Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
NMCC-201
With
Criminal Appeal No. …/2019
Samar…………………………………………………………….......……Appellant
v.
State of Indiana…………………………..………………………………..Respondent
INDEX
CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................. 1
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................................ 3
STATUTES ........................................................................................................................................ 3
CASES................................................................................................................................................ 3
CONVENTIONS ............................................................................................................................... 3
BOOKS .............................................................................................................................................. 4
LEXICONS........................................................................................................................................ 4
LEGAL DATABASES...................................................................................................................... 5
ARTICLES REFFERED.................................................................................................................. 5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................................... 6
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS ........................................................................................................................ 7
STATEMENT OF ISSUES .................................................................................................................. 9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................................ 10
BODY OF ARGUMENTS ................................................................................................................... 1
1 THAT THE APPEAL FILED BY SAMAR IS MAINTAINABLE. ...................................................... 1
1.1 The Matter Involves Question Of Law Of General Public Importance. ............................ 1
1.2 The Matter Involves Substantial Question Of Law ............................................................. 1
2 THAT THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF INDIANA. ..... 2
2.1 Doctrine Of Reasonable Classification Under Article 14 Is Violated ........................... 3
2.2 The Act Is In Contravention To The Article 15(3) Of The Constitution Of Indiana........ 4
2.3 The Test Of Procedural Fairness Under Article 21 Is Violated .......................................... 4
2.4 Trial Of Juveniles As Adults Is In Contravention Of International Instruments To
Which Indiana Is A Signatory. .................................................................................................... 5
3. THAT THE DECISION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD TO TRY AARYAN, SUBHASH AND
RATAN AS ADULTS IS NOT VALID. ................................................................................................... 7
3.1 The Ossification Test Is Uncertain And Inaccurate....................................................... 7
3.2 Other Documents Can Be Relied Upon Before Opting For The Ossification Test Or
Medical Examination Under The Indiana Evidence Act........................................................... 8
3.3 The Decision Of The JJ Board Is Influenced By Subsequent Public Rage ........................ 9
4 . THAT THE HIGH COURT HAS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE SESSIONS
COURT .............................................................................................................................................. 10
4.1. The Circumstantial Evidence Is Not Conclusive In Nature ............................................. 10
4.2. The Last Seen Of The Deceased Does Not Corroborate With The Circumstantial
Evidence. ...................................................................................................................................... 10
4.3. There Exists no Linkage Between The Chain Of Events.................................................. 11
PRAYER .............................................................................................................................................. 13
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
1. & And
4. Art. Article
5. BG Bachcha Gang
6. CRC Convention
on the Rights
of the Child
7. Edn. Edition
8. FIR First
Information
Report
9. HC High Court
17. ¶ Paragraph
28. v. Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
CASES
Haryana State Industrial Corp. v. Cork Mfg. Co., (2007) 8 SCC 359.
Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169.
C.C.E v. Standard Motor Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298
Sir Chunilal Mehta and Sons. Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
(1962) AIR 1314.
Sripur Paper Mills v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax (1970) AIR1520.
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75
M.G. Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 260 at pp 264
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 4 SCC 34
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR SC 597
Subramanian Swamy v. Raju, (2014) 8 SCC 390.
Salil Bali v Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705.
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207.
Mukarrab vs. State of U.P. (30.11.2016 - SC) : MANU/SC/1550/2016.
Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, (1988) Supp SCC 604
Babloo Parsi v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2008) 13 SCC 133.
Abuzar Hossain alias Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489.
Amit Singh v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 13 SCC 744.
S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1996) 4 SCC 596.
State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114.
Nizam and Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan (04.09.2015 - SC) : MANU/SC/0964/2015
Ashok Bairagya v. State of West Bengal, 1994 SCC Cal 186
CONVENTIONS
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice
(Beijing Rules)
BOOKS
LEXICONS
LEGAL DATABASES
SCC ONLINE
MANUPATRA
ARTICLES REFFERED
DR. BHUPENDER KUMAR, Juvenile Justice Act, 2015; Whether reforms really needed?
