of
property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is
used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having
been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere
consequence of community life.[19]
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action
will lie,[20] although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been
invaded[21] One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the
means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latters
favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can
give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to
achieve a lawful end by lawful means.[22]
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the
trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
[G. R. No. 126486. February 9, 1998]
BARONS MARKETING CORP., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHELPS DODGE
PHILS., INC. respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The instant petition raises two issues: (1) whether or not private respondent is guilty of
abuse of right; and (2) whether or not private respondent is entitled to interest and attorneys
fees.
The facts are undisputed:
On August 31, 1973, plaintiff [Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. private respondent herein]
appointed defendant [petitioner Barons Marketing, Corporation] as one of its dealers of
electrical wires and cables effective September 1, 1973 (Exh. A). As such dealer, defendant
was given by plaintiff 60 days credit for its purchases of plaintiffs electrical products. This
credit term was to be reckoned from the date of delivery by plaintiff of its products to
defendant (Exh. 1).
During the period covering December 1986 to August 17, 1987, defendant purchased, on
credit, from plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in the total amount of P4,102,438.30
(Exh. B to K).These wires and cables were in turn sold, pursuant to previous arrangements,
by defendant to MERALCO, the former being the accredited supplier of the electrical
requirements of the latter. Under the sales invoices issued by plaintiff to defendant for the
subject purchases, it is stipulated that interest at 12% on the amount due for attorneys fees
and collection (Exh. BB).[1] On September 7, 1987, defendant paid plaintiff the amount
of P300,000.00 out of its total purchases as above-stated (Exh. S), thereby leaving an unpaid
account on the aforesaid deliveries of P3,802,478.20. On several occasions, plaintiff wrote
defendant demanding payment of its outstanding obligations due plaintiff (Exhs. L, M, N, and
P). In response, defendant wrote plaintiff on October 5, 1987 requesting the latter if it could
pay its outstanding account in monthly installments of P500,000.00 plus 1% interest per
month commencing on October 15, 1987 until full payment (Exh. O and O-4). Plaintiff,
however, rejected defendants offer and accordingly reiterated its demand for the full payment
of defendants account (Exh. P).[2]
On 29 October 1987, private respondent Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc. filed a complaint
before the Pasig Regional Trial Court against petitioner Barons Marketing Corporation for the
recovery of P3,802,478.20 representing the value of the wires and cables the former had
delivered to the latter, including interest. Phelps Dodge likewise prayed that it be awarded
attorneys fees at the rate of 25% of the amount demanded, exemplary damages amounting to
at least P100,000.00, the expenses of litigation and the costs of suit.
Petitioner, in its answer, admitted purchasing the wires and cables from private
respondent but disputed the amount claimed by the latter. Petitioner likewise interposed a
counterclaim against private respondent, alleging that it suffered injury to its reputation due
to Phelps Dodges acts. Such acts were purportedly calculated to humiliate petitioner and
constituted an abuse of rights.
After hearing, the trial court on 17 June 1991 rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc.
to have preponderantly proven its case and hereby orders Barons Marketing, Inc. to pay
Phelps Dodge the following:
1. P3,108,000.00 constituting the unpaid balance of defendants purchases from plaintiff and
interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the respective expiration of the 60 day
credit term, vis--vis the various sales invoices and/or delivery receipts;
2. 25% of the preceding obligation for and as attorneys fees;
22
3. P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. Costs of suit.[3]
Both parties appealed to respondent court. Private respondent claimed that the trial
court should have awarded it the sum of P3,802,478.20, the amount which appeared in the
body of the complaint and proven during the trial rather than P3,108,000.00. The latter
amount appears in petitioners prayer supposedly as a result of a typographical error.
On the other hand, petitioner reiterated its claims for damages as a result of creditors
abuse. It also alleged that private respondent failed to prove its cause of action against it.
On 25 June 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying the decision of the
trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc.
to have preponderantly proven its case and hereby orders Barons Marketing, Inc. to pay
Phelps Dodge the following:
1. P3,802,478.20 constituting the unpaid balance of defendants purchases from plaintiff and
interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the respective expiration of the 60 day
credit term, vis--vis the various sales invoices and/or delivery receipts; and
2. 5% of the preceding obligation for and as attorneys fees.
No costs.[4]
Petitioner Barons Marketing is now before this Court alleging that respondent court
erred when it held (1) private respondent Phelps Dodge not guilty of creditors abuse, and (2)
petitioner liable to private respondent for interest and attorneys fees.
I
Petitioner does not deny private respondents rights to institute an action for collection
and to claim full payment. Indeed, petitioners right to file an action for collection is beyond
cavil.[5] Likewise, private respondents right to reject petitioners offer to pay in installments is
guaranteed by Article 1248 of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be
compelled partially to receive the prestations in which the obligation consists. Neither may
the debtor be required to make partial payments.
However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the creditor may
demand and the debtor may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the
liquidation of the latter.
Under this provision, the prestation , i.e., the object of the obligation, must be performed in
one act, not in parts.
 Tolentino concedes that the right has its limitations:
Partial Prestations. Since the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial performance,
unless otherwise stipulated, the creditor who refuses to accept partial prestations does not
incur in delay ormora accipiendi, except when there is abuse of right or if good faith requires
acceptance.[6]
Indeed, the law, as set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code, prescribes a primordial limitation
on all rights by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise
thereof .[7] Thus:
ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Petitioner now invokes Article 19 and Article 21[8] of the Civil Code, claiming that private
respondent abused its rights when it rejected petitioners offer of settlement and subsequently
filed the action for collection considering:
xxx that the relationship between the parties started in 1973 spanning more than 13 years
before the complaint was filed, that the petitioner had been a good and reliable dealer
enjoying a good credit standing during the period before it became delinquent in 1987, that
the relationship between the parties had been a fruitful one especially for the private
respondent, that the petitioner exerted its outmost efforts to settle its obligations and avoid a
suit, that the petitioner did not evade in the payment of its obligation to the private
respondent, and that the petitioner was just asking a small concession that it be allowed to
liquidate its obligation to eight (8) monthly installments of P500,000.00 plus 1% interest per
month on the balance which proposal was supported by post-dated checks.[9]
Expounding on its theory, petitioner states:
In the ordinary course of events, a suit for collection of a sum of money filed in court is done
for the primary purpose of collecting a debt or obligation. If there is an offer by the debtor to
pay its debt or obligation supported by post-dated checks and with provision for interests, the
normal response of a creditor would be to accept the offer of compromise and not file the suit
for collection. It is of common knowledge that proceedings in our courts would normally take
years before an action is finally settled. It is always wiser and more prudent to accept an offer
of payment in installment rather than file an action in court to compel the debtor to settle his
obligation in full in a single payment.
