Criminal​ ​Procedure​ ​Digests
Atty.​ ​George​ ​S.D.​ ​Aquino
Agcaoili, Benitez, Cabusora, Capuchino, Cera, Dizon, Echauz, Fradejas,
Jalandoni,​ ​Montes,​ ​Paredes,​ ​Perez,​ ​So,​ ​and​ ​Ventilacion
2D,​ ​1st​ ​Semester,​ ​AY​ ​2017-2018
Instructions:
1.​ ​Indicate​ ​the​ ​following​ ​in​ ​the​ ​digest:
​ ​-​ ​Facts
​ ​-​ ​Issues​ ​/​ ​Held​ ​(related​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Crim​ ​Pro​ ​topic​ ​assigned)
​ ​-​ ​Ratio
​ ​-​ ​Doctrine
2.​ ​Maximum​ ​of​ ​one​ ​page.
3.​ ​Indicate​ ​your​ ​name​ ​(i.e.​ ​“Prepared​ ​by​ ​Juan​ ​de​ ​la​ ​Cruz”)
4. The arrangement of the digests in this document should follow the
arrangement​ ​shown​ ​in​ ​the​ ​First​ ​Semester​ ​SY​ ​2017-2018​ ​syllabus​ ​of​ ​GSA.
5.​ ​Format:​ ​Font:​ ​Georgia,​ ​Font​ ​Size:​ ​10,​ ​single​ ​spacing
II.​ ​RULE​ ​110​ ​-​ ​PROSECUTION​ ​OF​ ​OFFENSES
A.​ ​Institution​ ​of​ ​Criminal​ ​Actions​ ​(Section​ ​1)
Section 1. ​Institution of criminal actions. — Criminal actions shall be
instituted​ ​as​ ​follows:
(a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant
to section 1 of Rule 112, by filing the complaint with the proper officer
for​ ​the​ ​purpose​ ​of​ ​conducting​ ​the​ ​requisite​ ​preliminary​ ​investigation.
(b) For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly
with the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
or the complaint with the office of the prosecutor. In Manila and
other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of
the​ ​prosecutor​ ​unless​ ​otherwise​ ​provided​ ​in​ ​their​ ​charters.
The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running period of
prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.
(1a)
1.​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Bautista,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​168641,​ ​27​ ​April​ ​2007,​ ​522​ ​SCRA​ ​742
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Tiffany​ ​So
FACTS:
June 12, 1999 - A dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused
against​ ​buyers.​ ​(Complainant).
Aug 16 1999 - complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor for
slight​ ​physical​ ​injuries​ ​against​ ​respondent​ ​and​ ​co-accused.
Nov. 9, 1999 - Prosecutor recommended the filing of information which WAS
APPROVED​ ​-no​ ​date.
June 20, 2000 - Information was filed with MeTC of had B seeks for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the 60 DAY period of prescription
from​ ​the​ ​date​ ​of​ ​the​ ​commission​ ​of​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​had​ ​already​ ​elapsed.
ISSUE:
W/N the prescription period began to run a new after the investigating
prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper criminal information against
respondent​ ​was​ ​approved​ ​by​ ​the​ ​City​ ​Prosecutor.
HELD:
NO, Art 91 of RPC states that prescriptive period shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate w/o accused being convicted or
acquitted, or, are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him
well settled rule that the filling of the complaint with the fiscal’s office
suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Therefore, prescriptive
period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed at the OCP until
it is either convicted or acquitted. Delay in the filing should not unduly
prejudice​ ​the​ ​interest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​State.
The more appropriate action is a disciplinary action against the prosecutor
for​ ​incurring​ ​delay.
1

2. Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, 25 November 2008, 571
SCRA​ ​549
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Tiffany​ ​So
FACTS:
1992​ ​-​ ​Cawili’s​ ​borrowed​ ​various​ ​sums​ ​of​ ​money​ ​amounting​ ​to​ ​P​ ​1.9M​ ​from
Jan. 8, 1993 - Cawili and business asssociate (Tongson), jointly issued 3
checjs​ ​to​ ​pay​ ​the​ ​loan​ ​(which​ ​has​ ​both​ ​signatures).
Mar 18, 1993 - checks were dishonored so Petitioner make demands to Cawili
on​ ​May​ ​23,​ ​1995​ ​and​ ​Tongson​ ​Jue​ ​26,​ ​1995.
AUG 24, 1995 - Petitioner Filed Complaint for BP 22 before the QC
Prosecutor’s​ ​office.
Tonson however avers that he is also a victim of Cawili and had filed multiple
complaint​ ​for​ ​BP​ ​22​ ​and​ ​he​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​business​ ​associate​ ​of​ ​Cawili.
Dec. 6, 1995 - City Prosecutor found probable cause against Cawili but
dismissed​ ​Tongson.
Petitioner​ ​filed​ ​a​ ​partial​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​Department​ ​of​ ​Justice.
June 11, 1997 - Chief State Prosecutor directed QC Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation​ ​for​ ​Tiongson​ ​and​ ​refer​ ​the​ ​signatures​ ​of​ ​Tongson​ ​to​ ​the​ ​NBI.
March 15, 1999 - Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga dismissed Tongson’s
case​ ​referring​ ​to​ ​NBI​ ​since​ ​it​ ​had​ ​already​ ​prescribed.
BP 22 prescribe after 4 years “which started when the check was dishonored.
The Filing of the complaint to QC prosecutor did not interrupt the
prescriptive period because it was an administrative and the order of Chief
State Prosecutor has no merit because its petitioner who should initiate the
investigation.
ISSUES:
1) W/N the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in
court?
HELD:
No, Art. 3326 (Prescription for Special Acts and Ordinances. W/c states taht
BP​ ​22​ ​prescribes​ ​in​ ​4​ ​years​ ​from​ ​the​ ​commission​ ​or​ ​discovery but halts
upon the institution of the judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. Therefore, once the complaint is filed with the justice of the
peace​ ​for​ ​preliminary​ ​investigation​ ​the​ ​period​ ​is​ ​interrupted.
Any investigation or examination of offenses partakes of a nature of a judicial
proceeding even if the courts undue the complaint or information is filed
can’t​ ​file​ ​the​ ​case​ ​on​ ​merits.
The term “proceedings” in the law is understood as either executive or
judicial​ ​in​ ​character.
EXECUTIVE​ ​-​ ​INVESTIGATION​ ​STAGE
JUDICIAL​ ​-​ ​TRIAL​ ​AND​ ​JUDGMENT​ ​STAGE
To rule otherwise deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication in
account​ ​of​ ​delays​ ​not​ ​under​ ​his​ ​control.
3. Jadewell Parking Systems v. Lidua, G.R. No. 169588, 7 October
2013,​ ​706​ ​SCRA​ ​724
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Tiffany​ ​So
FACTS:
- P is a parking space authorized under Sec 13 of City Ordinance to clamp any
illegally​ ​parked​ ​vehicle.
- May 17, 2003: R dismantled and carried away the clamp which was clamped
because​ ​it​ ​was​ ​parked​ ​at​ ​a​ ​loading​ ​and​ ​unloading​ ​zone​ ​(basically​ ​robbery)
-​ ​May​ ​7,​ ​2003:​ ​R​ ​did​ ​the​ ​same​ ​thing​ ​to​ ​another​ ​car
-​ ​May​ ​23,​ ​2007:​ ​Complaint​ ​was​ ​filed​ ​to​ ​the​ ​OCP​ ​of​ ​Baguio
-​ ​May​ ​28,​ ​2003:​ ​Preliminary​ ​Investigation​ ​took​ ​place
- July 25, 2003: Although the charge on robbery was dismissed, the
Prosecutor​ ​found​ ​Usurpation​ ​of​ ​Authotity
-​ ​Oct​ ​2,​ ​2003:​ ​two​ ​criminal​ ​ifo​ ​were​ ​filed​ ​with​ ​nthe​ ​MTC
2
- R argues that prescription is done (Art. 89 of RPC) and failure of info to
state facts that charge an offense and imposition of charges on R for more
than​ ​one​ ​offense
- Prescription has run because more than 3 months has passed from the
commission​ ​of​ ​act​ ​to​ ​filing​ ​with​ ​MTC
ISSUE:
W/N​ ​the​ ​filing​ ​of​ ​complaint​ ​to​ ​the​ ​OCP​ ​tolled​ ​the​ ​prescription​ ​period?
HELD:
No.
- Act. No. 3326 is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for
violation​ ​of​ ​special​ ​laws​ ​and​ ​municipal​ ​ordinances
-​ ​In​ ​resolving​ ​the​ ​issue​ ​of​ ​prescription,​ ​the​ ​following​ ​should​ ​be​ ​considered:
a. Period​ ​of​ ​prescription​ ​for​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​charged
b. Time​ ​the​ ​period​ ​of​ ​prescription​ ​starts​ ​to​ ​run
c. The​ ​time​ ​the​ ​prescriptive​ ​period​ ​was​ ​interrupted
For​ ​(a)​ ​2​ ​months​ ​is​ ​the​ ​period​ ​for​ ​City​ ​Ordinance
Art.​ ​91​ ​(RPC)
(b)​ ​May​ ​7,​ ​2003
(c) When it is filed in court not when it was filed for preliminary
investigation.​ ​Therefore​ ​on​ ​Oct.​ ​2,​ ​2003.
- It is the Rules on Summary Procedure that must be followed because it is a
criminal case of a municipal or city ordinance (Sec 21 of Baguio City
Ordinance)
B.​ ​Who​ ​must​ ​prosecute​ ​(Section​ ​5,​ ​16)
4. Piñote v. Ayco, AM No. RTJ-05-1944, 13 December 2005, 477
SCRA​ ​409
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Tiffany​ ​So
FACTS:
Aug. 13 & 20, 2004 - Judge Ayco allowed the defense for violation of Sec. 3,
P.D. 1866 to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses
while​ ​State​ ​Prosecutor​ ​Piñote​ ​was​ ​absent​ ​undergoing​ ​medical​ ​treatment
Judge Ayco ordered Piñote to cross examine the two defense witnesses, but
he refused on the ground that he was absent therefore the proceedings were
void
Judge Ayco considered Piñote to have waived his right to cross-examine
hence arose the complaint against Judge Ayco for gross ignorance of law and
grave​ ​abuse​ ​of​ ​authority​ ​and​ ​serious​ ​misconduct
Judge Ayco answered that this is Piñote’s act to cover up and save face for his
incompetence and that there was no substantial prejudice because complaint
was​ ​permitted​ ​to​ ​cross-examine​ ​the​ ​two​ ​defense​ ​witnesses
ISSUE:
W/N Judge Ayco was allowed to continue the complaint despite the absence
of​ ​Piñote​ ​or​ ​a​ ​,prosecutor​ ​in​ ​general?
HELD:
No.
- Section 5 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court was violated since it specifically
states that “All criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the Prosecutor.” This is therefore the general rule. And if the
schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, a private prosecutor may
be​ ​authorized.
- Violation of criminal laws is against the Philippines not just to the
complainant, that is why the presence of a public prosecutor is necessary to
protect​ ​the​ ​interest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​people.
5.​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Piccio,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​193681,​ ​6​ ​August​ ​2014,​ ​732​ ​SCRA​ ​254
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Tiffany​ ​So
FACTS:
- Respondents (a group called Parents Enabling Parents Coalition Inc.)
published an article which petitioners filed a complaint for 13 counts of libel.
In Makati City RTC however, it was quashed for lack of jurisdiction because it
did not state where the article was printed and first published or where the
offended​ ​parties​ ​reside.
- The People of the Philippines, through the Private Prosecutors and with
conformity​ ​of​ ​Public​ ​Prosecutor​ ​Verming​ ​filed​ ​a​ ​notice​ ​of​ ​appeal
3
- The OSG suspended the filing to ask the DOJ whether it is the People or
Private​ ​Complainant​ ​who​ ​should​ ​file​ ​it.
- OSG did not conform to the appeal therefore he avers that the appeal must
fail because it is only the OSG that should represent the People in criminal
cases.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners being more private complainants, may appeal an order of
the​ ​trial​ ​court​ ​dismissing​ ​a​ ​criminal​ ​case​ ​even​ ​without​ ​the​ ​OSG’s​ ​conformity
HELD:
No.
- Petitioners lack the legal personality to appeal. It is well-settled that the
authority to represent the State in appeals for criminal cases before the Court
and​ ​CA​ ​is​ ​vested​ ​only​ ​in​ ​the​ ​OSG
- It is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect
representing the people because the party affected is the People and not the
petitioners​ ​who​ ​are​ ​merely​ ​complaining​ ​witnesses.
- ​The private complainant or the offended party may file an appeal
without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil
liability​ ​of​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​is​ ​concerned.
- because it was not petitioner’s reason for filing the complaint, appeal is
dismissed​ ​but​ ​should​ ​not​ ​prejudice​ ​them​ ​from​ ​filing​ ​a​ ​civil​ ​case​ ​in​ ​the​ ​future.
6. People v. dela Cerna, G.R. No. 136899-904, 9 October 2002, 390
SCRA​ ​538
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Tiffany​ ​So
FACTS:
-​ ​Irene​ ​filed​ ​6​ ​counts​ ​of​ ​rape​ ​against​ ​his​ ​Father,​ ​the​ ​accused
- Irene first admitted to her friends who admitted to their mother who
admitted​ ​to​ ​her​ ​mother.​ ​Thereafter,​ ​she​ ​was​ ​brought​ ​to​ ​DSWD
- She voluntarily executed an affidavit of desistance but her father was still
charged​ ​guilty​ ​for​ ​the​ ​6​ ​counts​ ​of​ ​rape
- Accused appealed such mainly on the affidavit of desistance averring that it
created​ ​reasonable​ ​doubt​ ​to​ ​his​ ​guilt
ISSUE:
W/N​ ​the​ ​complaint​ ​was​ ​extinguished​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Affidavit​ ​of​ ​Desistance
HELD:
No.
- An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement executed by a complainant
that he or she is discontinuing the action filed upon his or her complaint.
However,​ ​the​ ​have​ ​no​ ​persuasive​ ​value.
- Careful scrutiny of the Affidavit of Desistance reveals that Irene never
retracted​ ​her​ ​allegation​ ​but​ ​that​ ​she​ ​forgave​ ​the​ ​father.
- Because the new law RA 8353 (Anti Rape Law of 1997) took effect after the
acts​ ​of​ ​rape​ ​done​ ​to​ ​Irene​ ​which​ ​ ​classified​ ​rape​ ​as​ ​a​ ​crime​ ​against​ ​persons.
- Art. 344 will be followed where we treat rape as a private crim. Accdg to Art.
344 & Sec 5 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the crime of rape shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents,​ ​guardians/grandparents
- There are two ways to extinguish the crime, marriage and pardon, however
it should be prior to the institution of criminal action. Any pardon after the
institution cannot extinguish the criminal liability because now the true
aggrieved party is the People and the offended party is merely a complaining
witness.
- However, the appeal opened the whole case for judgment. The 2 counts of
rape prior to the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law are correctly punished
with reclusion perpetua but the last 4 punished with death is not valid even if
it happened after the enactment of the law because minority and relationship
must​ ​be​ ​proven​ ​clearly​ ​without​ ​reasonable​ ​doubt
- There was no evidence or basis of Irene’s actual age therefore penalty
should​ ​be​ ​reclusion​ ​perpetua.
7. People v. Go, G.R. No. 201644, 24 September 2014, 736 SCRA
501
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Tiffany​ ​So
FACTS:
- Private Complainant PDIC filed before the RTC against accused Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Documents for defrauding Orient
Commercial​ ​Banking​ ​Corp​ ​P159​ ​M.
- There were a series of postponements and even after 5 years, the
prosecution​ ​was​ ​unable​ ​to​ ​finish​ ​its​ ​presentation
- Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and violating
their​ ​right​ ​to​ ​speedy​ ​trial
4
- RTC voted in favor of Respondents then the prosecution so respondents
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA where a copy was not sent to the
People,​ ​through​ ​the​ ​OSG​ ​but​ ​only​ ​to​ ​the​ ​private​ ​complainants
-​ ​CA​ ​dismissed​ ​the​ ​case​ ​for​ ​violating​ ​speedy​ ​trial​ ​without​ ​the​ ​prosecution
ISSUE:
W/N the criminal cases against the respondents were properly dismissed by
the CA on certiorari; which the people as represented by the OSG having
been​ ​implead
HELD:
No.
- ​The People is an indispensable party to the proceedings (Sec 5 Rule 110)
therefore​ ​w/o​ ​them​ ​the​ ​petition​ ​is​ ​defective
- All criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public​ ​prosecutor
- While failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for
dismissal (because they can still be added) the remain essential and
jurisdictional that any indispensible party be impleaded in the proceedings
before​ ​the​ ​court​ ​renders​ ​judgment
- Absent the indispensable party render the action of the court, null and void
for​ ​want​ ​of​ ​authority​ ​to​ ​act
C.​ ​Complaint​ ​and​ ​Information​ ​(Sections​ ​2-4;​ ​6-13)
8. People v. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, 18 February 2015, 750 SCRA
677
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Beeya​ ​Echauz
Principal​ ​Accused:​ ​Bayabos​ ​et.​ ​Al.
Respondents:​ ​PMMA
Facts:
- Many several midshipmen of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy
(PMMA) were charged as principals by the NBI before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Zambales for the death of Fernando Balidoy due to hazing on
May​ ​3,​ ​2001
- The corresponding criminal case filed against them at the RTC of Iba,
Zambales.​ ​(1)
- The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military the finding of probable cause against the school
authorities,​ ​herein​ ​respondents,​ ​as​ ​accomplices​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Anti-Hazing​ ​Law.
- The Ombudsman Investigator sided with the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor and the case was re-docketed as a regular administrative case for
grave​ ​misconduct.
- The Office of the Special Prosecutor also charged respondents with a
criminal​ ​case​ ​as​ ​accomplices​ ​to​ ​the​ ​hazing​ ​before​ ​the​ ​Sandiganbayan.​ ​(2)
- RTC case filed against the principal accused (the midshipmen/students)
was​ ​dismissed​ ​and​ ​became​ ​final​ ​and​ ​executory.
- The respondents herein filed a Motion to Quash Information in
Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Information did not contain the essential
elements​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offense.
- There was no allegation that the purported act had been made a
prerequisite for admission to the academy; no averment that the PMMA was
a fraternity, sorority or organization and that the alleged hazing was not part
of the “physical, mental, and psychological testing and training procedure
and practices” and that the school was given prior notice of the activity and
they​ ​had​ ​permitted​ ​the​ ​activity
-​ ​The​ ​Sandiganbayan​ ​ordered​ ​the​ ​quashal​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Information.
- It ruled that the Information charged no offense and the allegations therein
were​ ​mere​ ​conclusions​ ​of​ ​law.
- The case against the respondents, being mere accomplices should also be
dismissed, since their liability was subordinate to that of the principals.
Before there can be an accomplice, there must be a principal by direct
participation.
- The Sandiganbayan order however, was silent on the matter of whether the
PMMA​ ​was​ ​an​ ​“organisation”.
- Aggrieved, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed the instant petition for
review​ ​on​ ​certiorari.
Issue
1. W/N the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing
can proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the
principal​ ​accused.
2. W/N the Information filed against respondents contains all the material
averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the
Anti-Hazing​ ​Law.
5
Held:
1.​ ​YES.
- Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed the case against respondents
because​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​the​ ​purported​ ​principals​ ​had​ ​already​ ​been​ ​dismissed.
- It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not
ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the
dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal,
especially​ ​when​ ​the​ ​occurrence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​has​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​been​ ​established.
- SC said in ​People v. Rafael​: “The corresponding responsibilities of the
principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as
the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the
determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently​ ​of​ ​that​ ​of​ ​the​ ​principal.”
- Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the
trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can
proceed​ ​independently​ ​of​ ​that​ ​of​ ​the​ ​alleged​ ​principal.
- Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed against
the​ ​alleged​ ​principals,​ ​because​ ​no​ ​crime​ ​had​ ​been​ ​committed.
- In fact, it does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the case.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on the
Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for
the​ ​dismissal​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case​ ​against​ ​the​ ​purported​ ​principals.
2.​ ​YES.
- Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not include all
the​ ​material​ ​facts​ ​constituting​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​of​ ​accomplice​ ​to​ ​hazing.
- The Rules of Court requires that the information charging persons with an
offense be “sufficient.” One of the key components of a “sufficient
information” is the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the
offense​ ​charged,​ ​subject​ ​of​ ​the​ ​complaint.
- The information must also be crafted in a language ordinary and concise
enough to enable persons of common understanding to know the offense
being​ ​charged​ ​against​ ​them.
- This approach is intended to allow them to suitably prepare for their
defense, as they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
constituting the offense they have purportedly committed. The information
need​ ​not​ ​be​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​language​ ​used​ ​in​ ​the​ ​law​ ​relied​ ​upon.
- The contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization is rejected. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term
organization includes – but is not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities,
sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs,
societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and
the​ ​AFP.
- Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the
PMMA is a government-owned educational institution established for the
primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine
officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of
the​ ​law.
- Sandiganbayan also erred in ruling that the quashal of the Information was
warranted for failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the
exemption relating to the duly recommended and approved “testing and
training procedure and practices” for prospective regular members of the
AFP​ ​and​ ​the​ ​PNP.
- This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element of, the
crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly
claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution. The accused carry the burden
of proof in establishing by clear and convincing evidence that they have
satisfied​ ​the​ ​requirements​ ​thereof.
- Thus, the prosecution’s failure to point out in the Information that the
exception​ ​is​ ​inapplicable​ ​would​ ​not​ ​justify​ ​the​ ​quashal​ ​of​ ​that​ ​Information.
- Nevertheless, the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information
does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to
hazing.
Doctrine​ ​(About​ ​Information)
In assessing whether an information must be quashed on that ground, the
basic test is to determine if the facts averred would establish the presence of
the essential elements of the crime as defined in the law. The information is
examined without consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims therein,
as these are more properly proven or controverted during the trial. In the
appraisal​ ​of​ ​the​ ​information,​ ​matters​ ​aliunde​ ​are​ ​not​ ​taken​ ​into​ ​account.
● al right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against​ ​her.​ ​Here,​ ​such​ ​is​ ​not​ ​the​ ​case.
9. Lasoy et al v. Zeñarosa, G.R. No. 129472, 12 April 2005, 455
SCRA​ ​360
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Enzo​ ​Agcaoili
6
FACTS
● Information filed with ACP dated 03 July 1996 - ​That on or about the
2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused (Lasoy et al.), conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to
sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any ​prohibited drug​,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of
42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops​, a prohibited
drug,​ ​in​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​said​ ​law.
● Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced
on​ ​16​ ​July​ ​1996​ ​in​ ​this​ ​wise
● ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby find[s] accused MARCELO LASOY
and FELIX BANISA, GUILTY of Violation of Section 4, Republic Act
6425 and they are hereby sentenced to suffer a jail term of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY… pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act​ ​5127.
● On 28 August 1996, plaintiff People of the Philippines, thru Assistant
City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two separate
motions, first, to admit amended Information, ​and second, to set
aside the arraignment of the accused, as well as the decision of the
trial​ ​court​ ​dated​ ​16​ ​July​ ​1996.
● 42.410 grams -> 42.410 kg marijuana fruiting tops from La Trinidad
to​ ​Metro​ ​Manila.
ISSUE
Whether or not the first information is valid and whether or not the RTC,
Branch 103, where the first information was filed and under which Criminal
Case​ ​No.​ ​Q-96-66788​ ​was​ ​tried,​ ​had​ ​jurisdiction​ ​to​ ​try​ ​the​ ​case.
HELD
● An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof.
● In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the
court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable
conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to
follow the language of the statute in the information. The
information​ ​will​ ​be​ ​sufficient​ ​if​ ​it​ ​describes​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​defined​ ​by​ ​law.
● Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first
information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by
which​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​was​ ​committed.
● Rule 110 Section 6. ​Sufficiency of complaint or information​. – A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​place​ ​wherein​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​was​ ​committed.
10. People v. Puig, G.R. No. 173654 – 765, 28 August 2008, 563
SCRA​ ​564
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Chris​ ​Paredes
Facts​:
November 2005 - Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor's Office filed before the
Dumangas, Iloilo RTC, ​112 cases of ​Qualified Theft against resp. Teresita
Puig (cashier) and Romeo Porras (bookkeeper) of Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc.
Allegations in the Informations were uniform and pro-forma, except for the
amounts, date and time of commission. After perusing the Informations in
these cases, the RTC did not find the existence of probable cause that would
have necessitated the issuance of a warrant of arrest based on the following
grounds:
(1) the element of ‘taking without the consent of the owners’ was missing on
the ground that it is the depositors-clients, and not the Bank, which filed the
complaint in these cases, who are the owners of the money allegedly taken by
respondents​ ​and​ ​hence,​ ​are​ ​the​ ​real​ ​parties-in-interest;​ ​and
(2) the Informations are ​bereft of the phrase alleging “​dependence,
guardianship or vigilance between the respondents and the offended party
that would have created a high degree of confidence between them which
the​ ​respondents​ ​could​ ​have​ ​abused.​”
RTC dismissed the cases on January 2006 and refused to issue a warrant of
arrest against Puig and Porras. MR filed by petitioner (People) on April 2006
and​ ​denied​ ​by​ ​the​ ​RTC​ ​on​ ​June​ ​2006,​ ​hence​ ​this​ ​appeal.
Issue​ ​/​ ​Held​:
Whether the informations for qualified theft ​sufficiently allege the element of
taking without the consent of the owner,​ and the qualifying circumstance of
7
grave abuse of confidence​. - ​YES​, the informations sufficiently allege all the
essential​ ​elements​ ​constituting​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​of​ ​Qualified​ ​Theft.
Ratio​:
It needs stressing that the RTC Judge based his conclusion that there was ​no
probable cause simply on the ​insufficiency of the allegations in the
Informations concerning the facts constitutive of the elements of the offense
charged.
The records reasonably indicate that the respondents may have, indeed,
committed the offense charged. The Bank acquires ownership of the money
deposited by its clients; and the employees of the Bank, who are entrusted
with the possession of money of the Bank due to the confidence reposed in
them,​ ​occupy​ ​positions​ ​of​ ​confidence.
On the sufficiency of the Information, ​§6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
requires, inter alia, that the information must state the acts or omissions
complained​ ​of​ ​as​ ​constitutive​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offense.
On the manner of how the Information should be worded, ​§9, Rule 110 of the
Rules​ ​of​ ​Court​,​ ​is​ ​enlightening:
“Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ​ordinary and concise language ​and ​not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient
to enable a ​person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and
for​ ​the​ ​court​ ​to​ ​pronounce​ ​judgment.”
It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the
statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding to
know​ ​the​ ​charge​ ​against​ ​him,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​court​ ​to​ ​render​ ​judgment​ ​properly.
Doctrine​:
Test for sufficiency of information is whether it enables a ​person of common
understanding to know the ​charge against him​, and the ​court to ​render
judgment​ ​properly​.
11. People v. Ceredon, G.R. No. 167179, 28 January 2008, 542
SCRA​ ​550
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Nicki​ ​Capuchino
FACTS:
Appellant (Elmer Ceredon) was indicted for ​10 counts of rape. That
sometime in 1995 in the municipality of Gattaran Province of Cagayan, the
above named accused, armed with a knife, with lewd design bu use of force of
intimidation, did then willfully and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein offender AAA, his youngest
sister,​ ​a​ ​minor,​ ​10​ ​years​ ​of​ ​age,​ ​all​ ​against​ ​her​ ​will​ ​and​ ​consent.
The tenth and last incident of rape transpired on May 8, 2000 during the
wake of their father who had passed away. AAA was then 15 y.o at that time.
However, on September 18, 2000, AAA reached the end of her rope, she
revealed to her sister DDD, friend Giselle and teacher Teresa that she was
raped by appellant, her brother. Teresa upon hearing AAA’s revelation,
accompanied her to their head teacher Felix Salvador. Then, together, they
went to the barangay captain who told them to report the matter to the
police.
On September 20, 2000 there was a confrontation arose between AAA and
his appellant (Elmer Ceredon). On September 21, 2000 there was a second
confrontation. Present with their mother, their sister DDD, their uncle
Raymundo Bumanglag, appellant’s wife, and AAA’s teaches Charito Elesterio
Jeery Roque, and Elpidio Salvatierra. In said Confrontation, AAA accused her
brother appellant, of raping her 10 times while he admitted to having raped
her thrice only. Josephine appellant’s wife, told him to admit so that AAA
could forgive him. He then admitted that he had raped her 10 times and
asked for forgiveness, unfortunately, AAA could no longer forgive her
brother.
RTC​ ​AND​ ​CA​ ​DISPOSITIONS:
RTC
The court finds accused Elmer Ceredon “GUILTY” beyond reasonable doubt
in all the ten (10) criminal informations for rape and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the supreme penalty of “DEATH” in each of the 10 criminal
8
informations. Hence, the automatic appeal to the Supreme Court. The case
was​ ​forwarded​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​of​ ​Appeals​ ​for​ ​intermediate​ ​review.
CA
The judgment conviction is affirmed with modifications of civil indemnity,
moral damages and exemplary damages. Then forwarded to SC FOR THE
AMENDMENTS​ ​FOR​ ​DEATH​ ​PENALTY.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged based ON AN IMPROVIDENT
PLEA OF GUILTY ( accused argues that when he was arraigned and he
pleaded guilty to all ten charges of rape levelled against him, he was “NOT
FULLY APPRISED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS CHANGE OF PLEA
FROM​ ​“NOT​ ​GUILTY​ ​TO​ ​GUILTY).
HELD:
NO. The rule is where the accused s\desires to plead guilty to a capital
offense,​ ​the​ ​court​ ​is​ ​enjoined​ ​to​ ​observe​ ​the​ ​following:
1) It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension​ ​of​ ​the​ ​consequences​ ​of​ ​his​ ​plea.
2) The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the
guilt​ ​of​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​and​ ​the​ ​precise​ ​degree​ ​of​ ​his​ ​culpability;​ ​and
3) The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his
behalf​ ​and​ ​allow​ ​him​ ​to​ ​do​ ​so​ ​if​ ​he​ ​desires.
There is no definite and concrete rule on how a trial judge may go about the
matter of a proper “SEARCHING INQUIRY” as required by the aforecited
rule. It is incumbent upon a trial judge to ascertain and be fully convinced
that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and its consequences fully
comprehended by the accused. Being assisted by counsel all throughout the
proceedings, when appellant was re-arraigned, the charges were read and
explained to him in Ilocano, his native tongue. ​HE CANNOT CLAIM
THATT HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS
CHANGE​ ​OF​ ​PLEA.
At any rate, contrary to the appellant’s assertion, he was convicted by the trial
court, “​NOT ON THE BASIS OF HIS PLEA OF GUILTY , BUT ON
THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
12. People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 178325, 22 February 2008, 546
SCRA​ ​514
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Karla​ ​Cera
FACTS
​Dominador Soriano (Accused-Appellant) with lewd designs, by
means of force,threat and intimidation had carnal knowledge with his
daughter AAA who was then 12 years old in several occasions while her
mother was in Manila. These encounters with her father led to her
pregnancy.
The information charged more than one offense where the trial court
and​ ​the​ ​appellate​ ​court​ ​found​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​guilty​ ​of​ ​“multiple​ ​rape”.
ISSUE
​W/N the trial court and appellate court are correct in finding the
accused​ ​guilty​ ​of​ ​“multiple​ ​rape”
HELD
​No, there is no such thing as “multiple rape”. The Court observes that
the information charged more than one offense in violation of Sec. 13, Rule
111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Considering that appellant
did not seasonably object to the multiple offenses in the information, the
court​ ​may​ ​convict​ ​the​ ​appellant​ ​of​ ​as​ ​many​ ​as​ ​are​ ​charged​ ​and​ ​proved.
It is noted, however, that both the trial court and the appellate court
merely found the appellant guilty of “multiple rape” without specifying the
number of rapes that appellant is guilty of.This has an effect on the
accused-appellant’s​ ​civil​ ​liability.
9
 In this case, the appellant is guilty of two counts of rape qualified by
the circumstances that the victim is under eighteen years of age and the
offender​ ​is​ ​the​ ​parent​ ​of​ ​the​ ​victim.
13. Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, 9 February 2007,
515​ ​SCRA​ ​302
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Anna​ ​Jalandoni
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a
collector-messenger by City Service Corporation. He was assigned to the
main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary
task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier.
He​ ​also​ ​delivered​ ​invoices​ ​to​ ​Caltex’s​ ​customers.
On November 6, 1997, Caltex, through its Banking and Insurance
Department Manager Ramon Romano, filed a criminal complaint against
petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents. Romano alleged that, on
October 16, 1997, while his department was conducting a daily electronic
report from Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa,
Makati Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was discovered that unknown
to the department, a company check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13,
1997 in the amount of ₱5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had been
cleared through PCIB on October 15, 1997. An investigation also revealed that
two other checks (Check Nos. 73999 and 74000) were also missing and that
in Check No. 74001, his signature and that of another signatory, Victor S.
Goquinco, were forgeries. Another check, Check No. 72922 dated September
15, 1997 in the amount of ₱1,790,757.25 likewise payable to Dante R.
Gutierrez, was also cleared through the same bank on September 24, 1997;
this check was likewise not issued by Caltex, and the signatures appearing
thereon had also been forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered that Check
Nos. 74001 and 72922 were deposited at the Banco de Oro’s SM Makati
Branch under Savings Account No. S/A 2004-0047245-7, in the name of a
regular​ ​customer​ ​of​ ​Caltex,​ ​Dante​ ​R.​ ​Gutierrez.
In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of ₱581,229.00 to Caltex
on March 29, 1998. However, the City Prosecutor of Makati City was not
informed of this development. After the requisite preliminary investigation,
the City Prosecutor filed 2 Informations for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents on June 29, 1998 against petitioner wherein both
criminal informations named Caltex Philippines as the party defrauded by
means​ ​of​ ​falsification​ ​of​ ​commercial​ ​documents.
On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the
private prosecutor for the substitution of PCIB as private complainant for
Caltex.
According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended party is an
essential element of estafa. The ​amendment of the Informations substituting
the PCI Bank for Caltex as the offended party would prejudice his rights since
he is deprived of a defense available before the amendment, and which would
be​ ​unavailable​ ​if​ ​the​ ​Informations​ ​are​ ​amended.
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private
complainant at this late stage of the trial is prejudicial to his defense.
He argues that the substitution is tantamount to a ​substantial
amendment of the Informations which is prohibited under Section
14,​ ​Rule​ ​110​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Rules​ ​of​ ​Court.
ISSUE:
W/N the designation of the name of the offended party in crimes against
property​ ​is​ ​indispensable​ ​in​ ​the​ ​information.
HELD:
No. ​In Sayson v. People,​33 the Court held that in case of offenses against
property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely
indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information​ ​can​ ​be​ ​properly​ ​identified:
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state
the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed or any appellation or nickname by which
such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of Identifying
him, he must be described under a fictitious name (Rule 110, Section 11,
Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the designation of
the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as
10
the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly
identified.​ ​Thus,​ ​Rule​ ​110,​ ​Section​ ​11​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Rules​ ​of​ ​Court​ ​provides​ ​that:
Section​ ​11.​ ​Name​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offended​ ​party-
… Information is not the same person who made the demand and filed
(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is
unknown, the property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with
such​ ​particularity​ ​as​ ​to​ ​properly​ ​Identify​ ​the​ ​particular​ ​offense​ ​charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom or
against whose property the offense was committed is disclosed or
ascertained, the court must cause the true name to be inserted in the
complaint​ ​or​ ​information​ ​or​ ​record.
14. Senador v. People, G.R. No. 201620, 6 March 2013, 692 SCRA
669
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Enzo​ ​Agcaoili
FACTS
● Senador​ ​charged​ ​with​ ​estafa
● Information - ​That on or about the 10th day of September 2000 in
the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said ​accused, having obtained and
received from one ​Cynthia Jaime various kinds of jewelry
valued​ ​in​ ​the​ ​total​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​₱705,685.00…
● Rita Jaime (Rita) and her daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime (Cynthia),
were​ ​engaged​ ​in​ ​a​ ​jewelry​ ​business.
● Sometime in the first week of September 2000, Senador went to see
Rita at her house in Guadalupe Heights, Cebu City, expressing her
interest to see the pieces of jewelry that the latter was selling. On
September 10, 2000, Rita’s daughter-in-law and business partner,
Cynthia, delivered to Senador several pieces of jewelry worth
P705,685
● Senador undertook to sell the jewelry thus delivered on commission
basis and, thereafter, to remit the proceeds of the sale, or return the
unsold items to Cynthia within 15 days from the delivery. Senador
failed​ ​to​ ​do​ ​so.
● Thus, in a letter dated October 4, 2001, Rita demanded from Senador
the return of the unsold jewelry or the remittance of the proceeds
from the sale of jewelry entrusted to her. The demand fell on deaf
ears prompting Rita to file the instant criminal complaint against
Senador.
● Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the
the complaint. According to Senador, the private complainant in the
Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during
trial,​ ​the​ ​private​ ​complainant​ ​turned​ ​out​ ​to​ ​be​ ​"Rita​ ​Jaime."
● Senador insisted that her acquittal on the postulate that her
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation
against​ ​her​ ​had​ ​been​ ​violated​ ​(based​ ​on​ ​Uba​ ​case)
ISSUE
Whether or not an error in the designation in the Information of the offended
party violates, as petitioner argues, the accused’s constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, thus, entitling
her​ ​to​ ​an​ ​acquittal.
HELD
● As correctly held by the appellate court, Senador’s reliance on Uba is
misplaced. In Uba, the appellant was charged with oral defamation, a
crime against honor, wherein the identity of the person against
whom the defamatory words were directed is a material element.
Thus,​ ​an​ ​erroneous​ ​designation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​person​ ​injured​ ​is​ ​material.
● In the instant case, Senador was charged with estafa, a crime against
property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper
designation of the name of the offended party. Rather, what is
absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act
charged​ ​in​ ​the​ ​information.
● Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the offended party in
crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court
mandates​ ​the​ ​correction​ ​of​ ​the​ ​information,​ ​not​ ​its​ ​dismissal.
● in offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous
designation of the offended party would depend on whether or not
the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently described and
identified.
● If the subject matter of the offense is generic or one which is not
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense
charged, then an erroneous designation of the offended party is
11
 material and would result in the violation of the accused’s
constitution
15. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 160619, 9 September 2015,
770​ ​SCRA​ ​162
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Nicki​ ​Vine​ ​Capuchino
FACTS:
Jessie Castillo was an elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in
the​ ​May​ ​1993​ ​Elections.
Sept. 19, 2000 - an information was filed against Castillo charging him with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in relation to the alleged
illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumspite located in Molino, Bacoor,
Cavite.
According to the information, Castillo while in the performance of his official
functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave unwarranted benefits to his co-accused
Melencio and Emerancio Arciaga by allowing the latter to operate the Villa
Esperanza Dumpsite without the requisite Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) and permit from the Environmental Management Bureau.
(EMB).
Sept. 21, 2001 Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion To Quash the
Information on the ground that the same does not charge an offense. Castillo
argued that the undue injury must only be mentioned in the information, its
extent must be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral
certainty.
ISSUE:
W/N an information alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence
of undue injury must state the precise amount of the alleged benefit unduly
granted as well as identify, specify and prove the alleged injury to the point of
moral​ ​certainty.
HELD:
NO, the foregoing information sufficiently alleges the specific elements of a
violation of SEC. 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. The information specifically alleged
that Castillo is the Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite who in such official capacity, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality and conspiring with the Arciaga,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, by
allowing the illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite, to the undue
injury of the residents and students in the area who had to endure the ill
effects of the dumpsite’s operation. For as long as the ULTIMATE FACT​S
constituting the offense have been alleged an information charging a
violation of SEC 3 (e) OF RA no 3019 need not to state to the point of
specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit granted nor specify,
quantify,​ ​or​ ​prove,​ ​to​ ​the​ ​point​ ​of​ ​moral​ ​certainty,​ ​the​ ​undue​ ​injury​ ​caused.
D.​ ​Amendment/Substitution​ ​(Section​ ​14)
16.​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Casey,​ ​L-30146,​ ​24​ ​February​ ​1981,​ ​103​ ​SCRA​ ​21
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Enzo​ ​Agcaoili
FACTS
● Joseph Casey alias "Burl" and Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad"
the​ ​capital​ ​punishment​ ​for​ ​the​ ​death​ ​of​ ​Alfredo​ ​Valdez.
● Information - On or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the
municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal… above- named accused,
being then armed with a knife, together with one Ricardo Felix alias
"Carding Tuwad" who is then armed with a firearm… with intent to
kill, evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm
and​ ​knife​ ​one​ ​Alfredo​ ​Valdez…​ ​caused​ ​his​ ​death.
● Accused​ ​pleaded​ ​not​ ​guilty
● Mercedes Palomo, 28, resident of 242 Mahinhin Street, San Juan,
Rizal, testified that on March 31, 1968, at around three o'clock in the
afternoon, while in the house of her aunt, she heard a shot coming
from​ ​the​ ​pool​ ​room​ ​located​ ​near​ ​her​ ​aunt's​ ​place.
● When asked as to whether she can Identify the men coming out of
the house, she answered in the affirmative and pointed to Joseph
Casey​ ​and​ ​Ricardo​ ​Felix
● Continuing her testimony, she said that she saw the one with curly
hair overtake and stab the victim several times, while in the
meantime, Ricardo Felix stood nearby holding a gun which he later
fired​ ​once​ ​at​ ​the​ ​victim
12
 ● Several other testimonies were taken pointing to the murder of
Valdez​ ​by​ ​the​ ​accused
● Accused Casey testified that they acted in self defense, while accused
Felix​ ​said​ ​that​ ​he​ ​did​ ​not​ ​see​ ​Casey​ ​on​ ​the​ ​day​ ​of​ ​the​ ​incident
● On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the court ​a quo rendered the
aforementioned judgment of conviction. It found that two
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime,
namely: employing or taking advantage of superior strength and
evident​ ​premeditation,​ ​one​ ​of​ ​which​ ​qualified​ ​the​ ​killing​ ​to​ ​murder.
ISSUE
W/N ​The Court ​a quo erred in illegally trying appellant Casey on the
amended information without arraignment, and in finding him guilty after
such​ ​illegal​ ​trial.
HELD
● The court ​did not err in trying the appellant on the amended info
without​ ​arraignment
● The lack of arraignment under the amended information is objected
to by accused-appellant Joseph Casey allegedly on the ground that
there is a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the
charge​ ​against​ ​him.
● There can be a violation of such right, however, only when the
amendment​ ​pertains​ ​to​ ​matters​ ​of​ ​substance.
● In the case at bar, the alterations introduced in the information refer
to the inclusion of accused appellant Ricardo Felix to the same
charge of murder. They do not change the nature of the crime against
accused-appellant​ ​Casey.
● Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage
of​ ​superior​ ​strength​ ​are​ ​similarly​ ​alleged​ ​in​ ​both​ ​informations.
● A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an
amendment to an information introduced after the accused has
pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the
crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which
could​ ​call​ ​for​ ​a​ ​higher​ ​penalty
● It does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance — not
prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section
13,​ ​Rule​ ​110​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Revised​ ​Rules​ ​of​ ​Court.
17. Fronda –Baggao v. People, G.R. No. 151785, 10 December 2007,
539​ ​SCRA​ ​531
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Karla​ ​Cera
FACTS
Provincial Prosecutor of Abra filed with the RTC Bangued four
separate Informations for Illegal Recruitment against Susan Fronda-Baggao,
petitioner, and Lawrence Lee. Petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade
before​ ​she​ ​was​ ​finally​ ​arrested.
The prosecutor filed a motion to amned the Informations from 4 separate
informations to one Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. Said
motion​ ​was​ ​denied​ ​by​ ​the​ ​trial​ ​court.
ISSUES
1)​ ​Whether​ ​the​ ​Four​ ​Informations​ ​for​ ​Illegal​ ​Recruitment​ ​could​ ​be​ ​amended.
2) Whether said 4 Informations can be lumped into one Information for
illegal​ ​recruitment​ ​in​ ​large​ ​scale.
3)​ ​Whether​ ​said​ ​amendment​ ​is​ ​violative​ ​the​ ​substantial​ ​rights​ ​of​ ​the​ ​accused.
HELD
1)​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​Yes,​ ​the​ ​Information​ ​can​ ​still​ ​be​ ​amended.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that
“Section 14. Amendment or substitution.—A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave​ ​of​ ​court,​ ​at​ ​any​ ​time​ ​before​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​enters​ ​his​ ​plea​…”
Following the above provisions and considering that petitioner has not yet
entered​ ​her​ ​plea,​ ​the​ ​4​ ​Informations​ ​can​ ​still​ ​be​ ​amended.
2)​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​Yes,​ ​the​ ​Informations​ ​can​ ​be​ ​lumped​ ​into​ ​one.
13
Petitioner contends that the above Rule refers to an amendment of one Motion ​on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the
Information only. Not four or multiple Infomations which cannot be joined Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted and arraigned before a
into​ ​only​ ​one​ ​information. competent​ ​court,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​case​ ​was​ ​terminated​ ​without​ ​his​ ​express​ ​consent.

