 People v.

Chavez, 278 SCRA 230 (1997)

Nature

This is an appeal from the February 24, 1994 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City,
Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. 10499 finding herein appellant Antonio Chavez y Estamante alias “Tony”
guilty of the crime of murder committed against the person of one Bernabe Jaos and imposing on him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the payment of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00,
interment expenses of P10,000.00, moral damages of P16,000.00 and the costs of suit.

Facts

The victim, Bernabe Jaos, 23 years old, lived with his common-law wife, Agripina Ablejina, in Sitio
Tampaga, Barrio Mantiquel, Siaton, Negros Oriental. Their nearest neighbor was Efraim Navarez whose
wife was the sister of Jaos. The house of Jaos was about two (2) meters away from that of Navarez so
that from there, one could look down on the front door of Navarez who sold goods to his neighbors.

At around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of October 18, 1992, Agripina was standing by the
window of her home, where she could observe the Navarez household. Her husband Jaos was buying
cigarettes at the house cum store of Navarez. Agripina saw that Efraim Navarez was with his wife and
younger brother. Navarez and Jaos were smoking and conversing with each other when appellant, first
cousin of Navarez “CHAVEZ”, arrived and stabbed Jaos with a knife. Jaos was stabbed above his
umbilical cord, causing his blood to spurt and his intestines to come out. The victim was then squatting
near the door inside the house of Navarez. Chavez pushed Jaos, who fell to the ground. Chavez then
ran to the house of his mother.

Agripina went to Jaos and removed the knife which was left sticking out of his body. She delivered the
knife to the PNP station in Mantiquel. When she was investigated at the police station, Agripina could
not finish her statement because her child was crying. She then requested Navarez to “finish” her
statement. His body was brought to the Siaton morgue.

On the trial court’s initiative, Agripina was recalled to the witness stand. The court verified
from her as to whom she surrendered the knife she had pulled out of the victim’s body. Agripina told
the court that she gave the knife to Agapito Quimada and that the bolo labelled as Exhibit E was not the
murder weapon.

Atanacio Caminade, a member of the CAFGU, surrendered the weapon to the police. Another CAFGU
member, Antonio Fabillar, had given it to him. The weapon that he surrendered was not a bolo but a
hunting knife. Upon learning that a bolo was brought to the court and identified as the murder
weapon, he confronted policeman Marcial Dingal. According to Caminade, the weapon wrongly brought
to the court by Dingal was the bolo used in the killing of a certain Sayson in Mantiquel. Caminade saw
how the killer in that case himself surrendered the bolo but it was he (Caminade) who surrendered the
hunting knife used in killing Jaos.
Once again recalled to the witness stand, Agripina testified that she pulled the knife out of Jaos’ body
in the presence of the barangay councilman, Serafin Sibol and Elsa Quitay. She gave the knife to Agapito
Quimada, a CAFGU, who was then in the company of Nelson Apostol, Benedicto Trumata and Antonio
Sombilon.

Issue

Whether the Trial Court gravely erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses and in totally disregarding that of the defense

Ruling

Considering that the parties presented contradictory facts, the issue in this appeal boils down to
credibility. As this Court has time and again said, the trial court’s evaluation on the credibility of
witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect by appellate courts. The trial court is
more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and
deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. Its findings on the issue
of credibility of witnesses and its consequent findings of fact must be given great weight and respect on
appeal, unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered might
affect the result of the case.

After a careful scrutiny of the records and evidence of the case, we find no persuasive reason to depart
from this well entrenched rule on credibility as to warrant a reversal of the decision of the trial court.
Nevertheless, the issues raised by the appellant should be faced squarely.

Appellant bewails the fact that the trial court accorded great weight to the testimony of the common-
law wife of the victim. Appellant posits that she could hardly be considered as an eyewitness as she was
in her house at the time of the killing, while there were other persons at the scene of the crime, who
were not even presented as witnesses.

