1 DABALOS (Y SAN DIEGO) v. RTC, BR 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), ET AL.

[G.R. No. 193960, January 07, 2013]

PERLAS-BERNABE, J. :

FACTS:

 Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders of the (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 which denied
petitioner's Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.

 Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information: x x x the
above- named accused, being then the boyfriend of the complainant, x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously use
personal violence [on] the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant's back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and
degrading the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.4ςrνl1

 RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest. The latter posted a cash bond and on August 12, 2010, filed a
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.

 Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private
respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.

 In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that
she sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was
responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict
on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information. The RTC denied petitioner's motion. It did not consider material the fact that the
parties' dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident.

ISSUES:

W/n the act of petitioner which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not
their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls
under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

HELD:

The petition has no merit.

The Court is not persuaded. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) " Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence
against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife,
former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is
likely to result in physical harm or suffering.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit: 1. The offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts
of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her. 6ςrνl1

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is
not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying
the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts
of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial
whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the
parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.

Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity 7 because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would
necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 8 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is
sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on
the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the
end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.

Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner
and the private respondent; the act of violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is
covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

2 SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO vs DAR and LBP
GR No. 161090
and
Eduardo Plopenio vs DAR and LBP
GR No. 161092

Facts:
Petitioner-spouses and Edwardo owns 11.8643 and 22.8349 hectares of coconut land in Caramoan, Camarines Sur respectively, In 2000,
the land of their brother Gavino Plopenio was valued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) at ₱51,125.60 per hectare
in DARAB Case No. V-LV-040-CS-00. On this basis, petitioners offered their entire landholdings to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
acquisition and distribution pursuant to Republic Act No. R.A. 6657.
On 26 October 2001, public respondent Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and Adjudication valuing the land of petitioner-spouses at
₱23,485.00 per hectare and that of petitioner Eduardo at ₱22,856.62 per hectare. Dissatisfied with Land Bank’s offer, petitioners rejected the Notice
of Valuation and Acquisition and referred the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur for summary
administrative proceedings.
The PARAD affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank in a Decision dated 5 September 2002, a copy of which petitioners received on 27
September 2002.
On 11, October 2002, or 14 days thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The PARAD denied their Motion in an Order
dated 20 November 2002, which petitioners received on 21 December 2002.
Petitioners then filed separate Petitions before the SAC-RTC on 6 January 2003, or 16 days after their receipt of the PARAD’s Order. They
explained that they were allowed to file their appeal 15 days from the receipt of the Order of denial of their Motion for Reconsideration. Since the
15th day fell on a Sunday, they reasoned that they should be allowed to file their appeal until 6 January 2003.
In its Answer, Land Bank alleged that the Decision of the PARAD had already attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day period, counted
from petitioners’ receipt of the PARAD’s Decision. Thus, it argued that the SAC-RTC (Special Agrarian Court-RTC) should no longer entertain the
Petitions. In its assailed Decisions, the SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision of the PARAD had already attained finality because petitioners failed to file
their Petitions on time.
From the Decisions and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed the instant Petitions for Review directly before this Court. On 24 July 2006, we
resolved to consolidate the cases at bar, considering that the factual milieu and legal issues involved in both cases are similar in nature.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioners erred in applying Rule 45 of Rules of Court on Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court and not Rule 60 of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

Held:
The Supreme Court denied the consolidated petition for review on the grounds that the petitioners resorted to a wrongful mode of appeal
by applying Rule 45 of Rules of Court, filing the petition directly with the Supreme Court. The Petitioners should have filed the petition to the Court of
Appeals as provided in Rule 60 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law:
Section 60. Appeals. - An appeal may be taken from the Special Agrarian Courts (SAC- RTC) by filing a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals within fifteen days (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final.
The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals there from are
governed by Section 60 thereof.
Furthermore, even if the Court were to allow the appeals to prosper, The Court finds that the Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time.
In this case, petitioners received a copy of the PARAD Decision on September 27 2002.They filed their Motion for Reconsideration thereof
on 11 October 2002, or 14 days from their receipt of a copy of the Decision. On 21 December 2002, they received the Order denying their motion.
Hence, petitioners only had one more day within which to file their Petitions with the SAC-RTC for the determination of just compensation for their
respective properties. Since December 22, 2002 fell on a Sunday, they had until December 23, 2002 to file their Petition However, they only filed
their Petitions on January 6 2003, or 16 days after they received the order denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly, the Petitions before the
SAC-RTC were filed out of time.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated Petitions for Review are hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decisions and Orders
of the Special Agrarian Court-Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City in Civil Case Nos. 2003-007 and 2003-004 are hereby affirmed.