MADHAV CHANDAVARKAR, Juvnenile Justice Act, 2015 is flawed.
Some Aspects of Juvenile Justice Act, Chandigarh Lawyers
ELIZABETH CAUFFMAN & LAURENCE STEINBERG, “(Im)maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults,”Behav. Sci. Law
18: 741 at 742-743 (2000).
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, “Adolescent Development and the
Regulation of Youth Crime”, The Future of Children, Vol. 18 No. 2, FALL 2008, p.15
at 24-25.
RUBEN C. GUR, American Bar Association, DECLARATION OF RUBEN C. GUR, Ph.D.
15 (2016).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Appellant/Petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of the Honourable Supreme Court of
Indiana under Articles 136 and 139A of the Constitution of Indiana.
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
I
----------------------------BACKDROP OF THE CASE--------------------------
1. Samar, Aaryan, Subhash and Ratan are residents of the Munga district of South Indiana
whose laws are in pari materia with the laws of India. Samar and Subhash have never
known their fathers. Aaryan comes from an abusive household and Ratan is an orphan.
They became friends in their early teens by regularly meeting in the playground.
2. In 2015, by the time they were 14, they gained notoriety as the “Bachcha Gang”1 who
were engaged in several petty offences such as shop lifting, pick-pocketing, etc. They
were caught a few times but never arrested owing to their age, but had their names
mentioned in a ‘roster of petty thieves’ maintained by the Kalaghat police station in
Munga.
3. In early 2016, Sam, a 12 year old boy befriended and joined the BG. He stopped going
to school and was involved in the wrongful activities of the BG. Sometimes he used to
steal money from his mother’s purse to fund the four boys. They also made him carry
strange looking paper bags in his school bag.
4. By June 2016, realising the full extent of the gang’s criminal activities he began
distancing himself from them and began focusing on school activities. By August 2016,
Sam rarely saw the BG. Samar told before his friends to teach him a lesson.
II
---------------------------THE GRUESOME MURDER OF SAM-------------------------------
5. On the night of 5th Jan. 2017, at around 7 PM, the BG met Sam at Kila tea stall and later
headed towards the woods on the outskirts of Munga.
6. On the morning of 6th, a missing report was lodged by Sam’s parents at the Kalaghat
police station.
7. A manhunt followed and after two days the body of Sam was recovered from the woods
surrounding Munga.
8. Marks of bruises discovered on the body were significatory of struggles of defence by
the deceased at the time of his murder. The entire face was badly disfigured.
9. The body was identified by clothes and a school ID in the pant pocket. A stone with
blood and tissue matching Sam was recovered by the Forensic experts at the crime
scene.
III
-------------------------------THE AUTOPSY REPORT----------------------------------
10. The autopsy report revealed the cause of the death to be a severe injury to the head,
primarily the result of blunt force trauma caused by repeated beating with a hard blunt
object on the skull as well as internal haemorrhage and profuse blood loss.
1
Hereinafter, “BG”.
IV
-------------------------------SUBSEQUENT EVENTS-----------------------------------
11. The brutal murder instigated public outrage demanding instantaneous arrest of culprits
and the same was immediately picked up by the media creating mass hysteria.
Unfortunately, owing to the paucity of sufficient evidences, no suspects were arrested
and the matter cooled down.
12. On June 21st, 2017, Samar was arrested on charge of robbery.
13. During a search that followed, a notebook and few photographs belonging to Sam were
recovered from his residence.
14. He, being a prime suspect in the case, was subjected to a hard line of questioning by
the police on the grounds of the abovementioned recovery.
15. All the four (Samar, Aryan, Subhash and Ratan) were arrested and booked for murder.
V
----------------DECISION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD-----------------
16. The documents revealed that on the date of murder Samar was18 years 12 days, Aaryan
was 17 years 320 days, Subhash was 17 years 5 days and Ratan was 16 years 200 days
old. But their medical reports showed that they were all over the age of 20 on the date
of arrest.
17. In accordance with the JJ Act, 2014, Aaryan, Subhash and Ratan were sent before the
JJ Board which, with the help of eminent psychologists and psychiatrists determined
that the boys were capable of being tried as adults and accordingly committed the matter
to the Sessions Court at Munga since no special Children’s Court had been established.