A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it uses the singular Issue:
word complaint or information, it does not mean that two or more 1. W/N respondent judge could amend the Information after Petitioner
complaints or Informations cannot be amended into only one Information. had​ ​already​ ​pleaded​ ​not​ ​guilty?
Surely, such could not have been intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can 2. W/N​ ​there​ ​is​ ​double​ ​jeopardy?
be an absurd situation whereby two or more complaints or Informations 3. W/N ​respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering that
could​ ​no​ ​longer​ ​be​ ​amended​ ​into​ ​one​ ​or​ ​more​ ​Informations. the original Information for Homicide stands after realizing that
disregard of rank does not qualify the killing to Murder which will
3) No, the amendment does not violate the the substantial rights of the result​ ​to​ ​double​ ​jeopardy?
accused.
Held:
Obviously, petitioner relies on Section 14 of the same Rule 110 which 1. Yes, ​Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or
provides that “after the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may substitution​ ​under​ ​Section​ ​14,​ ​Rule​ ​110​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Rules​ ​of​ ​Court.
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.” As stated earlier, petitioner has not yet Distinction​ ​between​ ​amendment​ ​or​ ​substitution:
been​ ​arraigned.​ ​Hence,​ ​she​ ​cannot​ ​invoke​ ​the​ ​said​ ​provision.
AMENDMENT SUBSTITUTION
18. Pacoy v. Hon Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, 28 September 2007, 534
-may​ ​involve​ ​either​ ​formal​ ​or -necessarily​ ​involves​ ​a
SCRA​ ​338
substantial​ ​changes substantial​ ​change​ ​from​ ​the
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Tiffany​ ​So
original​ ​charge
Facts: -Amendment​ ​before​ ​plea​ ​has -Substitution​ ​of​ ​information
An Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner who: been​ ​entered​ ​can​ ​be​ ​effected must​ ​be​ ​with​ ​leave​ ​of​ ​court​ ​as
“shot his commanding officer Esquita with the aggravating circumstance of without​ ​leave​ ​of​ ​court the​ ​original​ ​information​ ​has​ ​to
disregard of his rank”. Petitioner pleaded not guilty and Respondent Judge be​ ​dismissed
set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002. However, on the
same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another -Where​ ​the​ ​amendment​ ​is​ ​only​ ​as -Another​ ​preliminary
Order directing the trial prosecutor to amend the Information to Murder in to​ ​form,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​need​ ​for investigation​ ​is​ ​entailed​ ​and
view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank. Acting upon such another​ ​preliminary​ ​investigation the​ ​accused​ ​has​ ​to​ ​plead​ ​anew
Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word and​ ​the​ ​retaking​ ​of​ ​the​ ​plea​ ​of​ ​the to​ ​the​ ​new​ ​information
Homicide and changing it to Murder in the caption. Everything else remained accused
the​ ​same​ ​except​ ​the​ ​victim’s​ ​name​ ​from​ ​Escuita​ ​to​ ​Escueta.
-An amended information refers -Requires or presupposes that
The date for pre-trial conference and trial was scheduled, petitioner was to be to the same offense charged in the new information involves
re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with the original information or to an a different offense which does
Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant
14
 Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a
offense which necessarily not include or is not
collector-messenger by City Service Corporation. He was assigned to the
includes or is necessarily necessarily included in the
main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary
included​ ​in​ ​the​ ​original​ ​charge original​ ​charge
task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier.
He​ ​also​ ​delivered​ ​invoices​ ​to​ ​Caltex’s​ ​customers.
-Substantial​ ​amendments​ ​to​ ​the -the accused cannot claim
information​ ​after​ ​the​ ​plea​ ​has double​ ​jeopardy.
On November 6, 1997, Caltex, through its Banking and Insurance
been​ ​taken​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​made​ ​over
Department Manager Ramon Romano, filed a criminal complaint against
the​ ​objection​ ​of​ ​the​ ​accused,​ ​for​ ​if
petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa
the​ ​original​ ​information​ ​would​ ​be
through falsification of commercial documents. Romano alleged that, on
withdrawn,​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​could
October 16, 1997, while his department was conducting a daily electronic
invoke​ ​double​ ​jeopardy
report from Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa,
Makati Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was discovered that unknown
The change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is to the department, a company check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13,
merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a 1997 in the amount of ₱5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had been
substitution. While the amended Information was for Murder it was cleared through PCIB on October 15, 1997. An investigation also revealed that
only in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or two other checks (Check Nos. 73999 and 74000) were also missing and that
preamble of the Information. There was no change in the recital of in Check No. 74001, his signature and that of another signatory, Victor S.
facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the Goquinco, were forgeries. Another check, Check No. 72922 dated September
jurisdiction​ ​of​ ​the​ ​court. 15, 1997 in the amount of ₱1,790,757.25 likewise payable to Dante R.
2. No, Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or Gutierrez, was also cleared through the same bank on September 24, 1997;
terminated his case for homicide without his express consent, which this check was likewise not issued by Caltex, and the signatures appearing
is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced. For the dismissal to be a thereon had also been forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered that Check
bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal. Nos. 74001 and 72922 were deposited at the Banco de Oro’s SM Makati
Following sec. 14, rule 110; since homicide is necessarily included in Branch under Savings Account No. S/A 2004-0047245-7, in the name of a
the crime of murder, the respondent judge merely ordered the regular​ ​customer​ ​of​ ​Caltex,​ ​Dante​ ​R.​ ​Gutierrez.
amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original
Information. In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of ₱581,229.00 to Caltex
3. No, respondent judge granted petitioner's motion for on March 29, 1998. However, the City Prosecutor of Makati City was not
reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but informed of this development. After the requisite preliminary investigation,
on his realization that disregard of rank is a generic aggravating the City Prosecutor filed 2 Informations for estafa through falsification of
circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to commercial documents on June 29, 1998 against petitioner wherein both
murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original criminal informations named Caltex Philippines as the party defrauded by
Information​ ​for​ ​Homicide. means​ ​of​ ​falsification​ ​of​ ​commercial​ ​documents.

19. Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, 9 February 2007, In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in
515​ ​SCRA​ ​302 Section 2, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the erroneous
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Doc​ ​Fradejas designation of the name of the offended party is a mere formal defect which
can​ ​be​ ​cured​ ​by​ ​inserting​ ​the​ ​name​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offended​ ​party​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Information.
15

On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the
private prosecutor for the substitution of PCIB as private complainant for
Caltex.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.​ ​The​ ​petitioner​ ​averred​ ​that:
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRIEVOUSLY ERRED BY ALLOWING THE
SUBSTITUTION OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, AFTER THE ACCUSED
WAS ALREADY ARRAIGNED AND PROSECUTION HAS ALREADY
TERMINATED PRESENTING ITS EVIDENCE THEREBY PATENTLY
VIOLATING THE STRICT CONDITION IMPOSED UPON BY RULE 110
SEC.​ ​14​ ​RULES​ ​ON​ ​CRIMINAL​ ​PROCEDURE.
According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended party is an
essential element of estafa. The ​amendment of the Informations substituting
the PCI Bank for Caltex as the offended party would prejudice his rights since
he is deprived of a defense available before the amendment, and which would
be​ ​unavailable​ ​if​ ​the​ ​Informations​ ​are​ ​amended.
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private
complainant at this late stage of the trial is prejudicial to his defense. He
argues that the substitution is tantamount to a ​substantial amendment of the
Informations which is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
W/N allowing the substitution of private complainant, after the accused was
already arraigned and prosecution has already terminated presenting its
evidence patently violated the strict condition imposed upon by Rule 110 Sec.
14​ ​Rules​ ​on​ ​Criminal​ ​Procedure.
HELD:
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution​. – A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without​ ​causing​ ​prejudice​ ​to​ ​the​ ​rights​ ​of​ ​the​ ​accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially​ ​the​ ​offended​ ​party.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment
of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After
the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of
court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment,
a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the
accused.
A ​substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other
matters​ ​are​ ​merely​ ​of​ ​form.
The ​test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment
is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant
might​ ​have​ ​would​ ​be​ ​equally​ ​applicable​ ​to​ ​the​ ​information.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is
not a substantial amendment​. The substitution did not alter the basis of the
charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner.
The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the
same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial.
Thus,​ ​he​ ​cannot​ ​claim​ ​any​ ​surprise​ ​by​ ​virtue​ ​of​ ​the​ ​substitution.
Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa complex with falsification
document. In estafa one of the essential elements "to prejudice of another" as
mandated​ ​by​ ​article​ ​315​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Revised​ ​Penal​ ​Code.
The element of "to the prejudice of another" being as essential element of the
felony​ ​should​ ​be​ ​clearly​ ​indicated​ ​and​ ​charged​ ​in​ ​the​ ​information.
16
This is not so in the case of petitioner, the twin information filed against him
alleged the felony committed " to the damage and prejudice of Caltex." This
allegation is UNTRUE and FALSE for there is no question that as early as
March 24, 1998 or THREE (3) LONG MONTHS before the twin information
were filed on June 29, 1998, the prejudice party is already PCIBank since the
latter Re-Credit the value of the checks to Caltex as early as March 24, 1998.
In effect, assuming there is valid subrogation as the subject decision
concluded, the subrogation took place an occurred on March 24, 1998
THREE​ ​(3)​ ​MONTHS​ ​before​ ​the​ ​twin​ ​information​ ​were​ ​filed.
20. Albert v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164015, 26 February 2009,
580​ ​SCRA​ ​279
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Nicki​ ​Capuchino
FACTS:
On 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of
the Ombudsman for Mindanao charged petitioner and his co-accused, Favio
D. Sayson and Arturo S. Asumbrado, before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft
and​ ​Corrupt​ ​Practices​ ​Act​ ​in​ ​Criminal​ ​Case​ ​No.​ ​25231.
On 18 December 2000, pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss,
petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to
Travel. The prosecution did not object to the latter motion on the condition
that​ ​petitioner​ ​would​ ​be​ ​"provisionally"​ ​arraigned​.
On 12 March 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to
Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The following day, or
on 13 March 2001, ​the Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner who
entered a plea of "not guilty.​" In the Resolution dated 16 April 2001, the
Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift
Hold​ ​Departure​ ​Order​ ​and​ ​to​ ​be​ ​Allowed​ ​to​ ​Travel.
16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner on
24 July 2003. However, in view of the pending motion for reconsideration of
the​ ​order​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Ombudsman,​ ​the​ ​arraignment​ ​was​ ​reset​ ​to​ ​2​ ​October​ ​2003.
24 September 2003, the SPO informed the Sandiganbayan of the
Ombudsman’s denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On even
date, the prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Information. During the 2 October 2003 hearing, this ex-parte motion was
withdrawn by the prosecution ​with the intention of filing a Motion for
Leave to Admit Amended Information​. The scheduled arraignment of
petitioner​ ​was​ ​reset​ ​to​ ​1​ ​December​ ​2003
Petitioner opposed the motion, ​alleging that the amendment made on
the information is substantial and, therefore, not allowed after
arraignment​.
Nothing on record (Minutes of Sandiganbayan) is indicative of the
provisional or conditional nature of the arraignment. Hence, following the
doctrine laid down in ​Espinosa​, the arraignment of petitioner should be
deemed​ ​simple​ ​and​ ​unconditional​.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the amendment, changing the phrase from gross negligent
act to gross inexcusable negligence, is substantial and prejudicial to the rights
of​ ​petitioner.
HELD:
No. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might
have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. On
the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original information and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an
amendment​ ​to​ ​form​ ​that​ ​can​ ​be​ ​made​ ​at​ ​anytime.
The Court held that a conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under
an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon
the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. Thus, we hold that the
inclusion of "gross inexcusable negligence" in the Information, which merely
alleges "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as modalities in the
commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an amendment in
form.
17
E.​ ​Venue​ ​(Section​ ​15)
21. Macasaet v. People, G.R. No. 156747, 23 February 2005, 452
SCRA​ ​255
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Chris​ ​Paredes
Petitioners:​ ​Allen​ ​Macasaet,​ ​Nicolas​ ​Quijano,​ ​Jr.,​ ​&​ ​Alfie​ ​Lorenzo
Respondents:​ ​People​ ​&​ ​Joselito​ ​Trinidad
Facts​:
In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Lorenzo, Macasaet, Quijano, Jr., and
Parajes, columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of
“​Abante​” were charged before the ​QC RTC with the crime of ​libel​. The
information accused the four of “...publicly imputing a crime, vice or defect,
real or imaginary or an act, omission, condition, status or circumstance and
causing in view of their publication, discredit and contempt upon the person
of ... ​Trinidad​, to his damage and prejudice.” The article is written in
Filipino and accuses Trinidad of “amoy-barbell”, “nakikikain” for free, being
an ingrate because he “pinagsalitaan ng masama si Tito Alfie [Lorenzo]”,
“masamang​ ​ugali”,​ ​etc.
On 24 Nov. 1997, the trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case due to
lack of jurisdiction. It noted that although the information alleged the venue
of this case falls within the jurisdiction of QC, the evidence submitted for its
consideration indicated otherwise. First, the editorial box of Abante clearly
indicated that the purported libelous article was ​printed and first
published in Manila City​. In addition, the trial court relied on the
following matters to support its conclusion that, indeed, jurisdiction was
improperly laid in this case: a) on page 4 of the information, the ​address of
private respondent appeared to be the one in Marikina City
although right below it was a ​handwritten notation stating “131 Sct.
Lozano St., Brgy. Sacred Heart, QC”​; b) the two barangay certifications
submitted by the petitioners; and c) the Memorandum for Preliminary
Investigation and Affidavit-Complaint attached to the information wherein
the​ ​given​ ​address​ ​of​ ​private​ ​respondent​ ​was​ ​Marikina​ ​City.
CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s conclusion and ordered the remand
of​ ​the​ ​case​ ​to​ ​the​ ​court​ ​a​ ​quo​ ​for​ ​further​ ​proceedings.​ ​Hence​ ​this​ ​appeal.
Issue​ ​/​ ​Held​:
Whether CA erred in ruling that the QC RTC has territorial jurisdiction over
the​ ​crime​ ​charged.​ ​-​ ​YES,​ ​the​ ​CA​ ​erred.
Ratio​:
In criminal actions, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere
else,​ ​the​ ​court​ ​should​ ​dismiss​ ​the​ ​action​ ​for​ ​want​ ​of​ ​jurisdiction.
The law, however, is more particular in libel cases​. The possible
venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of said case are
concisely​ ​outlined​ ​in​ ​Art.​ ​360​ ​of​ ​the​ ​RPC.
Agbayani​ ​v.​ ​Sayo​ ​summarized​ ​Art.​ ​360​ ​in​ ​the​ ​following​ ​rules:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the
criminal action may be filed in the CFI of the province or city where the
libelous​ ​article​ ​is​ ​printed​ ​and​ ​first​ ​published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be
filed in the CFI of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time
of​ ​the​ ​commission​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offense,​ ​the​ ​action​ ​may​ ​be​ ​filed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​CFI​ ​of​ ​Manila.
18
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the
action may be filed in the CFI of the province or city where he held office at
the​ ​time​ ​of​ ​the​ ​commission​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offense.
In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the
publication of the alleged libelous article, hence, he could only file his libel
suit in the Manila City where Abante was first published or in the province or
city where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article was
printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals
that the allegations contained therein are utterly insufficient to vest
jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating
“Quezon City” at the beginning of the information, the assistant city
prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to indicate whether
the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either because Abante was
printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the
time the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the
fundamental issue of the court’s jurisdiction, Art. 360 of the RPC mandates
that either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself
and the absence of both from the very face of the information renders the
latter ​fatally defective​. Sadly for private respondent, the information filed
before the trial court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city
prosecutor’s failure to properly lay the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of
the QC RTC, effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance of
this​ ​case.
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for
written defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations
as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was
a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at
that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was
printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would
be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and
first​ ​published​ ​is​ ​used​ ​as​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​of​ ​the​ ​venue​ ​of​ ​the​ ​action.
Petition​ ​granted.​ ​Dismissal​ ​of​ ​RTC​ ​reinstated.
22.​ ​Bonifacio​ ​v.​ ​RTC,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​184800,​ ​5​ ​May​ ​2010,​ ​620​ ​SCRA​ ​268
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Beeya​ ​Echauz
FACTS:
● Petitioners were charged with the crime of ​libel by private
respondent​ ​Gimenez,​ ​on​ ​behalf​ ​of​ ​Yuchengco​ ​family
● Malayan Insurance Co.​, filed a criminal complaint before the
Makati City Prosecutor for libel under Article 355 in relation to
Article​ ​353​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Revised​ ​Penal​ ​Code​ ​against​ ​the​ ​petitioners​ ​as​ ​well
● The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several
anonymous writers, publicly and maliciously with intention of
attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and
reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc. and the Yuchengco family
for​ ​exposing​ ​them​ ​to​ ​public​ ​hatred​ ​and​ ​contempt
● The defamatory article persuading the public to remove their
investments and policies from the said company were published
online​ ​on​ ​pepcoalition.com​.
● This was after the petitioners filed to seek their redress for their
pecuniary​ ​loss​ ​under​ ​the​ ​policies​ ​they​ ​obtained​ ​from​ ​the​ ​company.
● Makati City Prosecutor, after finding probable cause to indict the
petitioners,​ ​filed​ ​separate​ ​information​ ​against​ ​them.
● Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to
Quash Information on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction
on​ ​the​ ​Makati​ ​RTC
● The acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law
since​ ​internet​ ​libel​ ​is​ ​not​ ​covered​ ​by​ ​Article​ ​353​ ​of​ ​the​ ​RPC.
● Petitioners maintained that the ​information failed to allege a
particular place within the trial court’s jurisdiction where the
subject article was printed and first published or that the offended
parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory
material was printed and first published, and the prosecution
erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the
offended​ ​party​ ​accessed​ ​the​ ​internet-published​ ​article.
ISSUE:
W/N​ ​the​ ​petitioner’s​ ​Motion​ ​to​ ​Quash​ ​Information​ ​is​ ​valid
HELD:
19
 YES.
● Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where
the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action
but​ ​constitutes​ ​an​ ​essential​ ​element​ ​of​ ​jurisdiction.
● The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual
is​ ​limited​ ​to​ ​only​ ​either​ ​of​ ​two​ ​places,​ ​namely:
1) where the complainant ​actually resides at the time of the
commission​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offense;​ ​or
2) where the alleged defamatory article was ​printed and first
published​.
● The Amended Information in the case opted to lay the venue by
stating that the offending article was first published and accessed by
the​ ​private​ ​complainant​ ​in​ ​Makati​ ​City.
● In other words, it ​considered the phrase to be equivalent to the
requisite allegation of printing and first publication​. This is wrong.
For the court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently
vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati ​simply because the
defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates
to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the
pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being
accessed​.
● Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted to lay down specific rules as to
the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in
written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by
means of ​out-of-town libel suits​, meaning complaints filed in
remote​ ​municipal​ ​courts.
23. Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, 17 November 2004, 442
SCRA​ ​450
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Annabelle​ ​Jalandoni
FACTS:
Alfredo Rigor was convicted of violating BP22, or for issuing a bouncing
check​ ​in​ ​the​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​ ​P500,000​ ​payable​ ​to​ ​Rural​ ​Bank​ ​of​ ​San​ ​Juan.
Nov. 16, 1989, he applied for a loan at RBSJ, signed a promissory note with
interest, the loan was approved, a cashier’s check was issued to him which he
encashed on the same day. It was not the bank policy for a borrower to apply
for a loan, obtain its approval and its proceeds on the same day. Appellant's
case was a special one considering that he is the kumpare of the President of
RBSJ and he is well-known to all the bank's directors since he, like them,
comes​ ​from​ ​Tarlac.
Appellant failed to pay his loan upon its maturity on December 16, 1989. He
personally asked the bank manager for a two-month extension and advised
RBSJ to date to February 16, 1990 his Associated Bank check no. 165476.
Failing anew to pay, he asked for another two-month extension or up to April
16, 1990. Both requests de Guzman granted. On April 16, 1990, appellant still
failed​ ​to​ ​pay​ ​his​ ​loan.
Appellant denied the charge. He claimed that on November 16, 1989, Agapito
Uy and his sister Agnes Angeles proposed to him that he secure a loan from
the RBSJ for P500,000. P200,000 of it will be for him and the P300,000 will
go to Uy and to his sister to pay unpaid loans of borrowers in their side
banking activities. For the approval of his loan, Uy told him that appellant
can put up his four-door Mercedes Benz as collateral for the P200,000 loan.
The P300,000 will have no collateral. Uy also told him the he (Uy) has
complete control of the bank and his Mercedes Benz will be enough collateral
for​ ​the​ ​P500,000.
Appellant agreed to the proposal. He signed a blank loan application form
and a promissory note plus a chattel mortgage for his Mercedes Benz.
Thereafter, he was told to come back in two days. Uy gave him two Premiere
Bank checks worth P100,000 each. He gave one check to his brother Efren
Rigor and the other to his sister-in-law for encashment in Tarlac. He issued
to Uy a personal check for P500,000 undated. This check was deposited in
the bank for encashment in the later part of May, 1990 but it bounced. When
demand was made for him to pay his loan, he told Uy to get his Mercedes
Benz as payment for P200,000 but Uy refused. Uy wanted him to pay the
whole​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​P500,000.
Petitioner, however, argues that ​since the officers of the bank knew
that​ ​he​ ​did​ ​not​ ​have​ ​sufficient​ ​funds,​ ​he​ ​has​ ​not​ ​violated​ ​BP​ ​22.​
Petitioner next contends that ​he did not receive a notice of dishonor​,
the​ ​absence​ ​of​ ​which​ ​precludes​ ​criminal​ ​prosecution.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the ​Regional Trial Court of Pasig had
no jurisdiction over this case since no proof has been offered that
20
his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of
insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro​ ​Manila​.
ISSUE​:​ ​ ​W/N​ ​the​ ​RTC​ ​of​ ​Pasig​ ​has​ ​jurisdiction.
HELD:
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as ​transitory or continuing crimes​.
A suit on the check can be filed in any of the places where any of the elements
of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is ​drawn​, ​issued​, ​delivered
or​ ​dishonored​.
The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing
and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information. Although, the check was
dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch​,
appellant has ​drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan​. The
place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part
of the offense, was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no question
that crimes committed in November 1989 in San Juan are triable by the RTC
stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently
vest​ ​jurisdiction​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​RTC​ ​in​ ​Pasig​ ​City.
24. Unionbank v. People, G.R. No. 192565, 28 February 2012, 667
SCRA​ ​113
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Danielle​ ​Olan
Unionbank filed 2 complaints for sum of money against spouses Tamondong.
The first complaint was filed before the RTC Pasay. The second complaint
was​ ​filed​ ​in​ ​MTC​ ​Pasay.
In both cases, ​Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping in Makati City. ​She was charged with
perjury "by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum
Shopping that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency". The ​Certification
was ​notarized in Makati City, but was ​submitted and used in Pasay
City.​ ​The​ ​Information​ ​against​ ​UnionBank​ ​and​ ​Tomas​ ​was​ ​filed​ ​in​ ​Makati.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the venue was improperly
laid and that the facts do not constitute an offense (not all of the elements of
perjury were present). On the first ground, Tomas argued that ​since it is the
Pasay City Court where the Certificate was submitted and used, it should
have​ ​the​ ​jurisdiction​ ​over​ ​the​ ​case​.
MTC-Makati denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over
the case since ​the Certificate was notarized there and the allegations in the
Information​ ​sufficiently​ ​charged​ ​Tomas​ ​with​ ​perjury.
When the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati, petitioners sought the
annulment of the MTC-Makati ruling. They also cited the rulings in ​US vs.
Canet and ​Ilusorio v. Bildner ​which state that "venue and jurisdiction
should​ ​be​ ​in​ ​the​ ​place​ ​where​ ​the​ ​false​ ​document​ ​was​ ​presented​".
The petition, however, was found to have no merit, pursuant to a recent
jurisprudence, ​Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy. ​In that case, the Court ruled that the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality
where the perjury was ​committed, or ​where any of its essential
ingredients​ ​occurred.
The petitioners then filed this ​petition to the SC to address the seeming
conflict​ ​between​ ​the​ ​rulings​​ ​in​ ​Illusorio​ ​and​ ​Sy​ ​Tiong​ ​Shiou.
W/N​ ​MTC​ ​Makati​ ​had​ ​jurisdiction​ ​over​ ​the​ ​case?​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​YES.
The criminal act charged was for ​perjury​, covered by Art. 183, RPC.
Pursuant to such, the jurisdiction and venue should be determined based on
this article which penalizes one who makes an affidavit upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases
in which the law so requires. The ​constitutive act of the offense is the
making of an affidavit, ​so the ​criminal act is consummated when
the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn ​before a
duly​ ​authorized​ ​person.'
The SC finds the ruling in ​Sy Tiong as more consistent ​with Art. 183,
RPC. The Court ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the
making of a false affidavit under Art. 183, RPC is committed at the time the
21
affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that
all​ ​the​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​of​ ​perjury​ ​are​ ​executed.
When the crime is committed through ​false testimony under oath
(actual testimony) in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil,
venue​ ​is​ ​at​ ​the​ ​place​ ​where​ ​the​ ​testimony​ ​under​ ​oath​ ​is​ ​given.
If, in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding
that is neither criminal nor civil, a ​written sworn statement is
submitted, venue may either be at the place where the ​sworn
statement is submitted OR where the oath was taken​, since the
taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the
crime​ ​committed.
In all cases, the ​determination of venue shall be based on the ​acts
alleged​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Information​ ​to​ ​be​ ​constitutive​ ​of​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​committed.
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown
when she made the ​false declarations in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City​, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not
true. Thus, Makati is the proper venue and MTC-Makati is the proper court
to​ ​try​ ​the​ ​perjury​ ​case.
25. Treñas v. People, G.R. No. 195002, 25 January 2012, 664 SCRA
355
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Ian​ ​Benitez
FACTS:
Margarita Alocilja mortgaged a house-and-lot in Iloilo City through
Maybank. Hector Trenas negotiated with Margarita through Elizabeth, her
employee and niece, with the titling of the property under her name for an
amount. Alociljca paid Teranes P150.000.00, who then issued ​receipts​,
which​ ​was​ ​then​ ​known​ ​to​ ​be​ ​fake​ ​through​ ​verification​ ​with​ ​the​ ​BIR.
Alocilja demanded the return of the money. Trenas issued a check in favor of
Alocilja. The check was dishonored because the account was closed.
Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to
pay.​ ​Thus,​ ​Estafa​ ​was​ ​filed​ ​against​ ​him​ ​in​ ​RTC-Makati​ ​City.
Alocilja pleaded not guilty and ​wasn’t able to attend the pretrial and
trial​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​he​ ​lives​ ​in​ ​Iloilo​ ​City​.
RTC​ ​-​ ​Trenas​ ​guilty​ ​of​ ​Estafa.​ ​MR​ ​filed​ ​by​ ​Trenas​ ​–​ ​denied.
Trenas’ arguments are as follows. First, he claims that the court has ​no
jurisdiction over the case.​ Second, he claims that ​the offended party should
be Margarita since she owns the money, and not Elizabeth​. He further
claims​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​proof​ ​that​ ​the​ ​demand​ ​was​ ​actually​ ​received​ ​by​ ​him.​
CA​ ​–​ ​Appeal.​ ​Affirmed​ ​the​ ​RTC’s​ ​decision.​ ​MR​ ​–​ ​denied.
SC requested a Comment from OSG. OSG asserts that: RTC did not err in
convicting​ ​the​ ​petitioner
ISSUES:
w/n​ ​RTC-Makati​ ​has​ ​ ​jurisdiction​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case?
HELD:
No. RTC-Makati does not have jurisdiction over the case. ​Prosecution
failed to show evidence that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of Makati City​. Even if it is alleged in the Information that
Elizabeth received the amount of P150,000.00 in Makati City, it is not
sufficient. ​Dishonor in a bank in Makati is not considered as an
element​ ​of​ ​the​ ​crime​.
Case​ ​dismissed.​ ​Referred​ ​to​ ​IBP​ ​for​ ​investigation​ ​of​ ​Trenas’​ ​behavior.
III.​ ​RULE​ ​111​ ​-​ ​PROSECUTION​ ​OF​ ​CIVIL​ ​ACTION
22

