NERI v AKUTIN affected A814 and A851 of the Civil Code.
But these sections have
74 PHIL 185
MORAN; May 21, 1943
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Testator Neri indicated in his will that he was leaving all of his
properties by universal title to his children by his second marriage
with preterition of his children by his first marriage.
- Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapita, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina are all
Neri’s children by his first marriage.
- The trial court annulled the institution of the heirs and declared total
intestacy.
- The children by the second marriage filed a motion for
reconsideration on the grounds that:
1) there is no preterition as to the children of the first marriage have
received their shares in the property left by the testator
2) assuming that there has been a preterition, the effect would not be
the annulment of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction of
the bequest made to them.
- The children by the second marriage anchor their argument on the
concept of “heir” whose A814 definition is deemed repealed by that
of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is maintained that the word
"heredero" under the Civil Code, is not synonymous with the term
"heir" under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the "heir" under
the latter Code is no longer personally liable for the debts of the
deceased as was the "heredero" under the Civil Code
ISSUES
1. WON there is preterition
2. WON there should be annulment of the institution of the heirs and
open the estate to total intestacy
HELD
1. YES, there is preterition
- According to the court’s findings, none of the children by the first
marriage received their respective shares from the testator’s property
- Even if clause 8 of the will is invoked (said clause states that the
children by his first marriage had already received their shares in his
property excluding what he had given them as aid during their
financial troubles and the money they had borrowed from him) the
Court can rely only on the findings of the trial court that the inventory
indicates that the property of Neri has remained intact and that no
portion has been given to the children of the first marriage.
- Neri left his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage and did not expressly disinherit his children by his first
marriage but did not leave anything to them. This fits the case of
preterition according to A814, CC which provides that the institution
of heirs shall be annulled and intestate succession should be declared
open.
2. YES
- The word "heir" as used in A814 of the Civil Code may not have the
meaning that it has under the Code of Civil Procedure, but this does
prevent a bequest from being made by universal title as is in
substance the subject-matter of A814 of the Civil Code.
- It may also be true that heirs under the Code of Civil Procedure may
receive the bequest only after payment of debts left by the deceased
and not before as under the Civil Code, but this may have a bearing
only upon the question as to when succession becomes effective and
can in no way destroy the fact that succession may still be by
universal or special title.
- Since a bequest may still be made by universal title and with
preterition of forced heirs, its nullity as provided in article 814 still
applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the Code of Civil
Procedure. The basis for its nullity is the nature and effect of the
bequest and not its possible name under the Code of Civil Procedure.
- In addition, Secs. 755 and 756 of the Code of Civil Procedure
been expressly repealed by Act No. 2141, thus restoring force to
A814 and A851.
ALVAREZ v IAC
185 SCRA 8 May 7, 1990
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and
Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus,
are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private
respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe.
Teodora was survivedby her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. There are two
parcels of land which are involved in this case.
Said lots were registered in the names of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes.
Fortunato D. Santiago was issued a Transfer Certificate of Title.
Santiago then sold the lots to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr.
The lots were sold thereafter Rosendo Alvarez. The Yaneses filed a
complaint against Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and
the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the “return” of the
ownership and possession of the lots, and prayed for an accounting of
the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint,
and that the share or money equivalent due the heirs be delivered to
them, and damages. During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold
the lots to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.
ISSUE: Whether the liability arising from the sale of the lots made by
Rosendo Alvarez to Dr.Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of
the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
As a general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations
are transmissible to the successors. However, in this case Petitioners
being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father’s transaction, which gave rise to the
present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the
property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction,
the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their
father’s hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets
are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the
estate.
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the
extent of the value of their inheritance.
Vitug v. CA
G.R. No. 82027, March 29, 1990
Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship
agreement with the Bank of American National Trust and
Savings Association. The said agreement contained the following
stipulations:
(1) All money deposited and to be deposited with the Bank in their
joint savings current account shall be both their property and shall be
payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of them
during their lifetime; and
(2) After the death of one of them, the same shall belong to and be the
sole property of the surviving spouse and payable to and collectible
or withdrawable by such survivor
Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix.
Romarico later filed a motion asking authority to sell certain shares of
stock and real property belonging to the estate to cover
his advances to the estate which he claimed were
personal fundswithdrawn from their savings account. Rowena
opposed on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from the
savings account were conjugal partnership properties and part of the
estate. Hence, there should be no reimbursement. On the other hand,
Romarico insists that the same are his exclusive property acquired
through the survivorship agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of the savings account subject of
the survivorship agreement were conjugal partnership properties and
part of the estate
No. The Court ruled that a Survivorship Agreement is neither a
donation mortis causanor a donation inter vivos. It is in the nature of
an aleatory contract whereby one or both of the parties reciprocally
bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what
the other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is to
occur at an indeterminate time or is uncertain, such as death. The
Court further ruled that a survivorship agreement is per se not
contrary to law and thus is valid unless its operation or effect may be
violative of a law such as in the following instances: (1) it is used as a
mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation; (2) it is used to transfer
property in fraud of creditors; or (3) it is used to defeat the legitime of
a compulsory heir. In the instant case, none of the foregoing instances
were present. Consequently, the Court upheld the validity of the
survivorship agreement entered into by the spouses Vitug. As such,
Romarico, being the surviving spouse, acquired a vested right over
the amounts under the savings account, which became his exclusive
property upon the death of his wife pursuant to the survivorship
agreement. Thus, the funds of the savings account are
not conjugal partnership properties and not part of the estate of
the deceased Dolores.
MONTINOLA v. HERBOSA
FACTS: Montinola filed an action against the heirs of Dr. Jose Rizal
for recovery of possession of personal property (the RIZAL RELICS)
allegedly sold to him by Doña Trinidad Rizal. The trial court held that
neither party is entitled to the possession of such property, relying
principally on the fact that in Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios, there is a line
where Rizal bequeathed all his property to the Filipino people. The
court argued that the handwritten work of Rizal constitutes a
holographic will giving the State all his property.
ISSUE: Does Mi Ultimo Adios constitute a last will?
HELD: No. An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a
thought or advice but does not contain a disposition of property, and
executed without Animus Standi cannot be legally considered a will.
Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios is but a literary piece of work, and was so
intended. It may be considered a will in a grammatical sense but not