This is argument has no basis in fact and in law. In the first place, it is the prosecution which
determines who among the witnesses to a crime should testify in court. The prosecutor handling the
case is given a wide discretion on this matter. It is definitely not for the courts, much more the defense,
to dictate what evidence to present or who should take the witness stand at the trial of a case.

Secondly, the trial court did not err in finding that Agripina was a credible witness whose testimony
should be deemed as nothing but the truth. The appellant himself admitted that there was no reason
why she should testify against him. Well-settled is the rule that when there is no evidence to indicate
that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is
that such witness was not so moved and that his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

Thirdly, simply because Agripina was a common-law wife of the victim, it does not necessarily follow
that her testimony is biased, incredible or self-serving. This Court has held that there is no legal
provision that disqualifies relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying, being otherwise
competent, regarding the facts and circumstances of the crime. Mere relationship of witnesses to the
victim of a crime, whether by consanguinity or affinity, does not necessarily impair their credibility as
witnesses. This is specially so when the witnesses were present at the scene of the crime.

Lastly, the defense further attacks Agripina’s credibility on the ground that her affidavit before the
police, does not even mention the stabbing incident itself. This omission was, however, explained by
Agripina when she testified that she could not finish her statement because she had to attend to her
crying child. Affidavits, being taken ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and inaccurate.

Appellant points out that Agripina’s testimony is not credible because her claim that her house was
elevated and therefore higher than that of Navarez, was contradicted by prosecution witness Agapito
Quimada. However, both the testimony of Agripina and Agapito’s sketch show that the window of the
victim’s house faced the front door of the Navarez residence. In other words, Agripina had an
unobstructed view of the incident. This is the material aspect of the prosecution’s case which the
defense failed to disprove satisfactorily.

 Molina v. People, 259 SCRA 138 (1996)

Nature

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court whereby petitioners Rafael
Molina and Reynaldo Soneja seek the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming their
conviction for the crimes of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3
(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
making it appear that the D'Vinta Marketing Center owned and operated by Homer Tabuzo, sold and
delivered to the JMA Memorial Hospital supplies.

Facts

That on or about and during the period from August 1, 1977 to November 11, 1977, the above-named
accused Rudy T. Concepcion, Chief of the JMA Memorial Hospital, San Andres, Catanduanes, a
government owned and operated institution; Reynaldo C. Soneja, Administrative Officer and Cashier of
the same hospital; Aristeo T. Arcilla, Jr., Bookkeeper of the same hospital; Rafael T. Molina, in his
capacity as Asst. Provincial Auditor of Catanduanes and Oliver F. Vargas, Checker-Inspector of the
Provincial Auditor's Office, same province, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously simulated a contract or transaction making it appear that the
D'Vinta Marketing Center, owned and operated by Homer Tabuzo, sold and delivered to the JMA
Memorial Hospital supplies consisting of 50 pieces bed sheets, 25 pieces patients (sic) gowns, 10 gallons
of merthiolate, 10 gallons of muriatic acid and 10 gallons of lysol disinfectant worth P7,610.00 by
simulating and falsifying requisition and issue vouchers, canvass papers, bidders (sic) tenders, contract
of sale, invoices and general vouchers, thereby making possible the issuance of Treasury Cheques Nos.
SN 3-9982421 and SN 3-9982422 in the total amount of P7,610.00, as supposed payment for the above-
described undelivered medical and/or hospital supplies which up to the present have never been
delivered for the simple reason that the proprietor and manager of the D'Vinta Marketing Center had no
knowledge whatsoever of the aforesaid illegal transaction defrauding the government in the amount of
P7,610.00 thereby directly having financial or pecuniary interest in the aforesaid transaction in
connection with which the above-named accused took part in their respective official capacities in which
they are prohibited by law from having any such interests; said accused having appropriated and/or
divided among themselves the aforesaid amount.

Issue

Whether affidavits of recantation made by a witness after the conviction of the accused is unreliable
and deserves scant consideration.

