SEM I CASES Batch 2

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 121075 July 24, 1997
DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROBERTO M. LAGMAN, and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE,
INC., respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of
the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 dated 5 January 19952 and 14
July 1995.3 The former denied the Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner Delta Motors Corporation
(hereinafter DELTA), while the latter amended the earlier Resolution.
The pleadings and annexes in the record of CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 disclose the following material
operative facts:
Private respondent State Investment House, Inc. (hereinafter, SIHI) brought an action for a sum of
money against DELTA in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch VI. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 84-23019. DELTA was declared in default, and on 5 December 1984,
the RTC, per Judge Ernesto Tengco, rendered a decision4 the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered

ordering the defendant to pay unto plaintiff the amount of P20,061,898.97 as its total
outstanding obligation and to pay 25% of the total obligation as and for attorney's
fees, plus cost of suit.
The decision could not be served on DELTA, either personally or by registered mail, due to its earlier
dissolution. However, Delta had been taken over by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the
meantime. This notwithstanding, SIHI moved, on 4 November 1986, for service of the decision by
way of publication, which the trial court allowed in its order of 6 December 1986. The decision was
published in the Thunderer, a weekly newspaper published in Manila. After publication, SIHI moved
for execution of the judgment, which the trial court granted in its order of 11 March 1987 on the
ground that no appeal had been taken by DELTA despite publication of the decision. The writ of
execution was issued and pursuant thereto certain properties of DELTA in Iloilo and Bacolod City
were levied upon and sold. The sheriff likewise levied on some other properties of DELTA.
DELTA then commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23068, wherein DELTA insisted that: (a) the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (DELTA) since there was no valid/proper service of
summons, thus rendering the decision null and void; and (b) the void decision never became final
and executory.
In its decision of 22 January 19915 the Court of Appeals ruled against DELTA on the first ground, but
found that the record before it "is bereft of any showing that a copy of the assailed judgment had
been properly served on P.N.B. which assumed DELTA's operation upon the latter's dissolution."
Accordingly the Court of Appeals ruled that:
[T]he [decision] did not become executory (Vda. de Espiritu v. CFI, L-30486, Oct. 31,
1972; Tuazon v. Molina, L-55697, Feb. 26, 1981).
If further opined that service by publication did not cure the fatal defect and thus decreed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, while the assailed decision was validly rendered by the respondent
court, nonetheless it has not attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on
petitioner DELTA, which may appeal therefore within the reglementary period.6
In a motion for reconsideration, DELTA insisted that there was no valid service of summons and the
decision of the RTC was not in accordance with the Rules, hence, void.7 SIHI also filed a motion for
reconsideration claiming that DELTA was not dissolved, and even if it were, its corporate personality
to receive service of processes subsisted; moreover, its right to appeal had been lost.8 These
motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 27 May 1991.9 Unsatisfied, DELTA
filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 100366) which was denied in the
resolution of 16 September 1991 for non-compliance with Circular No. 1-88. A motion for
reconsideration was denied in the resolution of 9 October 1991, a copy of which was received by
DELTA on 31 October 1991. 10
On 12 November 1991, DELTA filed a Notice of Appeal 11 with the RTC in Civil Case No. 84-23019,
indicating therein that it was appealing from the 5 December 1984 decision, and prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that this Notice
of Appeal be noted and the records of this case be elevated to the Court of Appeals.
SIHI filed on 2 December 1991 a motion to dismiss DELTA's appeal 12 on the ground that it was filed
out of time, since DELTA obtained a certified true copy of the decision from the RTC on 21
September 1990, hence it had only fifteen days therefrom within which to appeal from the decision.
Despite DELTA's opposition, 13 the trial court dismissed the Notice of Appeal. 14 DELTA moved to
reconsider, 15 which SIHI opposed. 16 In its order 17 of 14 September 1992 the trial court denied Delta's
motion.
DELTA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29147. 18 In its petition, Delta prayed for the: (a)
annulment of the order of the trial court dated 3 June 1992 dismissing the Notice of Appeal dated 6
November 1991; (b) annulment of the order of the trial court dated 14 September 1992 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the former; and (c) elevation of the original records of Civil Case No.
84-23019 to the Court of Appeals.
On 30 October 1992 the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 a restraining order
enjoining respondents and any and all other persons acting on their behalf "from enforcing or
directing the enforcement of the Decision, subject of the petition." 19 Thereafter, in its resolution
promulgated on 22 December 1992, 20 the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition in said
case, considered the comments of private respondents therein as its answer and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
On 17 June 1993 the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision 21 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, the
dispositive portion providing:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the respondent court dated June 3, 1992,
dismissing the notice of appeal dated November 6, 1991; and the order dated
September 14, 1992 of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration filed
by the petitioner, through counsel, are hereby SET ASIDE; and respondent court
hereby ordered to ELEVATE the records of the case to the Court of Appeals, on
appeal.
On 18 January 1993, the RTC elevated the record of Civil Case No. 84-23019 to the Court of
Appeals.
SIHI appealed to this Court from the decision by way of a petition for review. 22 It contended that
DELTA had lost the right to appeal in view of the lapse of more than 15 days from DELTA's receipt
of a certified true copy of the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019. This petition for review was
docketed as G.R. No. 110677. 23
While SIHI's petition in G.R. No. 110677 was pending before this Court, DELTA filed on 14 February
1994, in CA G.R. SP No. 29147 of the Court of Appeals, an Omnibus Motion 24 to:
1) DECLARE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT ANY FORCE AND
EFFECT THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT COURT DATED MARCH 11, 1987
ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION;
2) DECLARE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT ANY FORCE AND
EFFECT THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE ORDER
DATED MARCH 11, 1987;
3) ALL OTHER PROCEEDINGS HELD, CONDUCTED AND EXECUTED BY

RESPONDENT SHERIFF IMPLEMENTING THE AFORESAID WRIT OF
EXECUTION.
SIHI opposed the motion 25 on grounds that: a) there was a pending appeal by certiorari with this
Court, thus the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to entertain the Omnibus Motion; b) the
Omnibus Motion was barred by res judicata; and c) the filing of the Omnibus Motion was a clear act
of forum-shopping and should then be denied outright.
In its resolution of 7 June 1994, the Court of Appeals merely noted the Omnibus Motion and stated:
It appearing that there is a pending petition for review with the Supreme Court of this
Court's Decision dated June 17, 1993, it would be improper for this Court to act on
the Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner Delta Motor Corporation . . . . 26
On 18 July 1994 this Court's Second Division issued a resolution 27 in G.R. No. 110677 denying the
petition therein for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
the questioned judgment. SIHI's motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution of this Court
of 21 September 1994. 28
On 26 October 1994 DELTA filed a manifestation and motion 29 to resolve its Omnibus Motion of
February 10, 1994.
In its resolution of 5 January 1995, 30 the Court of Appeals denied DELTA's Omnibus Motion, holding:
[T]he matters prayed for in the Omnibus Motion of petitioner Delta Motor Corporation
dated February 10, 1994 and abovequoted are matters which were not raised as
issues by petitioner in the instant petition and, therefore, not within the jurisdiction
and power of this Court in the instant petition to decide. 31
On 27 January 1995 DELTA filed a motion for reconsideration and/or clarification 32 wherein it alleged
that: (a) while it was true that the matters prayed for in the Omnibus Motion of petitioner were not
raised in the instant petition, they were, nevertheless, included in the general prayer in the petition
"for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises;" (b) it could not file the
Omnibus Motion with the RTC since the records of Civil Case No. 84-23019 had already been
elevated to the Court of Appeals and upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court lost jurisdiction
over the case; and (c) the matters raised in the Omnibus Motion were incidental to and included in
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, on 2 February 1995, SIHI filed a motion for clarification 33 wherein it asked for the
deletion, for being mere obiter dictum, the following paragraph in the Resolution of 5 January 1995,
to wit:
While it is true that as a necessary consequence the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 22, 1991 ruling that the decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 "has not
attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner Delta, which may
appeal therefrom within the reglementary period", all proceedings and/or orders
arising from the trial courts decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 are null and void . . .
.
SIHI argued that this paragraph was "not necessary to the decision of the case before it" 34 and
"cannot be considered binding for the purpose of establishing precedent;" 35 likewise, the Resolution
itself did not decide the incident on its merits or consider and dispose of the issues, nor determine
the respective rights of the parties concerned.
In its resolution of 14 July 1995, 36 the Court of Appeals granted SIHI's motion for clarification and
denied DELTA's motion for reconsideration. As to the latter, it ruled that:
[P]etitioner DELTA is not without remedy, especially considering the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in the first petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 23068) which
ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, while the assailed decision was validly rendered by

the respondent court, nonetheless it has not attained finality pending
service of a copy thereof on petitioner DELTA, which may appeal
therefrom within the reglementary period.
Clearly, the only issue in this petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 29147) is as to the validity of
the questioned orders of respondent court dated June 3, 1992 (dismissing the notice
of appeal dated November 6, 1991) and the Order dated September 14, 1992 of the
same court (denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner through
counsel). 37
It then decreed to amend its Resolution of 5 January 1995 by deleting the assailed
paragraph.
DELTA then filed the instant petition, insisting that the matters raised in the Omnibus Motion were
incidental to and included in the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals; hence, it had
jurisdiction to rule on said motion. As regards the grant of SIHI's motion to strike out a paragraph in
the resolution of 5 January 1995 for being obiter dictum, DELTA submitted that the latter contained a
finding or affirmation of fact, thus could not have constituted obiter dictum.
After SIHI filed its comment, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda. DELTA and SIHI did so on 16 April 1996 and on 13 May 1996,
respectively.
After a painstaking review of the record in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, we are more than convinced that
respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in denying DELTA's Omnibus Motion.
The decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 June 1993 in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 29147 had long become
final insofar as DELTA was concerned, and it very well knew that the only issues raised therein
concerned the trial court's orders of 3 June 1992 and 14 September 1992. As a matter of fact, at the
time Delta filed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, the orders sought to be declared null and void
in the Omnibus Motion had already been issued, they having been so issued at the commencement
of CA-G.R. SP No. 23068. In short, if DELTA intended such orders to be challenged in CA-G.R. SP
No. 29147, it could have explicitly alleged them as sources of additional causes of action and prayed
for the corresponding affirmative relief therefrom, and if this course of action initially proved
unavailing then DELTA could and should have moved for reconsideration on that aspect. After the
finality of the decision in said case, any attempt to introduce or revive the issue had become
procedurally impermissible. Plainly, the issues raised in the Omnibus Motion could have been
allowed during the pendency of said case by way of amendments to the petition.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioner's Omnibus Motion in keeping with
jurisprudence 38concerning Section 7 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court on the Procedure in the Court
of Appeals, which mandates that:
Sec 7. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment
of errors and properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at its option, may notice
plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors.
Clearly then, the Court of Appeals could only consider errors raised by petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No.
29147, which were limited to the trial court's orders of 3 June 1992 and 14 September 1992. These
were the only errors Delta argued extensively in its brief. To allow DELTA's Omnibus Motion which it
filed more than eight months from promulgation of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, or long
after finality of said case, would result in abandonment of sound judicial process.
In light of the dispositive portions of the Court of Appeals' decisions of 22 January 1991 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 23068, and of 17 June 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, we cannot agree with SIHI that
DELTA is barred by res judicata. This conclusion is further fortified by the unequivocal statements of
the Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 14 July 1995 that:
[P]etitioner DELTA is not without remedy, especially considering the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in the first petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 23068) . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the only issue in this petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 29147) is as to the validity of
the questioned orders of respondent court dated June 3, 1992 (dismissing the notice
of appeal dated November 6, 1991) and the Order dated September 14, 1992 of the
same court (denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner through
counsel.)
The Court of Appeals likewise did not commit reversible error in deleting the phrase SIHI protested
as obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law
which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. 39 It is a remark made, or opinion
expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally,
and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are
not binding as precedent. 40
The assailed phrase was indeed obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter not raised by petitioner
expressly in its petition assailing the dismissal of its notice of appeal. It was not a prerequisite in
disposing of the aforementioned issue. The body of the resolution did not contain any discussion on
such matter nor mention any principle of law to support such statement.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the challenged resolutions of 5 January 1995
and 14 July 1995 in C.A. G.R.-SP. NO. 29147 are AFFIRMED.
Cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Mistakenly captioned "Petition for Review on Certiorari," Rollo, 9.
2 Original Record (OR) CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, 534-538; Imperial, J. J ., with Buena,
A. and Verzola, E., JJ.,. concurring.
3 Id., 570 et seq.; Rollo, 29-33.
4 OR, 269-271.
5 Id., 30-37. Per Martinez, A., J., with Melo, J.A.R., (now an Associate Justice of this
Court), and Victor, L., JJ., concurring.
6 OR, 36.
7 Id., 38-50.
8 Id., 51-59.
9 Id., 77-78.
10 Decision of 17 June 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, 3-4; OR; 225-226.
11 OR, 79-81.
12 OR, 82-84.
13 Id., 85-91.
14 Id., 26-28.
15 Id., 96-110.
16 Id., 111-119.
17 Id., 29
18 Id., 1-25.
19 Id., 139.
20 Id., 162.
21 OR, 223-230.
22 Id., 242-258.
23 Id., 242-257.
24 Id., 393-397.
25 Id., 410-424.
26 OR, 510.
27 Id., 515.
28 Id., 516-517.
29 Id., 511-514.
30 Id., 534-538.
31 Id., 538.
32 Id., 539-542.
33 OR, 545-548.
34 Citing Auyong Hian v. CTA, 59 SCRA 120 [1974].
35 Citing Tobias v. Diaz, 213 SCRA 253 [1992].
36 Supra, note 2.
37 Rollo, 32.
38 Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 760 [1969]; Bañez v. Court of Appeals, 59

SCRA 15 [1974]; Escaño v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 197 [1980]
39 Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110, 120 [1974].

40 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 967 (5th ed., 1979).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 87977 March 19, 1990
ILUMINADO URBANO and MARCIAL ACAPULCO, petitioners,

vs.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, RAMON BARCELONA and AMY LAZARO-JAVIER, respondents.
G.R. No. 88578 March 19, 1990
NEMESIO G. CO, petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG (BRANCH 165), THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL and FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, respondents.
Tañada Vivo & Tan and Benjamin C. Santos Law Office for petitioner in 88578.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Can the Office of the Solicitor General represent a public officer or employee in the preliminary
investigation of a criminal action against him or in a civil action for damages against him? This is the
principal issue in these two consolidated Petitions.
G.R. No. 87977
Sometime in 1988, the petitioners in G.R. No. 87977, namely, Iluminado Urbano and Marcial
Acapulco, instituted a criminal case against Secretary Luis Santos of the Department of Local
Government as well as Sectoral Representatives Pacifico Conol and Jason Ocampos, Jr. of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tangub City, for alleged violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint
against them was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and was docketed as OSP Case No. 88-
02780. The Office of the Solicitor General, through Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, Assistant
Solicitor General Ramon A. Barcelona and Solicitor Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, entered its appearance
as counsel for the said respondents as far as the preliminary investigation of the case is concerned.
By way of a special civil action for prohibition filed with this Court, the said petitioners seek to enjoin
the Solicitor General and his associates from acting as counsel for the said respondents in the
course of the preliminary investigation. The said petitioners submit that in the event that the
corresponding information is filed against the said respondents with the Sandiganbayan and a
judgment of conviction is rendered by the said court, the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor
General on behalf of the said respondents during the preliminary investigation will be in conflict with
its role as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines.
In its Comment filed on June 13, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that the issue
raised by the petitioners had been squarely resolved in favor of the said Office in Anti-Graft League
of the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon.Ortega1 and Solicitor General v. Garrido. 2
G.R. No. 88578
On December 29, 1987, the petitioner in G.R. No. 88578, namely, Nemesio G. Co, filed an Amended
Complaint for damages against Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, the Businessworld Publishing
Corporation, Raul L. Locsin and one John Doe. The Amended Complaint was filed with Branch 165
of the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila and was docketed as Civil Case No. 55379. The
Honorable Milagros V. Caguioa was the presiding judge therein.
In sum, the Amended Complaint alleged, inter alia, that the defendant Chavez knowingly, willfully
and maliciously published and/or caused to be published certain defamatory imputations against the
petitioner in an article which appeared in the December 4, 1987 issue of Business World, a
periodical publication in Metro Manila, and that he caused the publication thereof by way of an
interview characterized by bad faith and actual malice. The petitioner also alleged that the
defamatory remarks impute that he was a close associate of former President Ferdinand Marcos
and his daughter Imee Marcos-Manotoc and that he was involved in some anomalous transactions
relating to the funds of the national government during the time that President Marcos was in office.
It appears that at the time of the publication of the questioned article, Solicitor General Chavez was
the counsel of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), the government agency
responsible for the investigation of alleged graft and corrupt practices relating to the former
President, his relatives and his close associates.
On February 11, 1988, the private defendants Businessworld Publishing Corporation and Raul L.
Locsin filed a joint Motion to Dismiss.
On February 12, 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General sought an extension of time to file the
required responsive pleading. On March 14, 1988, the said Office filed a Motion to Dismiss on behalf
of Solicitor General Chavez. Thereafter, the trial court set the case for oral argument on June 23,
1988.
During the scheduled oral argument, the counsel of the petitioner objected to the appearance of the
Office of the Solicitor General on behalf of Solicitor General Chavez. The trial court issued an Order
suspending the proceedings and instructed the parties to submit their respective positions on the
propriety of the appearance of the said Office for the Solicitor General himself. The parties complied
with the instructions of the trial court.
By way of a Motion seeking the disqualification of the Office of the Solicitor General to act as
counsel of Solicitor General Chavez, the petitioner manifested to the trial court that he is suing the
Solicitor General in his personal capacity for acts which he committed beyond the scope of his
authority and as such he cannot be represented by the said Office in the civil suit instituted with the
trial court. 3
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that the objection raised by the
petitioner is an afterthought on account of its belated character, and that this objection
notwithstanding, it is authorized to represent any public official even if the said official is sued in his
personal capacity pursuant to the unconditional provisions of Presidential Decree No. 478 which
defines the functions of the said Office, as well as Executive Order No. 300 issued on July 26, 1987
which made the said office an independent agency under the Office of the President of the
Philippines. 4 In support of this contention, the said Office cited the pronouncement of this Court
in Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. 5 The said office also maintained that the cause of action
against the Solicitor General is for acts committed by him in his official capacity, i.e., as legal counsel
of the PCGG under Executive Order No. 14, series of 1986, and that the assailed actuations of a
public official are presumed to have been done in the lawful performance of his duties. 6 In support
thereof, the said Office cited the ruling of this Court in Peralta v. Firme. 7
In addition to the arguments above, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that public policy
militates against the disqualification of the said Office from representing the Solicitor General in his
capacity as a public official because, if it where the other way around, public officials will hesitate to
perform their official functions for fear of being haled to court by almost anybody for the purpose of
accounting for official acts, not to mention the trouble of having to hire a private lawyer at his own
expense in order to defend himself. 8
The petitioner submitted his Reply thereto, alleging therein, among others, that the argument of the
Solicitor General is untenable inasmuch as the expression of his views by way of an interview
subsequently featured in a newspaper article is not an official function of the Solicitor General and
that the jurisprudence cited by the Office of the Solicitor General opposes the position it had taken.9
In an Order dated November 9, 1988, the trial court denied the Motion of the petitioner for lack of
merit. 10 The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the Order. On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General opposed the reconsideration sought by the petitioner. 11 The petitioner filed a Reply
to the opposition on the part of the said Office 12 which, in turn, filed a Rejoinder to the Reply. 13
In another Order dated May 26, 1989, the trial court denied the reconsideration sought by the
petitioner. The pertinent portion of the said Order is as follows —
After a careful study, assessment and dissertation of the grounds, arguments
advanced by the parties in their respective pleadings now under consideration, as
well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence cited therein, the Court has arrived at
the inescapable conclusion, and so holds that the plaintiff failed to satisfactorily
convince the Court that the Office of the Solicitor General cannot and/or does not
have the authority to represent the defendant Francisco I. Chavez in this case, for
the simple reason that it is indisputable that at the time said defendant allegedly
made the malicious imputations against the plaintiff, he was then and still is the
incumbent Solicitor General, and at the same time the counsel for the Presidential
Commission on Good Government or PCGG. 14
Thus, the Order of the trial court dated May 26, 1989 is challenged before this Court on the ground
that the same amounts to a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the trial court. 15 The petitioner now asks the Court to order the Office of the Solicitor General to
desist from representing the Solicitor General in the civil suit for damages.
On August 21, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on the Petition, reiterating
therein its position before the trial court. 16
On August 31, 1989, the Court resolved to consider the said Comment as the Answer to the Petition
and to give due course to the Petition. 17 Nonetheless, on October 4, 1989, the petitioner filed his
Reply to the Comment, reiterating therein his arguments raised before the trial court. 18
The issue raised in G.R. No. 87977 relates to the authority of the Office of the Solicitor General to
appear for certain government officials in the course of the preliminary investigation of their case
before the Office of the Ombudsman. The issue raised in G.R. No. 88578 pertains to the authority of
the said Office to appear for the Solicitor General who was haled to court in a civil suit for damages
arising from an alleged defamatory remark which appeared in a newspaper. Both petitioners raise
pure questions of law inasmuch as there are no evidentiary matters to be evaluated by this Court.
Moreover, if the only issue is whether or not the conclusions of the trial court are in consonance with
law and jurisprudence, then the issue is a pure question of law. 19 Thus, the Court resolved to
consolidate both Petitions and to treat them as Petitions for certiorari on pure questions of law in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. 20 In due time, both Petitions were deemed
submitted for decision.
In resolving both Petitions, the Court must take into account the duties and functions of the Office of
the Solicitor General. Presidential Decree No. 478 21 defines such duties and functions, to wit —
Sec. 1. Functions and Organization. — 1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of a lawyer. . . (Emphasis supplied)
The Office of the Solicitor General submits that on the basis of this provision, it can represent or
otherwise defend any public official without any qualification or distinction in any litigation, and that
an intepretation thereof to the effect that it is authorized to represent a public official only when the
said official is clearly shown to be sued in his official capacity is erroneous. In short, the said Office
argues that inasmuch as the law does not make a distinction as to the type of litigation wherein the
said Office can enter its appearance as counsel, there should be no distinction made. 22
A similar provision can be found in Section 1661 of the Revised Administrative Code. It reads as
follows: "As principal law officer of the Government, the Solicitor General shall have the authority to
act for and represent the Government of the Philippine Islands, its officers and agents in any official
investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer." Like the cited provision of
Presidential Decree No. 478, this provision does not have any qualifying phrase. The argument of
the Office of the Solicitor General as regards Presidential Decree No. 478 seems to apply to this
provision as well. Executive Order No. 300, series of 1987 cited by the said Office merely reiterates
the provisions of the aforementioned Presidential Decree.
In Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., 23 this Court pointed out that the phrase "official
investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer" found in Section 1661 of the
Revised Administrative Code embraces a preliminary investigation in a criminal case initiated
against a public official considering that the law makes no qualification as to the nature or character
of the "official investigation" contemplated. The Court emphasized, however, that where the
investigation results in an information filed against the public official concerned, then that official may
no longer be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General and that, accordingly, he will have to
get his own private counsel. Thus, this Court held that the Office of the Solicitor General can
represent the public official at the preliminary investigation of his case, and that if an information is
eventually filed against the said public official, the said Office may no longer represent him in the
litigation. This ruling was reiterated in Solicitor General v. Garrido. 24
What is the rationale behind this rule which allows the Office of the Solicitor General to represent a
public official during the preliminary investigation of his case, and which prohibits the said office from
further representing the said public official when an information is filed against him with the
appropriate court? In Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., this Court stressed that in the
performance of their duties, public officials can be subjected to numerous suits, whether ill-founded
or not, and that by threats of possible criminal prosecution, parties adversely affected by official
action can stay the hand of the public official concerned. The Court observed that there may be
hesitancy and diffidence in the execution of their duties if public officials are deterred by the thought
that they could be brought to court and face criminal charges. The Court conluded that as an
assurance against timidity the Office of the Solicitor General sees to it that the public officials
concerned are duly represented by counsel in the preliminary investigation. As to why the public
official concerned may no longer be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, the ostensible
reason is this: the said Office may no longer represent him considering that its position as counsel
for the accused will be in direct conflict with its responsibilities as the appellate counsel of the People
of the Philippines in all criminal cases.
The Court believes that the ruling announced in Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. and
reiterated in Garridoshould be re-examined in the light of the nature of a suit against a public official.
Under the Presidential Decree No. 478 aforecited, the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents
in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. This is as it
should be as he is the principal law officer of the Government. 25
In Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., this Court interpreted this to embrace "both civil and
criminal investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. 26
In Garrido, the Court sustained the authority of the Solicitor General to enter his appearance on
behalf of public officials charged with violating a penal statute for acts connected with the
performance of their official duties.27
It is undisputed that the Office of the Solicitor General is the appellate counsel of the People of the
Philippines in all criminal cases. As such, the said Office participates in a criminal case only when
the same has reached the appellate courts. It is the office of the city, provincial or state prosecutor,
as the case may be, and not the Office of the Solicitor General, which attends to the investigation
and the prosecution of criminal cases in the first instance.
However, under the doctrine announced in Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. and Garrido,
the Office of the Solicitor General is authorized to enter its appearance as counsel for any public
official, against whom a criminal charge had been instituted, during the preliminary investigation
stage thereof. Nevertheless, in the same case, this Court held that once an information is filed
against the public official, the Office of the Solicitor General can no longer represent the said official
in the litigation. The anomaly in this paradigm becomes obvious when, in the event of a judgment of
conviction, the case is brought on appeal to the appellate courts. The Office of the Solicitor General,
as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines, is expected to take a stand against the
accused. More often than not, it does. Accordingly, there is a clear conflict of interest here, and one
which smacks of ethical considerations, where the Office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the
public official, defends the latter in the preliminary investigation stage of the criminal case, and
where the same office, as appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines, represents the
prosecution when the case is brought on appeal. This anomalous situation could not have been
contemplated and allowed by the law, its unconditional terms and provisions notwithstanding. It is a
situation which cannot be countenanced by the Court.
Otherwise, if the Solicitor General who represents the state on appeal in criminal cases can appear
for the accused public official in a preliminary investigation, then by the same token a provincial or
city fiscal, his assistant or any government prosecutor who represents the People of the Philippines
at the preliminary investigation of a case up to the trial thereof can appear for an accused public
official at the preliminary investigation being conducted by another fiscal, prosecutor or municipal
judge. The situation would simply be scandalous, to say the least.
There is likewise another reason, as earlier discussed, why the Office of the Solicitor General cannot
represent an accused in a criminal case. Inasmuch as the State can speak and act only by law,
whatever it does say and do must be lawful, and that which is unlawful is not the word or deed of the
State, but is the mere wrong or trespass of those individual persons who falsely speak and act in its
name. 28 Therefore, the accused public official should not expect the State, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, to defend him for a wrongful act which cannot be attributed to the State itself. In
the same light, a public official who is sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his personal
capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the author of a wrongful act, much less
commit a crime.
Thus, the Court rules that the Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public
official at any stage of a criminal case. For this reason, the doctrine announced in Anti-Graft League
of the Philippines, Inc. v.Hon. Ortega and Solicitor General v. Garrido, and all decided cases
affirming the same; in so far as they are inconsistent with this pronouncement, should be deemed
abandoned. The principle of stare decisis notwithstanding, it is well-settled that a doctrine which
should be abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. After all, more
important than anything else is that this Court should be right. 29
This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled to court on a civil suit for
damages arising from a felony allegedly committed by him. 30 Any pecuniary liability he may be held
to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account. The State is not liable for the
same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General likewise has no authority to represent him in such
a civil suit for damages.
For all these reasons, the argument of the Office of the Solicitor General to the effect that it has the
authority to represent or otherwise defend any public official without any qualification or distinction in
any litigation pursuant to the unconditional provisions of Presidential Decree No. 478 and the other
cited laws is untenable. Applying these principles to the case at bar, the Office of the Solicitor
General has no authority to represent Solicitor General Chavez in the civil suit for damages filed
against him in the Regional Trial Court arising from allegedly defamatory remarks uttered by him.
The issues raised in these two Petitions have been resolved on the basis of law and jurisprudence
as well as the pertinent arguments of the parties concerned. The other points raised by them are
irrelevant to the proper disposition of these cases and need not be considered.
The Court is aware of the possibility of public officials being haled to court in an endless array of civil
suits. With or without this pronouncement, and considering the nature of a public office in the
Philippines vis-a-vis the litigious character of most Filipinos as demonstrated by the number of cases
filed in the courts daily, this scenario is a fact that must be accepted. The possibility of being brought
to court is an occupational hazard of both the public officer and the citizen, in the same way that
every occupation has its own hazards to reckon with. This grim reality notwithstanding, public
officials should know that nobody is above the law.
Of course, there is the Citizens Legal Aid Office of the Department of Justice that may be made to
assist in the defense of any such public official. As to respondent Francisco I. Chavez, he may
appear in his own defense in his private capacity in the action for damages against him. The
services of private counsel may also be availed of. And if it is the intention of the State to protect
public officials from alleged harassment suits, then the creation of a separate office of government
lawyers for this purpose may be in order. But certainly the Office of the Solicitor General can not
assume a responsibility in defense of such public officials beyond its statutory authority.
Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds that the Office of the Solicitor General is not
authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages
arising from a felony. This pronouncement applies to all public officials and employees in the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the herein Petitions are hereby GRANTED. The Office of
the Solicitor General is permanently prohibited from representing the said respondents in OSP Case
No. 88-02780 pending in the Office of the Ombudsman and respondent Francisco I. Chavez in Civil
Case No. 55379 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., Did not participate in the deliberations.
Footnotes
1 99 SCRA 644 (1980).
2 100 SCRA 276 (1980).
3 Pages 36 to 40, Rollo.
5 Supra, note 1.
7 101 SCRA 225 (1980).
10 Page 29, Rollo.
14 Pages 27 and 28, Rollo.
15 Page 8, Petition; page 9, Rollo.
17 Page 190-A, Rollo.
18 Pages 200, et seq., Rollo.
19 Torres vs, Yu, 119 SCRA 48 (1982).
20 Rules 45 and 65, Rules of Court.
21 Signed into law by President Marcos on June 4, 1974.
22 Pages 15 and 16, Comment; pages 125 and 126, Rollo.
23 Supra, note 1.
24 Supra, note 2.
25 Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code.
26 Supra, page 648.