3 Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. IAC [G.R. No. L-72005. May 29, 1987]
Ponente: GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:

[P]rivate respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian
Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00 thru petitioner
Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin. Varian
Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties
of Varian in respondent Court. The respondent Court granted the petition of Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer and petitioner herein, raised the issue to
the Supreme Court. A temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of was issued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on the counterbond of the petitioner.

HELD:

YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with costs against petitioner.
RATIO:

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and
general significance. The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so
as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is
indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it
ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of
Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the
execution of a judgment pending appeal.

4 Pilar vs. Comelec [G.R. No. 115245. July 11, 1995]

Ponente: QUIASON, J.

FACTS:

On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993
and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition
in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was subsequently filed to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a “non-candidate,”
having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that “it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have
entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost” under Section 14 of R.A. 7166 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized National
and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew their candidacy for election.

HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

RATIO:

Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the
term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
Also, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that “[t]he filing or
withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.”
Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

5 Colgate-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-14787 January 28 1961]
Ponente: GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium
saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For
every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign
exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended,
commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it
had paid. The auditor of the Central Bank, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax
Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term “stabilizer
and flavors” mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products.
Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the present petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special
excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No. 601).

HELD:
YES. The decision under review was reversed.

RATIO:

General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term “stabilizer and flavors” as used in the law refers only to those materials
actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that “general
terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the
statute’s object and purpose.” The rule, however, is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration
belong to or fall under one specific class (ejusdem generis). In the case at bar, it is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is preceded by a number
of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the
same classification.

The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does
not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in
connection with other rules of construction.

6 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND VICTORIA AMANTE,
RESPONDENTS.
[PERALTA]
G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009

Facts:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14,
1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. No liquidation was made after almost two years and so on December 22, 1995, a demand letter was
issued by the City Auditor asking respondent to settle her unliquidated cash advance within 72 hours from receipt of the demand. Upon the
recommendation of the Commission on Audit (COA), the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas) resolved to file an Information
for Malversation of Public Funds. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) found probable cause to indict respondent Amante and thus on May 21,
2004, the Office of the Special Prosecutor(OSP) filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D.
No. 1445 (The Auditing Code of the Philippines).

Respondent Amante in her MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION dated November 18, 2004 stated that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of
salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases
where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A.
No. 6758.

The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against Amante for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however,
is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.

Issue/s:
Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Ruling:
The present case falls under P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4(a) of said law, the following offenses are specifically
enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the
Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch
occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial
governors, vice-governors, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city
department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of
the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their
office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of
the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The provision of the law
shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in
relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public
official or employee's office.

In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), public office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies
involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office.
Moreover, Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those
specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
The Petition was GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, case was
REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

7 ROLANDO N. CANET v. MAYOR JULIETA A. DECENA

[G.R. No. 155344. January 20, 2004]

Facts:
On July 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur, passed a resolution authorizing petitioner Rolando N. Canet to establish,
operate, and maintain a cockpit in the area.
Subsequently, the Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance regulating the operation of cockpits and other related game-fowl activities in the
Municipality of Bula but respondent Mayor Julieta A. Decena returned the same because it was noted that the Ordinance does not contain rules and
regulations on cockfighting and other related game fowl activities and a separability clause. The Sangguniang Bayan resolved to withdraw, set
aside, and shelf said ordinance.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed an application for a mayor’s permit to operate, establish and maintain a cockpit in Sitio Cabuya, San Roque, Bula,
Camarines Sur, which was denied on the grounds that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the authority to give licenses for the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits as well as the regulation of cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in
the Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, respondent cannot issue the said permit since there was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
authorizing the same.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Mayor with the Regional Trial Court for Mandamus and Damages with Application for Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction. The petition was granted but was later annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can be compelled to issue the necessary business permit to petitioner absent a
municipal ordinance which would empower her to do so.