in a legal or juridical sense. Moreover, it also lacks the requirements
of a holographic will such as a statement of the year month and day
of its execution and his signature.
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO
ABADIA, G.R. No.L-7188, August 9, 1954
20
JUL
[MONTEMAYOR, J.]
FACTS
The deceased Father Sancho Abadia executed a holographic will in
his own handwriting, numbered and signed by the testator himself
and attested by three (3) witnesses on September 6, 1923. He died on
January 14, 1943 in Cebu. The will was admitted to probate on
January 24, 1952. Some of the cousins and nephews, who would
inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
ISSUE
What law should apply as to the validity of the holographic will: the
old Civil Code when the will was executed or the new Civil Code
which could have validated the will?
RULING
It should be the old Civil Code. The new Civil Code, which took
effect August 30, 1950, provides in Art. 795: “The validity of a will
as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the
time it is made.” Here, the validity of the holographic will is to be
judged not by the law enforced at the time when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed.
When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and
follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution, just like in
this case, then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as
having died intestate. This is because the general rule is that the
Legislature cannot validate void wills.
G.R. No. L-46364 April 6, 1990
SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and
TEODORA GRADO, respondents.
Antonio E. Bengzon III for petitioners.
Agustin U. Cruz for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the following
Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Honorable Court of Appeals: (1)
Decision, dated March 1, 1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled
"Sulpicia Jimenez, et al., v. Vicente Fernandez, et al." affirming in
toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third
Judicial District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the same parties
and (2) Resolution dated June 3, 1977 denying plaintiffs-appellants'
motion for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is
as follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four
Hundred Thirty Six (436) square meters of that parcel of residential
land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of
Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 82275 (Exhibit A) issued in the name of Sulpicia Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters,
formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two (2)
sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez
who predeceased his father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia
Jimenez. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land
was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and
Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. As a
result of the registration case Original Certificate of Title No. 50933
(Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names of Carlos
Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter,
Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession
of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-
portion of the property to Edilberto Cagampan and defendant Teodora
Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties"
whereby the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the
latter, who has been in occupation since.
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit
adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to
Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her
deceased uncle. Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275
was issued on October 1, 1969 in petitioner's name alone over the
entire 2,932 square meter property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted
the present action for the recovery of the eastern portion of the
property consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant
Teodora Grado and her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaint and holding the defendant, Teodora Grado, the
absolute owner of the land in question; ordering the
plaintiffs to pay to the defendant the amount of P500.00 as
damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of
Appeals and on March 1, 1977, respondent Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirming the same in toto. Said decision was
rendered by a special division of five (5) justices, with the Hon.
Lourdes San Diego, dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable
Court of Appeals, filed therewith a motion for reconsideration. But
said motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals
in its resolution dated June 3, 1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the
aforequoted decision of the trial court, herein petitioner raised the
following assignments of error to wit:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS
MELECIA JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF
CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS
MELECIA JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL THE
LAND IN QUESTION TO EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN DID NOT BECOME
THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY
VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE (EXH. "1")
EXECUTED BY MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALIAS
MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT TEODORA GRADO DID NOT BECOME THE
OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF
THE DEED OF EXCHANGE (EXH. "7") EXECUTED
BY HER AND EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT THE TITLE OF APPELLANT SULPICIA
JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION CAN NOT
BE DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE OPEN AND
NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF APPELLEE TEODORA
GRADO.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS THE
ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN
THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE CASE OF LOURDES ARCUINO, ET
AL., V. RUFINA APARIS AND CASIANO PURAY, G.R.
NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968,
WHICH CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE APPELLANTS TO
PAY THE APPELLEES THE SUM OF P500.00 AS
ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS THE COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.
We find merit in the petition.
From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that
Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known as Melecia Jimenez, is not
the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the
property in question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence
to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really the daughter of Carlos
Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that
Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez
there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to
succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly
acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion
of the property subject of this petition.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art.
777, Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as
follows:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or
without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be
governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous
laws, and by the Rules of Court . . . (Rollo, p. 17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of
that parcel of land then covered by Original Certificate of title No.
50933, died on July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the successional rights pertaining
to his estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of
1889.
Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this
Court categorically held that:
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which
was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died and which
should be the governing law in so far as the right to inherit
from his estate was concerned), a child must be either a
child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an
acknowledged natural child — for illegitimate not natural
are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807,
935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-
law-relationship between her mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos
Jimenez, she could not even be considered an acknowledged natural
child because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana
Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and
consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child
and not entitled to any successional rights in so far as the estate of
Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her
by Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez of the litigated portion of the
land could not even legally transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto
Cagampan who accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same
to herein private respondents.
Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We can immediately
discern another error in the decision of the respondent court, which is
that the said court sustained and made applicable to the case at bar the