27 Supra, page 278.
28 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885).
29 Phil Trust Company and Smith, Bell & Co. v. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, 36 (1933), cited
with approval in Koppel (Phil.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil, 496, 515 (1946) and Olaguer v.
Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144,165 (1987).
30 Article 100, Revised Penal Code.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 47616 September 16, 1947
JOSE TAN CHONG, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondent-appellant.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 47623 September 16, 1947
LAM SWEE SANG, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE

PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Lucas Lacson for appellants.
Antonio V. Raquiza for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
On 15 October 1941, a decision was promulgated in thecase of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor,
G.R. No. 47616,whereby this Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
which hAd granted the writ of habeas corpus applied for by tan Chong, on the ground that he, being
a native of the Philippines, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a citizen of the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the same date, in the case of Lam Swee Sang vs. Commonwealth of the Philippines (G.R. No.
47623), this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition of the applicant for naturalization filed
in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, on the ground that the applicant, having been born in
Sulu, Philippines, of a Chinese father and Filipino mother, is a citizen of the Philippines. The
dismissal of the petition implies and means that there was no need of naturalization for the applicant
who is aFilipino citizen.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On 21 October 1941, a motion for reconsideration was filed in both cases by the Solicitor General.
The latter contends that even if the petitioner in the first case and the applicant in the second were
born in the Philippines, of a Chines father and a Filipino mother, lawfully married, still they are not
citizens of the Philippines under and pursuant to the laws in force at the time of their birth, and prays
that both decisions be set aside and the judgments appealed from be reversed. This motion for
reconsideration was pending in this Court when the Pacific was broke out. During the battle for
liberation, the records of both cases were destroyed. Upon petition of the Assistant Solicitor General,
Mr. Roberto A. Gianzon, therecords were reconstituted in accordance with the provisionsof Act. No.
3110. The record of the first case, G.R. No. 47616,was declared reconstituted on 5 June, and of the
second case, G.R. No. 47623, on 28 June 1946. Upon these reconstituted records, we now proceed
to dispose of the motion for reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that the principle of jus soli applies in this jurisdiction.
It is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provides
that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." In the case of U.S. vs. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S., 649, the SupremeCourt of the United States applying the principle of jus soli held that
a person born in the United States of Chinese parents domiciled therein is a citizen of the United
States. It further held that the Fourteenth Amendment was declaratory of the common law as existed
in England and in the United States before and after the Declaration of independence. From that
decision, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented. The principle
of jus soli was the rule in this jurisdiction until the 30th of September, 1939, when in the case
of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor (68 Phil., 649), this Court abandoned it and held that a person of
Chinese parentage born in the Philippines in 1941 is not a citizen thereof, because she followed the
citizenship of her Chinese parents and she is not a citizen of the Philippines under the provisions of
section 2 of the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. But in the cases of Torres and
Gallofin vs. Tan Chim (69 Phil., 518), decided on 3 February 1940 (69 Phil., 518), and Gallofin vs.
Ordoñez, decided on 27 June 1940 (70 Phil., 287), this Court reverted to the rule of jus soli laid
down in the cases prior to the decisionin the case of Chua vs. Secretary of
Labor, supra.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Solicitor General heeding the opinions of the Assitant Secretary of State, Mr. G.S. Messermith,
of 15 January 1938; of the Second Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Alvey A. Adee, dated 12
September 1921, and of the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Huntington Wilson, of 5April 1912, who
held that a person born in the Philippines of alien parentage is not a citizen thereof, because the
common law principle of jus soli or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitutiton of United States
was not extended to the Philippines - the same opinions upon which the Solicitor General had relied
in the case of Chua vs. The Secretary of Labor, supra, in his contention that the rule applying the
principle of jus soli in this jurisdiction should be abandoned - urges upon this Court to reconsider its
decisions in the cases under consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Muñoz vs. Collector of Customs, 20 Phil.,494, the Court applied the principle of jus
soli to a person born in the Philippines of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, and in so doing it
cited the case of U.S. vs. Gosiaco, 12 Phil., 490 where, according to the Court, the principle had
been applied. But nowhere in the decision of the last mentioned case was such principle applied,
because the only question passed upon was whether a person detained for not having a certificate
of registration, as required by Act 702, could be admitted to bail pending determination of his appeal
by this Court as to whether he did come within the provisions of said
Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil.,315, this Court passed upon the question as to
whether a person born in the Philippines of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, legally married; is
a citizen thereof. In this case this Court took into consideration the provisions of articles 17, 18 and
19 of the Civil Code in viewof the fact that the petitioner was born on 6 July 1889; the second
paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris; section 4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of 1
July 1902) and the amendatory Act of Congress of 23 March 1912, these being the laws then
applicable. Commenting on sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill, as amended, this Court said:
By section 4 the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth which prevails in the United
States was extended to the Philippine Islands, but with limitations. In the United States every person,
which certain specific exceptions, born in the United States is a citizen of that country. Under section
4 every person born after the 11th of April, 1889, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date
and who continued to reside in this country are at themoment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the
Philippine Islands. From the reading of section 4 and taking into consideration the Act of March 23,
1912, it is clear that Congress realized that there were inhabitants in the Philippine Islands who did
not come within the provisions of said section, and also that Congress did not then by express
legislation determine the political status of such persons. Therefore, the inquiry is - Did Congress
intend to say that all of the inhabitants who were not included in section 4 are to be "deemedand
held to be" aliens to the Philippine islands? (Pp. 333-334.) (Emphasis supplied.)
In answering the question in the negative, this Court cited the case of an unmarried woman, a native
of Porto Rico, 20 years of age, who arrived in New York by steamer from Porto Rico on 24 August
1902. She was detained at the Immigrant station, examined by a board of special inquiry, and
excluded. The writ for habeas corpushaving been denied by the Circuit Court, for the reason that she
might become a public charge, she appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States which held
that she was not an alien to the United States. But the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case cited does not answer negatively the question asked by this Court, because it
does not appear that she is of alien parentage and it appears that she was a resident of Porto Rico
on11 April 1899. (192 U.S. 1.) Further commenting on section 4, this Court said:
This section declares that a certain class of inhabitants shall be citizens of the Philippine Islands. It
does not declare that other inhabitants shall not be citizens. Neither does it declare that other
inhabitants shall be deemed to be aliens to the Philippine Islands, and especially it does not declare
that aperson situated as in the appellant shall not be nor shall not elect to be a citizen of the country
on his birth. The appellant could, as we have said, elect to become a citizen of the United States had
he been born in that country under the same circumstances which now surround him. All the laws
and the rulings of the courts on the subject so declare, and this has been the declared policy of the
United States. While it has been decided that the Constitution and acts of Congress do not apply ex
proprio vigore to this country, but that they must be expressly entended by Congress, nevertheless,
some of the basic principles upon which the government of the United States rests and the greater
part of the Bill of Rights, which protects the citizens of that country, have been extended to the
Philippine Islands by the instructions of the President to the first Philippine Commission and the
Philippine Bill. (P. 339-340.)
The declaration that a certain class of inhabitants shall be citizens of the Philippines is tantamount or
equivalent to declaring that those who do not belong to that class shall not be. Realizing the
weakness of the position taken, in view of the express provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill,
as amended, and of the fact that the Constitution of the United States and Acts of Congress do not
apply ex proprio vigore to the Philippines, the Court hastened to add another ground in support of
the pronouncement that petitioner Roa is a Filipino citizen, and for that reason entitled to land and
reside in the Philippines. The additional ground is that the petitioner's father having died in China in
1900, his mother reacquired her Filipino citizenship which he being under age followed upon the
death of his father. The concluding pronouncement in the decisionof the case is, as follows:
The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of the
Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of
this country.
If all the native inhabitants residing in the Philippines on the 11th day of April 1899, regardless of
their alien parentage, are citizens thereof, the amendatory Act of Congress of 23 March 1912
empowering the Philippine Legislature to provide by legislation for the acquisition of Filipino
citizenship by those natives excluded from such citizenship by the original section 4 of the Philippine
Bill, would be meaningless.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are not unmindful of the importance of the question submitted to us for decision. We know that
the decision upon the motion for reconsideration in these cases is momentous. We have given the
time and the thought demanded by its importance. While birth is an important element of citizenship,
it alone does not make a person a citizen of the country of his birth. Youth spent in the country;
intimate and endearing association with the citizens among whom he lives; knowledge and pride of
the country's past; belief in the greatness and security of its institutions, in the loftiness of its ideals,
and in the ability of the country's government to protect him, his children, and his earthly
possessions against perils from within and from without; and his readiness to defend the country
against such perils, are some of the important elements that would make a person living in a country
its citizen. Citizenship is a political status. The citizen must be proud of his citizenship. He should
treasure and cherish it. In the language of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, "the question of citizenship in a
nation is of the most vital importance. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition."
(U.S. vs. Wong Kim Ark, supra.) Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must
not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the application of the
principle of jus soli to persons born in this country of alien parentage would encourage dual
allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to both countries of which such persons might
claim to be citizens.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The pinciple of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The doctrines or rule laid
down, which has been followed for years, no matter how sound it may be, if found to be contrary to
law, must be abandoned. The principleof stare decisis does not and should not apply when there is
conflict between the precedent and the law. The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any
doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
It appears that the petitioner in the first case was born in San Pablo, Laguna, in July 1915, of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother, lawfully married, left for China in 1925, and returned to the
Philippines on 25 January1940. The applicant in the second case was born in Jolo, Sulu, on 8 May
1900, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. It does not appear whether they were legally
married, so in the absence of proof to the contrary they are presumed to be lawfully married. From
the date of his birth up to 16 November 1938, the date of filing of his application for naturalization,
and up to the date of hearing, he had been residing in the Philippines. He is married to a Filipino
woman and has three children by her. He speaks the local dialect and the Spanish and English
languages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Considering that the common law principle or rule of jus soli obtaining in England and in the United
States, as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, has
never been entended to this jurisdiction (section 1, Act of 1 July 1902; sec. 5, Actof 29 August 1916);
considering that the law in force and applicable to the petitioner and the applicant in the two cases at
the time of their birth is sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended by Act of 23
March 1912, which provides that only those "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands," we are of the opinion and so hold that the petitioner in the first case and the applicant in the
second case, who were born of alien parentage, were not and are not, under saidsection, citizens of
the Philippine Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Needless to say, this decision is not intended or designed to deprive, as it cannot divest, of their
Filipino citizenship, those who had been declared to be Filipino citizens, or upon whom such
citizenship had been conferred, by the courts because of the doctrine or principle of res
adjudicata.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Accordingly, the decision of this Court in the first case confirming the lower court's judgment is set
aside; the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila appealed from is reversed; the petitioner
is recommitted to the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration to be dealt with in accordance
with law; and the decision of this Court in the second case is set aside; the decree of theCourt of
First Instance of Zamboanga appealed from granting the applicant's peition for naturalization filed
on16 November 1938 is affirmed, for the applicant comes under section 1 (a), Act 2927, as
amended by Act 3448, and possesses the qualifications required by setion 3 of the same Act, as
amended, which was the law in force at the time of the filing of the petition for naturalization. No
costs shall be taxed in both cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, and Hontiveros, JJ.,concur.
Separate Opinionschanrobles virtual law library
HILADO, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library
I concur in the entire majority opinion. I concur inthe revocation of the doctrine of jus soli enunciated,
among other cases, in Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 315. Besides, the ruling in that
case can not be invoked in favor of the petitioner in G.R. No. 47616 nor of the applicant in G.R. No.
47623 for the reason that, while Tranquilino Roa in that case was born in the Philippines in theyear
1889, when articles 17 et seq. of the Civil Code were yet in force here and made him a Spanish
subject, the said petitioner and applicant in the instant cases were born, although also in the
Philippines, 1915 and 1900, respectively, i. e., after the abrogation of said articles, due to their
political character, upon the changeof sovereignty following the treaty of Paris ending theSpanish-
American war (Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 315, 330; Halleck's International Law,
Chapter 34, par. 14; American and Ocean Insurance Companies vs. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. [26
U.S.], 511 542, 7 Law.ed., 242). As declared in the majority opinion, the citizenship of said petitioner
and applicant should be determined as of the dates of their respective
births.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At the time the petitioner in G.R. No. 47616 was born (1915) the law on Philippine citizenship was
contained in the Philippine Bill, section 4, as amended by the Act of Congress of March 23, 1912.
Under this provision said petitioner could not be a Filipino citizen upon the date of his birth because
his father, who was legally married to his mother, was a Chinese citizen and not a subject of Spain.
If his father had been a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, like his mother, who was a native Filipina,
before their marriage - and in that case, after said marriage, she would have acquired the citizenship
of her husband even if she had been a foreigner - then under section 4 of thePhilippine Bill, as
amended, said parents of said petitioner would have become citizens of the Philippines unless they
should have elected to preserve their allegiance to Spain in the manner and within the period therein
prescribed; and then, too, the petitioner upon being born in 1915 would automatically have acquired
Philippine citizenship. But such was not the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The applicant in G.R. No. 47623 could not possibly be a Filipino citizen upon his birth (1900)
because, aside from the fact that his father, who is presumed to have been legally married to his
mother, was a Chinese subject, there was no law on Philippine citizenship at that time, because,
firstly, even the aforecited articles of the Civil Code had previously been abrogated, as already
stated by the change of sovereignty in the Philippines following the Spanish-American war,
secondly, said articles at any rate did not regulate Philippine citizenship nor did they make said
applicant's father a Spanish subject, and, thirdly, the Philippine Bill was not enacted until July 1,
1902.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of the applicant in G.R. No. 47623, his father was a Chinese subject on April 11, 1899.
And his mother, upon her marriage with her Chinese husband, acquired his nationality. So that when
said applicant was born in 1900 his parents were Chinese subjects. When the Philippine Bill was
enacted on July 1, 1902, therefore, said applicant and his parents were not subjects of Spain and
consequently could not have acquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of section 4 thereof. It was only
after the Philippine Naturalization Law was enacted, pursuant to the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916 (Jones Law), that the said applicant had his first opportunity to become a naturalized citizen of
this country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Consequently, I reach the same conclusion as the majority.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity

as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying
reconsideration.3
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied
for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue
district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in
obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to
slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent
suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year.6
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income
taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore,
respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional
documents to support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on
April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section 229 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but
such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from
the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise
after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor,
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to
claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are
of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and
nights from sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which
they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the
filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,
respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was
filed beyond the reglementary period.15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13
of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap
year.19
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April
14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of
730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.20
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly
construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against respondent
inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds
and tax credits) begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the claim
should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time
respondent filed its final adjusted return.
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year
prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted
return.24 But how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled
that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.26
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of
thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according
to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night"
from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it
may contain."28 It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to,
but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month."29 To illustrate,
one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one
calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.30
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated
by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled
with the previous one).31Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987
states:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify
or designate the laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws
inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987. 1avvphi 1
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and
unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses
entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.33
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a
year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation
of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-
year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return34 on April
14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

1 month
2nd calendar May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

month
3rd calendar June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998

month
4th calendar July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
month
5th calendar August 15, 1998 to September 14,

month 1998
6th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1998

month 1998
7th calendar October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
month
8th calendar November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998
month
9th calendar December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999

month
10th calendar January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
month
11th calendar February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
month
12th calendar March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

month
Year 13th calendar April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

2 month
14th calendar May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
month
15th calendar June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
month
16th calendar July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

month
17th calendar August 15, 1999 to September 14,

month 1999
18th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1999

month 1999
19th calendar October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999
month
20th calendar November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999
month
21st calendar December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000

month
22nd calendar January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

month
23rd calendar February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
month
24th calendar March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
month
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the
24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within
the reglementary period.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals
which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property
Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices

Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Jose C. Mendoza of the Special Fifteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 21-25.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices

Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Jose C. Mendoza of the Former Special Fifteenth Division of
the Court of Appeals. Id., pp. 26-28.
4 Id., pp. 37-42.
5 Id., pp. 39-40.
6Id. This was the period of economic slowdown known as the "Asian (Financial) Crisis"
which started in mid-1997.
7 Id., p. 41.
8 Summary of Tax/Payments for 1997:
Creditable
Quarter Corporate Income Tax TOTAL
Withholding Tax
1st ₱ 3,440,082.00 ₱ 687,783.00 ₱ 4,127,865.00
2nd 15,694,502.00 633,175.00 16,327,677.00
3rd 2,419,868.81 3,154,506.51 5,574,375.32

4th 288,481.00 288,481.00
₱ 21,554,452.81 ₱ 4,763,945.51 ₱ 26,318,398.32
Id., p. 40.
9 Id., p. 41.
10 Id., pp. 78-79.

