People of the Philippines vs Casio without   the   victim’s   consent   or   knowledge,   within   or   across   national
G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014 borders;” 
Facts: On   May   2,   2008,   International   Justice   Mission   (IJM),   a
nongovernmental   organization,   coordinated   with   the   police   in   order   to
entrap   persons   engaged   in   human   trafficking   in   Cebu   City.   Chief   PSI
George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert
Luardo,   and   PO1   Roy   Carlo   Veloso   composed   the   team   of   police
operatives, Luardo and Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to be
tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests. IJM provided them
with marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter. The team
went to Queensland Motel and rented adjacent Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24
was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the
police team. PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street
in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district where the accused
noticed them and called their attention. Negotiation occured and upon the
signal, the accused was arrested and the two minors were taken into custody
by the DSWD officials.
Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for trafficking of persons.
Held: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in
persons have been expanded to include the following acts: 
(1)   The   act   of   “recruitment,   obtaining,   hiring,   providing,   offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other
forms   of   coercion,   abduction,   fraud,   deception,   abuse   of   power   or   of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent  of a person
having control over another person” 
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs”
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused
when their services were peddled to the police who acted as decoys. AAA
was a child at the time that accused peddled her services.66 to work as a
prostitute   because   she   needed   money.   AAA   also   stated   that   she   agreed
Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one who
need money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No.
9208.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of
a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by
any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered
as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set 6. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement
forth in the preceding paragraph.” agencies; and 

Accused   is   further   guilty   of   qualified   trafficking. SEC.   6.   Qualified 7. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons,

Trafficking   in   Persons.—   The   following   are   considered   as   qualified the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is
trafficking:  afflicted   with   Human   Immunod   eficiency   Virus   (HIV)   or   the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
1. When the trafficked person is a child; 

2. When  the  adoption  is  effected  through   Republic   Act  No.  8043,
otherwise known as the “Inter­Country Adoption Act of 1995” and
said   adoption   is   for   the   purpose   of   prostitution,   pornography,
sexual exploitation,forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage; 

3. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale.
Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group   of   three   (3)   or  more   persons   conspiring  or   confederating
with   one   another.   It   is   deemed   committed   in   large   scale   if
committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group; 

4. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a
person who exercise authority over the trafficked person or when
the offense is committed by a public officer or employee; 

5. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution
with any member of the military or law enforcement agencies; 

Rubi et.al v. The Provincial Board of Mindoro (1918-19)
ARTICLE VI: The Legislative Department, SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
FACTS:
• This case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. They allege that:
o The Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the officials of the provinces.
o Rubi and his companions are being held against their will on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro.
• The facts show that the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution no. 25:
o It directed “non-Christian” people of Mindoro to take up their habitation at Tigbao on Lake
Naujan.
o That any Manguian show shall refuse to comply shall upon conviction, be imprisoned not
exceeding sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code
(RAC). • Rubi questions the validity of section 2759 of the RAC:
o Section 2145: Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected by provincial
governor.·With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non- Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public' lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board."
• SC first provided a brief history of the PH attitude towards “non-Christians”. These
show that (1) the government recognizes the difference between Christian and non-Christian
territories in the PH, and (2) the government has always considered their welfare and
advancement.
o Spanish Rule – The attitude was to improve the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of
the Islands by concentrating them in “reducciones”.
 § It is the duty of the government to civilize those bavkwards races that might exist
in the nation and place them under the protection of the law.
 § The provincial authorities are tasked to find the towns or settlements and shall
adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities,
construction of schools, fixing up the means of communication, etc.
o United States acquisition –
 § Organic Law – In dealing with uncivilized tribes, the Commission should adopt
the same
course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of the North American Indians.
 Under the Philippine Bill – the PH legislature was to have jurisdiction
over the Christian portion of the Island. The PH Commission was to
retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of the Islands inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
 Under the Jones Law – the law transferred the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction and authority exercised by the PH Commission to the PH
Legislature. It also divided the PH into twelve senatorial districts.
 Hence, PH organic law has recognizes a dividing line between the
territories inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and those
that are not.
 § Statute Law – Several laws, particularly the administrative codes show the regard
for the welfare of the non-Christian inhabitants of the PH and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods followed for their advancement.
• T erminologies:
o Non-Christian – According to the intent of the law, the term is intended to relate to a degree
of civilization and not to a religious or geographical conception.
  § Secretary of Interior: “To hold that it is indicative of a religious meaning will
make the law invalid as against the Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom”
 § CollectorofInternalRevenue:theinternalrevenuelawexemptsmembersofnon-
Christian tribes from payment of cedula taxes. This does not mean that persons who
profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that
all other persons are exempt.
• It is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides
whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a
civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a
recruit.
• To be categorized as non-Christian, one looks at his mode of life, degree of advancement in
civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community.
o The Manguianes – Signifies “savage”, “mountaineer”, “pagan”, “negro”.
§ They are considered very low in culture and have not advanced much in
civilization.
§ They are peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people.
o American-Indian comparisons – The comparison is important because the method used by the
PH government in dealing with non-Christians is practically identical to that followed by the
US in dealing with Indian tribes.
 § The relation between the US and the Indians is that of a guardian and ward.
Indian tribes are communities dependent on the US.
 § Hence: we look at their case law to show how to properly address the issue at
hand:
• US v. Cook (Standing Bear Case)
o This is a habeas corpus case against Brigadier General Cook.
o The Indians in this case has withdrawn from the tribe and completely severed relations with
them. In fact, they have adopted the general habits of the whites.
o They were arrested and restrained by order of Cook for escaping the reservation.
o There are two issues in this case: (1) can an Indian avail of the habeas corpus remedy?, and
(2) can the government arrest and hold the Indians for the purpose of being returned to the
reservations?.
 § As for the first issue, an indian is a person within the meaning of the laws of the
US. They have the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus.
 § As to the second issue, the Indians are being restrained of liberty. the Indians
possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race,
and have the inalienable right to 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness/ so long
as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is Rubi et.al. entitled to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in the PH courts? – YES
• The decision in the Standing Bear case is used as authority to rule that Rubi, a Manguian, a
Filipino, and a citizen of the PH islands, is a “person” within the meaning of the law.
Is there a valid delegation of legislative power to the provincial government? – YES
 The GR is that the Constitution forbids the delegation of legislative power.
 However, a distinction must be made between:
o The delegation of power to make the law which involves discretion as to what the law shall
be, and o The delegation conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
o The first kind of delegation cannot be done. This stems from the growing “necessity” of
delegation.
• Furthermore, the general rule admits of an exception: the central government can
delegate legislative powers to local authorities, sanctioned by immemorial practice.
o Applied in this case, the PH legislature has then conferred authority to the Province of
Mindoro.
o As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most
favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.
• Hence, Section 2145 of the RAC is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
Is the segregation of non-Chrisitians a form of discrimination based on religious beliefs? –
NO
• The SC upheld the long continued meaning given to the common expression.
• The term non-Christian refers to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate
between individuals on account of religious differences.
Was there a violation of (1) liberty, (2) due process of law and (3) equal protection of laws? –
NO
• Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men.
o However, no man can do exactly as he pleases. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of
citizens would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and
equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. • Due process of law
simply means that:
o There shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government;
o This law shall be reasonable in its operation;
o It shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and o It shall
be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class.
• There is no denial of the three rights. – See discussion on INTENT
Was there a violation of involuntary servitude? – NO
 Slavery and involuntary servitude all denote a condition of enforced, compulsory
service of one to another.
 Their living together in one area does not make them slaves or put them in a
condition where they are compelled to do services for another. They do not work for
anybody but for themselves. Hence, there is no involuntary servitude.
Is there a valid exercise of police power? – YES
• Given the scope of police power, it has become almost impossible to limit.
o It is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling
necessity.'
o It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit
all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
 In the PH, the exercise of police power belongs to the legislature, and this power is
limited only by Acts of Congress.
 In this case, the court considers the fact that:
o These people do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to
another as the living conditions warrant.
o The placing of a penalty is a measure by the government to make sure that they stay in one
place. o As people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the
mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provided for, you can not make
them live together.
Does the legislative intent of the law warrant the acts of the local government? – YES
• Under the resolution of the provincial board, it provided for the ff. reasons for the action:
o (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the
province;
o (2) the only successful method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement,
o (3) The protection of the Manguianes;
o (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; and
o (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
• The purpose of the law is to “establish friendly relations with the so-called non- Christians,
and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and
advancement in civilization”. – this method was termed in Spanish times as “bringing under
the bells”.
o FOR the Manguianes –
 § Segregationwillconstituteprotectionforthem.
 § The government wants to gather them into a reservation for educational purposes,
and to improve the health and morals of their people.
o FOR the state -
 § The manguians are engaged in the works of destruction – burning and destroying
of the forests and making illegal caingins.
 § To allow this to continue will be detrimental to the state since the will eventually
become a heavy burden to the State.
§ On account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations or if not they
will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
 The ultimate purpose of the government is to unify the people of the PH so that they
may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the
law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence.
  Since the petitioners Rubi are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty, Habeas corpus is not an issue.
Caunca v Salazar
GR. No. L-2690
January I, 1949
Liberty of abode and travel
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided
by law.
Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in
behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores, an orphan and an illiterate, who was
employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia
Salazar, respondent herein.
An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the
employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita
wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the
employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment,
which was applied to her transportation expense from the province
should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and
detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?
Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance
to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to
curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force
has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does
not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of
movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another,
freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to
external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to
erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an
impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of
choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect
of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of
another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice
as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.
Ratio:
On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a
valid reason for respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere
with her desire to leave. Such indebtedness may be multiplied by
thousands or millions but would not in any way subtract an iota
from the fundamental right to have a free choice of abode. The
fact that power to control said freedom may be an effective
means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency is no reason for
jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of
business cannot be controlled by controlling a fundamental
human freedom. Human dignity is not merchandise appropriate
for commercial barters or business bargains. Fundamental
freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other
business enterprise.
Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon
any person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of a
debt, shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will, as
household servant or farm laborer."
Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where
a housemaid is prevented from leaving her employ because of the
influence of the person detaining her.
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia,
Jr.,
521 SCRA 470 , April 19, 2007
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants
of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order
of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region
filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same
case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law
granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high
“flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was
granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused
hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and
processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in
this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of
filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in
extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this
case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the
week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all
the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest,
with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets
be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the
respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall
not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to
resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted
bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available
only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss
of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6,
September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended"
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence
in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s
case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in
international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in
public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in
the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe
these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the
duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the
worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the
recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the
subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically
eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle
of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of
war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the
Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These
significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of
international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international
organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights.
Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to
life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were
proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said
Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members
of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this
Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law
of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines
signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the
rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that
those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court,
to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the
various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human
rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this
Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual
of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings.
Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to
our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In
fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the
obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold
human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese
facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of
registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the
prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To
refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most
serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal
proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law."
Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no
formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the
finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff
relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the
detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases,
there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of
the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from
the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of
the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power,
created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a
crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other
state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal
proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition
proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,
even though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis,
tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the
following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting
state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused,
pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the
accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears
all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected
to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be
a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999,
and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court
ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over
two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard,
such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of
liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing
a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as
that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is
premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan
correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the
purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the
arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of
the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee
is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee
thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk
and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a
potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should
not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided
that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required
in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply
given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in
Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but
higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove
by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence
to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the
trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order
the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