ruling in the case of Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray, No. L-23424,
January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 407, wherein We held that:
. . . it is true that the lands registered under the Torrens
System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs
herein are not the registered owners. They merely claim to
have acquired by succession, their alleged title or interest in
lot No. 355. At any rate plaintiffs herein are guilty of
laches.
The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that
respondents had acquired the property under litigation by
prescription. We cannot agree with such conclusion, because there is
one very marked and important difference between the case at bar
and that of the Arcuino case, and that is, that since 1933 petitioner
Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property then being registered
in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez' name. In the Arcuino case, this
Supreme Court held. "(I)t is true that lands registered under the
Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs
herein are not the registered owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said
cited case the principle of imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was
respected.
Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-interest
would be unavailing against the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was
the holder pro-indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate
of Title covering a tract of land which includes the portion now in
question, from February 28, 1933, when the Original Certificate of
Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued.
No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by
said original certificate of titles, could defeat the title of the registered
owner of the land covered by the certificate of title. (Benin v. Tuason,
L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531)
Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided property remained good
and continued to be good when she segregated it into a new title
(T.C.T No. 82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969. Sulpicia's ownership over
her one-half of the land and which is the land in dispute was always
covered by a Torrens title, and therefore, no amount
of possession thereof by the respondents, could ever defeat her
proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent, that the right of plaintiff
(now petitioner) to institute this action to recover possession of the
portion of the land in question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia
Jimenez, T.C.T. No. 82275 (Exhibit "A") is imprescriptible and not
barred under the doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v.
Macalindong, L-15398, December 29, 1962, Francisco v. Cruz, et al.,
43 O.G. 5105) Rollo, p. 39)
The respondent Court of Appeals declared the petitioner Sulpicia
Jimenez guilty of laches and citing the ruling in the case of Heirs of
Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan (65 SCRA 605), held that, since
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez executed her Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication only in 1969, she lost the right to recover possession of
the parcel of land subject of the litigation.
In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no absolute
rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is
to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The
question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled
by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or
to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It would be rank injustice and
patently inequitous to deprive the lawful heirs of their rightful
inheritance.
Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for,
declaring her to be the sole and absolute owner of the land in question
with right to its possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos
Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the properties then
owned in co-ownership with his niece Sulpicia descended by
intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any
issue or other heirs.
After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Act or the law which established the Torrens
System of Land Registration in the Philippines is that the stability of
the landholding system in the Philippines depends on the confidence
of the people in the titles covering the properties. And to this end, this
Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title
and in, among others, J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6
SCRA 938), held that "the right of the appellee to file an action to
recover possession based on its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and
not barred under the doctrine of laches.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution dated March 1, 1977 and June 3, 1977 in CA
G.R. No. L-49178-R are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in
question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his
participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval
of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business
and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that
the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to
postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of
the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the
depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of
the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect
to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question, whatever may be
the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as
he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are
on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and
Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws
are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an
opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of
the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such
laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial
court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse
of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in
force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was
not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the
exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one
of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the
second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a
Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon
me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality
and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable
length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded
in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my
wish that the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or
persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will
to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee
who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his
attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to
law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following: RULING

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good
morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code
above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern
his testamentary dispositions.
[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of
the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).“It is
therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail
over general ones.”

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the
law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the
legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of
the decedent. (Article 1039, Civil Code) The law which governs
Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is
the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate
may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run
counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions
and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that
said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed

that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to
include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and
the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to
costs.

So ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984.

20
JUL
[GUTIERREZ, JR., J.]

FACTS

The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and
was a permanent resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix
died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister; that during
her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament according
to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death, her
last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and
registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A. An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein
petitioner alleging among other things that the intrinsic provisions of
the will are null and void. The petitioner maintains that since the
respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will,
Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was
reserved by the law for him.

ISSUES

[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the

intrinsic validity of a will executed by an undisputed foreigner.

[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the

capacity to succeed of Adoracion’s heirs.