VI
-------VERDICT GIVEN BY THE SESSIONS COURT AND THE HIGH COURT-------
18. Based on the evidences before it, the Court of Session having found all the three boys
(Aaryan, Subhash and Ratan) guilty of murder of Sam, sentenced them to 8 years of
rigorous imprisonment each.
19. Samar, on the other hand was tried as an adult by the Session Court since he was above
the age of 18 on the date of murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
20. He subsequently filed an appeal in HC which upheld the decision of the Sessions Court.
VII
-------------APPEAL AND PETITION FILED IN THE SUPREME COURT---------------
21. Samar filed an appeal in the SC.
22. Immediately thereafter, a PIL was also filed by an NGO named PEPC before the HC
of South Indiana challenging the JJ Act and the subjective and biased committal
proceedings of the boys.
23. The SC , suo moto transferred the writ to itself and clubbed the same with the appeal
pled by Samar.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I
WHETHER THE APPEAL FILED BY SAMAR AND THE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE THIS HON’BLE
COURT IS MAINTAINABLE.
ISSUE II
WHETHER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT, 2014 IS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF INDIANA.
ISSUE III
WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD TO TRY AARYAN, SUBHASH, AND
RATAN AS ADULTS IS VALID.
ISSUE IV
WHETHER THE HIGH COURT HAS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE SESSIONS
COURT.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE APPEAL FILED BY SAMAR AND THE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE
THIS HON’BLE COURT IS MAINTAINABLE.
CONTENTION 1. THAT THE APPEAL FILED BY SAMAR BEFORE THE HON’BLE SC IS
MAINTAINABLE.
It is humbly submitted that the appeal filed by Samar before the Hon’ble SC is maintainable as
the matter involves a substantial question of law of general public importance and grave
injustice has been done by convicting Samar u/s 302 of IPC. The arbitrary judgment of the HC
of South Indiana upholding the decision of the Sessions Court of Munga has resulted in
miscarriage of justice as there were lacunae of evidences in support of the findings of the
facts, thus shocking the conscience of the Court.
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT,
2014 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF
INDIANA.
CONTENTION 2. THAT THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN)
ACT, 2014 IS UNCONSITUTIONAL AND VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF
INDIANA.
It is humbly submitted that all international instruments for children’s rights vouch for the need
to treat juveniles under a criminal system separate from that of adults. The UN Convention on
the Rights of Children, the Beijing Rules and the Havana Rules, all require the best interest of
the child to be given greatest importance with the aim to rehabilitate, rather than punish them.
The Constitution through Article 14, requires that juveniles and adults, who form separate
classes, not be held culpable equally. Article 21 protects them from procedural arbitrariness
inherent in the preliminary assessment, which presumes guilt on the child’s part before trial in
a court.
ISSUE III: WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD TO TRY AARYAN,
SUBHASH, AND RATAN AS ADULTS IS VALID.
CONTENTION III: THAT THE DECISION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD TO TRY AARYAN,
SUBHASH AND RATAN AS ADULTS IS NOT VALID.
It is humbly submitted that the decision of the Juvenile Justice Board to try Aaryan, Subhash
and Ratan as adults is subjective and biased. The ossification test does not yield absolute result,
there is always a scope of error and so the courts have taken judicial notice of this fact. In the
absence of birth matriculation certificate, in order to record a finding in respect of age of a
person the JJB is required to obtain the opinion of a duly constituted medical board. It is evident
from the rule that although the Board is bound to obtain the opinion of the medical board but
the opinion per se is not a conclusive proof of age of the accused.
It is also submitted that the decision of the JJB was due to the public outrage.
ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE HIGH COURT HAS ERED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
SESSIONS COURT.
CONTENTION IV: THAT THE HIGH COURT HAS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
SESSIONS COURT.
It is humbly submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the Sessions Court is bad in law
and is thus not sustainable. It is also contended that the case based on circumstantial evidence
is vitiated by serious errors. The last seen theory is insupported by circumstantial evidence and
there exists no link between chain of events. And on that account miscarriage of justice has
been occasioned by upholding the order of Sessions court by the HC.