A.​ ​Sections​ ​1-3;​ ​5
1.​ ​Lee​ ​v.​ ​Chua,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​181658,​ ​7​ ​August​ ​2013,​ ​703​ ​SCRA​ ​240
Prepared by Tiffany So (will put all relevant doctrines para di paulit ulit sa
other​ ​digests)
Petitioner Lee is the President of CHI while Respondent Chua is a majority
stockholder​ ​and​ ​Treasurer​ ​of​ ​CHI.
Petitioner on behalf of CHI caused the filing of a verified Petition for the
Issuance of an Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT which covers a property
owned​ ​by​ ​CHI,​ ​together​ ​with​ ​an​ ​affidavit​ ​of​ ​loss,​ ​which​ ​the​ ​RTC​ ​approved.
Respondent thereafter alleged that Petitioner knew fully well that
Respondent had the Owner’s duplicate copy and that Petitioner only needs to
have​ ​another​ ​copy​ ​to​ ​Mortgage​ ​it​ ​to​ ​Planters​ ​Development​ ​Bank.
Respondent is charging Petitioner of perjury allegedly committed on the
following occasions: (1) by declaring in the VERIFICATION the veracity of
the contents in his petition filed with the RTC of Manila concerning his claim
that TCT No. 232238 was in his possession but was lost; (2) by declaring
under oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3) by testifying
under​ ​oath​ ​that​ ​the​ ​said​ ​TCT​ ​was​ ​inadvertently​ ​lost​ ​from​ ​his​ ​files.
Petitioner argued that perjury is a crime against public interest as provided
under the RPC where the offended party is the State alone. Petitioner posited
that there being no allegation of damage to private interests, a private
prosecutor is not needed. He opines that perjury is a felony where no civil
liability arises on the part of the offender because there are no damages to be
compensated​ ​and​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​private​ ​person​ ​injured​ ​by​ ​the​ ​crime.
Issue:​ ​W/N​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​private​ ​offended​ ​party​ ​in​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​of​ ​perjury?​ ​YES
Held:
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that “​every person criminally liable is also civilly
liable​.” When a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1)
the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose
law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. (read sec 1 of rule 111 and
sec​ ​16​ ​of​ ​rule​ ​110)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT
covering CHI’s property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be
perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondent’s personal credibility and
reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and
responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential
injury​ ​to​ ​the​ ​corporation​ ​itself​ ​is​ ​likewise​ ​undeniable.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case,
whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial
court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely
a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its
right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right
reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole
purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of
demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention is always subject to
the​ ​direction​ ​and​ ​control​ ​of​ ​the​ ​public​ ​prosecutor.
The contention of Petitioner regarding ​Tan Jr v Gallardo stating that where
from the nature of the offense or where the law defining and punishing the
offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may
not intervene in the prosecution of the offense, lacks merit. An act or
omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether
done​ ​intentionally​ ​or​ ​negligently.
Following Sec 1 of rule 110 since respondent did not waive the civil action,
nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil
action for damages arising from the offense charged, the private prosecutors
can intervene in the trial of the criminal action. And even assuming that there
is no damage to complainant, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil
23
liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries
suffered.
2. Cancio v. Isip, G.R. No. 133978, 12 November 2002, 391 SCRA
393
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Chris​ ​Paredes
Petitioner:​ ​Jose​ ​S.​ ​Cancio,​ ​Jr.​ ​(represented​ ​by​ ​Roberto​ ​L.​ ​Cancio)
Respondents:​ ​Emerenciana​ ​Isip
Facts​:
Background: Cancio Jr. (owner/proprietor of Cancio's Money Exchange),
with private prosecutor, filed 3 cases of violation of BP 22 and 3 cases of
Estafa, against Isip for allegedly issuing the following checks without
sufficient funds: 1) Check No. 25001151 for P80,000.00; 2) Check No.
25001152​ ​for​ ​P​ ​80,000.00;​ ​and​ ​3)​ ​Check​ ​No.​ ​25001157​ ​for​ ​P30,000.00.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed Crim. Case No. 13356, for
Violation of BP 22 covering check no. 25001151 on the ground that the check
was ​deposited with the drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the
check​. The 2 other cases (Crim. Case No. 13359 and 13360) were filed with
and subsequently dismissed by the Guagua, Pampanga, MTC Br. 1 on the
ground​ ​of​ ​ ​“failure​ ​to​ ​prosecute.”
Meanwhile, the 3 cases for Estafa were filed with the Pampanga RTC Br. 49,
and docketed as Crim. Case Nos. G-3611 to G-3613. On Oct. 21, 1997, after
failing to present its 2nd witness, the prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa
cases against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its right to file a
separate civil action arising from the said criminal cases. On the same date,
the​ ​trial​ ​court​ ​granted​ ​the​ ​motions​ ​for​ ​dismissal.
Present case: On Dec. 15, 1997, Cancio, Jr. filed the instant case for collection
of sum of money, seeking to recover the amount of the checks subject of the
estafa cases. On Feb. 18, 1998, Isip filed a motion to dismiss contending that
Cancio, Jr.'s action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata​. Isip further
prayed that ​Cancio, Jr. should be held in contempt of court for
forum-shopping​.
On Mar. 20, 1998, the ​trial court found in favor of Isip and dismissed.
The court held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent on
the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute is ​an adjudication on the
merits which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection​. It
further held that the filing of said civil case amounted to
forum-shopping.nOn Jun. 1, 1998, the trial court denied pet's motion for
reconsideration.​ ​Hence,​ ​the​ ​instant​ ​petition.
Issue​ ​/​ ​Held​:
Whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent bars the
institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of
the estafa cases. - ​No, the dismissal does not bar the institution of
civil​ ​action.
Ratio​:
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988 and under
the present Rules, the civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, but the offended party is given the option to file a separate
civil​ ​action​ ​before​ ​the​ ​prosecution​ ​starts​ ​to​ ​present​ ​evidence.
Anent the independent civil actions under Arts. 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, the old rules considered them impliedly instituted with the civil
liability ex-delicto in the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. Under the present Rules, however, the
independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right
to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the
Civil​ ​Code.
In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his
cause of action is based on culpa contractual, an independent civil action. An
independent civil action arising from contracts may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action. Under Art. 31 of the Civil Code “[w]hen the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
[e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal​ ​proceedings​ ​and​ ​regardless​ ​of​ ​the​ ​result​ ​of​ ​the​ ​latter.”
24
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the
instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an
independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in
the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the
offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an
entirely​ ​different​ ​cause​ ​of​ ​action,​ ​i.e.,​ ​culpa​ ​contractual.
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by
petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are,
however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are
based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on
culpa​ ​contractual.
Hence, the doctrine of res judicata and forum-shopping will not operate to
bar​ ​the​ ​separate​ ​civil​ ​action.
3. Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161067, 14 March 2008, 548
SCRA​ ​460
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Paolo​ ​Dizon
Facts​:
Information was filed against ​Dominador Ferrer, being the Administrator of
the Intramuros Administration (IA), Manila, while in the performance of his
official and administrative functions as such, and acting with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits to
Offshore Construction and Development Company, by causing the award of
the Lease Contracts to said company without conducting any public bidding
as​ ​required​ ​under​ ​Joint​ ​Circular​ ​No.​ ​1​ ​of​ ​DBM,​ ​DENR​ ​&​ ​DPWH.
The Office of the President (OP) had a ruling, dated February 29, 2000,
which absolved petitioner of administrative liability. The OP reviewed the
administrative case filed against petitioner with the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) and held that petitioner acted in good
faith​ ​and​ ​within​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​his​ ​authority.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash, reiterating his argument that since he has
been cleared of administrative liability, the criminal case that was pending
against​ ​him​ ​should​ ​likewise​ ​be​ ​dismissed.
Petitioner further argues that the criminal case against him requires a higher
quantum of proof for conviction that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt than
the administrative case, which needs only substantial evidence. He claims
that from this circumstance, it follows that the dismissal of the administrative
case​ ​should​ ​carry​ ​with​ ​it​ ​the​ ​dismissal​ ​of​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​case.
Issue​ ​/​ ​Held​:
Whether or not a finding of lack of administrative liability of accused
government official bar the filing of a criminal case against him for the same
acts?
No- It does not bar the filing of a criminal case because they are
entirely independent proceedings, neither of which results in or
concludes the other. The established rule is that an absolution
from​ ​a​ ​criminal​ ​charge​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​bar.
Answer for his second argument: The basis of administrative liability differs
from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly
to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a
public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal
prosecution​ ​is​ ​the​ ​punishment​ ​of​ ​crime.
To sustain petitioner's arguments will be to require the Sandiganbayan and
the Ombudsman to merely adopt the results of administrative investigations
which​ ​would​ ​not​ ​only​ ​diminish​ ​the​ ​powers​ ​and​ ​duties​ ​of​ ​these
constitutional offices, but also violate the independent nature of criminal and
administrative cases against public officials. This will also amount to untold
delays in criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman,
as every criminal trial and investigation before these bodies will be made to
await the results of pending administrative investigations. Such is not the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the laws governing public
officers.
4.​ ​Corpuz​ ​v.​ ​Siapno,​ ​AM​ ​MTJ-96-1106,​ ​17​ ​June​ ​2003,​ ​404​ ​SCRA​ ​83
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Tiffany​ ​So
Facts:
25
 inventory.​ ​This​ ​can​ ​be
Corpuz filed an affidavit complaint against Respondent Judge Siapno for AC
no. 3-92 and 17-94, Anti-graft and corrupt practices act, falsification, conduct delegated​ ​to​ ​members
unbecoming of a public officer, abuse of authority, delay in the of​ ​his​ ​staff​ ​who​ ​should
administration​ ​of​ ​justice​ ​and​ ​ignorance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​law. regularly​ ​report​ ​to​ ​him.
Precisely,​ ​this​ ​is​ ​what
The Office of the Court Administration recommended that all the charges respondent​ ​did.
against respondent Judge be dismissed, except that for Ignorance of the Law
for failure to award civil damages in Criminal Cases Nos. 12527 and 13482, that​ ​he​ ​used​ ​his​ ​filing that​ ​the​ ​filing​ ​cabinet No​ ​evidence
for which respondent Judge must be fined in the amount of Two Thousand cabinet​ ​for​ ​storing in​ ​his​ ​court​ ​was​ ​not
Pesos​ ​(P2,000.00).
personal​ ​belongings being​ ​used​ ​for​ ​kitchen
instead​ ​of​ ​case​ ​records; utensils​ ​and​ ​personal
Issue: W/N Respondent Judge is guilty of Ignorance of the Law for failure to
award​ ​civil​ ​damages? belongings;

Held:
Petitioner’s
allegations
Complainant​ ​alleged
that​ ​immediately​ ​upon
his​ ​assumption​ ​of
office,​ ​respondent
Judge​ ​proposed​ ​to​ ​her
that​ ​they​ ​extort​ ​money
from​ ​litigants;
that​ ​respondent​ ​Judge
used​ ​his​ ​chambers​ ​as
his​ ​residence;
that​ ​he​ ​failed​ ​to​ ​make
the​ ​required​ ​inventory
of​ ​cases;
Respondent’s
allegation
Respondent​ ​filed​ ​his
Comment​ ​on​ ​April​ ​7,
1997,​ ​wherein​ ​he
vehemently​ ​denied​ ​the
charges​ ​against​ ​him.
that​ ​he​ ​sleeps​ ​in​ ​his
houses​ ​in​ ​Dagupan
City​ ​and​ ​Asingan;
that​ ​the​ ​inventory​ ​of
cases​ ​was​ ​done​ ​by
Judith​ ​Tambo​ ​under
his​ ​supervision;
SC’s​ ​decision
No​ ​evidence
No​ ​evidence
A​ ​judge​ ​is​ ​not​ ​required
to​ ​personally​ ​catalog
the​ ​records​ ​of​ ​cases
during​ ​the​ ​physical
that​ ​he​ ​allowed​ ​his
family​ ​to​ ​use​ ​a
typewriter​ ​issued​ ​by
the​ ​Supreme​ ​Court;
that​ ​he​ ​dismissed​ ​five
criminal​ ​cases​ ​against
his​ ​friend​ ​and​ ​drinking
companion,​ ​Captain
Josephus​ ​Javonillo;
that​ ​he​ ​falsified​ ​his
Certificate​ ​of​ ​Service
by​ ​stating​ ​therein​ ​that
he​ ​conducted​ ​sessions
everyday​ ​of​ ​the​ ​week
when​ ​he​ ​was​ ​always
absent​ ​on​ ​Thursdays
and​ ​Fridays;
that​ ​he​ ​owns​ ​three No​ ​evidence
typewriters​ ​and​ ​a
personal​ ​computer​ ​in
his​ ​house;
that​ ​he​ ​does​ ​not​ ​have No​ ​evidence
drinking​ ​sessions​ ​with
Captain​ ​Javanillo;
that​ ​he​ ​holds​ ​sessions No​ ​evidence
only​ ​from​ ​Mondays​ ​to
Wednesdays​ ​because
the​ ​Public​ ​Prosecutor
and​ ​PAO​ ​lawyer
assigned​ ​to​ ​his​ ​branch
are​ ​available​ ​only​ ​on
those​ ​days;

26

that​ ​he​ ​sent​ ​his​ ​court
personnel​ ​on​ ​personal
errands​ ​such​ ​as
marketing​ ​chores​ ​and
washing​ ​dishes;
that​ ​he​ ​dismissed​ ​a
rape​ ​case​ ​despite​ ​the
interest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​DSWD
in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​since​ ​the
victim​ ​was​ ​a​ ​minor;
that​ ​he​ ​returned
criminal​ ​cases​ ​for
barangay​ ​conciliation
despite​ ​the​ ​presence​ ​of
certificates​ ​to​ ​file
action​ ​therein​ ​but
entertained​ ​the
countercharges​ ​despite
the​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​said
certifications;
that​ ​he​ ​failed​ ​to
award​ ​civil
damages​ ​in
Criminal​ ​Cases​ ​Nos.
12527​ ​and​ ​13482.
that​ ​his​ ​resolution
dismissing​ ​the​ ​rape
cases​ ​were​ ​affirmed​ ​by
the​ ​Provincial
Prosecutor;
that​ ​he​ ​referred
Criminal​ ​Cases​ ​Nos.
16050,​ ​16039​ ​and
17001​ ​to​ ​the​ ​barangay
conciliation​ ​because
the​ ​validity​ ​of​ ​the
certifications​ ​to​ ​file
action​ ​was​ ​questioned
by​ ​the​ ​counsel;
that​ ​he​ ​did​ ​not
award​ ​civil
damages​ ​in
Criminal​ ​Cases​ ​Nos.
12527​ ​and​ ​13482
because​ ​the
prosecution​ ​did​ ​not
present​ ​any
evidence​ ​therefor.
As to respondent Judge’s failure to award civil damages, this was an error.
No​ ​evidence
Concomitant with his rendition of a guilty verdict, respondent should
likewise make a finding on the accused’s civil liability because it is basic that
every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Furthermore, Article 2202
of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant
shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences​ ​of​ ​the​ ​act​ ​or​ ​omission​ ​complained​ ​of.
No​ ​evidence
Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the rule expressly imposes
upon the courts the duty of entering judgment with respect to the civil
liability arising from the offense, if no reservation or waiver has been made to
ventilate it in a separate action. Indeed, even in case of an acquittal, unless
there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the
Presumption​ ​of​ ​good accused​ ​in​ ​favor​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offended​ ​party.
faith.
The methods for indemnifying the private complainant is provided for under
the provisions on civil liability which, under Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code, includes: restitution; reparation for the damage caused; and
indemnification for consequential damages. Pursuant to these statutory
provisions, it behooves respondent to require the production of evidence to
make a finding on civil liability. This is especially so where the accused has
pleaded​ ​guilty​ ​and​ ​has​ ​therefore​ ​admitted​ ​his​ ​liability.
Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. We
find the recommended amount of fine to be insufficient. The records show
that this is not respondents first administrative case. Since he has already
been chastised thrice respondent judge, has still not reformed, more
stringent penalties than those recommended by the Investigating Judge is
warranted in this case. The amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
is​ ​more​ ​commensurate​ ​for​ ​respondent​ ​Judges​ ​infraction​ ​in​ ​this​ ​case.
5. Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123340, 29 August 2002, 388
SCRA​ ​72
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Danielle​ ​Olan
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner Cruz with the crime of
Estafa​​ ​thru​ ​Falsification​ ​of​ ​Public​ ​Document​ ​before​ ​the​ ​RTC​ ​Manila.
It was proven that Petitioner, before a Notary Public, executed an ​Affidavit of
27
Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land in Bulacan​, stating that she was the sole
surviving heir of the registered owner, when in fact she knew there were
other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not reserve the right to file
a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil action was
deemed​ ​instituted​ ​in​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​case.
After trial, ​RTC acquitted petitioner ​on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In the same decision, ​RTC rendered judgment on the civil aspect of
the​ ​case,​ ​ordering​ ​her​ ​to​ ​return​ ​the​ ​land​ ​to​ ​the​ ​surviving​ ​heirs.
Petitioner filed two MRs, assailing the RTC ruling on the civil aspect of the
criminal​ ​case.​ ​Both​ ​Motions​ ​were​ ​denied​ ​for​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​merit.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, seeking to nullify the RTC orders and to
resolve​ ​her​ ​MR.
The CA upheld the assailed RTC decision on the civil aspect of the case, to
wit:
xxx the institution of a criminal action carries with it the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. There was
neither reservation nor waiver of the right to file the civil action separately
nor has one been instituted to the criminal action. Hence, the civil action for
the civil liability has been impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal
case... Petitioner's contention that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
property because it is located in Bulacan - outside their territorial
jurisdiction - is off. Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged,
the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Civil
Procedure​ ​Rules.
Petitioner claims that the CA erred in holding that the RTC had jurisdiction
to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case. ​Petitioner
asserts that the RTC Manila had no jurisdiction over the parcel of
land in Bulacan, since it is outside the RTC's territorial
jurisdiction.
W/N RTC Manila had jurisdiction to render judgment over the
civil​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case.
YES. Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the
governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Civil
Procedure Rules which pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory
pleading​ ​that​ ​gives​ ​rise​ ​to​ ​the​ ​suit.
Pursuant​ ​to​ ​the​ ​3​ ​requisites​ ​for​ ​a​ ​court​ ​to​ ​acquire​ ​criminal​ ​jurisdiction:
* ​Subject matter - court had jurisdiction since the law conferred on the court
the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through falsification of a
public​ ​document
* ​Over the offense charged - court had jurisdiction since the crime was
committed​ ​within​ ​its​ ​territorial​ ​jurisdiction.
* ​Over the person - had jurisdiction because accused voluntarily submitted to
the​ ​court’s​ ​authority.
When all 3 requisites are present, the court necessarily exercises
jurisdiction over ALL issues to be resolved. ​One of the issues in a
criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, since
every​ ​person​ ​criminally​ ​liable​ ​for​ ​a​ ​felony​ ​is​ ​also​ ​civilly​ ​liable.
The ​action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the
criminal action unless reserved by the offended party. ​Here, the
offended party did not reserve the civil action Although the ​RTC
acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal did not
extinguish the civil liability. ​Thus, RTC Manila had jurisdiction to
decide the civil aspect of the case - ordering restitution, even if the parcel of
land​ ​is​ ​located​ ​in​ ​Bulacan.
6. Lo Bun Tiong v. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, 28 January 2008, 542
SCRA​ ​504
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Rosario​ ​Reyes
Facts:
1. Spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng (petitioners)
charge​ ​Vicente​ ​Balboa​ ​(respondent)​ ​with​ ​forum​ ​shopping.
2. Respondent filed with RTC of Manila a civil case for collection of sum of
money​ ​against​ ​petitioner​ ​Caroline
3. Several criminal complaints for violation of BP 22 were filed against
Caroline​ ​before​ ​MTC​ ​of​ ​Manila​ ​covering​ ​the​ ​said​ ​three​ ​checks.
28
4. [civil case] RTC rendered its decision finding petitioners liable to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P5,175,250 .00 plus 6% interest per annum until full
payment​ ​and​ ​P100,000​ ​as​ ​and​ ​for​ ​attorney’s​ ​fees​ ​plus​ ​cost​ ​of​ ​suit.
5. [criminal case] MTC acquitted Caroline of the offense charged for failure
of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. MTC,
however,​ ​found​ ​Caroline​ ​civilly​ ​liable​ ​in​ ​favor​ ​of​ ​respondent.
6.​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​The​ ​spouses​ ​now​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​court​ ​charging​ ​Balboa​ ​with​ ​forum-shopping
Issue: ​WON Balboa’s act of filing civil and criminal cases constitute forum
shopping.
Held:
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other court
would render a favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party
against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in
an attempt to seek and possibly to get a favorable opinion in another forum,
other​ ​than​ ​by​ ​an​ ​appeal​ ​or​ ​a​ ​special​ ​civil​ ​action​ ​for​ ​certiorari.
There is forum shopping when the following ​elements ​concur: (1) identity of
the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both
actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is
founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia.
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., the
Court ruled that there is identity of parties and causes of action between a
civil case for the recovery of sum of money as a result of the issuance of
bouncing checks, and a criminal case for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22
violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal of the civil action so as to prevent
double​ ​payment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​claim.
In the said case, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97
effective September 16, 1997, which provides that ​"the criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include
the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action
separately​ ​shall​ ​be​ ​allowed​ ​or​ ​recognized."
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit: ​(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation​ ​to​ ​file​ ​such​ ​civil​ ​action​ ​separately​ ​shall​ ​be​ ​allowed.
The foregoing, however, is not applicable as the civil and criminal case were
filed on February 24, 1997 and on July 21, 1997, respectively, prior to the
adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997. At the
time of filing of the cases, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules​ ​of​ ​Court,​ ​to​ ​wit:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​action.
Since Balboa instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then the
civil case may proceed independently of the criminal cases and there is no
forum shopping to speak of. Even under the amended rules, ​a separate
proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases of violations of B.P. No.
22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case​. Even
then,​ ​the​ ​Rules​ ​encourage​ ​the​ ​consolidation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​civil​ ​and​ ​criminal​ ​cases.
7.​ ​Co​ ​v.​ ​Muñoz,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​181986,​ ​4​ ​December​ ​2013,​ ​711​ ​SCRA​ ​508
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Monchie​ ​P.​ ​Fradejas
Facts
Elizalde Co(petitioner) filed 3 cases of libel against Munoz (respondent) after
Munoz talked on a radio interview saying that petitioner: (1) influenced the
office of the city prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite the issuance of
warrant of arrest against Muñoz in connection with the perjury case; (2)
manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the
Masarawag-San Francisco dredging project, and; (3) received P2,000,000.00
from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-contract the project to Muñoz,
29
which condition Co did not comply with. Munoz’s defense was that the
statements he said during the radio interview was privileged because Co was
a public figure. Munoz was then convicted at the RTC on the 3 counts of libel.
Munoz appealed the decision to the CA and he was then acquitted because
the CA believed that Co was a public figure and the statements made by
Munoz was privileged. Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the
criminal aspect of the libel suits because that would violate Muñoz’ right
against double jeopardy. Hence, he claims damages only on the basis of
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (​ROC​), which states that the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. He avers that this principle applies in general whether the civil action
is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. He also claims that
the civil liability of an accused may be appealed in case of acquittal. Munoz
however claims that Co misunderstood Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC
because, as its title suggests, the provision presupposes the filing of a civil
action ​separately from the criminal action. Thus, when there is no
reservation of the right to separately institute the civil action arising from the
offense, the extinction of the criminal action extinguishes the civil action.
Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising
from the offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the
present​ ​petition​ ​to​ ​enforce​ ​the​ ​civil​ ​liability.
Issue
Whether a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he
seeks​ ​to​ ​enforce​ ​the​ ​accused’s​ ​civil​ ​liability.-YES
Held
The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks
to enforce the accused’s civil liability. ​The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule
111 of the ROC applies to civil actions to claim civil liability arising from the
offense charged, regardless if the action is ​instituted with or ​filed separately
from the criminal action. Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC
governs situations when the offended party opts to institute the civil action
separately from the criminal action; hence, its title “​When separate civil
action is suspended​.” Despite this wording, the last paragraph, by its terms,
governs all claims for civil liability ​ex delicto.​ This is based on Article 100 of
the RPC which states that that “[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.” Each criminal act gives rise to two liabilities: one criminal
and​ ​one​ ​civil.
Reflecting this policy, our procedural rules provide for two modes by which
civil liability ​ex delicto may be enforced: (1) through a civil action that is
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action; (2) through a civil action
that is filed separately, either before the criminal action or after, upon
reservation of the right to file it separately in the criminal action. ​The
offended party may also choose to waive the civil action. This dual mode of
enforcing civil liability ​ex delicto does not affect its nature, as may be
apparent from a reading of the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the
ROC,​ ​which​ ​states:
Section​ ​2.​ ​Contents​ ​of​ ​the​ ​judgment.​ ​–​ ​x​ ​x​ ​x
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did
not​ ​exist.
Moreover, an appeal is favored over the institution of a separate civil action
because​ ​the​ ​latter​ ​would​ ​only​ ​add​ ​to​ ​our​ ​clogged​ ​dockets.
*although Co was allowed to appeal the civil aspect of the case, her petition
was denied because the Court agreed with the CA that Co was a public figure
and the statements made by Munoz were privileged communication. In cases
of libel against private individuals, there is always a presumption of malice
(malice in law) on the part of the accused. In libel committed against public
figures, the burden is on the public figure to prove that there is actual malice
on the part of the accused. Here, Co failed to prove that there was actual
malice so there was no crime committed, hence, no civil liability on the part
of​ ​Munoz.
30
 ​8. Casupanan v. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, 26 August 2002, 388
SCRA​ ​28
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Luigi​ ​Ocampo
● Laroya​ ​driving​ ​a​ ​vehicle,​ ​owned​ ​by​ ​Capitulo,​ ​got​ ​into​ ​an​ ​accident
with​ ​Casupanan.
● Laroya​ ​filed​ ​a​ ​criminal​ ​case​ ​against​ ​Casupanan​ ​for​ ​reckless
imprudence​ ​resulting​ ​in​ ​damage​ ​to​ ​property.
● Casupanan​ ​filed​ ​a​ ​case​ ​against​ ​Laroya​ ​for​ ​quasi-delict​ ​while​ ​criminal
case​ ​was​ ​in​ ​PI​ ​stage.
● Laroya​ ​filed​ ​a​ ​motion​ ​to​ ​dismiss​ ​the​ ​civil​ ​case​ ​considering​ ​that​ ​there
was​ ​already​ ​a​ ​criminal​ ​case​ ​pending.
○ Said​ ​it​ ​was​ ​tantamount​ ​to​ ​forum​ ​shopping.
○ Court​ ​granted​ ​motion.
● Capas​ ​RTC​ ​denied​ ​Casupanan’s​ ​motion​ ​of​ ​reconsideration​ ​saying​ ​an
appeal​ ​was​ ​proper​ ​since​ ​MTC​ ​decision​ ​was​ ​final.
● Casupanan​ ​argued​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​forum​ ​shopping.
○ Filed​ ​only​ ​once​ ​action,​ ​the​ ​independent​ ​civil​ ​action​ ​based​ ​on
quasi-delict.