Held:
No. Respondent cannot issue business permit to operate a cockpit to petitioner because the Municipal Ordinance supposed to support the same was
withdrawn by the Sanggunian Bayan. Invoking the Municipal Tax Ordinances, which generally provide for the issuance of a mayor’s permit for the
operation of businesses, is not allowed since they do not contain specific provisions prescribing the reasonable fees to be paid in the operation of
cockpits and other game fowl activities. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. In other words, the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expression unius est exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit
cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislative body would not have
made specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, or rewrite the law to conform to what they think
should be the law. Nor may they interpret into the law a requirement which the law does not prescribe. Where a statute contains no limitations in its
operation or scope, courts should not engraft any. And where a provision of law expressly limits its application to certain transactions, it cannot be
extended to other transactions by interpretation. To do any of such things would be to do violence to the language of the law and to invade the
legislative sphere.

8 MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,

CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE,
represented by its Municipal Mayor, SALVADOR PILLOS, and the COURT OF APPEALS
Case No.: G.R. No. 169435

Petitioner: MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,
CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA
Respondents: MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,
SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Statutory Rule:
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS (Express Mention and Implied Exclusion)
Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very
language of the statute cannot be placed therein.

Law in Dispute:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte,
are hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with
the following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder
road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on
the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of Biding.

FAC TS

1. The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc,
Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General
Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the
township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated September 30, 1916.
2. The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
3. Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall be derived from the listed barangays of
Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not
mentioned. Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a source of territory of Marcos.
4. There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The
problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos' boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the
Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary."
5. On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary, Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which
adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning was founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos
Norte-Apayao boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary, part of Nueva Era would
consequently be obtained by it.
6. Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,7 or only on March 8, 1993, when its
Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva
Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
7. Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. The SP, on the other hand, required Marcos to
submit its position paper.
8. On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era, by dismissing the case of Marcos. This decision was affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte.
9. In a decision dated June 6, 2005,the Court of Appeals partly reversed the Regional Trial Court decision with the following disposition:
10. “WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition treated as one for certiorari. The Decisions of both the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and
Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they made the eastern boundary of the municipality of Marcos co-
terminous with the eastern boundary of Dingras town, and another is rendered extending the said boundary of Marcos to the boundary line between
the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, but the same Decisions are AFFIRMED with respect to the denial of the claim of Marcos to the
detached northern portion of barangay Sto. Niño which should, as it is hereby ordered to, remain with the municipality of Nueva Era.”

ISSUE
Whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.

RULING
1. Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. To wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte,
are hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with
the following boundaries:
2. Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded.
3. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a
statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and
effect.49 This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind.
4. Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise
language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. The
rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
5. Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall
be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est, which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
6. Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for the
creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.
7. Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the
purpose and intent of the statute.
8. Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter still contends that said law included Nueva
Era. It alleges that based on the description of its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.
9. The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder
road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on
the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
10. Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary," a portion of Nueva Era formed part of
its territory because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its
eastern side to reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the middle portion of Nueva Era. Marcos further claims that
it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to its northern portion which, as a consequence, was isolated from the major part of
Nueva Era.
11. The Court cannot accept the contentions of Marcos. Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the
said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory. Considering
that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative
intent. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. We thus uphold the legislative intent to create
Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.
12. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.
9 Farolan vs. Court of Tax Appeals
GR No. 42204, January 21 1993, 217 SCRA 298

FACTS:

On January 30, 1972, the vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk" arrived at the Port of Manila carrying, among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to
Bagong Buhay Trading (Bagong Buhay).

