Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 124
2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Execu ‘ive Committee Over-all Chairperson MARIA REGGIELEENE 5. DIONISIO Chairperson for Academics LYAN DAVID M. JUANICO : Chairperson for Hotel Operations TYRONE LEWIS D. ONG. Vice-Chair for Operations DANIEL P. ANG Vice-Chair for Secretariat RODOLFO A. SABULAO JR. Vice-Chair for Finance CLARISA G. BELO Vice-Chair for Electronic Data Processing JOSE MANUEL P. PENAFLOR Vice-Chair for Logistics PATRICK STEPHEN M, CUA Vice-Chair for Membership MAICAH MARIE A. PAMFILO Subject Committee Political Law Labor Law and Social Legislation Civil Law Taxation Law Commercial Law Criminal Law Remedial Law Legal and Judicial Ethics ALDRIN JAMES L. GUANZON MARITONI B. MOLINA, RICHARD ARMAND C. ANGELES DANIEL RADJIT D. PINEDA CARL RON F. VILLAMIL, CARMELA J, LUNA APRII. JOY G. ONG HANNA NAZRIA S. MACAPINTAL San Beda College of Law Administration ATTY, VIRGILIO B. JARA College Dean Centralized Bar Operations Advisers ATTY. MARCIANO G. DELSON Vice.Dean and Adviser ATTY. RISEL G. CASTILLO-TALEON Prefect for Student Affairs and Co-Adviser ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES M. SENGA, Administrative Officer Centralized Bar Operations Core Group Dorothy Jean Aclan. Cheska Ata Agrupis, Kates Jstine Aguitor, Edrese Groce Avie, Aysse Trut) Alinea, Donna Queen Attila Noveanne'Sanoron, Martin Alec Rais, Lorle Joslle Bucu, Frances Buenda, Boerwel Cestlo, Pam Louiese Chua Felson Dalagiete, Poteicia Derecho, Frka Mate Gotla, Steven Mark Gayades,Peolo Romeo Valetina Sison Go, Guennavere Ho, chstine Intl histo Franco Lacandalo, Mary Zecile Li, Mark reson Magdame, Krist Maras, hy Joy Navarro, MarviePagesiwangan, Jamaica Wa Pace Nina Kathvina Pineda, Mark Lorena Quezon, Graham Eason Raga, Marz Regal, Zaire Xana Reyes, Louie Slade, Emo San Dice, 4. Danika Mare Santos, Caro Viel Saplan, At Aries Sefioran Jenifer Sexon, Reval Saco, Angeca Sy. Karo Paolo Temondong Hane Darr Ti, Ma. Neisera Aah Tequero, Von Adoiph Urdag, Ma. Felice Ericka Valeriano, Ranier Albert Vllanueva, Glenda Ag Ya, Ma. Celine Endques, Luis Mori Gran, Mark GregaeyAfable,Clseléa Esguera, Nieco Holla. Kent Jeséph impo, Joanna Mugea, Darvet Barnacea, Actin Gem Seforn, Storm Sarmiento, Hannah Caceres, Marie Canite lores LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION SUBJECT COMMITTEE Subject Chair MARITONI B. MOLINA Assistant Subject Chair KARLA RAISA M. APOLINARIO Subject Committee Electronic Data Processing GERALD VINCENT A. SOSA Subject Heads NICOLE ELENA Il C. ESPINA, Labor Standards JETHRO T. MABAN, Labor Relations KIM NYCA R. LOFRANCO, Social Legislation/Special Laws Subject Committee Members MARIA CLARABEL S. BUSINE, CAMILLE ANNALYN M. TOMARONG, CAROLYN MINA M. CABLING, MARI-NESSA N. CABATUANDO, ALEXVI CHRISTIE G. TUMULAK, JESZA MAE M. FERRER, NINANETTE A. BANAL, EZEKIEL V. TANAEL, DIOMDtLIA B. VERGARA, Advisers ATTY, JOYRICH M. GOLANGCO ATTY. THERESA GENEVIEVE NUEVE-CO ATTY. MARLON J. MANUEL ATTY. PETER JOEY USITA UNDERTAKING This publication is the intellectual property of the San Beda College of Law Centralized Bar Operations. Any unauthorized reproduction, use, szle or purchase hereof is a violation of intellectual property laws. ‘hereby recognize the right of the San Beda College of Law Centralized Bar Operations to prosecute any action in accordance with law to protect the infringement of such intellectual property rights. As such, | will neither unlawfully reproduce nor cause the unlawful reproduction of this material without the prior consent of the San Beda College of Law Centralized Bar Operations. Summary of Doctrines ...... Fundamental Principles and Policies BACKWAGES OF ILLEGALY DISMISSED EMPLOYEES MUST INCLUDE THE UNEXPIRED PORTION OF THE CONTRACT; SECTION 7 OF RA 10022, UNCONSTITUTIONAL, ‘Sameer Overseas Placement Agency Inc. v. Joy C. Cabiles GR. No. 170139, August 5, 2014 Loonen, J. a CONTROL OF RECRUITMENT ACTIVITES RECRUITMENT Vilma Suliman v. People of ings GR. No. 1908 Peralta, J... RANTS CONVICTION FOR ILLEGAL, 22, CONVICTION OF REGAL PENALTY OF Estals People of the Enna GR. No, 199211, June Brion, J) Princess Joy Placement G.R. No, 197005, Junn-4i2014 Brion, J IONTH PAS TOA a abe Pe. dohn Seo ON "PAKYAW" OR TASK-BASIS ae Arie! David, doing busings Macasio GR. No, 195486, July 2, Ste p BF nn “ONEAALE MONTH SALARPAEShcome RA 7644 EQUATED TO 22.5 DAYS Grace Christian High School, repr Filipinas Lavandera GIF No 177648, August 20, 2014 Portas Bernabe, J. COMPUTATION OF RETIREMENT PAY Zenaida Paz v. Northern Tobacco Redrying Co., Inc. GR_No: 199554, February 18, 2015 Leonen, J. fs ‘ 29 26 28 ‘Termination and Employment REGULAR EMPLOYEE, HOW DETERMINED Hacienda Leddy/Ricardo Gamboa, Jr. v. Paquita Villegas : GRR No, 179654, September 22,2014 Peralta, J. iiesittetiee cy ee 30 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS IT 1S NOT THE PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE'S JOB DESCRIPTION BUT THE ADEQUATE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH ‘CONSTITUTES THE INHERENT AND IMPLIED STANDARD FOR REGULARIZATION ABBOTT Laboratories, Philippines, et al. v. Pearlie Ann Alcaraz GR. No. 192571, April 22, 2014 Perias-Berabe, J i GROUNDS FOR A VALID TERMINATION OF A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE Universidad De Sta. Isabel v. Marvin-Jutian Sambajen, Jr. GR. Nos. 196280 & 196286, April 2, 2014 Villarama, Jt. J... 7 PROOFS THAT MAY BE PRESEN. RELATIONSHIP Bernard Tenazas et.al. v. R. Vil GR. No. 19299% Reyes, J Pe ye TSEDA a oe CONTROL TEST MUST PE! =RRORMING-THE JOB AND NOT NERELY rOcoMbmaW Fotis CoP LORCENONNES Royal Homes Marketilig/Cor rPide Alcantara AY Del Castillo, J... sib teceelben Q ‘Omni Hauling Services; Ine., etal. Be GR.No, 199968, September 214. | Perias-Bernabe, i DETERMINATION OF NATURE 0 Jeanette Manalo, et. al., ¥. TNS PI GR. No. 208567, Novembe?-26, 20% Mendoza, J Se ae ATTAINMENT OF REGUEAREIPLO Dionarto Noblejas ve katan GR. No. 207880, June 6,364 Mendoza - Fuji Television Network v. Arione Espit GAR. No. 204944-45, December 03, 2014 Leonen, J. PROJECT-BASED EMPLOYMENT, REQUISITES, WHEN VALIDLY TERMINATED Gadia v. Sykes Asia, Inc. G.R. No. 209499, January 28, 2015 Perlas-Bernabe, J : REGULAR v. FIXED TERM EMPLOYEES 2 Basan v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines GR. No. 195412 February 4, 2015 Peralta, J ; SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 31 32 33 34 35 36 7 at Job Contracting LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTOR; PRINCIPAL HAS BURDEN OF PRi enone {OVING STATUS OF Avelino Alilin, et. al. v. PETRON Corporation G.R. No. 177592, June 9, 2014 Del Castillo, J. 42 Dismissal From Employment REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID RETRENCHMENT Am-Phil Food Concepts, Inc. v. Paolo Jesus Padilla G.R. No. 188753, October 1, 2014 Leonen, J 43 wssconoucr on menorenie ii TERMINATION. OF, EMPLOYMel IS: Northwest Ailines Ine. v- Ma, BBReeBelon dl Rosario” GR. No, 187633, Sepfember 10, 2044 OA Basen eee 2S AN BS CONVICTION IN cRIiniNAL CASE alsa letesheViobd TERMINATION OF EMPL OYMENT#=ss2040 St. Luke’s Medicai Center, Inclv. Sanchez GR No 212084, March 11, 2015 Perlas-Bernabe, J 44 45 GAR. No, 208908, March 41, 2018; Brion, J 46 17 1S NOT THE JoB TITLEIBUT T PERFORMS THAT DETERMINES Bluer Than Blue Joint Ve G.R.No. 192882, April 7, 20 Reyes. J ar 68 WHAT CONSTITUTES CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL Chiang Kai Shek College and Carmenta Espino v. Rosalinda Torres, G.R.No. 189456, April 2, 2014 Perez, J) a 69 ILLEGAL CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL Girly G. Ico v. Systems Technology Institute, Inc., Monico Jacob and Peter Fernandez GR, No. 185100, July 09, 2014 Del Castillo, J. 70 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS wei” ~ T Social Welfare Legisiation BIOLOGICAL PARENT AS SECONDARY BENEFICIARY OF THE DECEASED Bernardina P. Bartolor te v. SSS and Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014 Velasco vr., J DEATH BENEFITS UNDER THE SSS Estrolla D.S. Banez vs Social Security System and De La Salle University G.R. No, 189574, July 18, 2014 Perez, J. PROOF NEEDED TO BE ENTITILE: GSIS v. Jose Capacite 2 GR. No, 190780) Septenber 24/261 Brion, J REPORTING eseatesas RESULTIN THE ARG EIT ny ‘TO CLAIM DISABILITY BENEFITS, SITY OF ‘A’ WORK-RELATED FOR'I,TO BE" sia 1 Jebsen Maritime InéApex Maritime Ship Manag Santiago +: Wilfredo Ravena G.R. No, 200566, September 17) 2044 Brion, J GAR, No. 188600, Apa-28,2014 Brion, J... . ee y Z ae RECEPIT OF DISABILITY/BENEFT sECLUDE cua ror Losdor FuTuRE EARNINGS, 5 ee re Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v<< GAR. No. 199022, Apr 752048 Abad, J car FAILURE TO ISSUE CERTIFICAT PERMANENT AND TOTAL. a United Philippine Lines, Inc. and Holl saa i le G:R. No. 201072, Apel 2, 2014 Villarama, Jr, J ce REIMBURSEMENT FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES SEPARATE AND DISTICT FROM DISABILITY BENEFITS The Late Alberto Javier v. Philippine Transmarine Cz..;vrs, Inc. and/or Northern Marine Menagement, Ltd. GR No. 20640, July 2, 2014 Brion, J : DEATH BENEFITS ~ THERE MUST BE PROOF OF THE CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DISEASE AND THE OCCUPATION Talosig v. United Philippine Lines, Inc. aoe Sereno, CJ... SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS "1 72 73 14 76 7 78 79 DEATH OF SEAFARER, INSTANCE WHEN DEATH BENEFITS MAY BE DENIED Agile Maritime Resources Inc., Atty. Imelda Lim Barcelona and Prona V Ship Management, Inc. v. Apolinatio Siador G.R. No. 191034, October 1, 2014 Brion, J. 80 OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, HOW DETERMINED Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. and/or MOL Tankship Management (Asia) Pte Ltd. v. Juanito Bengson GR. No. 198528, October 13, 2014 Del Casto, J at WHEN 240-DAY RULE APPLIES AND, WHE ASSESSMENT OF COMPANY D9CTGC Noriel Montierro'v. Rickmers Marina Ag QAR No 210084, Jeruary 14,2018" Sereno, Cd... 82 Labor Relations ae E GOOD FAITH FAITH BARGAINING AND GENDEADLOCK —— tekst Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees'As¥octt Corporation : GIR No. 170007, Apri 7, 2014 Leona-De Ca8H6 deena 84 COMPANY-WIDE BASIS. Purtsimo Cabaobas v.Pepsi.Cola Products one GR. No. 176908. March 25, 2018,» wows se Peralta, J 85 SiRNo, 168405, January 14 ams 85 Leonen, J Procedure and Jurisdiction < JURISDICTION OF THE LANERY EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; E Milan v. NLRC, Solid Mil, Ine G.R.No, 202961, February 04, 2015 Leonen, J : RULE ON AMOUNT OF APPEAL BOND NOT ABSOLUTE ‘Sara Lee Philippines, Inc. v. Emilinda Macatlang et. al., G.R. No. 180147-50, 180319, 130685, June 4, 2014 Perez, Jessen ‘ 87 THE 10% BOND REQUIREMENT IN McBURNIE v. Ganzon PERTAINS TO THE BOND THAT SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE MOTION TO REDUCE BOND NOT THE BOND TO. PERFECT AN APPEAL Sara Lee Philippines, Inc., v. Emilinda D. Macatlang, et al. G.R. No. 180147, GR’ No. 180147, GR. No. 180148, G.R, No, 180149, GR. No. 180150, G.R. No. 180319, and G.R. No, 180685, January 14, 2015 0 Perez, J : a SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS. east” ~ T CLAIMS FOR SSS CONTRIBUTION, ISSUE ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP AMECOS Innovations, Inc. and Antonio Mateo v. Eliza Lopez G.R_No.178055, daly 2,2 2014 Del Castillo, J... ot LABOR ARBITER HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER DISPUTES ARISING FROM INTERPRETATION OF THE CBA University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union v. University of Santo Tomas G.R. No. 2013957, July 30,2014 Carpio, J. 2 GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF AN EMPLOYER WORKABLE ENVIRONMENT ISTO JURISDICTION OF REGULAR 6 Indophil Textile Mills v. Engr, GR. No. 171212; August 4, 2044 Peralta, J ue THE NLRC MAY REGLIVE EV WERE SURGE carrie, sie uco APPEAL; DEATH B! SIGE Is SNOT GE COMPENSABLE UNDER THE POF CONTRACT wey Lee: Ez Unico! Management’ Sgevices, nc. Link vernal js andor Vietoriang)B,irot, m 93 t ¥. Delia Malipot, in behalf Giicerio Malipot ee GR. No, 206562, January 21, 2015 ne Peralta, J i 93 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN TERMINATION CASE RETURN TO WORK = Ruben Jordan v. Grandes Secu GR. No, 206716, Junesa aura sais Brion, J... ea abe 95 ebay Ora ists shareator M:CouitapAnpeals REMEDY TO ASSAIL AN AWARD O} Philippine Electronic Corppration ( GR. No, 168612, December Leonen, J 7 PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR George Arriola v. Pilipino Star’ GR. No. 175689, August 13, 2014-7" Leonen, ¥. : 98 ADDITIONAL CASES, FAILURE OF THE COMPANY DESIGNATED DOCTOR TO RENDER A DEFINITIVE FINDING AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE 120-240 DAY PERIOD WOULD MAKE THE PARTIAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY CLAIM TOTAL AND PERMANENT Carcedo v. Maine Marine Philippines, Inc. ~ GR. No, 203806; Api 18,2018 CARPIO, J. " 99 ONLY THE LEGAL SPOUSE OF THE DECEASED MEMBER IS QUALIFIED TO BE THE BENEFICIARY OF SS BENEFITS Social Security Commission v. Azote GAR. No. 209741; April 18, 2015 J- Mendoza, : . 101 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law MIN 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS SH A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE CA OR THE SC SHALL NOT STAY EXECUTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION UNLESS A TRO IS ISSUE BY THEM SMART COMMUNICA: IONS, INC. vs. SOLIDUM GAR. No, 2014646; April 15, 2015 CARPIO, J. 103 RIGHT TO APPEAL IS MERELY A STATUTORY PRIVILEGE; HEI ROVI: ‘OF LAW MUST BE COMPLIED WITH. NCE, PROVISIONS MANILA MINING CORPORATION vs. LOWITO AMOR, ET. AL. G.R, No. 182800; April 20, 2015 PEREZ, Jo. toa CONTINUOUS REHIRING MAKES. NELSON BEGINO, GENER DE{ SUMAYAO, GR No, 109185 -Ap20, "2015 PEREZ, J. RS, 105 : “ae i OFFENSE cad cd MA oak eal CONSTITUTE SER‘ 9 ROQUE 6. BENITEZ-and SANTA FE LABOR U WORKERS v. SANTA.RE-MOVING AND RELOCAI G.R. No. 208163, Apri-20/20157 | eke P BRION, J 106 TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE PRESUME MED, ANTONIO: PAGARIGAN.\ cANGEL ‘A YAGUE at Respondents. BRION, J, 107 GRADINGS mune Wilhelmsen-Smith Bell GR. No. 207328, Apt 204R0}5 Brion, J. 108 THE FILING OF A COMPLAII INTENTION OF ABANDONING FO! Litex Glass and Aluminum Supply~v. G.R. No. 198485, Agr 22,2015 ¢ Del Castillo, J 109 POEA HAS THE POWER TO DECLARE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF A RECRUITMENT AGANCY DISQUALIFIED IN THE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT PORGRAM UPON CANCELLATION OF ITS LICENSE Republic of the Philippines, represented by Hon. Lourdes M. Trasmente.in her capacity as Undersecretary of the DOLE and Hon. Jennifer Jardin-Manaiili, in her capacity as then POEA vs. Humanlink Manpower Consultants inc. 7 G.R. No. 205188, April 22, 2015 : Velasco, J 7 ae : cw 140 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS a FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES CONVICTION OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNDER LABOR CODE DOES NOT BAR PENALTY OF ESTAF.\ UNDER RPC People of the Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment _ Philippines v. Jeric does nol preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Fernandez Code for the crime of estafa. The appellant's act of falsely G.R. No. 199211, June pretending to possess power and qualifications to deploy 4, 2014 the complainants to Hongkong, even if he did not have the Brion, J authority or ficense for the purpose, undoubtedly constitutes estafa PERFECTION OF APP! SCHEME a Princess ©. Joy Placement and. “reprégeasing’, pe tutes General Service Inc... Ariele3 3p ofthe Ce 0 v. German Binall IN REPROCESSING called “illegal recruitmént" under ets 1 BACKWAGES Ofy LLEGALY ‘INCLUDE THE UNEXPIRED PORTION (0! 7/OF RA 10022, _UNCONSTITUTIONAL, “Sameer Overseas 10022 is invalid and is declared” Placement —_ Agency i of the three-month equivalent Inc. v. Joy C. Cab! GR. No. 170139 August 5, 2014 Leonen, J. algibe jacreased to the amount of the employment of RA 8042, CONTROL. OF RECRUIT ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT! Vilma Suliman People of Philippines ‘CONVICTION FOR “of Suliman International, the recruitment activities jdubtedly, she has control, GR. No. 190970, the business of the said November 24, 2014 company.“-Thus,\Suliman’s conviction for illegal Peralta, J.” recruitment is affirmed’ APPLICATION OF THE LABOR LAW PROVISIONS ON HOLIDAY, SIL AND 43TH MONTH PAY TO A WORKER ENGAGED ON "PAKYAW" OR TASK BASIS. Ariel David, doing In determining whether workers engaged on "pakyaw’ or business under the task basis" is entitled to holiday and SIL pay, the presence name and style “Yiels (or absence) of employer supervision as regards the Hog Dealer,” v. John worker's time and performance is the key: if the: ‘worker is Macasio simply engaged on pakyaw or task basis, theri the general G.R. No, 195466, July rule is that he is entitled to a holiday pay and SIL pay 2, 2014 unless exempted from the exceptions specifically provided Brion, J under Article 94 (holiday pay) and Article 95 (SIL pay) of the Labor Code. However, if the worker engaged on SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS, pakyaw or task basis also falls within the meaning of “field personne!” under the law, then he is not entitled to these ‘monetary benefits LABOR STANDARDS ONE-HALF MONTH SALARY FOR COMPUTATION RI UNDER RA 7641. EQUATED TO 22.5 DAYS Set etter Grace Christian High’ RA 7641 amended Article 287 (now Arlide 302) of he School, | represented Labor Code, providing for the rules on retirement pay to by ‘its Principal, Dr. qualified private sector employees in the absence of any James Tan, —_v._retirementas hment. The said law states Filipinas Lavandera en GR. 014 attis, at leastbine half (1/2) Perlas-Berabé, months saldtyl ors 6ven} sear of sonic, | bee a of at I . i feggt sermon ne Spas = 1 whole year der inclusions, il mean fifteen 313th month pay DF in five (5) days of he fofegding provision is ijo CBACOr other applicable néwenefits to employees, eee agreement if. it is below the Service : incenth Applicalplewhels COMPUTATION OF: Zenaida Paz Northern Tobae Redrying Co., Inc. 4 GR. No. 199554 Age\fof, the Eats February 18, 2015 SBheAkient NTRCI fd é Leonen, J. Baga mRERTHE ie alleged retirement policy, the Court~applitd~Adicle 287 of the Labor Code, as amendéd by RepublibAct No. 7641 TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 'T IS NOT THE PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE'S JOB DESCRIPTION: BUT THE ADEQUATE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AND. RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH CONSTITUTES THE INHERENT AND IMPLIED STANDARD FOR REGULARIZATION ABBOTT Laboratories, It is not the probationary employee's job description bul Philippines, et al. v. the’ adequate performance of his duties and Pearlie Ann Alcaraz __responsibilities which constitutes the inherent and implied G.R. No. 192571, April standard for regularization. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS wr (CRE) —~ 22, 2014 Perlas-Bernabe, J. GROUNDS FOR A VALID TERMINATION GF A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE Universidad De Sta. Notwithstanding the limited engagement of probationary Isabel v. Marvin-Julian_ employees, they are entitled to constitutional protection of Sambajon, Jr. security of tenure during and before the end of the G.R. Nos, 196280 & probationary period. The services of an employee who 196286, April 2, 2014. has been engaged on probationary basis may be Villarama, Jr., J terminated for arly of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a Bguaim%,accordance with reasonable RELATIONSHIP ES a Bernard Tenazas tal, “fo v. R. Villegas’ Taxi Transport Romualdo Villegas” G.R. No, 192998; ,April 2, 2014 Reyes, J. ointment letters Janization. charts, employee status, PETRON Corporation 94 GR. No, 177592, June’) 9, 2014 Del Castillo, J. ial capital, investment, % the principal is the one legitimate contractor, said ATTAINMENT OF REGULAR “EMPLOYEENSTATUS; PROOF OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL Dionarto Noblejas vs The continuing need for employee's services is sufficient Italian Maritime evidence of the necessity and indispensability of ‘his Academy Phils., Inc., services to the business for purposes of determining who et. al. is a regular employee, GR. No. 207888, June 9, 2014 Mendoza, J. CONTROL TEST MUST PERTAIN TO MEANS AND METHOD OF PERFORMING THE JOB AND NOT MERELY TO COMPANY POLICIES Royal Homes Not every control is indicative of an employer-employ SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Marketing Corporation «relationship. A per nd Marketing Corpor ip. A person.who performs work for another and is subjected to its rules, regulations, and co G.R. No, 195190, July does not necessarily become an employee. a rong ue 28, 2014 level of control does not interfere with the means and Del Castillo, J methods of accomplishing the assigned tasks, tho rules imposed by the hiring party.on the hired pariy do not amount to the labor law concept of control that is indicative of an employer-employee relationship. Thus, rules, regulations, code of ethics and periodic evaluation do not involve control over the means and methods by which he was to perform his job. WHEN EMPLOYMEN’ of the Labor Code Omni Hauling ‘ Services, Ine, etal. v. ééiBlishes vin resumed {teBe regular. Bernardo Bonet al. Reset tel i Ep gery and kro walysinformed of GR. No. 199388,... thei eet pe Be “R y je \erployecs, with i September 3, 2014/ (Cthe bdkatgh-an ified at the time Fo ct Perlas-BernabesJy gheyamerezen 8 Py iption of regular 4 employ in Bye. REGULAR EMPLOYEE, HOW BETERMI yer : Hacienda ‘Theitest ‘emiployiment is regular or Leddy/Ricardo fot is the rea gionsbetween the particular Gamboa, Jr. v. Paquita _activity’perforn vee felation to the usu Villegas ploybexlithe employee has GR. No. as{-Gile year, even if the September 22, 2014.8) pe BeiplyIntermitent, the Peralta, 5 “in atihuing need for its : the necessity, if not yfpé-business DETERMINATION OF ‘Ns Jeanette Manalo, et. A length of time of th al., v. TNS Philippines é I-A controlling determinant of Ine, and’ Gary projet ICS vital in determining whether he Ocampo was hited for a spéeific undertaking or in fact tasked to GR. No. _ 208567, perform functions vital, necessary and indispensable to November 26, 2014 the usual business or trade of the employer. Mendoza, J. Petitioners’ successive re-engagement in order to perform the same kind of work firmly manifested the necessity and desirability of their work in the usual business of an enterprise.” - REGULAR AND CASUAL EMPLOYEE. WHEN ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT. REGULAR EMPLOYEE V. CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEE. WHEN DISEASE IS VALID GROUND FOR TERMINATION. i Fuji Television A contract indicating a fixed term does not automatically Network v. Arlene mean that an employee could never be a regular 44 SANBEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS ee” Espiritu employee, which is what Article 280 (now Article 205) of G.R. No. 204944-45, the Labor Code seeks to avoid. December 03, 2014 Leonen, J. _PROJECT-BASED EMPLOYMENT, REQUISITES, WHEN VALIDLY TERMINATED Gadia v. Sykes Asia, The principal test for determining whether particular Inc, employees are properly characterized as "project-based G.R. No. 209499, employees" as distinguished from "regular employees", is, January 28, 2015 whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out Perlas-Bernabe, J a specific project or undertaking, the duration (and scope) i.the time they were engaged for ta6 er be (1) a particular job business: separates, tand ‘the other _~ undertakings, of icular job or runde isiness of the (5, corporations idered project- by complignce with two (2) i ree yee was assigned to id@ftaking: and (b) the ui duration and they wére engai Hicks: yw A resopaee & enaluses rk; ahs rae cea men tefets'to those employees fa particy| ich is necessary or ir usugbusj trade of the employer, REGULAR v. FIXED -TERM EMBL Basan v. Coca-Cola Pirsti Bottlers Philippines », GR. No. 195412... empl February 4, 2015 Peralta, J. been performing the job, 2 , for at least a year. oe IT IS NOT THE JOB TITLE BUTTHE ACTU, \L WORK THAT THE EMPLOYEE PERFORMS THAT DETERMINES WHETHER HE OR SHE OCCUPIES A POSITION OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE; LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE MUST BE WILLFUL ditt Bluer Than Blue Joint It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee Ventures periorms that determines whether he or she occupies a Company/Mary —_Ann_ position of trust and confidence. Among the fiduciary rank- dela Vega v. Glyza anc-fle employees are: cashiers, auditors; property Esteban custodians, or those who, in the normal exercise of their G.R. No. 192582, April functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money 7, 2014 or property. Reyes, J. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS REDUNDANCY v. RETRENCI DUE TO REDUNDANCY Eugene Arabit, et ai, v. and MB Finance 'HMENT; GUIDELINES.IN DISMISSING EMPLOYEES & position is “redundant where it is superfiuous, and Superfluity of a position does not need to be always Employees triggered by a decline in the business. Thus, even if a Association. FFW business is doing well, an employer can still validly Chapte: (Federation of dismiss an employee from the service due to rédundancy Free Workers) __v. if that employee's position has already become in exons Jardine Pacific of what the employer's enterprise requires. On the other Finance, inc. hand, retrenchment is an act of the employer of dismissing GR. No. 181719, April employees because of losses in the operation of 21, 2014 business, lack. of work. and considerable reduction on the Brion, J. voluteeior sings POLICIES, RULES AND REGULATIONS: QNy THE. EMPLOYEES MUST ALWAYS'BE PAIR-AND RI MIRANT (Philippines). While ithe: @doption sand fet Corporation and AntisQeugs..Poli Edgardo Bautista’ v. management pi Joselita Caro not abgolute and GR. No. 181490, April maiiagefiént prerogal emplgyéi must therefore 23, 2014 ensure: that the ‘policies, andwfegulations on work- Villarama, Jr, J. related activitiesiof:tae! s CHS! always be fair and reasonable an ‘oridiig” penalties. when -REQUISITES OF A.VALID IMPLEMENTATION'OF A’RED! SPi Technologies,:Ine, / F and Lea Villanueva. y“employe Victoria Mapua “ecwhitten' nen GR. No. 191154, April 7, 2014 sfnployee to be entitled to cause of death of the DEATH BENEFITS UNDER Tt Estrella D.S. Banez i Social Security death b tS System and De Lac éinployee must be Salle University other illness caused by GR. No. 189574, July e c f that the risk of contracting 18, 2014 the same:is incréaged by the working conditions. Thus, Perez, J claimant has to prové-by substantial evidenos the causal relationship between the illness and the working conditions. SCCIAL WELFARE LEGISLATION BIOLOGICAL PARENT AS SECONDARY BENEFICIARY OF THE DECEASED Bernardina P. Article 167()) of the Labor Code, as amended, includes Bartolome v. SSS and dependent parents who are secondary beneficiaries in the Scanmar Maritime definition of ‘Beneficiaries’. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Services, Inc. Administrative Ruies on Employees’ Compensation 14 SANBEDACOWEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS eae GR No. 192537, November 12, 2014 Velasco Jr., J. deviates from the clear language of the Labor Code by limiting the definition of “beneficiaries” to legitimate parents. It also violates the equal protection clause as there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Thus, it is the interpretation in the Labor Code that is applicable. _ACCIDENT AS BASIS FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS Carlo Sunga v. Virjen The CBA shail previa! if more iavorable for the employee. Shipping Corporation The parties’ CBA provides that a seafarer who suffers et.al. permanent disability as a result of an accident whilst in the G.R. No. 198640, employmentvof:the-shipping company regardiess of faull, April 23, 2014 including: aay ile traveling to or from the Brion, J Ten: bility due to willful acts, ition to sick” a entitled ‘Rit pensation according to they Brevision: of the CBA... > Corporation v. Oscar Chin Jr. G.R-No. 199022 April 7, 2014 Abad, J. ignat award for loss of ys Permanent total his montality. and “therefore, is not -@r illness." What. is work resulting in the ea Es ng ean FAILURE TO ISSUE‘CE Grea pn 240 FSMAKES THE INJURY PERMANENT AND TOTAS is United Philippine Falta oi the compaaysdésignated physician to issue @ Lines, Inc. and _certficatiety# AEGree-of disability of a seafarer within Holland America Line 240 days:makes the'disability permanent and total. v. Generoso Sibug va G.R. No. 20107: April 2, 2014 Villarama, Jr., J REIMBURSEMENT FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES SEPARATE AND DISTICT FROM DISABILITY BENEFITS The Late " Alberto CA erred in ded the medical a from Javier v. Philippine Alberto's disability benefits. Under Section 20-B of the Transmarine Carriers, POEA-SEC, employers. must: (1) pay the. seafarer Inc. and/or Northern sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage in Marine Management, addition to the medical treatment that they must provide ‘SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS i Ltd. G.R. No. 204101, July 2, 2074 Brion, J. DEATH BENEFITS - THERE Mil -BETWEEN THE DISEASE AND THE OCCUPATION 5 2 Talosig Vv. Unit Philippine-Lines, inc. GR. No. 198388, July 28, 2014. Sereno, CJ _BE COMPENSABLE Jebsen Maritime. Inc., Apex Maritime Ship Management Co. LEC,, and/or Santiago v. Wilfredo Ravena GR. No, 200566; September 17, 2014» Brion, J oo?” Sunjntap physician. | . Sone the seafarer with at their cost, and (2) compensate the Seafarer for his permanent total or partial disability as finally determined by the company-designated physician, The Court observes the evident intent of the POEA-SEG to treat these liabilities of the employer separately and distinctly from one another by treating the different items of liability under Separate paragraphs. These individual Paragraphs, in turn, show the bases of each liability that are unique from the others. UST BE PROOF OF THE CAUSAL CONNECTION Glaimanticano Simply fel i Sa fegsthe disputable presumption i thescompensa ‘during the “terme of fan illness suffered by a MIS contract/méationed in Section 20x(8)(g), of the 2000 POEA-SEGAS-he did so without ‘Solid *préofof'work+relation and\Wwetk-causation or “Work dagravation SAMI ilind’s\fine CquFt-cannot provide LL Ya A seafarer whoswa: for-medica! reasons musi, within three working:days: froth his.disembarkation, submit himself to ai {postietnployment\ medical examination (PEME).:tobo conducted’ Sy the,| company-designated rman , forfeits: benef GR. No. — 199780, “direst September 24, 2014 Brion, J. DEATH OF SEAFARER, Agile Maritime Resources Inc., Atty. Imelda Lim Barcelona and Prona V Ship Management, Inc. v. Apolinario Siador C jot award such benefits on the basis ofStres8\and fatigue, which are general consequences of workihg in all kinds of activity; otherwise, we would unreasonably open the flood’ gates of compensability and render the purposes of @ system like GSIS meaningless, INSTANCE WHEN DEATH BENEFITS MAY BE DENIED Under the POEA-SEC, no compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer. 16 SANBEDA COLLEGE OF Law. 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS. GR. No. 191034, October 1, 2014 Brion, J. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, HOW DETERMINED Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. andlor MOL Tankship Management (Asia) Pte Ltd. v. Juanito Bengson GR. No. 198528, October 13, 2014 Del Castillo, J WHEN 240: ASSESSMEN: Noriel Montierro’ v.. Rickmers sNetary award in the judgment Perez, J. snot absolute. The Supreme sPeciing the-bénd requirement to i CaSeS-Where: (1):théte was substantial the Rules,’ (2) perform activities which Ydder For this reason, Omni ile a complaint for illegal respondents to sign eiipl duration of the same peti that they were already te were necessary and desir terminated the employment dismissal, “ The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favebobbetitio employees. On appeal, it was affinfied' by. the: that respondents were illegally cismissgd espondents were merely project A reversed the decision and declared ISSUE: Are the respondents regular employees of Omni? HELD: Yes, they are regular employees of Omri. Article 280 of the Labor Code distinguishes a “project employee" from a “regular employee” as well as establishes that employment is presumed to be regular. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW s (2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS * 7 [p this case, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that respondents were made to sign tly stating that they were going to be hired as pro) ject employees, with the period of their employment to-be co-terminus with the original period of Omni's service tho act Thus, the conclusion is that respondents were not clearly and knowingly informed of their employment status as mere project employees, with the duck : luration and scope of specified al the time they were engaged. Aer poet As such, the presumption of regular employment should be accorded in their favor DETERMINATION OF NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT (PROJECT v, REGULAR) Jeanette Manalo, et. al., v. TNS Philippines Inc., G.R. No. 208867, November 26, Mendoza. J. and Gary Ocampo ile A ‘ oa Facts: ay) 4 < WS Peiitoners wore by TNS a NERS Prblect-to-project ea Various dates starting (or Seyefal 3 The rem, ig jecltosproject employment contract. Thereafter, png nade cAI bended nl NPS the DOLE Reston! Office. They were ‘however agsigned:ottice Rot ona yPEE project. basis and petitioners did not sighdny cobtract forithese i jenfS-wer not reported to tie DOLE either. it L Cee? 5 geidmy \ iok The fast time respondhi-comBany led 0, es 2007, indicating project éompletion on Novémnt joie Among the stipulation: tingle hhalligvethe option of renewing or extending the period ofthis agmearte ich tyrie-gs it May be BEcessary to complete the Project or because we feed furtheltione i fipetenge-on the job.” q ‘ Petitioners filed a consolig were later advised by TN from their current assign ‘any projects. Petitioners, thereafter, filed a complair at even if petitioners were continuously rehired for se fe inifig factor was whether, al the was predetermined, NLRC revel CA tuled in favor of TNS and stated tithe repeated’ye-hiring of petitioners did not ipso facto convert their status to regular employees. TNS conitnded that the repeated and successive rehiring of project employees does not qualify petitioners as regular employees, as length of sevice is not the controling determinant of the employment tenure of a project employee; but whether the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking and its completion has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. ISSUE: i Are petitioners regutar employees? HELD: YES. They are regular employees. « SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law S36 2016 CENTRALIZED Bax OrERaTions Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly defined a project employee. Although itis tue that the length of time of the employee's service is not a controlling determinant of project employment, itis vital in determining whether he was hired for a specific undertaking or in fact tasked to perform functions vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. Petitioners’ successive re-engagement in order to perform the same kind of work firmly manifested the necessity and desirability of their work in the usual business of TNS. The project. ‘employment scheme used by TNS easily circumvented the law and preciuded its employees from attaining regular employment status in the subtlest way possible. Petitioners were rehired-not intermittently, but continuously, contract after co wolving the very same tasks. Further, the Court, the phrase "because.wemeedty e 6 your competence on the jol would refer to a probationary are aa ie of a project employment, pale Wi a ae aoe Jn sum, petitioners are deemed to have become regular employ SA ie 0) BOY ATTAINMENT OF REGULAR, enpipee see Dionarto Noblejas‘vs'ltalian Maritime:Acadeyy G.R. No. 207888, June-9; 2014 Mendoza, J. 4 FACTS. aad tf 4 Noblejas was hired as @ training instructor in Ita was a training center for/seamen and office Managing Director of IMAPI whi administrative manager. Wee my /Prils., Inc. (IMAPI) which “Capt. Terrei was the fa was the company's He filed a complaint for iligal distile apt. Terrei, Ferrez and Mendoza. Terrei had -been’ appolf briasse§ct of the company on # @Acsrionth period, IMAPi hired Bp-Tate, but no written contract erg at nt eons Ue of the contract. Not having “terrei. During the meeting, an incident, Capt. Terrei instructed Nobiejas anew as training i was drawn for his rehiring executed along with otner de received a response, Nobleja altercation between them ensded ts Forrez to dismiss him from employitignt ~— ploy The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that Nobiejas was illegally dismissed from his employment, and avarded him limited backwages. LA added that, as reinstatement was no longer feasible considering the strained relationship between the parties, payment of separation pay was the more equuable relief The respondents appealed the decision of LA before NLRC which reversed LA's decision. Nobiejas filed a potition for certiorari before the CA. CA rendered the challenged decision finding the petition for certiorari to be devoid of merit. I upheld the findings of the NLRC: that Noblejas was a contractual employee of IMAPI and that there was no evidence to prove that he was dismissed from employment. Noblejas filed the present petition for review on certiorari , SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 7 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 7 ISSUES: 4. Is Noblejas a contractual employee? 