ISSUE:​ ​WON​ ​a​ ​separate​ ​civil​ ​case​ ​can​ ​be​ ​instituted?

HELD:​ ​YES.​ ​Rule​ ​111​ ​s3​ ​provides​ ​that​ ​the​ ​offended​ ​party​​ ​can​ ​file​ ​an
independent​ ​action​ ​for​ ​civil​ ​damages​ ​but​ ​can​ ​only​ ​collect​ ​damages​ ​once.​ ​Here
however​ ​it​ ​is​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​filing​ ​the​ ​separate​ ​civil​ ​action.​ ​Rule​ ​111​ ​s1​ ​par.​ ​6
says​ ​accused​ ​can​ ​file​ ​his​ ​counterclaim​ ​in​ ​a​ ​separate​ ​civil​ ​action.​ ​Capusanan
can​ ​invoke​ ​Art.​ ​2177​ ​of​ ​CC​ ​to​ ​avail​ ​a​ ​remedy​ ​independent​ ​of​ ​civil​ ​action​ ​and
to​ ​deny​ ​him​ ​this​ ​is​ ​to​ ​deny​ ​him​ ​due​ ​process.​ ​Cabaero​ ​case​ ​cited​ ​which
allowed​ ​accused​ ​to​ ​file​ ​separate​ ​action​ ​based​ ​on​ ​quasi-delict,​ ​and​ ​court
hearing​ ​criminal​ ​case​ ​should​ ​focus​ ​only​ ​on​ ​criminal​ ​aspect.​ ​Azcuena​ ​case​ ​said
that​ ​if​ ​civil​ ​action​ ​is​ ​subordinate​ ​to​ ​criminal​ ​then​ ​it’s​ ​pointless​ ​to​ ​have​ ​them
independent.

31
B.​ ​Prejudicial​ ​question​ ​–​ ​Sections​ ​6-7
9. Dreamwork v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, 30 June 2009, 591
SCRA​ ​466
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Cera
DOCTRINE
Prejuducial Question; When is the institution of the civil action constitute as
a prejudicial question that will suspend the criminal proceeding.- Civil case
must​ ​exist​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​case;
FACTS
In 2004, Petitioner Dreamwork, through its President, Roberto Concepcion,
and VP for Finance and Marketing, Normandy Amora, filed a Complaint for
violation of BP 22 against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the
Office​ ​of​ ​the​ ​City​ ​Prosecutor​ ​of​ ​Las​ ​Pias​ ​City.
By 2006, Respondent Janiola, joined by her husband, instituted a civil
complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint for the rescission of an
alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.
Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC,
were​ ​issued​ ​in​ ​consideration​ ​of​ ​the​ ​construction​ ​agreement.
Thereafter, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or
intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other
words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial
question​ ​as​ ​against​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in
Comment/Opposition to Accused Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on
Prejudicial​ ​Question​ ​on​ ​the​ ​grounds​ ​that:
1. There is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the
contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate
and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent
violated​ ​BP​ ​22;​ ​and
2. Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the
elements of a prejudicial question is that the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is
missing​ ​in​ ​this​ ​case,​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​case​ ​having​ ​preceded​ ​the​ ​civil​ ​case.
ISSUES
1. Whether the proceeding in this criminal case should be suspended on
the basis of a prejudicial question in the civil case subsequently filed by the
respondent-​ ​NO
2. Whether the determination of the validity of the construction
agreement in the civil case is relevant to the determination of the ​valuable
consideration​ ​as​ ​an​ ​element​ ​of​ ​BP​ ​22-​ ​NO
HELD
1. NO. The proceeding in this criminal case should NOT be suspended on
the basis of a prejudicial question in the civil case subsequently filed by the
respondent
Under​ ​Rule​ ​111,​ ​Sec​ ​5​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Rules​ ​of​ ​Court,
The​ ​two​ ​(2)​ ​essential​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​a​ ​prejudicial​ ​question​ ​are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised​ ​in​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​action;​ ​and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may​ ​proceed.
Reconciling​ ​Art​ ​36​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Civil​ ​Code​ ​with​ ​Rule​ ​111,​ ​Sec​ ​5​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Rules​ ​of​ ​Court
Private​ ​respondent​ ​cites​ ​Article​ ​36​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Civil​ ​Code​ ​which​ ​provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed​, shall be governed by
32
rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not
be​ ​in​ ​conflict​ ​with​ ​the​ ​provisions​ ​of​ ​this​ ​Code.​ ​(Emphasis​ ​supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed must be interpreted to mean that a
prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the
institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal
action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the
provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers
a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case
preceded​ ​the​ ​filing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​civil​ ​case.
We​ ​cannot​ ​agree​ ​with​ ​private​ ​respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in
phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent
to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had. ​In the
instant case, the phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the
nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the
criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of
subsequent directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical
explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil
and​ ​criminal​ ​actions,​ ​that​ ​the​ ​civil​ ​action​ ​must​ ​precede​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​action.
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a statute should
be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with
other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible​ ​system.
Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are
susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law.
The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly
worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause
before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36
of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to
suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation
with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during
the​ ​trial​ ​with​ ​the​ ​court​ ​hearing​ ​the​ ​case.
In the case at bar, the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to
suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial
question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal
proceedings.
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal
complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its
equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was
instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private
respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no
valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the
construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three
(3)​ ​years​ ​from​ ​the​ ​execution​ ​of​ ​the​ ​construction​ ​agreement.
2. NO. The issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks
which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the
success​ ​of​ ​a​ ​prosecution​ ​for​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​BP​ ​22.
Private respondent claims that if the construction agreement between the
parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued
in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and
cannot​ ​be​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​of​ ​a​ ​criminal​ ​prosecution.
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support
the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable
consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. This Court has
held in a long line of cases that the agreement surrounding the issuance of
dishonored​ ​checks​ ​is​ ​irrelevant​ ​to​ ​the​ ​prosecution​ ​for​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​BP​ ​22.
10. First Producers Holdings Corp v. Co, G.R. No. 139655, 27 July
2000,​ ​336​ ​SCRA​ ​551
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Hanston​ ​Balonan
Facts:
-​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​Armand​ ​Luna​ ​filed​ ​criminal​ ​complaint​ ​against​ ​Co​ ​for​ ​estafa​ ​and​ ​perjury
- In the meeting of board of directors of Producers Bank of Philippines
(PBP), resolution was passed allowing PBP to purchase 3 shares from
Manila​ ​Polo​ ​Club​ ​under​ ​the​ ​name​ ​of​ ​Luis​ ​Co​ ​and​ ​others​ ​on​ ​behalf​ ​of​ ​PBP
33
- Shares were purchased and placed under the names of Luis Co and etc
(Proprietary​ ​Membership​ ​Certificate)
- Baustista separated from the service of Luis Co and demanded from him
the​ ​transfer​ ​of​ ​the​ ​certificate​ ​to​ ​the​ ​corporation
- Luis Co instead of transferring ownership of the certificate to PBP, filed
a false AFFIDAVIT of LOSS (AOL) and was able to secure replacement in
his name by misrepresenting himself as the legitimate owner of the share
(stated in AOL that the certificate was lost but in reality certificate was
actually​ ​within​ ​the​ ​possession​ ​of​ ​the​ ​corporation)
- Another demand was sent to Luis Co to assign said certificate to a new
nominee
-​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​Luis​ ​Co​ ​failed​ ​to​ ​deliver​ ​which​ ​caused​ ​damage​ ​to​ ​the​ ​corporation
- City Prosecutor filed info against Co for estafa in RTC and perjury under
MTC​ ​(Both​ ​Makati)
- Co files a civil action against Luna and First Producers where he was
claiming​ ​ownership​ ​of​ ​certificate
- CA ruled that prejudicial question existed and therefore crim case should
be​ ​suspended
o Co seasonably filed civil case before prosecution rests
therefore​ ​crim​ ​case​ ​should​ ​be​ ​suspended
Issue:​ ​WON​ ​prejudicial​ ​question​ ​existed
Held:​ ​No,
-​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​Elements​ ​of​ ​Prejudicial​ ​question
o Civil action involves issues similar or intimately related to
issues​ ​in​ ​criminal​ ​action
o Resolution of issues in civil action determines whether or
not​ ​crim​ ​action​ ​can​ ​proceed
-​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​Suspension​ ​of​ ​crim​ ​action​ ​because​ ​of​ ​prejudicial​ ​question
o Petition for suspension may be filed with fiscal or court
conduction​ ​preliminary​ ​investigation
o When criminal action filed before court, suspension can
be​ ​filed​ ​before​ ​prosecution​ ​rests
- Court ruled that civil action and the issue of prejudicial question were
merely​ ​dilatory​ ​tactics
o Co only filed civil action eight months after complaint was
filed​ ​to​ ​City​ ​Prosecutor
o ​Issue on ownership could be raised in criminal
action​ ​since:
§ ​Civil action is presumed to be lodged
together​ ​in​ ​criminal​ ​action
§ ​Trial court had jurisdiction to hear all
defenses pertaining to ownership and its
recovery
-​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​Ownership​ ​is​ ​not​ ​an​ ​essential​ ​element​ ​of​ ​estafa
o ​Estafa could still be committed even if the injured
party​ ​is​ ​not​ ​the​ ​owner​ ​of​ ​said​ ​property
o ​Article 315 only states that “any person who shall
defraud​ ​ANOTHER…”
§ ​No distinction between owner and the
defrauded​ ​party
11. San Miguel v. Perez, G.R. No. 166836, 4 September 2013, 705
SCRA​ ​38
Prepared​ ​by​ ​JC​ ​Abalos
Facts:
- Petitioner San Miguel Properties, purchased from BF homes, represented
by​ ​Atty.​ ​Orendain​ ​as​ ​its​ ​receiver​ ​appointed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​SEC.
o​ ​ ​ ​130​ ​lots​ ​for​ ​the​ ​aggregate​ ​price​ ​of​ ​P106M
- TCTs covering lots bought under first and second deeds were fully
delivered to San Miguel, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land
worth​ ​40M​ ​were​ ​not​ ​delivered.
- BF claimed that Orendain had ceased to be its receiver pursuant to an
order​ ​from​ ​SEC
- BF refused to deliver titles despite demands, so ​San Miguel filed a
complaint with OCP Las Pinas charging respondents in violation
of​ ​Sec​ ​25​ ​in​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​Sec​ ​39​ ​of​ ​PD​ ​957
- ​At the same time San Miguel sued BF for specific performance in
the​ ​HLURB
-​ ​ ​ ​OCP​ ​Las​ ​Pinas​ ​dismissed​ ​San​ ​Miguel’s​ ​complaint​ ​for​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​PD​ ​957.
o that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the
suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the
distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC ​en banc or by the
34
HLURB; no definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendain's actions; and
that the criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply
with​ ​a​ ​directive​ ​of​ ​the​ ​HLURB​ ​directing​ ​it​ ​to​ ​deliver​ ​the​ ​titles
the​ ​HLURB​ ​directing​ ​it​ ​to​ ​deliver​ ​titles
-​ ​ ​ ​ ​San​ ​Miguel​ ​appealed​ ​OCP’s​ ​decision​ ​to​ ​the​ ​DOJ,​ ​and​ ​DOJ​ ​denied
o ​unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the
transactions involving the lands in question with specific
reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in
the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally
respondents for non-delivery of the subject land titles. In other
words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957
until such time that the HLURB shall have ruled and decided on
the​ ​validity​ ​of​ ​the​ ​transactions​ ​involving​ ​the​ ​lots​ ​in​ ​question.
- San Miguel appealed to CA on ​certiorari ​and ​mandamus​, CA dismissed
San​ ​Miguel’s​ ​petition
o HLURB has jurisdiction over San Miguel’s complaint on the
doctrine​ ​of​ ​primary​ ​jurisdiction
o San Miguel’s argues that prejudicial questions generally applies to
civil​ ​and​ ​criminal​ ​actions​ ​only,​ ​not​ ​administrative​ ​ones
Issue:
WON​ ​a​ ​prejudicial​ ​question​ ​exists
Held:
- ​YES​. the essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in
Section 7, Rule 111 of the ​Rules of Court​, to wit: (​a​) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (​b​) the resolution of such issue
determines​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​action​ ​may​ ​proceed.
- The action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine
whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the
delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide
whether or not BF Homes' directors and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously
precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties
to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did
not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his
receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal
liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would
evaporate,​ ​thereby​ ​negating​ ​the​ ​need​ ​to​ ​proceed​ ​with​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​case.
- ​The action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in
the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no consequence at all​.
HLURB under the ​doctrine of primary jurisdiction, may hear the action for
special performance despite being civil in nature because of its expertise and
specialized skills. To accord with the ​doctrine of primary jurisdiction,​ the
courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question
within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having
been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal
under​ ​a​ ​regulatory​ ​scheme
- SC also found untenable San Miguel’s argument that violation of PD957 is
a ​malum prohibitum ​crime and that mere failure to deliver TCTs would
render​ ​the​ ​suspension​ ​unsustainable.
o​ ​ ​ ​This​ ​will​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​absurd​ ​results
- San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly
raise the prejudicial question as a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings
because respondents had not themselves initiated either the action for
specific​ ​performance​ ​or​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​action
- The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no
distinction​ ​as​ ​to​ ​who​ ​is​ ​allowed​ ​to​ ​raise​ ​the​ ​defense.
-​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​CA​ ​ruling​ ​AFFIRMED
12. Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060,13 September 2010, 630
SCRA​ ​436
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Bryan​ ​Solco
DOCTRINE​:
Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a
prejudicial​ ​question​ ​in​ ​a​ ​criminal​ ​case​ ​for​ ​parricide.
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before
the​ ​Regional​ ​Trial​ ​Court​ ​of​ ​Quezon​ ​City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case
35
(Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the
civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before
the​ ​RTC​ ​Quezon​ ​City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case before it. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that
even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared
void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
parricide​ ​had​ ​already​ ​been​ ​committed.
ISSUE:
WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide​ ​against​ ​petitioner.
HELD:
No, ​Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​action​ ​may​ ​proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7,
Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
action​ ​was​ ​filed​ ​subsequent​ ​to​ ​the​ ​filing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide, which punishes any person “who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants
or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case
for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is
not​ ​determinative​ ​of​ ​the​ ​guilt​ ​or​ ​innocence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of
execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time​ ​of​ ​the​ ​subsistence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​marriage.​ ​In​ ​short,​ ​even​ ​if​ ​the​ ​marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was​ ​still​ ​married​ ​to​ ​respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that
“the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.”
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of
a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question
in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court declared
in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely
no​ ​moment​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​the​ ​State’s​ ​penal​ ​laws​ ​are​ ​concerned.”
13. Gaditano v. San Miguel Corp., G.R. No. 188767, 24 July 2013,
702​ ​SCRA​ ​191
36
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Nicki​ ​Capuchino
FACTS:
Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida Gadiano
(Florida), who were engaged in the business of buying and selling beer and
softdrinks products, purchased beer products from San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) in the amount of ₱285, 504.00 on 7 April 2000. Petitioners paid
through a check signed by Florida and drawn against Argovan’s Asia Trust
Bank Current Account. When said check was presented for payment on 13
April 2000, the check was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written demands, petitioner failed to
make good of the check. This prompted SMC to file a criminal case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners, docketed
as I.S. No. 01-4205 with the Office of the Prosecutor in Quezon City on 14
March​ ​2001.
In their Counter-Affidavit, petitioners maintained that their checking account
was funded under an automatic transfer arrangement, whereby funds from
their joint savings account with AsiaTrust Bank were automatically
transferred to their checking account with said bank whenever a check they
issued was presented for payment. Petitioners narrated that sometime in
1999, Fatima Padua (Fatima) borrowed ₱30,000.00 from Florida. On 28
February 2000, Fatima delivered Allied Bank Check No. 82813 dated 18
February 2000 payable to Florida in the amount of ₱378,000.00. Said check
was crossed and issued by AOWA Electronics. Florida pointed out that the
amount of the check was in excess of the loan but she was assured by Fatima
that the check was in order and the proceeds would be used for the payroll of
AOWA Electronics. Thus, Florida deposited said check to her joint AsiaTrust
Savings Account which she maintained with her husband, Argovan. The
check was cleared on 6 March 2000 and petitioners’ joint savings account
was subsequently credited with the sum of ₱378,000.00. Florida initially paid
₱83,000.00 to Fatima. She then withdrew ₱295,000.00 from her joint
savings account and turned over the amount to Fatima. Fatima in turn paid
her​ ​loan​ ​to​ ​Florida.
Petitioners claimed that on 7 April 2000, the date when they issued the check
to SMC, their joint savings account had a balance of ₱330,353.17.As of 13
April​ ​2000,​ ​petitioners’​ ​balance​ ​even​ ​amounted​ ​to​ ​₱412,513.17.
On 13 April 2000, Gregorio Guevarra (Guevarra), the Bank Manager of
AsiaTrust Bank, advised Florida that the Allied Bank Check No. 82813 for
₱378,000.00, the same check handed to her by Fatima, was not cleared due
to a material alteration in the name of the payee. Guevarra explained further
that the check was allegedly drawn payable to LG Collins Electronics, and not
to her, contrary to Fatima’s representation. AsiaTrust Bank then garnished
the ₱378,000.00 from the joint savings account of petitioners without any
court order. Consequently, the check issued by petitioners to SMC was
dishonored​ ​having​ ​been​ ​drawn​ ​against​ ​insufficient​ ​funds.
On 23 October 2000, petitioners filed an action for specific performance and
damages against AsiaTrust Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima,Petitioners
alleged that AsiaTrust Bank and Guevarra unlawfully garnished and debited
their bank accounts; that their obligation to SMC had been extinguished by
payment;​ ​and​ ​that​ ​Fatima​ ​issued​ ​a​ ​forged​ ​check.
Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute
a bar to the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg.​ ​22​ ​and​ ​estafa.
On 29 January 2002, the Office of the Prosecutor recommended that the
criminal proceedings be suspended pending resolution of Civil Case No.
Q-00-42386. SMC thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration before the
Office of the Prosecutor but it was denied for lack of merit on 19 September
2002.
ISSUES:
W/N THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION BELOW BECAUSE TWO
DIFFERENT BANK ACCOUNTS ARE INVOLVED IN THE CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL​ ​CASES.
HELD:
YES. THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION​. The issue in the
criminal case is whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether AsiaTrust Bank
had​ ​lawfully​ ​garnished​ ​the​ ​₱378,000.00​ ​from​ ​petitioners’​ ​savings​ ​account.
The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the
criminal investigation being conducted by the prosecutor. The
37
prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of another check.
SMC is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check leading
to its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners’ savings account.
The source of the funds of petitioners’ savings account is no longer SMC’s
concern. The matter is between petitioners and Asia Trust Bank. On the other
hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is whether petitioners issued
a​ ​bad​ ​check​ ​to​ ​SMC​ ​for​ ​the​ ​payment​ ​of​ ​beer​ ​products.
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia Trust Bank liable for the
unlawful garnishment of petitioners’ savings account, petitioners cannot be
automatically adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, because the mere issuance of worthless checks with
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself the
offense.
In the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, deceit and damage are additional and essential elements of the offense.
It is the fraud or deceit employed by the accused in issuing a worthless check
that is penalized. A prima facie presumption of deceit arises when a check is
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. Records show that a notice of
dishonor as well as demands for payment, were sent to petitioners. The
presumption of deceit applies, and petitioners must overcome this
presumption through substantial evidence. These issues may only be
threshed out in a criminal investigation which must proceed independently of
the​ ​civil​ ​case.
the resolution or the issue raised in the civil action is not
determinative or the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal investigation against them. There is no necessity that the
civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
complaints​.
14.​ ​Reyes​ ​v.​ ​Rossi,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​159823,​ ​18​ ​February​ ​2013,​ ​691​ ​SCRA​ ​57
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Annabelle​ ​Jalandoni
On October 31, 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced
Foundation Construction Systems Corporation (Advanced Foundation),
represented by its Executive Project Director, respondent Ettore Rossi
(Rossi), executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes
of equipment consisting Dredging Pump worth P10,000,000.00. The parties
agreed that Reyes would pay the sum of P3,000,000.00 as downpayment,
and the balance of P7,000,000.00 through four post-dated checks. Reyes
complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his
obligation under the deed of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated
checks with nine post-dated checks that would include interest at the rate of
P25,000.00/month.
Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes’ request, and returned the four
checks. In turn, Reyes issued and delivered 9 post-dated checks in the
aggregate sum of P7,125,000.00 drawn against the United Coconut Planters
Bank.
Rossi deposited 3 of the post-dated checks on their maturity dates in
Advanced Foundation’s bank account at the PCI Bank in Makati. Two of the
checks were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes’ instructions to stop their
payment,​ ​while​ ​the​ ​third​ ​was​ ​dishonored​ ​for​ ​insufficiency​ ​of​ ​funds.
Rossi likewise deposited 2 more checks at the PCI Bank in Makati, but the
checks were returned with the notation Account Closed stamped on them. He
did not anymore deposit the three remaining checks on the assumption that
they​ ​would​ ​be​ ​similarly​ ​dishonored.
Meanwhile, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and
damages in the RTC Quezon City. His complaint, sought judgment declaring
the deed of conditional sale “rescinded and of no further force and effect,”
and ordering Advanced Foundation to return the P3,000,000.00
downpayment with legal interest from June 4, 1998 until fully paid; and to
pay​ ​to​ ​him​ ​attorney’s​ ​fees,​ ​and​ ​damages.
On September 8, 1998, Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and
five counts of violation of BP22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
for the dishonor of checks. Another criminal charge for violation of BP22 was
lodged​ ​against​ ​Reyes​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Office​ ​of​ ​the​ ​City​ ​Prosecutor​ ​of​ ​Quezon​ ​City.
Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
over the criminal charges against him on the ground that he had issued the
checks in Quezon City; as well as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor
38
of Makati should suspend the proceedings because of the pendency in the
RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract that ​posed a prejudicial
question​​ ​as​ ​to​ ​the​ ​criminal​ ​proceedings.
Contending that the ​rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a prejudicial
question​, Reyes states that if the contract would be rescinded, his obligation
to pay under the conditional deed of sale would be extinguished, and such
outcome would necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings
for​ ​the​ ​violations​ ​of​ ​Batas​ ​Pambansa​ ​Blg.​ ​22.
ISSUE:
W/N​ ​the​ ​rescission​ ​of​ ​the​ ​contract​ ​of​ ​sale​ ​constitutes​ ​a​ ​prejudicial​ ​question.
HELD:
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former
an issue that must first be determined before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to
avoid​ ​conflicting​ ​decisions.
Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a
prejudicial question are expressly stated in Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules​ ​of​ ​Criminal​ ​Procedure,​ ​to​ ​wit:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial
question​ ​are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related​ ​to​ ​the​ ​issue​ ​raised​ ​in​ ​the​ ​subsequent​ ​criminal​ ​action
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may​ ​proceed.
Rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the obligatory
relation as if it was never created, the extinguishment having a retroactive
effect. The rescission is equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical
tie,​ ​leaving​ ​things​ ​in​ ​their​ ​status​ ​before​ ​the​ ​celebration​ ​of​ ​the​ ​contract.
The ​issue in the criminal actions upon violations of BP22, whether or not
Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be without funds upon
presentment. The i​ssue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the
breach in the fulfilment of Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted the
rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil
action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have committed material
breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such result would not
necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility
for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements
show, he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks
that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding
upon the parties. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance
of a worthless check was already the offense in itself. Under such
circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission of
the​ ​conditional​ ​sale.
The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will
warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute
the buyer for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg.
22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer issued in connection
with​ ​the​ ​sale.
In this light, it is clear that the pendency of the civil case does not bar the
continuation of the proceedings in the preliminary investigation on the
ground​ ​that​ ​it​ ​poses​ ​a​ ​prejudicial​ ​question​.
39
IV.​ ​RULE​ ​112​ ​-​ ​PRELIMINARY​ ​INVESTIGATION
Cases:
1. Santos-Concio et al v. DOJ Sec, G.R. No. 175057, 29 January
2008,​ ​543​ ​SCRA​ ​70
Prepared​ ​by​ ​RL​ ​Cabusora
[TOPIC: Initial steps in preliminary investigation; filing of the complaint for
preliminary​ ​investigation​ ​(p.​ ​207,​ ​Riano)]
Days before the first anniversary of Wowowee, a noontime game show aired
in ABS-CBN, people have started queuing at the Philsport Arena (Ultra) in
Pasig​ ​City​ ​in​ ​the​ ​hopes​ ​of​ ​winning​ ​in​ ​the​ ​said​ ​gameshow.
(Feb. 4, 2006) In the morning of the said anniversary show, when the gates
were​ ​opened,​ ​a​ ​stampede​ ​happened​ ​and​ ​claimed​ ​71​ ​lives.
DILG Sec. Angelo Reyes, created an inter-agency fact-finding team to
investigate the circumstances surrounding the stampede and a report was
released​ ​on​ ​Feb.​ ​7,​ ​2006.
(8 Feb 2006) Respondent DOJ Sec. Raul Gonzales constituted an Evaluating
Panel with respect to the DILG Report whether there is sufficient basis to
proceed with the conduct of a PI. The Evaluating Panel concluded that there
was​ ​no​ ​sufficient​ ​basis​ ​to​ ​proceed​ ​with​ ​a​ ​PI​ ​because:
(a) no formal complaints were filed by any of the victims or their relatives or
any​ ​law​ ​enforcement​ ​agency​ ​with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​Rule​ ​110;
(b) there were no documents submitted to prove the reports on the deaths
and​ ​injuries;
(c) fact-finding report did not indicate the names of the persons involves and
their​ ​participation​ ​in​ ​the​ ​incident;​ ​and
(d) most of the victims did not mention, in their sworn statements, the names
of​ ​the​ ​persons​ ​whom​ ​they​ ​alleged​ ​to​ ​be​ ​responsible​ ​for​ ​the​ ​incident.
However, respondent NBI-NCR acting on the Evaluating Panel’s referral of
the case, submitted to the DOJ an investigation report with supporting
documents recommending the conduct of PI for Reckless Imprudence
resulting in Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries against
petitioners.
With respect to the NBI-NCR recommendation, Sec. Gonzales created an
Investigating Panel composed of state prosecutors to conduct the PI. The
Investigating Panel later issued subpoenas directing the petitioners
(respondents​ ​therein)​ ​to​ ​appear​ ​at​ ​the​ ​PI.
ISSUES:
(1) WON respondents have the power to conduct both criminal
investigation​ ​and​ ​the​ ​preliminary​ ​investigation.​ ​–​ ​YES
(2) WON the complaints were sufficient to warrant the conduct of
a​ ​PI.​ ​–​ ​YES
HELD
(1) Petitioners were invoking ​Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG were the Court ruled
that the entity which conducted the criminal investigation is disqualified
from conducting the preliminary investigation. But Court held that said case
was​ ​different​ ​from​ ​this​ ​one.[1]
Notatu dignum​[2] is the fact that the ​Evaluating Panel was dissolved ​functus
oficio ​upon rendering its report. It was the NBI, a constituent unit of the
DOJ, which conducted the criminal investigation. It is thus foolhardy to
inhibit the entire DOJ from conducting a preliminary investigation on the
sheer ground that the DOJs constituent unit conducted the criminal
investigation.
(2) Petitioners alleged that the NBI-NCR Report, which they advert to as the
complaint-affidavit, there being no statement of specific and individual acts
or omissions constituting reckless imprudence was insufficient under Rule
40
110, Rules of Court. Petitioners also pointed out that the said NBI-NCR
Report​ ​was​ ​not​ ​under​ ​oath.
Court held that a complaint for purposes of conducting a preliminary
investigation differs from a complaint for purposes of instituting a criminal
prosecution.
Preliminary investigation is conducted precisely to elicit further facts or
evidence. ​Being generally inquisitorial, the preliminary investigation stage is
often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime, to enable the preparation of a complaint or
information.
Sec.​ ​3,​ ​Rule​ ​112:
(a) ​The ​complaint shall state the address of the respondent ​and ​shall be
accompanied by theaffidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses​, as well as other supporting documents to establish
probable​ ​cause​.
x x x ​The ​affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor
or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed​ ​and​ ​understood​ ​their​ ​affidavits​.
As clearly worded, the complaint is not entirely the affidavit of the
complainant, for the affidavit is treated as a component of the complaint. The
phraseology of the above-quoted rule recognizes that all necessary allegations
need not be contained in a single document. It is unlike a criminal complaint
or information where the averments must be contained in one document
charging only one offense, non-compliance with which renders it vulnerable
to​ ​a​ ​motion​ ​to​ ​quash.
Soriano v. Casanova citing ​Ebarle v. Sucaldito:​ “​a complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the offended party.
The rule has been that, ​unless the offense subject thereof is one that
cannot be prosecuted ​de oficio​, ​the same may be filed, for preliminary
investigation​ ​purposes,​ ​by​ ​any​ ​competent​ ​person.​”
A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an
affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document, like the
NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal
complainant.​ ​To​ ​require​ ​otherwise​ ​is​ ​a​ ​needless​ ​exercise.
A complaint for purposes of conducting preliminary investigation is not
required to exhibit the attending structure of a complaint or information laid
down in Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) which already speaks of the
People of the Philippines as a party, an accused rather than a respondent, and
a court that shall pronounce judgment. If a complaint or information filed in
court does not comply with a set of constitutive averments, it is vulnerable to
a motion to quash. The filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of a
counter-affidavit is proscribed by the rule on preliminary investigation,
however. The investigating officer is allowed to dismiss outright the
complaint only if it is not sufficient in form and substance or no ground to
continue​ ​with​ ​the​ ​investigation​ ​is​ ​appreciated.
NOTE:​ ​Second​ ​issue​ ​is​ ​more​ ​important.
[1] “​In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who conducted the
criminal investigation, gathered the evidence and thereafter filed the
complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation cannot be allowed to
conduct the preliminary investigation of his own complaint. It is to say the
least​ ​arbitrary​ ​and​ ​unjust.
It is in such instances that We say ​one cannot be ‘a prosecutor and
judge at the same time.’ Having gathered the evidence and filed the
complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with
impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as
a​ ​public​ ​prosecutor.”​ ​(​Cojuangco,​ ​Jr.​ ​v.​ ​PCGG​)
NOTE: Explanation in case is quite confusing. Above excerpt is directly lifted
from​ ​Cojuangco,​ ​Jr.​ ​v.​ ​PCGG
41
[2] presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge's functions,
hence bias, prejudice and even undue interest cannot be presumed, specially
weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under oath of office to administer
justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and to
the​ ​rich.
2.​ ​Borlongan​ ​v.​ ​Pena,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​143591​ ​23​ ​November​ ​2007
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Agcaoili
FACTS
● Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and
expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees, against Urban Bank and the
petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental,​ ​Bago​ ​City.
● Pena’s duty as agent - perform such acts necessary to prevent any
intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s
property​ ​located​ ​along​ ​Roxas​ ​Boulevard,​ ​Pasay​ ​City.
● Petitioners argue that they never appointed Pena as agent or counsel.
They presented documents showing that Pena was appointed by
Isabela​ ​Sugar​ ​Company,​ ​Inc​ ​(ISCI),​ ​and​ ​not​ ​by​ ​them.
● Pena claimed that documents were falsified because the alleged
signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories
were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse,
petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC
knowing​ ​that​ ​they​ ​were​ ​falsified.
● City Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty
of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents
penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code​ ​(RPC).
● Petitioner filed Omnibus Motion to Quash, insisting that they were
denied due process because of the non-observance of the
proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed
in​ ​the​ ​Rules​ ​of​ ​Court.
● Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to
submit​ ​their​ ​counter-affidavit.
● They claimed that the ​trial judge merely relied on the
complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing
the​ ​warrants​ ​of​ ​arrest
● (Unimportant, but might be asked) They also claimed that criminal
case should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being
threshed​ ​out​ ​in​ ​the​ ​civil​ ​case​ ​is​ ​a​ ​prejudicial​ ​question.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law
because of the denial of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit
their​ ​counter-affidavit
HELD
● The penalty imposable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and
one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Clearly, the case is
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and preliminary
investigation​ ​is​ ​not​ ​mandatory.
● Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the
complaint-affidavit of the respondent and did not require the
petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits. The prosecutor should
not be faulted for taking this course of action, because it is
sanctioned​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Rules.
● To reiterate, upon the filing of the complaint and affidavit with
respect to cases cognizable by the MTCC, the prosecutor shall take
the appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting
documents​ ​submitted​ ​by​ ​the​ ​complainant.
● With this, prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint if he does not
see sufficient reason to proceed with the case, or file the information
if​ ​he​ ​finds​ ​probable​ ​cause.
● The prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission
of​ ​counter-affidavits.
● Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the
affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without
infringing​ ​on​ ​the​ ​constitutional​ ​rights​ ​of​ ​the​ ​petitioners.
[Dispositive]
● The rest of the case talks about issuance of a warrant of arrest
without affording petitioner’s right to submit counter affidavits, but
this is discussed in rule 113. It also talks about sufficiency of probable
cause.
42
● There is no provision of law or procedural rule which makes the
submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge can
determine whether or not there exists probable cause to issue the
warrant.
● However, notwithstanding the proper observance of the procedure
laid down by the Rules, a closer scrutiny of the records reveals that
the Informations should not have been filed and the warrants of
arrest​ ​should​ ​not​ ​have​ ​been​ ​issued,​ ​because​ ​of​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​probable​ ​cause.
● Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal
information​, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​is​ ​probably​ ​guilty​ ​thereof.
● On the other hand, we have defined probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest as the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought​ ​to​ ​be​ ​arrested.
● To accord respect to the discretion granted to the
prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a
rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor’s
determination​ ​of​ ​probable​ ​cause.
● Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the
RPC or Introduction of Falsified Document in a Judicial Proceeding.
The falsity of the document and the defendant’s knowledge of its
falsity​ ​are​ ​essential​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​the​ ​offense.
● Contrary to the findings of the MTCC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, we find the complaint-affidavit and attachments
insufficient to support the existence of probable cause.
Specifically, the respondent failed to sufficiently establish prima facie
that the alleged documents were falsified. That the signatures were
falsified are mere assertions, insufficient to warrant the filing of the
complaint or the issuance of the warrant of arrest. These did not
qualify as personal knowledge since nowhere in the affidavit was it
stated that he was present at the time of execution of said
documents. He simply made a bare assertion that the signatories
were mere dummies of ISCI and they were not in fact officers,
stockholders or representatives of the corporation. At the very least,
the affidavit was based on respondent’s "personal belief" and not
"personal​ ​knowledge."
● (IMPORTANT) True, a finding of probable cause need not be based
on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable
doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction.
Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause requires
less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at
least​ ​be​ ​more​ ​than​ ​mere​ ​suspicion.
● Wherefore, petition is granted considering that respondent failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim that the documents
were​ ​falsified.
3. Estrada v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212140-41, 21 January 2015,
748​ ​SCRA​ ​1
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Ong
FACTS
• ​The Ombudsman served upon Estrada a copy of a complaint filed by the
NBI and Atty. Baligod, and another one filed by the FIO of the
Ombudsman. Both complaints prayed that the criminal proceedings for
Plunder and violations of RA 3019 push through. Estrada filed his
counter-affidavits​ ​for​ ​both​ ​complaints.
• ​18 of Estrada’s co-respondents in the complaints filed​
​their
counter-affidavits​ ​as​ ​well.
• ​Estradafiled a request to be furnished with copies of the
counter-affidavits​ ​of​ ​the​ ​other​ ​respondents​ ​(Request).
o ​Estrada made the Request pursuant to his right to
“examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
and to have access to the evidence on record”, as given
by​ ​Rule​ ​112​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Rule​ ​of​ ​Court.
• ​The Ombudsman denied the Request, stating that the Rules of Court, as
well as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman do not
entitle Estrada to be furnished all the fillings of his co-respondents. The
co- respondents are only required to furnish their counter- affidavits and
43
 controverting evidence to the complainant, and not to the other •​​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​This​ ​was​ ​denied​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Ombudman,​ ​reasoning:
respondents.
o W
​ hile it is true that Estrada’s request for copies of Tuason,