xxx.
xxx. Why then did private respondent elect to file a suit for collection rather than accept
petitioners offer of settlement, supported by post-dated checks, by paying monthly
installments of P500,000.00 plus 1% per month commencing on October 15, 1987 until full
payment? The answer is obvious. The action of private respondent in filling a suit for
collection was an abuse of right and exercised for the sole purpose of prejudicing and injuring
the petitioner.[10]
23
Petitioner prays that the Court order private respondent to pay petitioner moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, as well as the costs of suit. It likewise asks that it be
allowed to liquidate its obligation to private respondent, without interests, in eight equal
monthly installments.
Petitioners theory is untenable.
Both parties agree that to constitute an abuse of rights under Article 19 the defendant
must act with bad faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. They cite the following comments
of Tolentino as their authority:
Test of Abuse of Right. Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not
unlawful, are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the
only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate,
the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. The principle does not
permit acts which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because
they violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. Hence,
every abnormal exercise of a right, contrary to its socio-economic purpose, is an abuse that
will give rise to liability. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to injure another. Ultimately, however, and in practice, courts, in the sound
exercise of their discretion, will have to determine all the facts and circumstances when the
exercise of a right is unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right.[11]
The question, therefore, is whether private respondent intended to prejudice or injure
petitioner when it rejected petitioners offer and filed the action for collection.
We hold in the negative. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is
presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the
same.[12] In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of private
respondent. Petitioners allegation that private respondent was motivated by a desire to
terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so that private respondent itself may deal
directly with Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most, such supposition is
merely speculative.
Moreover, we find that private respondent was driven by very
legitimate reasons for rejecting petitioners offer and instituting the action for collection before
the trial court. As pointed out by private respondent, the corporation had its own cash
position to protect in order for it to pay its own obligations. This is not such a lame and poor
rationalization as petitioner purports it to be. For if private respondent were to be required to
accept petitioners offer, there would be no reason for the latter to reject similar offers from its
other debtors. Clearly, this would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise, especially a
profit-oriented one like private respondent. It is plain to see that what we have here is a
mere exercise of rights, not an abuse thereof. Under these circumstances, we do not deem
private respondent to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy as to violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, petitioners prayer for moral and exemplary damages must thus be
rejected. Petitioners claim for moral damages is anchored on Article 2219 (10) of the Civil
Code which states:
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx.
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
xxx.
Having ruled that private respondents acts did not transgress the provisions of Article 21,
petitioner cannot be entitled to moral damages or, for that matter, exemplary damages. While
the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, petitioner must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or notexemplary damages should be awarded. [13] As we have observed
above, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
It may not be amiss to state that petitioners contract with private respondent has the
force of law between them.[14] Petitioner is thus bound to fulfill what has been expressly
stipulated therein.[15]In the absence of any abuse of right, private respondent cannot be
allowed to perform its obligation under such contract in parts. Otherwise, private
respondents right under Article 1248 will be negated, the sanctity of its contract with
petitioner defiled. The principle of autonomy of contracts[16] must be respected.
II
Under said contract, petitioner is liable to private respondent for the unpaid balance of
its purchases from private respondent plus 12% interest. Private respondents sales invoices
expressly provide that:
xxx. Interest at 12% per annum will be charged on all overdue account plus 25% on said
amount for attorneys fees and collection. xxx.[17]
It may also be noted that the above stipulation, insofar as it provides for the payment of
25% on said amount for attorneys fees and collection (sic), constitutes what is known as a
penal clause.[18]Petitioner is thus obliged to pay such penalty in addition to the 12% annual
interest, there being an express stipulation to that effect.
Petitioner nevertheless urges this Court to reduce the attorneys fees for being grossly
excessive, considering the nature of the case which is a mere action for collection of a sum of
money. It may be pointed out however that the above penalty is supposed to answer not only
for attorneys fees but for collection fees as well. Moreover:
x x x the attorneys fees here provided is not, strictly speaking, the attorneys fees recoverable
as between attorney and client spoken of and regulated by the Rules of Court. Rather, the
attorneys fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is
aptly called a penal clause. It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not
contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant. The attorneys
fees so provided are awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel. It is the litigant, not
counsel, who is the judgment creditor entitled to enforce the judgment by execution.[19]
24
Nonetheless, courts are empowered to reduce such penalty if the same is iniquitous or
unconscionable. Article 1229 of the Civil Code states thus:
ART. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has
been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no
performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable. (Underscoring supplied.)
The sentiments of the law are echoed in Article 2227 of the same Code:
ART. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be
equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
It is true that we have upheld the reasonableness of penalties in the form of attorneys
fees consisting of twenty-five percent (25%) of the principal debt plus interest.[20] In the case
at bar, however, the interest alone runs to some four and a half million pesos (P4.5M), even
exceeding the principal debt amounting to almost four million pesos (P4.0M). Twenty five
percent (25%) of the principal and interest amounts to roughly two million pesos (P2M). In
real terms, therefore, the attorneys fees and collection fees are manifestly
exorbitant. Accordingly, we reduce the same to ten percent (10%) of the principal.