PEOPLE VS. COGAED
June 30, 2014, G.R. No. 200334
LEONEN, J.
FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a
checkpoint, the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed
was carrying marijuana inside Cogaed’s bag; the police officer then approached Cogaed and
asked the accused about the contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what
was inside and that he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed
subsequently opened the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by
the police officers.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated
is admissible as evidence.
HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not be
admissible as evidence.
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of
probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The known
jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2) Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply
with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy
of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the
concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. It does not
have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a “genuine reason to
serve the purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception.
The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
detecting dangerous weapons.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation
for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the
person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the
person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that
he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This
should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid
search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was
made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was
about to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an
escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless
arrest.
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did
not object when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be lightly
taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule
prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing
expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence
because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person,
houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his
bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to
convict Cogaed.
G.R. No. 213847, Aug. 18, 2015
Juan Ponce Enrile
vs.
Sandiganbayan ( 3rd division ) and People of the Philippines
Facts:
Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan
for their alleged involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriation
under the PDAF. When his warrant was issued, Sen. Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to the CIDG and was later confined and detained at the PNP
General Hospital, he then filed a motion to fix bail where he argued that:
1. He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;
2. Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be reclusion
temporal considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, his
voluntary surrender and that he is already at the age of 90;
3. That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be
seriously considered.
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:
1. He is charged with a capital offense;
2. That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail
because the prosecution have not yet presented its evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying his motion to fix
bail?
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the
objective of bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health
and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is safeguarded by the
constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal appearance of the accused
during trial or whenever the court requires and at the same time recognizing
the guarantee of due process which is the presumption of his innocence until
proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be
allowed independently of the merits charged, provided his continued
incarceration is injurious to his health and endanger his life. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the right to
bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed
and attended, which will then enable him to attend trial therefore achieving
the true purpose of bail.

Harden vs. Director of Prisons (81 Phil. 741)
Facts:
On July 12, 1941 Fred M. Harden was involved in a civil case
with Mrs. Harden concerning conjugal partnership, payment of
alimony and accounting. A preliminary injunction was issued
restraining Mr. Harden from transferring or alienating, except
with consideration and consent of the court, all assets (money,
shares of stock, property, real, personal, whether in his name,
her name or both) in the partnership with Mrs. Harden. During
1946 however, Mr. Harden transferred drafts and cash in
overseas accounts. In the course of two years, he received
orders from the SC to return the amounts but Mr. Harden kept
filing for extensions. On March 24, 1948, he was committed to
jail because of contempt (failure to comply with the court’s
orders of producing the amounts) and held there until he can
produce said amounts.
Issue:
Relevant: WoN the imprisonment sentence for Mr. Harden is
excessive punishment.
Irrelevant: WoN the property moved into foreign jurisdiction is
still covered by Philippine jurisdiction
Held and Ratio:
Relevant: No. Mr. Harden has “the keys to his prison” and his
detainment is something that he himself can end at any time.
(Sec. 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court: When the contempt
consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power
of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a
superior court until he performs it)
Irrelevant: Yes. “While a court cannot give its receiver
authority to act in another state without the assistance of the
courts thereof (53 C. J., 390-391) yet it may act directly upon
the parties before it with respect to the property beyond the
limits of its territorial jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt
if they resist the court’s orders with reference to its custody or
disposition.”
Decision: Petition is denied.
Separate Opinion: Perfecto, J.
He believes that it is indeed an excessive penalty because of
Mr. Harden’s claims that it is beyond his power to comply with
the court order and would thus result in life imprisonment for
Mr. Harden.
Agcaoili vs. Farinas
G.R. No. 232395, July 03, 2018
The House Rules railroaded to initiate the inquiry
• Referral of House Resolution No. 882 from the Committee on Rules to the
Committee on Good Government and the scheduling for hearing on 02 May
2017 all took place on 16 March 2017, without the conduct of preliminary
determination before the Committee on Rules (for determination of whether
it is the proper subject of legislative inquiry) and before the respondent
Committee on Good Government (for determination of jurisdiction over the
subject matter)
• The subpoena ad testificandum for petitioners Ilocos 6 to appear at the
hearing scheduled on 16 May 2017 were only served on them on 15 May
2017 - one (1) day prior to the scheduled hearing, instead of at least three
(3) days as required under Section 8 of the House Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
• Despite lack of sufficient notice, the Committee of Good Government and
Public Accountability cited petitioners Ilocos 6 in contempt for failure to
appear at the 16 May 2017 hearing.
• The conditions of confinement are degrading and inhuman - effectively a
continuing psychological torture inflicted on the Ilocos 6. The Ilocos 6 were
not provided food and mattresses and beddings. The detention was a stock
room with very poor ventilation and turned hastily into a detention room.
• These conditions evince the coercive nature of the interrogation as
evidenced by statements of Respondent Fariñas during the inquiry on May
29, 2017 that petitioners will be detained until the House of Representatives
resumes its session in July 24, 2017.
• A Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by the Petitioners Ilocos 6 before
the Courts of Appeals where a “Writ of Habeas Corpus” was issued.
Subsequently, an "Order of Release" was issued to the Ilocos 6 after posting
bond but said order was not served because the process server was denied
entry to the House of Representatives.
• Worse, the leadership of the House of Representatives, specifically House
Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez, openly flouted the authority of the Court of
Appeals, stating publicly that the House of Representatives would not
recognize the orders of the Court of Appeals and even threatened to abolish
the Court of Appeals through a legislation originating from the House of
Representatives.
• In the end, with the Committee, specifically Respondent Fariñas
unsatisfied with their answers to the questions raised by the Committee, the
Ilocos 6 were ordered back into detention, until they were ready to answer
the queries of the Committee in a manner that it deemed satisfactory.
While the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before the CA,
petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos filed the instant Omnibus Petition.
In opposition, respondents maintain that the writ of Amparo and writ
of Habeas Corpus are two separate remedies which are incompatible and
therefore cannot co-exist in a single petition. Further, respondents argue that
the issuance of a writ of Amparo is limited only to cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances which are not extant in the instant
case.
Issue: WON the petition for writ of amparo while petition for habeas corpus
is pending is proper?
Ruling:
No. While there is no procedural and legal obstacle to the joining of a
petition for habeas corpus and a petition for Amparo,117 the peculiarity of
the then pendency of the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA renders the
direct resort to this Court for the issuance of a writ of Amparo inappropriate.
The privilege of the writ of Amparo is confined to instances of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof
Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily admit that the instant
Omnibus Petition does not cover extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof. Thus, on this ground alone, their petition
for the issuance of a writ of Amparo is dismissible.
ARVIN R. BALAG v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 234608, 3 July 2018, EN BANC (Gesmundo, J.)
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE
The interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its
legislative inquiry are balanced. The Senate can continuously and
effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry
against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be
exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a
contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of
the said witness. However, the Senate will be prevented from effectively
conducting legislative hearings during recess - shall be duly addressed
because it is expressly provided herein that the Senate may still exercise its
power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that
the period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry, specifically, upon the approval or disapproval of the
Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still
potent and compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of
the persons appearing are respected because their detention shall not be
indefinite.
FACTS
This is a case of petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
of an issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin implementation of the
Senate P.S. Resolution No. 504 and October 18, 2017 Order of Complaint
by the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs filed by
Arvin R. Balag (petitioner) against the Senate of the Philippines, et. al.
(respondent). On September 17, 2017, a first-year law student from the
University of Santo Tomas named Horacio Castillo III, allegedly died due to
hazing-related activities conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity. On
September 20, 2017, the senate released Senate Resolution No. 504 entitled
“a Resolution Directing the Appropriate Senate Committees to Conduct an
Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the Recent Death of Horacio Castillo III
Allegedly due to Hazing-Related Activities” filed by Sen. Paolo Benigno
Aquino IV.
When the petitioner attended the hearing dated on October 18,
2017, Sen. Grace Poe asked the petitioner if he was the president of Aegis
Juris Fraternity however, the petitioner refused to answer and invoked his
right to self-incrimination. Sen. Panfilo Lacson reminded that it was just a
“simple question” to invoke self-incrimination and warned the petitioner
that he may be cited in contempt, but the petitioner still refused to answer.
According to Sen. Grace Poe, the petitioner’s signature appeared on the
document for the application of the Aegis Juris Fraternity in the
organizational sheet submitted in the school administration and it was
indicated therein that the petitioner was the President, yet he still refuses to
answer the simple question asked. The petitioner was then cited in contempt
and was ordered to place in detention under the Senate Sergeant at Arms’
supervision after the senate hearing. Sen. Panfilo Lacson gave the petitioner
a chance to purge out of contempt, however, the petitioner still refused to
answer and invoked his right to self-incrimination. When the petitioner was
asked of the question of whose decision it was to bring the victim to the
hospital, the petitioner submitted a plea to lift his contempt and stated that
he was a member of the Aegis Juris Fraternity, however, he does not know
who the president was because he was enrolled at another university at the
time of the incident. The question asked before his plea was again repeated
and the petitioner invoked again his right to self-incrimination. The d
ISSUE:
Did the Senate Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion in
conducting the legislative inquiry and citing petitioner in contempt?
RULING:
YES. However, the court denied the petition for being moot and
academic. In the present case, the Court finds that there is no more
justiciable controversy to be decided up since in its resolution dated
December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate release
of petitioner pending resolution of the instant petition. Thus, petitioner was
no longer detained under the Senate's authority.
However, the court still resolved the case despite being moot and
academic. The court ruled that the period of imprisonment under the
inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of
legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry.
The court stated that the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing
in its legislative inquiry should be balanced. The Senate can continuously
and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry
against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be
exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a
contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of
the said witness. However, during recess, the Senate will be prevented from
effectively conducting legislative hearings. But the Senate may still exercise
its power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided
that the period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee
Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and
compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the
persons appearing are respected because their detention shall not be
indefinite.
Stonehill v Diokno
Stonehill v Diokno
Facts:
Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued at different dates against
petitioners and the corporations of which they were officers. Peace officers
were directed to search the persons of the petitioners and/or their premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences. Books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets, and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins were to be seized.
Petitioner contends that the issued search warrants were null and void as
having contravened the Constitution and the Rules of Court for, among
others, it did not describe the documents, books and things to be seized
PARTICULARLY.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant has been validly issued.
Whether or not the seized articles may be admitted in court.
Held:
The authority of the warrants in question may be split in two major groups:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations; and (b) those
found and seized in the residences of the petitioners.
The petitioners have no cause of action against the contested warrants on
the first major group. This is because corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of their officers,
directors and stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only
by the party whose rights have been impaired, the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure purely being personal cannot be availed by third parties.
As to the second major group, two important questions need be settled: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made
under authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer is no, whether
said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
petitioners.
The Constitution protects the rights of the people from unreasonable
searches and seizure. Two points must be stressed in connection to this
constitutional mandate: (1) no warrant shall be issued except if based upon
probable cause determined personally by the judge by the manner set in the
provision; and (2) the warrant shall describe the things to be seized with
particularly.
In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the warrant’s
application. The averments of the offenses committed were abstract and
therefore, would make it impossible for judges to determine the existence of
probable cause. Such impossibility of such determination naturally hinders
the issuance of a valid search warrant.
The Constitution also requires the things to be seized described with
particularity. This is to eliminate general warrants.
The Court held that the warrants issued for the search of three residences of
petitioners are null and void.
Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was
charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal
Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of
Drugs in two separate Informations.
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from
their confidential informant that accused-appellant
was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder
Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP
Chief formed a team of operatives. The group
positioned themselves across McArthur Highway
near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The
other group acted as their back up.
Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by
accused-appellant which just arrived and parked
near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-
appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed
Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag
hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves
as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out
his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a
crystalline substance protruded from his right back
pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a
body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live
.22 caliber firearm bulletsfrom his left back pocket.
When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the
Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline
substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the
small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box,
the twenty (20) pieces of .22
caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-
appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police
operatives who arrived at the scene brought the
confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at
the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles
City.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the
accusation against him and narrated a different
version of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the
car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila.
He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route
along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a
small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes
and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man
approaches and examines the inside of his car.
When he called the attention of the onlooker, the
man immediately pulled out a .45caliber gun and
made him face his car with raised hands. The man
later on identified himself as a policeman. During
the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his
wallet and instructed him to open his car. He
refused, so the policeman took his car keys and
proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police
officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two
cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene,
pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank,
while the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and
was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his
men to call the media. In the presence of reporters,
Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-
appellant was made to hold the box while pictures
were being taken.
The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal
Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for
Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu.
Hence, this appeal to the Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant
was lawful; and
(2) WON the search of his person and the
subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on
him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.
Held: The lower court believed that since the
police received information that the accused will
distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder
Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to
act quickly and there was no more time to secure a
search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a
“stop and frisk”.
The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-
and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. These two types of warrantless searches
differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in
their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely
used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be arrest
before a search can be made—the process cannot
be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception
to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in
the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not act in a
suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes,
there was no overt manifestation that accused-
appellant has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
“Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence
and within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-
frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally,
a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It
should also be emphasized that a search and
seizure should precede the arrest for this principle
to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain
in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant
was firstarrested before the search and seizure of
the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The
apprehending police operative failed to make any
initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s business in
the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box
he was carrying. The apprehending police officers
only introduced themselves when they already had
custody of accused-appellant.
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto
nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to
justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search
and seizure made by the police operatives on
accused-appellant.
Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is
hereby Acquitted.
KATZ v. US