• ​Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos, Figura, Buenaventura
decision, Estrada filed the present Petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and Sevidal’s affidavits was initially denied, this Office
to​ ​set​ ​aside​ ​the​ ​resolution​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Ombudsman. thereafter re- evaluated the request and granted it. This
Office, in fact, held in abeyance the disposition of the
• ​The Ombudsman then issued a resolution, finding probable cause to motions for reconsideration in this proceeding in light of
indict Estrada and his co-respondents for 1 count of Plunder and 11 its grant to Senator Estrada a period of five days from
counts​ ​of​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​RA​ ​3019. receipt of copies to formally respond to the above-named
co-respondents’ claims. In view of the foregoing, this
• ​Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned
Office fails to see how Senator Estrada was deprived of
decision, Estrada filed the present Petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
his​ ​right​ ​to​ ​procedural​ ​due​ ​process.
to​ ​set​ ​aside​ ​the​ ​resolution​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Ombudsman.
• ​The Ombudsman, the FIO and the NBI, collectively, argued against
o E
​ strada prayed for judgment declaring that he has been
Estrada’s claims, saying that there was no violation of Estrada’s right to
denied DUE PROCESS. Also, the proceedings in the 2
due process since no rule mandates that a respondent be furnished
complaints against him should be declared void
copies​ ​of​ ​the​ ​counter-affidavits​ ​of​ ​the​ ​other​ ​co-respondents.
(Proceedings​ ​meaning​ ​the​ ​preliminary​ ​investigation).
o E
​ strada argued that the documents given to him were still
• ​It
should be noted that on the same day Estrada filed this petition before
not​ ​complete.
the SC, the Ombudsman ALLOWED Estrada to access the
counter-affidavits​ ​of​ ​8​ ​of​ ​his​ ​11​ ​co-​ ​respondents.
o E
​ strada further argues that the petition is not moot even

• ​Estrada
then filed before the Ombudsman a motion to suspend the though his Request was (partially) granted because there
proceedings in the 2 complaints because the denial of his Request to be is​ ​still​ ​a​ ​recurring​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​his​ ​right​ ​to​ ​due​ ​process.
furnished copies of counter-affidavits of his co-respondents deprived him
of his right to procedural due process, and because he has filed the ISSUES:
current​ ​petition​ ​before​ ​the​ ​SC.
Whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​Estrada’s​ ​right​ ​to​ ​due​ ​process​ ​was​ ​violated.​ ​–​ ​HELL​ ​NO.

44
 - ​Supreme Court: Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that a respondent “shall have
HELD: access to the evidence on record,” this provision should be construed in
relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as to the Rules of
• ​Estrada: Denial of his Request violates his constitutional right to due
Criminal​ ​Procedure.
process.

o T
​ hat a respondent shall have “access to the evidence on
• ​Supreme Court: There is now law or rule, even in the Rules of
record” does not stand alone, but should be read in
Criminal Procedure and Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
relation to the provisions of Section 4(a and b) of the
Ombudsman, which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a
same Rule II requiring the investigating officer to furnish
respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his
the respondent with the “affidavits and other supporting
co-respondents.
documents” submitted by “the complainant or

o S
​ en. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule
supporting witnesses.” Thus, a respondent’s “access to

which states that it is a compulsory requirement of evidence on record” in Section 4(c), Rule II of the

due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits

Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the and supporting documents of “the complainant or

counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.Neither supporting witnesses” in Section 4(a) of the same Rule

Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of II.

Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the

o ​Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
Procedure provides that “[t]he respondent shall have the
supports​ ​Sen.​ ​Estrada’s​ ​claim.
right to examine the evidence submitted by the

o ​What Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant which he may not have been furnished and

complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of to copy them at his expense.” A respondent’s right to

the co-respondents. Obviously, the examine refers only to “the evidence submitted by the

counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part complainant.”

of​ ​the​ ​supporting​ ​affidavits​ ​of​ ​the​ ​complainant.

45
- ​Justice Velasco’s dissent (Arguing for Estrada): Relies on Ombudsman v. submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence
Reyes​ ​to​ ​support​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​Estrada​ ​was​ ​denied​ ​of​ ​due​ ​process.​
  submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets
a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the
- ​Supreme Court: Ombudsman v. Reyes is an administrative case, hence a parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity
different set of rules apply, because the case of Estrada involves a to be present but without the right to examine or
criminal​ ​case. cross-examine.

o In the ​Reyes ​case, failure to furnish a copy of the - ​Supreme Court: In citing the Reyes case, Justice Velasco’s dissent
counter-affidavits happened in the administrative overlooked a vital portion of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning. This Court
proceedings on the merits, which resulted in Reyes’ dismissal quoted from the Court of Appeals’ decision: “x x x [A]dmissions made by
from the service. In Sen. Estrada’s Petition, the denial of his Peñaloza​ ​in​ ​his​ ​sworn​ ​statement​ ​are​ ​binding​ ​only​ ​on​ ​him.
Request happened during the preliminary investigation
where the only issue is the existence of probable cause for the o T
​ he admissions of Sen. Estrada’s co- respondents can in

purpose of determining whether an information should be no way prejudice Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents can in
filed, and does not prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a no way prejudicd Sen. Estrada. The co-respondents’
copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during testimonies were merely corroborative and were not
the​ ​pre-trial​ ​or​ ​even. mentioned in isolation from the testimonies of
complainants’​ ​witnesses.
- ​Supreme Court: A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and
it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his - ​Justice Brion’s dissent (arguing for Estrada): The due process standards
rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to of​ ​Ang​ ​Tibay​ ​v.​ ​CIR1​ ​should​ ​be​ ​controlling.
establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a
- ​Supreme Court: Ang Tibay gave out guidelines for administrative cases,
preliminary​ ​investigation​ ​are​ ​limited​ ​to​ ​those​ ​granted​ ​by​ ​procedural​ ​law.
and​ ​the​ ​present​ ​case​ ​is​ ​not​ ​an​ ​administrative​ ​one.

o ​It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a o A

​ person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada
preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine is in the present case when he filed his Request, is not yet
the witnesses which the complainant may present. an accused person, and hence cannot demand the full
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly exercise​ ​of​ ​the​ ​rights​ ​of​ ​an​ ​accused​ ​person
provides that the respondent shall only have the right to

46
 o T
​ he Ombudsman and the prosecution service under the
control and supervision of the Secretary of the
Department of Justice are inherently the fact-finder,
investigator, hearing officer, judge and jury of the
respondent in preliminary investigations. Obviously, this
procedure cannot comply with ​Ang Tibay​, as amplified
in​GSIS​. However, there is nothing unconstitutional with
this procedure because this is merely an Executive
function, a part of the law enforcement process leading
to trial in court where the requirements mandated in
Ang​ ​Tibay​,​ ​as​ ​amplified​ ​in​ ​GSIS​,​ ​will​ ​apply.
§ p
​ robable cause merely implies probability of guilt
and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part
of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused
can demand the full exercise of his rights, such
as the right to confront and cross-examine his
accusers​ ​to​ ​establish​ ​his​ ​innocence.
- ​The rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are merely
statutory rights, not constitutional due process rights. An investigation to
determine probable cause for the filing of an information does not
initiate a criminal action so as to trigger into operation Section 14(2), Art.
III​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Constitution.
o ​A preliminary investigation to done away with entirely
without infringing the constitutional right of an accused
under​ ​the​ ​due​ ​process​ ​clause​ ​to​ ​a​ ​fair​ ​trial.
- ​Supreme Court: The determination of probable cause can rest partially,
or even entirely, on hearsay evidence, as long as the person making the
hearsay​ ​statement​ ​is​ ​credible.
o H
​ earsay may be the basis for issuance of the warrant “so
long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay.
§ S
​ ubstantial basis is not the same as substantial
evidence because substantial evidence excludes
hearsay evidence while substantial basis can
include​ ​hearsay​ ​evidence.
- ​Supreme Court: To require the application of ​Ang Tibay​, as amplified in
GSIS​, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence
required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or
probability​ ​of​ ​guilt​ ​to​ ​substantial​ ​evidence​ ​of​ ​guilt.
o ​The rule is well-settled that a judicial decision applies
retroactively if it has a beneficial effect on a person
convicted by final judgment even if he is already serving
his​ ​sentence,​ ​provided​ ​that​ ​he​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​habitual​ ​criminal.
47
 ​ pplying ​Ang Tibay​, as amplified in​GSIS​, to preliminary
o A
investigations will result in thousands of prisoners,
convicted​ ​by​ ​final​ ​judgment,​ ​being​ ​set​ ​free​ ​from​ ​prison.
In Relation to Rule 65 (Not the issue in this case I think but here is the
summary):
Sen. Estrada did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the 27 March 2014
Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313 denying his Request, which is the subject of the
present Petition. He should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration, in the
same manner that he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 15 May 2014
Order denying his motion to suspend proceedings. The unquestioned rule in
this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the
acts of the public respondent.56 The plain, speedy and adequate remedy
expressly provided by law is a Motion for Reconsideration of the 27 March
2014 Order of the Ombudsman. Sen. Estrada’s failure to file a Motion for
Reconsideration​ ​renders​ ​this​ ​Petition​ ​premature.
Sen. Estrada also raised in this Petition the same issue he raised in his
Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution of the
Ombudsman finding probable cause. While his Motion for Reconsideration
of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution was pending, Sen. Estrada did not
wait for the resolution of the Ombudsman and instead proceeded to file the
present Petition for Certiorari. The Ombudsman issued a Joint Order on 4
June 2014 and specifically addressed the issue that Sen. Estrada is raising in
this Petition. Thus, Sen. Estrada’s present Petition for Certiorari is not only
premature,​ ​it​ ​also​ ​constitutes​ ​forum​ ​shopping
​4. Racho v. Miro, G.R. No. 168578, 30 September 2008, 567 SCRA
213
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Echauz
FACTS:
DYHP Balita action team addressed a letter on behalf of an anonymous
complainant to Deputy Ombudsman Primo Miro. The letter accused Nieto
Racho, a BIR-Cebu employee of having accumulated wealth disproportionate
to his income. Photocopied bank certifications disclosed how much Racho
had in three different banks (about P5.8M). Pio Dargantes, a Graft
Investigation Officer was assigned to investigate the complaint. He directed
DYHP to submit a sworn statement of its witnesses but DYHP filed a
Manifestation withdrawing its complaint for lack of witnesses. Dargantes
dismissed the case and ruled that the photocopied bank certifications did not
constitute​ ​substantial​ ​evidence​ ​required​ ​in​ ​administrative​ ​proceedings.
Two memoranda by Ombudsman Director Santiago disapproved Dargantes’s
Resolution. Santiago held Racho administratively liable for falsification and
dishonesty, and meted on him the penalty of dismissal from service. Santiago
found probable cause to charge Racho with falsification of public documents
under​ ​the​ ​RPC.
Racho appealed the administrative case and filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the CA to question the ruling of the ombudsman. CA
annulled the decision of the ombudsman and ordered a reinvestigation of the
cases against the petitioner. On reinvestigation, Ombudsman issued the
assailed Reinvestigation Report which stated in its dispositive portion that
based on her previous findings, there is probable cause for the crime of
falsification of public document against Racho for making unthruthful
statements​ ​in​ ​a​ ​narration​ ​of​ ​facts​ ​in​ ​his​ ​SALN.
ISSUES:
1. W/N OMB Director Santiago gravely abused her discretion when she did
not​ ​inhibit​ ​herself​ ​in​ ​the​ ​reinvestigation.
2.​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​W/N​ ​Racho​ ​was​ ​denied​ ​due​ ​process​ ​of​ ​law​ ​the​ ​supposed​ ​reinvestigation.
3. W/N there was probable cause to hold petitioner liable for falsification of
document​ ​under​ ​RPC.
48