Private respondent, however, argues that petitioner failed to question the award of
attorneys fees on appeal before respondent court and raised the issue only in its motion for
reconsideration.Consequently, petitioner should be deemed to have waived its right to
question such award.
Private respondents attempts to dissuade us from reducing the penalty are futile. The
Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as
errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision of the case.[21]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED in that the
attorneys and collection fees are reduced to ten percent (10%) of the principal but is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and
administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY
discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several
thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and
reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to
petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General
Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner
Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to
take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers
open, and to leave the office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced
leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was
then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his
handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine
his complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report
(Exh. "A") clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose
G. Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty.
This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending
Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner,
after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions,
submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding that the
handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved
in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on
Tobias also yielded negative results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact
that the report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners
filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were
filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial
document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets
Through Seizure of Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these complaints were refiled with
the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All
of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the
fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who,
however, affirmed their dismissal.
25
In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners
that his employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's decision.
However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling,
reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the
Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and
private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's
complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter
stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did
not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through
Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering
petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias
appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated
August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration
having been denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of
their right to dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner
in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners
must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for
the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the
defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its
spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain
norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve
as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end
that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.)
Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
 Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights
but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law
since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does
not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code
provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p.
40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no
rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether
the legal and factual circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co.
of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra;Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v.
Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-
46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-
30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153
SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law,
depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after
examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all
26
petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent
Tobias who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry
"showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number
one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to
leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)"
[RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether
or not it was private respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's
reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer
who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in
taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to
go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from
such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly
uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private
respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon
reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and
swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators
was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner
Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment
during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to
dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised
and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is
liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R.
No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia,
G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant
case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss
Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21
of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were
committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the
latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against
Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response,
Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company
would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You
Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various
actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well
as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear
violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO
sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due
to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as
a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further
damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent
with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if
not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private
respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the
accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any
threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property. And this includes warning one's
brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man
whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners'
act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two
years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against
Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and
that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by
filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the
commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded
them of substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort
to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto.
Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be
exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971,
38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2
SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a
weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear
perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And
in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld the
judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after
making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints
against respondent, all of which were dismissed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted
by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v.
CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit by
itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA,
G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal
complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no
competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R.
No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].
In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith
in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias, observing that:
xxx
Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6)
criminal cases, five (5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial document
and one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure
of correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or lack of evidence." The
27
dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry
invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted to, two of these cases
were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was frustrated
by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.
xxx
To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro
Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of
participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the
negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo,
and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report
will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6)
criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of
commercial document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so
much so that as was to be expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the
investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the
haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and
haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias," there can be no mistaking that
defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass,
oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.
xxx
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].
In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the
criminal complaints were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by
Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were filed, which
the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that
only six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one
hundred cases, considering the number of anomalous transactions committed against
GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is belied by the threat made by Hendry
after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would be filed against
Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was made to hang like the
sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in which the
criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal
dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were
filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the
anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the
cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by
malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed
against petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages;
eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation of the
damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him
the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages; two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary
damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be
underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts,
i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless
imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language
heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to
RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of
the criminal complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court
finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was
reasonable under the circumstances.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of
damnum absqueinjuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff
(private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been
dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants
(petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not
constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v.
CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29
Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20
SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even
granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive
manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners
must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in
connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of
several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled
in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er
express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in
the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no
error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of
the Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants
the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act
performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zuluetacase, the
nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is
sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.
28
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us, is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
modifying the decision of the trial court in a civil case for recovery of damages against
petitioner corporation by reducing the award to private respondent Loreto Dionela of moral
damages from P40,000 to Pl5,000, and attorney's fees from P3,000 to P2,000.
The basis of the complaint against the defendant corporation is a telegram sent through its
Manila Office to the offended party, Loreto Dionela, reading as follows:
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN
LEGASPI CITY
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER
LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER
115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT
BULBUL MO
(p. 19, Annex "A")
Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to
him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected
adversely his business as well because other people have come to know of said defamatory
words. Defendant corporation as a defense, alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a
private joke between the sending and receiving operators and that they were not addressed to
or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog
words are not defamatory. The telegram sent through its facilities was received in its station
at Legaspi City. Nobody other than the operator manned the teletype machine which
automatically receives telegrams being transmitted. The said telegram was detached from the
machine and placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff, obviously as is. The
additional words in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the telegram when
delivered.
The trial court in finding for the plaintiff ruled as follows:
 There is no question that the additional words in Tagalog are libelous. They clearly impute
a vice or defect of the plaintiff. Whether or not they were intended for the plaintiff, the effect
on the plaintiff is the same. Any person reading the additional words in Tagalog will
naturally think that they refer to the addressee, the plaintiff. There is no indication from
the face of the telegram that the additional words in Tagalog were sent as a private joke
between the operators of the defendant.
The defendant is sued directly not as an employer. The business of the defendant is to
transmit telegrams. It will open the door to frauds and allow the defendant to act with
impunity if it can escape liability by the simple expedient of showing that its employees
acted beyond the scope of their assigned tasks.
The liability of the defendant is predicated not only on Article 33 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines but on the following articles of said Code:
ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
There is sufficient publication of the libelous Tagalog words. The office file of the defendant
containing copies of telegrams received are open and held together only by a metal fastener.
Moreover, they are open to view and inspection by third parties.