Facts of the case

Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over

the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an
eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz.
Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted
under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering
information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz
challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as
evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the
absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court
granted certiorari.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and

seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a
public pay phone?

Conclusion

Yes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he
occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. "The Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for
the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the
idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.
Terry v Ohio

Syllabus

A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been

patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another
man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and
forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window,
which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route
was followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which
they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two
men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw them
rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer
approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their
names. The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun
petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his
overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the
three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver,
and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted
down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from
Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer
garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might
have been a weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until
he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Petitioner and
Chilton were charged with carrying
Page 392 U. S. 2
concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons. Though
the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized
during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to
suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the
officer had cause to believe that petitioner and Chilton were acting
suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the officer, for
his own protection, had the right to pat down their outer clothing having
reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The court
distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a
"frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for
evidence of crime. Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate
appellate court affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
on the ground that "no substantial constitutional question" was involved.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects
people, not places," and therefore applies as much to the citizen on the
streets as well as at home or elsewhere. Pp. 392 U. S. 8-9.
2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct,
but the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the
search and seizure. P. 392 U. S. 12.
3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products
of legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques, and this Court's
approval of such techniques should not discourage remedies other than the
exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective
sanction. Pp. 392 U. S. 13-15.
4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as
those followed here. Pp. 392 U. S. 16-20.
(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. P. 392 U. S. 16.
(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an
attempt to find weapons is a "search" under that Amendment. P. 392 U. S.
16.
5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a
given case in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he
may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person believed by him to
be armed and dangerous
Page 392 U. S. 3
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for
crime or the absolute certainty that the individual is armed. Pp. 392 U. S.
20-27.
(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant to make
a search and seizure, that procedure cannot be followed where swift action
based upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat is required.
P. 392 U. S. 20.
(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be
assessed in light of the particular circumstances against the standard of
whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in believing that the
action taken was appropriate. Pp. 392 U. S. 21-22.
(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function of investigating
suspicious conduct when he decided to approach petitioner and his
companions. P. 392 U. S. 22.
(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual whose suspicious
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed may, to neutralize the
threat of physical harm, take necessary measures to determine whether that
person is carrying a weapon. P. 392 U. S. 24.
6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions and the
limited search which he made were reasonable, both at their inception and
as conducted. Pp. 392 U. S. 27-30.
(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the
officer's hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight robbery and
were armed. P. 392 U. S. 28.
(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to
determine whether the men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made
for the sole purpose of protecting himself and others nearby, was confined
to ascertaining the presence of weapons. Pp. 392 U. S. 29-30.
7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into evidence
against him, since the search which led to its seizure was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 392 U. S. 30-31.
Affirmed.

(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. Pp. 392 U. S. 25-
26.

(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable
apprehension of danger before being possessed of information justifying
arrest. Pp. 392 U. S. 26-27.
 United States v. Place

Syllabus

When respondent's behavior aroused the suspicion of law enforcement

officers as he waited in line at the Miami International Airport to purchase a
ticket to New York's La Guardia Airport, the officers approached respondent
and requested and received identification. Respondent consented to a search
of the two suitcases he had checked, but, because his flight was about to
depart, the officers decided not to search the luggage. The officers then
found some discrepancies in the address tags on the luggage and called
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authorities in New York to relay
this information. Upon respondent's arrival at La Guardia Airport, two DEA
agents approached him, said that they believed he might be carrying
narcotics, and asked for and received identification. When respondent
refused to consent to a search of his luggage, one of the agents told him that
they were going to take it to a federal judge to obtain a search warrant. The
agents then took the luggage to Kennedy Airport where it was subjected to a
"sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection dog which reacted positively to
one of the suitcases. At this point, 90 minutes had elapsed since the seizure
of the luggage. Thereafter, the agents obtained a search warrant for that
suitcase and, upon opening it, discovered cocaine. Respondent was indicted
for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and the District Court
denied his motion to suppress the contents of the suitcase. He pleaded guilty
to the charge and was convicted, but reserved the right to appeal the denial
of his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
prolonged seizure of respondent's luggage exceeded the limits of the type of
investigative stop permitted by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, and hence
amounted to a seizure without probable cause in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Held: Under the circumstances, the seizure of respondent's luggage violated
the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the evidence obtained from the
subsequent search of the luggage was inadmissible, and respondent's
conviction must be reversed. Pp. 462 U. S. 700-710.
probable cause. Under this standard, the police conduct here exceeded the
permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative stop. The length of the
detention of respondent's luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the
seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause. This Fourth
Amendment violation was exacerbated by the DEA agents' failure to inform
respondent accurately of the place to which they were transporting his
luggage, of the length of time he might be dispossessed, and of what
arrangements would be made for return of the luggage if the investigation
dispelled the suspicion. Pp. 462 U. S. 707-710.

