I. SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED V.

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-381 was issued in favor of Rafael
Galvez, over four parcels of land - Lot 1 with 6,571 square meters; Lot 2, with 16,777 square meters;
Lot 3 with 1,583 square meters; and Lot 4, with 508 square meters. On April 11, 1960, Lots No. 1 and 4
were conveyed by Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and
Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale which was inscribed as Entry No. 9115 OCT No.0-381 on August 10,
1960. August 16, 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company.

On February 1, 1963, unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, the Court of First
Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, issued an order declaring OCT No. 0-381 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of La Union issued in the name of Rafael Galvez, null and void, and ordered the
cancellation thereof.

On October 28, 1963, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold to herein petitioner Lots No. 1
and 4. In the meantime, Rafael Galvez filed his motion for reconsideration against the order issued by
the trial court declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void. The motion was denied. The Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued an Entry of Judgment, certifying that its decision dated
August 14, 1973 became final and executory on October 23, 1973. Twenty four long years, thereafter,
on January 14, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter dated January 11, 1999 from
Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, stating that the
aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court in L.R.C. No. N-361 have not been executed by the
Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union despite receipt of the writ of execution. On April 21, 1999,
the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles
before the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region (Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union)

ISSUE:

whether or not the Republic of the Philippines can maintain the action for revival of judgment
herein

HELD:

No. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be
invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While
Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez’s title was ordered
cancelled, the same no longer holds true today.

With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right or
interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the
instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in
cases where the government is a party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” To
qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must
appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to enforced. A real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. Being the owner of the areas
covered by Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not the Government,
which stands to be benefited if the land issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled.
III. SATURNINO BERMUDEZ

FACTS:

Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief before the SC, asking the same Court to clarify exactly
who were being referred to in Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution. Said provision
reads in part: "The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February
7, 1986 election is, for the purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June
30, 1992."

ISSUE:

Does Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution pertain to incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or to elected President Ferdinand Marcos and Vice-President
Arturo Tolentino?

HELD:

Petition has no merit and should be dismissed outright for the following reasons:
 petitions for declaratory relief do not fall within the jurisdiction of the SC;
 petitioner does not have the legal standing to sue;
 although no respondent is impleaded, the instant petition amounts to a suit against incumbent
President Corazon Aquino, who is immune from suits during her incumbency;
 it should be fairly obvious -- mutatis mutandis, there should be no question -- that the
aforecited provision pertains to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador
Laurel. The Aquino administration is legitimately recognized by other nations, and all eleven
members of the SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the land under her government;
and
 the people of the Philippines have accepted her government as the one in effective control of
the country, such that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government.
___

De facto means "actual" or "in reality." Therefore, a de facto government is one that exercises power
as if legally constituted even though it is not formally recognized. De jure means "by right" or
something that is based on laws or actions of the State.
III. ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESSICATORS VS. PHILIPPINE COCONUT
DESICCATORS

FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's
Administrative Order, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, writ of preliminary
injunction, while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA
issued a Resolution for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the
coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors,
the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration
of quality standards.

The PCA issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut
processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines for
not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent petitioner received no reply
from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA
has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate.

ISSUES:
At issue in this case is the validity of a resolution, of the Philippine Coconut Authority in which it
declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a
license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business.

HELD:
The petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued under it are
hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut
Authority to adopt or issue. The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for
authority to adopt the resolution in question. The President Aquino approved the establishment and
operation of new DCN plants subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA. In the first place, it could
not have intended to amend the several laws already mentioned, which set up the regulatory system,
by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place, even if that had been her intention, her act
would be without effect considering that, when she issued the memorandum in question on February
11, 1988, she was no longer vested with legislative authority.

PRINCIPLES

The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so
strenuously urged by the Solicitor General rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies
before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of
respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the
exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of
administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion
doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete[4] and it is
clear, in the case at bar, that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of
the desiccated coconut industry became effective. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of
the President of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D.
No. 1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it
to be approved by the President before they become effective.
IV. WILLIAM C. REAGAN, PETITIONER VS COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS:
The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of Bendix Radio, Divison of
Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided technical assistance to the United States Air Force was
assigned at the Clark Air Base Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19. Nine months, before his tour duty
expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960 Cadillac car which valued at $6443.83. More than two
months after the car was imported, petitioner requested the Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to
sell the car. The request was granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member of the United
States Armed Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases.
On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private in US Marine
Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill of sale executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date
William Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence by a deed of sale executed in
Manila.
The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal exemption which
the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net income arising from such transaction the amount of
P17912.34 rendering him liable for income tax of P2979.00. After paying the sum, he sought refund
from the respondent claiming that he is exempted. He filed a case within the Court of Tax Appeals
seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal rate of interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by respondent from petitioner.