It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to damages and attorney's fees. The plaintiff is a
businessman. The libelous Tagalog words must have affected his business and social
standing in the community. The Court fixes the amount of P40,000.00 as the reasonable
amount of moral damages and the amount of P3,000.00 as attorney's fee which the
defendant should pay the plaintiff. (pp. 15-16, Record on Appeal)
The respondent appellate court in its assailed decision confirming the aforegoing findings of
the lower court stated:
The proximate cause, therefore, resulting in injury to appellee, was the failure of the
appellant to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the
humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed any safeguard
against such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does not speak well of its
concern for their clientele's interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is
imputable to appellant and not to its employees.
The claim that there was no publication of the libelous words in Tagalog is also without
merit. The fact that a carbon copy of the telegram was filed among other telegrams and left
to hang for the public to see, open for inspection by a third party is sufficient publication. It
would have been otherwise perhaps had the telegram been placed and kept in a secured
place where no one may have had a chance to read it without appellee's permission.
29
The additional Tagalog words at the bottom of the telegram are, as correctly found by the
lower court, libelous per se, and from which malice may be presumed in the absence of any
showing of good intention and justifiable motive on the part of the appellant. The law
implies damages in this instance (Quemel vs. Court of Appeals, L-22794, January 16,
1968; 22 SCRA 44). The award of P40,000.00 as moral damages is hereby reduced to
P15,000.00 and for attorney's fees the amount of P2,000.00 is awarded. (pp. 22-23, record)
After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court, petitioner came to Us
with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner-employer should answer
directly and primarily for the civil liability arising from the criminal act of its employee.
II The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient publication of
the alleged libelous telegram in question, as contemplated by law on libel.
III The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of petitioner-company-
employer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Articles on Human
Relations.
IV The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding Atty's. fees. (p. 4, Record)
Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration. The action for damages was filed in
the lower court directly against respondent corporation not as an employer subsidiarily liable
under the provisions of Article 1161 of the New Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20
of the New Civil Code (supra). As well as on respondent's breach of contract thru the
negligence of its own employees. 1
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting
messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a
contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to
transmit the message accurately. There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous
matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the
sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and
libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent. As a corporation, the
petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving
and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not
liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive
the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate
remedy. In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover.
However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the
doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of
facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the appellate court is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,
vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not
the case? This is the issue in the instant petition for review premised on the following
undisputed facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals
(CA),1 to wit:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first
semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2",
also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student (Exhibit
"A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade
given him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit "2") which was approved
by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on
March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a
grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L", "2-N").1âwphi1.nêt
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate
on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name
appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of
Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the following annotation:
JADER ROMEO A.
Def. Conflict of Laws — x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript
with S.O. (Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2").
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws
was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the
invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates.
(Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there
appeared however the following annotation:
30
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily
complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto
Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called,
escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and
his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a
rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the
occasion (Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").
He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and
relatives who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were
pictures taken too during the blow-out (Exhibits "D" to "D-1").
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without
pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at
the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2"). Having learned of
the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination.2
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless
nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's
negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led
respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when
his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students. After trial, the lower court
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the
lower court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the
 amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages. Costs against
defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.4
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case to this
Court on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no
liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate cause
of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying
from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam.
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education
is entered into between said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or
instructors hired by the school are considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to
perform the school's commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the
school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as
the professors with respect to the status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents
either professors or students from sharing with each other such information. The Court takes
judicial notice of the traditional practice in educational institutions wherein the professor
directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school
to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to
whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a
degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate. Although
commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary
occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the
whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree
during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior
or subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student
of any problem involving the latter's grades and performance and also most importantly, of
the procedures for remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot
be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for
a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of
the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the
absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. 5 It
is the school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its
professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the
computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much
less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in
disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules
and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general
supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of
31
reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or
entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.6
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program,
enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services.7 He
must see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position
outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a
professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting
a student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his
employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is
engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more
specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code
which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide
specifically in statutory law.8 In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will
do them no intended injury — that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them;
that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary
understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal
in the general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of
liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. 9 Schools and professors
cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the
former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and
not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the
rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can
support a claim for damages.10 Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations
coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would
make the erring party liable.11 Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in
the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance
that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably.
Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time because a student has to
comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements
for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of
the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied
all requirements for the course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of the respondent
court:
 It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee University had
been informed during the deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-
appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of
his failure to complete the requirements for the degree nor did they remove his name from
the tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite
the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, againincluded plaintiff-
appellant's name in the "tentative list of candidates for graduation which was prepared
after the deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement rites program.
Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was allowed to remain in the
tentative list of candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able to
remedy the situation in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson,
however, did not explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have done something to
complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee university did not exert any effort to inform
plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I.12
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to
the delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer,
he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it.13 The modern tendency is to grant
indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not
illicit.14 If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury
caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he
acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.15
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the
latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral
damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' findings that respondent suffered shock,
trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to
take the bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself
whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations.