2. Was Noblejas illegally dismissed? HELD: 1. NO, Noblejas is not a contractual employee. Fursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code, there are two kinds of regular employees, namely: (1) those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, and (2) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activities in which they are employed, In the case.atbench, Nobiejag wad ert period of three'(3) months. After the end of the same position and continued-to, wock ag=such desirable in thé’bisiness or trade or MMA, Fela Officers of vessels. Moréovér,)guch Eortigding HB sehyc ficient evidence of the necessity andiindispénsability of his servi it Taken in this light; Noblejas had indeed atta employee at the time he ceased to report for work. : - 2, NO, he was not illegally dismissed BERT bn wag} for, a valid ér authorized tehtividence the fact cf their The employer has the burden of proving the cause. However, .emiployeestShouid’ dismissal from employment. #2) Aside from his mefe-assertiori 80/6 Noblejas to substantiaté. his claifntt bereft of any indication that he wag, any work assignment tigiso not Ferrez, the secretary ‘ot Gdp ‘employment of the companys to dismiss him from employ Svidence was adduced by loyment. The record is or otherwise deprived of < id to show that respondent Kilgyzewby IMAP to terminate the ACindeed instructed by Capt. Terrei gn Slasé6-srant complainant's demands does ot constitute an overt act of dismissal OWURSCMANy, Tis rather the apparent disinterest of ‘complainant to continue his employmént'with FesBondent company that may be considered a covert act that severed his employment when the létt@r dig not grant the litany of his demands. He was not illegally dismissed SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law 382016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS é AN EMPLOYEE WHOSE CONTRACT HAS BEEN CONTINUOUSLY RENEWED Ol EXTENDED TO THE SAME POSITION, WITH THE SAME DUTIES AND REMAINED IN THE EMPLOY WITHOUT ANY INTERRUPTION IS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE; TERMINATION MUST BE DCNE WITH DUE PROCESS. FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK, INC. vs. ARLENE S. ESPIRITU GR. Nos. 204944-45. December 3, 2014 LEONEN, J FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA Decision, affirming with modification the decision of the NLRC ine the respondent as regular employee. ‘ Sipe In 2005, Arlene S. Espiritu (& Gabed OVE Ui news correspondenUproduceritaske joann DIRE Bureau field office.” Espiritu's“employment contract initially was successively-renewed on a §éatly, sbdsig-iuith! Sakigy in January 2009, Espiritu was.diagnosed-with ung, arzSl will havea oroblem’renewing ster-conteadtsineduit Would ISSUE: 4. Was Espiritu a regular empigyee? | 2. Was Espiritu illegally dismissed? HELD: 1. YES. Espiritu was a fequtar emplo In determining whethenyanemplay applicable test is the reas@pable cone e employee in relation to theiugual,businesstomtfade of {tig contract had been continudisiy [extended or éXguae same duties and remained is @ regular employee. fegular or non- regular, the r activity performed by the Cig the same position, with the interruption, then such employee In this case, the successive renewals of Espiritu’s contract indicated the necessity and desirability of her work in the usual course of Fuj’s business, thus making her a regular employee, with the right to security of tenure. Espiritu was hired by Fujl as a news producer, but there was no showing wiat she was hired because of unique ability, talent ‘orskills that would distinguish her from ordinary employees. Her contract also indicated that Fuji had control over her work because sh¢ was required to work for eight (8) hours from Monday to Friday, although on flexible time. Fuji gave her instructions on what to report. Even the mode of transportation in carrying out her functions was controlled by Ful 2. YES. Espiritu was illegally dismissed. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OFLAW - 39 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS For disease to be a valid be complied with: (1) th continued employment i of his co-employees; Ground for termination under the Labor Code, two requirements must 1e employee's disease cannot be cured within six months and his 's prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health and (2) certifica ion issued by a competent public heaith authority that even with proper medical treatment, the disease cannot be cured within six months: Non- compliance leads to the conclusion that the dismissal was illegal. The existence of a fixed. term contract should not mean that there can be no iliegal dismissal. Due process must stil be observed in the pre-termination of fixed-term contracts of employment. There is no evidence showing that Espiritu was accorded due process. After informing her employer of her lung cancer, she was not given the chance to present medical certificates. Fuji immediately conclud 1e could no longer perform her duties because of chemotherapy ..li.didiict Neither did it suggest for leaves. Worse: it did not What Fuji did/was to inform when she didiot agree, her Gmgetent publig,heatth authority. Ido !ongerbekfenewed, ard her that her contract ‘ela ide iittala: PROJECT-BASED-EMPLOVEESL ERVICES: ARE CaiveGbis rey CESSATION OF THEIPROJEG Tremp uamg te Gadia v. Sykes Asia,,Ine: oe ne ¥ se ae GR. No. 209499, January 28, 20 Perlas-Bernabo, J. Bf FACTS: eat Assailed in this petitionsf6r rev CA which annulled: and’ set reinstated the Decisiin’, of the i validly terminated froin etnploymi a5 bso “Gnd? the Resolution of the Decisigntand the Resollition of the NLRC, and Btlioners\asipypject eripldvees and thus, were Ty al Sykes Asia is a corporation er provides support to itSit their operations, governed Commtinications, Inc. (Alte FSsby carrying on some. of Senters with them. Allte! Ildeemiands of Altet clients for its Suk8e> NO. The adoption and enforcement by petitioner of its Anti- exercise of its management prerogative as an employer, unbridled. In thu exercise ofits management prerogative, an the policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable and the corresponding penalties, when Prescribed, commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. The Anti-Drugs Policy of petitioner fell short of these requirements. First, the policy was not clear on what constitutes "unjustified refusal" to submit to the test. Even the company’s panel had different interpretations of what the term “unjust refusal" means. In cases of doubt with respect to labor provisions, it shall be construed in favor of the work force. Second, the penalty of termination fet shert of being fair and reasonable. REQUISITES OF A VALID IMRLEWMENTATON.OB ARE SPI Technologies, Inc. and Lea VillatidevavVietorial Map GR. No. 191154 yApril 7, 2014 Reyes, J. Drugs Policy is recognized as a valid such exercise is not absolute and employer must therefore ensure that FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorariisRespoy was hired by SPI Technologies, inc. (SPI) as (es intelligence Unit Head and Manager of the company ia) alleged that she , Research/Business The hard disk on Mapua's laptop crashed) causingstiet té [bseifles-and-data. Eizabeth Nolan (Nolan), Mapua’s supervisor, informed’ respondent. th Was realigniig Mapua's position to become a subordinate of co-manager Sameer Raina: (Rai ae to hetifhissing a work deadline Mapua fost about 95% of her work projects,and jot res; the phone that her position was cobs ideted: re employment effective immedietely. AE AEE Ss sASiies (Raingrinformed Mapua over jundant afd thal} she is terminated from i ; ef hina Daily Inquirer. It fisted all ime drgliswhere Mapua previously tupdant. On the other hand, E;objective of streamtining ils A recruitment advertisement of SPL: vacancies in SPI, inclidirig 2 position belonged. Mapua was convinced that fi SPI stated that it underwent a feorgani ‘operations due to the unexpected growth dT Mapua filed with the Labor Arbiter) il@gal dismissal: The LA ruled that respondent's termination was illegal appeal, the CA reinstated the LA’s decree” SPI's motich,for reconsideration was denied. ISSUE: Was there a valid implementation of a redundancy program which justifies respondent's dismissal? HELD: NO. For a valid implementation of a redundancy program, the employer must comply’ with the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employee and the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date of termination; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (3) gq SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 00d faith in abolishing the redundant position; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be deciared redundant. Anent the first requirement, Mapua was very specific that her laptop computer and cellphone were immediately taken, Within edout an hour, her landline phone ceased to function. Her company LD. was taken away from her that very same day. With respect to the second requisite, there is. No question that SPI indeed offered separation pay to Mapua. As regards the third and fourth requisites, petitioner falled to establish in good faith the abolishment of the position due to redundancy and it failed to show the fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining the redundant position. The presentation of the new table of the organization and the certification of the Human Resources Supervisor that the positions occupied by the retrenched employees are redundant are inadequate as evidence to support the redundancy program. As they are, they are grossly inadequate and mainly self-seryiggyMore't6tapeling:évidence. would have been a comparison of the old and new staffing patterasya¢ erik ae list \ewly created positions, and proof of the set .ousiness tary oe al A @ which ,pegassitated the reorganization or’streamiining. ‘Also connected with the eviden jating redu Publication of job. vacancies after Mapud wasitefmiidated trdm employment, Ve Hence, there was noWelid implenidntation obktrediindancy-piogran 7 ppscoenmscoanes 40 EMPLOYEE HANDLING FUNDS AND PRagERY 8 ‘TRUSTWORTHINESS,THAN ORD! Si IS THE ESSENCE OF LOSS:OF TRUST) AND:CONFIDE! EMPLOYEE'S DISMISSAL. a A GREATER BURDEN OF ‘AY ALOF TRUST REPOSED & = 3 P.J. Lhuillier, Ine. v. Flordeliz Velaya G.R. No. 198620, November 12,2044: :0.9.7 Reyes, J Ss ee - FACTS: zi q oS This is a petition for review. on cert affirming the NLRC finding that, Respondent Flordeliz Vélavo/ ty “PeraPadala” as an accounting EE Court of the Ca Decision ers yee Gfi'Pefitioner PJ Lhuillier (PAL) janand bookkeeper roles. Velayo and was placed under preventive-sdpang idustof a formal investigation and after finding Velayo's explanations witout mefitePS-terminated her employment on grounds of serious misconduct and breach of tryste“Thus, Vélayo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, separation pay and other damages against PJL. ‘ ‘The Labor Arbiter (LA) found that the termination was valid, while the NLRC ruled that the dismissal was illegal. The CA affirmed the decision of the ni RC, ISSUE: Was there betrayal of trust reposed which is the essence of loss of trust and confidence that will be considered ground for dismissal on the part of Velayo? : SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 5 2016 CenteaLizeD BAR OperaTions > HELD: YES, there was a betrayal of trust. The respondent was not er just charged with a misdeed, but with loss of trust and confidence under Article 282(c) (now Article 297) of the Labor Code. In order to Invoke such provision, certain requirements must be complied with, namely: (1) the employee ‘must be holding a position of trust and confidence; and (2) there must be an cel that it the loss of trust and ecnfidence. a : Tiel Due to the nature of PJL's “PeraPadala” business. Velayo is naturally in a position enjoying the ‘trust and confidence of PJL. Moreover, the series of willful misconduct committed by Velayo in mishandling the unaccounted cash receipts exposes her as unworthy of the utmost trust inherent in her position. A cashier's inability to safeguard and account for missing cash is sufficient cause {o dismiss her. PJL is fully justified in claiming loss of trust and confidence in Velayo, justifying her dismissal. : a ea ste, se ies, SEXUAL INTERGOURSE We MPANY EB ours TO SERIOUS MISCONDUCTJUSTIFYING THE DISMISSAL oe A SF BEBA imasen Philippirie Manufacturing Gorporation v.-Alcon.and Rapa GIR No. 104864, Odtobor 22:20 Petes Ce TARP Brion, J : sesin ih ome ee FACTS: s Paine This is @ petition for review on’ certiorari of the" NLRC Decision. The NURC Decision affirmed the Lab for illegal dismissal that was filed by respondents aio} Resolution which nullified the (LA) dismissal of the complaint n and Joann Papa. sen) is asdomestic corporation er and:slide-ajusters. It hired the respondents Petitioner Imasen Philippine Manufacturing ? Reynaldo V. Paz (Paz) was a former commercial Association of the Philippines (ALPAP), the sole the pitots in PAL. : pilot of PAL and a member of the Airlines Pilots and exclusive bargaining representative of all ALPAP filed a notice of strike with the NCMB. DOLE Secreta Gispute and enjoined the parties from committing acts which wil further seacestone the This notwithstanding, the ALPAP officers and members sta the DOLE Secretary issued a return-to-work ofder. Pending the MR on decision of DOLE Secretary, PAL filed 2 petition for rehabilitation with SEC ich the SEC approved. DOLE Secretary declared the strike staged by ALPAP illegal and that the participants deemed to have lost er lent. Respondent Paz filed complaint fer illegal missal claiming non- participation, trike was staged, PAL claimed that the respondent was among} ; LA tuled that respondent was~iil executory. NLRC Ssustained the Babre suspending its executién in-view, he apilit reinstatement salaries during the ber Oieal a permis ISSUE: meee n During corporate rehabilitation is sesiee lafles from the time LA rendre season url ver od SRR a ay ay HELD: a 2 i NO. The rule is that the employee: thstanding the reversal of the LA decision granticghim sig 4 PAL stHe-Gourt somehow relaxed the rule by holding that the empioy i fine accrued wages, if il is shown that the delay in éffofcing swithout fault on the part of the employer. The test is two-fold: (1) thefe/ must Pending appeal was not executetdsprior’t ‘employer's unjustified act or otis ‘The delay in reinstating was justredieds 2 recognizes that unless there is "a-restrainifg.order~ the implementation of the ocder of reinstatement is ministerial and mandatory. And it is Settled that upon appointment by the SEC of @ rehabilitation receiver, all actions for claims before”any court, tribunal or board against the Corporation shall ipso jure be suspended. tthe order of reinstatement iGlay must not be due to the Ip "cht of the fact that PAL’s failure to comply with the reinstatement order was justified by the ‘exigencies of corporation rehabilitation, the respondent may no longer claim salaries which he Should have received during the period that the LA decision ordering his reinstatement is still pending appeal until it was overturned by the NLRC. 60 SANBEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS } | or (i) THE RECOMPUTATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL UPON EXECUTION OF THE DECISION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF THE FINAL DECISION BEING IMPLEMENTED. University of Pangasinan, Inc. v. Florentino Fernandez and Heirs of Nilda Fernandez G.R. No. 211228, November 12, 2014 Reyes, J FACTS: The case arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Florentino and Nilda against UPL and its officials, The case was appealed until the SC ruled with finality in favor of respondents. onde opoutation of their award to include tne GEA until finality. UPI questioned in v hile the NLR granted the eversed thy ion, ruling in After the entry of judgment, regp backwages and other benefits ff the re-computation. The LA rik subsequent appeal, ruling in favor of the re-computation. SAN BEBA ISSUES: 3 ILLEGE 1. Is a re-compuiation df award constitutes the final decision decision being implemented? 2. Does payment of backwages cit HELD: 1. NO, itis not. No essential cl ‘his step is a necessary t Sa jgclared in that decision. The reliefs continue fo-add ofCGAt 3° Under Article 279 of the: Labor Code. That “the “amour f 2. NO, it does nol. First, “Artigle’287 oa {(60 is merely an optional but nol the mandatory retirement age. : iJed does not show at whose option it is to retire thesfacpity BYE 65. Third, there is no proof t 60 years of age. And fouth, respondents filed claims for retire th 63 years old, hence, their acts did not necessarily constitute an admission that@0 is the retirement age for UPI's faculty members ila RECOVERY OF ACCRUED WAGES PRIOR TO HIGHER COURT'S REVERSAL OF DECISION Froilan Bergonic, Jr., et al. v. South East Asian Airlines and.rene Dornier GR. No. 19522, April 21, 2014 Brion, J. FACTS: 7 On April 30, 2004, the petitioners filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal and illegal suspension with prayer for reinstatement against respondents South East ‘SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW a 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS ¢ Aslan Airlines (SEAIR) and Irene Dornier as SEAIR's Presieent The illegally dismissed and ordered the respondents, Petitioners with full backwages. LA found the petitioners among others, to immediately reinstate the SEAR manifested their option to reinstate the petitioners in’ the Payroll, However, the ninclatersent did not materialize. Thus, the petitioners filed before the LA a manife station for their Meanwhile, SEAIR appealed withthe NE ROHKE WARS digm i ruling of the LA. However, the NLRC dismissed the appeai anditikew 8 fase Sin@tiaiiior reconsideration. Thus, the latter filed before'the CA a petilion forcantiorani Zine GF ruling of the NLRC.,Moreover. it ordered wages. The CA held that when the faigid6) 12 proper compu aision is:rdv8Skd by a higher #f, an employee May be barred from collecting-the accrued wages, t-shown, that th ‘enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal-wae wilichtt mar ol ieee poe Rayfe-Gonsequently, the Ie) e wher petitioners’ accrued Wages should-onlysbexcomy Teport for work. r t ISSUE: \ eS Did the CA err in ruling that the computation of petitign failed to report for work?. i e HELD. : Yes, the CA erred in computing employee may still-recover the a tribunal. By way of exception’ to theaiy accrued wages if show that the delay) cing the g fi fault on the part of the empioyer..To d reversal by the higher red from collecting the t-pending appeal was without Fa is thus barred, two tests must be satisfied; (1) actual delay, orthe fachthattti ord itement pene Not executed prior to its reversal nang (2) the delay mi je to the employer's unjustified act or omission, th . SEAIR foiled to comply with both tests ®hér, it failed t@reinstate their employees and Such delay Was due to their unjustified acts. Moreover, the respondents filed several pleadings to suspend the execution of the LA’s reinstatement order. Neither did SEAIR give the petitioners ample ‘opportunity to comply with the return-to-work directive Accordingly, SEAIR’s failure in this case to reinstate the employees rendered them liable for the Petitioners’ accrued salary until the'LA decision was reversed by the CA. 62. SANBEDA COLLEGE oF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS REINSTATEMENT OR SEPARATION PAY, AND BAGKWAGES ARE TWO SEPARATE RELIEFS Wenphil Corporation v. Almer Abing and Anabelle Tuazon GR. No. 207983, April 7, 2014 Brion, J FACTS: This is @ petition for review on certiorari. This case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Almer Abing and Anabelle Tuazon (respondents) against Wenphil Corporation (Wenphil) Labor Arbiter Geobel Bartolabac (LA) ruied that the respondents have been illegally dismissed and ordered Wenphil to immediately reinstate the respondents, The parties entered into a while Wenphil’s appeal with tt decision with modifications. inst directed Wenphilto pay the eaganeen st reconsideration of the NLRC's résolutio inding that the “ Thereafter, the sponds fled a petiton for reve — “a sr wit SC. However, the SC affirmed the CA's decision and resolution, Sometifne = eSC's,d ision, the respondents filed with the LA @ motion for issuance of wit ofvexe thabihe’ were stil entitled to backwages from the time: of their dismissal until te NERC's.decision-fiding them to be ilegatly dismissed was reversed with finality. The LA grante nde Wenphit maintained that the respondents were tiled to-peymant of backwages in view of the modification ~of the LA's sulin Cpurstoae ‘With their compromise agreement we ISSUE: ji oe ’ Are the respondents stilentiled cpaymed ay shove y pesaward of separation pay? one 2 / Ye HELD: Cvb-> Yes, the respondents are: ee to tof Spite the award of separation pay. The Court points out tat er separate reliefs available to an illegally dismissed employée-Ba it that was lost by reason of unlaWful/dts immediate future, the transitional period she dismissed, replacement job ° SS Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should haye been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing separation pay is usually the length of the employee's past service, while that for backwages is the actual period when the employee was uniawlly prevented from working. Thus, the respondents are entitled to payment of backwages. : NO JUST CAUSE TO DISMISS WHEN ACT COMPLAINED: OF IS NOT WORK RELATED; WHEN COMMISSIONS NOT INCLUDED IN BACK WAGES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law 63 2036 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Frilippine Spring Water Resources IncJ Danilo Lua v. Court of Appeals and Juvenstein fahilum G.R. No, 205278, June 11, 2014 Mendoza, J. FACTS: Bvenstein Mahilum (Mahiium) was designated as over-all chairman of the inauguration of Philippine Spring Water Resources Inc.'s (PSWRI) Bulacan plant and the company’s Cinistinae Party. Due to other urgent matters, Mahilum delegated the task to Evangelista, Vice-President for Administration and Finance, Thereafter, meetings on the program of activities for the inauguration and Christmas party were conducted withoul Mahilum’s presence. Evangelista took charge and assumed the lead role until the, dawof Pep ene ifoian, got furios as he was Mahilum's attention was calledjyy not recognized:during-the inaugural program, Mahilum was required to explainywhiy Lua was not recognized and.made to deliver hisispgdch\ At thelsainediine, he was nlacaginder preventive Suspension for thiity (30) daysmMahilum submitted, his written explanati spe Subsequently, an Gasket tortedeogr a investigation was coriducted-Whérrhis-S0. was prevented from. entering the:workplacem his services the nextday. } ' ionter fahilliniteported for work but ofa Mex idtandum terminating it en rient, payment of back wages and damages. He argued. that’ hé. waseilles lle Suspended! anc thereafter, dismissed le also claimedhtl o or constructively from the service ; . : er to sign.a waiver i ieee : lorslackof meritand! Because-of the quitclaim that he f (Uled,in.higsfavor. dove {0 the NLRC, while ne ofdheFinatiguration of the Bulacan plant, the wymeanonshe okey The LA dismissed Mahilum’s cor signed. Mahilum appealed to NI ISSUE: me Was Mahilum illegally dist K HELD: ‘Yes, Mahilum was illegally disr iféyee who was entitled to security of tenure. Thus, he could only be dist iUSes' provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Mahilum’s designatioi'as the anarman.of the whole afar did nat form part of his duty as a supervisor. He was engagedktp Supervise the'sales and marketing aspects of PSWRI's Bulacan Plant. Consequently, the charge of loss of trust and confidence had no leg to stand on, ‘as the act complained of was not work-related. Simply put, the petitioners were not able to prove that Mahilum was unfit to continue working for the company. Moreover, Mahilum is entitled to monetary claims. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an ‘employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their rionetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from hhim up to the time of his actual reinstatement SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law a 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS {tis well-established in jurisprudence that the determination of whether or not a commission forms part of the basic salary depends upon the circumstances or conditions for its payment. The Court held that Mahilum's 0.25% commission based on the monthly sales and 0.25% commission for cash payrwents must be taken tc come in the nature uf overriding commission, not sales Commission. The latter is not properly includable in the busic salary, as it must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to the claimant, ‘Thus, Mahilum being illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement and monetary claims. EMPLOYEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY WHEN DISMISSAL IS FOR A JUST CAUSE Immaculate Conception Academy/ Dr. Jose Paulo Campos v. Evelyne Camiton Villarama, Jr, J. FACTS: 7 z ae Aer Tiss @ pettion Feareviow on cents ella EGA CK's decision Dales peltonrs liabie for separation pa/..Réspendent, Evelyn: Gamilog~(Gamilon), was gan emmloyee of petitioner Immaculate one Aen on oi Johan 'Spondéyf-was responsible for pre-auditing the schaol cashier's reportscheckigg in apd, KORping custody of the petty cash fund. She hs also direct supervisionoy Cashier slznice Loba (Loba) ‘ . v an woskiyea fid! desttdyédschool records, anc fees paidforby 186 students in an milon. afr, finding that she was It was discovered throligh an audit ‘hat misappropriated the amount of P1,167,161.45 eleven-month period: Thus, ICA terminated the QF ismissal, asserting) ttiat ICA failed to cite specific negiigent acts or to stal be employed in'adsisting or cooperating with ihe cashier ir. priati the cashier in the misapprepriato! a ve A ‘respondént Camilon to have been validly qe : iS"gameasure of social justice. ipce her negligence resulted The CA had affirmed withmodification dismissed but holding petitioners liable However, ICA asserts tha isn in a substantial amount of logs ISSUE: a Is Camiton entitled to separation pay? HELD: : No, Gamilon is not entitled to separation pay. According to jurisprudence, "separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee's fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause.” Camiton was guilty of gross and habitual negligence when she failed to. regularly pre-audit the report of the school cashier, check the entries therein and keep custody of the petty.cash fund. Had respondent been assiduously doing her job, the unaccounted school funds would have been discovered right away. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 65 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS ON ence” Hence, she should not be granted separation pay. To rule otherwise would be to reward respondent for her negligent acts instead of punishing her for her offense. WHEN QUITCLAIMS ARE B:NDING AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. v. Michael Maximo R. Amurao Il G.R. No. 187225, October 22, 2014 Bersamin, J. FACTS: Petitioner Radio Mindanao Network, inc. (RMN) hired respondent Maximo Amurao (Amurao) as 2 radio broadcaster. When RMN later reformatted and restructured the programming of its station, {Nmurao, among others, were told that thei: employment would be affected, but wore assured that they would be paid their retir maa; i employees and the manager Mint pay. The empioyees later accepted the téfths and exect ie tb jaims agsinst:RMN. Amurao was among those..who execut quitclaims, but later filed a ‘compiaint yo MN for ilegal dismissal with monelctaims. SAN BEDA Bye The LA declared nev ae iS afeiea iy Ac) ati In its defense, RMN-di quitclaim was valid an: ISSUE: Ng Is the Affidavit of Release/Quitolaim HELD: é seogue Yes, the quitclaim is binging. Ne quitclaim is ineffective irr Barring ree (the transaction is shown to be aie fronab) inequitabie. x se eh 8 Against public policy. A f an eIpploVee's rights only when: eghside; pais scandalousiy low and ets eement, and as a radio ‘anager, i pod that he could be easily be duped into simply signing awaystis bife-te contention of RMN that a series of negotiations between-t et ided the giving of the settlement pay that they had considered ds-réasi . itelaim was executed after receiving the agreed settlement pay. ee With the quitctaim having been freely: and voluntarily Signed, RMN was released and absolved from any liability in favor of Amurao. FLOATING STATUS OR TEMPORARY OFF-DETAIL; DEFINITION, LIMITATION AND VALIDITY; CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL Exocet Security and Allies Services Corporation and/or Ma. Teresa Marcelo v..Armando Serrano GR. No. 198538, September 29, 2014 Velasco, Jr, J. ‘SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law ce 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiotari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the CA which ordered petitioner to pay respondent separation pay and backwages fgr having been illegally dismissed from employment. Petitioner Exocet, a security agency, assigned respondent Armando Serrano (Serrano) as "close- in’ security personnel for JG Summit's corporate officers. Serrano was later relieved by JG ‘Summit from his duties. For more than six months after he reported back to Exocat, Serrano was without any reassignment. Serrano filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Exocet. Exocet denied dismissing Serrano alleging that after Serrano was relieved from duty, he no longer reported for duty assignment as VIP security for, JG. Summit, nd later demanded for VIP Security Jients in need of VIP security service which was allegedly COLLEGE OF LAW ISSUE: . ; Was Serrano constr HELO: NO. Serrano was notesastructivély didmisgedsy Code which governs:thefoating statis” or taf considered by the Courtias, a form of temporary defined as that period ofiime whieg i re oy a a ores fic provision in the Labor a ic i of $Bcurity guards, this was iitior tay-dff This concept has been vg ie aSbignnients or when they are Biblevinls-post-yontil they-arestransterred to @ new one. But lefatelyatiie Cavity 1S appliéd’Article 292 (previously mafem se -off to ~ xjmum cf 6 months aficr igpment; otherwise, he is since an employee canrigt be laid Atticle 286) by analogy tel-set the which the employee shouldbe deemed terminated. ~ sity,” provides that the lack of rized cause for termination af lidly terminate a security guard hi sere Aty notices mandated by Article 289 service assignment for a coritine the employee, who is then ent thereunder, the security agency Milist giv (previously Art. 283) of the Labor Codey» SS Nonetheless, while the Court has recognized the security guards' right to security of tenure under the “floating status" rule, it has similarly acknowledged the management prerogative of security agencies to transfer security guards when necessary in conducting its business,-provided it is done in good faith, In the case, Serrano was placed on floating status but there is no showing that Exocet acted in bad faith when he was placed on floating status. Exocet made an offer to Serrano to go back to work. His lack of assignment for more than six months cannot be attributed to Exocet. It is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to immediately declare the mere lapse of the six-month period ‘SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 7 2016 CENTRAUZED BAR OPERATIONS 7 Of floating status as a case of constructive dsmissel, smthout king i i Circumstances that resulted in the security Pee eae guard's failure to assume another post, FOR MORE THAN 6 MONTHS CUNSTITUTES CONSTRUCTIVE SEMISSAL: REINSTATEMENT IS THE GENERAL RULE Write SEPARATION PAY IS THE EXCEPTION : Teel eee er Emeritus Security and Maintenance Systems, Inc. v. Janrie Dailig G.R. No. 204761, April 2, 2014 Carpio, J. FACTS: This petition for review assails C. Dailig (Dailig) illegally dismig Inc. (Emeritus){nd ordered backwages. =~ =i! SAN BEDA ss Emeritus hired Dailig a8 one ofits secur De 00k i aed rm is ou On sie see a RE aha RAD QE er Separation pay agdifist Emeritus-before:the: Gage he CA finding respondent Janrie aid and Maintenance Systems, Stead of reinstatement, and . + Dailig claimed that of Various dates, hbiwent t After more than six\(6)-months Sinceihig tagia assignment. Emeritusapgued thatifan émplo Such employee is deemed legally dismissed ipvhis next assignment. lig-Was not given a new Emeritus denied dismissing Daigg however, it required himto rep relief. Dailig allegedly failed to cotsal The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared Emeritus to reinstate cor RC dismissed it for tack of merit. On appeal, the CAvaffirmed the Le fhiat respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioner. However, the NGRC's reinstatement order. Instead, the CA ordered the: is between the parties. his last assignment, receipt of the order of ISSUES: uu 1. Willa floating status of a securlty‘Quard 1a dismissal? G . 2. Ifrespondent was illegally dismissed by petitioner, Wes the CA correct in ordering the payment of separation pay, instead of reinstatement? ix (6) months constitute constructive HELD: 1. Yes. A floating status of more than six (8) .rionths amounts to constructive dismissal. Respondent was thus illegally disinissed by petitioner. Petitioner admits relieving respondent from his post as security guard on 10 December 2005, There is also no dispute that respondent remained on floating status at the time he filed his ‘complaint for illegal dismissal on 16 June 2006. In other words, respondent was on floating Status from 10 December 2005 to 16 June 2006 or more than six months. The Court agrees SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 68 2016 CENTRALIZED Bar OPERATIONS with the ruling of the LA, NLRC and CA that a floating status of a security guard, such as respondent, for more than six (6) months constitutes constructive dismissal Further, the Court notes that the LA, NLRC, and CA unanimously found that respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC. i Supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court, more So when they coincide with those of the LA. Such factual findings are given more weight when the samo are affirmed by the CA. 2. No, the CA erred in ordering the payment of separation pay, insiead of reinstatement, Article 278 of the Labor Code of the Philippines mandates the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee. Reinstatement is the general rule, while the award of separation pay is the exception, sa . By in lieu ofrsipstatement if best int f the parties the company wa worker's cor : idle, hen the ill'be, tt fipgihy i lati betweer the employer andita cheese kOe” CHE CTY saieaiguio Contrary to the°CA/s.ruling, thereyts noth between the parties to warrant thé award 6) Beevath either allegation nor Proof that such animosity existe respOuHerit. In fact, petitioner Complied with the LA's reinsratemeat citer 4 payment of separation pay,'in lieu Bf rein it aay WHAT CONSTITUTES CONS: iistitution and petitioner Carmelita been employed as a teacher of the Espino is the Vice-President of the pan Petitioner. She was accused of leaking’s’opy of a eral quiz given to students of HEKAS! 6, When respondent was confronted about the leakage, she initially denied it but later on admitted that she gave the test paper to Mrs, Anduyan as the latter asked her to soe the special quiz However, she was not aware that Mrs. Anduyan did not retum to her the copy of the special quiz, The Investigating Committee found respondent and Mrs. Anduyan-guilly of committing a'grave offense of the schoo! policies. According to petitioners, the Committee had actually decided to terminate respondent but respondent allegedly pleaded to change the penalty of termination to ‘suspension and that she will be tendering her resignation at the end of the schoal year. On the other hand, respondent alleged that she was forced to submit the written request for the change of the penalty and the commitment to resign at the end of the school year. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BaROreRaTiOns 6? Respondent filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and illegal sus, Arbiter (LA), The LA held that there was no constructive dismisea’ beseech the Labor issal because respondent was not ppeal, NLRC rendered a Decision was denied, Hence, this petition for review. Issue: Was respondent constructively dismissed? HELD: NO, respondent was not constructively dismissed. There is constructive dismissal when there is ecseriployraehlisstemdered impossible, unreasonable or near ay and other benefits. Aptly wade to apogaras if it were iyewiate dismissal from The school's act of imposing:the-penalty.of-su ne Fyéar did not constitute service in exchange for.the employee's resignatio constructive dismissal. We do fot find Anything ifted latter came about because respondent!was face honorable severance fram employment! Respordentsintpel consequence of thatiinffaction, i... termination of,emplo to resign by the end of the ‘School year. W. wholeheartedly, circumstances :ofeh Fespondent voluntarily resigned isaile to resign or promi ténder her resignation apy other option. That Therefore, there was rio'ednstructive: Girly G. Ico v. Systems Technology btyand Peter Fernandez G.R_No. 185100, July 09, 26: Del Castillo, J Facts: te This isa patton fr review on cenforat the CA Dgbsion which affmed the NLRC Decision setting aside the ruling of the Labor Arbiter (LA) that petitioner was illegally dismissed and respondents were guilty of malice and bad faith in the handling of her case. Petitioner Girly G. Ico (Ico) was hired as Faculty Member by STI College Makati, and was promoted fo the position of Chief Operating Officer (COO). A Plan of Merger was executed between STI and ST! College Makati, whereby the latter would be absorbed by STI. A Memorandum was issued cancelling petitioners COO assignment as a result of organizational re-structuring in line with the merger. An official communication was disseminated throughout STI, announcing changes in the administration, however, petitioner's appointment as Compliance Manager was left out. A Memorandum was issued placing petitioner under preventive suspension 70 SANBEDA COULEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS. & a (Las and banning her entry to any of STI's premises, citing an Audit investigation being conducted relative to the offenses for which petitioner was charged. 