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE APPEAL FILED BY SAMAR AND THE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE
THIS HON’BLE COURT IS MAINTAINABLE.
1. It is humbly submitted that the Special Leave Petition against the judgment of
Hon’ble High Court is maintainable under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
It is contended that the jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 136 can always
be invoked when a question of law of general public importance arises and even
question of fact can also be a subject matter of judicial review under Art.136.
2. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the jurisdiction conferred
under Art. 136 on the SC is corrective one and not a restrictive one 2 and can be
invoked when a question of law of general public importance arises,3 by filing
Special Leave Petition.
3. Art. 136 provides residuary power to the SC to do justice where the court is satisfied
that injustice has been done.4
4. In the instant matter, the accused has been charged for murder for which there is no
direct evidence in support and that the provisions of the new Act 5 are severely
affecting the provisions of the Constitution of Indiana which is a matter of general
public importance and therefore, calls for intervention by the SC.
5. It is humbly submitted by the petitioner before this Hon’ble Court that, the matter
involves substantial question of law as it concerns the violation of the provisions of
the Constitution of Indiana by the newly enacted JJ Act, 2014 and gross injustice
has been meted out by the decision of the HC of South Indiana which arbitrarily
upheld the decision of the Sessions Court.
2
Haryana State Industrial Corp. v. Cork Mfg. Co., (2007) 8 SCC 359.
3
Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169.
4
C.C.E v. Standard Motor Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298; See also, 2 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
INDIA, 845 (4th Edn., 2010).
5
JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT, 2014.
6. A Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court, while explaining the import of the
“substantial question of law” expression, observed that:
“The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is
substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance
or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so
whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by
this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from
difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views6.”
7. It is, plain that when the Supreme Court reaches the conclusion that a person has
been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or tribunal has not given a fair deal to a
litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the finality of finding of facts, or
otherwise can stand in the way of the exercise of this power.7
8. It is submitted that, the present case involves a matter of general public importance
as it directly and substantially convicts an innocent for a heinous crime and it
directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties as the order is erroneous
and prejudicial to the interest of the petitioners. Hence, it is humbly submitted
before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana that the matter involves a substantial
question of law and hence is entitled to be maintainable.
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT,
2014 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF
INDIANA.
9. It is respectfully submitted that the impugned Act seeks to punish the child in
conflict with law for the failure of the society at large in providing the child with
adequate care and protection. It is submitted that the impugned Act seeks to create
a fictional classification between the children belonging to age group of 16-18 years
on the basis of degree of crime “allegedly” committed by them.
10. The class distinction so made and the classification done is merely on the basis of
the “heinousness” which is determined on the basis of the scale of punishment. It is
6
Sir Chunilal Mehta and Sons. Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1962) AIR 1314.
7
Sripur Paper Mills v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax (1970) AIR1520.
also contended that this ambit is arbitrary and inconsistent with Art.14 of the
Constitution.8 It also refrains the juvenile to use its right as provided.
11. It is submitted that as per the scheme of the amendment act the Juvenile Justice
Board under section 159 of the Act will have an arbitrary power to conduct a
preliminary inquiry to determine whether a juvenile offender is to be sent for
rehabilitation or be tried as an adult. In order to be reasonable, the classification
should be based on intelligible differentia and the differentia must have a rational
or reasonable nexus10 with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.11 The
object12 of the JJ Act gives primary importance to the best interest of the child, and
aims at the rehabilitation of a child, rather than retribution. It is submitted that the
impugned Act has been brought in place in a knee jerk manner and without keeping
in mind the interest of the children.