11 Docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 6113. Id., pp. 192-199.
12Penned by Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta and concurred in by Associate Judges

Amancio Q. Saga (retired) and Ramon O. de Veyra (retired). Dated December 15, 2000. Id.,
pp. 187-190.
13 CIR v. CA, 361 Phil. 359, 364-365 (1999).
14 The computation was as follows:
April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 ----------------------- 365 days
April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 (leap year) ---------- 366 days
TOTAL 731 days
15 Rollo, p. 190.
16 Id., p. 191.
17Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64782. Id., pp. 180-186. (This case observes the procedure
in RA 1125 prior to the amendments of RA 9282.)
18Id., pp. 21-25. Under RA 9282 which took effect on April 22, 2004, decisions of the CTA
are now appealable to the Supreme Court.
19 Id., p. 24.
20 Id.
21 Id., pp. 26-28.
22 Id., p. 13.
23 Id., p. 15.
24Tax Code, Sec. 229 and supra note 12 at 367. See also ACCRA Investments Corporation
v. CA., G.R. No. 96322, 20 December 1991, 204 SCRA 957. See also CIR v. Philippine
American Life Insurance Co., G.R. No. 105208, 29 May 1995, 244 SCRA 446.
25 139 Phil. 584 (1969).
26 Id., pp. 588-589 citing People v. del Rosario, 97 Phil 70, 71 (1955).
27 Executive Order
28 Gutierrez v. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334, 335-336 (1929).
29 Section 9, Time, 74 AmJur 2d 593 citing Re Lynch's Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254 P2d 454.
30This is pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Civil Code which provides that "[i]n computing a
period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included."
Cf. Rules of Court, Rule 22, Sec. 1. The section provides:
Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or

allowed by this Rules, or by the order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run
is to be excluded and the date of performance included.If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday in the
place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
(emphasis supplied)
31Jose Jesus G. Laurel, Statutory Construction: Cases and Materials, 1999 ed.,
176 citing Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 1463.
32 Agujetas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106560, 23 August 1996, 261 SCRA 17, 32.
33 David v. Commission on Election, G.R. No. 127116, 08 April 1997, 271 SCRA 90, 103.
34 Supra note 25.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184823 October 6, 2010
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right,
privilege, or incentive in his favor, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of
taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement
to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural due process as non-observance of the
prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative and the judicial claims would result in the
denial of his claim.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the July
30, 2008 Decision1 and the October 6, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in the manufacturing, producing, and
processing of steel and its by-products.3 It is registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as
a Value-Added Tax (VAT) entity4 and its products, "close impression die steel forgings" and "tool and
dies," are registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a pioneer status.5
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1,
2002 to September 30, 2002 in the total amount of ₱3,891,123.82 with the petitioner Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency
Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center.6
Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA
On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review7 with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same
input VAT. The case was docketed as CTA Case No. 7065 and was raffled to the Second Division of
the CTA.
In the Petition for Review, respondent alleged that for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002, it generated and recorded zero-rated sales in the amount of ₱131,791,399.00,8 which was
paid pursuant to Section 106(A) (2) (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997 (NIRC);9 that for the said period, it incurred and paid input VAT amounting to ₱3,912,088.14
from purchases and importation attributable to its zero-rated sales;10and that in its application for
refund/credit filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center,
it only claimed the amount of ₱3,891,123.82.11
In response, petitioner filed his Answer12 raising the following special and affirmative defenses, to
wit:
4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative investigation by the

Bureau;
5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input taxes for the period in question;
6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export sales contemplated under Sections 106(A)
(2) (a), and 108(B) (1) of the Tax Code of 1997;
7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed within the two (2) year period prescribed in
Section 229 of the Tax Code;
8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to
refund, and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for refund; and
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake of the
nature of exemption from taxation.13
Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision
partially granting respondent’s claim for refund/credit. Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to validly claim a refund, Section 112 (A) of
the NIRC of 1997, as amended, provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-
rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax
due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax
has not been applied against output tax: x x x
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with the following requisites: (1) the
taxpayer is engaged in sales which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is VAT-
registered; (3) the claim must be filed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when
such sales were made; and (4) the creditable input tax due or paid must be attributable to such
sales, except the transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against
the output tax.
The Court finds that the first three requirements have been complied [with] by petitioner.
With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by petitioner, such as the Sales Invoices
(Exhibits "II" to "II-262," "JJ" to "JJ-431," "KK" to "KK-394" and "LL") shows that it is engaged in sales
which are zero-rated.
The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The Certificate of Registration with OCN
1RC0000148499 (Exhibit "C") with the BIR proves that petitioner is a registered VAT taxpayer.
In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its administrative claim for refund on September
30, 2004 (Exhibit "N") and the present Petition for Review on September 30, 2004, both within the
two (2) year prescriptive period from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made,
which is from September 30, 2002.
As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there are some documents and claims of
petitioner that are baseless and have not been satisfactorily substantiated.
xxxx
In sum, petitioner has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit
certificate representing unutilized excess input VAT payments for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002, which are attributable to its zero-rated sales for the same period, but in the
reduced amount of ₱3,239,119.25, computed as follows:
Amount of Claimed Input VAT ₱ 3,891,123.82

Less:
Exceptions as found by the ICPA 41,020.37
Net Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,850,103.45

Less:
Output VAT Due 610,984.20
Excess Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,239,119.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT
CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner [in] the reduced amount of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN AND 25/100 PESOS (₱3,239,119.25),
representing the unutilized input VAT incurred for the months of July to September 2002.
SO ORDERED.14
Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,15 insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-
year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He
reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on
September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004.16 He
cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code,17 which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC.18 According to
the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a "condition precedent"19 before a judicial
claim can be filed. He explained that the rationale of such requirement rests not only on the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies but also on the fact that the CTA is an appellate body which
exercises the power of judicial review over administrative actions of the BIR. 20
The Second Division of the CTA, however, denied petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration for
lack of merit. Petitioner thus elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc via a Petition for Review.21
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s Decision allowing the partial tax
refund/credit in favor of respondent. However, as to the reckoning point for counting the two-year
period, the CTA En Banc ruled:
Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims were filed beyond the period allowed by
law and hence, the honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the same. In addition, petitioner further
contends that respondent's filing of the administrative and judicial [claims] effectively eliminates the
authority of the honorable Court to exercise jurisdiction over the judicial claim.
We are not persuaded.
Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall file a
quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the
close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered
persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
[x x x x ]
Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty five (25) days from the close of each
taxable quarter within which to file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts. In
the case at bar, the taxable quarter involved was for the period of July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002. Applying Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, respondent has until October 25, 2002 within which to
file its quarterly return for its gross sales or receipts [with] which it complied when it filed its VAT
Quarterly Return on October 20, 2002.
In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period provided under Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC
should start from the payment of tax subject claim for refund. As stated above, respondent filed its
VAT Return for the taxable third quarter of 2002 on October 20, 2002. Thus, respondent's
administrative and judicial claims for refund filed on September 30, 2004 were filed on time because
AICHI has until October 20, 2004 within which to file its claim for refund.
In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner's contention that the 1997 NIRC requires the
previous filing of an administrative claim for refund prior to the judicial claim. This should not be the
case as the law does not prohibit the simultaneous filing of the administrative and judicial claims for
refund. What is controlling is that both claims for refund must be filed within the two-year prescriptive
period.
In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to disturb the findings and conclusion spelled
out in the assailed January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second
Division. What the instant petition seeks is for the Court En Banc to view and appreciate the
evidence in their own perspective of things, which unfortunately had already been considered and
passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED
for lack of merit. Accordingly, the January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the
CTA Second Division in CTA Case No. 7065 entitled, "AICHI Forging Company of Asia, Inc.
petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent" are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En Banc denied23 his Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes the issue of whether respondent’s judicial
and administrative claims for tax refund/credit were filed within the two-year prescriptive period
provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.24
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains that respondent’s administrative and judicial claims for tax refund/credit were
filed in violation of Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.25 He posits that pursuant to Article 13 of the
Civil Code,26 since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on
September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004.27
Petitioner further argues that the CTA En Banc erred in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in
determining the start of the two-year period as the said provision pertains to the compliance
requirements in the payment of VAT.28 He asserts that it is Section 112, paragraph (A), of the same
Code that should apply because it specifically provides for the period within which a claim for tax
refund/ credit should be made.29
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the fact that the administrative claim with the BIR and the judicial
claim with the CTA were filed on the same day.30 He opines that the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior
filing of an administrative claim.31 He insists that such procedural requirement is based on the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the fact that the CTA is an appellate body
exercising judicial review over administrative actions of the CIR.32
Respondent’s Arguments
For its part, respondent claims that it is entitled to a refund/credit of its unutilized input VAT for the
period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 as a matter of right because it has substantially complied
with all the requirements provided by law.33 Respondent likewise defends the CTA En Banc in
applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in computing the prescriptive period for the claim for tax
refund/credit. Respondent believes that Section 112(A) of the NIRC must be read together with
Section 114(A) of the same Code.34
As to the alleged simultaneous filing of its administrative and judicial claims, respondent contends
that it first filed an administrative claim with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center of the DOF before it filed a judicial claim with the CTA.35 To prove this, respondent
points out that its Claimant Information Sheet No. 4970236 and BIR Form No. 1914 for the third
quarter of 2002,37 which were filed with the DOF, were attached as Annexes "M" and "N,"
respectively, to the Petition for Review filed with the CTA.38 Respondent further contends that the
non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in
Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year
prescriptive period.39 In support thereof, respondent cites Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Victorias Milling Co., Inc.40 where it was ruled that "[i]f, however, the [CIR] takes time in deciding the
claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the
[CTA] before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the [CIR]."41 Lastly,
respondent argues that even if the period had already lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of
equity considering that it is not a jurisdictional requirement.42
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Unutilized input VAT must be claimed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made
In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, the
Second Division of the CTA applied Section 112(A) of the NIRC, which states:
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-
rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax
due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax
has not been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of zero-rated sales
under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign
currency exchange proceeds thereof had been duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where the taxpayer is
engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or
properties or services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be directly and
entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of
the volume of sales. (Emphasis supplied.)
The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into consideration Sections 114 and 229 of the NIRC,
which read:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax. –
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall file a
quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the
close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered
persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
Any person, whose registration has been cancelled in accordance with Section 236, shall file a
return and pay the tax due thereon within twenty-five (25) days from the date of cancellation of
registration: Provided, That only one consolidated return shall be filed by the taxpayer for his
principal place of business or head office and all branches.
xxxx
SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. –
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal
revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such
tax, penalty or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the
date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without written claim therefor,
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the CTA En Banc ruled that the reckoning of the two-year period for filing a claim for
refund/credit of unutilized input VAT should start from the date of payment of tax and not from the
close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.43
The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the two-year prescriptive period, however, has
already been resolved in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation,44 where
we ruled that Section 112(A) of the NIRC is the applicable provision in determining the start of the
two-year period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, and that Sections 204(C) and
229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as "both provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment
or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes."45 We explained that:
The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly provides in no uncertain terms
that unutilized input VAT payments not otherwise used for any internal revenue tax due the
taxpayer must be claimed within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter
when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT regardless of whether said tax
was paid or not. As the CA aptly puts it, albeit it erroneously applied the aforequoted Sec. 112 (A),
"[P]rescriptive period commences from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made
and not from the time the input VAT was paid nor from the time the official receipt was issued." Thus,
when a zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent transaction, said
taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for refund or tax credit of the unutilized creditable input VAT.
The reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales or transaction
was made, regardless when the input VAT was paid. Be that as it may, and given that the last
creditable input VAT due for the period covering the progress billing of September 6, 1996 is the
third quarter of 1996 ending on September 30, 1996, any claim for unutilized creditable input VAT
refund or tax credit for said quarter prescribed two years after September 30, 1996 or, to be precise,
on September 30, 1998. Consequently, MPC’s claim for refund or tax credit filed on December 10,
1999 had already prescribed.
Reckoning for prescriptive period under

Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable
To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either Sec. 204(C) or 229 of the NIRC which,
for the purpose of refund, prescribes a different starting point for the two-year prescriptive limit for
the filing of a claim therefor. Secs. 204(C) and 229 respectively provide:
Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. – The
Commissioner may –
xxxx
(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority,
refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the
purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit
for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties
shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or
refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return
filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
xxxx
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but
such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the
date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor,
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive period, reckoned from date of
payment of the tax or penalty, for the filing of a claim of refund or tax credit. Notably too, both
provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal
revenue taxes.
MPC’s creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is an indirect tax which can be
shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of the
taxpayer. The fact that the subsequent sale or transaction involves a wholly-tax exempt client,
resulting in a zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transaction, does not, standing alone, deprive the
taxpayer of its right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input VAT, albeit the erroneous, illegal,
or wrongful payment angle does not enter the equation.
xxxx
Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112 (A) of the NIRC, providing a two-
year prescriptive period reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant
sales or transactions were made pertaining to the creditable input VAT, applies to the instant
case, and not to the other actions which refer to erroneous payment of taxes.46 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CTA En Banc erroneously applied Sections 114(A) and 229
of the NIRC in computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund/credit of unutilized
input VAT. To be clear, Section 112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the refund/credit of
input VAT. Thus, the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made.
The administrative claim was timely filed
Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine whether the administrative claim was timely
filed.
Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code,47 which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and
taking into account the fact that the year 2004 was a leap year, petitioner submits that the two-year
period to file a claim for tax refund/ credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired
on September 29, 2004.48
We do not agree.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,49 we said that as between
the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of
1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail
following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.50 Thus:
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 deal with the same subject matter – the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a
year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation
of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-
year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14,
1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998
6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998
7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998
9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999
18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999
21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000
22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the
24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within
the reglementary period.51
Applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the
period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s
administrative claim was timely filed.
The filing of the judicial claim was premature
However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, we are constrained to deny
respondent’s claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation of Section 112(D) of the
NIRC, which provides that:
xxxx
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. – In proper cases, the
Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within
one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the
application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the
Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected
may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration
of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax
Appeals. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 days, from the date of the
submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit]," within
which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse
is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if
after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the
taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously filed on September 30,
2004. Obviously, respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day
period. For this reason, we find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Respondent’s assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day period is not fatal to the filing of a
judicial claim as long as both the administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the two-year
prescriptive period52 has no legal basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondent’s view. Subsection (A) of the said
provision states that "any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply
for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to
such sales." The phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund" refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.
This is apparent in the first paragraph of subsection (D) of the same provision, which states that the
CIR has "120 days from the submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in
accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)" within which to decide on the claim.
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render nugatory Section 112(D) of the
NIRC, which already provides for a specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal the
decision or inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph of Section 112(D) of the NIRC envisions two
scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2)
when no decision is made after the 120-day period. In both instances, the taxpayer has 30 days
within which to file an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in filing
an appeal with the CTA.
With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc.53 relied upon by
respondent, we find the same inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306,
now Section 229 of the NIRC. And as already discussed, Section 229 does not apply to
refunds/credits of input VAT, such as the instant case.
In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA
warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed July 30, 2008 Decision and the
October 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Court of Tax Appeals Second Division is DIRECTED to dismiss CTA Case No. 7065 for having
been prematurely filed.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1Rollo, pp. 31-A-43; penned by Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova and concurred in by
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Justices Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., Lovell
R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, and Olga Palanca-Enriquez.
2 Id. at 44-45.
3 Id. at 13.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 CTA Second Division rollo, pp. 26-27.
7 Rollo, pp. 79-90.
8 Id. at 82.
9 SEC. 106. Value-added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties. –
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every
sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods or
properties sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or
transferor.
xxxx
(2) The following sales by VAT-registered persons shall be subject to zero percent
(0%) rate:
(a) Export Sales. – The term ‘export sales’ means:
(1) The sale and actual shipment of goods from the Philippines to a foreign country,
irrespective of any shipping arrangement that may be agreed upon which may
influence or determine the transfer of ownership of the goods so exported and paid
for in acceptable foreign currency or its equivalent in goods or services, and
accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP);
(2) Sale of raw materials or packaging materials to a nonresident buyer for delivery to
a resident local export-oriented enterprise to be used in manufacturing, processing,
packing or repacking in the Philippines of the said buyer’s goods and paid for in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP);
(3) Sale of raw materials or packaging materials to export-oriented enterprise whose

export sales exceed seventy percent (70%) of total annual production;
xxxx
10 Rollo, p. 82
11 Id. at 82-83.
12 Id. at 91-94.
13
Id. at 92.
14 Id. at 53-54 and 61-62.
15 Id. at 95-104.
16 Id. at 98.
17Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four
hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of
days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.
18 Rollo, pp. 98-99.
19 Id. at 101.
20 Id. at 100-101.
21 Id. at 105-118.
22 Id. at 41-43.
23 Id. at 44-45.
24 Id. at 19.
25 Id.
26 Supra note 17.
27 Rollo, p. 21.
28 Id. at 22.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 24.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 25.
33 Id. at 161-162.
34 Id. at 164.
35 Id. at166.
36 CTA Second Division rollo, p. 26.
37 Id. at 27.
38 Rollo, p. 166.
39 Id. at 166.
40
130 Phil. 12 (1968).
41 Id. at 16.
42 Rollo, p. 167.
43 Id.
44 G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008, 565 SCRA 154.
45 Id. at 173.
46 Id. at 171-175.
47 Supra note 17.
48 Rollo, p. 21.
49 G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436.
50 Id. at 444.
51 Id. at 444-445.
52 Rollo, p. 166.
53 Supra note 40.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner,

vs.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,1 Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure (Rules) are the April 30, 20082 and August 1, 20083 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 of Caloocan City, which annulled and set aside the Orders
dated September 4, 20065 and November 16, 20066 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
50 of Caloocan City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634.
The facts are simple and undisputed:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private
complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the MeTC
Branch. 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were
provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules).7 Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003 Order on July
2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.8 On July 2, 2004, Uy, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of
the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied Co’s motion for
reconsideration.10 When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from handling the
criminal cases per Order dated January 10, 2005.11The cases were, thereafter, raffled to the MeTC
Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases.12 It was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005.13 Co’s motion for reconsideration was, subsequently,
denied on December 16, 2005.14 Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before
the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096.15 We dismissed the petition per
Resolution dated February 13, 2006.16There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal
became final and executory on March 20, 2006.17
Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-
raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on July 13,
2006.18 Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved
with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096.19In spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an
Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion.20 When the court subsequently denied Uy’s
motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006,21 Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of
Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121
acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and
November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal
cases.22 Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the
petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for
TRO/WPI.
According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in this petition:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST
PETITIONER ONTHE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
CONSTITUTES FINAL DISMISSAL OF THESE CASES;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH JURISDICTION IN REVIVING THE

CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH WERE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND
OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; and
3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTITHE CASES WERE ONLY PROVISIONALLY

DISMISSED:
a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS COMPUTED

FROM ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL;
b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE BASIS FOR

COMPUTING THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR;
c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES AGAINST PETITIONER

ARE REVIVED IPSO FACTO BY THE FILING OF MOTION TO REVIVE THESE
CASES.23
Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to
speedy trial was denied. He reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the initial
trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay, which is in
violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) 24 and Section 2, Paragraph 2,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure25 mandating that the entire trial period should
not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that the
MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a
mere motion because its revival would already put him in double jeopardy.
Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such
dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice
to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court’s
issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Lastly, even assuming
that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the
June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap
year.
The petition is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this petition were also the meat of the
controversy in Co’s previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We dismissed per Resolution dated
February 13, 2006. Such dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006. While the first
petition was dismissed mainly due to procedural infirmities, this Court nonetheless stated therein that
"[i]n any event, the petition lacks sufficient showing that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon the finality of Our February 13, 2006 Resolution in
G.R. No. 171096, the same already constitutes as res judicata between the parties. On this ground
alone, this petition should have been dismissed outright.
Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly raised in the present petition, Co’s
arguments are nonetheless untenable on the grounds as follows:
First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to
show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial was
attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part
of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and necessarily a
flexible concept."26 In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay
should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.27 The factors to balance are the
following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it;
and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.28 Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which,
after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.29 "While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy
trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the
trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial."30
Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule
117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion
for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and
dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case.31 In this case, it is apparent from the records that there is no notice
of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634 or of the hearing thereon which was served on the private complainant at least three days
before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules.32 The fact is that it was only in
open court that Co moved for provisional dismissal "considering that, as per records, complainant
had not shown any interest to pursue her complaint."33 The importance of a prior notice to the
offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly explained in People v. Lacson:34
x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the
offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any
motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended
party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public
prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable
them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such
service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule
will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the
opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds,
including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of
a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make
witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the
accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other
prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or
loss of the prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party
to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property
or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.35
Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co’s supposition that the dismissal of the
cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and not after notice
to the offended party. When the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent
one year after the issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally
interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy the basic requirements of due process;
thus, said in one case:
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision
should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without
the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the
timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.36
We hasten to add though that if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better rule
is that the reckoning period should commence to run from the time such private counsel was actually
notified of the order of provisional dismissal. When a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all
kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given address.37 Section 2, Rule
13 of the Rules analogously provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon the
former shall be made upon the latter.38
Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving
it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such interpretation is
not found in the Rules. Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put the offended party at the
mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice must be taken
of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal with clogged dockets in addition
to their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could not be expected to act at all times on
all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within the prescribed period of time. It is
likewise possible that some of them, motivated by ill-will or malice, may simply exercise their whims
and caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.
Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s
motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co’s categorical admission that Uy is
represented by a private counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3,
2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a
motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order of provisional dismissal, it
necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the private
counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.
And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a leap
year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of receipt of
the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases
against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular
year or a leap year.39 Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a yearis composed of 12
calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant. This was our ruling in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,40 which was subsequently reiterated in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,41 thus:
x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31.Legal Periods.- "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty
days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to
the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night"
from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it
may contain." It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to,
but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month." To illustrate,
one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one
calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.42
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the one-
year period reckoned from the time Uy received the order of dismissal on July2, 2003 consisted of
24 calendar months, computed as follows:
1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003
2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003
3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2, 2003
6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004
7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004
8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004
10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004

11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004
12th calendar month June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004
In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was filed as a dilatory
tactic to prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634. As correctly pointed out
by Uy since the time when the "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" was filed, the issues raised herein
were already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. Verily, Co, acting through the
guidance and advice of his counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a worthless and vexatious
legal maneuver for no purpose other than to delay the trial court proceedings. It appears that Atty.
Maglaque’s conduct contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03,
Canon 10) as well as not to unduly delay a case or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12).
The Lawyer’s Oath also upholds in particular:
x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients x x x.1âwphi1
This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the prompt termination of
litigation is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice. In Spouses Aguilar v.
Manila Banking Corporation,43 We said:
The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court, must see
to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a counsel
to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack
of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to
advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s
oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1,
2008 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which affirmed
the January 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan City, annulling
and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that permanently dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.
The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate

Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque for his acts that appear to have violated the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Rule on Forum Shopping.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**

Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES***

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Surnamed Yu in some parts of the records.
* Per Special Order No. 1707 dated June 17, 2014.
** Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014.
*** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per
Special Order No. 1704 dated June 17, 2014.
2
Rollo, p. 36.
3
Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate Justices Rebecca
De Guia-Salvador and Vicente S.E. Veloso concurring; id. at 38-40, 307-309.
4
Rollo, pp. 243-246.
5
Id. at 172-174.
6
Id. at 206.
7
Id. at 44. Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules states:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except

with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six

(6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived.
8
Rollo, p. 57.
9
Id. at 50, 58.
10
Id. at 56-58, 69-71.
11
Id. at 244.
12
Id. at 72-87.
13
Id. at 116-117, 292-293.
14
Id. at 128, 294.
15
Id. at 129-144.
16
Id. at 147-148, 295-296.
17
Id. at 297-298.
18
Id. at 149-165.
19
Id. at 166-171.
20
Id. at 172-174, 299-301.
21
Id. at 206.
22
Id. at 243-246, 302-305.
23
Id. at 12-13.
24
Section 6. Time Limit for Trial.- In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime,
except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed
by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos
(₱1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after
consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for
continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so
as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty
(180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule22 of the Rules of Court.
25
SEC. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.—Trial once commenced shall
continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a
reasonable period of time for good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the
case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest
possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period
exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise
authorized by the Supreme Court.
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not
apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter
period of trial.
Jacob v. Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010, 635
26
SCRA 94, 106.
27
Id.; People v. Rama, 403 Phil. 155, 168 (2001).
28
Tan v. People of the Philippines, 604 Phil. 68, 81 (2009).
29
Id.; Jacob v. Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, supra note 26, at 106-107.
30
People v. Rama, supra note 27.
People v. Lacson, 448 Phil. 317, 370-371 (2003), as cited in Los Baños v. Pedro, 604 Phil.
31
215, 229 (2009).