'c0 filed @ complaint of zonstructive dismissal and ilegal suspension before the NLRC against the fespondents. Petitione. argues that her appointment as Compliance Manager is illegal, because ine abolition of the STI-Makati COO position and the creation of the position of Compliance Manager were contrived and fabricated. On the other hand, respondents maintain that the merger of STI and STI-Makati required the abolition of some positions including the COO. Issue: 's the respondent guilty of illegal constructive dismissal of the petitioner? HELD: YES, the respondent is guilly ofilleqaliconsteudtives employer cannot prove that the transfer of.an employee isiforsvalidiandtegit ‘Grou gitranster shall be tantamount to unlawful constrictive dismissal. When another employee 1<50Hlafter apg which the employer claims has beerabdlishel, {ig Sinployee who 's transferred againit her willjo-a position which dogs-noyexiat dhe compefate structure, there is evidently a ca otilegat canetotve feo LAND x i>, It appears that the posilin of STI-Makati COO Wasa 800n after Petitioner was removed from the posi This thus belies respondents’ claim tiiat tHe po and was thus abolished ae of THe BEGEASED Nerinh Serictsing ae) F Z & Velasco Jr., J. FACTS: ol This is an appeai under Rules Employees Compensation Cami daceased employee under the 143 annul the Decision of the loner is not a beneficiary of the John Colcol was employed by Scanmat.Maritime Seqviges, inc. on board one uf its vessels. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP), An accident occurred on board the vessel, leading to his untimely death. John was childless and unmarried as of the time of his death. Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome (Bartolome), John's bioiogical mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the SSS. The elaim was denied since John was legally adopted by petitioner's grandfather, thus excluding petitioner as beneficiary, even though the adoptive parent died during John's minority. The denial was appealed to the Employee's Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the SSS decision. SANBEDACOLEGEOF LAW 74 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS: ISSUE Is pet HELD: YES, petitioner is the lawful beneficiary. Article 167() of the Labor Code, as amended, includes. Gopendent parents who are secondary bene‘ciaries in the definition of Beneficianes’ Rule xv, Bection 1(c)(1) of the Adininistrative Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the elect language of the Labor Code by fmiting the definition of "beneficiaries" to legitimate parents Mato violates the equal protection clause as there is no compeling reasonable basis to discriminate agains! illegitimate parents. Thus, itis the interpretation in the Labor Code that is applicable, Sino ihe parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein patitiner. lehn’s sole remaining beneficiary DEATH BENEFITS UNDER Ti Estrella D.S, Bafiez vs Sociall& GR. No, 189574)July 18, 2014" Perez, J FACTS: ) COLLE AE a Baylon Bariez was emiioyed byDo-La:Salle University(Di .a Labolatoty Technician at the Chemistry Departmentyé{ DLSU. Baylon wasidiagne ‘er dleG-with Systemic Lucus Erythematosus. Two doctors af Baylon stated that Systemic bupus, Erythematosus (SLE) may have been precipitated by the chronic &xposure to chemiealhich 16 Ayaceupational hazard in his performance of being a labératory technician,” 7 a Petitioner Estrella 0.5. Bafiez, wife of Baylon: ae of egasiructive dismissal and illegat suspension before the NERG:againstthé:respondantsrPetitigheraigues that the work of her husband which involved chronic exposute, to chemicals rpightha ye prociolteted the latter's illness and eventual death. She’ e \edicel(Opipions oflthe’ two physicians, basco on medical records andindings," asserts that peiitioner fal 0 show, ISSUE: an 3 Mn oa Is the petitioner entitied to-deathyberiefi 5 S i WY 7 iy oa HELD: ALT Ae NO, the petitioner is not entitled to deat upaséidtfe 38S, In order forthe beneficiary of an employee to be entitled to death bénefts under the SSS, the cause of death of the employee must be a sickness listed as an occupational diseasé*py ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contractirig the same is increased by the working conditions. SLE is not listed as an occupational diseasé under the Rules on Employees’ Compensation. Thus, petitioner has to prove by substantial evidence the causal relationship between her husband's illness and his working conditions. Petitioner relied unqualifiedly on the toxicological report which failed to prove the causal relationship between Baylon’s work and his illness. A REASONABLE WORK-CONNECTION AND NOT A DIRECT CAUSAL RELATION WHICH MUST BE PROVED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN ACLAIM FOR ECC BENEFITS SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law iG 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS: GSIS v. Jose Capacite G.R. No. 199780, September 24, 2014 Brion, J. FACTS: In an appeal under Rule 43 before the SC, petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assails the decision of the CA which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) denying the claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 of respondent Jose Capacite (Capacite). Elma Capacite was an employee in the DAR for almost z years. She was found to be suffering from lung cancer and later died. 3 waiigin ae indent Capacite, filed a claim for ECC death benefits before they cane javorking call caused ihe Cancer that eventually led to hendeatBe.- ees ue by = as GSS dena ts fi for fina to —— eacoate pss a causal i between nas ilness and Hey yor pacite's claim was denied due to the fact although Annex Bas fin he Amen om 1 sone eden Manas fer: 17 provides that "cancer of the lungs;liver sate gd "that it had been HELD: » = oF 1. NO. While itern 17, Annex “ ing Syiad vo. be." goripensable ‘occupational disease, it likewise piayides th ora plastic worker hisicase i manufacture of chlorine ovpasti disease. NS 2. No, The Court does not fii ‘support the ‘claim that the, law requires a reasonabl post aed seh ig be,émploye 8 a vinyl chloride worke Be i ot, Roy prork ing p-environment involving ti fe nat ye ‘considered an occupational and fatigue, which are general conseq} Thing in all kinds of actly, otherwise, we would unreasonably open the flood-Gates of compensability and render thé purposes of a system like GSIS meaningless. Thus, for failing to prove tha? Elma’s lung cancer was work-related, Capacite is not entitled to death compensation benefits. : é FAILURE OF THE SEAFARER TO COMPLY ‘WITH THE THREE-DAY MANDATORY REPORTING REQUIREMENT SHALL RESULT IN THE FORFEITURE OF HIS RIGHT 10 CLAIM DISABILITY BENEFITS; NECESSITY OF A SEAFARER’S ILLNESS-TO BE WORK- RELATED FOR IT TO BE COMPENSABLE ‘SAN-BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS ed Jebsen Maritime Inc., Apex Maritime Ship Management Co. LLC., and/or Estanistao Santiago v. Wilfredo Ravena G.R. No. 200866, September 17, 2014 Brion, J. : FACTS: In a petition for review on certiorari before the SC. petitioner Jebsen Maritime Inc. (Jebsen) challenges the decision of the CA and the Labor Arbiter (LA) granting the claim of respondent Wilfredo Ravena (Ravena) for disability benefits, sickness allowance, medical expenses, loss of eaming capacity, damages and attomey’s fees with legal interest. Ravena was employed’as 4th Engineer b: respondent. While on board the vessel, Ravena suffered extreme abdominal discomientandip: ei SSlgPgpied’y chils, diarthea, general feeling p lloilo City where the doctors Gof ests. Ravena's-ohysician did Ustihot be awayfrom a treatment We He took three days-t&constitwith b-dodiohin laikohy artu.ive MOVE tollnggem the petitioners of his illness and the scHeduled Whipplesurgenya itionecsyagteed that the former shall shoulder the médical expensessfor the § reimbtitsement by the latter. Ravena underwent the surgery and: he was! yidiagnosedt %6 be suffering from adenocarcinoma or cancer of the ampullary. area, ee $ : Nicomedes Cruz, a Ravena reported at debsen’s office in| Manila d.t9 Dy {EF examipiation and the review of cancer surgeon and, the company det a that’ Ravena’s records and-hjs ‘lines jéhe's ilifesS-was not work-related. Therefore, petitioners danied Rav saBilty benefits. 57 fe Siro ¥ ISSUES: Feel) f Se F BiG) f * we pjéscri 1. Has Ravena has complied witht Ravena's disability? Mes, ibedipiczedures for determining o bee 2. Is Ravena's iliness — ad} HELD: FPements of Section 20-6 of the POEA- ‘who was repatriated for medical reasons must, within three working days ffonvhis disembarkation, submit himself to a post-employment medical examination (PEME) to be conducted by the company-designated physician. Failure of the seafarer fo comply with this three-day mandatory reporting requirement shall result in the forfeiture of his right to claim the POEA-SEC granted benefits. 4, NO, Ravena failed to comply withthe i SEC. Under Section 20-B(3), paragraph’? a seat ‘The three-day reporting rule was not followed. Ravena immediately went fo his hometown in Hloilo which is at a considerable distance from Manila, compared with Jebsen’s office which is in Manila. Even if he had been physically incapacitated, it would have been easier for him to contact Jebsen in Manila than to go home in Iloilo, 74 SANBEDACOLLEGEOF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Further, the Court noted that Ravena's physician did not even certify that he was no longer fit- to-work, or at the very least determine the appropriate disability grading; he simply stated that “he must not be away from a treatment area for an indefinite period of time.” On the other hand, Dr. Cruz certified that Ravena's illness is not at «nl work-related. NO. Ampullary cancer is not an occupational disease. Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC considers only two types of cancers as compensable occupational disease: (1) cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder; and (2) cancer, epitheliomatous or ulceration of the skin or of the corneal surface of the eye due to certain chemicals, Section 20-B(4) affords only a disputable presumption that should be read together with the conditions specified by Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, He failed to satisfy the conditions, Fo engineer or the specific tasks will did not show howhis duties or ntributed to the development of, or aggravated. his ampulla jhe substailges”or chemicals which he claimed he:was exposed Losk yihpcsheallessapyove athe hedingbsfbeen exposed to the chemicalsisubstances he claimé s expos! ring his em int contract; how ce these substances/cRemicalg ‘could Have: GabSed is Emgul} feasures that the i rd board MIV Tate J. Also, he company did or -did-rlot take to I @ use of such substances/chemicalsy-toiprevent or at | Thus, Revena is not ented tosispbithpbenet RAGA Lif ACCIDENT AS BASIS FOR DISABILITY BENEFIT Carlo Sunga v. Virjen Shipping Corporation| G.R. No, 198640, April.23,,201 4S gaa es Brion, J. FACTS: “4 In an appeal before the’ SC -petitig which reversed and setuasisie’ the Di disability benefits. K/) ils'the decision of the CA ner Sunga not entitled to 200-kilogram globe valve from thé OWeR Sees ine room to its installing position. Untortunately, one of the oilers lost his grlpr Causing. the whole weight of the globe valve to crash on Sunga. Al that instant, he felt his back snap, caUsifig intense pain at his lower back which Persisted for several days. Unable to even stand up just to go'to the bathroom, he was forced to request for repatriation. ‘Sunga then demanded that his disability benefits be based on the disability grading of 25%, pursuant to the provisions of the parties’ CBA. Virjen argued that it had no liability to pay Sunga any disability benefits.under the CBA. It claimed that Sunga failed to comply with the CBA requirement that for permanent disability to be compensable, the disability should be the result of an accident incurred during the course of the seafarer’s employment. It alleged that his disability was simply an illness or an anatomical defect. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR Operations 7° ‘As found by both the NLRC and the Labor Arbit since his injury is not merely an anatomical defect but a bodily harm brought upon by th is e performance of his duties and functions as filter of the vessel. oe However, the CA ruled that the injury was not accidental; it being @ common knowledge that carrying heavy objects can cause injury and that lifting and carrying heavy objects are part of his duties as fitter. Thus, a back injury is reasonably anticipated. It cannot serve as basis, therefore, for Sunga to be entitled to disability benefits. ISSUE: May Sunga claim the disability benefits under the parties’ CBA? gna HELD: Se 2 YES, Sunga is entitied to receive-t idebone’ chinghe The parties’.GBA provides that a seafarerwhio suffers permanent disability as a result of an acewent whilst inthe employment of the Virjen regardléss of fault, incladigedddntfodehglkg while travel a i t i from the ship, ut excluding permanent disability di lf al) in, i Compensation according tothe patos bene cba EL. x “pay, be entitled to “Accident” is an unintended and unforgseen it in the usual course of events or that Seo p rformipashis regular duties; an 1@ SHEL. weight of the item is © beluljdertaken by several men 5 Zeasonably anticipated, arty @ 200-kilogram gic irgen’s vessel, Sunga's Notably, this incident cannélibe Sunga's duly as a fitter involved valve single-handedly. Since Sugar disability benefits should falt within theses 3h RECEIPT OF DISABILITYSBENEF! ISEOR LOSS OF FUTURE EARNINGS Magsaysay Maritime aS. G.R.No. 199022, April 7, 2014 vo Abad, J. oe “SS FACTS: In an appeal before the SC, petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay) assails the Decision o1 tie CA in affirming the Labor Arbiter's award of loss of future earings on top of disability benefits as well as awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in favor of respondent Oscar Chin Jr. (Chin). Thome Ship Management Pte. Ltd., acting through its agent petitioner Magsaysay hired respondent Chin to work for 9 months as a seaman. Chin sustained injuries while working on his job aboard the vessel. Chin was repatriated and on return to the Philippines, he was diagnosed to have a moderate rigidity of his tract. 76 SANBEDACOLLEGEOF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS iter, Sunga is entitled to the benefits under the CBA (BBE) Chin received US$30,000.00 as disability compensation. He then executed a Release and Quitclaim in favor of Magsaysay. Chin filed a complaint with the NLRC, claiming underpayment of disability benefits and attomey’s fees. The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision awarding loss of future wages, moral and exemplary damages to Chin, on top of the disability benefit already received. NLRC modified the LA's Decision by deleting the award of loss of future earnings. ISSUE: Was CA correct in granting loss of future earnings? HELD: ge NO, the LA's award of loss of ea ot a! compensation for loss of earnifi double recovery, Permanent tdia! disability means digableme the same kind of.work, or work of similag ie the or any kind of work ‘which a personojhig-mentality aqdatteinnne is not synonymous-with "sicknésd"ar ibsebaryrouk col resulting in the impaiigont of iiseanning-eapa Moreover, the award for loss) of earhing la Employment (POEA SCE), thei gdvertitng jaw Be grant. Section 20, paragraph (G) of thelPOEA SEE Boy covers “all claims arising-from ér in relation wit including but not limited to-damages afising fr laws of the Philippines.or anyothy Sfandard Contract of Ot provide for such a of the'seat iifor negligence under the jsability compensation is iprihe seatarer FAILURE TO ISSUF CERTIFICATIC AND TOTAL =e United Philippine Lines G.R. No. 201072, April 2,20: Villarama, Jr., J = FACTS: v : Ina petition for review on certiorari: B&tit fried Phitibpine Lines, Inc. (United) and Holland ‘America Line (Holland) assails the decigion of the CAvtMuling that respondent seaman Generoso E. Sibug (Sibug) is twice entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. Petitioners hired Sibug as waste handler on board the vessel M/S Volendam. Sibug fell from a ladder and injured isis nee. He was repatriated and had reconstruction surgery. He was declared fit to return to work. Sibug sought reemployment, passed the pre-employment medical ‘examination, and was re-hired by petitioners in the same capacity for the vessel M/S Ryndam. On board Ryndam, Sibug met another accident and injured his right hand and wrist, He was repatriated. He arrived in the Philippines on January 15, 2007, and had surgery. On September 7, 2007, the company-designated doctor issued a medical report that Sibug has a permanent but incomplete disability. In an email dated September 28, 2007, the company-designated doctor classified Sibug’s disability from his Ryndam injury as.a grade 40 disability. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS am Sibug filed two (2) complaints for disabilit dismissed the Volendam case as Sibu case, the 'A awarded an amount equivalent to the work ISSUE: Is Sibug entitled to permanent and total disability benefits for both his Volendam and Ryndam injuries’ peng HELD: pa NO, Sibug is not entitled to pebtianefit aie total asa i 's entitled to permanent and total disabiity benefit fo his Ry } & 2 Sibug is not entitleg,to/ permanent a Under Section 20-B of the POEA-SEG, employers must: (4). pay jhe sealarep sickness, alldyvance equivalent to his basic wage in addition Tether hebicat ‘reat a rat hearin été seatarer with at their cost; and (2) compensate the-seatarer-fomhisa | or (patti. disability as finally determined by the company-designated physician. e EASEC:1¢!to treat iNese liabilities of the “sonsidefing|tnat there’are different ilems of Bis. In turn, show the bases of that oe medical expenses from EAYSEC, The SC observed thatthe evident ihtelt’or th employer separately and distinctly from one, anat liability under separate paragraphs. These individu each liabilliy is unique from the:others, Thus, the the total monetary award is contra ete, of ty BARUFES:QOES NOT'DO AWAY WITH THE st E HIS'GLAIM FOR DISABILITY TWEEN THE DISEASE AND THE THE DISPUTABLE PRESUMP" NEED FOR THE CLAII BENEFITS; PROOF OF “THE/CAU: OCCUPATION STILL NECESSAI Talosig v. United Philippi G.R. No, 198388. July 28, 204 SERENO, CJ. FACTS: oo This is a Petition for Review on Certiordritinder Rule 6.fled by herein petitioner who is the widow of Viadimir Talosig (Talosig), assailing the decision of the CA. The CA ruled that the widow of Talosig is not entitled to death benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. * Talosig was a seafarer hired by United Philippine Line, Inc “.'PL!) who was deployed after being declared as “fit to work’, However, while overseas, he was confined and was diagnosed with ‘malignant neoplasm infiltrating colonic mucosa”. With this, he was medially repatriated back to the Philippines. Upon arrival, he was further diagnosed with colon cancer, Stage IV and eventually died. This prompted his widow, to file a complaint for claim of death benefits. UPLI denied the claim and argued that death of a seafarer is compensable only ift occurs during the term of his contract of employment; SANBEDACOWEGEOF LAW 7g 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS accordance with the parties’ e covered by the POEA Standard Employment Contract ISSUE: Whether of not there is an undisputable presumption that a the death of its employee due to a disease HELD: No, not all deaths may be compensable. For an occupational disease and the resulting disability oF death to be compensable, all the following co-itions must be established: (1) The satay’, work must involve the risk described herein; (2) The disease was contracted a8 a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described) $: (GB) Tiedtisease,was contracted within a period of ‘©xposure and under such oth is rlecessak cobiracyit he negligence on the part of the seafarers» eafarer's employer is responsible to intial ge (4) There was no notorious PSS See ea . eer cannot sicily rely on. thefd)shiuladle jpRSusipysy provision ment ) of the 2000" \-SEX -t id $0 without salid-proof of relati¢ ‘or work aggravation. éf4he iinctel hace nok peace ray * J germane ed in Section 20 and work-causation Sy jallow-ghe’to just sit down and ;putablépresumption of work- stittaineéd to substantiate his wait for the company'to ‘present’evidence to'o relatedness of the iliness: Contrary, {d'petitidner'sipe ciaim in order to be entitled to disabilty.compensati was work-related and that it must have existed dutingneltedt “gn cannot simply argue that the burden of proof Delete jent caipany, a og in sum, absent of any substantial ie STRANGE BEHAVIOR.COULD NOt. and his work, this Court ééinnot g} efits oshjsiReis baselon’ more presumptions THE BASIS FOR A CLAIl BO) Of le causal connociigh netlist the disease of Talosig a aes AND COULD NOT BE Agile Maritime Resources-in¢., Atty. Ima a Bs ie ‘aiid Pfona V Ship Management, Inc. v. Apolinario Siador “S07 Ht Sie G.R.No. 191034, October 172044.) [> BRION, J. on FACTS: or » ‘This is a petition for review on certiorari challenging thé’decision of the CA which ruled in favor of the respondents Dennis Siador (Dennis), son of respondent Apolinario Siador (Apolinario), eniéred into a seven- month contract of employment, ‘@s Ordinary Seaman on board-the vessel LNG Aries. with petitioner Agile Maritime Resources, Inc. (Agile), the local manning agent of petitioner Pronav Ship Management, Inc. Apolinario filed a complaint for death benefits, damages and attorney's fees against the petitioners. ‘or the death of Dennis fll from the vessel and died in the high seas while the vessel was cruising. They alleged that prior to his death, Dennis had been suffering from mental instability and could 80 SANBEDACOILEGEOF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS not be considered to have intentionally taken his life. Although the unfortunate incident was undisputed, petitioners contend that someone saw Dennis jump overboard. Additionally, they argue that personal circumstances characterized by heavy personal and psychological problems may have driv an hitn to take his own life. ISSUE: Does the empioyer have the burden of proof in claims of death benefits? HELD: No. As a claimant, Apolinario has the burden of proving that the seafarer’s death (1) is work- related; and (2) happened during the term of the employment contract. Sufficient proof of insanity or mental sickness may be presented to-negate the cequrement of wilfulness as a matter of counter-defense. Since the wilifuinessimay/bi niptet ie, physical act itself of the seafarer, the insanity or mental illness aoe f fat deprived him of the full control of his seriges. In this regard) seletledieiréum: fo and surrounding his death might have provided substantial evidence of the sree sucHinsanity ort nental sickness, Scam In the present case ithe strange-behavior ofDenn| me v fofe-finding of insanity as sufficient aes ving proves aos er "Bom a ee on faut Hs father is not entled:t6:ceath compensation OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE. How, opera i + ae ie Magsaysay Mitsui O8 Marino, Inc. andlor i Juanito Bengson G.R. No. 198528, October 13, 2014 | : DEL CASTILLO, Js soe oad FACTS: + = Since 1986, respondent Bengsor Mate, for, petitioner Magsaysay. fumbhess on half of his body. Upon repatriation, he wa8- Bany-designated- physician Bengson was found to have-si as not work-related. ‘Thus, Bengson filed his disability comperisation slgun {Magsaysay claiming his illness was work- related but the same was denied sinde” PT was not work-related, hence, not compensable. LA tuled in favor of Bengson. On appeal, NLRC reversed the decision of the LA.‘CA annulled the decision of the NLRC and held that Bengson's illness was work-related ISSUE: Is the illness (cardiovascular disease) of Bengson an occupational disease/work-related? HELD: YES. Bengson’s iliness is work-related. The Court has ruled that the list of ilinesses/diseases in Section 32-A does not preclude other ilinesses/diseases not so fisted from being compensable. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CentRauzeo BaROrerarions — OF The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain Unfit for further sea duties. And equally significant, rather itis the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment As the facts indicate, he has been serying as Third Mate fora long period of time and with heavy responsibilities relative to navigation of the vessel, ship safety and management ot Strain Coca Beyond doubt that respondent was subjected to physical and mental trees uicg Strain. Considering his length of service, this took a toll on hig body. and he coc not have Contracted his iliness elsewhere except while working for petitioners WHEN 240-DAY RULE APPLIES v. WHEN 120-DAY RULE APPLIES; WHEN ASSESSMENT OF COMPANY DOCTOR PREVAILS Norie! Montierra v. Rickmer: G.R. No. 210634; January 1 SERENO, C.J. SAN BEDA ee { SAN BEDA y ot ¢ 5 ee Respondent hii pttiondr-Noher Mable MorMrd, AA Mca assigned to work on.board thewveseel-MvsGS; i we tS, While on board the vessel and 26 Bn fot (wisted his legs, thus injuring histrightfkaée. There recommended surgery: further, dgund him unt Philippines for further medical treatment. ~ pues Mortig# lost his batance and xaimied in Spain and was Two days after his repatriation designated physician. He undenvey “meniscal tear, posterior horn tio GE-Aleyre I, the company. ioht/knge, The MR! showed he had id -mingial’ joint fluid.” Upon the “medical meniscectomy Meanwhile, Montierro filethwith the compenasion Men Re ot recommending total permangaiegh iy oF The LA and NLRC held that one eX total disability benefits under the POEA-SEC. The LA relied on the 120-Gay-rule'mntrntuceaBy the 2005 case Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad which stated that the inabilifyf the seafas to perform work for more than 120 days equates to permanent total disability, which entitles a séafarer to full disability benefits, However, the.CA held that Montierro was entitled merely to “Grade 10° permanent partial disability benefits It ruled that his disability could not be deemed total anu permanent under the 240-day rule established by the 2008 case of Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. Vergara extends the period to 240 days when, as within the first 120-day period reckoned from the first day of treatment, a final assessment cannot be made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, provided a declaration has been made to this effect fy of permanent disability y his physician of choice The CA futher pointed out that only 215 days had lapsed from the time of Montierro's medical repatriation when the company-designated physician issued a “Grade 10" final disability assessment. It justified the extension of the period to 240 days-on the ground that Dr. Alegre 82 SAN BEDACOLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS ERR Ea ee issued an interim disability grade of “10° on 3 September 2010, the G1st day of Montierro's treatment, which was within the initial 120-day period. Finally, the CA upheld the jurisprudential rule that, i> case of conflict, it is the recommendation issued by the company-designated physician that prevails over the recommendation of the claimant's physician of choice. ISSUES: 1. Whether itis the 120-day rule or the 240-day rule that should apply to this case; 2, Whether itis the opinion of the company doctor or of the personal doctor of the seafarer that should prevail; HELD: ‘ 1. The 240-dajitule applies. Ve If the ragtine gopersaton cdmpaldirit\radiGa haghto 6 October tb ay ro appl a0, CORCES Eee en rh eo Re 120-day rule wards, the 240- in this case, Marijérro flea his Complai ae 2 promuigation of Vefgara of| 6 OctoBer, 200! case, and not the:}20-day tule, 7 Applying the 2a0-day five 16 this cise, the sane, the CA. The CA correatly ruled that Montierr@ ppotbea isability. nM Foe BES nfioagd the vessel, his fitness 3¢g4 physigjan’ The physician has 120 ssmeniyi'the physician appointed by nated physician, the opinion 2. When a seatarer for work shalt be dete days, oF 240 days, tra the seafarer disagrees with of a third dootor may bei shall be final and jc Vergara ruled that the procedures} ist be strictly followed; otherwise, if not availed of or followed strictiy-by essment of the company-designated physician stands. In this case, Montierro and respondent are covered by the provisions of the same 2000 POEA- SEC. It is the law between them. Hence, they are bound by the mechanism for determining liability for a disability benefits claim. Montierro, however, preempted the procedure when he filed on 3 December 2010 a Complaint for permanent disability benefits based on his chosen physician's assessment, which was made one month before the company-designated dactor issued the final disability grading on 3 January 2011, the 213th day of Montierro’s treatment: Hence, for failure of Montierro to observe the procedure provided by the POEA-SEC, the assessment of the company doctor should prevail. . ‘SAN BeDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 83 Labor Relations GOOD FAITH FAITH BARGAINING AND CBA DEADLOCK MAY CO-EXIST Gabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association v. Pilipinas Shell Potreloum Co G.R. No. 170007, April 7, 2014 cn Leonardo-De Castro, J FACTS: Pettloner and respondent started negotiations for a new CBA. Afier several negotiations, the ce ec Prgpased the declaration of a deadlock and recommended that the help ofa third patty Pe sought. On that same day, the union filed a Notice of Strike in the National Coneilation cy Mediation Board (NCMB), alleging bad. fait part of the company. The NCMB. immediately summoned the parties aia ediation proceedings but the Parties failed to.reach an amici i During the cooliigiof period, the unign caneluct sary strike vote. union, who participated: in the sige ly Be the holding aware of this developicent, te’ cofnflaty: leita PDNn for ARsyfhptic ; es ike. Upon being Putisdiction with the DOLE Secretary. setae The union contended that.the EBA debidiock i ‘nen-conformity with the deciardiowoffalso "deadlock can only be declared upon Committed grave abuse of discretion whersthe, Y gipuind rules provided that 1S, the DOLE Secretary ifb.bargaining. According iSt because an impasse The union also alleged that respond. to the union, bad faith bargaining at in negotiations can only exist on the ISSUE: a ts there absence of good faith on thé ee HELD: an None. While the purpose of célleclive bi s4 “6Pan agreement between the. employer and the employee’suunighiresulting pbetween the parties, the failure to reach an agreement after negatiatigag lable period does not mean lack Of good faith. The laws invite and contémpiateReeBISEIs bargaining contract but do not compel one. For after all, a CBA, like any contraghis’a producsof mutual consent and not of compulsion. As such, the duly to bargain does not in¢luge the obligation to reach an agreement. As there was no bad faith on the part of the company in its bargaining with the union, deadlock was possible and rid occur. The absence of the parties’ mutual declaration of deadlock does not mean that there was no deadlock, What was lacking was the formal recognition of the existenbe Of such a deadlock because the union refused a declaration of deadlock. eq SANBEDACowLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS NO UNION BUSTING WHEN RETRENCHMENT WAS IMPLEMENTED ON A COMPANY-WIDE BASIS Purisimo Cabaobas v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. G.R. No. 176908. March 25, 2015 Peralta, J FACTS: Respondent PCPPI implemented a company-wide retrenchment program due to heavy losses incurred by one of its piants. Several employees were retrenched leading to a complaint for illegal Gismissal. Petitioners alleged that no serious financial losses were veing sustained by PCPPi as it regularized four employees ang hired replacements for forty-seven (47) cf those. previously dismissed and that the retrenchment program was designed to prevent their union becoming the certified bargaining agent of PCPRUsitank alartisieglg Respondents on the other hand argued that the retrenchment progam vas aim five and reinforced its claim of heavy losses as evidenced by finangial: Soe The Labor Arbiterfound the dismissal to be illegal and ordered . The NLRC on the.other hand, found, the ‘retrenchientéprogram valid is ordered the payment of separation Bay. The-GA agreed wit eters EES AW ISSUE: 10 gues is the retrenchment’progfam valid? HELD: oe - Yes, the reirenchmentiprogram is valid It wase endhment program was not constitutive of union busting or ULP. The same ‘on 2 company-wide basis: belies the claim respondent has complied with thei and the workers to be'fetrenched:# carry great credibility andite vy The fact that it was done bifheringve,‘records disclose that dos ati. age notice toth to DOI to stantial evidence whicin ‘plied with when it served inement was elrenched a nth prior to the date cf er oP oy G IKE AND THE CAUSE OF jallosses aretdgemed THE CAUSE OF ACTION’ ACTION FOR ILLEGAL Dit Club Filipino, inc. v. Benj Leonen, J FACTS: Club petitioner, the Company. The Union and the Company entered into previous collective bargaining agreements (CBA). Later on, the Union filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock, and, thereafter, =‘29ed a strike. ‘The Company filed a Petition to Declare the Strike illegal on the ground that the Union failed to file @ Notice of Strike and to conduct a strike vote. The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared the strike “procedurally infirm’. On Appeal, the NLRC ruled that the Appeal was filed by persons “{havingi} ‘no legal standing to question the LA's decision’ as they were no longer officers of the Union when they filed the Appeal. The CA found that the LA “disregarded” the law on the status of employees who participated in an illegal strike. Under the law, union officers may be dismissed for ‘SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, 2016 CenTRAUzeD Bar OreRaTIONs Partcipating in an ilegal strike only it they knowingly participated init. According to the CA, the LA erred in ordering all the officers of the Union dismissed from the service, 12.2 Resolution dated July 13, 2002, the SC denied the Company's Pettion for Review on Gettlorari. Thereafter, the Company ‘fled a Motion for Leave to file and admit ie present Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The Company alleged that pending ils Pethon for declaration of ilegal strike with the NLRC, itimplemented a retrerichment program to minimise te ‘mounting losses.” Among the retrenched employees were respondents who fled Complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC, questioning the validity of the retrenchment program. The LA dismissed the Complaint anc found the retrenchment program valid. This was aifimmed by the NLRC and the Decision became final and executory Considering that the NLRC had finallyere adsihalvéSpondents were not illegally dismissed and had already ordered that respond eee FSebarations sr the retrenchment program, the Company’ argues that the NURG's Resolbtionotandis stituted res judicata as to bar the CA from declaring, that respondents were illegal dismissed’ separation pay in-the illegal strike cases, Pf Be ISSUE: J fiat HELD: i ‘ i No, the NLRC's Decision on the illegal:diSinisg case. Res judicata has two (2) aspects, “the Prosecution of a second action:upon the sami aspect is conclusiveness of judgment, which stat a former suit cannot again be raised: in different cause of action,” Be The elements of res juiicata,are's flor judgment that preciudes the dkOr cavSS"of action. The second .ctually_and directly resolved in en thig:same parties involving a 1. the judgment sought:to,bar the ww ae 2. the decision must nave'baen renders and the parties; ey Gi 3. the disposition of the éabeuniust be 4. there must be as betweer'the first and's causes of action, NAS The first three (3) elements of res j icy ibis case. The fourth element, however, is absent. The cause of action for declaration of ‘it strike and the cause of action for illegal dismissal are different. In an action for déclaration of fava strike, the cause of action is premised on @ union or a labor organization's conduct of a strike without compliance with the: statutory fequirements. On the other hans, in an action for illegal dismissal, the cause of action is premised ca an employer's alleged dismissal of an employee without a just or authorized cause as provided. under Arts. 282 - 284 (now Arts. 297- 299) of the Labor Code. The Company filed the illegal strike because members of the Union allegedly disrupted the Company's business when they staged ‘strike without complying with the requirements of the law. For their part, respondents filed the egal dismissal case to question the validity of the Company's retrenchment program. Hence, there is no res judicata in the present case. » 86 SANBEDACOUEGE oF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Procedure and Jurisdiction JURISDICTION OF THE LAINLRC IN CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; EXCEPTION TO NON-WiTHHOLDING OF WAGES Milan v. NLRC, Solid Mills, Inc. G.R. No. 202961, February 4, 2015 Leonen, J. FACTS: Petitioners are respondent Solid Mills' employees. As such, they were allowed to occupy SMI Village, @ property owned by Solid Mills on the condition that the employees would wacate the premises anytime the Company deems itr: [ations due to sezious business fd Were requirbg-6 sign a MOA Those who signed-the MOA WEie: for the release of their termination benefit same and demanded: to; be paid ‘their beneks possession of Solid Mills property is natian acoautit Hence, petitioners filed complaintsibefore:the L that petitioners’ compiaint was premature bec sUoject td clearance procedures. #Ondhe otherihiand, Solid Mills arqued i ot; vacated?its, property. i Sane LA ruled that petitioners’ possession should vs Siistitied!as “accountabil cleared first before the release 19 jurisdiction of the LA. ies" that must be ES, . seestibir Gye propgny arose out of employer alice lactic Solid'Milis' property, justifies the withholding of their benefitsfand sop; CAkgism'spec the spetiion for certiorari. 