(a) When an officer's observations lead him reasonably to believe that a

traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles
of Terry and its progeny permit the officer to detain the luggage temporarily
to investigate the circumstances that aroused the officer's suspicion,

Page 462 U. S. 697

provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope.

Pp. 462 U. S. 700-706.

(b) The investigative procedure of subjecting luggage to a "sniff test" by a

well-trained narcotics detection dog does not constitute a "search" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 462 U. S. 706-707.

(c) When the police seize luggage from the suspect's custody, the limitations
applicable to investigative detentions of the person should define the
permissible scope of an investigative detention of the luggage on less than
 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

A. The Recognition and Guarantee of Human Rights in the 1987

Constitution

B. Transformation Clause

1987 Phil. Consti. Article 7, Section 21

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective

unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Phil.ippines v.

Duque
Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines
Respondents: DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH Undersecretaries Dr.
Ethelyn Nieto, Dr. Margarita Galon, Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade
Del Mundo; and Asst. Secretaries Dr. Mario Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada
and Dr. Nemesio Gako

Facts: - Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by
Pres. Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to
her under the Freedom Constitution.

(1)One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law seeks to give effect to
Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substituttes
(ICMBS), a code adopted by the WHA (World Health Assembly) in 1981.

- In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights

of the Child. Art. 24 of the instrument mandates that States should take
measure to diminish infant mortality and should ensure that all segments of
society are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.

- From 1982 – 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should
be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.
- May 15, 2006 – DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to
take effect on July 7, 2006. – The RIRR imposes a ban on all advertisements
of breastmilk substitutes –
June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary
injunction. - August 15, 2006 – the Court issued a Resolution granting the
TRO, enjoining the respondents from implementing the assailed RIRR. -
Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC thereby
amending and expanding the coverage of the said law.
- DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but
also various international instruments regarding infant and young child
nutrition. They posit that the said international instruments are deemed part
of the law of the land and therefore may be implemented by the DOH in the
RIRR.
Issue: W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional?
Sub-issue(s): W/n the RIRR is in accord with TMC? W/n pertinent
international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law
of the land and may thus be implemented through an RIRR, if so, is the
RIRR in accord with such international agreements?
Note: I focused on the parts on international law. The other matters (in case
ma’am asks) are at the bottom of the digest.
Held: No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the
Milk Code which in turn is based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of
the law of the land. The other WHA Resolutions however cannot be
imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of the land.
Ratio:
1. Are the international instruments referred to by the respondents part of
the law of the land? - The various international instruments invoked by
respondents are:
(1)The UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child (2) The International
Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(3)Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women
- These instruments only provide general terms of the steps that States must
take to prevent child mortality. Hence, they do not have anything about the
use and marketing of breastmilk substitutes
- The ICMBS and other WHA Resolutions however, are the international
instruments which have specific provisions on breastmilk substitutes -
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of domestic
law in 2 ways:
(1) Transformation – an international law is transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation
 Treaties become part of law of the land through this method, pursuant to
Art 7, Sec 21 – wherein “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid..
unless concurred by at least 2/3 of Senate”
 The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they haven’t
been concurred in by the required 2/3 vote.
 HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed into domestic law through
local legislation that is TMC.
• Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se that has the force of law but it’s
TMC.
o While TMC is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, it did not
adopt the latter’s provision on the absolute prohibition on advertising of
products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead the MC provides that
advertising promotion or other marketing materials may be allowed if such
materials are approved by a committee.
(2)Incorporation – by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law
 This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 – The Philippines… adopts generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
 In Mihares v. Ranada: International law becomes customary rules
accepted as binding as a result of two elements: 1.) Established, widespread,
and consistent practice on part of the state 2.) Opinion juris sive necessitates
(opinion as to law or necessity.
 Generally accepted principles of international law refer to norms of
general or customary international law which are binding on all states, valid
through all kinds of human societies, and basic to legal systems generally
 Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one above. Customary
international law has two factors: 1.) Material factor – how states behave •
The consistency and the generality of the practice 2.) Psychological or
subjective factor – why they behave the way they do • Once state practice
has been established, now determine why they behave they do. Is it ouor of
courtesy or opinio juris (the belief that a certain type of behavior is
obligatory)
 When a law satisfies the two factors it becomes part of customary
international law which is then incorporated into our domestic system
2. Since the WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local
legislation, have they attained the status of customary law and hence part of
our law of the land? –
The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international
specialized agencies of the UN.
- According to the WHO Constitution, it’s the WHA which determines the
policies of the WHO, the former also has the power to “adopt regulations
concerning advertising and labeling of pharmaceutical and similar products”
and “to make recommendations to members on any matter within the
Organization’s competence” –
Note that the legal effect of a regulation as opposed to recommendation is
quite different
(1)Regulations which are duly adopted by the WHA are binding on member
states
(2) On the other hand, recommendations of the WHA do not come into
force for its members unlike regulations. Rather, they carry moral and
political weight as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the
collective membership of the highest body in the field of health.
- The WHA resolution adopting the ICMBS and the subsequent WHA
resolutions urging states to implement the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding. –
Hence, unlike the ICMBS which has become TMC through legislative
enactment, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, which provide for exclusive
breastfeeding and prohibition on advertisements and promotions of
breastmilk have not been adopted as domestic law.
- WHA Resolutions have been viewed to constitute “soft law” or non-
binding norms, which influence state behavior. Soft law has been noted to
be a rapid means of norm creation, in order to reflect and respond to the
changing needs and demands of constituents (of the UN.)
- As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered
customary law, it must be established that such rule is followed by states
because it is considered obligatory (opinio juris).
- In the case at bar, respondents have not presented any evidence to prove
that the WHA Resolutions are in fact enforced or practice by member states.
Further, they failed to establish that provisions of pertinent WHA
Resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of law
of the land.
- Hence, legislation is necessary to transform the WHA resolutions into
domestic law. They cannot thus be implemented by executive agencies
without the need of a law to be enacted by legislature.
On other issues:
W/n the petitioner is the real party in interest?
Yes. - An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack
of direct interest of its members are affected by the action. An organization
has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. (Exec Sec vs CA)
- The Court has rules that an association has the legal personality to
represent its members because the results of the case will affect their vital
interests. (Purok Bagong Silang Association Inc. vs. Yuipco)
- In the petitioner’s Amended Articles of Incorporation, it states that the
association is formed “to represent directly or through approved
representatives the pharmaceutical and health care industry before the
Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical professions and
the general public.”
- Therefore, the petitioner, as an organization, has an interest in fulfilling its
avowed purpose of representing members who are part of the
pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner is duly authorized to
bring to the attention of the government agencies and courts any grievance
suffered by its members which are directly affected by the assailed RIRR.
- The petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members,
should be considered as a legal party-in-interest which stands to be
benefited or injured by any judgment in the case.
W/n the DOH has the power to implement the WHA Resolutions under
the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law?
Only the provisions of the Milk Code. (as per the discussion above)
- Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the RAC of 1987 provides that the DOH
shall define the national health policy and can issue orders and regulations
concerning the implementation of established health policies.
- A.O. No 2005 -0014 which provides the national policy on infant and
young child feeding, does not declare that as part of its policy, the
advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely
prohibited. –
Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of the subsequent WHA
Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject
RIRR.
W/n the provisions of the RIRR being in accordance with the Milk
Code? Not all of them
- Assailed provisions: [1] extending the coverage to young children; [2]
imposing exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months; [3] imposes
an absolute ban on advertising and promotion for breastmilk substitutes; [4]
requiring additional labeling requirements; [5] prohibits the dissemination
of information on infant formula; [6] forbids milk manufacturers and
distributors to extend assistance in research and continuing education
Although the DOH has the power under the Milk Code to control
information regarding breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, this power
is not absolute because it has no power to impose an absolute prohibition in
the marketing, promotion and advertising of breastmilk substitutes. Several
provisions of the Milk Code attest to the fact that such power to control
information is not absolute.
- Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code
because such provisions impose an absolute prohibition on advertising,
promotion and marketing of breastmilk substitutes, which is not provided
for in the Milk Code. Section 46 is violative of the Milk Code because the
DOH has exceeded its authority in imposing such fines or sanctions when
the Milk Code does not do so. Other assailed provisions are in accordance
with the Milk Code.
W/n Section 13 of the RIRR providing a sufficient standard?
Yes. - Questioned provision, in addition to Section 26 of Rule VII provide
labeling requirements for breastmilk substitutes  found to be in consonance
with the Milk Code
- The provisions in question provide reasonable means of enforcing related
provisions in the Milk Code.
W/n Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws?
- Section in question only repeals orders, issuances and rules and
regulations, not laws. The provision is valid as it is within the DOH’s rule-
making power.
- An administrative agency has quasi-legislative or rule-making power.
However, such power is limited to making rules and regulation subjected to
the boundaries set by the granting statute and the Constitution. The power is
also subject to the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
The power, which includes amending, revising, altering or repealing, is
granted to allow for flexibility in the implementation of the laws.

W/n On Section 4, 5(w), 11, 22, 32, 47 and 52 violates the due process
clause of the Constitution (Article III Section 1)?