Ruling

The Solicitor General strongly discounts the aforequoted affidavit as inconsequential and hardly
credible. He laments such a last ditch, desperate attempt by petitioners to be liberated from criminal
proceedings instituted on account of their illegal and malicious acts which have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution; petitioners, the Solicitor General submits, simply wish to escape
criminal responsibility at all costs.

Affidavits of recantation made by a witness after the conviction of the accused is unreliable and
deserves scant consideration.

“x x x Merely because a witness says that what he had declared is false and that what he now says is
true, is not sufficient ground for concluding that the previous testimony is false. No such reasoning has
ever crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is that a witness may be impeached by a previous
contradictory statement x x x not that a previous statement is presumed to be false merely because a
witness now says that the same is not true. The jurisprudence of this Court has always been otherwise,
i.e., that contradictory testimony given subsequently does not necessarily discredit the previous
testimony if the contradictions are satisfactorily explained. (U.S. vs. Magtibay, 17 Phil. 417; U.S. vs.
Briones, 28 Phil. 362; U.S. vs. Dasiip, 26 Phil. 503; U.S. vs. Lazaro, 34 Phil. 871)."

Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if
credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent
different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to
believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A
testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be
done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and
juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the
reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed. The unreliable character of the affidavit
of recantation executed by a complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after
going through the burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by the law
enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-affidavit against the accused, attending trial and testifying
against the accused, the said complaining witness would later on declare that all the foregoing is actually
a farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation. And in situations, like
the instant case, where testimony is recanted by an affidavit subsequently executed by the recanting
witness, we are properly guided by the well-settled rules that an affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant
is presented on the witness stand[ and that affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered inferior
to the testimony given in open court
  PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE NARSICO (NARSICO) alias ROGELIO
LIMPIO y SUICO and EFREN SUICO (at large), accused, JOSE NARSICO (NARSICO) alias ROGELIO
LIMPIO y SUICO, accused-appellant.

NATURE:

APPEAL ON THE DECISION OF RTC FINDING JOSE NARCISO GUILTY OF MURDER OF ELIEZAR ROSARIO.

FACTS:

On 20 July 1988, at around 9:30 in the evening, Eliezer Rosario was watching a betamax movie inside
the store of Jovel Pesquera in the public market of Balamban, Cebu, together with Jovel, his common-
law wife Delia and children, their helper Virgie, and Rogelio Estan. Rosario was directly facing the
television screen while Pesquera was on his right side sitting sideways towards Rosario. After a while
Jose Narsico (Narciso) and Efren Suico arrived. Suico stood beside the door while Narsico advanced
inside towards Rosario. Suddenly and without any provocation, Narsico fired a volley of shots
at Rosario causing the latter to collapse face down on the table.

Accused set up the defense of alibi and presented his witness Rey Espisa to corroborate his defense.

Rey Espisa, presented to corroborate the story of Narsico, testified that on the night of 20 July 1988 they
finished working at Marlyn Trading at around ten o'clock and walked home together to their employer's
house - he, Narsico and the latter's sister Angeling. He and Narsico slept in one room and never went
out that night.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the defense of alibi will prosper?

2. Whether Rey Espisa is qualified as a witness?

HELD:

1. NO.

The denial of the appellant does not carry any evidentiary value at all, especially when weighed against
the positive statements of the prosecution witnesses. In Abadilla v. Tabiliran Jr.[3] we ruled that denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving assertion which
deserves no weight in law. It cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

Unfortunately, alibi is an inherently weak defense. It is usually cast off in favor of positive
identification.[4] For alibi to prosper the person pleading this excuse must show that (a) he was
somewhere else and not at the crime scene at or about the time of the killing; and, (b) it was physically
impossible for him to be at the place of the crime.

2. NO.

As for Espisa, his testimony can hardly be given credence. As observed by the trial court, it appeared
to be rehearsed and perjured. Firstly, Espisa said that he was requested by Angeling to testify in the
latter's behalf, and that he (Espisa) was "surprised" upon being informed that Narsico was charged with
murder. Quite interestingly, although Espisa claimed to have been stunned when told about the charge
against Narsico, his pretension soon manifested lack of natural solicitude and curiosity when he was
cross examined. Having supposedly maintained close personal relations with the accused, sharing the
same sleeping quarters for months, Espisa was expected to display some concern for Narsico; haplessly,
he did not.

In the case at bar, the defense witness Rey Espisa when he testified to corroborate the testimony of the
accused that he was in Cebu City working about at the time and date of the incident was testifying in a
manner and observed by the Court while on the witness stand was feeling uneasy and uncomfortable,
indicative of a fact that he was falsely testifying on matters which are (sic) untrue. Further, the
testimony of Rey Espisa that they were together with accused Jose Narsico in Marlyn Trading working
sometimes up to 10:00 p.m. was not corroborated.

SC SUSTAINED RTC DECISION.

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO FERNANDEZ y MAGNO, ALIAS

FERNAN and JOEL SANTIAGO y RUSTIA, accused.

FERNANDO FERNANDEZ y MAGNO, accused appellant.

NATURE:

APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF RTC MALOLOS finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of robbery with homicide and physical injuries and consequently sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

FACTS

The accused rob the house of Sps. Tolentino which as an incident to the commission of the robbery
caused the death of Mrs. Eugenia Tolentino and physical injuries to Dr. Delfin Tolentino.

Initially, only Santiago was apprehended, and after the trial was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged.

Eventually, when Fernandez was under the custody, he pleaded not guilty. Thus, the appealed decision.

The prosecution presented the Dr. Tolentino, Dr. Nilo Tolention, PO3 Eladio San Pedro, and Rene Julian.

Accused set up the defense of alibi that he went to Isabela on that day the crime was committed. This
was corroborated by his wife and mother.

Accused-appellant argues that Santiago’s (co-accused) declarations as relayed to the trial court by PO3
San Pedro, should not have been considered as Santiago was not called as a witness in the case and thus
could not have been cross-examined on such matter.

Likewise, the accused faults the trial court for lending credence to the positive identification given by Dr.
Delfin Tolentino since he is already 82 years old at that time and his perception isn’t very clear (bulag na
haha)

ISSUE
1) Whether the testimony of PO3 Eladio is admissible?

2) Whether the positive identification of Dr. Delfin deserves the weight sufficient to find guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD

1) NO. Testimony of PO3 is hearsay.

The contention that the trial court erred in considering PO3 San Pedros testimony regarding Santiagos
declarations implicating Fernandez is correct. The implicatory statements of Santiago, it must be noted,
were not given during the trial of accused-appellant, who was thus deprived of the right of cross-
examining and confronting his accuser. Thus, Santiagos statements on this matter, as related to the
trial court by PO3 San Pedro, are mere hearsay, which even if not objected to, as in this case,
nevertheless do not deserve credence.

2) YES. The positive identification of accused-appellant by Dr. Delfin Tolentino who is untainted by
any motive to falsely testify, sufficiently established the guilt of accused-appellant, for the law
does not require that positive identification be corroborated to obtain conviction. The people
submits that it does not matter that it was only after such declaration that the police were able
to get a lead on Fernandez. Indeed, and most helpfully, the police got valuable information from
their interview with Dr. Delfin Tolentino which led to the successful solution of the crime.

There was no proof that Dr. Delfin Tolentino, at the time of the incident, did not possess the proper
mental and physical faculties as to make him less than credible witness. Dr. Delfin Tolentinos categorical,
clear, and consistent answers during the intensive cross-examination all the more indicated that he
possessed all the faculties required of a qualified witness, that he was telling the truth, and that his
declaration and answers established, beyond reasonable doubt, the identity of the perpetrators of the
crime.

 WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO, respondents.