RULING:
The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state. Its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. Its laws govern therein and everyone to whom it applies must submit
to its term. It does not prelude from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional rights over certain portions of its territory. Such areas sustain their status as native soil
and still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished but it does not disappear.
The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of
the Military Bases Agreement which states that a “national of the US serving or employed in the
Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, or defense of the bases and
residing in the Philippines only by reason such unemployment is not to be taxed on his income unless
derived in the bases which one clearly derived the Phil.
Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals rendering the
petitioner liable of the income tax arising from the sale of his automobile that have taken place in Clark
Air Field which is within our territory to tax.
V. PEOPLE VS. GOZO
G.R. No. L-36409 October 26, 1973

FACTS: Appellant Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval
Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City, which she then demolished to build
another one in its place. These she did without securing the building permit from the City Mayor of
Olongapo City, as provided for in Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964. She was convicted by the trial
court of violation of the said ordinance, which she contested by invoking due process as taught in
People vs. Fajardo. Appellant Gozo maintained that her house was constructed within the naval base
leased to the American armed forces. She argued the validity of Municipal Order No. 14 or at the very
least its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base.

ISSUE: Whether or not Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964 is valid and may be enforced within the
naval base.

HELD: Yes. First, the Court held that using the precedent in People vs. Fajardo is fruitless because this
case contemplates upon defendant Fajardo who tried securing a permit from the Mayor and, when
unable to, built his home nonetheless for needing it badly. The case at bar, on the other hand, shows
that the appellant never bothered to comply with the ordinance. The Court reiterated that, under the
terms of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States, The Philippine Government has
not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. The United States Government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. Jurisdiction of the Philippines over the
military bases may be diminished but it does not disappear. These bases are under lease to the
American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be
foreign territory.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found the accused,
Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of
1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and modified insofar as she is required to demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she
being given a period of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain the required
permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring demolition be
enforced. Costs against the accused.
VII. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA
[G.R. L-13250] October 29, 1971
En Banc

FACTS:
Maria Cerdiera is a Spanish national (Filipina married to a Spanish citizen), lived in Morocco and died
there. In the Philippines, she left intangible properties. The person tasked as administrator of the
intangible properties is Antonio Campos Rueda. He filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return
on all properties left by her. The Collector of Internal Revenue, the respondent, pending the
investigation of the tax value of the properties, issued an assessment for estate tax worth P111,592.48
and inheritance tax worth P187,791.48 with a total amount of P369,383.96. These tax liabilities were
paid by Antonio Rueda.
Later, Campos Rueda filed an amended tax return wherein the properties worth P396,308.90 are
claimed as exempted from taxes. Respondent, still pending investigation on the same subject, issued
another assessment for estate tax worth P202,262.40 and inheritance taxed worth P267,402.84 with a
total amount of P469,665.24.

ISSUES:
Respondent’s reply to the request for exemption of taxes, etc.:
(1) There is no reciprocity as it did not meet the requirements mentioned in Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Tangier is a mere principality and not a foreign country.
(Note: As argued, section 122, in relation to the case, grants certain exemption of taxes provided that
‘reciprocity’ be met and for reciprocity to be met, Tangier must be a foreign country within the meaning
of Section 122).
(2) Respondent denied request for exemption because the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
(3) Respondent demanded the payment of the sums of 239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and
inheritance tax including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties.
The Court of Tax Appeals ruled:
(1) Tangier allows a similar law for the exemption of taxes. Such exemption is sufficient to entitle
Antonio Rueda to the exemption benefits. There is no lacking of reciprocity.
The Collector of Internal Revenue asked a question of law:
(1) Whether the requisites of statehood is necessary (sine qua non) for the acquisition of international
personality.
(2) Whether acquisition of international personality is required for a ‘foreign country’ to fall within the
exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
The Supreme Court referred the case back to the Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the
alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption required by Section 122.

HELD:
(1) Requisite of Statehood is necessary.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line
with Pound’s formulation that:“it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of
outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of law.”
(2) Tangier is a state.
(3) Section 122 does not require that the “foreign country” possess an international personality. In other
words, international personality is not a requisite.
(4) Supreme Court affirms Court of Tax Appeals ruling. (Note: Look at the ruling of the Court of Appeals
found in the issue.)
VIII. BACANI VS. NACOCO

G.R. NO. L-9657, NOVEMBER 29, 1956

FACTS:

Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut
Corporation, AssistantCorporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant ,requested said
stenographers for copies of thetranscript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing
714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their billsfor the payment of their fees. The National
Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacaniand P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for
said transcript at the rate of P1 per page the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said
amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed
that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of
the fees in question.