32
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion.– Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by
the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall
be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three
(3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice.
33
See Order dated June 9, 2003 (Rollo, p. 44).
34
448 Phil. 317 (2003).
35
People v. Lacson, supra note 31, at 378-379.
36
Id. at 371.
See Sy v. Fairland Knitcraft Co., Inc., G.R. No. 182915 and G.R. No. 189658, December
37
12, 2011, 662 SCRA 67, 100 and Bello v. National Labor Relations Commission, 559 Phil.
20, 27 (2007), citing Ginete v. Sunrise Manning Agency, 411 Phil. 953, 957-958 (2001).
38
Id.
39
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 558 Phil. 182, 189
(2007).
40
558 Phil. 182 (2007).
41
G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 422.
42
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., supra note 39.
43
533 Phil. 645 (2006).
44
Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, supra, at 669.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,

vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-
appellee.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.
ANTONIO, J.:p
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the
accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in
issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1
The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the
poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not
authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his
possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with
one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial
was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed
to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment
as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them
the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His
appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:
Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be
an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and
order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of
trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the
detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the
undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have
qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally
of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in
this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be
clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered
sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate
separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a
firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of
your duties.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by
taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE

Provincial Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Make: — German
SN: — 64
Cal:— .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas
as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted
persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order
condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to
possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the
performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.
Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence
of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to
possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its
decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases
of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court
considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero,

supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a
certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial
Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of
crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that
while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit,
nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and
Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero,
We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to
the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to
effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and
by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful
for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards
in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms
are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of
their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he
is not exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our
decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in
this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero,
or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he
accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time
appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that
the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held
not to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.
2 106 Phil. (1959), 713.
3 103 Phil. (1958), 500.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 97973 January 27, 1992
SPOUSES GAUVAIN and BERNARDITA BENZONAN, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BENITO SALVANI PE and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 97998 January 27, 1992
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENITO SALVANI PE, respondents.
Ruben E. Agpalo for Sps. Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan.
Vicente R. Acsay for Benito Salvani Pe.
Thomas T. Jacobo for DBP.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the August 31, 1990 decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the
right of respondent Benito Salvani Pe to repurchase a parcel of land foreclosed by petitioner
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and sold to petitioners Gauvain and Bernardita
Benzonan.
Respondent Pe is a businessman in General Santos City who owns extensive commercial and
agricultural properties. He is the proprietor of the firm "Dadiangas B.P. Trading." One of the
properties he acquired through free patents and miscellaneous sales from the Bureau of Lands is a
26,064 square meters parcel covered by Free Patent No. 46128 issued on October 29, 1969. OCT
No. P-2404 was issued on November 24, 1969.
On February 24, 1970 or barely three months after he acquired the land, the respondent mortgaged
the lot in question, together with another lot covered by TCT No. 3614 and some chattels to secure a
commercial loan of P978,920.00 from the DBP. The lot was developed into a commercial-industrial
complex with ricemill and warehouse facilities, a solar drier, an office and residential building,
roadway, garden, depository, and dumping grounds for various materials.
When the private respondent failed to pay his loan after more than seven years had passed, DBP
foreclosed the mortgage on June 28, 1977. On that date, the total obligation amounted to
P1,114,913.34. DBP was the highest bidder. Certificates of sale were issued in its favor;
P452,995.00 was for the two lots and P108,450.00 for the chattels. The certificate covering the
disputed lot was registered with the Registry of Deeds on January 24, 1978.
After the foreclosure sale, respondent Pe leased the lot and its improvements from DBP for
P1,500.00 a month. Part of the property was also leased by DBP to the then National Grains
Authority.
The respondent failed to redeem the property within the one year period. On September 24, 1979
DBP sold the lot to the petitioner for P1,650,000.00 payable in quarterly amortizations over a five
year period. The petitioners occupied the purchased lot and introduced further improvements worth
P970,000.00.
On July 12, 1983, claiming that he was acting within the legal period given to him to repurchase,
respondent Pe offered in writing to repurchase the lot for P327,995.00. DBP countered, however,
that over the years a total of P3,056,739.52 had already been incurred in the preservation,
maintenance, and introduction of improvements.
On October 4, 1983, Pe filed a complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City.
On November 27, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant Development Bank of the

Philippines is ordered:
1) to reconvey unto the plaintiff the parcel of land in question (Lot No. P-2404) for the
repurchase price of P327,995.00 plus legal interest from June 18, 1977 to June 19,
1978 only, and the expenses of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; expenses for
registration and ten percent (10%) attorneys fees;
2) ordering the defendants to vacate forever the premises of said property in favor of
the plaintiff upon payment of the total repurchase price;
3) ordering the defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees in
the amount of P25,000.00;
4) and to set an example to government banking and lending institutions not to take
borrowers for granted by making it hard for them to repurchase by misleading them,
the bank is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff by way of exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00;
Ordering further the defendant DBP:
5) to reimburse the co-defendants spouses Benzonan the amount they have paid or
advanced the defendant DBP for the purchase of Lot O.C.T. No. P-2404;
6) ordering the defendants to pay the cost of suit. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 74-
75)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with modifications as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
All the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the
decision rendered by the court a quo with the modification that the defendant DBP
shall reimburse to its co-defendant Benzonan spouses all amounts that the latter
have paid for the land, minus interest, and that the Benzonan spouses shall be
allowed to remove the improvement that they have made on the property under
litigation, without impairing or damaging the same. (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, p. 105)
A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 19, 1991.
The petitioners-spouses in G.R. No. 97973 raise the following "legal issues, reasons, or errors"
allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that conversion and use of the land in
question to industrial or commercial purposes, as a result of which it could no longer
be used for cultivation, and the fact that respondent Pe has vast holdings whose
motive in seeking to repurchase the property is to continue the business or for
speculation or greater profits did not deprive him of the right to repurchase under
Sec. 119 of CA 141, and, as a result, in ignoring or disregarding Pe's admissions and
undisputed facts establishing such circumstances, contrary to what this Court held
in Santana v. Mariñas, 94 SCRA 853 [1979], Vargas v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA
195 [1979] and Simeon v. Peña, 36 SCRA 610 [1970].
2. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent Pe still had the right to repurchase the land
under Sec. 119 of CA 141, the Court of Appeals erred in not counting the 5-year
period from the date of foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977 or at the very most from its
registration on January 24, 1978, in accordance with the prevailing doctrinal law at
the time as enunciated in Monge v. Angeles, 101 Phil. 561 [1957], Oliva
v.Lamadrid, 21 SCRA 737 [1967] and Tupas v. Damasco, 132 SCRA 593 [1984],
pursuant to which Pe's right to repurchase already expired.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively the ruling in Belisario

v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 165 SCRA 101 [1988], which held that the 5-year
period is counted from the date after the one-year period to redeem foreclosed
homestead expired, to the foreclosure of the land in question in 1977, as its
retroactive application revived Pe's lost right of repurchase and defeated petitioners'
right of ownership that already accrued under the then prevailing doctrinal law.
4. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent Pe had the right to repurchase the land in
question and assuming, further, that the 5-year period is to be counted from the
consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the one-year period to redeem, the
Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the mere filing of an action for repurchase
without tendering or depositing the repurchase price did not satisfy the requirements
of repurchase, Pe's failure to make the tender or deposit even up to the present
being confirmatory of speculative motive behind his attempt to repurchase.
5. Assuming, finally, that respondent Pe is entitled to repurchase the property, the

Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioners are possessors in good faith,
similar to a vendee a retro, entitled (a) to reimbursement of necessary and useful
expenses under Article 1616 of the Civil Code as held in Calagan v. CFI of
Davao, 95 SCRA 498 [1980] and in Lee v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 196 [1975];
and (b) to refund of all amounts paid by them by reason of the sale of the property in
their favor, including interest payments, in both instances with right of retention.
(Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 14-16)
In G.R No. 97998, DBP limited its petition to the value of the repurchase price and the nature of the
contract between the parties. It framed the issues as follows:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that Section 31 of Commonwealth Act
No. 459 as amended is not applicable in the instant case to determine the
repurchase price contrary to decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court in the
following cases: DBP v. Jimenez, et al. (36 SCRA 426) and DBP v. Mirang (66 SCRA
141).
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the law between the contracting
parties are the terms and conditions embodied in the contract signed by them.
(Rollo of G.R. No. 97998, p. 12)
We find merit in the petitions.
The determination of the main issues raised by the petitioners calls for the proper application of
Section 119 of CA 141 as amended which provides: "Every conveyance of land acquired under the
free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant,
his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance."
There is no dispute over the fact that the Government awarded the land to respondent Pe so that he
could earn a living by farming the land. Did respondent Pe lose his right to repurchase the subject
agricultural lot under the aforequoted law considering its conversion for industrial or commercial
purposes? The evidence relating to the conversion is sufficiently established and yet was not
properly appreciated by the respondent court.
Only three months after getting the free patent and the original certificate of title over the subject lot,
it was mortgaged by respondent Pe to get a commercial loan of nearly P1 million from DBP. Pe
spent the proceeds of the loan to construct permanent improvements on the lot for his rice-mill and
other businesses, i.e., two warehouse buildings; administration-residential building; perimeter fence;
solar and concrete drier; shed; machine shop; dirty kitchen; and machineries and equipments such
as ricemill (TSN, August 13, 1984, pp. 173-174). The entire lot has been converted to serve
commercial and industrial purposes. The testimony of petitioners Gauvain Benzonan on this score
has not been successfully challenged, viz:
Q. Out of this 2.6 hectares land area, how much of this is devoted to
the solar drier construction?
A. The solar drier is about one thousand (1,000) square meters . . .

ah no, about six thousand (6,000) square meters.
Q. What about the area occupied by the warehouse and the ricemill
complex?
A. The warehouse and ricemill complex is occupying about one and a

half (1 1/2) hectares.
Q. What about the area occupied by the residence as well as the

roadways?
A. It covers about another half of a hectare again, Sir.
Q. Is any part of this two point six hectares devoted to agricultural

production or production of agricultural crops?
A. None whatsoever because the other portion is occupied as a

dumping area for our waste materials. (TSN, PP. 361-362, Sept. 3,
1985).
The conversion of the lot for commercial purposes is understandable considering that the heart of
General Santos City developed in that area.
The respondent does not deny that, he is using the land for purely commercial and industrial
purposes. His explanation is that the land may be converted into agricultural land in the future. He
applies the Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila (79 Phil. 461 [1947]) ruling that lands not mineral
or forest are agricultural in nature and may be devoted to business purposes without losing their
agricultural classification.
Indeed, the records show that it was never the intention of respondent Pe to utilize the land, given to
him for free by the Government, for agricultural purposes. He was not the kind of poor farmer for
whom homesteads and free patents were intended by the law.
As stated by the petitioners:
1. Respondent Pe acquired by free patent the land in question with an area of 2.6064
hectares, which was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-2404 on November 24,
1969. Instead of cultivating it for agricultural purposes, Pe mortgaged the land, along
with another land, on February 24, 1970, or only three (3) months from issuance of
OCT No.
P-2404, with the DBP for P978,920.00. (par. 4, complaint, Annex "A"). Pe testified
that his purpose was to construct in the land in question "bodega", an administration-
residential building, a perimeter fence, a concrete drier, and for some machineries
and equipment." (TSN, p. 95, June 22, 1984). He stated that the improvements and
facilities in the land included "the warehouse, the ricemill and a big warehouse
housing the palay of stocks of the National Grains Authority and an administration-
residential building, a solar drier and a perimeter fence and some sheds or garage . .
. a small piggery pen of several compartments, a dirty kitchen . . . a machine shop."
(TSN, pp. 173-174, August 13, 1984). Pe used the property for such purposes and
operated the ricemill business for a period of about nine (9) years until September,
1979 (pars. 7 and 8, complaint, Annex "A"), without paying the DBP of his mortgage
indebtedness, as a result of which DBP foreclosed the properties. (Annex "F")
2. Respondent Pe testified that the land in question with its improvements has an
appraised value of P1,347,860.00 in 1974, and P2,028,030.00 in 1976. (TSN, pp.
176, 177, August 13, 1984). Petitioner Gauvain Benzonan claimed it has a fair
market value, as of 1985, of P5,000,000.00. (p. 8, trial court decision, Annex "F"). As
against such value of the land and improvements, respondent Pe insisted that the
repurchase price should only be the principal sum of P327,995.00. (par. 10,
complaint, Annex "A")
3. Respondent Pe, when he testified in 1984, said he was 60 years old; he is now
therefore over 66 years old. He is a "businessman and resident of Dadiangas,
General Santos City" (TSN, p. 3, June 20, 1984), doing business under the style,
"Dadiangas B.P. Trading" (TSN, 144, June 22, 1984). In his sworn declaration dated
July 18, 1983, filed with the assessor's office pursuant to P.D. No. 1612, he listed the
following real properties and their market value, all situated in General Santos City,
to wit (Exh. 11-Benzonan):
(a) 447 sq. m. residential P 28,720.00

(b) 11.9980 hectares of agri. lot P 23,880.00
(c) 2.000 hectares of agri. lot P 40,000.00
(d) 2.000 hectares of agri. lot P 40,000.00
(e) 6,064 sq. m. of industrial lot P303,200.00
(f) Industrial building P434,130.00
(g) Industrial machinery P 96,000.00
On June 22, 1984, when Pe testified, he said that "I own three (3) residential lots,"
(TSN, p. 153, June 22, 1984) and that he and his wife own in Antique Province
"around twenty (20) hectares planted to coconut and sugarcane" (ibid., p. 145); he
used to have 30 hectares of agricultural lands and 22 subdivision lots, which he sold
to Norma Salvani and Carlos Salvani. (TSN, pp. 166-169, June 22, 1984); Exhs. 1, 1-
A, 1-B, 1-C, 3, 6, 6-A-Benzonan). (Rollo of G.R. No. 97973, pp. 17-19)
In the light of the records of these cases, we rule that respondent Pe cannot repurchase the disputed
property without doing violence to everything that CA No. 141 (as amended) stands for.
We ruled in Simeon v. Peña, 36 SCRA 610, 617 [1970] through Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee,
that:
xxx xxx xxx

These findings of fact of the Court of Appeals that "(E)vidently, the reconveyance
sought by the plaintiff (petitioner) is not in accordance with the purpose of the law,
that is, "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public
land which the State has gratuitously given to him"" and expressly found by it to "find
justification from the evidence of record. . . ."
Under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to agree with the Court of Appeals
that petitioners' proposed repurchase of the property does not fall within the purpose,
spirit and meaning of section 119 of the Public Land Act, authorizing redemption of
the homestead from any vendee thereof.
We reiterated this ruling in Vargas v. Court of Tax Appeals, 91 SCRA 195, 200, [1979] viz:
As regards the case of Simeon v. Peña, petitioners ought to know that petitioner
therein was not allowed to repurchase because the lower court found that his
purpose was only speculative and for profit. In the present case, the Court of Appeals
found that herein petitioners' purposes and motives are also speculative and for
profit.
It might be well to note that the underlying principle of Section 119 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for
himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a
reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it. (Simeon v. Peña, 36 SCRA 617).
As found by the Court of Appeals, the motive of the petitioners in repurchasing the
lots in question being one for speculation and profit, the same therefore does not fall
within the purpose, spirit and meaning of said section.
and in Santana et al. v. Mariñas, 94 SCRA 853, 861-862 [1979] to wit:
In Simeon v. Peña we analyzed the various cases previously decided, and arrived at
the conclusion that the plain intent, the raison d' etre, of Section 119, C.A. No. 141 ".
. . is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and
his family the land that the state had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his
labor in cleaning and cultivating it." In the same breath, we agreed with the trial court,
in that case, that "it is in this sense that the provision of law in question becomes
unqualified and unconditional. And in keeping with such reasons behind the passage
of the law, its basic objective is to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and
decent living for destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of independent small
landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order.
As it was in Simeon v. Peña, respondent Mariñas' intention in exercising the right of

repurchase "is not for the purpose of preserving the same within the family fold," but
"to dispose of it again for greater profit in violation of the law's policy and spirit." The
foregoing conclusions are supported by the trial court's findings of fact already cited,
culled from evidence adduced. Thus respondent Mariñas was 71 years old and a
widower at the time of the sale in 1956; that he was 78 when he testified on October
24, 1963 (or over 94 years old today if still alive); that . . . he was not living on the
property when he sold the same but was residing in the poblacion attending to a
hardware store, and that the property was no longer agricultural at the time of the
sale, but was a residential and commercial lot in the midst of many subdivisions. The
profit motivation behind the effort to repurchase was conclusively shown when the
then plaintiff's counsel, in the case below, Atty. Loreto Castillo, in his presence,
suggested to herein petitioners' counsel, Atty. Rafael Dinglasan ". . . to just add to
the original price so the case would be settled." Moreover, Atty. Castillo manifested in
court that an amicable settlement was possible, for which reason he asked for time
"within which to settle the terms thereof'" and that "the plaintiff . . . Mr. Mariñas, has
manifested to the Court that if the defendants would be willing to pay the sum of One
Peso and Fifty Centavos (P1.50) per square meter, he would be willing to accept the
offer and dismiss the case."
Our decisions were disregarded by the respondent court which chose to adopt a Court of Appeals
ruling in Lim, et al. v. Cruz, et al., CA-G.R. No. 67422, November 25, 1983 that the motives of the
homesteader in repurchasing the land are inconsequential" and that it does not matter even "when
the obvious purpose is for selfish gain or personal aggrandizement."
The other major issue is when to count the five-year period for the repurchase by respondent Pe —
whether from the date of the foreclosure sale or from the expiration of the one year period to redeem
the foreclosed property.
The respondent court ruled that the period of repurchase should be counted from the expiration of
the one year period to redeem the foreclosed property. Since the one year period to redeem expired
on January 24, 1979 and he filed Case No. 280 on October 4, 1983 to enforce his right to
repurchase the disputed property, the Court of Appeals held that Pe exercised his right to
repurchase within the five-year period provided by Section 119 of CA 141 as amended.
The respondent court cited Belisario, et al., v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 165 SCRA 101,
107 [1988] where we held:
. . . In addition, Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 provides that every

conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead patent provisions of
the Public Land Act, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his
widow or legal heirs within the period of five years from the date of conveyance. The
five-year period of redemption fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of
homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run from the day after the
expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial
foreclosure. (Manuel v. PNB, et al., 101 Phil. 968) Hence, petitioners still had five (5)
years from July 22, 1972 (the expiration of the redemption period under Act 3135)
within which to exercise their right to repurchase under the Public Land Act.
As noted by the respondent court, the 1988 case of Belisario reversed the previous rulings of this
Court enunciated in Monge, et al., v. Angeles, et al., 101 Phil. 563 [1957] and Tupas v. Damasco, et
al., 132 SCRA 593 [1984] to the effect that the five year period of repurchase should be counted
from the date of conveyance or foreclosure sale. The petitioners, however, urge that Belisario should
only be applied prospectively or after 1988 since it established a new doctrine.
We sustain the petitioners' position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on
February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18,
1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that
enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the
DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4
of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks
forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations
of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating
new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974] ". . . when a doctrine
of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof."
There may be special cases where weighty considerations of equity and social justice will warrant a
retroactive application of doctrine to temper the harshness of statutory law as it applies to poor
farmers or their widows and orphans. In the present petitions, however, we find no such equitable
considerations. Not only did the private respondent apply for free agricultural land when he did not
need it and he had no intentions of applying it to the noble purposes behind the law, he would now
repurchase for only P327,995.00, the property purchased by the petitioners in good faith for
P1,650,000.00 in 1979 and which, because of improvements and the appreciating value of land
must be worth more than that amount now.
The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on our rulings in Monge and Tupas when they
purchased the property from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13) years ago. Under the rulings in these two
cases, the period to repurchase the disputed lot given to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982.
He failed to exercise his right. His lost right cannot be revived by relying on the 1988 case
of Belisario. The right of petitioners over the subject lot had already become vested as of that time
and cannot be impaired by the retroactive application of the Belisario ruling.
Considering our above findings, we find no need to resolve the other issues raised by the petitioners
in their petitions.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993
ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of his
share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered
to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank,
postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.1 The check was deposited on January 3,
1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED
ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 222 was filed by the salvage company
against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's
conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty
(60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was
reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on
the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160
(1987)3 — i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check
on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que
v. Peopleon September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an
obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of
the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as
follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg.
22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the

payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally
liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia
Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs.
Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A.
Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria
Aquino, August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984
(Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check
to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that
Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the
deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the
intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an
obligation," as follows:4
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having

interpreting authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but
that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs.
Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim
that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an
obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid defense.
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos
v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to
the passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP
22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court
dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court
required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its
comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on
appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment,
Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and
contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and
adjudicate the same on its merits.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code.
"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares
Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . .5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases.
These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576
which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of
loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado
v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on
June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given
retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect
that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no
retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be
convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before
publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying
retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the
soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the
promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA
519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a
tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for
retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by
RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding
that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294
and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to
wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a
circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect
adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590
of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive
application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an
employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason
whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964,
the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People
v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958).6 Our decision in People
v. Mapa,7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in
this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete
reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence
of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed,
since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis
vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of
the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It
is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine
of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al.
(G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No
97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528:8
We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was
mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest
bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on
September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as
amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners
Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for
pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But
while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4
of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non
respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is
easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to
decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55
SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view
is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the
oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The
Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a
statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity.
Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera,9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which declared
"that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no
force and effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in
reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." — the Court said:
. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no
rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation of
"Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued
by the then President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other
monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v.
Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged a minute longer . . ." — the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit:11
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional
act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering
from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify
any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially
declared results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount.
Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not
however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in
force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect.
Parties may have acted under it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done
while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in
all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a

statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This
language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil.
1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]).
An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the
Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No
34, 12 — declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against
civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons — this Court,
in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:
In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle,
be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final
when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive
nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military
courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final
sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the
convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional
rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be
ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on
the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be
released since judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and
commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were
created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated
declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did
not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision
in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the
limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27
SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a
municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government
abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22
— should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall
within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128,
applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is
inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go
Chico are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official
issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the special law
violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest
misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the
present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a
private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government,
the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which
reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a
constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature
and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation.17 Senarillos
vs.Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that
in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary
construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must
be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason
why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear
implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are
reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED,
with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 As found by the Court of Appeals, the agreement was between Co, representing
Mayflower Shipping Corporation, and Geronimo B. Bella, representing Tans-Pacific
Towage, Inc. The expenses for refloating were apportioned chiefly between FGU
Insurance and Development Bank of the Philippines, which respectively contributed
P2,329,022.00 and P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo, pp. 9, 20-21.
2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
3 The ruling is contained in an extended resolution on a motion for reconsideration,

promulgated by the Special Former Second Division of the Court on September 21,
1987, written for the division by Paras,J., with whom concurred Fernan, Gutierrez,
Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ. In that resolution, the Court gave its "stamp of
approval" on the decision of the Court of Appeals holding inter alia that "It is now
settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored
checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee."
4 Emphasis supplied.
5 Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity are collated, e.g., in the textbook of retired
Justice Edgardo A. Paras (Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 ed., Vol. 1,
pp. 22-23) viz : 1) laws remedial in nature; 2) penal law favorable to accused, if ; after
not habitual delinquent; 3) laws of emergency nature under police power : e.g.,
tenancy relations (Vda. de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47 O.G. 4259, Valencia et al. v.
Surtida et al., May 31, 1961); 4) curative laws; 5) substantive right declared for first
time unless vested rights impaired (Unson v. del Rosario, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen v.
Belen, 49 O.G. 997; Peo v. Alejaga, 49 OG 2833).
6 106 Phil. 713 and 103 Phil. 500, respectively, both involving prosecutions for illegal
possession of firearms, and both holding that appointment by the Provincial
Governor or Provincial Commander of a person as a "secret agent" or "confidential
agent" "sufficiently placed him under the category of a 'peace officer' . . . who under
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code is exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearm.
7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.
8 The title of the cited Monge case is Monge, et al. v. Angeles, et al., and is reported
in 101 Phil., 563 [1957], while that of the cited Tupas case is Tupas v. Damasco, et
al., reported in 132 SCRA 593 [1984].
9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.
10 And several other rulings set forth in a corresponding footnote in the text of the
decision.
11 SEE also Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987)
(Citing Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 where the question arose
as to whether the judicial nullification of an executive order creating a municipality
wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished); Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA
686 (1990); Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 (1991); Union of Filipino
Employees v. Vivar, Jr., 205 SCRA 200 (1992); Peralta v. Civil Service Commission,
212 SCRA 425.
12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).
13 SEE also Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 [1988] and Res. of February 26, 1991;
and Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 [1991].
14 SEE footnote 3, supra.
15 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission punishing any person who shall
expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view . . . any flag, banner,
emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to
designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, . . .
16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.
17 Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640; Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47.

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143789 November 27, 2000
SYSTEMS FACTORS CORPORATION and MODESTO DEAN, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RONALDO LAZAGA and LUIS C.
SINGSON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The instant petition seeks to set aside the Resolution dated February 15, 2000 dismissing the
petition for certiorari and the Resolution dated June 22, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration,
both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56849.
Petitioner Systems Factors Corporation is a corporation engaged in the business of installing

electrical system in buildings and infrastructure projects wherein it employs electricians, engineers
and other personnel. Private respondents Ronaldo Lazaga and Luis Singson were employed by
petitioner corporation as electricians in one of its projects. Private respondents filed a complaint
against petitioners for illegal dismissal and non-payment of backwages, service incentive fees,
premium pay, separation pay and other allowances. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering
petitioners to reinstate private respondents to their former positions and to pay them backwages. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA-decision. Petitioners allegedly received the NLRC judgment on
August 10, 1999 and a motion for reconsideration thereto was filed on August 20, 1999. On
November 25, 1999, petitioners received the NLRC-Resolution dated November 11, 1999 denying
their motion for reconsideration. Hence, on January 24, 2000, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
pursuant to Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. On February 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution denying the petition for failure of petitioners to comply with procedural requirements, i.e.,
(1) the petition was filed out of time, and (2) except for the assailed NLRC resolutions, the
documents and material portions referred to in the petition were not certified. On Motion for
Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated June 22, 2000, applied this Court’s
ruling in the case of Cadayona vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 128772, February 3, 2000 and
gave weight to petitioners’ submission that only the questioned resolution need be certified and not
the entire records. Said motion for reconsideration was nonetheless denied in view of its finding that
the petition was filed out of time.
The Court of Appeals, in finding that the petition for certiorari was filed out of time, reckoned the
counting of the period of sixty (60) days, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, from receipt on August 10, 1999 of the NLRC-resolution dismissing the appeal which is
interrupted by the filing on August 20, 1999 of the Motion for Reconsideration; and the remaining
period to be counted from receipt on November 25, 1999 of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration. As found by the Court of Appeals, the petition was filed late as petitioners had fifty
(50) days remaining or until January 14, 2000 within which to file the petition for certiorari. The
petition for certiorari was filed only on January 24, 2000.
In the instant petition, petitioners invoke A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which took effect on September 1,
2000, specifically amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure wherein the
sixty-day period is reckoned from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Thus, from receipt by petitioners on November 25, 1999 of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, the filing of the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on January 24, 2000
would have been within the reglementary period. Petitioners argue that before a party can file a
petition for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration is a mandatory pleading and thus, it is logical to
assume that the sixty-day period should be reckoned from notice of resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration. Petitioners likewise argue that remedial laws should be construed liberally in order
to give litigants ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and avoid denial of substantial
justice due to legal technicalities.
On September 18, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution requiring respondents to comment on the
petition.
Respondents filed their Comment alleging that the issue in the present petition is not whether
liberality should be applied. They contend that the controversy sought to be laid to rest would
multiply as similar requests for liberality, leniency and exceptions would be filed. They argue that the
Labor Code mandates that conflicts in the interpretation of the law and the rules should be resolved
in favor of the working man, respondents herein. Moreover, the plea of liberality should be denied as
there is no reason other than neglect of counsel that may compel this Court to treat this case as an
exception to the rule.
We find for the petitioners.
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC amended Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (as
amended by the Resolution of July 21, 1998), which took effect September 1, 2000 and provides:
"SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. --- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
1âwphi1
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days."
We hold that the amendment under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC wherein the sixty-day period to file a
petition for certiorari is reckoned from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
should be deemed applicable. Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes.1 Statutes regulating to
the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected.2 The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to nor arise
from procedural laws.3
The above conclusion is in consonance with the provision in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure that "(T)hese Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated February 15, 2000
and June 22, 2000 are hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208.
2
Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229; Tinio vs. Mina, 26 SCRA 512.
3
Billones vs. CIR, 14 SCRA 674.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 141959 September 29, 2000
JUANITA NARZOLES, PERLITA GUTIERREZ, MYLENE GERONAGA, LETICIA M. FORNAL,

ARNEL DIMALIBOT, MARITES SAGUID, IRENE MARCENE, ABRAM GERONAGA, ROLANDO
LU, MARIBETH HERNANDEZ, CORAZON AGARAP, PATRICIA ROSARIO, BERNADETTE LU,
ANGELES MANGUL and JOSEFINA MARTE, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EASTERN MINDORO INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCES (EMITS), AND MR. MARCIAL S. SEMILLA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Section 4, rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98, provides that the 60-day period for filing a
petition for certiorari shall be interrupted by the filing of a motion for reconsideration or new trial. In
the event of the denial of the motion, the petitioner only has the remaining period within which to file
the petition. Does the amendment apply to cases where the motion for reconsideration was filed
before the amendment although the petition was filed after the amendment took effect? This is the
question originally raised by the instant petition.
From the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing their complaint for illegal dismissal,
petitioner-employees appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC modified the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered respondents to reinstate petitioners "but without
backwages." Petitioners received the NLRC decision on 23 July 1998, and filed a motion for
reconsideration on 3 August 1998. (The last day for filing said motion was on 2 August 1998, a
Sunday.)
On September 1, 1998, the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 took effect per Circular No. 39-98. The
amendment added another paragraph to said Section, and reads:
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said
judgment, order, or resolution the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five
(5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Previous to the amendment, Section 4, Rule 65 provided in the lone paragraph that "(t)he petition
may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to
be assailed in the Supreme Court."
On 19 October 1998, petitioners received a copy of the NLRC Resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in this Court on 17 December 1998. The
Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes
vs. NLRC.1
Acting on the petition, the court of appeals denied the same for late filing. Apparently, the CA applied
Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98, in computing the period for the filing of the
petition for certiorari. It held:
The reglementary period to file petition for certiorari is sixty (60) days from notice of the accrual of
the cause for certiorari (Sec. 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Petitioner's last day to file their petition for certiorari is December 8, 1998. The petition was filed
before the Honorable Supreme Court on December 17, 1998. Consequently, this court hereby
RESOLVES TO DISMISS the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.2
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioners filed the present petition
for review.
There is no question that the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, which took effect on
September 1, 1998, were already in force, and therefore applicable when petitioners filed their
petition. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense.3 No vested
rights attach to procedural laws.4 Consequently, the CA, in accordance with Circular No. 39-98,
correctly deducted the 16 days (the fifteenth day was a Sunday) it took for petitioners to file their
motion for reconsideration from the 60-day reglementary period. As petitioners only had the
remaining period of 44 days from 19 October 1998, when it received a copy of the resolution denying
reconsideration, to file the petition for certiorari, or until 8 December 1998, the filing of the petition on
17 December 1998 was nine (9) days too late.
Petitioners, however, claim exception to the retroactive application of Circular No. 39-98 since it
would work injustice to them.5 We do not deem it necessary to rule on this contention in view of
further amendments to Section 4, Rule 65.
The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion resulting in
the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because, historically, i.e., even
before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of
the order denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the
amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would have been
resolved on the merits. Hence, the Court deemed it wise to revert to the old rule allowing a party a
fresh 60-day period from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition
for certiorari. Earlier this year, the Court resolved, in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, to further amend Section
4, Rule 65 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. When and were petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days. [Underscoring supplied.]
1âw phi1
The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in the Manila
Bulletin on august 4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7, 2000, two newspapers of
general circulation.
In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65 can only be described as
curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable.
Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which
would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements.6 They are intended to
supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to
carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal
consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make
valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to
acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied
with.7 Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.8
Accordingly, while the Resolution states that the same "shall take effect on September 1, 2000,
following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," its retroactive application
cannot be denied. In short, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court on 17 December 1998 is
deemed to be timely, the same having been made within the 60-day period provided under the
curative Resolution. We reach this conclusion bearing in mind that the substantive aspects of this
case involves the rights and benefits, even the livelihood, of petitioner-employees.
As regards the contention of respondents that the case ought to be dismissed, considering that only
three of the fifteen petitioners verified the petition for certiorari originally filed in this Court, the same
is best resolved by the Court of Appeals, where the records of the case remain.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to GIVE DUE COURSE to, and GRANT, the
petition. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
295 SCRA 494 (1998).
2
Rollo, p. 33.
3
Diu vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 472 (1995).
4
Alindao vs. Joson, 264 SCRA 211 (1996).
Quoting I O. HERRERA, REMEDIAL LAW 173 (1994), which cites Atlas Consolidated
5
Mining and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 51 (1991).
6
Erectors, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 629 (1996).
7
Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. vs. Dela Serna, 312 SCRA 22 (1999).
8
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11 (1994).

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 104215 May 8, 1996
ERECTORS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. JULIO ANDRES, JR. and FLORENCIO
BURGOS, respondents.
PUNO, J.:p
Petitioner Erectors, Inc. challenges the jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter Julio F. Andres, Jr. to hear and decide the
complaint1 for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay filed by private respondent Florencio Burgos, an overseas
contract worker.
The facts are undisputed:
In September 1979, petitioner recruited private respondent to work as service contract driver in
Saudi Arabia for a period of twelve (12) months with a salary of US$165.00 and an allowance of
US$165.00 per month. They further agreed that private respondent shall be entitled to a bonus of
US$1,000.00 if after the 12-month period, he renews or extends his employment contract without
availing of his vacation or home leave. Their contract dated September 20, 1979, was duly approved
by the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
The aforesaid contract was not implemented. In December, 1979, petitioner notified private
respondent that the position of service driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they
executed another contract which changed the position of private respondent into that of
helper/laborer with a salary of US$105.00 and an allowance of US$105.00 per month. The second
contract was not submitted to the Ministry of Labor and Employment for approval.
On December 18, 1979, private respondent left the country and worked at petitioner's Buraidah
Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia, performing the job of a helper/laborer. He received a
monthly salary and allowance of US$210.00, in accordance with the second contract. Private
respondent renewed his contract of employment after one year. His salary and allowance were
increased to US$231.00.
Private respondent returned to the Philippines on August 24, 1981. He then invoked his first
employment contract. He demanded from the petitioner the difference between his salary and
allowance as indicated in the said contract, and the amount actually paid to him, plus the contractual
bonus which should have been awarded to him for not availing of his vacation or home leave credits.
Petitioner denied private respondent's claim.
On March 31, 1982, private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against the petitioner
for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and contractual bonus.
On May 1, 1982, while the case was still in the conciliation stage, Executive Order (E.O. No. 797
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) took effect. Section 4(a) of
E.O. No. 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including
money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."2
Despite E.O. No. 797, respondent Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case on the merits. On
September 23, 1983, he rendered a Decision3 in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent to pay the

complainant as follows:
1. The sum of US$2,496.00 in its peso equivalent on August 25, 1981 as difference
between his allowance as Service Driver as against his position as Helper/Laborer;
2. The sum of US$1,000.00 in its peso equivalent as of the same date, as his
contractual bonus.
The complaints for non-payment/underpayment of overtime pay and unpaid wages or

commission are DISMISSED for lack of merit.4
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It questioned the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over the case in view of the enactment of E.O. No. 797.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1991,5 respondent NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld
the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction. It ruled:
To begin with, the Labor Arbiter has the authority to decide this case. On May 29,
1978, the Labor Arbiters were integrated into the Regional Offices under P.D. 1391.
On May 1, 1980, P.D. 1691 was promulgated giving the Regional Offices of the
Ministry of Labor and Employment the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment. There is no dispute that the Labor Arbiter had the legal
authority over the case on hand, which accrued and was filed when the two above
mentioned Presidential Decrees were in force.6
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari reiterating the argument that:
The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in

affirming the Labor Arbiter's void judgment in the case a quo.7
It asserts that E.O. No. 797 divested the Labor Arbiter of his authority to try and resolve cases
arising from overseas employment contract. Invoking this Court's ruling in Briad Agro Development
Corp. vs. Dela Cerna,8 petitioner argues that E.O. No. 797 applies retroactively to affect pending
cases, including the complaint filed by private respondent.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.9 On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint
against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 10 and Presidential
Decree No. 139111 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters
with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations
including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment."12 At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over
the same.
E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to hear and decide the case filed by private
respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative
intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used.13 We fail to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive
effect.
The case of Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela Cerna 14 cited by the petitioner is not applicable
to the case at bar. In Briad, the Court applied the exception rather than the general rule. In this case,
Briad Agro Development Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. challenged the jurisdiction of the
Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment over cases involving workers' money
claims, since Article 217 of the Labor Code, the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint,
vested in the Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. The Court dismissed the petition
in its Decision dated June 29, 1989.15 It ruled that the enactment of E.O. No. 111, amending Article
217 of the Labor Code, cured the Regional Director's lack of jurisdiction by giving the Labor Arbiter
and the Regional Director concurrent jurisdiction over all cases involving money claims. However, on
November 9, 1989, the Court, in a Resolution,16 reconsidered and set aside its June 29 Decision and
referred the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings, in view of the promulgation of Republic
Act (R.A.) 6715 which divested the Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims. It bears
emphasis that the Court accorded E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 a retroactive application because as
curative statutes, they fall under the exceptions to the rule on prospectivity of laws.
E.O. No. 111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the workers' access to the
government for redress of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent
jurisdiction over cases involving money claims. This amendment, however, created a situation where
the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. 6715
further amended Article 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions. Under R.A. 6715, the
Regional Director has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money claims provided: (1)
the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service, or
househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek
reinstatement; and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed
P5,000.00. All other cases are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. E.O.
No. 111 and R.A. 6715 are therefore curative statutes. A curative statute is enacted to cure defects
in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements.
The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. It was not intended to remedy any defect in
the law. It created the POEA to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development
Board, the National Seamen Board and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of
Employment Services. Accordingly, it gave the POEA "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen." 17 The
rule on prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O. No. 797. It should not affect jurisdiction
over cases filed prior to its effectivity.
Our ruling in Philippine-Singapore Ports Corp. vs. NLRC18 is more apt to the case at bar. In this case,
PSPC hired Jardin to work in Saudi Arabia. Jardin filed a complaint against PSPC for illegal
dismissal and recovery of backwages on January 31, 1979 with the Labor Arbiter. PSPC questioned
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because at that time, the power to hear and decide cases
involving overseas workers was vested in the Bureau of Employment Services. We held:
When Jardin filed the complaint for illegal dismissal on January 31, 1979, Art. 217 (5)
of the Labor Code provided that Labor Arbiters and the NLRC shall have "exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide" all cases arising from employer-employee relations
"unless expressly excluded by this Code." At that time Art. 15 of the same Code had
been amended by P.D. No. 1412 which took effect on June 9, 1978. The pertinent
provision of the said presidential decree states:
Art. 15. Bureau of Employment Services. —
(a) . . .
(b) The Bureau shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or
cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims, arising out of
or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment, except seamen. The decisions of the Bureau shall be final and
executory subject to appeal to the Secretary of Labor whose decision shall be final
and inappealable.
Considering that private respondent Jardin's claims undeniably arose out of an

employer-employee relationship with petitioner PSPC and that private respondent
worked overseas or in Saudi Arabia, the Bureau of Employment Services and not the
Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. . . .
Art. 15 was further amended by P.D. No. 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1990.
Such amendment qualifies the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Employment Services as
follows:
(b) The regional offices of the Ministry of Labor shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employer-employee relations including
money claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment except seamen: Provided that the Bureau of
Employment Services may, in the case of the National Capital Region, exercise such
power, whenever the Minister of Labor deems it appropriate. The decisions of the
regional offices or the Bureau of Employment Services if so authorized by the
Minister of Labor as provided in this Article, shall be appealable to the National Labor
Relations Commission upon the same grounds provided in Article 223 hereof. The
decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission shall be final and
inappealable.
Hence, as further amended, Art. 15 provided for concurrent jurisdiction between the
regional offices of the then Ministry of Labor and Bureau of Employment Services "in
the National Capital Region." It is noteworthy that P.D. No. 1691, while likewise
amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code, did not alter the provision that Labor Arbiters
shall have jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-employee relations
"unless expressly excluded by this Code."
The functions of the Bureau of Employment Services were subsequently assumed by

the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on May 1, 1982 by
virtue of Executive Order No. 797 by granting the POEA "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee
relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment, including seamen." (Sec. 4 (a); Eastern Shipping Lines v.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration [POEA], 200 SCRA 663 [1991]).
This development showed the legislative authority's continuing intent to exclude from
the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction claims arising from overseas employment.
These amendments notwithstanding, when the complaint for illegal dismissal was
filed on January 31, 1979, under Art. 15, as amended by P.D. No. 1412, it was the
Bureau of Employment Services which had jurisdiction over the case and not the
Labor Arbiters. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action (Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, 201
SCRA 632, 637 [1991]). P.D. 1691 which gave the regional offices of the Ministry of
Labor concurrent jurisdiction with the Bureau of Employment Services, was
promulgated more than a year after the complaint was filed. (emphasis supplied)
In sum, we hold that respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter over the complaint filed by private respondent against the
petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Docketed as NLRC-NCR-3-3142-82.
2 Official Gazette, Vol. 78, No. 21, May 24, 1982, pp. 2368-7 - 2638-13.
3 Rollo, pp. 13-23.
4 Rollo, p. 23.
5 Rollo, pp. 26-30.

6 Rollo, p. 28.
7 Rollo, p. 7.
8 179 SCRA 269, November 9, 1989.
9 Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 197 (1992).
10 Took effect on May 1, 1980.
11 Took effect on May 29, 1978.
12 Article 15 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1691 and P.D. 1391.
13 Article 4, New Civil Code; Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (1988); Nilo vs. Court of
Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 (1984).
14 179 SCRA 269 (November 9, 1989).
15 174 SCRA 525.
16 179 SCRA 269.
17 Section 4 of Executive Order No. 797.
18 218 SCRA 77 (1993).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10806 July 6, 1918
MONICA BONA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HOSPICIO BRIONES, ET AL., objectors-appellees.
Ramon Pimentel for appellant.

Ocampo and De la Rosa for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
Counsel for Monica Bona, the widow by the second marriage of the deceased Francisco Briones
who died on August 14, 1913, applied for the probate of the will which the said deceased husband
on September 16, 1911, executed during his lifetime; for the fixing of a day for the hearing and
presentation of evidence after all the interested parties had been cited; and then for the approval of
the partition had been cited; and then for the approval of the partition property made by the testator
in the said will. By an order dated January 20, 1915, Monica Bona's petition was granted and a date
set for the trial and other necessary proceedings for the probate of said will.
Counsel for Hospicio, Gregoria, and Carmen, all surnamed Briones, the legitimate children by the
first marriage of the testator, by a pleading dated March 5, 1915, opposed the probate of the will
presented by the widow of the deceased Briones, alleging that the said will was executed before two
witnesses only and under unlawful and undue pressure or influence exercised upon the person of
the testator who thus signed through fraud and deceit; and he prayed that for that reason the said
will be declared null and of no value, with costs against the petitioners.
The trial of the case opened and in the presence of counsel for both parties, Gregorio Bustilla, one of
the witnesses of the said will, was examined and he stated under oath: That he as well as Sixto
Barrameda and Domingo de la Fuente, was actually present as attesting witness when Francisco
Briones executed his will in the month of September in his (Bustilla's) house situated in the
municipality of Bao, Ambos Camarines; that Francisco Briones knowing of the presence of notary
Domingo de la Fuente in the house, he went upstairs and announced himself; that on being asked
what he wanted, Briones stated that he wanted to execute his will; that after Briones and the notary
had talked with each other, the former left and after a while returned bringing with him some paper;
that then Domingo de la Fuente, under the direction of Francisco Briones, began to draft the will,
which when finished was signed by the latter in the presence of the notary, of the declarant, and of
another witness, Sixto Barrameda; that then the three witnesses — the declarant, de la Fuente, and
Barrameda — signed in the presence of each other. The declarant identified the signature placed on
the will by the testator Briones and those of the other witnesses Sixto Barrameda and Domingo dela
Fuente, who all signed in the presence of the testator himself. He stated further that the testator at
that moment was in his sound judgment and not forced to execute the will. He identified the
document Exhibit A as the will executed by Francisco Briones and the signature of the latter as the
one placed by the testator. By agreement of both parties it was made to appear in the record that, if
the witnesses Sixto Barrameda and Domingo de la Fuente were called, they would have testified in
the same terms as witness Gregorio Bustilla.
In view of the above, the judge rendered judgment, dated March 27, 1915, denying probate to the
will Exhibit A as executed by Francisco Briones. From the judgment, counsel for Monica Bona
appealed and prayed to be allowed to sue further as a pauper; whereupon, by order of March 31,
1915, the judge admitted the appeal, ordered the original records to be brought up, and reiterated
his order of December 28, 1913, declaring Bona as a pauper, for the purposes of the appeal
interposed.
The whole issue discussed by the parties and submitted for the decision of this court resolves itself
as to whether or not in the execution of the will in question the solemnities prescribed by section 618
of Act No. 190 have been observed.
But before proceeding further it is indispensable to note that the will in question was executed by
Francisco Briones on September 16, 1911, as already stated and the order denying probate was
rendered on March 27, 1915, both dated being prior to that of Act No. 2645 amending said section
618 and promulgated on February 24, 1916, which took effect only from July first of the last named
year: so that, in order to explain whether or not the above-mentioned will was executed in
accordance with the law then in force, the last named law cannot be applied and the will in question
should be examined in accordance with, and under the rules of, the law in force at the time of its
execution.
The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or
by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is
proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
A mere reading of the last four paragraphs or parts of the will Exhibit A shows in a clear manner that
the said will in its form and contents expresses without shadow of doubt the will of the testator; and
that in its execution the solemnities prescribed by the above-mentioned section 618 of Act No. 190
have been observed.
Even though Domingo de la Fuente drafted the will and intervened in its preparation as a notary, by
the order and under the express direction of the testator, it is nevertheless true that he did it as a
witness to the execution of the said will with positive and concrete acts, while the two other
witnesses Gregorio Bustilla and Sixto Barrameda merely attested all that appeared in the second of
the four paragraphs mentioned; for in its they certify that the foregoing testament contains the last
will of the testator Francisco Briones; that the latter told them that before and at the time that he
dictated his will, there was no inducement nor threat by anybody; and that as he did not know how to
write the Spanish language, said testator requested Domingo de la Fuente to write the will, and he
did it as it is now drafted, certifying also, that the testator Briones signed his will voluntarily with his
own hand, in the presence of the declarants who, as witnesses, signed the instrument on the date
expressed. Domingo de la Fuente on his part declared that the two said witnesses formally swore
before him on the certification which precedes the said will and, according to this testimony as
shown in the records and the testimony of the above-mentioned witnesses, the said Domingo de la
Fuente wrote and drafted the said will Exhibit A by the order and under the direction of the testator
Francisco Briones, who signed in the presence of the witnesses, Bustilla and Barrameda and of
Notary Domingo de la Fuente, all of whom immediately signed also in the presence of the testator,
each doing it in the presence of each other. So that, although it is not shown expressly that Domingo
de la Fuente was an attesting witness to the will, yet it cannot be denied that it was he who wrote it
by the order and under the direction of the testator; that he was a witness to its execution from the
first to its last line; and that he was perfectly aware of the fact that all that he had written in the
document Exhibit A expresses the genuine and true will of the testator. He saw and was present
when the latter signed his will, as also when the two witnesses Bustilla and Barrameda affixed their
signatures; said witnesses also saw and were present when Domingo de la Fuente signed at the
end of the said document.
The name of Domingo de la Fuente appears as that of a notary who certifies as to the certainty of
the will made by Francisco Briones and of the signatures of the testator as well as of the witnesses
at its end; and as the law does not require that one of the witnesses must necessarily be a notary,
and it cannot be denied that Domingo de la Fuente attested the execution and the signing of the will
not only by the testator but also by the attesting witnesses, it cannot but be admitted that Domingo
de la Fuente intervened, attested, and signed the testament as a witness.
This is a case in which the judicial criterion should be inspired in the sense that it is not defeated,
and if the wish of the testator is so manifest and express as in the instant case, it is not proper nor
just to invalidate the will of Francisco Briones merely because of some small defect in form which is
not essential nor of great importance, such as the failure to state therein that Domingo de la Fuente
was also a witness to the said will when he signed it twice. As a matter of act, he understood the
contents of the will better than the two other attesting witnesses, for he really was a witness and he
attested the execution of the will during its making until it was terminated and signed by the testator,
by the witnesses, and by himself, even though he did it in the capacity of a notary.
The last paragraph of section 618 of Act No. 190 supplies a legal basis to support the validity of the
will in question with the conditions for its probate because, notwithstanding the existence of such
defect merely in the form and not in the substance, the certification of authenticity and the very text
of the will show in a clear and indubitable manner that the will Exhibit A contains the last will of the
testator, and that it was signed by the latter and attested as being true and legitimate not only the
two witnesses Bustilla and Barrameda but also by the one who wrote it, Domingo de la Fuente, who
was also a truthful and reliable witness, even though he be called a notary public.
The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which amended the oft-repeated section 618 cannot be
required in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as this document was executed in September,
1911, five years before said amendatory law began to take effect (July 1, 1916), while the testator
died on August 14, 1913, two years and some months before the enforcement of the said law; and
so, the only law applicable to the present case is the provision contained in section 618 of Act No.
190, and in accordance with the provisions of this section, the said will should be probated; for it has
been presented to the court many months before the amendatory act went into effect.
It is well-known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive effect only governs the
rights arising from acts done under the rule of the former law; but if the right be declared for the first
time by a subsequent law it shall take effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts
subject to the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the same
origin.
It is well-known that hereditary rights are not born nor does the will produce any effect until the
moment of the death of the person whose inheritance is concerned. (Decision rendered in cassation
by the supreme court of Spain on June 24, 1897.)
In view of these facts, it follows that the judgment appealed from should be reversed and it should be
declared as we hereby declare that the will Exhibit A has been executed in due form by Francisco
Briones on September 16, 1911, and that the said will contains and expresses the last will and
testamentary wishes of the deceased testator. Consequently, let the records be returned to the court
wherefrom they came with a certified copy of this resolution in order that the judge, upon petition by
the proper party, may provide for the necessary proceedings with respect to the inheritance, and the
clerk of the court may issue certified copies of the said testament; without any special ruling as to
costs. so ordered.
Johnson, Carson, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24022 March 3, 1965
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., respondents.
Jose C. Zulueta and Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400
metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of
1964.
On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on
December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the
President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to
undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to
bid for said importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965.
Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government
from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer,
filed the instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as
Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid
scheduled on the date abovementioned, and from doing any other act that may result in the
contemplated importation until further orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General were made co-respondents.
Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
which, in due course, this Court granted upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
This bond having been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.
Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they
adduced reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the
importation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.
It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even
if there is a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply
of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited
by Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only
left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn
Administration, or any other government agency, is prohibited from doing so.
It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively to
private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency, but from this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the
government to undertake the importation of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our
opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said
Act wherein, among other things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in
the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by
the National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru
any government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic
Council has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a
national emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after
consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately
undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore,
no plausible reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.
The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable
in the light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic
Act 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The question may now be asked:
what is the nature of this repealing clause ? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it
fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the
case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding
implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing
laws so that, if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. v.
Simpson, 8 F (2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va.
521, 199 S.E. 876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to
repeal any existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is
no such inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable
to different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as
provided for in Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the
Administration. The philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period of
sufficiency or even of a minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the
local price which may discourage them from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support
program and a partial ban of rice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step
adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate
objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the
other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period.
There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the
time underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers
three different situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption;
(2) when the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a
national emergency; and (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to
constitute a national emergency. Under the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether by
the government or by the private sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law
authorizes importation, by the government.
Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with. Nowhere in
said law can we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such
gravity as to constitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes
importation during normal times, but when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as
to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore,
are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered
by a consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which was
presented in answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to
import rice in the Philippines. On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and
Almendras:
SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof
"that the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from
importing rice and corn."
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and corn is left
to private parties upon payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, the position of the
Committee as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No.
3452 is applicable under normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964).
Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the President
authority to declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest
and, during the emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in
any private warehouse or bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said
Act also bans importation on the part of the government even in case of an emergency. The
contention is predicated on a misinterpretation of the import and meaning of said provision. Note that
the section refers to an emergency where there is an artificial shortage because of the apparent
hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or businessmen, and not to an actual serious
shortage of the commodity because, if the latter exists, there is really nothing to raid, seize or
confiscate, because the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could
have intended under such a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to stave off
hunger and starvation. Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found
in the Philippines. Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such
remedy cannot produce the rice needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice
stocked in the private warehouses and bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual
emergency, in which case we have to turn to Republic Act 2207.
The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its
policy to promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty
of this Court to adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to
effect a repeal by implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to
the prior existing law [United States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix
Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v. McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, supra, p. 462]. The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible
(Compañia General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms
and provisions of the statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. There must be
such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot
be made to reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statute, supra, p. 631). The
clearest case possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn
[Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.
Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year
Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any
nullifying value, as it is pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as
provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to
purchase rice from abroad." The reason is that it is a mere temporary law effective only for a specific
year. As its title reads, it is merely an authority to import rice during the year 1964. The same,
therefore, is now functus officio at least on the matter of importation.
Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pending
prosecutions for any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said
Act 3848 the implication is that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is
merely a safeguard placed therein in order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be
defeated with the enactment of Republic Act 3848 because the latter provides for penal provisions
which call for lesser penalty. The intention is to except them from the rule that penal statutes can be
given retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.
To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been impliedly repealed by Republic Act
3452, we wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the
discussion of House Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill
was presented to accede to the request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case of
emergency in view of the uncertainty of the law, but that during the discussion thereof it was strongly
asserted and apparently upheld that such request for authority was not necessary because Republic
Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this reason that said bill, after having been approved by
the Senate, was killed in the conference committee that considered it. These views, while not
binding, are of persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity of Republic
Act 2207.
SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in the case of
emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under the provisions of
R.A. No. 2207?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph (c),
Section 2, page 2, that when we say "under the provisions of existing law," we are referring
to R.A. No. 2207.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the amendment
by substitution reads:
Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and under the
provisions of existing law.
I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No.
3452. Does this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize the continued existence
of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 on rice
importation ?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out the stand-
by power on the part of the President to import rice.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because of the
existing law — that is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 — that is the
reason your Committee eliminated that stand-by power of the President to import rice.
Because you know, Your Honor, what is the use of that stand-by power, inasmuch as under
Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 the President can designate any
government agency to import rice?
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of the
Supreme Court, as I said, there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-existence or
implied repeal between these two Acts.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator
Liwag, informed me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make that clear ... .
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and corn is left
to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the position of
the Committee, as expressed by the distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act
No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed on whether
Republic Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains the
theory that there has been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by Republic Act No. 3452
insofar as rice importation is concerned. The other view is that there is no repeal. The
Supreme Court does not state clearly which side prevails. I take the view that the two laws
can be reconciled ... .
Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are not totally
repugnant to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except on certain
points: First, is importation in case of a national emergency certified by the National
Economic Council permissible? By reading the two provisos together I would say yes
because there is nothing in the proviso contained in Republic Act No. 3452 which would be
inconsistent with importation during a shortage amounting to a national emergency.
Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally
approved by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act
No. 2207 (Section 14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee.
This attitude clearly reveals that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to
future importations.
Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation in
question, suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is
authorized to borrow, raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives.
We refer to Section 3 (e) of said Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and to
encumber any property it has as a guaranty, and Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and
Corn Administration, transferred its functions and powers to the latter, including the power to borrow
money under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough power with which to finance the
importation in question.
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby
dissolved. Costs against petitioners.
Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
It is regrettable that in their effort to uphold the Government's power to import rice, under Section 2
of Republic Act 2207, the majority opinion seems to have overlooked that the repeal of statutes is
primarily a matter of legislative intention; and that on its face, Republic Act No. 3452 was plainly
intended to supersede the prior law, Republic Act No. 2207.
The specific issue, in brief, is whether the extraordinary emergency power to import rice and corn,
granted to the President by Section 2 of Republic Act 2207, may still be considered as subsisting at
present, notwithstanding the terms of Section 10 of the subsequent Republic Act No. 3452.
For convenience, we present in parallel columns the specific provisions of the respective acts:
REP. ACT NO. 2207 REP. ACT NO. 3452