- Despite the fact that the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a
policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare… free enterprise does B. Incorporation Clause
not call for the removal of protective regulations. It must be clearly
explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such
protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. 1987 Phil. Consti. Article 2, Section 2

- Section 4 – proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation in any The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
policymaking body; Section 22 – classes and seminars for women and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
children; Section 32 – giving of assistance, support and logistics or training; law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
Section 52 – giving of donations freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

- In the instant case, petitioner failed to show how the aforementioned Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244 , February 01, 2011
sections hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. They also failed to
establish that these activities are essential and indispensable to their trade.
FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo,
Disposition: The Petition is Partially Granted. Only sections 4(f), 11 and 46
signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification,
of A.O. 2006-0014 are declared null and void for being ultra vires. The TRO
is lifted insofar as the rest of the provisions of A.O. 2006-0012 is concerned. acceptance or approval” by the signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP,

represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender
agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from
frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding

and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

ISSUE: [1] Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in
contravention of the Rome Statute?
[2] Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by
at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate?
HELD: The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it
differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one
complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of
complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of
the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states].” the Rome Statute expressly
recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious
crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are
unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a
State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a
signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification
by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging
the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.
And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute
still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into
between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the
Rome Statute.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations,
most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims.
The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such
concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her
conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it,
“executive altogether.” The right of the President to enter into or ratify
binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long
practice. DISMISSED.
Vinuya v. Romulo, 732 SCRA 595 , August 12, 2014
FACTS
 In 2010, the SC ruled against the petitioners herein.
 Petitioners are now praying that the court reconsider its 2010 decision and
declare that 1) rape, sexual slavery, torture, and other forms of sexual
violence committed against the Filipino Women are crimes against
humanity and war crimes under customary international law and that 2) the
Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the
waiver if the claims of the Filipina Comfort Women against Japan is
concerned; 3) that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive
Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the
claims of Filipina comfort woman; and 4) that petitioners are entitled to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents.
 Petitioners also pray the the court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
and the Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipino Comfort
women for an official apology, legal compensation, and other forms of
reparation from Japan.
 Respondents argue that the formal apology by the Government of Japan
and the reparation the Government of Japan has provided through the Asian
Women’s Fund are sufficient to recompense petitioners on their claims,
specifically:

o About 700M Yen would be paid from the National Treasury over the next
10 years as welfare and medical services

o The services would be provided through organizations delegated by the

governmental bodies in the recipient countries (PH, Korea, Taiwan)

o Compensation would consist of assistance for nursing services like

housing, environmental development, medical expenses, and medical
goods.

ISSUE: WON the court can order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipino Comfort women for
an official apology, legal compensation, and other forms of reparation from International-Municipal Issue
Japan? – NO.
• Communication Addressed to the Government on 17 March 2015:
DISPOSITIVE: MR denied and Supplemental MR denied. Concerning Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, No. 24/2015 (Philippines)

RATIO  The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the
conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse
petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive
determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot
interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by
the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive
Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign
relations with Japan in a certain manner.
• Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233 , February 18, 2010
PARTIES:
1. PETITIONERS: LOURDES RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO,
and MARY JO Y RUBRICO CARBONEL
2. RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GE. AVELINO RAZON, M AJ.
DARWIN SY, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO
CUARESMA, P/SUPT. EDGAR ROQUERO, ARSENIO GOMEZ,
JONATHAN, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari of CA decision

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
1. Supreme Court: Original Action for a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
2. Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals summarily heard the Original Action for Petition of Amparo.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a partial judgment which is the
subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa
Gawa Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air
Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS) based in Lipa City while
attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was brought to and
detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week after
relentless interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would
be a military asset.
Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes
filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint
for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave misconduct against
Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has happened. She
likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas
municipal and Cavite provincial police stations , but nothing eventful
resulted from their inv estigation.
Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation
which indicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico
filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25
October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the
Ombudsman to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified
with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico
also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents
submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to
the Court of Appeals (CA) for summary hearing and appropriate action. At
the hearing conducted on 20 Nov ember 2007, the CA granted petitioner’s
motion that the petition and writ be serv ed on Darwin Sy /Rey es, Santana,
Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped
the President as respondent in the case.
On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial
judgment, dismissing the petition with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero,
Gomez, and Ombudsman. Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of command
responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition. No.
HELD:
DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY and THE WRIT OF
AMPARO
Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo
proceedings – [C]ommand responsibility, as a concept defined, developed,
and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo
proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in
the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr.
Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the
responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,
foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for
the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty
of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an
omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made
responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent
or punish the perpetrators.
There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under the
Doctrine of Command Responsibility – While there are sev eral pending
bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that
provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be
contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military
/police commanders liable for extra -legal killings, enforced disappearances,
or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the
command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international
law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation
clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these
proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to
have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for
individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach
of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on
any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an
infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed.
Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought
not to pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the
investigation in question to its natural end – [T]he right to security of
persons is a guarantee of the protection of one’s right by the government.
And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-
legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The
nature and importance of an inv estigation are captured in the Velasquez
Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An inv
estigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own
legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends upon the
initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government.
The remedy of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously – The
privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears
and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the preval ence of
extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy
ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of
amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs
and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition for review. It issued a
decision as follows:
(1) Affirming the dropping of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
from the petition;
(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the
command responsibility principl e, to attach accountability and
responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for
the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments
allegedly committed against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with
respect to the Ombudsman is also affirmed for failure of the petition to
allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and
(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the
incumbent Director -General of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the
investigations already commenced by their respective units on the alleged
abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she
and her daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary
diligence as required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule. The Chief of Staff of
the AFP and Director-General of the PNP are directed to order their
subordinate officials, in particular, to do the following:
(a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and
locations of respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy
Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and
submit certifications of this determination to the OMBUDSMAN with copy
furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this Court;
(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to
Maj. Darwin Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and
(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic
sketches of respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro,
Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in positively
identifying and locating them.
The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from
receipt of the Decision; and within thirty (30) days after completion of the
inv estigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of the
PNP are likewise directed to submit a full report of the results of the
investigations to the Court, the CA, the OMB, and petitioners.
The Supreme Court accordingly referred the case back to the CA for the
purpose of monitoring the investigations and the actions of the AFP and the
PNP.
• Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377 , October 17, 2000
FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the
U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department
of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to
take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated
extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to
Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from
the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the
request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the
petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must
present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional
governments ironclad duties under a treaty. provision.

RULING: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its
treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally
accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as
part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of
the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies
of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark
Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice
has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national
or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where
the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of

the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such
rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are

confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of
the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to

both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper
regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
 E. Social Justice
• Calalang v. Williams et al., 70 Phil.., 726 , December 02, 1940

Facts: Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer

of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its

resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30
Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street
from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening of
the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940

recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the
resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the
approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval
of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved
the recommendations on August 10, 1940.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their
owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue:
1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right
to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public
safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty
is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,
the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise
of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to
the greatest number.” THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS
AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
 F. Three Constitutions in One
• Constitution of Sovereignty

Popular sovereignty is government based on consent of the people. The

government's source of authority is the people, and its power is not
legitimate if it disregards the will of the people. Government established by
free choice of the people is expected to serve the people, who
have sovereignty, or supreme power.

Sovereignty is the full right and power of a governing body over itself,
without any interference from outside sources or bodies. In political
theory, sovereignty is a substantive term designating supreme authority
over some polity.

• Constitution of Government

Constitutional government. Constitutional government is defined by the

existence of a constitution—which may be a legal instrument or merely a
set of fixed norms or principles generally accepted as the fundamental law
of the polity—that effectively controls the exercise of political power.
Constitutional government is defined by the existence of a constitution—
which may be a legal instrument or merely a set of fixed norms or principles
generally accepted as the fundamental lawof the polity—that effectively
controls the exercise of political power. The essence of constitutionalism is
the control of power by its distribution among several state organs
or offices in such a way that they are each subjected to reciprocal controls
and forced to cooperate in formulating the will of the state. Although
constitutional government in this sense flourished in England and in some
other historical systems for a considerable period, it is only recently that it
has been associated with forms of mass participation in politics. In England,
for example, constitutional government was not harnessed to
political democracy until after the Reform Act of 1832 and subsequent 19th-
century extensions of the suffrage. In the contemporary world, however,
constitutional governments are also generally democracies, and in most
cases they are referred to as constitutional democracies or constitutional-
democratic systems. VI. THE BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Definition
• Constitution of Rights
• Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 , July 21, 2003 (J. Tinga
Usually any constitution defines the structure, functions, powers, and limits Separate Opinion)
of the national government and the individual freedoms, rights, and
obligations which will be protected and enforced when needed by the
national authorities. FACTS:
The PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good Government) created an
A constitutional right can be a prerogative or a duty, a power or a restraint AFP Anti-Graft Board tasked to scrutinize the reports of unexplained wealth
of power, recognized and established by a sovereign state or union of states. and corrupt practices by any AFP personnel (active or retired). The AFP
All constitutional rights are expressly stipulated and written in a Board investigated various reports of alleged “ill-gotten” wealth of
consolidated national constitution, which is the supreme law of the land, respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Ramas. Along with this, the Constabulary
meaning that any other laws which are in contradiction with it are raiding team served a search and seizure warrant on the premises of
considered unconstitutional and thus regarded as invalid. Usually any Ramas’ alleged mistress, Elizabeth Dimaano. The Board then concluded
constitution defines the structure, functions, powers, and limits of the that Ramas be prosecuted for violating the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt
national government and the individual freedoms, rights, and obligations Practices Act (RA 3019)” and “Forfeiture of unlawfully Acquired
which will be protected and enforced when needed by the national Property (RA 1379)”. Thereafter, they filed a petition for forfeiture against
authorities. him before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case on
several grounds one of which is that there was an illegal search and seizure
of the items confiscated.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the PCGG has the authority to investigate Ramas and
Dimaano
2. Whether or not the properties and other belongings confiscated in
Dimaano’s house were illegally seized which will consequently make it
inadmissible
HELD: The petition was dismissed. Even in the absence of a Constitution,
the right against unlawful seizure can be found in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum, the Filipino people
under the Covenant and Declaration continued to enjoy almost the same
rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. As stated in
Article 2(1) of the Convenant, the State is required “to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.” Further, under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o
one else shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence.”
The Declaration also provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property.” The Court has taken into consideration
the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international
law and binding on the State. Hence, the revolutionary government was also
obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under
the Declaration, because it didn’t repudiated either the Covenant or the
Declaration during the interregnum.
Footnotes:
(1) REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT) Section 1. Statement of policy. It is the policy of the
Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a
public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons
alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
(2) REPUBLIC ACT No. 1379 (AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN
FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND TO HAVE BEEN
UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR
EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS
THEREFORE.)
Section 1. Definitions. (a) For the purposes of this Act, a "public officer or
employee" means any person holding any public office or employment by
virtue of an appointment, election or contract, and any person holding any
office or employment, by appointment or contract, in any State owned or
controlled corporation or enterprise.
(3) E.O. # 14 Sec. 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property
under Republic Act No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages, or
indemnification for consequential and other damages or any other civil
actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, members
of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or
business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, may proceed
independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence
(4) Art. 2(1) of the Covenant – “to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant.”
(5) Art. 17(1) of the Declaration –“ to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the right
recognized in the present Covenant.”
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J.:
In a little less than a fortnight, I find myself privileged with my involvement
in the final deliberation of quite a few significant public interest cases.
Among them is the present case.
With the well-studied and exhaustive main opinion of Justice Antonio
Carpio, the scholarly treatise that the separate opinion of Justice Reynato
Puno is, and the equally incisive separate opinion of Justice Jose Vitug, any
other opinion may appear unnecessary. But the questions posed are so
challenging and the implications so far-reaching that I feel it is my duty to
offer my modest views.
To begin with, there is unanimity as regards the nullity of the questioned
seizure of items which are not listed in the search warrant. The
disagreement relates to the juridical basis for voiding the confiscation. At
the core of the controversy is the question of whether the Bill of Rights was
in force and effect during the time gap between the establishment of the
revolutionary government as a result of the People Power Revolution in
February 1986, and the promulgation of the Provisional or Freedom
Constitution by then President Corazon C. Aquino a month thereafter.
According to the majority, during the interregnum the Filipino people
continued to enjoy, under the auspices of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("Universal Declaration") and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("International Covenant"), practically the same
rights under the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution although the said
Constitution itself was no longer operative then. Justice Puno posits that
during that period, the right against unreasonable search and seizure still
held sway, this time under the aegis of natural law. Justice Vitug is of the
view that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained in force
and effect mainly because the revolutionary government was bound to
respect the Universal Declaration.
Interestingly, the case has necessitated a debate on jurisprudential thought.
Apparently, the majority adheres to the legal positivist theory championed
by nineteenth century philosopher John Austin, who defined the essence of
law as a distinct branch of morality or justice. 1 He and the English
positivists believed that the essence of law is the simple idea of an order
backed by threats.2
On the other side is Justice Puno’s espousal of the natural law doctrine,
which, despite its numerous forms and varied disguises, is still relevant in
modern times as an important tool in political and legal thinking.
Essentially, it has afforded a potent justification of the existing legal order
and the social and economic system it embodies, for by regarding positive
law as based on a higher law ordained by divine or natural reason, the actual
legal system thus acquires stability or even sanctity it would not otherwise
possess.3
While the two philosophies are poles apart in content, yet they are somehow
cognate.4 To illustrate, the Bill of Rights in the Constitution has its origins
from natural law. Likewise a natural law document is the Universal
Declaration.5
A professor of Jurisprudence notes the inexorable trend to codify
fundamental rights:
The emphasis on individual liberty and freedom has been a distinctive
feature of western political and legal philosophy since the seventeenth
century, associated particularly with the doctrine of natural rights. In the
twentieth century this doctrine has resulted in the widespread acceptance of
the existence of fundamental rights built into the constitutional framework
as a bill of rights, as well as receiving recognition internationally by means
of Covenants of Human Rights agreed upon between states.
As such bill of rights—whether proffered as a statement of the inalienable
and immutable rights of man vested in him by natural law, or as no more
than a set of social and economic rights which the prevailing consensus and
the climate of the times acknowledge to be necessary and fundamental in a
just society—will inevitably take the form of a catalogue of those rights,
which experience has taught modern western society to be crucial for the
adequate protection of the individual and the integrity of his personality. We
may therefore expect, in one form or another, the inclusion of a variety of
freedoms, such as freedom of association, of religion, of free speech and of
a free press.6
In the case at bar, in the ultimate analysis both jurisprudential doctrines
have found application in the denouement of the case. The Bill of Rights in
the Constitution, the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant,
great documents of liberty and human rights all, are founded on natural law.
Going back to the specific question as to the juridical basis for the
nullification of the questioned confiscation, I respectfully maintain that it
is no less than the Freedom Constitution since it made the Bill of Rights force, independently of the Freedom Constitution, or at least the provisions
in the 1973 Constitution operable from the incipiency of the Aquino thereof proscribing unreasonable search and seizure12 and excluding
government. evidence in violation of the proscription.13

In the well-publicised so-called "OIC cases," 7 this Court issued an en
banc resolution8 dismissing the petitions and upholding the validity of the
removal of the petitioners who were all elected and whose terms of office
under the 1973 Constitution were to expire on June 30, 1986, on the basis of
Article III, Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986.
This Court perforce extended retroactive effect to the above-quoted
provision as the petitions except one9 were filed before the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution on March 25, 1986. That being the case, with greater
reason should the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution be accorded
retroactive application pursuant to the Freedom Constitution.
But the more precise statement is that it was the unmistakable thrust of
the Freedom Constitution to bestow uninterrupted operability to the
Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution. For one thing, the title 10 itself of
Proclamation No. 3 which ordained the Freedom Constitution, as well as
one of the vital premises or whereas clauses 11 thereof, adverts to the
"protection of the basic rights" of the people. For another, the Freedom
Constitution in Article 1, Section 1 mandates that the Bill of Rights and
other provisions of the Freedom Constitution specified therein "remain in
force and effect and are hereby adopted in toto as part of this Provisional
Constitution."
Markedly departing from the typical, the revolutionary government installed
by President Aquino was a benign government. It had chosen to observe
prevailing constitutional restraints. An eloquent proof was the fact that
through the defunct Philippine Constabulary, it applied for a search warrant
and conducted the questioned search and seizure only after obtaining the
warrant. Furthermore, President Aquino definitely pledged in her oath of
office to uphold and defend the Constitution, which undoubtedly was the
1973 Constitution, including the Bill of Rights thereof.
True, the Aquino government reorganized the government, including the
judiciary and the local officialdom. It did so to protect and stabilize the
revolutionary government and not for the purpose of trampling upon the
fundamental rights of the people.
While arguably the due process clause was not observed in the case of the
sequestration orders issued by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, the fact remains that by and large, the Aquino Government
elected and managed to uphold and honor the Bill of Rights.
In light of the foregoing, I concur in the result.

Of course, even if it is supposed that the Freedom Constitution had no

retroactive effect or it did not extend the effectivity of the Bill of Rights in
the 1973 Constitution, still there would be no void in the municipal or
domestic law at the time as far as the observance of fundamental rights is
concerned. The Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution would still be in
 • Sta. Maria v. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637, February 18, 1970

Facts :

Petitioner Felixberto C. Sta.Mariawas the Dean, College of Education,

University of the Philippines (UP), and the the respondent Salvador P.
Lopez the Univerity President.

Sta. Maria, a professor of English and Comparative Literature, was elected

Dean of the College of Education on May 5, 1967 by the Board of Regents,
on nomination of the UP President. His appointment as such Dean was for a
five year term, "effective May 16, 1967 until May 17, 1972, unless sooner
terminated, with all the rights and privileges as well as the duties and
obligations attached to the position in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the University and the Constitution and laws of the Republic
of the Philippines.