4 SE Sproperty of Solid Mills? 2. Is the withholding of ben account of petitioners’ refusal to HELD: 4. YES. The NLRC has jurisdiction to determine, preliminarily, the parties’ rights over a property, ‘when itis necessary to determine an issue related to rights or claims arising from an employer employee relationship. # Article 217 (now Article 224) of the Labor Code provides that the LA, in his or-her original Jurisdiction, and the NLRC, in its appellate jurisdiction, may determine issues involving'claims arising from employer-employee relations. : In this case, the return of Solid Mills’ properties is an issue that must be resolved to determine ‘whether benefits can be released immediately. The issue raised by the employers, therefore, SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016.CeNTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 87 connected to petitioners’ claim for benefits and is sufficient ; ; ly intertwined with the parties’ Smployer-employee relationship. Thus, itis properly within the labor bibunale jurisdietion 2. YES. Requiring clearance before the procedure among employers. Clearanc Although as a general rule the law prohibits withholding of wages and elimination or diminution Of benefits, Atcie 113 of the Labor Code allows deduction from wages of employees “in cases Where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor nna Employment.” Axticle 1706 of the Civil Codgsgitor wo oe, “Debi in thiscase refers toaniy obi et the employerAs"long as the debtor, ion ywas by virtué6fthe employer- As debt ¢ itue yer employee relationship, generally; ant luded 4W'the employee'S accountabilities that are subject to-cldaréncerpiaced GE DE LAV ~ eo ee me Withholding of payhrient bythe eriplover Cae obligation to pay-eiployees their wages, subjected to the.c6ndition: thatthe emplo} employer. untability.¢f. thé employee to fhe eriplpyr may renege on its s, 2ndidve benefits, is only erly belonging to the ee Re iM anoBligation or liability on the jonshipGeased. Thus, respondent enetilS because of this existing in this case, the retuhn of the property's pgs part of the employees whenithe employer-¢ Solid Mills has the rightsto with TS Wages an debt or liability, - ae) dof © ey nyt Bae Me RULE ON AMOUNT OF-APPEAL'BONI nonassolore/ Sara Lee Philippines, lick: Emilindamac Naaigtal! GR. Nos. 180147-50, 180319,"180685; June) 2078" 7 Perez, J a ie a. ™ FACTS: ‘onsidering the 'g: Report whieh getajiéd>the events that 5 In this petition,:pelitionérs insist tibtCedachai2SlidSiigSeommitted suleides Investigation Report, 6g Book enractgc 9nd as transpired before™-seaman ‘Glicerio- come stick le. ‘Fhey* Contend “thatthe CA erred in on SuspicighiS,of foul play. eS ISSUE: 1. Was the CA correct in holding that the investigation Report which were submitted for the first ime: omapp admitted by the NERC? rae BSED. 2. Did seaman Glicerio, commit suicides 3 Is death by suicide compensable, % HELD: Ws 1. NO, the CA was not céfréct in Hold Master's Report which were subi have been admitted ‘by time on appeal on thé-grauhd; that Tteagy asce: regard to technicalities cuss theinterest Of sub i 4 fae 4, AY : iljusstigation’Rgport: og book extracts, and nce pe onsaioeal to the NURC should not iderice submitted for the first , Ke ? In Sasan, Sr. v. NLRC, 4th Division jurisprudence is replete with cases allowing the NLRC to admit eviden rebeqted before the LA, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. Thé submissichgf additional evidence before the NLRC is Not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure considering that rules of evidence prevailing in Courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. 2. YES, Glicerio committed suicide. First, the Investigation Report submitted completely detailed the events that happened prior to seaman Glicerio’s death, ie., from the last person who corresponded with him when’ he was still alive, the circumstances leading to the day he was discovered dead, to the person who discovered him dead, Based on the investigation, it appears that Glicerio was cheerful during the first two months. However, he, thereafter, kept to himseff after telling people that his family is facing problems in the Philippines and that he already informed petitioners to took for his replacement. oq SANBEDACOLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Second, both the Medico-Legal Report and Death Certificate indicate that the actual cause of death of seaman Glicerio is “suicidal asphyxia due to hanging.” NO, death by suicide is not compensable undur the POEA Contract. Under Sec. 20 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, the emp.oyer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased Seafarer for death henefits once it-is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his: deliberate or wilful act. Thus, since petitioners were abie to substantially prove that seaman Glicerio’s death is directly attributable to his deliberate act ethatia himself, his death, therefore, is not compensable and his heirs not entitied to any, ny gomnens ORIGINAL JURISDICTION oineranation LGA WORK ty) Bo seas : Ruben Jordan ¥- “Grandeur Security’ &'S: GR, No, 206716, Juge/18, 2018. Brion, J FACTS: s Petitioner Ruben Jordani (Jordan) is an ‘employee é Corp. (Grandeur Security): The petition for, revi S the decision of the cA which held that the NLRC. gravely abused its oe ni tiga hen [ordered randeur Secunty to pay Jordan backwages, separation pay, - alone es ae oad Grandgiur Security, They alleged a9 1eS;-hdliday, } Beh ‘ium, service incentive yallowanee..Then, Jordan emended use offaction. ber Grandeur Security denied habit te a, fempl6yp oa, It claimed that it merely issued Jordan a memoraridd uig City. Itfurther insisted that Jordan abandoned his~w sal case against it instead of complying with the memorar jon-payment of money claims to the complainants. leave, and thirteenth monith pays a his complaint and included illegal a feffed to'arlother workplace. The LA ordered Grandeur ‘The LA held that Jordan was merely tra ment and further awarded the complainants’ monetary Security to “reinstate” Jordan in empl claims. Grandeur Security partially appealed the decision before the NLRC with respect io the grant of monetary awards. However, it did not contest the “reinstatement order" as it allegedly mailed Jordan a return to work order (letter). The letter was addressed to Jordan's residence and was evidenced by a Registry Receipt as well as the registry return card bearing the recipient's signature. NLRC denied Grandeur Security's partial appeal and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. The decision became final and executory. NLRC issued a writ of execution. After the NLRC issued SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law ° 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 7° writ of execution, Grandeur Security paid the amount of P80,000.00 to J 0 5 U . jordan who executed a Quitclaim on his money claims. Notably, the quitclaim states that “the issue on reinstatement ¢ still pending for {the] determination by the Labor Arbiter.” LA pronounced the proceedings closed and terminated in view of: (1) the complainant's individual quitclaims; and (2) Jordan's waiver of his right to be reinstated, The LA found that Jordan did not Feport for work despite his receipt of Grandeur Security's letter Jordan appealed'before NLRC and insisted that neither he nor his wife received the letter. Jordan thus claimed backwages and separation pay for failure of Grandeur Security to comply with the reinstatement order. Jordan was entitied to backwage with the reinstatement order. CA nullified the nt ruling ISSUES: way € 1. Is the NLRC rulingipull andivoid? ASR 2. Did Jordan waive his right to retury to work : onthe Eee HELD: aA A ebb YT oh 1. YES, it is null and.void’ NLRC has ino origing in the proceedings: bélow, Jorda the subject letter. Significantly reinstatement, in hisi*memo! appeal” shows that.{his-pleadi alleged in his "memorandum ofp attorney's fees arose after Grande The NLRC and the CA’SKould ha lack of jurisdiction. UndenArtigle- 27 (for legal dismnissal, Jordan for backwages, separation pay, and hegdsiHé-EA's return to work order. 'némorandum of appeal" for jiie-224) of the Labor Code, the LA has original and excise’ jurisdic Bide disputes. The NLRC only has. exclusive appeliate jurisdict Sues these cases friore, Jordan's remedy against Grandeur's Security alleged ai B Blur toWork order is not to file a complaint for legal dismissal, but to ask thé NURGAO Sec ergeur Security in indirect contempt. ¢ 2. NO, he did not waive his right to reid to work in Gtandeur Security. Whether or not Jordan received Grandeur-Security’s etter directing him to report to work is irrelevant in determining his waiver of employment. SC ruled that it is inprepared to declare this case closed because the mere absence or failure to report for work, even after nctice to return, does not necessarily amount to abandonment. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment; there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. The operative act is stil the employee's ultimate act of putting an end to his employment. In the present case, Jordan's filing of a complaint for illegat dismissal in the form of @ “memorandum of appeal” before the NLRC is inconsistent with abandonment of employment. 96 SANBEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRAUZED BAR OPERATIONS ‘The filing of this complaint is a proof of his desire fo return to work, effectively negating any suggestion of abandonment. We-also cannot fault him for his continuous absence because he faithfully relied on the void NLRC rulings which ordered Grandeur Security to pay backwages, separation pay, and att.mey's fees in lieu of the LA's return to work order. REMEDY TO ASSAIL AN AWARD OR DECISION OF 4. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR Philippine Electronic Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 168612, December 10, 2014 Leonen, J. FACTS: Eleodoro Lipio (Lipio) and Eme s ted for promotion as Foreman I. Their training allowance was pigvidk afijgunt was contrary to the CBA nd PHILEG Workers’ Union (PWU). Said’ CBA, provided thé Siep increases in the salary offrank and fia Waoloyes who is promoted. This prompted Lipio and. Ree sbByit fhe Stievance to th: ice machincty. When the panies: fale fa SSORLEBE O ort ANY IB for voluntary As per PHILEC, it py arbitration. a nel a with PWU. Thus, PHILEG had to apply'the se pay gr te thelallowance. The VA iield that PHILEC violated'the qunel1987¢ ere Lipio and Ignacio were selected féripromotion 6) the iaw between thesparies, PHILEC'should he the same. VA denied the Motionsfor Reon fis certiorari, under Rule 65; the instant petition fort ISSUES: 1. Was Petition for Certigea the decision of VA?“ 2. Was the petition filed with 3. Did the VA gravely abuse fi based on the CBA? HELD: 1. NO, a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy. The proper remedy to assail the VA's decision is by an appeal under Rule 43. A VA acts ina quasi-judicial capacity. Assuming arguendo that the VA is not strictly acting as such, it will stil fall within the concept of a “quasi-judicial instrumentality.” Under BP 129, the CA has exclusive jurisdiction over décisions of quasi-judicial instrumentality 2. NO, the petition was filed out of time. Article 262-4 (now Article 276) of Labor Code provides that, “the award or decision of the VA “shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days: from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties”. Notwithstanding the 15-day ‘SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 7 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 7 Beriod to appeal provided in Rule 43, the 10-day period must stil govern because under the Constitution, the SC shall not increase, diminish or modify substantive rights, The period to appeal under the LC is an example of a substantive right. In this case, PHILEC filed the petition before the CA 18 days after its receipt of the VA's decision. Having filed the same beyond the 10-day period, no appeal was seasonably filed, Consequently, the VA's decision becomes final and executory S._YES, the VA gravely abused his discretion in directing PHILEC to pay the training allowance In the case at bar, the pay grade scale imposed by PHILEC does not comply with the June 1997 CBA at the time when Lipio and Ignacio were selected for promotion in August 1997 ‘The fact that the modified pay grade scale was applied to prevent the salary distortion doos Not justify its non-compliance with,the.CBAxy ARTICLE 306 (FORMERLY & i 4 OD FOR MONEY CLAIMS DOES NOT COVER BACKWAG A GAL DISMISSAL George Ariola-Pilpino Star Noe. RIE TA( et simone ye GR. No. 175689, Atigust 1372 =¢3: — a SRN 8294 LEGE OF LAW ¢ ae correspondent. He wrote “Tinig wriolaynever returned for work. Ré&porident denied Arriola’s fromm. jork and never returned FACTS: ye 4 Pilipino Star Naayon, Ife: employs ge An ng Pamilyang OFWs" uptikhis tohtens was /temo Arriola fied 2 complaiht for Weal denieosls allegations and alleged-that Arriola suddenly g despite Belmonte’s phohe'calls. and Beeper employment. He maintaiged thal and to claim his separation, pay. iphiasjelrig? that Arriola took throe sustaiBédsthe decision of the LA, hence, this petition, ISSUES: 1. Ase the money claims fil68- 2. Is the petitioner illegally disi HELD: 1. NO, petitioner's claims for backwages and damages have not yet prescribed. The LA, NLRC, and the CA, in ruling that Arriola’s claims for unpaid salaries. backwages, damages, and attorney's fees have prescribed, cited Article 291 (now Article 306) of the Labor Code, which requires that money claims arising from employer-employee relations: be filed within three years (3) from the time the cause of action accrued, The provision, however, does not cover "monéy claims" consequent to an illegal dismissal such as backwages. It lso does not cover claims for damages due to illegal dismissal. These claims are governed by Article 1146 (1) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides in SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW ad 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS: Part that an action must be instituted within four (4) years upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff. Hence, the prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal complair:. is four years from the. time the cause of action accrued. This four-year prescriptive period, not the three-year period for filing money claims under Article 291 of the Labor Code, applies to claims for backwages and damages due to illegal dismissal. 2. NO, petitioner is not illegally dismissed by respondent. The removal of petitioner's column from private respondent is not tantamount to a termination of his employment as his job is not dependent on the existence of his column. When Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. removed "Tinig ng Pamilyana OFWs" from publication, Arriola remained as section editor. Moreover, newspaper publisher has he sana determine what columns to print in Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. in.employee to,continue his Tents: first lure to report employment, without any intehtién of retuming, for work or absence without valid:or4 FINITIVE FINDING AFTER THE LAPSE’OF THE 120-240 HE PARTIAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY CLAIM TOT: Carcedo v. Maine Marine Phili G.R. No. 203804; April45, 204 CARPIO, J. FACTS: In a petition for review-Hléds befdpes Decision of the CA whicti‘nullfied th Labor Arbiter (LA) denying Carcedols, disability. Ee id’ (Carcedo) assails the insfated the Decision of the Contract for nine months for which e"wa ‘work. While on board, Carcedo's foot was wounded because of his safety shoes. Upan “eXafhination by the ship doctor, he was given antibiotics and allowed him to resume work. His foot’s condition worsened until he felt pain in the back of his swollen leg and devetoped fever and headache. Dr. Cruz, company-designated physician, recommended an impediment disability grading of 8% Loss of first toe (big toe) and some of its metatarsal bone and was advised to continue his medications. Unsatisfied, Carcedo consulted with Dr. Alan Leonardo R. Raymundo, who amputated Carcedo’s second toe on 30 November 2009 and diagnosed him that he is not fit to return to his previous work duties as a chief mate on board. ‘ SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 99 20116 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS US$148,500.00, sickness allowance and other conse injury was work related because he sustained the his injury was compensable under Section 20(B) (2) his disability was total and permanent; the i medication, there was no certainty that his former physical condition would get restored and he Could resume his customary work; he walked with difficulty and not without a cane; (3) he suffered Severe depression and anxiety, for which, he was entitled to moral and exemplary damages, and allomey's fees; (4) his employer's refusal to pay his disability benefits showed evident bad faith and (5) he was denied a better medical treatment because he had to make do with what his depleted resources could afford. quential damages. Carcedo averred: (1) his wound from his safety shoes at work, hznce, of the POEA Standard Employment Contract; injury on his leg was so severe that despite Respondent denied Garcedo’s the provisions on disability compensation under the POE) idard Employmen ylhe disability assessment of the company-designategiphysi oughout his illness and who had authority.to.as §S@8s hi mela -titmost credence, instead of a doctor who had'only examinedifiv'sed la sted in bad faith and had dealt fairly with: Cércedo; it*compliedtthn all of Carcedo’s medical bills and ever! offered f tract; (4) i paid for $11,880.00; and (6) 10r6.than 120 days; and Nas fit for sea duty were Is the petitioner entitled'to total and by the company-designated:ghysici “ie " 9 disability grading made Elance witp'the ve 00% disability compensation. ed 100% disability; (2) when the seafarer is assessed with disability’of t leat S0%randYS}when the seatarer, while assessed at below 50% disabilty, is certified as perhariently unfitfor sea service. ‘These are: (1) when the seafarer’ The seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment ‘but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally Unable to work. This period may be extended until 240 days subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. An impediment should be characterized as partial and permanent not only under the Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC but should be so under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the Amended Rule on Employee Compensation. That while the seafarer 1100. SAN BEDA COLLEGE oF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS is partially injured or disabled, he is not preclided from eaming doing the'same work he had before his injury or disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may bu, he shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. Moreover, the ccompany- designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should ho fall to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. Here, the company-designated physician failed to >aivea definitive impediment rating of Carcedo's Xd, after the 120-day period but less than rary disability lapsed into a Dr. Cruz's deciaration of 8% impediment rat cs 63 da 120 pers However bojona spas Cre dakaoe Based on the foregoing discussion? Carc8do is officer at the time he! was injured, at /400§ US$148,500.00. ONLY THE LEGAL ‘SPOUSE @F sq BADE BENEFICIARY OF SS BENEFITS@7 GR. No. 209741; April 15,: 2015 J. Mendoza FACTS: Respondent Edna and Edgardo were married in civil rites at the RTC Legazpi City, Albay in 1992. Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their six children as designated beneficiaries. Edgardo passed away in the year 2005. Then Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. However, it appeared from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 on November 5, 1982 with a different set of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote, as his spouse; and Elmer Azote, as dependent, Consequently, Edna's claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children..The benefits, however, would be SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 01 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS. 1 Geath benefits, lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo, She insisted that she was the legitimate wife of Edgardo. The SSC dismissed Edna's petition for lack of merit and Rosemarie was still the presumed legal \/ife of Edgardo because although he filed the Form E-4 designating Edna and their six children as beneficiaries, he did not revoke his prior designation of Rosemarie as his wife-beneficiary, The CA ruled otherwise. Hence, an appeal was made by SSC and it posited that under Section 5 of the SS Law, Edna is not a legitimate spouse who is entitled to the death benefits of Edgardo, SSC further contends that even though Edgardo revoked and superseded his earlier designation of Rosemarie as beneficiary, his designation of Edna was stil not valid considering that only a {egitimate spouse could qualify-ascaiiirimaly beqeliciagy. Sask Se gee Issue: i pelbicatie Is Edna entitled tothe SSS benefits as wife;beneficjary.of decease AN EEA CLLEGE ME! aye NO. Eana is not enitied.io Se Banctichas the-pomdciatrgPny Yoel d-member. S72 pamnmncmees 7 Section 8(e) and (k) of LA. No, 6282 iSiclear tI oe is qualified to be the beneficiary ofthe latter's § beret dependents include the legal spouse entitled bys ree 8{k) provides in part thal the primary beneficiaries ia remarries and the dependent children of the mente thai for the purpose of,cantractingya, srt summary proceeding asyprovidedsit this absentee, without prejudice-to thé aff HELD GT gsea gy failed to establish that there was retfect a In this case, there is a-corigréte prt individual as evidenced 'byathéir may status when he filled out thé {982 For marriage of Edgardo with Ednaiés,celeo “ys Using the parameters outlined int no impediment or that the impedimént'wai ferhoved at the time of the celebration of hér marriage to Edgardo. There was no evidéhce that“tHe, earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there was 2 declaration of Rosemarie's presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to ‘show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased- member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo. Hence, Edna cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Edgardo as their marriage took place during the exisience of a previously contracted marriage. The denial of Edna's claim by the SSC was correct. . A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE CA OR THE SC SHALL NOT STAY THE EXECUTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION UNLESS A TRO IS ISSUE BY THEM San BeDa COLLEGE OF Law 7029046 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. SOLIDUM G.R. No. 2014646; April 15, 2015 CARPIO, J. FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Smart Communications, inc. (Smart). Napoleon Nazareno (Nazareno) and Ricardo Isia (Isla) challenged the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the NLRC who ruled in favor of Respondent Jose Solidum (Solidum), Petitioner Smart hired Respordentsssligtinn ast ‘Smart Buddy. Activation is und Fa hich is headed by Isla. On September 2%; 2005, sia gaveySelidam”a*t ai i jing him of alleged acts of dishonesty, directing him to expiain why, his employment shouldtnét be terminated, and placing him under preventiye‘suspension withoufpay for-80-HaysAfter the lapseta/gO-days, Solidum's suspension was extended for 10, moresdays. He was-than i Jo altendtive administrative nearing of his suspel Geena ede ee oa OMe November 9, 2005 Yeftiatingisremploymentay et ep y ‘isa dismissal, illegal ages, and attorney's fecs. 4 noe tee Petitioners filed with the.CA a motion to,0rd aie: ¥,395.86, representing the total amount under the-Gctober 22.2010" fey 18-2011 alias writs,of execution but the CA suled in favor of Soliduity Hence, 1. In response thereof; Solidum filéda/"Eompiaint against suspension, non-paymientof salacies, actual, moralank for ISSUE: oe) Did the petition for certiorati:filed by No, the petition for certiorari the 2002 New Ruies of Procedi i tition for certiorari with the Court temporary restraining order is issued by‘fhe Court dfAppeals or the Supreme Court. In Bago v. NLRC, the Court held that employees are entitled to their accrued saiaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses untii the NLRC's reversal of the labor rhiter’s order of reinstatement becomes final and-executory, as shown on. the entry of judgment. The certification issued by the NLRC states that the NLRC's May 29, 2009 Decision became final and executory on Aug. 10, 2009. Hence, Solidum is entitled to P2,881,335.86, representing his accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses. RIGHT TO APPEAL IS MERELY A STATUTORY PRIVILEGE; HENCE, PROVISIONS OF LAW MUST BE COMPLIED WITH SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW °2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS: 103 MANILA MINING CORPORATION vs. LOWITO AMOR, ET. GR. No. 182800; April 20, 2015 atte PEREZ, J. FACTS: Respondents Lowito Amor, Rollybie Ceredon, Julius Cesar, Ronito Martinez and Fermin Tabil, Jr. were regular, employees of Petitioner Manila Mining Corporation (MMC), a domestic corporation which operated a mining claim in Placer, Surigao del Norte. MMC maintained a permit as compliance to environmental laws. When petitioner failed to secure an extension permit, it served a notice 1, its employees and the DOLE of the temporary ‘suspension of its operations for.sixs id Cet Sragulay-off of its employees. After the apse of said period, petitioner aSexlens Of its operations for another Gismissal and maketary claims" Pero NLRC. : Si) SAN BEDA pe The Labor Arbiter (LA) holds,-the peopel 2 dive distrissar in view of the suspension of its opel fon nd-the re iod a ray Id ie fe-for separation pay, damages and attornéy’s-fees with-thetotakamount 02. Agere petitioner filed its. Memorandum of apdeal before the NERC andi théireductidnof, the appeal bond to 100,000.00 due to setious financial oéses. RESpOi jed that thE. appeal bond tendered by petoner was grossly disprove monet an appeal. The NLRC reversed tha:LA’s decision’ On at that petitioner failed to-nefféct eis a pe « for a aside from being Fonly 116 days after In case of a judgment involving Smt jow Article 229) of the Labor Code mandates that, “an appeal by the éMployer-may-Devp .d only upon the posting of a cash or surely bond issued by a reputable bonding company bly accredited by the [NLRC] in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from." In McBurnie v. Ganzon, et al., while it is true that reduction of the appeal bond has been allowed in meritorious cases on the principle that substantial justice is befter served by allowing appeals on the merits, it has been ruled that the employer should comply with the following-conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary awaid is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall Not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. In the case, the petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that there is a need to reduce the bond due to serious losses. Also, the amount of P100,000.00 supposedly posted would not help their toa SINBEOACOUEDECRLAW | 2016 ConrnaatD Bat OPERATIONS case considering that the check submitted was dishonored and was refunded only 116 days after its right to appeal the LA’s decision had expired. Therefore, the appeal was not perfected. CONTINUOUS REHIRING MAKES THE EMPLOYEE A REGULAR ONE NELSON BEGINO, GENER DEL VALLE, MONINA A VILA-LLORIN AND MA. CRISTINA SUMAYAO, vs. ABS-CBN CORPORATION (FORMERLY, ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION) AND AMALIA VILLAFUERTE. G.R. No. 199166; Aprit 20, 2015 PEREZ, J) FACTS: e*, Respondent’ ABS:CBN Corp yillatuert) as Manager. ABS-CBN engaged the avae of poten Nelso ind Gener Del Valle (Del Valte}-sometime in 1996 43 Carel Sometime in fae arerauberbh pao eins the said contracts, wet Petitioners filed agait thal they performed funetions nscsssafy‘nd desi been continuously rehifed’since 1996) Algo) they: that they are mandated to wea! ory IDs a needed 4 he contiol.of ABS CBN considering vided. With all the equipment they Article 280 (now Article 295) of the Labior’Code of the’Rhilippines provides that an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has-been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a epecific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seascnal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the Season. Any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists.. The test to determine whether employment is regular or notis the reasonable connection between the activity Performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW (2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS ao AS cameramenieditors and reporters, petitioners were undoubtedly perfor necessary and essential to ABS-CBN’s business of broadca: Also, petitioners were continuously re-hired by responden's over the years. If the employee has been performing the job for atleast one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated or continuing performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity in the business. {t also 2ppears that petitioners were subject to the contro! and supervision of respondents which, first and foremost, provided them with the equipment essential for the discharge of their functions. In contrast to Sonza v. ABS CBN, G.R. No, 138051, June 10, 2004, case which involved a well-known television and radio Personality who was legitimately considered a talent and amply compensated as such, petitioners lay no claim to fame and/or unique talents. Therefore; petitioners are not tai ABS-CBN. OFFENSIVE WORDS DIREC’ CONSTITUTE:SEROIUS MIS noave , wen we rt SS fai SANTA FE MOVING AND REI nat SL GR, No. 208163, Aprili20, 2015 i mere xe ‘5 “i BRION, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Roque Benitez: ( relocation Services, «5°! to join the raffle, Benitez then the company itself and atthe ‘saying, "Putang ina mo ka’\ ‘employees, their families, as: Shai. Benitez was quoted as Pin front of the company's The company served him a memorandum advising him hot to report for work effective immediately, thereby terminating his employment, on grounds of serious misconduct or wilful Xisobedience after he failed to give an explanation. Petiioner argued that the penalty of dismissal is disproportionate to his alleged offense, ‘considering that it was committed during 4 casual Gathering and had no connection to his work ISSUE: : ‘Whether or not the act of Benitez saying offensive words to his manager constitutes serious misconduct? SAN BEDACOLLEGE OF LAW > Saad 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS (REQ RULING: Yes, The acts of Benitez constitute serious misconduct. Serious misconduct is a just cause for termination of employment under the law. Article 282 (now Article 297) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an employment for Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or represeniative in connection with his work, among others. Under the foregoing circumstances, his display of insolent and disrespectful behavior, in utter disregard of the time and place of its occurrence, had very much to do with his work. He set a bad. example as a union officer and as jon of the company. His actuations company. of CL ene, his ori “Ac amie LEGE OF Law | TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CF NNOTBE PRE ANTONIO PAGARIGAN v. ANGELITA YAS GR. No. 195203, April’20, 2015 e BRION, J } i FACTS: . land to his daughters, the respon produced and delivered to them each y they thought all along that Alfonse (petitioner's father) we was merely delivering to them their share in the harvest upon Alfonso's instructions. The respondents confronted the petitioner and demanded that he vacate the property because they did not consent ‘= “is institution as tenant of the land. ‘The petitioner mainly argues that the respondents’ continued acceptance of his deliveries of palay constituted as implied acquiescence of his occupation and cultivation of the subject rice land, thus, he claims that an implied tenancy has ‘been created between him and the respondents. SAN BEDACOLLEGEOFLAW 497 201.6 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS, ISSUE: Whether oF not the respondents’ acceptance of petitioner's palay deliveries constitutes as implied fenancy? RULING: No, the acceptance of petitoner’s palay defiveries did not constitute implied tenency. The presence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. The following essential elements of €n agricultural tenancy relationship must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there 1 ion on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) tHachamase, gndowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee ; Occupancy, aig ial |. no matter,howdong, will not * ipso facto make-one arde jure tenant. The elements for its existeneeiare explicl ea and cannot be done away withiby mere conjectltes. i SED AL Rye The element of consti frofrthe Mendosmnbcte-tnelpbhiioder Aa Mey Consistently failed to-provide igdependent and lgagamaeey and their father, Anasta of the subject rice tand: PP am nt. The petitioner Hence, no tenancy relationship: was created: i i Wilhelmsen-Smith Ball Manning’6 GR. No. 207328, April20;2015 Brion, J 4 FACTS: se 5 This is a petition for reviewonee a 8 ‘ourt of Appeals (CA) ruling that respondent Allan Suared, al pivipary seaman en continuously hired by the petitioner for five years, suffered.fronkng ! permanent total disability benefits, ‘Gathages. On the seventh month of his last nine month contract, fespondent Suarez diagnosed as unfit to work because of hydronephrosis secondary to uteropelvic junction obstruction, right (a kidney ailment). With this, he was repatriaivirback to the Philippines. ‘Suarez alleged that under the permanent medical unfitness clause of their company CBA, he is entitled to permanent disability benefits, regardless of his disability grade. In their defense, petitioners stated that Suarez's condition was not work-related. The petitioners also pointed out that Suarez's illness is not an occupational disease, The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the case for lack of merit. However, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the CA reversed SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 208 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS the LA's decision and concluded that Suarez Suffered from permanent total disability since he was unable to return to his job as a seafarer for more than 120 days. ISSUE: 1. Would a seafarer be entitled to disability benefits even if the cause of the same is neither work related nor an occupational disease? 2. Is the 120-day rule for the award of permanent total disability compensation proper? HELD: 1. No, an ailment which is not te Under Section 20 (B) = ployer is eyjabie only for Suri compensation/benefits when the, reset Wot voila jury or ills ring the term of the contract.Even the company CBA'S tates thatthe injury or ail t be ‘a resull of work related illnéss or from, at injuiy. Asi@-tesult 6f ah sei Sa feropelvic junction ‘obstruction is nbt/an occupational disease, a appear ja Yieclist of occupational diseases 2. No. The degree of a seatarer's disabiity,cai day rule or intotal disregard of the seataréig: cot the parties’ CBA, and Philippine law and-rules in case of any unteg: application of the’ 120-day rules ae especially the parties’. compliat rule cannot be accepted as ae ei compensation. Ouriaws do not only, cow yal dul jes Jeol Sater The 20-day A IKerawvard olfpefmanent total disabiity By iegeene of nutibefof days but by gradings. ee Ai ate’ fe 8 pd There being no impedimianti railing deel benefits must necessarily ISO . THE FILING OF A COMPLAINT ABANDONING FOREGOING EMPLOYMENT. Litex Glass and Aluminum Supply v. Sanchez G.R. No. 198465, April 22, 2015, Del Castillo, J : IEGATES ANY INTENTION OF FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to declare respondent Dominador Sanchez (Sanchez) to have been illegally dismissed from employment by petitioners. The Labor Arbiter (LA), NLRC and the CA ruled in favor of Sanchez and ruled that there was illegal dismissal. SAN BeDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CenTRAuzeD Bar OperaTions 7° Sanchez, who was employed as driver and managed by Ong-Sitco—the last of which i scolded and threw insulting words an indefinite leave, After several attempts always unwilling to talk to him. aluminum installer in several companies owned and is Litex, was surprised when ‘Ong-Sitco and his wife i invectives upon him and then ordered him to go on ‘0 nquire about his employment status, Ong-Sitca was Subsequent to the fling of the Sanchez’ fing of a complaint, he received two memorandum: letters from petitioners which were dated differently from the mailing dale. it cntained a directive {or Sanchez te repart for work and to explain his continued absence and a waming that his refusal {0 follow the earlier directive to report and explain his continued absence within 24 houre would constitute abandonment of work PAR SoHE ewe, Seog # Bp > AY Coe Beyond doubt;»Sanchez, stated ‘nding: ig 1emorandyms.were a mere aione: atterthought. Intheir defense, peiitioners averred that it was Saenz who stypiepea his job by not reporting forawoyke SAN BEDA aye ec) COLL ee 7 Yn ee , GOLLEGE OF ih HELD: oo No. The filing of a complaint for illegalidismissall abandonment, it is essential that an employegsfa justifiable reason and:that-he had a clear intentign overt act. eee In this case, Sanchez:teported ak. Cine ite es! ‘umes ta,4sk,about his employment Status but was not enteiiainéd. Od Vc ossitco-diever A acthered {9-ekplain why during these instances, he did not warn: Sanche

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi