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G.R. No.

208091, April 23, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENITO MOLEJON,


Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:

On April 24, 2013, the accused-appellant Benito Molejon was charged in five separate
information’s, with five counts of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353; three of which was committed against his own 13-year old
stepdaughter AAA and, two against his 11-year old stepdaughter BBB and was charged in 11 separate
information’s with the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), eight of which were committed against AAA and three against BBB.

ISSUE:

Does the accused-appellant Benito Molejon aggravatedly commited the crime acts of
lasciviousness and rape to his two stepdaughters by using force, threat and intimidation to
consummate his lust?

RULING:

The carnal knowledge had also been proven. The respective testimonies of AAA and BBB
vividly describe their harrowing experience in the hands of the accused. It bears emphasis that the
accused resorted to force, threat and intimidation to consummate his lust. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that rape is committed when intimidation is used on the victim, which includes
moral intimidation or coercion. The accused also committed acts of lasciviousness using intimidation
on AAA and BBB. The essence of acts of lasciviousness is lewd design that is, deriving vicarious
pleasure from acts performed on the person of the victim. The acts complained of have been
sufficiently proved by the testimonies of the complainants.

CASUPANG SHERWIN LAMPUYAS 1-E CRIMINAL LAW 1


G.R. No. 215720, February 21, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OSCAR MAT-AN Y


ESCAD, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

On 13 April 2009, the accused-appellant Oscar Mat-an Escad was charged with the crimes of
Attempted Homicide (Criminal Case No. 29335-R) and Murder in two information’s (Criminal Case
No. 29336-R).

ISSUE:

Whether the accused-appellant Oscar Mat-an y Escad is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
death of Minda Babsa-ay and the injuries sustained by Anthonette Ewangan?

RULING:

The trial and appellate courts did not err in convicting Oscar. The prosecution was able to
establish his guilt for Minda's death and Anthonette's injury. He cannot escape liability therefor just
because he "blacked out" and "could not recall" that he committed said crimes.

The Court concurs that the crime committed against Minda is Murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength and also of slight physical injury.

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that Oscar abused his superiority when he killed
Minda. Indeed, it was sufficiently shown that Oscar was armed with a knife, a deadly weapon, while
Minda was then burdened by a child and had no means to defend and repel the attacks of her
assailant. Furthermore, the trial court noted that Oscar was of heavy build and stood at 5'10" in
contrast to Minda's 4'11" frame. Clearly, Oscar abused his superiority afforded him by his sex, height,
and build and a weapon when he attacked Minda who was then carrying a child. Thus, the trial and
appellate courts correctly convicted him of murder.

The Court also concurs that Oscar can be held guilty only of slight physical injuries with respect to
Anthonette. The prosecution failed to present any evidence which would show that Oscar also
intended to kill Anthonette. Without the element of intent to kill, Oscar could only be convicted for
physical injury; and considering that Anthonette's wound was only superficial, the appellate court
correctly convicted Oscar of slight physical injury.

CASUPANG SHERWIN LAMPUYAS 1-E CRIMINAL LAW 1


GR NO. 155409, June 8,2007.
MAQUILAN vs. MAQUILAN
FACTS:

Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and
out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter
when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour,
which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the
latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged.

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing
psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner
and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was
denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the convictions of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in
the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in the
conjugal property?

RULING:

No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:

Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any
ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such
property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.

Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:

Art. 43. Prision correccional — its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall
carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and
that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in
this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.

It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA that the crime of adultery does not carry the
accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property
and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

CASUPANG SHERWIN LAMPUYAS 1-E CRIMINAL LAW 1

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