In February 1969, the graduate and undergraduate students of the UP

College of Education presented to President Salvador P. Lopez a number of
demands having a bearing on the general academic program and the
physical plant and services, with a cluster of special demands. In response,
President Lopez created a committee which met with Sta. Maria regularly.
As a result of the dialogues and recommendations by Sta. Maria to the
president, the students were not appeased. The students went on to boycott
their classes which infected the other colleges and the newly installed
members of the UP Student Council voted to support the education students'
strike. Until the day that all academic activity in the university came to a
complete stand still so that the UP President called a meeting of the faculty
of the College of Education. Those present gave him a vote of confidence
(40 in favor, 7 abstained) to resolve the issue on hand as he sees fit.
Armed with the vote of confidence of the education faculty, President Lopez
issued the transfer order herein challenged, Administrative Order 77.
Theorder, addressed to Dean Sta. Maria and simultaneously appointed ad
interim Professor Nemesio R. Ceralde as "acting Dean of the College of
Education, without additional compensation.
Issue: Whether or not the transfer of Sta. Maria constitutes removal.
Held:
Yes, A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of
equivalent rank, level or salary, without break in service." Promotion is the
"advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties and
responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an
increase in salary."
A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction
or a transfer that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent
position", cannot be done without the employee's consent. For that would
constitute removal from office. Indeed, no permanent unless the officer or
employee is transfer can take place unless the officer of the employee is first
removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position.
The transfer was a demotion. A demotion, because: First, Deanship in a
university, being an academic position which requires learning, ability and
scholarship, is more exalted than that of a special assistant who merely
assists the President, as the title indicates. The special assistant does not
make authoritative decisions. Second. The position of dean is a line position
where the holder makes authoritative decisions in his own name and
responsibility. A special assistant does not rise above the level of staff
position. Third. The position of dean is created by law, the university
charter, and cannot be abolished even by the Board of Regents. That of
special assistant, upon the other hand, is not so provided by law; it was a
creation of the university president.
It will not avail respondents any to say that Sta. Maria retained "the rank of
Dean". In actual administrative practice, the terms "with rank of" dean is
meaningless. He is no dean at all. He of course, basks, in the trappings of
the dean. A palliative it could have been intended to be. But actually he is a
dean without a college.
B. Purpose
• Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 , May 29, 1987
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of
public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus
instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government
employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to
validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public
concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all
information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc.,
are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the
availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by
the nature of the information sought, i.e.,
(a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and,
(b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee.
The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought
is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as
already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to
grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has
the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public
concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by
law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to
dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in
an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against
release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]).
To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the
government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the
proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office
being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles.
Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their
eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing
to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite
any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's
right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles.
We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil
service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for
various professions, are released to the public.
Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen,
has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service
Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in
the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register
of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person
occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies
C. Historical Development
D. Hierarchy of Rights
• Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 , January 18, 2000
FACTS:
In accordance to "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America" (RP-US Extradition Treaty), the Department of Justice received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United
States attached with the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued
by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other
supporting documents on June 18, 1999. Mr. Jimenez was charged with the
following:

i. 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United
States; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
ii. 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;4 counts; Maximum
Penalty:5 years/count)
iii. 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; 2 counts; Maximum
Penalty: 5 years/count)
iv. 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; 6 counts; Maximum Penalty:
5 years/count)
v. 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts;
Maximum Penalty: less than 1 year)
The Department of Justice denied Mr. Jimenez request for extradition
documents based on the following:
i. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the
United States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the
procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and
admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements are under Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069. Evaluation by the Department of the documents is not a
preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal
cases. Thus, the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all
criminal prosecutions are not available. It merely determines the
compliance of the Requesting Government with the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty. After the filing of the
petition for extradition, the person sought to be extradited will be furnished
by the court with copies of the petition.
ii. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the
foreign governments in all extradition requests. Furthermore, Article 7 of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of
a request for extradition. Thus, it must comply with the request of the
United States Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject
information.
iii. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of
accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
Mr. Jimenez filed with filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region a petition presided over by the Honorable Ralph C.
Lantion against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation:
i. mandamus to compel the Department to furnish the extradition
documents
ii. certiorari to set aside Department’s letter dated July 13, 1999 denying
his request
iii. prohibition to restrain the Department from considering the extradition
request and from filing an extradition petition in court
iv. enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI
from performing any act directed to the extradition
v. application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary
of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to maintain
the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of, from
conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United
States Government, from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional
Trial court and from performing any act directed to the extradition for a
period of 20 days from service of the order.

Hon. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines ordered Hon. Lantion to cease and desist from enforcing the
order. Due to transcendental importance, the Court brushed aside peripheral
procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-
94684 and the TRO and proceded on the issues.
ISSUE:
i. Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases
ii. Whether or NOT the twin basic due process rights granted by Sec. 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court on the right to be furnished a copy of the
complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents and the right to
submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within 10 days
from receipt is dispensable
iii. Whether or NOT the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern granted under Sec. 7 of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution is
violated
HELD: DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.
i. NO.
Extradition Request
The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is made by the Foreign Diplomat
of theRequesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The
Secretary of Foreign Affairs has the executive authority to conduct the
evaluation process which, just like the extradition proceedings proper,
belongs to a class by itself or is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation
but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial
functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power:
1) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of
the extradition papers in form and substance
2) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the
supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable
3) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation.
The process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process
(NOT an exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power) (Sec. 5.
PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) that is
indispensable to prosecution. The power of investigation consists in
gathering, organizing and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool
in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-
judicial functions.
In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory
functions applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate
extradition documents. If the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented
to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement
affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and
judgment. Thus, the role of the administrative body is limited to an initial
finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court. The
court has the power to determine whether or not the extradition should be
effected. The evaluation procedure (in contrast to ordinary investigations)
may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee or
accused (Sec. 2[c] of PD 1069) at 2 stages:
1) provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission
of the request This is because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a
contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought
pending presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty) to prevent flight but he shall be automatically discharged after 60
days (Par. 4 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d] PD
1069) if no request is submitted. Otherwise, he can be continuously
detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Par. 5, Art 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty)
2) temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of
the extradition petition in court (Sec. 6, PD 1069).
The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure is
that:
1) there is yet no extradite; BUT
2) it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may
cause his immediate incarceration
The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.
Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary
investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the
respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his
liberty. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing
to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
In this case, the extradition request was delivered to the Department of
Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999 (the following day the Department of
Justice received the request). Thus, the Department of Foreign Affairs
failed to discharge its duty of evaluating the same and its accompanying
documents.
Extradition Petition
After delivery of the Extradition Request by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs to the Secretary of Justice, the latter shall designate and authorize an
attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Par. 1, Sec. 5, PD 1069).
The attorney shall file a written Extradition Petition with the proper regional
trial court, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under
consideration (Par. 2, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The presiding judge shall issue an
order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the
petition. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the
ends of justice or to prevent flight (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069).
Extradition Hearing
The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not
inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply during
the Extradition Hearing (Par. 1, Sec. 9, PD 1069) The attorney may
represent the Requesting state. (Sec. 8, PD 1069). The Court’s decision on
whether the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual
criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty or whether or not the offense for which extradition is
requested is a political one (Par. 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty) shall be final and immediately executory (Sec. 12, PD 1069) and
appealable with the Court of Appeals where the provisions of the Rules of
Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply
except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Sec. 13, PD 1069).
ii. YES.
Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the twin rights of
notice and hearing from a prospective extradite. In the absence of a law or
principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. Petitioner contends
that United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Such argument,
however has been overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it
refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. If
the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at
any stage of the extradition proceedings. The constitutional issue in the
case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private
respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by
treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.
However in this case, with the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which
cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its
intricacies and certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that
are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are
not properly authenticated) it cannot to be said to be urgent. Therefore,
notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside.
iii. NO.
During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our
own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is
premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would
already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by
then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition
request.

• Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine

Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 , June 05, 1973

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a

mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances
against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming

Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the
meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was
stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but
was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to
freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for
redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt
the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue.
This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would
lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that
while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and
regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they
would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a
violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the
PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial
Relations for being filed two days late.
Issue:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
Held:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and
the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property
and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential
to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and
such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men
and women by whom we shall be governed.”
• Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 , January 31, 1968
Facts:
 The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA
No. 3019)
 Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or
after his assumption of office “and within the month of
January of every year thereafter”, as well as upon
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the
head of the office to which he belongs, “a true detailed
and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
 amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year”.
 Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical
submission “within the month of January of every other year
thereafter” of their sworn statement of assets and liabilities (SAL)
is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police
power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to
privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination.
 Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
 Acceptance of public position = voluntary assumption of
obligation
 Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring
the interest of general welfare in honest and clean public
service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of police
power.
 CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the
permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the
due process clause
Issue/s:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is: 1. An
oppressive exercise of police power; 2. Violative of due process and an
unlawful invasion of the right to privacy implicit in the ban against
unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition
against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the personal integrity and official
dignity of public officials.
Ruling: Decision reversed.
Ratio:
1. Presumption of validity
 Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable
requirement for employment so a public officer can make of record
his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did not
present evidence to rebut the presumption of validity.
 “If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects the
most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider.” (Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila)
1. Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due
Process Clause
 “inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society” (Justice Malcolm)
 The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things
within the limits of its domain (Justice Taney, going beyond
curtailment of rights)
 Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of
police power to regulatory action affecting persons in public or
private life can invoke the protection of due process.
 It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public
official to protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense is
analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due process to
strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty.
 Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as
long as due process is observed.
 The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test:
Official action must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
in sheer oppression.
 “It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the
harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-
present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to
condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that
imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having
done so upon assuming office…There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.”
1. Right to privacy
 Right to be let alone
 “It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls
for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a
 person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational
relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective of a
valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of
such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of
position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to
emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory
revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of
the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private
sphere.”
1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
 The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion.
1. Right against self-incrimination
 We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to
protect a man’s conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing
from justice.
1. Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
 Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the
action taken, mey be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.

• Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529 , July 26, 1996 (J.
Vitug Dissenting Opinion)

I. THE FACTS

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of

the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for
public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures
and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed]
and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical
interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board.
The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the
necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent
Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent
Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series
of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an
attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series
“indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with
the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV
program?
(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its
discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the
action of the respondent Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV Program Series
Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the
CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review
petitioner’s TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]
1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV
program.
Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No.
1986 that the respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should
not include religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A
contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of
the Constitution which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.”
[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public
broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of
internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of
children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of religious freedom
can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present
danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public
health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the
exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels
the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a
volatile area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue
to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a
heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the
irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the
State should not stand still.
2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program.
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity
and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this
burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series
for “attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An
examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called “attacks” are
mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they
were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent
court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be
prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,
clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
to free exercise of religion. xxx. substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already
on ground.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by
petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however,
unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of
the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another
religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said
religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State
where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the
reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better
theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is
best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the
luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech
should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat
of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply

the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of
Manila, this Court held: “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be
justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that
there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we
further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent VII. FIRST GENERATION RIGHTS
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the A. Civil and Political Rights (LIBERTY)
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and B. Right of Self-Determination
only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.”
The principle of self-determination is prominently embodied in Article I of
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the the Charter of the United Nations. ... All peoples have theright to self-
respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of
harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the • ICCPR, Article 1
Article 1
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.