Said importation was declared through a customs broker which was classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code at
35% ad valorem.

Since the customs examiner found the subject shipment reflective of the declaration, Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due which was paid
through the Bank of Asia.

Thereafter, the customs appraiser made a return of duty.

Acting on the strength of an information that the shipment consisted of "mosquito net" made of nylon, the Office of the Collector of Customs ordered
a re-examination of the shipment which revealed that the shipment consisted of 80 bales of screen net, each bale containing 20 rolls or a total of
1,600 rolls.

The value of the shipment was re-appraised.

Furthermore, the Collector of Customs determined the subject shipment as made of synthetic (polyethylene) woven fabric classifiable under Tariff
Heading No. 51.04-B at 100% ad valorem.

Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading was assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the shipment in question.

Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to quantity and value, the Collector of Customs forfeited the subject shipment in favor of the
government which was also affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs.

However, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissioner declaring that the latter erred in imputing fraud upon private
respondent because fraud is never presumed and thus concluded that the forfeiture of the articles in question was not in accordance with law.

As a consequence, several motions were filed and private respondent demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable.

HELD:

The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods.

Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the
government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state.

On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent," categorically applies.

As an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit.

Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation.

As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is definitely not a proprietary function.

Thus, private respondent's claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fail.

10 Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988

FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora (victim) died after being mortally hit by a gun fired by his classmate in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose Recoletos (CSJR).
Both the victim and the offender were graduating 17-year-old students. The crime happened 3 days before graduation ceremony. The student was
convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.

Additionally, the victim’s parents filed a civil action for damages under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code against the school, its principal, dean, physics
teacher, the offender, two other students, and their parents.

The respondent Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and absolved ALL defendants on the grounds that:

2180 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to CSJR because it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution.
The semester had already ended, thus the students were no longer in the custody of the school.
There was no clear identification of the fatal gun
The defendants exercised the necessary diligence in preventing injury.
ISSUES:
Is Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code applicable to establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades? – YES.
Were the students considered under the custody of the defendants at the time of the crime? – YES.
Are the defendants liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code? – NO.
RULING:
None of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by their students against the victim student.

RATIO:
Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic and non-academic.

The general rule is that all teachers shall be held liable for the acts of their students. The exception to the rule is where the school is technical in
nature, it is the head thereof who should be held responsible. There is no substantial distinction between the academic and non-academic schools in
so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. The reasons for disparity in liability of teachers and heads are no longer material at
present BUT Art. 2180 remains unchanged and must be interpreted according to its clear legislative intent until further amendment

The students are considered to be at the custody of the school authorities at the time of the crime.

Custody is not co-terminous with the semester. The student shall be considered to be in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under
the control and influence of the school and within its premises. As long as the student is in school fora legitimate student purpose, legitimate exercise
of student rights and privileges, the responsibility of the school authorities continues

Custody does not connote actual and physical control, but refers more to the influence on the child and the discipline instilled in him. Art. 2180 of the
New Civil Code directly imposes liability on the teacher or the head is technical school and not on the school itself. If any, the school may be held to
answer for acts of the teachers or heads and may be allowed to exculpate liability by proof of exercise of diligence The same provision treats parents
more favorably than teachers. Unlike parents who are only liable for children until they turn 18 years old, teachers are held answerable by law for
acts of students regardless of their age. Nevertheless, there is leniency in assessing liability of teachers especially in cases where students involved
are no longer minors

None of the defendants may be held liable for damages.

As to the principal and the dean, they only exercise general authority since they were not teachers-in-charge. The Dean of boys could have been
held liable in view of the undisputed evidence on his confiscation of an unlicensed gun from one of the students, which he returned without any
disciplinary measures. However, there’s no proof of the identity of the gun used against the victim.

As to the Physics teacher, his absence during the time of the crime is not considered negligence because he was not required to be in school at the
time. The Teacher-in-charge of the erring student was not identified.

As to the school, it may not be held liable under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code.