HELD:
1.​ ​ ​NO.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts. Such finding of probable cause is a finding of fact
which is generally not reviewable by this Court. The only ground upon which
a plea for review of the OMBs resolution may be entertained is an alleged
grave abuse of discretion. By that phrase is meant the capricious and
whimsical​ ​exercise​ ​of​ ​judgment​ ​equivalent​ ​to​ ​an​ ​excess​ ​or​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty; or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law; or to act at all in contemplation of law, as when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. As already
well settled, as long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman’s
ruling, his decision will not be overturned. The finding of the Ombudsman
that there was probable cause to hold petitioner liable for falsification by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts rests on substantial
evidence.
2.​​ ​NO.
Contention of the petitioner that he was denied due process when no hearing
conducted on his motion for reinvestigation cannot sustain. A a clarificatory
hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by the
use​ ​of​ ​the​ ​term​ ​may​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​3(e)​ ​of​ ​Rule​ ​112​,​ ​thus:
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be
clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions
to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine​ ​or​ ​cross​-examine.
This rule applies equally to a motion for reinvestigation. As stated, the Office
of the Ombudsman has been granted virtually plenary investigatory powers
by the Constitution and by law. As a rule, the Office of the Ombudsman may,
for every particular investigation, whether instigated by a complaint or on its
own initiative, decide how best to pursue such investigation. The OMB found
it unnecessary to hold additional clarificatory hearings. A hearing was
conducted during preliminary investigation where petitioner invoked his
right to remain silent and confront witnesses who may be presented against
him,​ ​although​ ​there​ ​was​ ​none​ ​presented.
Besides, under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Administrative Order No. 07), particularly Rule II, Section 7(a) in relation to
Section 4(f), a complainant’s active participation is no longer a matter of
right during reinvestigation. Admittedly, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. Thus, it is
settled that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process​ ​in​ ​its​ ​strict​ ​judicial​ ​sense.
3.​​ Y
​ ES.
Petitioner argues that his culpability should not be ascertained on the basis of
photocopied bank certifications. Apparent from the records of the OMB
which required petitioner to comment on the certified true copies of bank
certifications issued by BPI and Equitable PCIB. All the same, even if the
Court exclude his deposit in Metrobank, a significant disparity between his
declared cash on hand of P15,000 and cash in bank of P2,860,985.12 subsists
when​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​his​ ​total​ ​bank​ ​deposits​ ​duly​ ​certified​ ​for​ ​the​ ​same​ ​year.
Indeed, the determination of probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. The trial of a case is
conducted precisely for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in
support of the charge. A finding of probable cause merely binds the suspect
to​ ​stand​ ​trial.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​pronouncement​ ​of​ ​guilt.
5. Tolentino v. Paqueo, G.R. No. 150606, 7 June 2007, 523 SCRA
377
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Luigi​ ​Bonoan
FACTS:
49

· Petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Information charging
private respondent Tecklo, the owner/proprietor of Qualistronic
Builders, of violation of Sec. 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 28 (e) of Republic
Act No. 8282 ​for failing to remit the premiums due for his employee to
the​ ​Social​ ​Security​ ​System,​ ​despite​ ​demand.
· The Information contains a certification by State Prosecutor Tolentino,
thus:
O “I hereby certify that the required investigation in this case has
been conducted by the undersigned special prosecutor in
accordance with law and under oath as officer of the court, that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense has been
committed, that the accused is probably guilty thereof ​and that
the filing of the information is with the prior authority
and​ ​approval​ ​of​ ​the​ ​regional​ ​state​ ​prosecutor​.”
· The case was raffled to the RTC of Naga City presided by respondent
Judge Paqueo, Jr. During the date of arraignment, counsel for private
respondent Tecklo requested time to file a motion to quash the
Information,​ ​which​ ​request​ ​was​ ​granted​ ​by​ ​the​ ​court.
· Private respondent Tecklo filed a Motion to Quash, upon the sole ground
that State Prosecutor Tolentino, not being the City Prosecutor nor the
Provincial Prosecutor, has no legal personality nor authority to
commence​ ​prosecution​ ​by​ ​the​ ​filing​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Information.
· State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Opposition to Motion to Quash ​on the
following​ ​grounds:
O (1) That he is authorized to investigate, file, and prosecute SSS
cases since he was designated as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases
by Regional State Prosecutor Turingan by virtue of a Regional
Order;
O (2) In a letter, Chief State Prosecutor J Zuño confirmed such
authority and that Informations to be filed in court by
prosecutors-designate do not need the approval of the Regional
State​ ​Prosecutor​ ​or​ ​Provincial​ ​or​ ​City​ ​Prosecutor;
O (3) Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Regional State
Prosecutor, as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice, is vested with
authority​ ​to​ ​designate​ ​Special​ ​Prosecutors;​ ​and
O (4) The City Prosecutor has been inhibited by the private
complainant from investigating SSS Cases as it is the Panel of
Prosecutors that is now acting as City Prosecutor over all city
cases involving violations of the Social Security Act. As acting
Prosecutor,​ ​the​ ​panel​ ​outranks​ ​the​ ​City​ ​Prosecutor.
· Respondent judge quashed the Information based on Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in relation to the third
paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
thus:
O Rule 112. Sec 4. ​Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its
review. - No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed
by an investigating prosecutor ​without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor ​or the Ombudsman or
his​ ​deputy.
O Rule 117. Sec. 3. ​Grounds​. - The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds: (d)
That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do
so.
· A glance on the face of the information would glaringly show that it was
filed by State Prosecutor Tolentino, without the approval of the City
Prosecutor of Naga City, the situs of the crime, a blatant violation of the
third paragraph of Sec. 4 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
· The designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino to investigate, file this
information if the evidence warrants, and to prosecute SSS cases in court
does not exempt him from complying with the provision of the third
paragraph of [Sec. 4 of] Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
· The designation given to Prosecutor Tolentino came from the Regional
Chief State Prosecutor, who is not one of those mentioned exclusively by
the Rules to approve in writing the filing or the dismissal of an
information.
· Also, the second attached document supporting the opposition to the
motion, is but an opinion of the Chief State prosecutor which has no
force and effect to set aside the mandatory requirement of the Rules in
the​ ​filing​ ​of​ ​an​ ​information​ ​in​ ​court.
· In totality, the RTC held that Prosecutor Tolentino may conduct exclusive
investigation and prosecute all violations of the provisions of the SSS
Laws within the Bicol Region, but in the filing of the information in court,
he must comply with the above-cited provision of the rules on criminal
50
 procedure, that is, to have the provincial or city prosecutor at the situs of
the​ ​offense​ ​approve​ ​in​ ​writing​ ​said​ ​information.
ISSUE:
· WON petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino is duly authorized to file the
subject​ ​Information​ ​without​ ​the​ ​approval​ ​of​ ​the​ ​City​ ​Prosecutor?
HELD:
· Notably, changes in the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were
introduced in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect
on​ ​December​ ​1,​ ​2000.
· It is noted that the letter dated October 24, 2000 of Chief State
Prosecutor Zuño, upon which State Prosecutor Tolentino relies to
support his authority to file the subject Information without the approval
of the City Prosecutor, was issued before the changes in the third
paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were introduced in the Revised Rules of
Criminal​ ​Procedure.
O ​1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure stated that "no complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an ​investigating
fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the
provincial​ ​or​ ​city​ ​fiscal​ ​of​ ​chief​ ​state​ ​prosecutor,"
O ​2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "no
complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority
or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor​​ ​or​ ​the​ ​Ombudsman​ ​or​ ​his​ ​deputy."
· Since the provision is couched in negative terms importing that the act
shall​ ​not​ ​be​ ​done​ ​otherwise​ ​than​ ​designated,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​mandatory.
· An examination of the functions of the Regional State Prosecutor under
Sec. 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1275 ​showed that they do not include
that of approving the Information filed or dismissed by the investigating
prosecutor.
O It is a rule of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others,​ ​expressio​ ​unius​ ​est​ ​exclusio​ ​alterius​.
· Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law
officers authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of the Information
of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by petitioner State
Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule
112​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Revised​ ​Rules​ ​of​ ​Criminal​ ​Procedure.
O Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the
Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal​ ​Procedure.
· Court finds that respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in
dismissing the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino
for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised​ ​Rules​ ​of​ ​Criminal​ ​Procedure.
OTHER​ ​ISSUE:
· Petitioners also contend that the accused must move to quash at any time
before entering his plea and the trial court is barred from granting
further time to the accused to do so; and that there is no evidence in
support​ ​of​ ​the​ ​motion​ ​to​ ​quash.
· Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the Motion to
Quash​ ​provides:
O SEC. 1. ​Time to move to quash​. - At any time before entering his
plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or
information.
O SEC. 2. ​Form and contents.​ - The motion to quash shall be in
writing, signed by the accused or his counsel and shall distinctly
specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no
grounds other than those stated in the motion, except lack of
jurisdiction​ ​over​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​charged.
· The Court finds that there is substantial compliance by private
respondent with the rule above quoted, as it was satisfactorily explained
in his Memorandum that his counsel orally moved to quash the
Information​ ​before​ ​the​ ​arraignment.
· In an Order issued on the same date, respondent Judge required private
respondent’s counsel to file a motion to quash within five days from the
issuance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Order.​ ​Accordingly,​ ​the​ ​motion​ ​was​ ​filed.
· Moreover, there was no need to submit any evidence to support the
ground for quashing the Information, since it was apparent and within
judicial notice that petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino was not the City
Prosecutor​ ​or​ ​the​ ​Provincial​ ​Prosecutor.
51
· As regards the allegation of willful miscitation of the ground for quashing
the Information, the Court finds that respondent Judge failed to cite in
his Order the correct ​paragraph under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
where the ground relied upon for quashing the Information is
enumerated.
O What is important, however, is that he correctly cited the ​ground
for​ ​quashing​ ​the​ ​Information.
Last Words: The Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts of the Philippines. For the ​orderly ​administration of justice, the
provisions contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially
by​ ​the​ ​prosecution​ ​arm​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Government.
6.​ ​Crespo​ ​v.​ ​Mogul,​ ​L-53373,​ ​30​ ​June​ ​1987,​ ​151​ ​SCRA​ ​462
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Calo
FACTS:
An information of Estafa was filed against Mario Crespo. When the case was
set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of
Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of
the​ ​information.
Presiding Judge Mogul denied the petition. The arraignment was,
nonetheless, suspendecd by the Court of Appeals. During the suspension,
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition
for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and
directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed
against​ ​the​ ​accused.
The​ ​CA,​ ​however,​ ​said​ ​that​ ​the​ ​arraignment​ ​should​ ​still​ ​proceed.
Crespo argues that the information filed is no longer valid. Hence, the
arraignment​ ​should​ ​no​ ​longer​ ​proceed.
ISSUE:​ ​WON​ ​there​ ​should​ ​still​ ​be​ ​an​ ​arraignment
HELD:​ ​YES.
- Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sound​ ​discretion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Court.
- The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting
the prosecution of the accused ​is terminated upon the filing of
the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated,
the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of
the​ ​Court​ ​must​ ​be​ ​secured.
- Even if the prosecutor believes that the accused should be
acquitted​, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the
Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the
accused​ ​should​ ​be​ ​convicted​ ​or​ ​acquitted.
- The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for
the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation
of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his
direction​ ​and​ ​control.
7.​ ​Baltazar​ ​v.​ ​People,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​174016,​ ​28​ ​July​ ​2008,​ ​560​ ​SCRA​ ​278
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Ian​ ​Benitez
FACTS:
On 21 Apr 2012 in Bulacan, Erlinda Baltazar and her son Rolando, while
riding a pedicab got into a crash incident with Armando Bautista, the
respondent, who allegedly ran over Erlinda after the crash, which then led to
the death of Erlinda, and injuries by Rolando. P01 Santos of PNP traced the
ownership of the car to a certain Ceslo Bautista, who sold the car to
Armando. Severino (Petitioner), Erlinda’s son, filed a murder and frustrated
murder​ ​case​ ​with​ ​the​ ​MTC-Pulilan​ ​against​ ​Bautista.
MTC-Pulilan - Judge Viola conducted the PI and issued a resolution stating
that the case be ​dismissed​, and be filed against Joel Santos, respondent’s
52
nephew, since he already admitted that he was the one driving. Upon transfer
and reinvestigation of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, the findings of
the MTC were reversed thereby claiming probable cause against Bautista
for murder. Appeals made by Bautista: first, to the RTC-Malolos for
Reinvestigation, then to DOJ for review of Provincial Prosecutor finding PC
against​ ​him​ ​-​ ​pending.
RTC denied the appeal and issued a warrant of arrest against Bautista, who
was then arrested and detained year later. Arraignment was then set, but
postponed​ ​due​ ​to​ ​Bautista’s​ ​claim​ ​of​ ​pendency​ ​of​ ​his​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​the​ ​DOJ.
DOJ then reversed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor claiming that it
was just a plain accident. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor then filed a
withdrawal of the case, which was then granted by the RTC thereby releasing
Bautista.
Private​ ​Prosecutor​ ​filed​ ​an​ ​MR​ ​-​ ​denied.​ ​Then​ ​to​ ​the​ ​CA​ ​-​ ​denied.
ISSUE:
WON​ ​the​ ​judge​ ​is​ ​bound​ ​by​ ​the​ ​findings​ ​of​ ​the​ ​prosecutor?
HELD:
NO. The PI made by the Prosecutor does not bind the judge, for it merely
assists him in making the determination of PC. He does not have to follow
what the prosecutor presents to him. The judge in the case withdrew the
information, not just because of DOJ’s resolution, but based on the following
grounds: (1) witness’ failure to identify the respondent, (2) Santos’
admission, (3) no malice or intent, and (4) this is a simple case of criminal
negligence.
Thus, no grave abuse of discretion. And the judge was not merely bounded by
the​ ​OP’s​ ​findings.
8. Chan v. DOJ Sec, G.R. No. 147065, 14 March 2008, 548 SCRA
337
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Chris​ ​Paredes
FACTS:
On April 1999, the Chief of the PAOCTF (Panfilo Lacson) referred to the State
Prosecutor evidence collected by the task force during a buy-bust operation
against petitioner ​Juanito Chan​, a Chinese citizen resident of Binondo,
Manila. The evidence consisted of:(1) self-sealing transparent plastic bag
containing 1 kg SHABU, with markings “DLS 04/23/99” placed inside a
HENNESSY box, (2) P6,000 Buy-bust money in P500 bills placed at the top
of each of the 12 bundles of ​boodle money (fake filler “money”) placed inside
a yellow paper bag with markings HAPPY BIRTHDAY; and (3) 1 green
Hyundai​ ​van​ ​for​ ​transporting​ ​SHABU.
Police Officers state that, on April 22, 1999, 10:30PM, their Confidential
Informant reported Chan was engaged in the sale of shabu, and offered
commission if buyer would find a buyer of shabu. Later, the two made a deal
for the sale of ​one kg of shabu (P600,000.00) at parking of Fuji Mart
Inc. (Timog Avenue, Quezon City, 5:30-7:30 a.m. the next day.) Buy-bust
operation was organized by PAOCTF and apprehended Chan after he turned
over to the poseur-buyer a small box containing one self-sealing transparent
plastic bag of white crystalline substance in exchange for the 12 bundles of
boodle​ ​money​ ​which​ ​he​ ​received​ ​from​ ​the​ ​poseur-buyer.
Petitioner requested a P.I. and ​waived his rights under Art. 125 of
the RPC​. Chan submitted his Counter-Affidavit denying charges, claiming
frame-up and extortion by police demanding P2M for his release. He
contended that ​his ​warrantless arrest ​was illegal because he was not
committing a crime at that time.​ He insisted that ​the supposed sale of drugs
never took place and that the alleged 1 kg of shabu was ​just planted by the
arresting​ ​officers.
After P.I., State Prosecutor Formaran issued a ​Reso ​recommending the
filing of an Information against the petitioner​. Prosecutor Formaran
did not give credence to petitioners unsubstantiated claim of frame up and
extortion. He said that the defenses and accusation of petitioner were matters
of defense that should be threshed out in court. He further said that in the
face of the laboratory findings that the object taken from the possession of
53
the respondent is positive for shabu, and considering the existence of the
buy-bust money, and finds sufficient ground to engender a well founded
belief that [the] crime charged has been committed and that the herein
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should, therefore, be held for trial.
Hence, it is recommended that an Information for violation of Sec. 15, Art. III
of RA No. 6425, as amended, be filed in court against ​Juanito Chan y Lim
alias​ ​Zhang​ ​Zhenting​.
Senior State Prosec. Manabat recommended the approval of this Reso. It was
then approved by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Guiyab, Jr., in behalf of
the​ ​Chief​ ​State​ ​Prosecutor.
Pet. filed a pet. for review with DOJ Secretary and was denied on the ground
that there was ​no reversible error in the investigating prosecutors finding of
probable​ ​cause​.​ ​Pet.​ ​filed​ ​MR​ ​but​ ​ ​likewise​ ​denied.
Pet. filed a Pet. for Certiorari with Very Urgent Prayer for WPI and/or TRO
with the CA, praying that CA nullify said Resos and direct withdrawal of the
Information.
CA dismissed, noting that the RTC had already assumed jurisdiction over the
case in accordance with ​Crespo v. Mogul that ​once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests on the sound
discretion of the court​. CA further held that certiorari will not lie since
petitioner may still avail of a motion to quash or dismiss the Information
with​ ​the​ ​trial​ ​court.
ISSUE:
Whether​ ​CA​ ​erred​ ​in​ ​dismissing​ ​based​ ​on​ ​Crespo​ ​v.​ ​Mogul.​ ​-​ ​NO​.
HELD:
Crespo subsists and was not superseded by Allado. Allado, which was
punctuated by inordinate eagerness in the gathering of evidence and in the
preliminary investigation, serves as an exception and may not be invoked
unless similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist. No such
circumstances​ ​were​ ​established​ ​in​ ​the​ ​present​ ​case.
Crespo: “once an Information is filed in court, any disposition of the case
rests on the sound discretion of the court.” Crespo does not bar the DOJ Sec.
from reviewing findings of investigating prosec. in the exercise of power of
control over subordinates. The power or authority of the DOJ Sec. to review
prosecutors findings subsists ​even after the Information is filed in
court​, but the court is not bound by such Reso. but must evaluate it before
proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is
persuasive,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​binding​ ​on​ ​courts.
Without arbitrariness of prosec. or other officer authorized to conduct P.I.,
courts as a rule must defer to said officers finding and determination of
probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is
the function of the prosecutor. Findings of DOJ Sec. are not subject to review,
unless​ ​made​ ​with​ ​grave​ ​abuse​ ​of​ ​discretion.
The determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information
in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the
public prosecutor and then to the DOJ Sec. The duty of the Court in
appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive
determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse​ ​of​ ​discretion.
Thus, the ​findings of the Justice Secretary may be reviewed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on the
allegation that he acted with grave abuse of discretion. This remedy is
available​ ​to​ ​the​ ​aggrieved​ ​party.
The determination as to what exactly constitutes a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy rests on judicial discretion and depends on the particular
circumstances of each case. There are many authorities that subscribe to the
view that it is the inadequacy, and not the mere absence, of all other legal
remedies, and the danger of a failure of justice without it, that must usually
determine the propriety of the writ. An adequate remedy is a remedy which is
equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, not merely a remedy which at some
time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment of the lower court
complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which would
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment
and​ ​the​ ​acts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​inferior​ ​court,​ ​tribunal,​ ​board​ ​or​ ​officer.[28]
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead
a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the
investigation. Being based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does
not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable
54
belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than
bare​ ​suspicion​ ​but​ ​less​ ​than​ ​evidence​ ​which​ ​would​ ​justify​ ​a​ ​conviction.
In the case at bench, petitioner is charged with illegal sale of a prohibited
drug. A successful prosecution of this offense requires the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of
the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.[31] To our mind, the documentary and object evidence
submitted to the State Prosecutor, particularly the Joint Affidavit of Arrest,
the 935.80 grams of shabu, and the buy-bust money sufficiently establish the
existence of probable cause against petitioner for the crime charged. After all,
a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect.[32] Unless there
is a clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team
were impelled by any improper motive, or were not properly performing their
duties,​ ​their​ ​testimonies​ ​on​ ​the​ ​operation​ ​deserve​ ​full​ ​faith​ ​and​ ​credit.[33]
9. Villaflor v. Vivar, G.R. No. 134744, 16 January 2001, 349 SCRA
194
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Dizon
10. Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 197293, 21 April 2014, 722 SCRA
647
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Ian​ ​Benitez
FACTS:
Alfredo Mendoza - an employee of Juno Cars, was charged with qualified
theft and estafa due to Mendoza’s failure to remit payments for cars (A
Honda City and a Starex van) that had been sold and released. Provincial
Prosecutor (PP) found PC and recommended the filing of an information.
Mendoza filed an MR to the DOJ - pending. OCP-Mandaluyong filed the
information​ ​to​ ​the​ ​RTC.
RTC dismissed the complaint on grounds of insubstantial evidences. Juno
Cars​ ​failed​ ​to​ ​prove​ ​ownership​ ​of​ ​cars,​ ​receipt​ ​of​ ​cars​ ​by​ ​Alfredo​ ​etc.
Thus​ ​this​ ​petition.
ISSUE:
WON​ ​the​ ​dismissal​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case​ ​is​ ​valid?
HELD:
YES. ​The judicial determination of PC determines whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued; whereas, the executive determination, the one with
the prosecutor's, concern itself to whether there is enough evidence to
support an information being filed. The judicial determination is
independent of the executive, but he must proceed with caution considering
the preliminary nature of evidence before it. Nonetheless, if there is no PC,
judge​ ​can​ ​dismiss​ ​the​ ​case.​ ​Thus,​ ​the​ ​dismissal​ ​is​ ​valid.
DOCTRINE:
Judge may dismiss the case, charged by the prosecutor, upon personal
assessment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​evidence​ ​does​ ​not​ ​establish​ ​PC.
11. Sesbreño v. Aglugub, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1581, 28 February 2005,
452​ ​SCRA​ ​365
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Dani
Sesbreo filed an administrative complaint against MTC judge Aglugub for
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service relative to a Criminal Case (People v. Marcelino,
et​ ​al).
In the said criminal case, Sesbreo filed 3 separate complaints against
Marcelino, Nuez, Tabazon, and Carunungan, all from the Traffic
Management Unit of San Pedro, Laguna, for Falsification, Grave Threats and
Usurpation of Authority. Respondent judge was assigned the 3 cases which
were​ ​consolidated.
After ​preliminary examination, Judge Aglugub issued a Consolidated
Resolution, dismissing the cases for Falsification and Grave Threats for lack
of probable cause, and setting for ​arraignment the case for Usurpation
of​ ​Authority​ ​only.
Only Marcelino failed to appear during arraignment. The rest were arraigned.
55
Respondent​ ​judge​ ​issued​ ​a​ ​warrant​ ​for​ ​Marcelino's​ ​arrest.
Subsequently, ​Sesbreo filed a Manifestation charging that the
defendants with violation of RA No. 10​, and praying that warrants of
arrest​ ​be​ ​issued​ ​against​ ​all​ ​of​ ​them.
**RA 10 penalizes a person who, with or without pretense of official
position, shall perform any act pertaining to the Government, or to any
person in authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do
so, shall be punished with imprisonment of 2-10 years. Violation thereof is
cognizable​ ​by​ ​the​ ​RTC​ ​but​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​preliminary​ ​investigation.
Respondent judge found no probable cause and dismissed the
charge for violation of RA 10​. Also, judge ​denied Sesbreo's prayer
for the issuance of warrants of arrest ​against the accused and
forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutors Office (PPO)
for​ ​review.
The ​PPO affirmed Judge's order and remanded the case to the
court for further proceedings on the sole charge of Usurpation of
Authority.
During the hearing of the case, Tabazon, Carunungan, and Nuez did not
appear. Sesbreo, however, did not move for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against them. Neither did he object to the cancellation of the scheduled
hearing.
The foregoing circumstances brought about the filing of this administrative
complaint.
ISSUES/​ ​HELD:
1. Did Respondent Judge err in refusing to issue warrants of arrest
for​ ​failure​ ​of​ ​the​ ​accused​ ​to​ ​appear​ ​during​ ​trial?​ ​ ​--​ ​NO
There is nothing in the Rules which requires a judge to issue a warrant of
arrest against the accused for their non-appearance during the trial. Its
issuance rests on the sound discretion of the presiding judge​. More
so, in this case, the private prosecutor did not move for the issuance of such
warrant.
Respondent judge, following the foregoing procedure, ​found probable caus​e
to hold the accused for trial for the charge of Usurpation of Authority and ​set
their arraignment and the pre-trial​. There is ​nothing irregular in the
course​ ​of​ ​action​ ​taken​ ​by​ ​respondent​ ​judge.
2. ​Did Respondent Judge err in dismissing the complaint for
violation​ ​of​ ​RA​ ​10?​ ​ ​--​ ​NO
Respondent judge admitted that she ​overlooked the charge of violation
of RA 10 when she conducted the preliminary examination of the
complaints. Nonetheless, after reviewing the case, respondent Judge found
no probable cause and ordered the dismissal of the case. Therefore, when
respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable
cause, she was acting in accordance with the procedure on preliminary
investigation​ ​laid​ ​down​ ​in​ ​Sec.​ ​3,​ ​Rule​ ​112​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Rules.
Respondent judge admits, however, that ​due to oversight, she failed to
rule on the charge of violation of R.A. 10 in her Consolidated
Resolution. Nonetheless, she asserts that she ​conducted a preliminary
investigation for the charge of violation of R.A. 10 and dismissed the charge
after taking into consideration the affidavits and evidence presented.
Complainant does not dispute the fact that indeed a preliminary investigation
was conducted for this charge. Thus, when respondent judge dismissed the
complaint​ ​for​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​R.A.​ ​10,​ ​she​ ​did​ ​so​ ​to​ ​correct​ ​an​ ​oversight.
Furthermore, it was the dismissal of the charge for violation of R.A. 10 that
was elevated to the PPO for review. However, it was ​imprudent for
respondent judge to transmit the ​entire records ​of the case to the
PPO, knowing that the charge for Usurpation of Authority was included in
the records of the case. Respondent judge should have ensured that at least
one complete set of the records remained in her sala so that the prosecution
for Usurpation of Authority would not be held up. However, there is ​no
proof that respondent judge was motivated by an evil intent to
delay​ ​the​ ​case.
56
3. ​Did Respondent Judge err in transmitting the records of the
case​ ​to​ ​the​ ​PPO​ ​instead​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Ombudsman?​ ​ ​--​ ​NO
* Complainant asserts that since the charge of violation of R.A. 10 is
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman has the
primary​ ​jurisdiction​ ​to​ ​review​ ​the​ ​resolution​ ​of​ ​dismissal.
Administrative Order No. 8 (Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of
Procedure of the Ombudsman) provides that a​ ll prosecutors are now
deputized​ ​Ombudsman​ ​prosecutors.
Moreover, Resolutions in Ombudsman cases against public officers and
employees prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to
the Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the
same to the Deputy Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the
approval or disapproval thereof. The Deputy Ombudsman shall take
appropriate final action thereon, including the approval of its filing in the
proper regular court or the dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charged is
punishable by prision correccional or lower, or fine of less than P6,000 or
both. Resolutions involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy Ombudsman with his
recommendation​ ​thereon​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Office​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Ombudsman.
Thus, ​respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting
in accordance with law when she forwarded the case for violation
of R.A. 10 to the PPO​. The fact that the PPO remanded the case to the
court for further proceedings instead of forwarding the same to the Deputy
Ombudsman as required by AO No. 8 is another matter. In any event,
respondent judge should have taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse
in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​preclude​ ​delay​ ​in​ ​the​ ​disposition​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case.
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be
found to be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that he
was moved by bad faith, dishonesty or some other like motive. Respondent
judge's acts hardly indicate bad faith or any motive to delay the case which
characterizes​ ​the​ ​offense​ ​of​ ​gross​ ​ignorance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​law.
DISPOSITIVE: Respondent Judge Aglugub is ADMONISHED to be
more​ ​wary​ ​in​ ​the​ ​performance​ ​of​ ​her​ ​duties​ ​in​ ​the​ ​future.
12. San Agustin v. People, G.R. No. 158211, 31 August 2004, 437
SCRA​ ​392
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Reyes
Facts:
Luz Tan executed a notarized criminal complaint and filed the same
with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) charging the petitioner, the
Barangay Chairman of Barangay La Huerta, Paraaque City, with serious
illegal detention alleging that the petitioner detained her husband Vicente
Tan without lawful ground. The petitioner then received a ​subpoena from
Ferdinand M. Lavin, the Chief of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the
NBI, requiring him to appear before said office the next day in order to give
his evidence in connection with said complaint and to bring with him the
barangay logbook for June 19, 2002. The petitioner complied with the
subpoena and presented himself at the NBI with the barangay logbook.
However, the petitioner was placed under arrest and prevented from going
back home. the NBI Director transmitted to the Department of Justice the
findings​ ​of​ ​the​ ​NBI​ ​on​ ​its​ ​investigation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case:
On June 19, 2002 at around 9:00 oclock in the morning while Victim
RICARDO TAN and Witness ANTONIO GERONIMO were selling their
wares of kitchen utensils along the highway of La Huerta, Paraaque City,
Victim TAN was mistaken as a snatcher by two tricycle drivers, namely,
ROMEO C. ALCANTARA and JOSEFINO FERRER, JR. Victim was
turned-over to Subject SAN AGUSTIN and other Subjects at the
Barangay Hall of La Huerta, Paraaque City; witness GERONIMO
followed them. GERONIMO witnessed that Victim was beaten by
Subjects and locked-up at the Barangay jail so he decided to inform the
wife of the Victim (Complainant) who was residing in San Pedro,
Laguna. When Complainant went to the Barangay Hall on the same day
and inquired on the whereabouts of his husband, two female clerks
thereat denied having seen the Victim. Complainant was able to talk to
57
 Subject SAN AGUSTIN the following day but he also denied having seen
Victim, worst Subject SAN AGUSTIN was furious and even shouted at
them and brought out his knife. Up to date, Victim, never resurfaced nor
his whereabouts located. Record at the NBI central file of Subject SAN
AGUSTIN revealed that he has several cases of homicide, murder and
multiple​ ​murder.
The NBI Director stated that the basis for the arrest of the petitioner was that
when San Agustin was subpoenaed before NBI-AOCD to controvert
allegations filed against him for kidnapping by Ms. Luz Tan, the logbook he
presented showed that there was no entry on June 19, 2002 that Victim
RICARDO TAN was arrested or transmitted to any law enforcement agency
or​ ​proper​ ​authority.
After an inquest investigation conducted by State Prosecutor, an
information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City,
charging the petitioner with kidnapping/serious illegal detention with no bail
recommended. The case was raffled to Branch 258 of the court and docketed
as Criminal Case No. 02-0759. 4 days after, the petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash the Information on the ground that he was illegally arrested and
subjected to an inquest investigation; hence, he was deprived of his right to a
preliminary investigation. He also prayed that he be released from detention
and that, in the meantime, the NBI be ordered to refile the complaint against
him with the Office of the Paraaque City Prosecutor and for the latter to
conduct a preliminary investigation. the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
the Information, this time, on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute the felony of kidnapping/serious illegal detention. He claimed that
he was a ​barangay chairman when the private complainant was allegedly
detained; hence, he should be charged only with arbitrary detention, the most
severe​ ​penalty​ ​for​ ​which​ ​is​ ​reclusion​ ​temporal​.
The prosecution opposed the petitioners motion to quash the Information on
the ground that when he detained the private complainant, he acted in his
private​ ​capacity​ ​and​ ​not​ ​as​ ​a​ ​barangay​ ​chairman
ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to a regular preliminary investigation,
not​ ​merely​ ​an​ ​inquest​ ​investigation.
HELD:​ ​Yes,​ ​petitioners​ ​are​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​preliminary​ ​investigation
The petitioner asserts that he was illegally arrested by the NBI; hence, he was
entitled to a regular preliminary investigation, not merely to an inquest
investigation. He contends that since the Information charging him with
kidnapping/serious illegal detention was filed before the Regional Trial Court
without affording him a preliminary investigation, the Information is void.
The RTC, the petitioner avers, should have granted his motion to quash the
Information and ordered the NBI to refile its complaint against him with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque for the appropriate preliminary
investigation and that, in the meantime, the RTC should have ordered his
release from detention. The petitioner posits that the RTC committed a grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying
his motion to quash the Information and directing the City Prosecutor to
conduct a reinvestigation. On the other hand, since the Assistant City
Prosecutor did not conduct a regular preliminary investigation before filing
the Information for arbitrary detention against him with the MeTC, the
Information is void. Hence, the MeTC should be ordered to quash the
Information​ ​filed​ ​therein.
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that the petition for certiorari of the petitioner in the Court of
Appeals and in this Court had become moot and academic by the withdrawal
of the Information from the Regional Trial Court and filing of the
Information for arbitrary detention against the petitioner in the MTC.The
inquest investigation conducted by the State Prosecutor was valid because
the petitioner refused to execute a waiver under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. The OSG asserts that the investigation conducted by the
Assistant City Prosecutor, as directed by the RTC, was valid. The petitioner is
estopped from assailing the Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor
finding probable cause for arbitrary detention because of his failure to submit
his​ ​counter-affidavit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner was unlawfully arrested;
hence, he was entitled to preliminary investigation and release from
detention subject to his appearance during the preliminary investigation.
However, the Court of Appeals declared that the lack of preliminary
58
investigation did not impair the validity of the Information filed with the
RTC. Moreover, the Court of Appeals declared that the petitioner had already
been granted a reinvestigation after which the Information filed with the RTC
was withdrawn.Consequently, the appellate court further declared that the
petition had been mooted by the withdrawal of the Information from the RTC
and the filing of another Information in the MeTC for arbitrary detention.
The appellate court also held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Order. It ruled that even if the reinvestigation conducted by the City
Prosecutor is defective, the Information filed with the MeTC is valid because
under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, there is no need for a
preliminary investigation for crimes cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial
Court.
The Supreme Court agrees that the petitioner was unlawfully arrested
without a warrant of arrest against him for kidnapping/serious illegal
detention. Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to a preliminary
investigation before an Information may be filed against him for said crime.
The inquest investigation conducted by the State Prosecutor is void because
under Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an
inquest investigation is proper only when the suspect is lawfully arrested
without​ ​a​ ​warrant.
However, the SC does not agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
there was no need for the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation since the crime charged under the Information filed with the
MeTC was arbitrary detention under Article 124, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code punishable by ​arresto mayor in its maximum period to​prision
correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of four months and
one day to two years and four months. Whether or not there is a need for a
preliminary investigation under Section 1 in relation to Section 9 of Rule 112
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure depends upon the imposable
penalty for the crime charged in the complaint filed with the City or
Provincial Prosecutors Office and not upon the imposable penalty for the
crime found to have been committed by the respondent after a preliminary
investigation. In this case, the crime charged in the complaint of the NBI filed
in the Department of Justice was kidnapping/serious illegal detention, the
imposable​ ​penalty​ ​for​ ​which​ ​is​ ​reclusion​ ​perpetua​ ​to​ ​death.
13. Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. No. 172070 – 72, 17207074 – 76, 175013,
1​ ​June​ ​2007,​ ​523​ ​SCRA​ ​318
Prepared​ ​by​ ​Fradejas
Facts
These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to
enjoin petitioners’ prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of
the DOJ and RTC Makati on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners’
cases.
Beltran​ ​Petition​:
On February 24, 2006, PGMA signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
declaring a “State of National Emergency.” Following that, police officers
arrested Crispin Beltran on while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and
detained​ ​him​ ​in​ ​Camp​ ​Crame.
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not
inform​ ​Beltran​ ​of​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​for​ ​which​ ​he​ ​was​ ​arrested.
He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition.
This was based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon
City​ ​on​ ​24​ ​February​ ​2006.​ ​Inquest​ ​prosecutor​ ​found​ ​probable​ ​cause.
BASIS: joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been
present​ ​at​ ​the​ ​rally.
He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion
conducted​ ​by​ ​DOJ​ ​state​ ​prosecutors.
59
The inquest was based on two letters from CIDG executive officer and deputy
director. The letters contained results of CIDG’s investigation implicating
Beltran, et al as “leaders and promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to
overthrow the Arroyo government. DOJ state prosecutors found probable
cause.
Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed
rebellion​ ​and​ ​that​ ​such​ ​inquest​ ​was​ ​void.
Ladlad​ ​and​ ​Maza​ ​petitions:
Ladlad, Maza, et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of
rebellion.
Basis of the PI: results of the CIDG investigation, culled from the Beltran
inquest.
During the PI, CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime
Fuentes, who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. Velasco, who
was the prosecutor, gave copies of the affidavit of Fuentes to media members
present​ ​during​ ​the​ ​proceedings.
Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and
independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were
investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice
made to the media regarding petitioners’ case, and the manner in which the
prosecution​ ​panel​ ​conducted​ ​the​ ​preliminary​ ​investigation.
Furthermore, they contend that the PI was tainted with irregularities as not
pursuant​ ​to​ ​Rule​ ​112​ ​Sec3.
Issues
1.​ ​WON​ ​the​ ​inquest​ ​for​ ​rebellion​ ​against​ ​Beltran​ ​was​ ​valid?​ ​NO.
2.​ ​WON​ ​there​ ​is​ ​probable​ ​cause​ ​to​ ​indict​ ​Beltran​ ​for​ ​rebellion?​ ​NO.
3. WON the PI conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with
irregularity?​ ​YES.
Held
1) The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest
proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested
without​ ​warrant.
The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers states that the officers
arrested Beltran, without a warrant, for Inciting to Sedition, and not for
Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted – as he
did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently,
when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the
second inquest void for the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to
comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ
Circular No. 61. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in
their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge
of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion,
sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion.
What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and
heard​ ​Beltran​ ​make​ ​an​ ​allegedly​ ​seditious​ ​speech​ ​on​ ​24​ ​February​ ​2006.
2) Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by
rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of
the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land,
naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature,​ ​wholly​ ​or​ ​partially,​ ​of​ ​any​ ​of​ ​their​ ​powers​ ​or​ ​prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving
crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the
panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion
60
consisted of the affidavits and other documents except for two affidavits,
executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), a person who admitted that he
was a member of the CPP and he saw Beltran in the “10th Plenum” of the CPP
in 1992, dated 20 Febuary 2006, and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23
February 2006, none of the affidavits mentions Beltran. In his affidavit,
Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran,
Ocampo, Casiño, Maza, Mariano, Virador, and other individuals on board a
vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and
that after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual who
looked like San Juan. Nothing in the documents were sufficient to indict
Beltran for rebellion. Nothing in the affidavits show that Beltran is a leader of
the CPP. It only showed that Beltran was in Padre Garcia, Batangas on
February​ ​2006.
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not
acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion. As
for the alleged funding of the CPP’s military equipment from Beltran’s
congressional funds, Cachuela’s affidavit merely contained a general
conclusion​ ​without​ ​any​ ​specific​ ​act​ ​showing​ ​such​ ​funding.
Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect by motu
proprio submitting to Branch 137 of the RTC Makati Fuentes’ affidavit as part
of their Comment to Beltran’s motion for judicial determination of probable
cause. Such belated submission, a tacit admission of the dearth of evidence
against Beltran during the inquest, does not improve the prosecution’s case.
Fuentes’s affidavit does not also support a charge of rebellion since it pertains
to another crime, which is conspiracy to commit rebellion, a preparatory act
distinct​ ​from​ ​the​ ​crime​ ​of​ ​rebellion.
3) The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3a of Rule 112 which
provides that the complaint must be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Here, the prosecutors
treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP
as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though
some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a
prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by
Section​ ​3(a)​ ​of​ ​Rule​ ​112.
Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the
complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the
investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall
“issue a subpoena to the respondents.” Here, after receiving the CIDG letters,
respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners
requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 “to secure
copies​ ​of​ ​the​ ​complaints​ ​and​ ​its​ ​attachments.”
During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked
Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco.
Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to petitioners
or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings.
Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the
complainant’s antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a
witness’ affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not
had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent
prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to
petitioners’ claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. Hence, the court
concluded that there was indeed partiality on the part of the prosecutors who
conducted​ ​the​ ​PI.
A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system
which spells for an individual the difference between months if not years of
agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind
and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a
preliminary investigation as not "a mere formal or technical right" but a
"substantive" one, forming part of due process in criminal justice. This
especially holds true here where the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion​ ​perpetua​ ​and​ ​may​ ​be​ ​non-bailable​ ​for​ ​those​ ​accused​ ​as​ ​principals.
61
*The Court also found merit on petitioner’s doubt on the prosecutors’
impartiality when the SOJ said: "We [the DOJ] will just declare probable
cause, then it’s up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x."42 Petitioners raised this
issue in their petition,43 but respondents never disputed the veracity of this
statement. This clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to file the
Information​ ​even​ ​in​ ​the​ ​absence​ ​of​ ​probable​ ​cause.