12. The NCRB data relied upon by the Parliament shows a minute increase of 0.9% in
juvenile crime since 2003. It is pertinent to mention herein that the abovementioned
data merely reflects the number of FIR registered and not the conviction. Further,
for heinous offences like rape, the data shows that in year 2013 out of total rape
cases registered only 5% of the rape crimes were allegedly committed by children
belonging to the age group of 16-18.13
13. The foundation of the Transfer System under the JJ Act, 2014 is that children “in
conflict with the law” can be discriminated against based on their age and the nature
of the offence. In doing so, these system groups together children alleged or found
to be in conflict with the law and adult accused persons or adult offenders as one
class. Whereas, research14 in developmental psychology explains the difference in
cognitive capacity and psychosocial maturity between children including
adolescents and adults that influence their decision-making in antisocial
situations.15
8
Id.
9
JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION) ACT. 2014, Section 15 – Preliminary assessment into heinous
offences by Board.
10
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873.
11
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75.
12
JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION) ACT, 2014, Statement Of Objects.
13
Crime in India - 2013, NATIONAL CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, 2014.
14
RUBEN C. GUR, American Bar Association, DECLARATION OF RUBEN C. GUR, Ph.D. 15 (2016).
15
ELIZABETH CAUFFMAN & LAURENCE STEINBERG, “(Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why
Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults,”Behav. Sci. Law 18: 741 at 742-743 (2000).
14. Equality is a basic feature of the constitution and any treatment of equals unequally
or unequals as equals will be violation of the basic structure of the constitution.16
Article 14 thus, means that ‘equals should be treated alike’; it does not mean that
‘unequals ought to be treated equally.’ ... where persons or groups of persons are
not situated equally, to treat them as equals would itself be violative of Article 14
as this would itself result in inequality. As all the persons are not equal by nature,
or circumstances, the varying needs of different classes or sections of people require
differential treatment. This leads to classification among different groups of persons
and differentiation between such classes.17
2.2 The Act Is In Contravention To The Article 15(3) Of The Constitution Of Indiana
15. It is submitted that the impugned Act is in violation of Article 15(3) of the
Constitution of Indiana.18 It is submitted that the stated object of the Act is for the
welfare of children, however, the amendment passed makes the legislation
draconian and against the idea of welfare of children. There is no need to subject
the children to different or adult judicial system as it will go against 15(3) of the
Constitution of Indiana.
16. It is submitted that the idea behind treating a certain age group as children is to
protect the most vulnerable section of the society. In case a crime is committed by
the children, the endeavour of the state should be reformative rather than punitive
or worse retributive. The law of juvenile justice stands on the principles of
restorative and reformative justice and any digression from the same would be
detrimental to the right of the children and in contravention with the principle as
enunciated under Article 15(3) of the Constitution of Indiana.
17. The arbitrary and irrational procedure provided under the Act contravenes the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court of India has categorically held that procedural fairness is an integral part of
due process.19 The Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India20 held that:
16
M.G. Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 260 at pp 264.
17
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 4 SCC 34.
18
CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA, Article 15(3), - Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any
special provision for women and children.
19
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR SC 597.
20
1978 AIR SC 597.
“The mere prescription of some kind of procedure cannot even meet the mandate
of Article 21. The procedure prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable,
not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary.”
18. Transfer system requires JJBs to conduct a preliminary inquiry of the mental
capacity of the child,21 for which they can take the assistance of experienced
psychologists, psycho-social workers and other experts. It assumes that an accurate
assessment of mental capacity/maturity for the purpose of transfer is possible. It is
humbly contended that this is in fact not true. Neither does it lay a uniform
procedure to ascertain mental maturity, nor can a uniform procedure accurately
assess it, since it is reiterated by experts that it is not possible to distinguish incipient
psychopaths from youths whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.22 Evaluation
of mental capacity is a complex process which cannot be done accurately by the
JJB even with the help of experienced psychologists. Such assessments will be
fraught with errors and arbitrariness and will allow inherent biases to determine
which child is transferred to an adult court, leading to a travesty of justice.
19. The preliminary assessment stands in complete contradiction to the Supreme Court
mandate by requiring the JJB to arbitrarily inquire into the culpability prior to even
an establishment of guilt. Neither a preliminary inquiry nor a final inquiry can be
the basis for depriving a person of his or her rights under the juvenile justice system
as both will fail the tests of procedural fairness under the Indianan Constitution.