As a senior law student, respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all
his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given
these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered untold
embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and not
being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take
the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements
including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly,
taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects
thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which
the prospective examinee must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand
Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed
from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is
DELEIED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
32
G.R. No. L-44484 March 16, 1987
OSMUNDO G. RAMA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE ABALA, MELCHOR ABANGAN, EUTIQUIO ALEGRADO,
EMIGDIO BLANCO, ISABELO CABUENAS, CESAR CAMILLO, JOSE CENIZA, ANDRES
CAMPANA, FIDEL CORONEL, MARCIANO CUESTAS, IGNACIO DACLIZON, ROLAND
ENRIQUEZ, DIONISIO FLORES, PATERNO FLORES, MODESTO GERALDE, CENON
GESIN, LEONCIO GUMBOC, CLAUDIO LEGASPI, INOCENCIO LLANOS, HIPOLITO
MANUBAG, MAURICIO MANACAP, CONSTANCIO MAMAYAGA, BIENVENIDO MATIS,
MODESTO NAMONG, CATALINO OCHIA, CECILIO QUIJANO, HILARIO DE LOS SANTOS,
FELICIANO SACARES, ENRIQUE SAROMINES, ALFONSO TABAY, ANGEL TEVES, SR.,
JAIME TRANI, RODULFO VERANO, VICENTE VILLARCA, DOROTEO ARMAS, ISABELO
ABAPO, GREGORIO ABASTILLAS, RAFAEL ABASTILLAS, LORETO ALICAWAY, CIRIACO
BARILLO, MIGUEL BINOLINAO, CELERINO BUTAY, IGNACIO BELLEZA, ANATOLIO
BINOYA, ZACARIAS BUCARIZA, FERNANDO CASTRO, MARCIANO DE LA CERNA,
VERANO BADANA, DONATO CABANERO, ANECITO DE LA CERNA, DIOSDADO CAÑETE,
GABRIEL CAÑETE, ERIBERTO DACALOS, NONILO DE CASTILLA, SERGIO DAYANAN,
FLAVIANO DEIPARINE, BERNARDO GAMBOA, ISMAEL GANTUANGCO, CESAR
HERNANDEZ, JORGE JACA, GORGONIO JACALAN, SEVERIANO LANGBID, TOMAS
LANGBID, DIOSDADO LASTIMADO, PABLO LUNA, MAXIMO LARIOSA, VICENTE LAPAZ,
RICARDO MAGALLON, EMILIANO MATARIO, RAMON PADRIGA, NICANOR OPURA,
ALBERTO MINTILLOSA, RUFINO REPONTE, BLAS PARDILLO, ESMAEL REGUDUS,
MARCELIANO DELOS SANTOS, CANDIDO RUFLO, LUIS SALAPA, PEDRO SACEL, FRISCO
SACEL, MIGUEL SARAMOSING, JULIAN VELOSO, BERNARDO TALLO, ARQUIPO YRAY,
PATRICIO VILLARMIA, VICENTE VILLAMORA and LEONCIO ZABALA, respondents.
ALAMPAY, J.:
During the incumbency of Rene Espina as provincial governor of Cebu, Osmundo G. Rama as
vice-governor and Pablo P. Garcia, Reynaldo M. Mendiola and Valerians S. Carillo as
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, said officials adopted Resolution No. 990 which
appropriated funds "for the maintenance and repair of provincial roads and bridges and for
the operation and maintenance of the office of the provincial engineer and for other
purposes." (L-44591, Rollo, pp. 34-37).
In said resolution, the provincial government of Cebu under the aforementioned officials,
declared its policy "to mechanize the maintenance and repair of all roads and bridges of the
province (including provincial roads and bridges receiving national aid "JJ"), to economize in
the expenditure of its Road and Bridge Fund for the maintenance and repair of provincial
roads and bridges receiving national aid "JJ" and to adopt a more comprehensive, systematic,
efficient, progressive and orderly operation and maintenance of the Office of the Provincial
Engineer."
To implement said policy, the provincial board resolved to abolish around thirty
positions * the salaries of which were paid from the "JJ" Road and Bridge Fund thus doing
away with the caminero (pick-shovel-wheelbarrow) system Consequently around 200
employees of the province were eased out of their respective jobs and, to implement the
mechanization program in the maintenance of roads and bridges, the provincial government
purchased heavy equipment worth P4,000,000.00. However, contrary to its declared policy to
economize the provincial administration later on hired around one thousand new employees,
renovated the office of the provincial engineer and provided the latter with a Mercedes-Benz
car (Decision in CA-G.R. No. 49328-R, L-44591, Rollo, p. 37).
Aggrieved by these turn of events, the employees whose positions were abolished filed
separate petitions for mandamus, damages and attorneys fees aimed at the annulment of
Resolution No. 990, their reinstatement and the recovery of damages The aforementioned
provincial officials who, together with the provincial auditor, provincial treasurer, provincial
engineer and the province of Cebu, were named respondents in said action, were sued "both
in their official and personal" capacities as a result of their alleged "unjust, oppressive, illegal
and malicious' acts (Petition, Record in Civil Case No. R-10704, p. 3).
In Civil Case No. R-10704, the Court of First Instance of Cebu declared Resolution No. 990
nun and void and ordered the respondent officials to re-create the positions abolished, to
provide funds therefore, to reinstate the 56 petitioners headed by Jose Abala, and to pay
them back salaries. For "lack of legal and factual basis," no damages were awarded to
petitioners and no pronouncement as to attorney's fees were made as the petitioners had
agreed to pay their lawyers 30% of whatever amount they would receive as back salaries (L-
44591, Rollo, pp. 33-34).
All the parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 49328-R). Eventually, said
appellate court, through its First Division, affirmed the lower court's decision with the
modification that respondents were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their "individual
and personal capacity" P1,000.00 moral damages to each of the petitioners considering that
the case involved a quasi-delict (L-44591 Rollo, p. 54).
From that decision, Osmundo G. Rama, interposed an appeal' to this Court (G.R. No. L-
44484). Espina, Garcia,' Mendiola and Carillo then filed their own petition for review (G.R. No.
L-44591). But before Espina, et al. could file said petition, the province of Cebu and its
Sangguniang Panlalawigan filed their own petition for review questioning that portion of the
appellate court's decision which ordered the reinstatement with back salaries of the
dismissed employees. Said petition, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-44572, was dismissed
by this Court for lack of merit in the resolution of October 25, 1976. Entry of judgment was
made on November 24, 1976.
Meanwhile, dismissed employees Froilan Frondoso and Jeremias Luna, who also had filed
their own petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, elevated their case to
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-04649). In its decision, the Court of Appeals' Ninth
Division followed the ruling of its First Division in CA-G. R. No. 48328-R, held that the wrong
committed by the respondent Public officials was a quasi-delict and ordered the reinstatement
with back salaries of Frondoso and Luna and the payment in solidum by respondent public
officials of P1,000.00 each to Frondoso and Luna as moral damages plus P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees. With the exception of Rama, the respondent public officials appealed to the
Court (G.R. No. L-44842). Subsequently, the Cebu Assistant Provincial Attorney, representing
the Province of Cebu and its Sangguniang Panlalawigan, also appealed to this Court from
that decision (G.R. No. L-44894).