11 Pelizloy v. Benguet
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President, GREGORY K. LOY, Petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 183137, 10 April 2013.

LEONEN, J.:

Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort in Tuba, Benguet, which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function halls.

In 2005, the Provincial Board of Benguet approved its Revenue Code of 2005. Section 59, the tax ordinance levied a 10% amusement tax on gross
receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots."

Pelizloy's posits that amusement tax is an ultra vires act. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition before the Secretary of Justice. Upon the Secretary’s failure
to decide on the appeal within sixty days, Pelizloy filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before the RTC.

Pelizloy argued that the imposition was in violation of the limitation on the taxing powers of local government units under Section 133 (i) of the Local
Government Code, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the
levy of percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise
provided.

The Province of Benguet assailed the that the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 (a) of the LGC encompasses resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots since Article 131 (b) of the LGC defines "amusement" as "pleasurable diversion and entertainment
synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun."

RTC rendered a Decision assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction for lack of merit. Procedurally, the RTC ruled
that Declaratory Relief was a proper remedy. However, it gave credence to the Province of Benguet's assertion that resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are encompassed by the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 of the LGC.

ISSUE: W/N provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and
tourist spots for being "amusement places" under the LGC.

RULING: NO.
Amusement taxes are percentage taxes. However, provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a form of
percentage taxes. The levying of percentage taxes is prohibited "except as otherwise provided" by the LGC. Section 140 provides such exception.

Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement."

However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of
the LGC as being subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the determination of whether amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to these places
hinges on whether the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class
or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."

Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition: "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other
places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.

As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘show’ means "a spectacle or display of something, typically an impressive one"; while
‘performance’ means "an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other form of entertainment." As such, the ordinary definitions of the words
‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or
presenting) such that actions are manifested to, and (correspondingly) perceived by an audience.

Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where
one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances". While it is true that they may be venues where people are
visually engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances.

12 Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Troadio Tecson [G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990]
Ponente: CORTES, J.

FACTS:

The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) recommended that private
respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as
amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss. The Board opposed. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of
private respondent because he is a “subordinate” of former President Marcos. Respondent alleged that he is not one of the subordinates
contemplated in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his
legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony, business
associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent acted as a “subordinate” under E.O. No.1 and related executive orders.

HELD:

NO. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. TRO was made permanent.

RATIO:

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is – [w]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. The term “subordinate” as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one
who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.

The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent, without prejudice to his investigation and
prosecution by the appropriate prosecution agency.

13 Vera vs. Cuevas (1979)

G.R. Nos. 33693-94 | 1979-05-31

Subject: Section 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by implication; Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk (Rule on Ejusdem
Generis); Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement administrative laws command much respect and
weight; Violation of property rights and equal protection clause; CIR has no authority to investigate and prosecute violations of health laws

Facts:

The Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines (IEFMP) (private respondent) is a corporation organized for the principal
purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members,
i.e. Consolidated Philippines Inc. whose products are sold under the brand "Darigold;" General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;"
and Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby."
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an order requiring private respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk
products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with the explicit
warning that failure to comply with said order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order.

Hence , the private respondents filed an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte petition for preliminary injunction in relation to the enforcement of
Section 169 of the Tax Code against their filled milk products.

Section 169 of the Tax Code reads :

"Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. All condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has
been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the
language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or
with other equivalent words."

The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the CIR from requiring private respondents to print on the labels of their filled milk
products the above inscription

Meanwhile, Antonio de Joya and Sufronio Carrasco, officers of the Philippine Association of Nutrition filed a complaint against IEFMP with the Fair
Trade Board (FTB) for misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or misbranding. The complaint included the charge of omitting to state in their
labels any statement sufficient to identify their filled milk products as "imitation milk" or as an imitation of genuine cows milk, and omitting to mark the
immediate containers of their filled milk products with the words: "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or
with other equivalent words," as required under Section 169 of the Tax Code. The CIR filed an action for prohibition and injunction to restrain the FTB
from acting on the complaint. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

The two actions (Declaratory relief and the Prohibition/Injunction petition) were joined. The court rendered its decision declaring that Section 169 of
the Tax Code has been repealed by implication, and that the Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to enforce the same. Further, the proper
authority to promote the health of infants is the Food and Drug Administration, the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice, as provided for in
RA 3720, not the CIR.