20. From the very inception, the 2000 amendment made in the act was for the welfare
of the child which has been violated now and the object of rehabilitation has
deviated.
21. The counsel humbly submits that the impugned amendment is against the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter as UNCRC) which is a
comprehensive and internationally binding agreement on the rights of children. It
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989. The definition of
child as envisaged in Article-1 states:
“For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being
below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child,
majority is attained earlier.”
22. The object clause of the present amendment states thus:
21
JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT, 2014, § 16(1), (2015).
22
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, “Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth
Crime”, The Future of Children, Vol. 18 No. 2, FALL 2008, p.15 at 24-25.
“And whereas, the Government of India has acceded on the 11th December, 1992
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly of
United Nations which has prescribed a set of standards to be adhered to by all State
parties in securing the best interest of child.”
23. The counsel submits that the mention of UNCRC in the objective of the impugned
amendment is a mere eye wash as the amendment seeks to erode the very definition
of child as envisaged in the UNCRC. The counsel further submits that section 1623
of the Act of 2000 had a specific provision to deal with children between 16-18
years who had committed serious offences which was well within the existing
juvenile system and that there was no need to push juvenile offenders into adult
criminal system.
24. The counsel submits that our country accepts the international convention of
keeping 18 years as the age of the child and the same is reflected in various laws
where the age of child was kept at 18 years such as Contract Act, Motor Vehicles
Act, etc. In those legal systems recognizing the concept of the age of criminal
responsibility for juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low
an age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual
maturity.24
25. The age of eighteen has been fixed on account of the understanding of experts in
child psychology and behavioural patterns that till such an age the children in
conflict with law could still be redeemed and restored to mainstream society, instead
of becoming hardened criminals in future. There are, of course, exceptions where a
child in the age group of sixteen to eighteen may have developed criminal
propensities, which would make it virtually impossible for him/her to be re-
integrated into mainstream society, but such examples are not of such proportions
as to warrant any change in thinking, since it is probably better to try and re-
integrate children with criminal propensities into mainstream society, rather than to
allow them to develop into hardened criminals, which does not augur well for the
future25.
26. Further, the Child shall be forced to face trial which will have negative effect on the
psychology of the child. Under the previous law, if a child, in conflict with law,
between the ages of 16-18 years was found to have committed an offence by the
Juvenile Justice Board, there was a range of rehabilitative dispositions that could be
passed by the Juvenile Justice Board. These rehabilitative dispositions included
admonition, community service, imposition of a fine, probation, group counselling
and an extreme measure of deprivation of liberty by way of placement of the child
in a special home for three years.
23
JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT. (2000) Section 16 - Order that may not be passed against juvenile.
24
Subramanian Swamy v. Raju, (2014) 8 SCC 390.
25
Salil Bali v Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705.
27. In a landmark case, in his minority judgement held that, while dealing with the
provision of the Constitution, the court should adopt such a construction as would,
if possible not bring it in conflict with the provisions of international law.26
28. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990 read with the
concluding Resolution of the Committee on Child Rights (constituted under the UN
Convention) of the year 2000 and the General Resolution of the year 2007 clearly
contemplate the MACR as 18 years and mandates member States to act accordingly.
The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (“the
Beijing Rules”) were adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in
1985. Rule 2.2(a) defines a juvenile as a child or young person who, under the
respective legal system, may be dealt with for an offence differently than an adult.
Rule 4.1 set out below mandates Member States to refrain from fixing a minimum
age of criminal responsibility that is too low, bearing in mind the facts of emotional,
mental and intellectual maturity.
29. Lastly, the counsel herein submits that the brain of the teenager is not completely
developed and he/she is incapable of fully understanding the consequences of his
actions or omissions. Furthermore, it is submitted before this Hon’ble court that in
the present case the act in question is in contravention with the Constitutional
provisions of the Constitution of Indiana as well as it is also not in consonance with
the principles of the UNCRC.
ISSUE III: WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD TO TRY AARYAN,
SUBHASH, AND RATAN AS ADULTS IS VALID.