33
On March 28, 1977, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. L- 44484, L-44842, L-44591
and L-44894 considering that said cases involve the same issues and factual background
(L44591, Rollo, p. 344).
Thereafter, Frondoso and Luna filed a motion to dismiss L-44894 and L-44842. They alleged
that as the petition in L44572 had been dismissed on October 25, 1976; said two cases
should likewise be dismissed because they, together with the private respondents in L-44572
who, like them, were also permanent appointees to their respective positions, "were separated
from the service on the same date by the same petitioners" L-44894 Rollo, p. 140) and
therefore, the petitions in L-44894 and L-44842 were barred by the rule of stare decision
The motion to dismiss, however, was noted in the resolution of February 17, 1978, it
appearing that said two cases had already been submitted for decision (L-44894 Rollo, p.
148; L-44842 Rollo, p. 139). Frondoso and Luna filed another motion to dismiss L-44894 but
after the petitioners had filed their comment thereon, said motion to dismiss was also noted
in the resolution of February 22, 1981 (L-44894 Rollo, p. 186).
We find, however, that Frondoso's and Luna's contention that L-44894 should be dismissed
is meritorious. The issues raised in L-44894 and L- 44572 are the same. In fact, the prayer in
the petition in L-44894 is virtually a verbatim reiteration of that in L-44572. The allegation of
petitioner province of Cebu and its Sangguniang Panlalawigan that the question of
jurisdiction was not raised in L-44572 (L-44894 Rollo, p. 150) cannot successfully save L-
44894 from dismissal. In their petition, the province of Cebu and its Sangguniang
Panlalawigan merely argued that the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case, considering that Frondoso and Luna's appeal was perfected after the expiration of the
reglementary period and that their brief was filed one month too late.
However, the trend of the rulings of this Court in matters pertaining to the timeliness of the
perfection of an appeal is to afford every party-litigant amplest opportunity to present their
case "for the proper and just determination of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities." (Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-37522, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 262).
Applying the above ruling to this case, the Court of Appeals may not, therefore, be faulted for
assuming jurisdiction over the appeal of Frondoso and Luna.
Hence, with respect to L-44894, this Court is bound by the dismissal of L- 44572 and so L-
44894 should likewise be dismissed, as it is hereby dismissed.
Proceeding now to resolve the issue, common to L-44484, L-44591 and L-44842, which is
whether or not Espina, Rama, Garcia, Mendiola and Carillo are personally liable for damages
for adopting a resolution which abolished positions to the detriment of the occupants thereof,
this Court has held that, at least, in principle, a public officer by virtue of his office alone, is
not immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith.
A different rule would sanction the use of public office as a tool of oppression (Tabuena vs.
Court of Appeals, L-16290, October 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 413).
Thus, in Correa vs. CFI of Bulacan, L-46096, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 312, We held personally
liable a mayor who illegally dismissed policemen even if he had relinquished his position.
Therein, We held that:
 A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the
scope of his duty, is not protected by Ms office and is personally liable therefor like any
private individual (Palma vs. Graciano, 99 Phil. 72, 74; Carreon vs. Province of Pampanga,
99 Phil. 808). This principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public
officer removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases
saying that by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal
from office, the officials were acting outside of their official authority (Stiles vs. Lowell 233
Mass. 174, 123 NE 615, 4 ALR 1365, cited in 63 Am. Jur. 2d. 770).
We hold that the petitioners in the instant three cases are personally liable for damages
because of their precipitate dismissal of provincial employees through an ostensibly legal
means.
The Court of Appeals, whose factual findings are binding on this Court, found that the
provincial employees concerned were "eased out because of their party affiliation." i.e., they
belonged to the Liberal Party whose presidential candidate then was Sergio Osmena Jr. (CA
Decision in G.R. No. 49328-R, p. 6, L-44591, Rollo, p. 38). Such act of the petitioners
reflected their malicious intent to do away with the followers of the rival political party so as
to accommodate their own proteges who, it turned out, even outnumbered the dismissed
employees.
Indeed, municipal officers are liable for damages if they act maliciously or wantonly and if the
work which they perform is done rather to injure an individual than to discharge a public
duty (56 Am. Jur. 2d 334, citing Yearly V. Fink 43 Pa 212). As we have held in Vda de Laig
vs. Court of Appeals, L-26882, April 5, 1978, 82 SCRA 294, 307-308, a public officer is civilly
liable for failure to observe honesty and good faith in the performance of their duties as
public officers or for wilfully or negligently causing damage to another (Article 20, Civil Code)
or for wilfully causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs and/or public policy (Article 21, New Civil Code).
Neither can petitioners shield themselves from liability by invoking the ruling in the cases
of Carino vs. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration L-23966, May 22,
1969, 28 SCRA 268. In those cases, the erring public officials were sued in their official
capacities whereas in the instant cases, petitioners were specifically sued in their personal
capacities.
For their part, the dismissed employees are entitled to damages because they have suffered a
special and peculiar injury from the wrongful act of which they complain Mechem, A Treatise
on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, p. 391). It is an undeniable fact that the dismissed
employees who were holding such positions as foremen, watchmen and drivers, suffered the
uncertainties of the unemployed when they were plucked out of their positions. That not all of
them testified as to the extent of damages they sustained on account of their separation from
their government jobs, cannot be used as a defense by the petitioners. Suffice it to state that
considering the positions they were holding, the dismissed employees concerned belong to a
low-salaried group, who, if deprived of wages would generally incur considerable economic
hardships.
34
Justice demands that they be recompensed for the predicament they were placed in, apart
from the back salaries which they are entitled to as a matter of right. We are inclined to agree
that the amount of P1,000.00 damages granted to each of them by the Court of Appeals was
fixed by that court judiciously and is a reasonable sum (Article 2216, Civil Code).