Held:

Section 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by implication

1. Section 169 was enacted in 1939, together with Section 141 (which imposed a specific tax on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalized
the sale of skimmed milk without payment of the specific tax and without the legend required by Section 169). However, Section 141 was expressly
repealed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 344, and Section 177, by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 463. By the express repeal of Sections 141 and
177, Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction.

Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk (Rule on Ejusdem Generis)

2. The use of the specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would
restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the
general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.

3. Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the "Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules and Regulations of the Board of Food
Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from which the fatty part has been removed. Filled milk, on the other hand, is any milk, whether or
not condensed, evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried, dessicated, to which has been added or which has been blended or compounded with
any fat or oil other than milk fat, so that the resulting product is an imitation or semblance of milk cream or skim milk. The difference, therefore,
between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is
substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and
filled milk.

Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement administrative laws command much respect and weight

4. The Board of Food Inspection way back in 1961 rendered an opinion that filled milk does not come within the purview of Section 169, it being a
product distinct from those specified in the said Section since the removed fat portion of the milk has been replaced with coconut oil and Vitamins A
and D as fortifying substances. This opinion bolsters the Court's stand as to its interpretation of the scope of Section 169. Opinions and rulings of
officials of the government called upon to execute or implement administrative laws command much respect and weight. (Asturias Sugar Central Inc.
vs. Commissioner of Customs)

Violation of property rights and equal protection clause

5. There seem to be no dispute that filled milk is suitable for feeding infants of all ages. Being so, the declaration required by Section 169 of the Tax
Code that filled milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age would, in effect, constitute a deprivation of property without
due process of law.

6. Section 169 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk product and not as against manufacturers, distributors or
sellers of condensed skimmed milk in which the fatty part has been removed and substituted with vegetable or corn oil. The enforcement of Section
169 against the private respondents only but not against other persons similarly situated as the private respondents amounts to an unconstitutional
denial of the equal protection of the laws, for the law, if not equally enforced, would similarly offend against the Constitution.

CIR has no authority to investigate and prosecute violations of health laws

7. With the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax Code, Section 169 has lost its tax purpose. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose,
petitioner Commissioner (CIR) necessarily lost his authority to enforce the same. This was so held by his predecessor immediately after Sections
141 and 177 were repealed in General Circular No. V-85.

8. The CIR's contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce Section 169 by virtue of Section 3 of the Tax Code which provides that the Bureau of
Internal Revenue shall also "give effect to and administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by this Code or other laws" is untenable.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police power only when necessary in the enforcement of its principal powers and duties consisting of the
"collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees and charges, and the enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected therewith."
The enforcement of Section 169 entails the promotion of the health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax purpose. This is the exclusive
function of the Food and Drug Administration of the Department of Health as provided for in Republic Act No. 3720.

9. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board, are without jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding,
mislabeling and/or misleading advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited is vested upon the Board of Food and Drug
Inspection and the Food and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice, also intervening in case criminal
prosecution has to be instituted. To hold that the petitioners have also jurisdiction as would be the result were their instant petition granted, would
only cause overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce confusion and conflict of official action which is neither practical nor desirable.

14 Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier et. al. [G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993]
Ponente: QUIASON, J.

FACTS:

The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda
et.al. The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the
private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required respondent
Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is
only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a
government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the
instant case”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

HELD:

YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.

RATIO:

When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred
to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word “suspension” in said provision referred to penalties in administrative
cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other
words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific
by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative
charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth,
as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

15 Fule vs. CA [G.R. No. L-79094. June 22, 1988]

Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the
basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. At the
hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant
waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted
petitioner-appellant.