NATURE:

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI under Rule 65 challenging the decision of the NLRC which upheld the
decision of the Labor Arbiter that Waterous Drug Corporation illegally dismissed Ms. Emma Co and
violated her constitutional right against illegal search and seizure.

FACTS:

Ms. Antonia Catolico was a pharmacist employed by Waterous Drug Corp on August 15, 1988.
Waterous alleged that she personally negotiates with suppliers of medicine without consulting the
Purchasing Department. Later on, the company charged her charged with irregularity by transacting
personally with YSP, Inc. (supplier), overpricing a certain drug and receiving kickbacks in form of a China
Bank Check.

On January 30, 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the reported
irregularity.
On 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be
placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company.

On February 10, 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP
was a Christmas gift and not a refund of overprice. She also averred that the preventive suspension was
ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Cos secretary, Irene Soliven

On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying Catolico
of her termination.

The labor arbiter ruled that the suspension and dismissal was illegal. And awarded her a separation pay.

NLRC affirmed LA and found that the evidence (check) was obtained by violating her right against illegal
search an siezure.

ISSUE

Whether the grounds for dismissal of Catolico proper?

HELD

NO. Catolico was unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and
valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a
finding that the dismissal is unjustified. Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.

It is evident from the Supervisors memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged
anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that
there was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolicos
inappropriate transaction stated in his affidavit:

4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in violation of the
[company] procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC needed medicines
like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of
only P320.00;

5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle
was indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed
that there was really an overprice and she said that the difference was refunded through their check
voucher no. 629552 which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank
Check No. 892068 dated November 9, 1989.

It clearly appears then that Catolicos dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never
testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed
to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value.

Catolicos dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employees dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence
must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.
Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term
trust and confidence is restricted.

As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to
revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOHN JENN PORRAS and SERGIO EMELO, accused-
appellants.

NATURE

The separate indictments are for MURDER and for FRUSTRATED MURDER respectively.

John Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo found guilty of MURDER. And appellant Sergio Emelo guilty of
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE John Jenn Porras is hereby acquitted.

FACTS

On the night of June 20, 1990, accused John Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo went to the Police Station
looking for Pfc. Roldan Emelo of the Cavite City PNP, a cousin of the latter and was directed by Sgt.
Pilapil to where he was.

After they ate and drank at Banaue Restaurant where Emelo asked for his .38 caliber ammunition, they
rode the tryk of Marcelo Real in which Marcos Luciano was passenger. Luciano was told to alight the
tryk and when he did so, a car passed which light caused Luciano to see John Porras who was wearing a
maong jacket and pants.

They proceeded to the Aroma Beer House where the victim Rosendo Mortel was and after some
misunderstanding, Rosendo Mortel went out and was shot at close range by either Porras or Emelo as
seen by a waitress, Maribel Herman who pointed to Porras as the assailant and who after seeing
Rosendo Mortel sprawled on the ground and bloodied, fled into an alley and thereafter returned and
shot the victim twice and sped away and who hailed Sgt. Catalino Bermas was then monitoring the
situation as an Intelligence Operative on his motorcycle to give chase.

During the shooting Jose Malumay who was on a bicycle on his way home after going to a house near
Sangley Point also heard a gun shot which he mistook for a blow-out and when he offered to assist, he
saw two men, one in dark attire and the other in white T-shirt who from the information of the
witnesses fixed their identities as the two accused John Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo who fired the
initial shot and ran away and later on returned to finish the job with Porras allegedly having fired the last
two shots killing the victim instantaneously as he was brought to the hospital dead on arrival.

The witnesses’ testimonies caused the finding of the RTC.

However, Accused-Appelants impugn the credibility of the prosecution witnesses by citing the seeming
inconsistency between the testimonies of Maribel - German, who apparently saw one assailant, and
Jose Malumay, who, on the other hand, claimed to have seen two assailants.
ISSUE

 Whether or not the inconsistency in the testimonies of the witnesses affect their credibility.

HELD

We find that the purported inconsistency is more fancied than real. A closer scrutiny of Maribel
Germans testimony reveals that she merely saw an assailant shot the victim (Mortel) while sprawled on
the ground, but nowhere in her testimony did she state that there is only one assailant. In fact, Maribel
German never testified witnessing the crime from its inception which Jose Malumay witnessed to have
been authored by two assailants. This explains the apparent inconsistency between the witnesses
testimonies.

At any rate, the alleged inconsistency just discussed, which was shown to be otherwise, is neither
substantial nor of such nature to cast a serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. The established rule of evidence is that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses, if only in minor details, reinforce rather than weaken their credibility, for it is usual that
witnesses to a stirring event should see differently some details of a startling occurrence.
Discrepancies on minor details, which do not destroy the substance of the witness testimony show
that the witness was not rehearsed.

NOTES

*Non-presentation of Cpl. Crisanto de la Cruz, one of the police officers who first investigated the
crime, and Pfc. Roldan Emelo, the police officer who gave appellant Sergio Emelo the black ammo pouch
bag and .38 caliber bullets, is fatal to the prosecutions case. SC find this contention devoid of merit. The
matter of deciding whom to present as witness for the prosecution is not for the accused or, for the
trial court to decide, as it is the prerogative of the prosecutor.

*Appellants likewise characterize as hearsay the testimony of Sgt. Amorico Alvarez on Pfc. Roldan
Emelos statements to the police investigator implicating them to the crime. This contention is bereft of
legal basis for it is a settled rule that when a testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the
tenor of a statement or the fact that such statement was made, as in this case, the same is not
hearsay. Furthermore, appellants conviction did not hinge solely on the assailed testimony as there
were other evidence extant in the records establishing their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

*RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Treachery as the prosecution failed to prove
the same. SC found them guilty of HOMICIDE in the first case. SC affirmed RTC decision on the Second
Case of Attempted Homicide.

 FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO, petitioners, vs. HONORATA
MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent.

NATURE
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the March 19, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals Reversing the
Decision of the RTC and rendering Honorata Mendoza Bolante as the possessor and owner of the
subject land.

FACTS

1) The land subject of the case was formerly declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza prior to 1954 but is now declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an
affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and
subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.

3) Petitioners are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza while the respondent is the only daughter of
Sinforoso Mendoza.

4) Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza were brothers, now deceased.

5) During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15, 1979 there was already a dispute between
Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, brother of petitioners.

6) Respondent was occupying the property in question.

7) RTC rendered its judgment in favor of petitioners, declaring that the parcel of land situated in
Bangad, Binangonan, Rizal covered by tax declaration no. 26-0027 in the name of Margarito Mendoza
belong to his heirs, the [petitioners] herein;

8)CA reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit allegedly
signed by the respondent and her mother had not been sufficiently established. The notary public or
anyone else who had witnessed the execution of the affidavit was not presented. No expert testimony
or competent witness ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.

9)The CA further ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent and her
mother. The former testified that the latter, never having attended school, could neither read nor write.
Respondent also said that she had never been called "Leonor," which was how she was referred to in
the affidavit.

ISSUE

Whether the affidavit (an Ancient Document) is an exception to the general rule that an affidavit is
classified as hearsay evidence, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand.

HELD

Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved first. And before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay
rule under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead, insane or
unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at the time
the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his interest; and (d) that
circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify.

In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who testified that
the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if the
declarant is available to testify as a witness. Such declarant should be confronted with the statement
against interest as a prior inconsistent statement.

PETITION IS DENIED AND CA DECISION IS AFFIRMED.