Petitioner Rama's protestations that when he eventually became the governor of Cebu, he
reinstated most of the dismissed employees through provincial board Resolution No. 392 (L-
44484 Rollo, p. 16) cannot erase the fact that he had a hand in the adoption of Resolution
No. 990. His subsequent benevolent act cannot sufficiently make up for the damage suffered
by the dismissed employees during their period of unemployment.
Apropos the practice of victorious politicians to remove government employees who did not
support them in their campaign for office, this Court has said: "There are altogether too many
cases of this nature, wherein local elective officials, upon assumption to office, wield their
new-found power indiscriminately by replacing employees with their own proteges regardless
of the laws and regulations governing the civil service. Victory at the polls should not be
taken as authority for the commission of such illegal acts." (Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, L-20977,
September 7, 1968, 25 SCRA 1.)
WHEREFORE, in L-44894, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit. In L-44484, L-44591 and L-44842, the decision of the First and Ninth Divisions of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense
that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one
Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant
cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that
defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's
affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved
are purely of law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one
Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and
unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and
Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his
aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was
an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because
of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs
who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The
two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the
town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged
love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each
other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their
love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant
was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even
filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between
defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at
54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house.
After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes
were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside
Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size,
was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will
have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the
present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant,
being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that
plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant and
35
Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her
parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the
reason that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win
Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court
may not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We
cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human
emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other,
not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and in full
consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita,
being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's
affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious
scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is
shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted
her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's
family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered
as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her
parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita.
Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national.
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the
parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has
caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married
man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay
the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and
expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court
of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of
her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of
promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the
latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said
court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimonypendente lite, P50.00
a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later
on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the
natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant
to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or
before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of
FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory
damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the
further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs
against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the
actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to
P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for
breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in
the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years
younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he
had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a
life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the
petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual
intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way,
whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17,
1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954,
defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on
or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain
permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code
provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract
marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise
is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a
minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of
the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who without just cause refuses
to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may have
incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
36
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be
brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De
Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . .
upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the
Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We
quote from the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these
articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil
Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is
advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to
betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral
damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a
marriage engagement to be broken.1awphîl.nèt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under
Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or
guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a
female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of the parents
or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in
case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not
civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility
of a male for seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party
even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor
refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and
pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
 Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the
affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for
damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be
obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the
promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the
report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The
history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It
is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm
suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344
Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762
Nevada 1943 — p. 75
Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141
New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223
California 1939 — p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326
Indiana 1936 — p. 1009
Michigan 1935 — p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in
legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the
creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence of years of
experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong direction.
(Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear
and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The
Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-
appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her
age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is
liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the
provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
37
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs
preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in
said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is
the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal
Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say
that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10)
years younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be —
when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because,
the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of
P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had
allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual
and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's
fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 — consisting of
P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and
the balance representing expenses incurred to support the child — and increased the moral
damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this
instance. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-14733 September 30, 1960
ERLINDA ESTOPA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LORETA PIANSAY, JR., defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Negros Occidental court of first instance awarding to plaintiff
the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees.
As stated by the court below, "this is an action for recovery of moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees. There is no dispute regarding the facts of this case. The plaintiff Erlinda
Estopa, a beautiful girl of twenty-three, residing in Bago, Negros Occidental, with her
widowed mother, Felicidad Estopa, stated that she fell in love and submitted herself
completely to the defendant Loreta Piansay, Jr., sometime in September, 1957, after a
courtship that lasted for a couple of months during which period the defendant consistently
promised and succeeded to make her believe in him that he was going to marry her; that
sometime in December, 1957, the plaintiff was informed reliably that defendant was backing
out from his promise of marriage so she demanded defendant's compliance to his promise in
order to vindicate her honor, and plaintiff went to the extent of asking the help of defendant's
parents, but all her efforts were in vain. Finally, realizing that her efforts were futile but
knowing that her cause was not completely lost, she decided to file her complaint, not to
compel defendant to marry her, but to demand from him a compensation for the damages
that she sustained."
There is no claim for any other kind of damages. In fact, Erlinda Estopa filed no brief here.
And her complaint merely alleged "social humiliation, mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feeling and moral shock."1awphîl.nèt
We have today decided that in this jurisdiction, under the New Civil Code, the mere breach of
a promise to marry is not actionable. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, Supra, 631); and we
have reversed the Cebu court's award for moral damages in breach of promise suit.
Consistently with such ruling, Loreta Piansay, Jr. may not be condemned to pay moral
damages, in this case.
Now, as plaintiff has no right to moral damages, she may not demand exemplary damages.
(She lays no claim to temperate or compensatory damages.)
While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. (Art. 2234,
New Civil Code) (Emphasis supplied.)
Therefore, as plaintiff is not entitled to any damages at all, there is no reason to require
Piansay, Jr. to satisfy attorney's fees.
Judgment reversed, defendant absolved from all liability. No costs.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is
worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to
get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this
note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
38
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a
scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA
LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff
adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment
was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings
and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court,
on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23,
1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable
settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the
opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his
counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief.
The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's
residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted
from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on
September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956
calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however,
defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant
has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant
alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it
was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being
negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid
defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his
petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's
cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous
event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere
conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10,
1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a
mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having
been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs.
Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating
the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33)
of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have
to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs.
Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code
authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733,
Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the
provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for
September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel
for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the
flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers
were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the
wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will
have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed
rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony
is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
39
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No
question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert
hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00,
should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article
2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as
under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... ,
reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the
particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is
deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment
is hereby affirmed, with costs.