31. It is submitted that the ossification test does not yield absolute result, there is always
a scope of error and so the courts have taken judicial notice of this fact and have
always held that the evidence afforded by radiological examinations is no doubt a
useful guiding factor for determining the age of a person but the evidence is not of
26
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207.
32. The psychological and psychiatric screening and assessment to which the three
accused were subjected after a period of about six months from the date of the
commission of the alleged crime stands nugatory and is thus insignificant to the
decision of the JJB. The biological research evidences ascertain the fact that
psychological as well as cognitive development undergoes extensive remodelling
and growth during the adolescent period that is 10 to 19 years. Also, the state of
mind of an individual at the time of the commission of crime could not be accurately
and absolutely determined after an interval of 6 months.
33. Therefore, placing reliance upon the biological aspects of an individual’s mental
aspect it is humbly submitted that since the psychiatric test of the three accused
were not conducted forthwith but after an interval of 6 months from the date of the
murder, the fact that “they were well aware of their actions”28is not conclusive of
their alleged crime.
3.2 Other Documents Can Be Relied Upon Before Opting For The Ossification Test
Or Medical Examination Under The Indiana Evidence Act.
27
Mukarrab vs. State of U.P. (30.11.2016 - SC) : MANU/SC/1550/2016.
28
Moot Proposition
29
INDIANA EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, Section 35
30
Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, (1988) Supp SCC 604.
31
JHARKHAND JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) RULES, 2003, Rule 22.
opinion per se is not a conclusive proof of age of the accused. It is no more than an
opinion.32
37. In the present case the documental age of the three accused, Aaryan, Subhash and
Ratan has been specified as 17 years and 350 days, 17 years and 5 days, 16 years
and 200 days respectively. They, being juvenile as per the documents, relying
therefore upon the decree in the aforementioned case of Amit Singh v. State of
Maharashtra35, it is humbly submitted that the decision of the JJB by placing
specific reliance upon the medical examination is unjustified.
38. It is most humbly submitted that since the medical examination is conducted by a
medical expert so absolute should not be accorded to it as s.45 of the Indiana
Evidence Act, clearly explains that “a medical report can be accepted as a relevant
fact but it needs to be corroborated with other sources to be considered as a valid
evidence in the court of law”36
39. Hence, the evidence of a medical expert is rather a weak type of evidence and the
courts do not generally consider it as offering conclusive proof and therefore it is
safe to rely upon the same with a corroboration of an independent and reliable piece
of evidence such as matriculation or birth certificates.37
40. It is most humbly submitted that the decision of the JJ Board to try the three accused
as adults is influenced by public rage and vexation. It is evident from the factsheet
that the gruesome murder of Sam was picked up by the media forthwith and
triggered mass hysteria and outrage. Therefore, relying on the facts and
circumstances of the case it is conclusive that the incident being shocking to the
conscience of the public at large, the subsequent decision of the JJ Board is an
attempt directed towards deadening and subduing the upsurge of public vexation
32
Babloo Parsi v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2008) 13 SCC 133.
33
Abuzar Hossain alias Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489.
34
Amit Singh v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 13 SCC 744.
35
Id.
36
INDIANA EVIDENCE ACT, Section 45.
37
S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1996) 4 SCC 596.
and outrage instigated primarily due to the fact that no evidence was found and no
one was arrested for the alleged crime.
ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE HIGH COURT HAS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
SESSIONS COURT.
4 . THAT THE HIGH COURT HAS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
SESSIONS COURT
41. It is humbly submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the Sessions Court is
bad in law and is thus not sustainable. It is also contended that the case based on
circumstantial evidence is vitiated by serious errors. The last seen theory is
insupported by circumstantial evidence and there exists no link between chain of
events. And on that account miscarriage of justice has been occasioned by
upholding the order of Sessions court by the HC.
4.1. The Circumstantial Evidence Is Not Conclusive In Nature
42. In the present case the plausibility of the hypothesis arisen by the recovery of the
belongings of the deceased from the residence of the accused is inconclusive in
nature and leaves reasonable doubt about the existence of any other hypothesis.