NOTE:

"While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed before a notary public, the general rule is
that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence, unless affiants are placed on the witness stand
(People's Bank and Trust Company vs. Leonidas, 207 SCRA 164). Affidavits are not considered the best
evidence, if affiants are available as witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 587). The due
execution of the affidavit was not sufficiently established. The notary public or others who saw that the
document was signed or at least [could] confirm its recitals [were] not presented. There was no expert
testimony or competent witness who attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures. Worse,
[respondent] denied the genuineness of her signature and that of her mother xxx. [Respondent]
testified that her mother was an illiterate and as far as she knew her mother could not write because
she had not attended school (p. 7, ibid). Her testimony was corroborated by Ma. Sales Bolante Basa,
who said the [respondent's] mother was illiterate."

 PEOPLE v. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 109279-80 (1999)

NATURE:

Appeal on the decision of the trial court (Las Piñas) convicting accused-appellant of the
separate crimes of parricide and illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions
sentencing him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

FACTS:

On the night of November 11, 1988, Cecilia Mendoza, wife of herein accused-
appellant, was shot to death in her residence at Las Piñas.

Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughter’s death, and that
valuables were being taken out of his daughters house, decided to remove, together with his
sons, the remaining pieces of property therein, including accused-appellants personal
effects.

From the aforestated personal effects of accused-appellant, Alipio found Mission Order
No. 86-580-893 dated November 7, 1986 issued to accused-appellant by Col. Eladio Gonzales,
PAF (GSC), Acting Wing Commander, 580th Aircraft Central Warning Wing, Villamor Airbase,
Pasay City, which authorized accused-appellant to carry a Colt Revolver, .38 Caliber with
Serial No. 41001 from November 15, 1986 to December 15, 1986. There was also a
Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, dated November 10, 1986, approved by Captain Luis
L. Salanguit of the Philippine Air Force and Lt. Col. Ramon Bandong and issued to one Octavio
L. Mendoza, Captain, PAF, Assistant Director for Personnel which described the firearm as One
Colt Revolver SN 41001.
 Accused-appellant claims that these documents were illegally procured in grave violation
of his constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against
unreasonable search and seizures

The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime as charged.

ISSUE:

Whether the personal effects of the accused found by Alipio were illegally procured in
grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his
right against unreasonable search and seizure.

RULING:

NO. The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right (right against
unreasonable search and seizure) applies as a restraint directed ONLY AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT and its agencies. The case in point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991])
where this Court had the occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government
and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within
the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.

In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered
by accused-appellants father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search
warrant is dispensable.

NOTE:

Convicted only for parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed
firearm.

 PEOPLE v. RAQUEL
G.R. No. 119005. (1996)

NATURE:

Review on the decision of the court a quo finding herein accused-appellants Sabas
Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as well as accused Amado Ponce, guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
indemnity.

FACTS:

At midnight of July 4, 1986, thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the

person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men
emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. Juliet (Agapito’s wife) went
out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband lifeless while a man took her
husband’s gun and left hurriedly.
 George Jovillano responded to Juliet’s plea for help. The police came and found one of
the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victims house. He
was identified as Amado Ponce.

Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and
Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their
residence. However, the police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after
the shooting incident. Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions.

ISSUE:

Whether the extrajudicial statement of Amado Ponce implicating co-accused Sabas

Raquel and Valeriano Raquel as his co-perpetrators of the crime be utilized against the latter.

RULING:

NO. A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification
of herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused
Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said
accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.

The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized

against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the
opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter’s extrajudicial statements, it is
elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation,
and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon
the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is
that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts
of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

NOTE:

Accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED.

 PEOPLE v. VALLA
G.R. No. 111285 (2000)

NATURE:

Appeal on the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62,
convicting appellant of the crime of rape with homicide, imposing upon him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

FACTS:
 On April 14, 1991, at around nine oclock in the morning, Myra Pines, a twelve-year old
girl, was passing by the ricefield near the road located at Barangay Ilayang Tayuman, heard a
voice coming from the direction of the forested area of the place and it seemed to her that
someone was being strangled. Listening closely, she recognized the voice as belonging to her
friend and playmate, Dyesebel de la Cruz, an eight-year old girl. Frightened at the thought that
Dyesebel was being strangled, Myra scampered and proceeded to the crossing where she was
originally headed for. After discharging her bananas at the crossing, she went home.