G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by
the former, his mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision 1 dated April 30, 1981 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner's complaint and set
aside the resolution 2 dated October 21, 1976 of the then Court of First Instance of Davao,
16th Judicial District, amending the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976
and ordering private respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge the minor Michael
Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor
child; (3) to pay complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral
damages; and (4) to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.
It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for
acknowledgment, support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. The case
was filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and docketed as Civil Case No.
8881. In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges, among others, that sometime in the
month of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz,
Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan
invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan
professed his love and courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's
proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to
which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside
his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married
man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November,
1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas
for help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other
man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the
complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress;
that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000 to
P8,000. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail
Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. By way of counterclaim, he further
prayed for the payment of exemplary damages and litigation expense including attorney's fees
for the filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint
impleading as co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was born on August 3, 1975. In
its order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court admitted the amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint reiterating
his previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the dispositive portion
of which reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Amelita Constantino and against defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages; and, the sum of
P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Ivan
Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by
evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the recognition and support of her
son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Constantino's motion
for reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976
to read as follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Amelita Constantino and plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino, and against defendant Ivan
Mendez ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of
40
actual and moral damages and the sum of P200.00 as and by way of payment of the
hospital and medical bills incurred during the delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael
Constantino; to recognize as his own illegitimate child the plaintiff-minor Michael
Constantino who shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining to a
child of such status; to give a permanent monthly support in favor of plaintiff Michael
Constantino the amount of P300.00; and the sum of P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney's
fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21, 1976.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside and the
complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court and in dismissing
the complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual findings of the
trial and in not affirming the decision of the trial court. They also pointed out that the
appellate court committed a misapprehension of facts when it concluded that Ivan did not
have sexual access with Amelita during the first or second week of November, 1976 (should
be 1974), the time of the conception of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only a persuasive
and not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to review the factual findings of the trial
court and rectify the errors it committed as may have been properly assigned and as could be
established by a re-examination of the evidence on record. It is the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals, not those of the trial court, that as a rule are considered final and
conclusive even on this Court (Hermo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]).
This being a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court will review
only errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-
examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the evidence on record or the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, et al., 158 SCRA 138
[1988]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that Amelita
Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is
the father of her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based on the evaluation of the
evidence on record is controlling on this Court as the same is supported by the evidence on
record. Even the trial court initially entertained such posture. It ordered the recognition of
Michael as the illegitimate son of Ivan only when acting on the motions for reconsideration, it
reconsidered, on October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated June 21, 1976. Amelita's
testimony on cross-examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first
or second week of November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her
response that she could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November,
1974 (Ibid, p. 106). Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of
November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as
she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September,
October and November, 1974.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that as
correctly pointed out by private respondent's counsel, citing medical science (Williams
Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean duration of actual pregnancy,
counting from the day of conception must be close to 267 days", the conception of the child
(Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before August 3, 1975 or sometime in the
second week of November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with
Ivan in November, 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own evidence
(Exh. F), the letter dated February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez requesting for a
conference, prepared by her own counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have
confided the attendant circumstances of her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory,
informing Ivan that Amelita is four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the
duration of actual pregnancy, the child was conceived on or about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 65)
is belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason
for her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She
also confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her
work. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may
be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to
establish her affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint
must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil
Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we
cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse is not by itself a
basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of
voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was
already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 3,
1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had
she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately
severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact
sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of
September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only
indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that
made her submit herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
41
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set
aside the Decision 1of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not
damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation
of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22)
years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at
the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical
course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the
latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester,
which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a
virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's
attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result
of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of
the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated
their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of
the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true
facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought
the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not
maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she
had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took
place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the
complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily
dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and
P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order 4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the
defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan
City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College
of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue,
Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to
pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation
expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and
private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because
of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by
reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with
Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be
held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and
relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and
42
(g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality,
have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court
gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have
had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence
for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as
follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had
a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He
later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his
proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her
hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform
them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to
"E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff,
were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers
and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and
because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his
proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their
house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When
plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie
plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4
o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day.
As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her
some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept
reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied
her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a
barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him
to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-
trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of
his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started
preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many
relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court
erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him
to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in
toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact,
respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29
years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that
she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had
boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed
to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant
must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception
of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures
Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a
nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least
thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a
beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on
March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's
mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's
hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship
between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and
(sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where
defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned
from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn
March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and
must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly
admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S.
Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in
Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt
so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a
young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent
and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception
on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and
undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and
43
deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has
been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to
study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made,
under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and
injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in
this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises
therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at
bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed
any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed
love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He
criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs,
traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian
ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to
fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to
the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes
that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral
character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for
consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also
promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special
circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and
the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of
his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of
witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not
disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court.
There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, inMedina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this
Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where
there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-
9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate
and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts
must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions
that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of
breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other
action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm
suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
44
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes,
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the
interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year
old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved.
The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action
for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right
of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal
acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to
be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered
by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts
which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills
that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code,
Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.
The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article
337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school
teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found
that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for
him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the
benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if
there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not
convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion
were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach
of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded
(U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
45
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the
path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception
is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a
recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for
the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such
cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from
1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual
relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible
with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had
the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces,
much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that
no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently
retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been
carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual
lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs.
Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29,
1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the
carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence
recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no
recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion: No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there wasseduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the
vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or
qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age,
has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be
the basis for indemnity.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may
not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner
in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that
she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari
delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime;
equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression
court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the
under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was
may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as itself procured by
there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act fraud. 36
is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or
dismissal of the criminal case for that reason. In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by
for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It
to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f.
private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their
relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said
that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse
or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial
assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34 WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the SO ORDERED.
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved
by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have
even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty
words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was
nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease
and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied
the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner
committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

46