(1959) (1962)
SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be SEC. 10. ... Provided, that the Rice
unlawful for any person, association, and Corn Administration or any
corporation or government agency other government agency is hereby
to import rice and corn into any point prohibited from importing rice and
in the corn: Provided, further, That the
Philippines: Provided, however, importation of rice and corn is left to
That should there be an existing or private parties upon payment of the
imminent shortage in the local corresponding taxes. (Emphasis
supply of the abovementioned Supplied)
commodities of such gravity as to
constitute a national emergency,
upon certification to this effect by
the National Economic Council,
based on the studies of the Office of
Statistical Coordination of said body,
the President of the Philippines may
authorize the importation of the
commodities, through
anygovernment agency that he may
designate in such quantities as the
National Economic Council may
determine necessary to cover the
shortage, subject to the taxes,
duties and/or special charges as
now provided by
law: Provided,further, That contracts
for such importation shall be only on
straightsales basis, and awarded
only after a public bidding, with
sealed bids. (Emphasis supplied)
It is apparent at first sight that the two provisions contradict each other. First, in policy; because
under Republic Act No. 2207, the general rule is that no person or entity, public or private, shall
import rice and corn; while under the later Act, Republic Act No. 3452, the importation of rice and
corn is left to private parties, with no restriction other than the payment of tax. Second, in procedure;
under Republic Act 2207, the President, in case of emergency, may import rice and corn in
quantities certified by the National Economic Council as necessary, through any government
agency that he may designate; while by Act 3452 any government agency is prohibited from
importing rice and corn, said prohibition being express, absolute, total, and unconditional. Not only
this, but violation of the prohibition is sanctioned by a P10,000 fine and imprisonment for not more
than 5 years (sec. 15, Act 3452).
We cannot see how the majority opinion can contend that the presidential power to make
importations of rice and corn still subsists, in view of the unqualified terms of Republic Act 3452.
If any government agency is prohibited from importing rice and corn by the later law, and the
violation of the prohibition is penalized by fine and imprisonment, in what manner can the President
make the importation? He cannot do so directly, since Act 2207 specifically requires that it be done
"through any government agency". How, then, may he import?
It is unnecessary to resort to legal gymnastics in order to realize why this must be so. Suffice it to
note that the Administration's power to import rice in certified emergencies under Act 2207 was but a
mere corollary to the total ban on rice and corn imports under that Act, and the existence of such
exceptional import power necessarily depended on the continuation of that total prohibition. 1äwphï1.ñët
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2207 clearly shows how intimate was this dependence between the
emergency importing authority granted to the government and the maintenance of the normal non-
import policy.
SEC. 2. Prohibition: It shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation

or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines, provided,
however, that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of the
above-mentioned commodities, of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency,
upon certification to this effect by the National Economic Council, based on the studies of the
Office of Statistical Coordination of said body, the President of the Philippines may authorize
the importation of these commodities, through any government agency that he may
designate, in such quantities as the National Economic Council may determine necessary to
cover the shortage, subject to taxes, duties and/or special charges as now provided by law;
provided, further, that contracts for such importation shall be only on straight sales basis, and
awarded only after a public bidding, with sealed bids. (Emphasis supplied)
So closely linked were the policy and the emergency import power that the latter was not even set
apart in a section. Therefore, repeal of the absolute ban on imports, prescribed in the opening
portion of the section quoted, necessarily entails the disappearance of the emergency power to
import rice and corn established by the later part of the same legal provision. Where the basic rule
disappears, the exception thereto must necessarily cease to operate, since the exception becomes
automatically functus officio for lack of basis.
The total banning of cereal imports logically, under Act 2207, meant that whenever the domestic
crop became insufficient to satisfy the demand for rice and corn, the latter had to be brought from
outside to fill the gap; and the legislature decided (in Act 2207) that it should be done through
governmental agencies. But under Republic Act 3452, the total prohibition to import disappeared,
and private parties were authorized to bring in the cereals at any time; hence, the exceptional
importing power of the Government lost all reason for its existence, because the private imports
allowed by Act 3452 were contemplated and intended to make up for the difference between
demand and supply, without necessity of government intervention. In truth, the expression in Section
10 of Act 3452 —
SEC. 10. ... Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn; Provided, further, That the
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding
taxes. (Emphasis supplied)
can only mean that the Administration must desist from importing, and leave to private parties the
task of bringing such cereals from without in order to make up for whatever shortages in production
should occur.
That only private parties, and not the government, can import the cereals finds confirmation in the
legislative journals. In the Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, page 1360, containing the
transcript of the Senate debates on the bill that later became Republic Act No. 3452, the following
appears:
CUENCO AMENDMENT
Mr. CUENCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 3, line 16, change the period (.) to colon and add the
following: PROVIDED, THAT THE RICE AND CORN ADMINISTRATION OR ANY OTHER
GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS HEREBY PROHIBITED FROM IMPORTING RICE AND
CORN: PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT THE IMPORTATION OF RICE AND CORN IS LEFT
TO PRIVATE PARTIES UPON PAYMENT OF THE CORRESPONDING TAXES.
Mr. OCAMPO. Suppose there is a calamity, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. CUENCO. Leave that to private parties.
Mr. OCAMPO. Accepted, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER. Is there any objection? (After a pause). The chair does not hear any. The
amendment is approved. (Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, p. 1360)
The Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962, also contains the following illuminating remarks:
SENATOR LEDESMA: So it is on the understanding then, Your Honor, that we could

proceed with the discussion.
Your Honor, House Bill No. 339, as I have already stated, specifically provides that
appointment of personnel should be in accordance with the Civil Service Law as well as with
the WAPCO. It seems to me that this provision is very laudable and very, very reasonable.
The second important feature in this proposed measure is that it prohibits importation by the
government. I think this should be clarified in the sense that, at the same time, it allows
importation by private parties but with the payment of the corresponding duties. Or rather,
under House Bill No. 339, the general policy which is being set in the proposed measure is
that the government should not resort to importation but that importation of the cereal is open
at all times to any citizen of this country so long as he pays the corresponding duties and
other taxes which are imposed by our government. (Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962)
It is thus clear that if section 16 of Republic Act 3452 providing that —
All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly",.
intended to refer to any preceding statute at all, it must have referred to Republic Act No. 2207.
Hence, the Presidential power to import no longer exists.
In arguing in favor of the Government's power to import even now, the majority opinion avers that
Republic Act No. 3452 is designed to apply only to normal times and conditions. This is plainly
absurd, for in normal times, when production equals consumption, no importation need be
authorized, for none will be required.
The majority opinion stresses that Republic Act 3452 does not repeal Act 2207 in express terms.
Granting arguendo that this were true, despite the express prohibition of government imports in
section 10 of the later Act, yet it does not elucidate why the legislature found it necessary, or
expedient, to enact an entirely different law, instead of merely providing for the amendment of the
prior statute (R.A. 2207). If both laws were designed to attain the same end, rice and corn sufficiency
for our country, and only a change of method was intended, why enact two statutes not only
unconnected with each other, but actually contradictory?
That the two laws are inconsistent with each other cannot be gainsaid. Under Act 2207, no person or
entity, public or private, could import rice or corn, since under Section 2 thereof "it shall be unlawful
for any person, association, corporation or government entity to import rice and corn"; while under
Act 3452, on the contrary, "importation of rice and corn is left to private parties" (sec. 10) at any time,
with no other restriction than the payment of taxes. How can it be said that the two laws, with so
diametrically opposite philosophies, were intended to co-exist?
Because the two laws covering the same field are plainly incompatible with each other (since private
importation of rice and corn cannot, at the same time, be unlawful under Act 2207 and lawful under
Act 3452), it is inescapable to conclude that the later statute (3452) is, and must have been,
intended to revise, supersede, and replace the former law (Act 2207).The established rule in this
jurisdiction in such a case is that —
While as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet if
the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act (Posadas vs. National City
Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 80 Law Ed. 351) (quoted and applied in In re Guzman, 73
Phil. 52).
pines adopted the American doctrine that in such a revision of the law, whatever is excluded is
discarded and repealed (In re Guzman supra, at pp. 52-53).1
It has been held that "where the legislature frames a new statute upon a certain subject-
matter, and the legislative intention appears from the latter statute to be to frame a new
scheme in relation to such subject-matter and make a revision of the whole subject, that
whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and that whatever is excluded is
discarded". (People v. Thornton, 186 Ill. 162, 173, 75 N.E. 841.)
And an author says: "So where there are two statutes on the same subject, passed at
different dates, and it is plain from the frame-work and substance of the last that it was
intended to cover the whole subject, and to be a complete and perfect system or provision in
itself, the last must be held to be a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in it
shall prevail and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed."
Or, as more tersely put in Madison vs. Southern Wisconsin R. Co., 10 A. L. R. 910, at page 915:
6. A subsequent statute, evidently intended as a substitute for one revised, operates as a

repeal of the latter without any express words to that effect; and so any distinct provision of
the old law, not incorporated into the later one, is to be, deemed to have been intentionally
annulled. Smith, Stat. Constr. sec. 784; Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass. 537, 7 Am. Dec. 99:
This rule, expressly adopted by this very Supreme Court, utterly destroys the contention of the
majority opinion that because the Government's power under Republic Act 2207, to make imports of
rice and corn in case of certified emergency, is nowhere expressly repealed by Republic Act 3452,
such power must be still deemed to exist. No such power can now exist for the reason that the Act
conferring it was totally and unconditionally superseded and repealed by Act 3452. The contradictory
philosophies of both Acts testify to that effect.
The majority also avers that Republic Act No. 3452 does not contemplate situations where the
shortage in local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. It also asserts that
Act 3452 refers only to artificial shortages through hoarding, and does not cover natural shortages
where the rice and corn crops do not suffice to meet the demands of consumption. Unfortunately,
the opposite of these assertions is precisely true. Thus,
Section 1 of Act 3452 provides: The Government shall engage in the purchase of these basic
foods from tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines ... and
whenever circumstances brought about by any cause, natural or artificial, should so require,
(the Government) shall sell and dispose of these commodities to the consumers ... .
Section 3 of Act 3452 — With a view to regulating the level of supply of rice and corn
throughout the country, the Administration is authorized to accumulate stocks as a national
reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies.
...
Section 12, Act 3452 — "The President of the Philippines is hereby authorized to declare a
rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest. During the
emergency period, the Rice and Corn Administration, upon the direction of the President,
shall, subject to constitutional limitation, conduct raids, seizures, and confiscation of rice and
con hoarded in any private warehouse or bodega: Provided, That the Rice and Corn
Administration shall pay such confiscated rice and corn at the prevailing consumer's price of
the Rice and Corn Administration. (Emphasis supplied)
Certainly the words used by the statute, "any cause, natural or artificial", "any contingencies", "rice
and corn emergency" are broad enough to cover all contingencies, natural deficiency due to
insufficient production, as well as artificial shortages due to hoarding. The terms employed exempt
the legislature from the accusation that it still has left some emergency unprovided for. What it did
deny the Government was the power to import rice and corn whenever it so chooses; instead, the
law expressly prescribed "that the Rice and Corp. Administration or any government agency is
hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn" (sec. 10, R.A. 3452), a command that, as previously
observed, squarely contradicts and vacates that permission to import previously granted under
Republic Act 2207. The Government, therefore, may not now bring in rice and corn from
abroad, unless special legislative authorization is first obtained, as was done for 1964 by Republic
Act No. 3848.
The very fact that the Administration went to and obtained from the Legislature permission to import
300,000 metric tons of rice during the calendar year 1964 (Rep. Act No. 3848), and made use of that
permission, is the best proof that the Executive felt that its former power under Republic Act No.
2207 no longer existed after the passage of Republic Act No. 3452. Such action places the
Administration in estoppel to assert the contrary. Why should it seek authority to make importation
during 1964 if it still possessed that granted by Republic Act 2207?
Note that, in consenting the Government's importing 300,000 tons of rice in 1964, the Legislature
once more re-affirmed the prohibition of further government imports in section 6 of the enabling law,
Republic Act No. 3848:
SEC. 6 — Except as provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the

Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." (Emphasis supplied)
which is a virtual repetition of the restraint imposed by Republic Act 3452. In addition, the law
imposed the further condition that the importation be made only upon two-thirds vote of the National
Economic Council, where Republic Act 2207 specified no particular majority.
The main opinion seeks to minimize the effect of these reiterated prohibitions by claiming that said
section 6 was intended to operate only for 1964. If that had been the intention, then section 6 was
absolutely unnecessary because the authority given by Act 3848 was a limitation in itself, as it only
permitted the importation of 300,000 metric tons for the calendar year 1964. Under such a grant, any
excess beyond the quantity fixed, and any import after 1964, were automatically forbidden. The
enactment of section 6 of Act 3848, therefore, was an actual reassertion of the policy of outlawing
Government imports, as declared in Republic Act 3452. If anything, it meant that to import rice now,
the Executive must first obtain an enabling law.
Moreover, the financing by the Government of its foreign purchase of rice would violate the
Constitutional restraint against paying money out of the Treasury, "except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law" (Art. VI, sec. 23, par. 3), and no law making such appropriation has been
enacted. Under the Revised Administrative Code, sections 606 and 607, no contract involving the
expenditure of public funds can be made without previous appropriation therefor, duly certified by the
Auditor General. Nor can these inhibitions be evaded by the ruse of causing a Government agency
to borrow the funds required for the purpose, considering that any and all government agencies are
flatly forbidden to import rice (Republic Act 3452, sec. 10), and the borrowing of funds to finance
importation is essential for the execution thereof.
Finally, we see no point in the quotations from statements made in the Senate during the
deliberations on House Bill No. 11511. That bill never became law, and is not before the Court. The
statements quoted are not binding, this Court having the exclusive prerogative of construing the
legislative enactments.
The effect in the majority decision is, after the Legislature had expressly prohibited government
agencies to import rice and corn, and after the lawmaking body refused to pass the bill (House Bill
No. 11511) granting the Executive a stand-by authority to import, a decision of this Court now
reverses this clear policy of the Legislature, and hands the Executive a blanket power to do what the
laws have expressly forbidden.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
REYES, J.B.L., dissenting:
Rule reiterated in Joaquin vs. Navarro, 81 Phil. 373; In re Resaba, 95 Phil. 247; Beysa vs.
1
Court of First Instance, 52 Off. Gaz., No. 7, p. 3572.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 106560 August 23, 1996
FLOREZIL AGUJETAS and SALVADOR BIJIS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:p
Petitioners Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, former Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers for the Province of Davao Oriental assail the decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental finding them guilty as charged for failure to proclaim a winning elected
candidate. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision 1 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 09689 reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with a modification in that

the actual damages of P50,000.00 are hereby reduced to P40,000.00 and the moral
damages of P100,000.00 awarded to Erlinda Irigo are deleted. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
The antecedents:
In the fateful evening of January 21, 1988, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of
Davao Oriental, composed of 1.) the Provincial Election Supervisor Florezil Agujetas, as Chairman,
2.) Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Bijis, as Vice Chairman, and 3.) Division Superintendent of Public
Schools in said province, Benjamin Miano, 2 as member, proclaimed the winners for Governor, Vice-
Governor, and Provincial Board Members for Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988 election. The
candidates proclaimed were:
PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES
Name No. of Votes
For Governor:
Leopoldo Lopez 59,309 votes

Francisco Rabat 51,191 votes
For Vice-Governor:
Modesto Avellanosa 46,353 votes

Josefina Sibala 54,083 votes
For Provincial Board Members
1. Cirilo R. Valles 42,394 votes

2. Ma. Elena Palma Gil 41,557 votes
3. Antonio Alcantara 39,104 votes
4. Dr. Capistrano Roflo 37,301 votes
5. Orlando Rodriguez 34,914 votes
6. Alfredo Abayon 34,191 votes
7. Justina Yu 32,360 votes
8. Pedro Pena 30,679 votes
The eighth board member proclaimed, Pedro Pena, garnered 30,679 votes when another candidate
for the Board, Erlinda Irigo, got 31,129 or 450 more votes than Pena.
Before the proclamation was made, when the certificate of canvass and proclamation statements of
winning candidates were finished, a verbal protest was lodged by Mrs. Maribeth Irigo Batitang,
daughter of candidate Irigo and her designated representative during the canvassing proceedings,
addressed to the Tabulation Committee.
At 8:00 o'clock in the morning of January 22, 1988, the Board resumed its session and undertook the
following activities:
1. Opening of Ballot Box No. CA-301596 and sealed by Metal Seal No. 204767 at
exactly 10:25 a.m.
2. Continued preparing all reports called for submissions to COMELEC, Regional

Office and Manila.
3. Reconciliation of entries in the tally sheets. (Exhs. "E" and "E-1")
Considering, however, that the protest was verbal and not officially brought to the attention of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers during official session, the same was not given appropriate official
recognition. (Exh. "7-B", p. 2, Minutes of Provincial Board of Canvassers, January 21, 1988)
The following day, January 23, 1988, Board Member Candidate Erlinda V. Irigo filed her written
protest 3 with the Board of Canvassers. (Exh. "F")
Meanwhile, Francisco Rabat, a losing gubernatorial candidate in Davao Oriental filed with the
COMELEC a complaint against the three board members for violation of BP 881 (Omnibus Election
Code) and RA 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987). After a preliminary investigation was
conducted by the COMELEC, criminal charges were filed against the Board members. The pertinent
portions of the information in Criminal Case No. 1886 for Violation of 2nd Paragraph of Section 231
in Relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code read:
That on or about January 21, 1988, in the Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused as Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Third Member, respectively, of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988 elections,
conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did, then
and there, willfully and unlawfully fail to proclaim Erlinda Irigo as elected
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member candidate who obtained 31,129 votes, the
eighth highest number of votes cast in said province but instead proclaimed
candidate Pedro Pena who obtained only 30,699 votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW 4
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, Criminal Cases Nos. 1885
and 1887 are hereby DISMISSED, with costs de oficio, and the accused considered
acquitted. Their bail bonds are ordered canceled and released.
In Criminal Cases No. 1886, the Court finds the accused Florezil Agujetas, Salvador
Bijis and Benjamin Miano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals for
violation of Section 231, second paragraph, of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines", and
hereby sentences each of them to ONE (1) YEAR IMPRISONMENT which shall not
be subject to probation. In addition, they are sentenced to suffer disqualification to
hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. Said accused are ordered to
pay, jointly and severally, Erlinda Irigo the amounts of P50,000.00 as actual
damages, P15,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and P100,000.00 as moral
damages, plus the costs of the proceedings.
Let copies hereof be furnished the Honorable Chairman, Commission on Elections,

and the Honorable Secretaries of Justice and Education, Culture and Sports.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 43-44, Decision)
The three accused appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the decision assailed in this
petition.
Petitioners impute to the respondent court the following errors:
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of conviction because:
a. It is the failure to make a proclamation on the basis of the Certificate of Canvass,

and not mere erroneous proclamations, which is punishable under Sec. 262 in
relation to Sec. 231 (2) of the Omnibus Election Code.
b. A protest made to the verification/tabulation committee does not constitute a

protest to the Board of Canvassers itself.
c. The functus oficio rule is applicable to the present case.
d. Credence should not have been given to hearsay testimony to establish the
alleged protest to the Board of Canvassers.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages to a person who is not a party to
the case.
We find the petition without merit.
On the first assigned error, the issue hinges on the question of what is being penalized by the
pertinent provision of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioners argue that they are not liable under the
said law because they complied with all the requirements of Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election
Code — 1. a certificate of canvass was prepared, 2. the same was duly supported by a statement of
votes of each of the candidates, and 3. it was on the basis of the certificate of canvass that the
winners were proclaimed. Only, the certificate was erroneous.
According to petitioners, the Omnibus Election Code does not punish the preparation of an incorrect
certificate of canvass, nor an erroneous proclamation made by the Board; what it does punish is
that, having thus prepared the corresponding certificate, the board for some reason fails to make the
corresponding proclamation on the basis thereof.
On the other hand, the People's counsel maintains that petitioner's challenges on this particular
issue is a question of semantics, a mere play of words; for while the prosecution maintains that there
was a failure to proclaim the winning candidate, petitioners on the other hand, counter that there was
merely an erroneous proclamation of the losing candidate; that petitioners forget that in proclaiming
an erroneous winner they actually failed to proclaim the winning candidate, in this case, Erlinda Irigo.
Respondents further argue that the situation presented by petitioners would not exculpate them from
criminal responsibility for, whichever way the matter may be looked into, whether as erroneous
proclamation of a losing candidate or failure to proclaim the winning candidate, the result is the same
— the winning candidate was not proclaimed, and hence, injustice is the end result.
We agree with the respondents.
The second paragraph of Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed
and affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member,
supported by a statement of the votes and received by each candidate in each
polling place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who
obtained the highest number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality or
barangay. Failure to comply with this requirement shall constitute an election offense.
To go by the explanation as proposed by the petitioner would be tantamount to tolerating and