On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-
appellant contending that the Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the
offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August
8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. In Sec.4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in
evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]

Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts
inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:

YES. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate
Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.

RATIO:

By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory
while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term “shall” further emphasizes its
mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July
21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be
strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).

16 Bersabal vs. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador [G.R. No. L-35910. July 21, 1978]
Ponente: MAKASIAR, J.

FACTS:

[P]etitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge and to compel said respondent Judge to decide petitioner’s perfected
appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already submitted
by the petitioner and respondents. The second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows:

Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts:
Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested … . (Emphasis supplied).

A decision was rendered by said Court which decision was appealed by the petitioner to the respondent Court. The respondent Judge dismissed
petition on August 4, 1971 upon failure of defendant–appellant to prosecute her appeal, with costs against her. Petitioner filed her memorandum. The
respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration on October 30, 1971. Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second motion for
reconsideration which was likewise denied by the respondent court on March 15, 1972.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere
failure of an appellant to submit on time the memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss
the appeal on the ground of failure to Prosecute.

HELD:

NO. The challenged orders of Respondent Judge dated August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971, and March 15, 1972 are set aside as null and void.

RATIO:

The above cited provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is
optional on the part of the parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as
a logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the submission of said
memorandum the appellant so chooses not to submit the memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the case
on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts. In other words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss
the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Court’s mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis
of the available evidence and records transmitted to it.

As a general rule, the word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word “shall” is imperative,
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that
the Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis of
the latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on request.

17 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 117188. August 07, 1997]
Ponente: ROMERO, J.

FACTS:

[T]his is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Home Insurance and Guaranty
Corporation (HIGC). This quasi-judicial body recognized Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (LGVHA) as the sole homeowners’
association in Loyola Grand Villas, a duly registered subdivision in Quezon City and Marikina City that was owned and developed by Solid Homes,
Inc. For unknown reasons, however, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws. LGVHAI was informed by HIGC that they had been automatically
dissolved. LGVHAI lodged a complaint with the HIGC. They questioned the revocation of LGVHAI’s certificate of registration without due notice and
hearing and concomitantly prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of registration of the North and South Associations by reason of the earlier
issuance of a certificate of registration in favor of LGVHAI. After due notice and hearing, private respondents obtained a favorable ruling from HIGC
recognizing them as the duly registered and existing homeowners association for Loyola Grand Villas homeowners and declaring the Certificates of
Registration of Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (North) Association, Inc. and Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. as hereby
revoked or cancelled.

The South Association appealed to the Appeals Board of the HIGC but was dismissed for lack of merit. Rebuffed, the South Association in turn
appealed to the Court of Appeals, but it simply reiterated HIGC’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation, as mandated by Section 46 of the
Corporation Code, result in its automatic dissolution.

HELD:

NO. Petition DENIED. Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

[U]nder the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), Section 46 of the
Corporation Code reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word “must” in the first sentence thereof.
Note should be taken of the second paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to incorporation. This provision in the same
section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement of filing the by-laws “within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of
the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.” It necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within
that period does not imply the “demise” of the corporation. By-laws may be necessary for the “government” of the corporation but these are
subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and related statutes.

[I]f the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object reveals that the legislature intended to use the
words “shall” and “must” to be directory, they should be given that meaning.

18 Gachon vs. Devera, Jr. (1997)

G.R. No. 116695 | 1997-06-20

Subject: Direct petition to the Supreme Court from decision of the RTC is allowed via petition for review under Rule 45 involving pure question of law;
Period to file answer under the Rules on Summary Procedure is construed as mandatory; Forum shopping does not arise between an action to quiet
title and an ejectment suit

Facts:

A complaint for forcible entry was filed by Susana Guevara against Patricio Guevara, Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the Municipal Trial
Court for Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. Summons was served on defendants on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the
reglementary period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him.

On September 4, 1993, Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara (petitioners) filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer.
On September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their receipt of the summons, petitioners submitted an urgent motion praying for the admission of
their answer, which was attached thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended answer.