43. That the recovery of the belongings of the deceased from the residence of the
accused is no evidence pointing towards the guilt of the appellant.
44. There is lack of legal evidence as no fingerprints of the appellant were found on the
alleged weapon of offence, hence the evidence adduced by the prosecution is
inadmissible in law and can’t be relied upon to convict the appellant.
4.2. The Last Seen Of The Deceased Does Not Corroborate With The Circumstantial
Evidence.
45. It is humbly submitted in the view of the time gap between when Sam left the tea
stall and the recovery of the body and also the place and circumstances in which the
body was recovered possibility of others intervening cannot be ruled out
46. In the absence of definite evidence that appearance and deceased were last seen
together and when the time is long it would be dangerous to come to the conclusion
that the appellant are responsible for the murder of Sam.
38
JOSHAW, JOHUNT & CHLOE WALLACE, Evidence, 15, (4th Edn. 2006)
47. The legal position regarding the Last Seen Theory has been explained by the
Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Satish39, as under:
“The last seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of
time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the
deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the
accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible.”
48. In the impugned matter, there lies a significant time gap of 2 days between the time
when the deceased was seen with the accused and the recovery of his dead body.
Hence, a possibility of other persons coming in between exists.
49. In the Case Nizam & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan40 the Hon'ble SC held that :
“Where time gap is long it would be unsafe to base the conviction on the
last seen theory it is safer to look for corroboration from other circumstances
and evidences produced by the prosecution.”
50. From the facts and evidence, we find no other corroborative piece of evidence
corroborating the last seen theory and thus the prosecution has not been able to
prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
4.3. There Exists no Linkage Between The Chain Of Events
51. In the impugned case, the facts and circumstances do not form a complete chain of
events and hence no inference can be drawn against the accused.
52. It is evident from the factsheet that the 4 accused, having grown up in harsh and
tough conditions, were deprived of any means of exposure to moral and ethical
values thereby failing to imbibe the same
53. Within themselves. Owing to this deprivation, the 4 boys could be deemed as
justifiably befitting a particular “Vulnerable group of children” requiring special
attention and succour on part of the govt. Howbeit, in this situation, as the
factsheet signifies, the state has failed to discharge it's duty in that respect which
eventually contributed significantly in directing the children's inclination towards
substance abuse.
54. Moreover, having left with no means of income and survival, they were
ineluctably forced to resort to petty offences while striving to make their both
ends meet.
55. Their subsequent friendship with Sam, who himself came from a disturbed family
background was a result of extreme sense of belonging and family owing to their
similar psychological condition at that time evident from the fact that all of them
were mentally tormented.
39
(2005) 3 SCC 114
40
MANU/SC/0964/2015
56. Furthermore, it is observed that the attempt of Sam to distance himself from the
seemingly inseparable group particularly irked Samar which is significatory of the
fact that he was in disagreement with the fragmentating unity of the group.
57. Therefore, the group's subsequent meeting at the Kila tea stall was an effort to
restore the same.
58. Further, it is submitted that in the present case there exists no link of proximity
between the last seen together theory and the murder of sam since the corpse was
recovered after 2 days. In the intervening period, however, there was every
possibility of any other person meeting the deceased at the place of incident or
before the commission of the crime.
61. There are several overwhelming inconsistencies which are fatal to the version of
the prosecution as they strike at the root of the case. The case of the prosecution is
based on circumstantial evidence but prosecution failed to prove the chain of
circumstances which led to the hypothesis of guilt of the appellant.
41
1994 SCC Cal 186
PRAYER
In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may this Hon’ble
Court be pleased to hold, adjudge and declare:
2. The conviction of Samar and free him from all the charges framed upon him.
3. That the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2014 is in
contravention with the Constitution of Indiana and the International Conventions and
thus unconstitutional.
4. That Aaryan, Subhash and Ratan should be treated as juveniles and invalidate their
ossification test.
And Pass any other Order, Direction or Relief that it may deem fit in the Best
interest of Justice, Fairness, Equity and Good Conscience.
For this Act of Kindness the Respondent Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.
Date: Sd/-
Place: (Counsels for the Appellant/Petitioner)