licensing boards of canvassers to "make an erroneous proclamation" and still be exculpated by just
putting up the inexcusable defense that the "foul-up resulted from the erroneous arrangement of the
names of candidates" 5 in one municipality or that "the basis of their proclamation was the erroneous
ranking made by the tabulation committee". That would be a neat apology for allowing the board to
be careless in their important task by simply claiming that they cannot be held liable because they
did their "duty" of proclaiming the winning candidates on the basis of the certificate of canvass —
even "erroneous" certificates — which they made.
At this point, it is appropriate to quote certain portions of the Resolution in IPD Case No. 88-100,
disposing of the complaint filed with the COMELEC issued by Regional Election Director
Resurreccion Borra of Region XI, in relation to the preliminary investigation conducted by him on
said case. Director Borra testified on this resolution 6 (Exh. "Z") under cross-examination by the
prosecution, certain portions of which are material to the case:
But there is one incontrovertible fact that the respondents miserably failed to dispute.
This undeniable fact is conveniently ignored by Respondents' Memorandum. In the
exhibits of the complainant, the computerized tabulation of votes based from the
statements of votes by precinct in each of the 121 Municipalities of Davao Oriental
for all of the 600 precincts and even admitted by the Respondents that there was no
error in the tabulation of votes in CA 26-A. Erlinda V. Irigo got 31,129 votes and
Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes or a margin of 450 votes by Irigo over Pena. From
the ranking, Irigo would have been ahead of Pena, and she should have been No. 8
in the winning list of 8 candidates instead of Pena. But in the Certificate of Canvass
of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for Provincial Offices, Pedro T.
Pena was included as No. 8 in the winning list and proclaimed as No. 8 Member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers.
xxx xxx xxx
The Complainant, in presenting the computerized summary tabulation of votes for

each precinct per municipality of the Province, admitted that the PBC prepared the
statements of votes . . . . The statements of votes (CE 26-A) should have been the
basis for the proclamation of the winning candidates for Provincial Offices.
Complainant's documentary and testimonial evidences showed that the PBC
proclaimed Pedro Pena who was not among those candidates who obtained the 8
highest number of votes cast in the province per municipality by precinct which
violated the legal requirement of the 2nd paragraph of Section 231 of BP No. 1 881
as amended.
The respondents were not able to explain their failure to comply with the requirement
that (sic) the basis for the proclamation of Pena when he was not among the eight
candidates who obtained the highest number of votes as evidenced by the
statements of votes. In fact they admitted that the basis was not the statement of
votes but the erroneous ranking by the Tabulators. . . . 7
It appears from the foregoing resolution of Director Borra that it was difficult to make a mistake in
selecting the 8 candidates with the highest votes for purposes of making the certificate of canvass
because there was no error in the tabulation of votes as CE Form No. 26-A (which is the statement
of votes) shows that Erlinda V. Irigo got 31,129 votes and Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes. The
mistake could only be made through utter carelessness, if not made deliberately. The situation only
illustrates that the questioned provision cannot be construed in the manner as argued by petitioners
for it would defeat the purpose and spirit for which the law was enacted, i.e., to achieve the holding
of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 8 the court
observed:
Experience and observations taught legislature and courts that, at the time of a hotly
contested election, the partisan spirit of indigenious and unscrupulous politicians will
lead them beyond the limits of honestly and decency and by the use of bribery, fraud
and intimidation, despoil the purity of the ballot and defeat the will of the people at
the polls. Such experience has led the legislature to adopt very stringent rules for the
purpose of protecting the voter in the manner of preparing and casting his ballot to
guard the purity of elections. "The infinite ingenuity of violent spirit in evading the
rules and regulations of elections and the use of bribery, fraud and intimidations has
made necessary the establishment of elaborate and rigid rules for the conduct of
elections. The very elaborateness of these rules has resulted in their frequent
violation and the reports of the courts are replete with cases in which the result of an
election has been attacked on the ground that some provisions of the law have not
been complied with. Presumably, all the provisions of the election laws have a
purpose and should be observed."
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the protest
made by candidate Irigo's daughter Maribeth Irigo Batitang was the verbal protest contemplated
under Sec. 245 of the Omnibus Election Code, such fact could not be deemed to be a protest made
to the Board of Canvassers itself; and that the failure of the member of the verification/tabulation
committee concerned to apprise the Board prior to the proclamation cannot be taken against the
members of the Board.
We find the above contentions untenable. As aptly stated by Director Borra in his aforementioned
resolution:
The timely verbal protest of the daughter-watcher of Mrs. Erlinda Irigo did not trigger
on the part of the PBC (Provincial Board of Canvassers) the responsible action of
verifying the basis of the protest. The 3 Members of the PBC could not attribute to
the Committee on Tabulation the blame for their errors as the PBC members
themselves were the ones who certified under oath the said Certificate of
Proclamation and the Tabulation Committee members were totally under their direct
supervision and control.
Petitioners also raised the issue that it was only after the proclamation had been made that the
Board was informed of the fact that an error may have been committed in the tabulation; and that
however, having discharged its function of making the canvass and proclamation of the winning
candidates, the Board of Canvassers became functus oficio and could no longer correct the
erroneous proclamation.
As to this issue, suffice it to state that whether or not "the Board of Canvassers became functus
oficio" after it proclaimed the winning candidates, is beside the point. What matters is whether or not
petitioners committed an election offense. Besides, as stated earlier, Mrs. Irigo's watcher made a
timely verbal protest to the Tabulation Committee.
Petitioners further contend that Maribeth Irigo Batitang, the daughter of candidate Irigo and her
designated representative during the canvassing proceedings, was never presented as a witness;
that Erlinda Irigo, upon whose testimony the trial court relied heavily to establish the fact of protest,
was not present during the canvassing proceedings; that Mrs. Irigo's testimony on this point is
inadmissible as being hearsay and should not have been considered by the trial court; that no other
evidence having been adduced with respect to the protest allegedly made by Irigo's representative,
such fact should be deemed as not having been established; and that there was thus no basis,
therefore, for the respondent Court of Appeals to hold that the Board was deemed to have been
constructively informed of the verbal protest and that the members thereof were liable for having
failed to act on the basis thereof.
We are not persuaded. Even if we tentatively grant that Mrs. Irigo's testimony is hearsay evidence,
there is still ample evidence which proves that the Board was deemed to have been informed of the
verbal protest and that the members thereof were liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof.
The resolution 9 of Director Borra quoted the questions and answers during the preliminary
investigation. The import of those deliberations show that petitioner Agujetas, as Chairman of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers, admitted that the tabulation committee was under the supervision of
the
Board. 10 As regards petitioner Bijis, Vice Chairman of the Board, he admitted that he signed the
minutes of the Board to the effect that on January 22, 1988 in the morning after the proclamation,
the Board's business was "reconciliation of entries in the tally sheet," 11 thus showing that the
proclamation in question had been made even before the votes were reconciled on the tally sheets.
And as
to accused Miano, Secretary of the Board, he admitted having stated in the minutes 12 that an oral
complaint was made by Mrs. Batitang, representative of Erlinda Irigo, but that the complaint was
lodged with the tabulation committee and not with the Board; and that he did not care to examine the
partial results for each provincial candidate, including Erlinda Irigo and Pedro Pena. 13
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. 14
On the last error assigned by petitioners, they maintain that the present case was filed by Francisco
Rabat, the losing gubernatorial candidate in the Province of Davao Oriental; that Mrs. Irigo never
joined the Complaint as a party-plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings; that she was merely
presented as a witness; and thus, for the court to have awarded damages to Mrs. Irigo was a patent
error. We find petitioners' allegations untenable. Except where the law specifically provides the
contrary, a complaint that a public crime has been committed may be laid by any competent
person. 15 The Omnibus Election Code does not specifically provide that a particular person must file
the complaint and hence, the complaint filed by Francisco Rabat is valid.
The counsel for the people points out and we agree
Even an offended party not mentioned in the Information may claim the civil liability
during the trial if he has not waived it. 16
In the case at bar, Erlinda Irigo clearly, was the party offended or the person whose
rights were trampled upon, by the indecent haste with which petitioners proclaimed
Teodoro Pena (sic) as the winner of the 8th seat of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The persistence of Erlinda Irigo's lawyers to participate, as in fact they participated, in

the proceedings a quo as private prosecutors over the vehement objections of
petitioners' counsel clearly indicates that Erlinda Irigo intended to claim damages
from petitioners. 17
In U.S. v. Heery, 18 this court held that "If the injured party has not expressly waived the civil liability
of the accused nor reserved his right to file a separate civil action, it is error for the court to refuse a
request of the injured party during the course of the criminal prosecution to submit evidence of his
damages." Thus, the arguments of the petitioners notwithstanding, respondent court did not err in
awarding damages to Mrs. Irigo.
After the People's counsel has filed respondents' comment, petitioners filed their Reply wherein they
raised for the first time (not even in their Petition), the issue that the crime under which petitioners
were convicted no longer exists because Republic Act Nos. 6646 (the Electoral Reforms Law of
1987) and 7166 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1991) were subsequently approved on January 5, 1988
and November 26, 1991, respectively; that these two laws amended the Omnibus Election Code by
deleting certain provisions thereof or adding new ones; and that among those amended was Section
231, which was modified by Section 28 of RA No. 7166 by removing the specific manner by which
the proclamation of winning candidates by the Board of Canvassers should be made and thereby, in
effect, repealing the second paragraph of Sec. 231 of the old Omnibus Election Code under which
Petitioners had been convicted.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. 19However, since RA 7166 was enacted after the trial court had
rendered its decision, and while the case was already pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, and in
order to settle the issue once and for all, this court will make a clear-cut ruling on the issue.
Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) was not expressly repealed by
R.A. 7166 because said Sec. 231 is not among the provisions repealed by Sec. 39 of R.A. 7166
which we quote:
Sec. 39. Amending and Repealing Clause. — Sections 107, 108 and 245 of the
Omnibus Election Code are hereby repealed. Likewise, the inclusion in Section 262
of the Omnibus Election Code of the violations of Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 109,
110, 111 and 112 as among election offenses is also hereby repealed. This repeal
shall have retroactive effect.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act No. 6646, Executive Order Nos. 144 and
157 and all other laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations or other issuances, or
any part thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby amended or
repealed accordingly.
The statement "All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly." certainly is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. If repeal of particular or specific law or
laws is intended, the proper step is to so express it. 20
Neither is there an implied repeal of Sec. 231 by the subsequent enactment of RA 6646 and RA
7166.
While Sec. 28 of RA 7166, like Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) pertains to the
Canvassing by the Boards of Canvassers, this fact of itself is not sufficient to cause an implied
repeal of the prior act. 21 The provisions of the subject laws are quoted below for comparison:
Sec. 231. Canvass by the board. — The board of canvassers shall meet not later
than six o'clock in the afternoon of election day at the place designated by the
Commission to receive the election returns and to immediately canvass those that
may have already been received. It shall meet continuously from day to day until the
canvass is completed, and may adjourn but only for the purpose of awaiting the other
election returns from other polling places within its jurisdiction. Each time the board
adjourns, it shall make a total of all the votes canvassed so far for each candidate for
each office, furnishing the Commission in Manila by the fastest means of
communication a certified copy thereof, and making available the data contained
therein to the mass media and other interested parties. As soon as the other election
returns are delivered, the board shall immediately resume canvassing until all the
returns have been canvassed.
The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed
and affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member,
supported by a statement of the votes and received by each candidate in each
polling place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who
obtained the highest number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality or
barangay. Failure to comply with this requirement shall constitute an election offense.
Subject to reasonable exceptions, the board of canvassers must complete their
canvass within thirty-six hours in municipalities, forty-eight hours in cities and
seventy-two hours in provinces. Violation hereof shall be an election offense
punishable under Section 264 hereof.
With respect to the election for President and Vice-President, the provincial and city
boards of canvassers shall prepare in quintuplicate a certificate of canvass supported
by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each polling place and
transmit the first copy thereof to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa. The
second copy shall be transmitted to the Commission, the third copy shall be kept by
the provincial election supervisor or city election registrar; the fourth and the fifth
copies to each of the two accredited political parties. (Sec. 169, 1978 EC) 22
Sec. 28. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municipal Boards of

Canvassers. — (a) The city or municipal board of canvassers shall canvass the
election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators and members of the House
of Representatives and/or elective provincial and city or municipal officials. Upon
completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President,
Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives and elective
provincial officials and thereafter, proclaim the elected city or municipal officials, as
the case may be.
(b) The city board of canvassers of cities comprising one or more legislative districts
shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators, Members
of the House of Representatives and elective city officials. Upon completion of the
canvass, the board shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-
President, and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of House of
Representatives and city officials.
(c) (1) In the Metro Manila Area, each municipality comprising a legislative district
shall have a district board of canvassers which shall canvass the election returns for
President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of representatives and
elective municipal officials. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the
certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President, and Senators and thereafter,
proclaim the elected Members of the House of Representatives and municipal
officials.
(2) Each component municipality in a legislative district in the Metro Manila Area
shall have a municipal board of canvassers which shall canvass the election returns
for President, Vice-President, Senators, . . .
(3) The district board of canvassers of each legislative district comprising two (2)
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall canvass the certificates of canvass for
President, Vice-President, . . .
(d) The provincial board of canvassers shall canvass the certificates of canvass for
President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and
elective provincial officials as well as plebiscite results, if any plebiscite is conducted
simultaneously with the same election, as submitted by the board of canvassers of
municipalities and component cities. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare
the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President and Senators and thereafter,
proclaim the elected Members of the House of Representatives and provincial
officials as well as the plebiscite results, if any. 23
While the two provisions differ in terms, neither is this fact sufficient to create repugnance. In order to
effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant
with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case
possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is
never presumed. 24 "It is necessarily, says the court in a case, 25before such repeal is deemed to exist
that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that
the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and
convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard
does not suffice." 26 For it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. 27 The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnance and,
accordingly, against implied repeal. 28 For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on
the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. 29
In the case at bar, the needed manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal is not present.
Neither is there any inconsistency between the two subject provisions. The explanation of a legal
scholar 30 on the subject, particularly on Section 1 of BP 881 is enlightening:
The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines is Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which
was enacted into law on December 3, 1985. It codified all previous election laws. It
has undergone some amendments, basically by the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act
No. 6646, otherwise known as "The Electoral Reform Law of 1987," and Republic Act
No. 7166, providing for synchronized national and local elections on May 11, 1992.
The Omnibus Election Code is the basic law on elections. While legislations have
been enacted every time an election for elective officials is scheduled, the Omnibus
Election Code remains the fundamental law on the subject and such pieces of
legislations are designed to improve the law and to achieve the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Consistently, while Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony . . . , this provision cannot be
applied to benefit the petitioners because Section 231 of BP 881 31 was not repealed by subsequent
legislations, contrary to petitioners contention that Section 231 was so repealed by R.A. Nos. 6646
and 7166.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and
Francisco, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., took no part.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jesus M. Elbinias, concurred in by Associate Justices

Nathaneal P. de Pano, Jr., and Angelina S. Gutierrez.
2 Accused Benjamin Miano, who was represented by a different counsel, filed with this court,
a separate petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 107215 which was dismissed on October
27, 1992 for failure to submit a certification that no other action or proceeding involving the
same issues raised in this case has been filed or is pending before any court, tribunal or
agency, pursuant to Circular 28-91.
3 The matter of erroneous proclamation of Pedro P. Pena instead of Erlinda V. Irigo as the
winning candidate for the 8th slot as Board Member of the Province of Davao Oriental was
elevated to the attention of, and duly rectified by, the COMELEC Head Office, Manila.
4 Original Record, pp. 1-2, Information filed by Jose P. Balbuena, OIC-Manager, Law
Department, COMELEC.
5 Petition, p. 12, Rollo, p. 13.
6 Resolution issued by Director Borra in IPD Case No. 88-100, preparatory to the filing of
Crim. Case No. 1886 against petitioners with the RTC of Mati, Davao Oriental; Exh. "Z",
Folder of Exhibits.
7 Exh. "Z", pp. 12, 14-15, Resolution issued by Regional Election Director Resurreccion Z.
Borra, in IPD Case No. 88-100.
8 39 Phil. 208, 213-214.
9 Exh. "Z", Folder of Exhibits.
10 Exh. "Z", p. 16.
11 Exh. "Z", p. 17.
12 Minutes of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental, held on January 21,
1988, Exh. D-1, Folder of Exhibits.
13 Exh. "Z", p. 19.
14 Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the New Rules on Evidence.
15 U.S. vs. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil. 209; U.S. vs. Narvas, 14 Phil. 410.
16 Despavellor, CA 53 O.G. 7297.
17 Comment, p. 16, Rollo, p. 86.
18 25 Phil. 600.
19 Tay Chun Suy vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 151.
20 Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters' Assn., Inc. vs. Feliciano, G.R. No. 24022, March 3, 1965, 13
SCRA 377; City of Naga v. Agna, G.R. No. 36049, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 176.
21 Valera vs. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823.
22 Section 231, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code.
23 Section 28, Republic Act No. 7166.
24 Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Assn., Inc. v. Feliciano, supra.
25 Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. 31711, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 190; Jalandoni v. Endaya,
G.R. No. 23894, Jan. 24, 1974, 55 SCRA 261.
26 Statutory Construction by Ruben Agpalo, 1990 ed., pp. 287-288.
27 Valdez v. Tuason, 40 Phil. 943.
28 Iloilo Palay & Corn, Planters Assn., Inc. vs. Feliciano, supra.
29 U.S. vs. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208.
30 Former Commissioner of the Commission on Elections, Ruben E. Agpalo in his

Comments on the Omnibus Election Code.
31 More specifically, that failure to proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the
highest number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality or barangay shall constitute
an election offense.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.
Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands on June
11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of
falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both
under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below
had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of
prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of
the criminal action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First Instance of
Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States
has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and
such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of
the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to
the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and
regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed.,
222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where
he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.],
423.) The substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction.
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the
United States governs this case. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the question
whether the constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner extended ex propio
vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the
political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned the Constitution of the
Philippines went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
Not only the members of this court but all other officers, legislative, executive and judicial, of
the Government of the Commonwealth, are bound by oath to support the Constitution.
(Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own existence to the great instrument, and
derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is
bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original
jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls." In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional
provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by
the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is
exclusive. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but
merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction
as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the original
jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises whether the original
jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads
as follows: The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warrantoin the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code
of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other
cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition,
and habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil
Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction
possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance.
Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and made to
include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, it follows that the
jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the pertinent
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution of the United States provides
that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the "original jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the
Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent
Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of
the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon
the Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more
than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No.
136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as
we have already indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of
ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside.
By Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution
until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The original jurisdiction
granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not made exclusively by any, law in
force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the
jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not
inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain operative and in force, subject to
the power of the National Assembly to amend alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P.
Co. vs. Insular Collector of Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp.
620, 623.)
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner,
an that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring:
In my humble opinion, there are three reasons why the jurisdiction of this court over the petitioner in
the instant case is concurrent and not exclusive. The strictly legal reason is set forth in the preceding
illuminating opinion. The other reasons are (a) historical and based on what I consider is the (b)
theory upon which the grant of legislative authority under our Constitution is predicated.
(a) As the provision in our Constitution regarding jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls, has been taken from the Constitution of the United States,
considerable light would be gained by an examination of the history and interpretation thereof in the
United States.
The fifth resolution of the New Jersey plan (Paterson resolutions of June 15, 1787) gave the
Supreme Court of the United States, the only national court under the plan, authority to hear and
determine "by way of appeal, in the dernier resort . . . all cases touching the rights of ambassadors .
. . ." This clause, however, was not approved. On July 18, the Convention of 1787 voted an
extraordinarily broad jurisdiction to the Supreme Court extending "to cases arising under laws
passed by the general legislature, and to such other questions as involve the national peace and
harmony." This general proposition was considerably narrowed by Randolph in his draft of May 29
which, however, did not mention anything about ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
But the Committee of Detail, through Rutledge, reported on August 6 as follows: "Article XI, Section
3. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls; . . . In . . . cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, . . . this jurisdiction shall be original . . . ."On September 12, the Committee on Style
reported the provision as follows: "Article III, Section 2. The judicial power shall extend . . . to all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls . . . In (all) cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls . . . the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction." This provision was approved in the convention with hardly any amendment or debate
and is now found in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United States. (The
Constitution and the Courts, Article on "Growth of the Constitution", by William M. Meigs, New York,
1924, vol. 1, pp. 228, 229. See also Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Yale
University Press, 1934, 3 vols.; Warren, The Making of the Constitution, Boston, 1928, pp. 534-537.)
The word "original", however, was early interpreted as not exclusive. Two years after the adoption of
the Federal Constitution, or in 1789, the First Judiciary Act (Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat., c.
20, 687) was approved by the first Congress creating the United States District and Circuit Courts
which were nisi prius courts, or courts of first instance which dealt with different items of litigation.
The district courts are now the only federal courts of first instance, the circuit courts having been
abolished by the Act of March 3, 1911, otherwise known as the Judicial Code. The Judiciary Act of
1787 invested the district courts with jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of the several states, of all
suits against consuls or vice-consuls and the Supreme Court of the United States with original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party. By the passage
of the Act of February 18, 1875 (18 Stat., 470, c. 137), the clause giving the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction was repealed and, since then state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal courts over civil or criminal proceedings against a consul or vice-consul. At the present time,
the federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction "of suits or proceedings against ambassadors or
other or other public ministers, or their domestics or domestic servants, as a court of law can have
consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction, of all suits brought by
ambassadors or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul is a party." (Act of March
8, 1911, 36 Stat., 1156, reenacting sec. 687 of the Act of September 24, 1789; 28 U. S. C. A., sec.
341; Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934, sec. 233.) The district courts now
have original jurisdiction of all suits against consuls and vice-consuls." (Act of March 3, 1911, 36
Stat., 1093; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 41, subsec. 18; Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit,
1934, sec. 24, par. 18.)
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was one of the early and most satisfactory acts passed by the Congress of
the United States. It has remained essentially unchanged for more than 145 years. It was prepared
chiefly by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut (1 Ann. Cong., 18, April 7, 1789) one of the ablest jurists in
the Constitutional Convention, who was later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States (1796-1800). It is interesting to note that 10 of the 18 senators and 8 of the members of the
House of the first Congress had been among the 55 delegates who actually attended the Convention
that adopted the federal Constitution (Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court
[Boston, 1935], p. 99). When, therefore, the first Congress approved the Judiciary Act of 1789
vesting in the Supreme Court original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or a
vice-consul shall be a party, express legislative interpretation as to the meaning of the word "original"
as not being exclusive was definitely made and this interpretation has never been repudiated. As
stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ames vs. Kansas ([1884], 111 U. S., 449; 4 S.
Ct., 437; 28 Law. ed., 482):
In view of the practical construction put on this provision of the Constitution by Congress, at
the very moment of the organization of the government, and of the significant fact that, from
1789 until now, no court of the United States has ever in its actual adjudications determined
to the contrary, we are unable to say that it is not within the power of Congress to grant to
the inferior courts of the United States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has
been vested by the Constitution with original jurisdiction. It rests with the legislative
department of the government to say to what extent such grants shall be made, and it may
safely be assumed that nothing will ever be done to encroach upon the high privileges of
those for whose protection the constitutional provision was intended. At any rate, we are
unwilling to say that the power to make the grant does not exist.
Dicta in some earlier cases seem to hold that the word "original" means "exclusive" and as observed
by Justice Field in United States vs. Louisiana ([1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69),
the question has given rise to some differences of opinion among the earlier members of the
Supreme Court of the United States. (See, for instance, dissenting opinion of Iredell, J., in U.
S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388.) Reliance was had on more or less general
expressions made by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch,
137; 2 Law. ed., 60), where it was said:
"If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has
declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has
declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without
substance." But Chief Justice Marshall who penned the decision in this case in 1803 had occasion
later, in 1821, to explain the meaning and extent of the pronouncements made in the Marbury case.
He said:
In the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 172; 2 Law. ed., 60), the
single question before the court, so far as that case can be applied to this, was, whether the
legislature could give this court original jurisdiction in a case in which the Constitution had
clearly not given it, and in which no doubt respecting the construction of the article could
possibly be raised. The court decided, and we think very properly, that the legislature could
not give original jurisdiction in such a case. But, in the reasoning of the court in support of
this decision, some expressions are used which go far beyond it. The counsel for Marbury
had insisted on the unlimited discretion of the legislature in the apportionment of the judicial
power; and it is against this argument that the reasoning of the court is directed. They say
that, if such had been the intention of the article, "it would certainly have been useless to
proceed farther than to define the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be
vested." The court says, that such a construction would render the clause, dividing the
jurisdiction of the court into original and appellate, totally useless; that "affirmative words are
often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those which are affirmed; and, in this
case (in the case of Marbury vs. Madison), a negative or exclusive sense must be given to
them, or they have no operation at all." "It cannot be presumed," adds the court, "that any
clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction
is inadmissible, unless the words require it." The whole reasoning of the court proceeds upon
the idea that the affirmative words of the clause giving one sort of jurisdiction, must imply a
negative of any other sort of jurisdiction, because otherwise the words would be totally
inoperative, and this reasoning is advanced in a case to which it was strictly applicable. If in
that case original jurisdiction could have been exercised, the clause under consideration
would have been entirely useless. Having such cases only in its view, the court lays down a
principle which is generally correct, in terms much broader than the decision, and not only
much broader than the reasoning with which that decision is supported, but in some
instances contradictory to its principle. The reasoning sustains the negative operation of the
words in that case, because otherwise the clause would have no meaning whatever, and
because such operation was necessary to give effect to the intention of the article. The effort
now made is, to apply the conclusion to which the court was conducted by that reasoning in
the particular case, to one in which the words have their full operation when understood
affirmatively, and in which the negative, or exclusive sense, is to be so used as to defeat
some of the great objects of the article. To this construction the court cannot give its assent.
The general expressions in the case of Marbury vs. Madison must be understood with the
limitations which are given to them in this opinion; limitations which in no degree affect the
decision in that case, or the tenor of its reasoning. (Cohens vs. Virginia [1821], 6 Wheat.,
264, 400; 5 Law. ed., 257.)
What the Supreme Court in the case of Marbury vs. Madison held then was that Congress could not
extend its original jurisdiction beyond the cases expressly mentioned in the Constitution, the rule of
construction being that affirmative words of the Constitution declaring in what cases the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction must be construed negatively as to all other cases. (See Ex
parte Vallandigham [1864], 1 Wall., 243, 252; 17 Law. ed., 589; Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee [1816], 1
Wheat., 305, 330; 4 Law. ed., 97; U. S. vs. Haynes [D. C. Mass., 1887], 29 Fed., 691, 696.) That
was all.
It should be observed that Chief Justice Marshall concurred in the opinion in the case of
Davis vs. Packard (11833], 7 Pet., 276; 8 Law. ed., 684). In this case the jurisdiction of the state
court of New York over a civil suit against a foreign consul was denied solely on the ground that
jurisdiction had been conferred in such a case upon the district courts of the United States
exclusively of the state courts. Such a ground, says Justice Harlan in Bors vs. Preston ([1884], 111
U. S., 252; 4 S. Ct., 407; 28 Law. ed., 419), would probably not have been given had it been
believed that the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court deprived Congress of the power
to confer concurrent original jurisdiction in such cases upon subordinate courts of the Union,
concluding that the decision in the case "may be regarded, as an affirmance of the constitutionality
of the Act of 1789, giving original jurisdiction in such cases, also, to District Courts of the United
States." Of the seven justices who concurred in the judgment in the case of Davis, five participated
in the decision of Osborn vs. Bank of the United States ([1824], 9 Wheat., 738; 6 Law. ed., 204), also
penned by Chief Justice Marshall and relied upon as authority together with
Marbury vs. Madison, supra.
The rule enunciated in Bors vs. Preston, supra, is the one followed in the United States. The
question involved in that case was whether the Circuit Court then existing had jurisdiction under the
Constitution and laws of the United States to hear and determine any suit whatever against the
consul of a foreign government. Justice Harlan said:
The Constitution declares that "The judicial power of the United States shall extend . . . to all cases
affecting ambassadors or other public ministers and consuls;" to controversies between citizens of a
state and foreign citizens or subjects; that "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, . . . the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction;" and that in all other cases
previously mentioned in the same clause "The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both
as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make."
The Judiciary Act of 1789 invested the District Courts of the United States with jurisdiction,
exclusively of the courts of the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for
offenses of a certain character; this court, with "Original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all suits . . .
in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party;" and the circuit courts with jurisdiction of civil suits
in which an alien is a party. (l Stat. at L., 76-80.) In this act we have an affirmance, by the first
Congress — many of whose members participated in the Convention which adopted the Constitution
and were, therefore, conversant with the purposes of its framers — of the principle that the original
jurisdiction of this court of cases in which a consul or vice-consul is a party, is not necessarily
exclusive, and that the subordinate courts of the Union may be invested with jurisdiction of cases
affecting such representatives of foreign governments. On a question of constitutional construction,
this fact is entitled to great weight.
In this case of Bors, Justice Harlan adopted the view entertained by Chief Justice Taney in the
earlier case of Gittings vs. Crawford (C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1, 10). In that case of Gittings, it
was held that neither public policy nor convenience would justify the Supreme Court in implying that
Congress is prohibited from giving original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls to the inferior
judicial tribunals of the United States. Chief Justice Taney said:
If the arrangement and classification of the subjects of jurisdiction into appellate and original,
as respects the Supreme Court, do not exclude that tribunal from appellate power in the
cases where original jurisdiction is granted, can it be right, from the same clause, to imply
words of exclusion as respects other courts whose jurisdiction is not there limited or
prescribed, but left for the future regulation of Congress? The true rule in this case is, I think,
the rule which is constantly applied to ordinary acts of legislation, in which the grant of
jurisdiction over a certain subject-matter to one court, does not, of itself, imply that that
jurisdiction is to be exclusive. In the clause in question, there is nothing but mere affirmative
words of grant, and none that import a design to exclude the subordinate jurisdiction of other
courts of the United States on the same subject-matter. (See also U.S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2
Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; United States vs. Louisiana [1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31
Law. ed., 69; Ex parte Baiz [1890],135 U. S., 403; 10 S. Ct., 854; 34 Law. ed., 222, denying
writ of prohibition Hollander vs. Baiz [D. C. N. Y., 1890]; 41 Fed., 732; Iasigi vs. Van de Carr
[1897], 166 U.S., 391; 17 S. Ct., 595; 41 Law. ed., 1045; Graham vs. Strucken [C. C. N. Y.,
1857]; 4 Blatchf., 58; Lorway vs. Lousada [D. C. Mass., 1866]; Fed. Cas., No. 8517; St.
Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay [C. C. N. Y., 1855]; 3 Blatchf., 259; State of Texas vs. Lewis [C.
C. Tex., 1882], 14 Fed., 65; State of Alabama vs. Wolffe (C. C. Ala., 1883], 18 Fed., 836,
837; Pooley vs. Luco [D. C. Cal., 1896], 76 Fed., 146.)
It is interesting to note that in the case of St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay, supra, the jurisdiction of
circuit courts exclusive of state courts over aliens, no exception being made as to those who were
consuls, was maintained. (See1 U. S. Stat. at L., c. 20, sec. 11, pp. 78, 79.)
From the history of, and the judicial interpretation placed on, clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the
Constitution of the United States it seems clear that the word "original" in reference to the jurisdiction
of Supreme Court of the United States over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, was never intended to be exclusive as to prevent the Congress from vesting concurrent
jurisdiction over cases affecting consuls and vice-consuls in other federal courts.
It should be observed that the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 placed cases affecting the official
representatives of foreign powers under the jurisdiction of Federal Supreme Court to prevent the
public peace from being jeopardized. Since improper treatment of foreign ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls may be a casus belli, it was thought that the federal government, which is
responsible for their treatment under international law, should itself be provided with the means to
meet the demands imposed by international duty. (Tucker, The Constitution of the United States
[1899], vol. II, 760, 772; vide, The Federalist, No. LXXXI, Ashley's Reprint [1917], 415.) Bearing in
mind in the distinction which international law establishes between ambassadors and other public
ministers, on the one hand, and consuls and other commercial representatives, on the other,
Congress saw it fit to provide in one case a rule different from the other, although as far as consuls
and vice-consuls are concerned, the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, as already observed,
though original is not exclusive. But in the United States, there are two judicial systems, independent
one from the other, while in the Philippines there is but one judicial system. So that the reason in the
United States for excluding certain courts — the state courts — from taking cognizance of cases
against foreign representatives stationed in the United States does not obtain in the Philippines
where the court of the lowest grade is as much a part of an integrated system as the highest court.
Let us now turn our own laws as they affect the case of the petitioner. Undoubtedly Philippine courts
are not federal courts and they are not governed by the Judiciary Acts of the United States. We have
a judicial system of our own, standing outside the sphere of the American federal system and
possessing powers and exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of our own Constitution and
laws.
The jurisdiction of our courts over consuls is defined and determined by our Constitution and laws
which include applicable treaties and accepted rules of the laws of nations. There are no treaties
between the United States and Uruguay exempting consuls of either country from the operation of
local criminal laws. Under the generally accepted principles of international law, declared by our
Constitution as part of the law of the nation (Art. II sec. 3, cl. 2), consuls and vice-consuls and other
commercial representatives of foreign nations do not possess the status and can not claim the
privilege and immunities accorded to ambassadors and ministers. (Wheaton, International Law, sec.
249; Kent, Commentaries, 44; Story on the Constitution, sec. 1660; Mathews, The American
Constitutional System [1932], 204, 205; Gittings vs. Crawford, C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1;
Wilcox vs. Luco, 118 Cal., 639; 45 Pac., 676; 2 C. J., 9 R. C. L., 161.) The only provisions touching
the subject to which we may refer are those found in the Constitution of the Philippines. Let us trace
the history of these provisions.
The report of the committee on the Judicial Power, submitted on September 29, 1934, did not
contain any provisions regarding cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
The draft of the sub-committee of seven of the Sponsorship Committee, submitted on October 20,
1934, however, contains the following provision:
Article X, Section 2. The Supreme Court shall have such original jurisdiction as may be
possessed and exercised by the present Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution, which jurisdiction shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other foreign ministers and consuls . . . ." The Special Committee on the
Judiciary, composed principally of Delegates Vicente J. Francisco and Norberto Romualdez,
included in its report the provisions which now appear in sections 2 and 3 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. Section 2 provides:
The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribed, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other ministers and consuls . . . . And the
second sentence of section 3 provides:
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall include all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls.
The provision in our Constitution in so far as it confers upon our Supreme Court "original jurisdiction
over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls" is literally the same as that
contained in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the United States Constitution.
In the course of the deliberation of the Constitutional Convention, some doubt was expressed
regarding the character of the grant of "original jurisdiction" to our Supreme Court. An examination of
the records of the proceedings of the Constitutional convention show that the framers of our
Constitution were familiar with the history of, and the judicial construction placed on, the same
provision of the United States Constitution. In order to end what would have been a protracted
discussion on the subject, a member of the Special Committee on the Judiciary gave the following
information to the members of the Convention:
. . . Sr. Presidente, a fin de poder terminar con el Articulo 2, el Comite esta dispuesto a hacer
constar que la interpretacion que debe dard a la ultima parte de dicho articulo es la misma
interpretacion que siempre se ha dado a semejante disposicion en la Constitucion de los Estados
Unidos. (January 16,1935.) Without further discussion, the provision was then and there approved.
It thus appears that the provision in question has been given a well-settled meaning in the United
States — the country of its origin. It has there received definite and hitherto unaltered legislative and
judicial interpretation. And the same meaning was ascribed to it when incorporated in our own
Constitution. To paraphrase Justice Gray of the Supreme Court of the United States, we are justified
in interpreting the provision of the Constitution in the light of the principles and history with which its
framers were familiar. (United States vs. Wong Kin Ark [1897], 169 U. S., 649; 18 S. Ct., 456; 42
Law. ed., 890, cited with approval in Kepner vs. United States, a case of Philippine origin [1904]; 195
U. S., 100; 49 Law. ed., 114.)
(b) What has been said hereinabove is not unnecessary attachment to history or idolatrous
adherence to precedents. In referring to the history of this provision of our Constitution it is realized
that historical discussion while valuable is not necessarily decisive. Rationally, however, the
philosophical reason for the conclusion announced is not far to seek if certain principles of
constitutional government are borne in mind. The constitution is both a grant of, and a limitation
upon, governmental powers. In the absence of clear and unequivocal restraint of legislative
authority, the power is retained by the people and is exercisable by their representatives in their
legislature. The rule is that the legislature possess plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. A prohibition to exercise legislative power is the exception. (Denio, C. J., in
People vs. Draper, 15 N.Y., 532, 543.) These prohibitions or restrictions are found either in the
language used, or in the purpose held in view as well as the circumstances which led to the adoption
of the particular provision as part of the fundamental law. (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; 73
S. W., 811; 108 Am. St. Rep., 929.)
Subject to certain limitations, the Filipino people, through their delegates, have committed legislative
power in a most general way to the National Assembly has plenary legislative power in all matters of
legislation except as limited by the constitution. When, therefore, the constitution vests in the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, without specifying the exclusive character of the grant, the National Assembly is not
deprived of its authority to make that jurisdiction concurrent. It has been said that popular
government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind. It is unquestionable that
the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people, and that these
representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the
instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which, by clear intendment, have that
effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, p.139, ante.) What the Constitution prohibits is merely the
deprivation of the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls and while it must be admitted that original jurisdiction if made
concurrent no longer remains exclusive, it is also true that jurisdiction does not cease to be original
merely because it is concurrent.
It is also quite true that concurrent original jurisdiction in this class of cases would mean the sharing
of the Supreme Court with the most inferior courts of cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls such that the Supreme Court would have concurrent jurisdiction with the
lowest courts in our judicial hierarchy, the justice of the peace of the courts, in a petty case for the
instance, the violation of a municipal ordinance affecting the parties just mentioned. However, no
serious objection to these result can be seen other that the misinterpreted unwillingness to share this
jurisdiction with a court pertaining to the lowest category in our judicial organization. Upon the other
hand, the fundamental reasoning would apply with equal force if the highest court of the land is
made to take recognizance exclusively of a case involving the violation of the municipal ordinance
simply because of the character of the parties affected. After alluding to the fact that the position of
consul of a foreign government is sometimes filled by a citizen of the United States (and this also
true in the Philippines) Chief Justice Taney, in Gittings vs. Crawford, supra, observed:
It could hardly have been the intention of the statesmen who framed our constitution to
require that one of our citizens who had a petty claim of even less than five dollars against
another citizen, who had been clothed by some foreign government with the consular office,
should be compelled to go into the Supreme Court to have a jury summoned in order to
enable him to recover it; nor could it have been intended, that the time of that court, with all
its high duties to perform, should be taken up with the trial of every petty offense that might
be committed by a consul by any part of the United States; that consul, too, being often one
of our own citizens.
Probably, the most serious objection to the interpretation herein advocated is, that considering the
actual distribution of jurisdiction between the different courts in our jurisdiction, there may be cases
where the Supreme Court may not actually exercise either original — whether exclusive or
concurrent — or appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding the grant of original jurisdiction in this class of
cases to the Supreme Court. If, for instance, a criminal case is brought either in a justice of the
peace court or in a Court of First Instance against a foreign consul and no question of law is
involved, it is evident that in case of conviction, the proceedings will terminate in the Court Appeals
and will not reach the Supreme Court. In this case, the Supreme Court will be deprived of all
jurisdiction in a case affecting a consul notwithstanding the grant thereto in the Constitution of
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting consuls. This is a situation, however, created not by the
Constitution but by existing legislation, and the remedy is in the hands of the National Assembly. The
Constitution cannot deal with every casus omissus, and in the nature of things, must only deal with
fundamental principles, leaving the detail of administration and execution to the other branches of
the government. It rests with the National Assembly to determine the inferior courts which shall
exercise concurrent original jurisdiction with the Supreme Court in cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, considering the nature of the offense and irrespective of the
amount of controversy. The National Assembly may as in the United States (Cooley, Constitutional
Law, 4th ed. [1931], sec. 4, p. 156), provide for appeal to the Supreme Court in all cases affecting
foreign diplomatic and consular representatives.
Before the approval of the Constitution, jurisdiction over consuls was exercisable by our courts. This
is more so now that the Independence Law and Constitution framed and adopted pursuant thereto
are in force. The fact that the National Assembly has not enacted any law determining what courts of
the Philippines shall exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court is of no moment. This
cannot mean and should not be interpreted to mean that the original jurisdiction vested in the
Supreme Court by the Constitution is not concurrent with other national courts of inferior category.
The respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila having jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the criminal case brought against the petitioner, the writ of prohibition should be
denied.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated
in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of
private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente
lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25,
2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution
issued by the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be
an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and
Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured
as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the
Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared,
while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court
issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them
to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship
over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the
couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said
agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96,
Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for
declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later
moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she
is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is
carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v.
Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca
also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente
lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly
support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of
action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001,
Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak
of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced
several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury
complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED.
Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the
duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during
actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of
adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order,
Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court
granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from
implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon
the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In
the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved
for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her
motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed
in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the
case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated
August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a
cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following
premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission
rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action. 27 Applying said
rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action
against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared
void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree
she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the
foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino
citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a
Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not
indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that
nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her
life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for
and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she
initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on
March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA
which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American
citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and
impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was
denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of
her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the
implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution
of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING
INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF
PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN
HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE
PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER
HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND
CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE. 30
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the
success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an
alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of
divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to
another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in
this jurisdiction.32
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the
propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the
questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment
was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment
of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce
from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective
repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed
in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she
was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated
being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID)
Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would
tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-
emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by
the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by
Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and
thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose
other particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section

1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by
Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced:
(1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6,
1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's
recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the
order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11,
1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the
Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on
June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with
the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes
judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001.
There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the
affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No.
292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it
is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services
and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is
required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly
provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date
of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of
Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued
before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification
Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently
indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000,
or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order
of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events
which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet
recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC
9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates
that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino
citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero
corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to
be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing
disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet
recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from
the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her
original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously
because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that
petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March
14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce
decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition.
Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-
Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to
expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her
citizenship being crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-
094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract
(Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to
dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a
case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming
for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in
public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly
after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured
personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which
pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of
this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled
and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x,
who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN
OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43
years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin
Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS,
attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996,
signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and
authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were
properly adjudicated through their Agreement38executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree
No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97
issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law
of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when
she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the
Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted
by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the
validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both
appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of
partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity
to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a

foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the
title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of

a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;
but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order
for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules
of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while
Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings.
As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court
are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the
June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of
Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in
determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's
policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the
bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each
other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M.
BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to
remarry after completing the legal requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second
paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente
and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid
divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed
on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The
Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their
marriage consists onlyof the real property and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by
TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro
Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x
x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its
second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That
the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City,
Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties
are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus
estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's
conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the
premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and
elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other.
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court
can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause
of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion
to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The
petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the
existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for
relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite,
or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie
binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support
the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty,
albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix,
having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four
months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years
old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is
best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the
support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial
court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions
until the child concerned shall have finished her education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R.
No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind
of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal
anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 3-34.
2Id. at 36-38. Penned by Associate, now Presiding, Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Mario L. Guariña III.
3 Id. at 40-41.
4 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 10-43.
5 Id. at 575-583.
6 Id. at 145.
7See Certification of Birth from the Government of Guam issued on June 1, 2000; rollo (G.R. No.
155635), p. 213.
8 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 146-150.
9 Id. at 214-217.
10 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 151-158.
11 Id. at 154.
12 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 206-212.
13 Id. at 305-306. Per a motion to withdraw dated November 8, 1996.
14 Id. at 213. Per Order of Judge Josefina Guevara Salonga dated November 14, 1996.
15 Id. at 236-237.
16 Id. at 126-144.
17 Id. at 156-204.
18 Id. at 123-124. Penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
19 Id. at 338.
20 Id. at 125. Per Order dated November 20, 2001.
21 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 512-590.

22 Id. at 592-593.
23 Id. at 38.
24 Id. at 852-869.
25 Id. at 850-851.
26 Supra note 5, at 583.
27 G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 401, 409.
28 Enumerated in San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116825
March 26, 1998, 288 SCRA 115, 125: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right.
29 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 597.
30 Id. at 22-23.
31 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
32 Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000, 345 SCRA 592, 600.
33Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 388-389, issued on January 18, 1995 with expiration date on
January 17, 2005.
34 Supra note 15.
35 Adopted on April 15, 1999.
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 268-292.
37 Id. at 147, 214-215.
38 Supra note 10.
39 Supra note 31.
40 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139, 143.
41 G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 495, 502-503.
42 Id. at 501-502.
43 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 148, 216.
44 Van Dorn, supra note 40, at 144.
45 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 122.
46 Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), p. 154.
47 Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 215.
48 Van Dorn, supra note 44.
49 G.R. No. 165500, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 242, 251-252; citations omitted.
50 Azur v. Provincial Board, No. L-22333, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 50, 57-58.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval,
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification
the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati
City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a
condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his
first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married
ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10,
1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on
September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children,
namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda,
Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2)
decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in
February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from
the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit)
at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on
installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas
law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit
was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was
registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share
of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold
to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated
that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA
thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a
portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of
ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of
the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the
heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since
they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY.
LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her
½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and
testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her
share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the
¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on
the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be
appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be
ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of
the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS
is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit,
hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit
and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate
arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE

TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE

OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT
THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF
THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES;
and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE

INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN
THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S
MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD
PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12,
1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not
terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS
is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry
of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of
the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first
marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence,
their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s
approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient
proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit;
and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the
subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the
25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher
on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine,
firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late
Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia

subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines
on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil
Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to
the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.15 Pursuant
to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,16 even
if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against
such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of
the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce
decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement

was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that
the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce
proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at
the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they
had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the
Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court
was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed
when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna
and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an
incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for
their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce. 21 With
the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine
public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and
enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,

was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976
was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had
not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of
the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the
first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its
being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules
on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of
1âwphi1
her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in
Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property
is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous
and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the
plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the
1âwphi1
relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still
prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact
has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of
the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of
₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00.28 The
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of
which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make
the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due
to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this
case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family
Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together
as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144
of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable
to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in
any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article
148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to
be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The
same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of
the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties
were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict
rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in
the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No.
L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to

prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that
the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY.
LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on
January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit
"7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P"
was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty.
Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also
for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated
December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the
payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not
established. x x x"
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly,
there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium
unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY.
LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee
or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The
loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty.
Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or
partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES
LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled
that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married
to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo
them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of
proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In
contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their
conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the
25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the
respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 34-51; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (later Presiding Justice) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez,
Jr. concurring.
2
Id. at 198-210.
3
Id. at 37-39.
4
Id. at 198-210.
5
Id. at 210.
6
Id. at 211-214.
7
Id. at 217-219.
8
Id. at 283.
9
Supra note 1.
10
Rollo, p. 44.
11
Id. at 50-51.
12
Id. at 52-53.
13
Id. at 54-65.
14
Id. at 17.
15
Article 15, Civil Code, which is a revision of Article 9.1, Spanish Civil Code, states:
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. (9a)
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas(G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 277), the
16
Court declares:
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void and
voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage.
Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.
17
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 446.
18
Rollo,p. 37.
19
Article XV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution.
20
Article 1, Family Code.
21
Id. at 74, 81-82.
22
Id. at 48.
Article 83, Civil Code; Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.109454, June 14, 1994, 233
23
SCRA 155, 158.
24
The Civil Coderelevantly states:
Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;
xxxx
25
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
26
Id. at 686-687.
27
Rollo, pp. 23-24.
28
Id. at 25.
29
Id. at 27.
30
Id. at 45-50.
31
Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 593, 602.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 121075 July 24, 1997

DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION, petitioner,

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered

3) ALL OTHER PROCEEDINGS HELD, CONDUCTED AND EXECUTED BY

WHEREFORE, while the assailed decision was validly rendered by

xxx xxx xxx

Cost against petitioner.

Narvasa, C.J., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., took no part.

1 Mistakenly captioned "Petition for Review on Certiorari," Rollo, 9.

3 Id., 570 et seq.; Rollo, 29-33.

34 Citing Auyong Hian v. CTA, 59 SCRA 120 [1974].

35 Citing Tobias v. Diaz, 213 SCRA 253 [1992].

38 Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 760 [1969]; Bañez v. Court of Appeals, 59

39 Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110, 120 [1974].

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 87977 March 19, 1990

ILUMINADO URBANO and MARCIAL ACAPULCO, petitioners,

G.R. No. 88578 March 19, 1990

NEMESIO G. CO, petitioner,

G.R. No. 87977

G.R. No. 88578

Feliciano, J., Did not participate in the deliberations.

1 99 SCRA 644 (1980).

2 100 SCRA 276 (1980).

3 Pages 36 to 40, Rollo.

4 Pages 41 to 49, Rollo.

6 Pages 49 to 52, Rollo.

7 101 SCRA 225 (1980).

8 Pages 53 to 55, Rollo.

9 Pages 57 to 71, Rollo.

10 Page 29, Rollo.

11 Pages 80 to 84, Rollo.

12 Pages 85 to 95, Rollo.

13 Pages 96 to 104, Rollo.

14 Pages 27 and 28, Rollo.

15 Page 8, Petition; page 9, Rollo.

16 Pages 111 to 136, Rollo.

17 Page 190-A, Rollo.

18 Pages 200, et seq., Rollo.

19 Torres vs, Yu, 119 SCRA 48 (1982).

20 Rules 45 and 65, Rules of Court.

21 Signed into law by President Marcos on June 4, 1974.

22 Pages 15 and 16, Comment; pages 125 and 126, Rollo.

25 Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code.

26 Supra, page 648.

28 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885).

30 Article 100, Revised Penal Code.

G.R. No. 47616 September 16, 1947

JOSE TAN CHONG, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondent-appellant.

G.R. No. 47623 September 16, 1947

LAM SWEE SANG, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE

Separate Opinionschanrobles virtual law library

HILADO, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library

Consequently, I reach the same conclusion as the majority.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity

Year 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

2nd calendar May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

3rd calendar June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998