2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its
own means of subsistence.

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having

responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination,
and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations.

• Portugal v. Australia: Case Concerning East Timor

On 22 February 1991 Portugal had instituted proceedings against Australia

concerning "certain activities of Australia with respect to East Timor".
Portugal acted as the administering Power over East Timor in accordance
with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations. Portugal claimed that
Australia, by the conclusion of a Treaty of "Cooperation in an area between
the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia of 11
December 1989", had failed to observe the obligation to respect the powers
and duties of Portugal as the administering Power of East Timor, as well as
the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and the related
rights. Australia, according to Portugal's allegations, had thereby incurred
international responsibility vis-à-vis both the people of East Timor and
Portugal, which claimed to have remained the administering Power
according to several resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security
Council, even though it had left East Timor definitely when Indonesia
invaded East Timor in 1975. As the basis of jurisdiction Portugal referred to
the declarations of both States according to Art. 36 paragraph 2 of the
Statute. Australia objected to the jurisdiction of the Court and the
admissibility of the application. The central issue for the Court was whether
the 1989 Treaty could have been legally concluded between Indonesia and
Australia or whether Portugal alone was empowered to conclude treaties on
behalf of East Timor. Thus, the main question was whether the Court could
decide the case in the absence of Indonesia which had not accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court and was not inclined to intervene in the case.
Australia argued that the Court was confronted with a situation comparable
to that in the Monetary Gold Case, namely that the Court would have to
decide on the lawfulness of Indonesia's entry into and continuing presence
in East Timor as well as the lawfulness of the conclusion of the Treaty, what
could not be done in the absence of Indonesia. While Portugal agreed in
principle on this point, it disagreed that the Court had in fact to decide on
the forementioned questions. Portugal argued that the Court had only to
judge upon the objective conduct of Australia, which consisted in having
negotiated, concluded and initiated performance of the 1989 Treaty with
Indonesia, and that this question was perfectly separable from any question
relating to the lawfulness of the conduct of Indonesia.
In its judgment, however, the Court concluded that Australia's behaviour
could not be assessed without first entering into the question of why
Indonesia could not lawfully have concluded the 1989 Treaty, while
Portugal allegedly could have done so. The Court was of the opinion that
the very subject-matter of the decision would necessarily be a determination
of whether Indonesia could or could not have acquired the power to
conclude treaties on behalf of East Timor relating to the resources of its
continental shelf. Such a determination, however, could not be made
without the consent of Indonesia.
The Court also rejected Portugal's additional argument that the rights which
Australia had allegedly breached were rights erga omnes and as such
permitted Portugal to sue Australia individually, regardless of whether or
not another State had conducted itself in a similarly unlawful manner. The
Court fully shared the assertion of Portugal that the right of peoples to self-
determination had an erga omnes character. Nevertheless, the Court
considered that the erga omnes character of a norm and the principle of
consent to the Court's jurisdiction were two different things. Whatever the
nature of the obligations invoked, the Court could not rule on the lawfulness
of the conduct of a State when its judgment would imply an evaluation of
the lawfulness of the conduct of another State not a party to the case.
The Court likewise dismissed the argument of Portugal that the United
Nations resolutions concerning the status of Portugal as administering
Power were imposing upon all States an obligation not to recognize any
authority of Indonesia over East Timor. The Court found that without
prejudice to the question of the binding or non-binding nature of these
resolutions such an obligation could not be inferred from those resolutions.
Therefore, the Court would have necessarily to rule upon the lawfulness of
Indonesia's conduct as a prerequisite for deciding Portugal's contention that
Australia violated its obligation to respect Portugal's status as administering
Power and East Timor's status as a non-self governing territory and the right
of 7its people to self-determination and to permanent sovereignty of its
natural resources. Thus, the rights and obligations of Indonesia would
constitute the very subject-matter of the case and could only be judged with
the consent of Indonesia. Since this consent was lacking, the Court had to
dismiss the case, despite the importance of the questions raised.
C. Right to Life
• 1987 Phil. Consti. Article 3, Section 1
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
• UDHR, Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Introduction • ICCPR, Article 6
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration provides that "everyone has the right to life, liberty
and security of person." This is not simply an Enlightenment reflex, but a profound 1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
reaction to what went on in the concentration camps. Article 3 overlaps with Article protected
25 by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
and should be read in conjunction with Article 5, which provides that no one shall be
subject to "torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," and Article 2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of
death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with
9, which provides that no one shall be the subject to "arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary
At the time of the drafting of the Declaration, the Chinese representative in the Third to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the
Committee of the UN General Assembly, Mr. Chang, proposed a conceptual framework Prevention
in and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only
which the initial three articles of the Declaration should express the main ideas of be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court.
eighteenth century political philosophy on rights: Article 1 to express the idea of
"fraternity;" Article 2 that of "equality;" and Article 3 that of "liberty." Article 3 thus3.sets
When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is
understood
forth this basic principle, which is then defined and clarified in the following nine articles that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the
(Articles 4--11). These inter-related articles, and especially Article 3 on which they are present Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed
conceptually based, deal with the issue of personal security (as opposed to issues under
of the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
political and civil rights, new international rights like citizenship and asylum, ofand the Crime of Genocide.
economic, cultural and social rights which are dealt with in later parts of the Declaration).
These strong protections for personal security illustrate the close connection between 4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or
the Holocaust and the Declaration. Hitler had an organic view of the state commutation (the of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the
sentence
implications of which were drawn out in Mein Kampf - in a terribly consistent way). He is of death may be granted in all cases.
the best known, though not the first thinker, to take the word "organic" literally. He stated
many times that he saw the "state as the living organism of a nationality" and he 5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons
used
similar metaphors and abstract phrases identifying the state with race, and race with eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
below
blood. Most of the activities of the Third Reich can be categorized as the assembling, women.
preserving, and bringing to dominance of the Aryan race. At a mass meeting in 1934,
Rudolf Hess declared National Socialism to be "nothing but applied biology." 6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the
Accordingly, National Socialism was not just authoritarian and totalitarian, it was firstabolition
and of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.
foremost racist.
• CRC, Article 6
This extreme "organic view" ensured the total breakdown of the dividing line between
individuals and their state. As Hernan Santa Cruz, the Chilean delegate to the Third 1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.
Committee, stated--this view is directly opposed to the assumption upon which2.the States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival
Declaration is based. That is to say, the Declaration in Articles 3--11 and 25, is based andondevelopment of the child.
the belief that "the interests of the individual [come] before those of the state and that the
state should not be allowed to deprive the individual of his dignity and his basic rights."• Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96 , January 19, 1999
(including separate opinions)

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public
respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that
the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but
also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final
and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case
Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its
powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the
penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is
like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its
plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the
power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of
a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is
no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can
protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate
the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the
government.

The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential

aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction
for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a
litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and
compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that
courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of
its processes and orders to make them comform to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the
TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function
under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has
been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these
rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict
who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a
state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an
exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that
• Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 , October 07,
2008
FACTS:
The brothers Raymond and Reynald Manalo, farmers from Bulacan were
abducted, detained in various locations, tortured by Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and
supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of
restrained liberty, torture, and other dehumanizing acts, were able to escape.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction,
and Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to prevent
military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and
other basic rights. Existing petition was treated as Amparo petition. The
Supreme Court granted the Writ of Amparo and ordered the Court of
Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not statements from the victims is sufficient for amparo
petitions.
2. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary to invoke the
right to security of a person

RULING:
1. Yes. Much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from
the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on
their credibility and candidness in their written and oral statements. Their
statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence
left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places
where they were detained.
2. Yes. Covered by the privilege of the writ, respondents must meet the
threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. The right to security of
person is “freedom from fear.” In The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) states that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.” Moreover, the
right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the
government. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, D. Prohibition Against Torture
the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of • 1987 Phil. Consti., Article 3, Section 12 (2)
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to
these rights especially when they are under threat. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
• UDHR, Article 5
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
• ICCPR, Article 7
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.
• CRC, Article 37
States Parties shall ensure that:
(a) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences
committed by persons below eighteen years of age;
(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily.
The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with
the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest
appropriate period of time;
(c) Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which
takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age. In particular, every
child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is
considered in the child's best interest not to do so and shall have the right to
maintain contact with his or her family through correspondence and visits,
save in exceptional circumstances;
(d) Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt
access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to
challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court
or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt
decision on any such action.
E. Prohibition Against Slavery / Forced Labor
• 1987 Phil. Consti., Article 3, Section 18 (2)
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political
beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
• UDHR, Article 4
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade 04
shall be prohibited in all their forms
• ICCPR, Article 8
1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their
forms shall be prohibited.
2. No one shall be held in servitude.
(a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour;
 • CRC, Article 19

PROTECTION FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT

1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative,

social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms
of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or
negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual
abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other
person who has the care of the child.
2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective
procedures for the establishment of social programmes to provide
necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of
the child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for
identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and
follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, • Calalang v. Williams et al., 70 Phil.., 726 , December 02, 1940
and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement.
Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,

resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period
of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940

recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of th
e provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Direc
tor with the approval from theSecretary of the Public Works and Communic
ation to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval
of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved
the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the
Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced
the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to
the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles
of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Issues: Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right
to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people?
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to
the greatest number.”

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public
safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty
is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,

nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and