ISSUE : WON NACOCO is a Government Entity

HELD:

They do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they donot come under the classification of
municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National CoconutCorporation. While it was
organized with the purpose of ³adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States´ and of providing ³Facilities for the better curing of copra products and
the proper utilization of coconut by-products´, a function which our government has chosen to exercise
to promote thecoconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from
our government, for it wasmade subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its
corporate existence and the powers that it mayexercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private
corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court hasaptly said,
³The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public.
the term ³Government of the Republic of the Philippines´ used in section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of
thegovernment are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms
through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form
of local government. These are whatwe call municipal corporations. They do not include government
entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which
are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, dutiesand liabilities have to be determined in the
light of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not thereforecome within the exemption
clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court
IX. RUFFY VS. CHIEF OF STAFF

RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET
AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946

Nature of the Action: Petition for prohibition, praying that respondents be commanded to desist from
further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before the military court

Facts: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated
camps or military bases all over the country. When the Japanese forces reached Mindoro, Ruffy and his
band were forced to retreat to the mountains. A guerilla outfit was then organized, called as the “Bolo
Area”. However, a certain Capt. Esteban Beloncio relieved petitioners of their positions and duties in
the “Bolo Area”, after Lieut. Col. Enrique Jurado effected a change of command. The latter, however,
was slain allegedly by petitioners, and it was this murder which gave rise to petitioners’ trial, the
legality of which is now being contested.

Issue: Were the petitioners subject to the military law at the time of war and Japanese occupation?

Ruling: Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed with
costs.

Ratio Decidendi: Yes, the petitioners were subject to military law. By their acceptance of
appointments as officers in the Bolo Area, they became members of the Philippine Army—the Bolo Area
being a contingent of the 6th military district which is recognized by the United States army. Thus,
petitioners are covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War, and other pertinent laws during an
occupation.
X. MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION

Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of
an appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of
lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated
as Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of
certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a
portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn
Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and
his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the
corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion.

Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge"
but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on
March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in
Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no
longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have
been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New
Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers
cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official
capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their
respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by
or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance
from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to
its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes against Canon 25.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1
XI. LAUREL VS. MISA

FACTS:

Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus. He was then charged and held for the crime of
treason during the Japanese occupation. He anchors his petition based on the theory that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUES:

1. Whether sovereignty of the legitimate government and allegiance of citizens was suspended during
the Japanese military occupation—NO

2. Whether there was a change in sovereignty over the islands—NO

RATIO:

A citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance,which consists in fidelity and obedience, to his
government or sovereign. It cannot be equated to the qualified or temporary allegiance w/c a foreigner
owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he
receives. In the same way, such foreigner remains liable to prosecution for treason against his own
government or sovereign, to which he owes absolute and permanent allegiance. This absolute and
permanent allegiance is not severed by enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government
is not transferred to the occupier, a theory adopted in the Hague Convention of 1907. Thus, it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government.

The existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence at least during
the period of ‘suspension’. What may be suspended is the exercise of rights of sovereignty with the
passing of control of the government to the occupant. However, the military occupant is enjoined to
respect or continue in force laws unless in conflict with laws and orders of the occupier. Such laws and
orders must come within the limitations prescribed by the Hague convention, meaning that such action
must be

(1) demanded by the exigencies of military service;

(2) necessary for the control of the inhabitants; and
(3) necessary for the safety and protection of his army.

If the contrary were true, invaders would be able force the citizens, without fear of prosecution for
treason, to be party to the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own independence and
repressing the exercise of their own sovereignty—to commit a political suicide.

Because the question of sovereignty is a purely political question, its determination by the legislative
and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of the country.

By virtue of Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution, which states that “all references in such laws
to the Government…shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this Constitution”, the crime of treason was made applicable not only to
the sovereignty of the United States but also to the sovereignty of the Government of the Philippines.

The change in form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of
those charged with the crime of treason committed during Commonwealth, because it is an offense
against the same government and the same sovereign people.
XII. CO KIM CHAM VS. VALDEZ TAN KEH
FACTS
Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the CFI of Manila.
After the liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, respondent Judge Dizon refused to
continue hearings, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated
and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines.

ISSUES
I. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made under Japanese occupation were valid and
remained valid even after the American occupation.

II. Whether or not it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and
void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation.

III. Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings
in actions pending in the courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the
American and Filipino forces

HELD
I
AFFIRMATIVE. [A]ll acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de
facto government are good and valid. If [the governments established in these Islands under the names
of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation or regime were de facto governments], the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts
and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion,
were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy in international law,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

II
NEGATIVE. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the
judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the
Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the
Japanese occupation.
[I]t should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas
MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.

[T]he legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own
territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and before the restoration of the
civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and
occupation, it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a
representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in
chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations
asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by
the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907.

III
AFFIRMATIVE. Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in
practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined,
unless absolutely prevented, to respect.
[I]n the Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War, “in practice, they (the municipal
laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far
as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.”

From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute
his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the
stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations
which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will
permit.