The MTCC denied the motions and considered the case submitted for resolution. Thereafter, the MTCC issued a decision resolving the complaint for
forcible entry in favor of Susana Guevara.

Instead of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, praying mainly
that the MTCC be ordered to admit the amended answer and to conduct further proceedings in the civil case for forcible entry.

The RTC dismissed the petition. It ruled that, under the the Rule on Summary Procedure (governing forcible entry actions), the ten-day-period to file
an answer reckoned from the date of the receipt of the summons is mandatory and no reason of any kind is acceptable to operate as an excuse.

Hence, this petition directly filed before this Court to assail the RTC Decision. Petitioners argue that the "technical rules of procedure must yield to
the higher interest of justice." Petitioners explain that they filed the motion for extension of time to file an answer, a prohibited pleading under the
Rule on Summary Procedure, because of "oversight. Furthermore, petitioners contend that "no prejudice to private respondent has been claimed or
alleged by reason of the delay" in filing an answer.

The main issues for resolution are (a) whether the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of pleadings are to be applied
strictly or liberally, and (b) What is the legal effect of a belated answer under the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Held:

Direct petition to the Supreme Court from decision of the RTC is allowed via petition for review under Rule 45 involving pure question of law

Petitioners filed directly before this Court a petition for review assailing the RTC Decision. This remedy is allowed under paragraph 2 of Circular 2-90,
which provides in part that; “ ... judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court”
Petitioners ask the Court to interpret a provision of the Rule on Summary Procedure. This is a pure question of law that may be properly raised in
this petition for review.

Period to file answer under the Rules on Summary Procedure is construed as mandatory

1. The Rule on Summary Procedure provides:

"Section 5. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on
the plaintiff . . .

2. The word "shall" ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a statute. This, however, is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction. The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and the
consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other.

3. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.

4. The Rule on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases." For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistent with this
reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule which allows the trial court to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an
answer within the reglementary period.

5. Further, speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy, and this rule should equally apply with full force in forcible entry
cases where the possession of the premises at the start is already illegal.

6. From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of the word "shall" in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscores the mandatory character of the
challenged provisions. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its
objective of expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, as petitioners suggest, is to put premium on dilatory maneuvers - the
very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. In this light, petitioners' invocation of the general principle in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is
misplaced.

7. “Oversight," which petitioners cite as the reason for their filing a motion for extension of time to file an answer, is not a justification. Oversight, at
best, implies negligence; at worst, ignorance. The negligence displayed by petitioners is clearly inexcusable; ignorance of so basic a rule, on the
other hand, can never be condoned. In either case, the directory application of the questioned provision is not warranted.

8. In Rosales vs. Court of Appeals, the defendant, instead of filing an answer, filed within the reglementary period a pleading labeled as a motion to
dismiss. The Court applied the Rule on Summary Procedure liberally in treating the motion to dismiss as an answer, since the grounds involved in
the motion also qualify as defenses proper in an answer. Petitioners cannot rely on the said case as it did not involve the question of extension in the
period for filing pleadings under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

9. In Co Keng Kian vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court allowed the notice to vacate, served upon the tenant, by registered mail instead of
personal service as required by the Rules of Court. In this case, there was substantial compliance with the law, something that cannot be said of
herein petitioners.

Forum shopping does not arise between an action to quiet title and an ejectment suit

10. Private respondent assails petitioners for engaging in forum-shopping by pursuing the present ejectment suit, notwithstanding the pendency of
an action for quieting of title involving the same property and parties.

11. For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances; and the actions must raise
identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.

12. An action for quieting of title and partition has a different cause of action than that in an ejectment suit. Ownership of a certain portion of the
property which is determined in a case of partition does not necessarily mean that the successful litigant has the right to possess the property
adjudged in his favor. In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership set forth by any of the party litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession
even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party's possession, provided that he has in his favor priority of time
which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. It has even been ruled that the institution of a separate action for quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating the execution of
the summary remedy of ejectment.