62
V.​ ​RULE​ ​113​ ​-​ ​ARREST
-​ ​Sec.​ ​5,​ ​RA​ ​10389​ ​(“Recognizance​ ​Act”)
Additional​ ​readings:
-​ ​RA​ ​6036
-​ ​Sec.​ ​2,​ ​Article​ ​III,​ ​Constitution
Cases:
-​ ​RA​ ​7438
1. People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 216007-09, 8 December 2015, 776
Cases: SCRA​ ​672
Prepared​ ​by
1.​ ​AAA​ ​v.​ ​Carbonell,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​171465,​ ​8​ ​June​ ​2007,​ ​524​ ​SCRA​ ​496
Prepared​ ​by 2. San Miguel v. Maceda, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749, 3 April 2007, 520
SCRA​ ​205
2. People v. Alunday, G.R. No. 181546,3 September 2008, 564 Prepared​ ​by
SCRA​ ​135
Prepared​ ​by 3. Lavides v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, 1 February 2000,
324​ ​SCRA​ ​321
3. People v. del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, 14 April 1999, 305 SCRA Prepared​ ​by
740
Prepared​ ​by 4. Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817, 27 June 2008, 556
SCRA​ ​471
4. People v. Jayson, G.R. No. 120330, 18 November 1997, 282 Prepared​ ​by
SCRA​ ​166
Prepared​ ​by 5. Andres v. Beltran, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1597, 20 August 2001, 363
SCRA​ ​371
5.​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Edaño,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​188133,​ ​7​ ​July​ ​2014,​ ​729​ ​SCRA​ ​255 Prepared​ ​by
Prepared​ ​by
6. Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010, 615
6. Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, 10 November 2014, 739 SCRA​ ​619
SCRA​ ​337 Prepared​ ​by
Prepared​ ​by
7. People v. Fitzgerald, G.R. No. 149723, 23 October 2006, 505
VI.​ ​RULE​ ​114​ ​–​ ​BAIL SCRA​ ​573
Prepared​ ​by
Additional​ ​readings:
8. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015, 767
-​ ​Sec.​ ​13,​ ​Article​ ​III,​ ​Constitution SCRA​ ​282
Prepared​ ​by
-​ ​Sec.​ ​1-7,​ ​AM​ ​No.​ ​12-11-2-SC,​ ​1​ ​May​ ​2014
63
9. Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140842, 12 April 2007, 520 VIII.​ ​RULE​ ​116​ ​-​ ​ARRAIGNMENT​ ​AND​ ​PLEA
SCRA​ ​729
Prepared​ ​by Cases:

10. Esteban v. Alhambra, G.R. No. 135012, 7 September 2004, 437 1.​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Magat,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​130026,​ ​31​ ​May​ ​2000,​ ​332​ ​SCRA​ ​517
SCRA​ ​560 Prepared​ ​by
Prepared​ ​by
2. People v. Ulit, G.R. No. 131799-901, 23 February 2004, 423
VII.​ ​RULE​ ​115​ ​-​ ​RIGHTS​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​ACCUSED SCRA​ ​374
Prepared​ ​by
Cases:
3. Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 163972-77, 28 March 2008,
1. Perez v. People, G.R. No. 164763, 12 February 2008, 544 SCRA 550​ ​SCRA​ ​233
532 Prepared​ ​by
Prepared​ ​by
IX.​ ​RULE​ ​117​ ​-​ ​MOTION​ ​TO​ ​QUASH
2. Benares v. Lim, G.R. No. 173421, 14 December 2006, 511 SCRA
100 Cases:
Prepared​ ​by
1. Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, 8 December 2010, 637
3.​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Baloloy,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​140740,​ ​12​ ​April​ ​2002,​ ​381​ ​SCRA​ ​31 SCRA​ ​615
Prepared​ ​by Prepared​ ​by

4.​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Teves,​ ​G.R​ ​No.​ ​141767,​ ​2​ ​April​ ​2001,​ ​356​ ​SCRA​ ​14 2. People v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, 23 July 2008, 559 SCRA
Prepared​ ​by 492
Prepared​ ​by
5.​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Musa,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​170472,​ ​3​ ​July​ ​2009,​ ​591​ ​SCRA​ ​619
Prepared​ ​by 3. Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166062, 26 September 2006,
503​ ​SCRA​ ​252
6.​ ​Aquino​ ​v.​ ​Paiste,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​147782,​ ​25​ ​June​ ​2008,​ ​555​ ​SCRA​ ​255 Prepared​ ​by
Prepared​ ​by
4. People v. Laggui, G.R. No. 76262-63, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA
7.​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Serzo,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​118435,​ ​20​ ​June​ ​1997,​ ​274​ ​SCRA​ ​553 305
Prepared​ ​by Prepared​ ​by

8. Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, 23 July 2014, 730 SCRA 5. People v. Honrales, G.R. No. 182651, 182657, 25 August 2010,
655 629​ ​SCRA​ ​423
Prepared​ ​by Prepared​ ​by

64
6. Quiambao v. People, G.R. No. 185267, 17 September 2014, 735
SCRA​ ​345 XI.​ ​RULE​ ​119​ ​-​ ​TRIAL
Prepared​ ​by
Additional​ ​readings:
7. Villalon v. Chan, G.R. No. 196508, 24 September 2014, 736
SCRA​ ​450 -​ ​Judicial​ ​Affidavit​ ​Rule
Prepared​ ​by
-​ ​Sec.​ ​8-15,​ ​AM​ ​12-11-2-SC,​ ​1​ ​May​ ​2014
8. People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA
550 -​ ​Sec.​ ​11-17,​ ​Rules​ ​on​ ​Summary​ ​Procedure
Prepared​ ​by
Cases:
9. Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA
350 1. Visbal v. Vanilla, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1651, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA
Prepared​ ​by 11
Prepared​ ​by
10. People v. Torres, G.R. No. 189850, 22 September 2014, 735
SCRA​ ​687 2. People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA
Prepared​ ​by 550
Prepared​ ​by
11. Torres v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 164268, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA
599 3. Cabador v. People, G.R. No. 186001, 2 October 2009, 602 SCRA
Prepared​ ​by 760
Prepared​ ​by
12. Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products, G.R. No. 183994, 30
June​ ​2014,​ ​727​ ​SCRA​ ​503 4. Salazar v. People, G.R. No. 151931, 23 September 2003, 411
Prepared​ ​by SCRA​ ​598
Prepared​ ​by
13. Los Baños v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, 22 April 2009, 586 SCRA
303 5. Cabarles v. Maceda, G.R. No. 161330, 20 February 2007, 516
Prepared​ ​by SCRA​ ​303
Prepared​ ​by
X.​ ​RULE​ ​118​ ​-PRE-TRIAL
6.​ ​Go​ ​v.​ ​People,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​185527,​ ​18​ ​July​ ​2012,​ ​677​ ​SCRA​ ​213
Cases: Prepared​ ​by

1. Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143689-91, 12 November 7. Ampatuan v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, 3 April 2013, 695 SCRA
2002,​ ​391​ ​SCRA​ ​415 159
Prepared​ ​by Prepared​ ​by
65
 XIV.​ ​POST-JUDGMENT​ ​REMEDIES
8. Jimenez v. People, G.R. No. 209195, 17 September 2014, 735
SCRA​ ​596 -​ ​Rules​ ​121-125;​ ​127
Prepared​ ​by
-​ ​Cases
XII.​ ​RULE​ ​120​ ​-​ ​JUDGMENT
1.​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Mateo,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​147678-87,​ ​7​ ​July​ ​2004,433​ ​SCRA​ ​640
Cases: Prepared​ ​by

1. People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 2. Pobre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141805, 8 July 2005, 463
550 SCRA​ ​50
Prepared​ ​by Prepared​ ​by

2. Rimando v. Aldaba, G.R. No. 203583, 13 October 2014, 738 3. Tamayo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147070, 17 February 2004,
SCRA​ ​232 423​ ​SCRA​ ​175
Prepared​ ​by Prepared​ ​by

3. Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 4. People v. Latayada, G.R. No. 146865, 18 February 2004, 423
350 SCRA​ ​237
Prepared​ ​by Prepared​ ​by

4. Sevilla v. People, G.R. No. 194390, 13 August 2014, 732 SCRA 5. Vitto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134981, 18 June 2003, 404
687 SCRA​ ​307
Prepared​ ​by Prepared​ ​by

XIII.​ ​RULE​ ​126​ ​-​ ​SEARCH​ ​AND​ ​SEIZURE 6. Quesada v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 150325, 31 August
2006,500​ ​SCRA​ ​454
Additional​ ​reading:​ ​Sec.​ ​2,​ ​Article​ ​III,​ ​Constitution Prepared​ ​by

Cases: 7. Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 9 February 2011,642

SCRA​ ​421
1. Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104879, 6 May 1994, 232 Prepared​ ​by
SCRA​ ​249
Prepared​ ​by 8. Macapagal v. People, G.R. No. 193217, 26 February 2014, 717
SCRA​ ​425
2. World Wide Web Corp. v. People, G.R. No. 161106 – 266, 13 Prepared​ ​by
January​ ​2014,​ ​713​ ​SCRA​ ​18
Prepared​ ​by 9.​ ​People​ ​v.​ ​Piccio,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​193681,​ ​6​ ​August​ ​2014,​ ​732​ ​SCRA​ ​254
Prepared​ ​by
66
10.​ ​Cajipe​ ​v.​ ​People,​ ​G.R.​ ​No.​ ​203605,​ ​23​ ​April​ ​2014,​ ​723​ ​SCRA​ ​615
Prepared​ ​by

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A​ ​M​ ​D​ ​G

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