Later that day, Barangay Captain Aristeo Allarey of Barangay Ilayang Tayuman was
visited in his house by Mila de la Cruz, Dyesebels mother, who reported that her daughter was
missing. Allarey sought the assistance of his constituents and organized a search party.
Barangay Captain Allarey learned from Gonzalo de la Cruz that, earlier, Dyesebel was in the
company of accused-appellant Vicente Valla, and that both of them were tasked to watch the
ricefield.

At around 11:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, they finally found Dyesebel.
Her body was found near the river with her neck blackened and her vagina bloodied. She was
still wearing her dress but her panty had been pulled down to her mid-thigh. Allarey and his
companions immediately confronted appellant who, out of remorse, admitted that he raped
and killed Dyesebel.

Upon arraignment, appellant, entered a plea of not guilty to crime charged but on March
29, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of "rape with
homicide”.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confession made by the accused be made in evidence
against him.

RULING:

YES. The declaration of appellant acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be
given in evidence against him under Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Note that his extrajudicial confession is corroborated by the corpus delicti as
required by Section 3 of Rule 133. The Rules do not require that all the elements of the crime
must be clearly established by evidence independent of the confession. Corpus delicti only
means that there should be some concrete evidence tending to show the commission of
the crime apart from the confession. In this case, the fact of the crime was sufficiently proven
through the testimonies by witnesses such as Myra Pines, who heard the cries of the victim, and
the other members of the search party who found the body of the victim, and witnessed the
confession of the appellant, as well as documentary evidence presented during trial such as the
medico-legal certificate attesting that the victim had been raped and killed.

supra. RES GESTAE

The statement of the accused asking for forgiveness and even offering his own daughter
in exchange for his crime may also be regarded as part of the res gestae. There are three
requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence, in this case the discovery of the body of the victim; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood, in
this case, appellant had begged for forgiveness immediately after the body was found; and (3)
that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances, in this case, appellant had admitted to raping and killing the victim, and even
"offered" his daughter in exchange for the victim.

 PEOPLE v. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 110290 (1995)

NATURE:

Appeal challenging the decision of RTC - Baguio City finding accused Jaime Agustin
guilty of two counts of murder sentencing him the punishment of reclusion perpetua.

FACTS:

Dr. Bayquen, a dentist, together with five others, were on their way aboard their
Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Malvar Street, Baguio City. While they were cruising along
Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the right side of a car
parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite
rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. All those in the car were hit and Dr.
Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot.(ambush)

Accused Quiaño, an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the
police authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal
Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who
engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Fredie Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a
certain "Jimmy."

The following day, Jimmy Agustin was apprehended, investigated and was afforded the
privileges like that of Quijano. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to admit
involvement at gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was
given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for
his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two
minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands.

The RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial statements made by accused-appellant is admissible.

RULING:

NOT ADMISSIBLE. Indeed, the extrajudicial admission — not extrajudicial confession

— of the appellant, which is the only evidence of the prosecution linking him to the commission
of the crime charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution. We also see in these cases a blatant disregard of the appellant's
right under Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested.

Before we go any further, it should be pointed out that, contrary to the pronouncement of
the trial court and the characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed extrajudicial
statement is not extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission.
 In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal
intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. Wharton defines a confession as follows:

A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal

case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the
accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with
proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and admission is something less
than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in
itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt.

We have examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we are
satisfied that nothing therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he merely
admitted some facts or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize a
conviction and which can only tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.

Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in evidence under Section
12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph 3 thereof
expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus:

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

NOTE:

Thus, we do not hesitate to declare the appellant's extrajudicial statement inadmissible

in evidence because it was obtained in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution.
since it is the only evidence which links him to the crimes of which he was convicted, he
must then be ACQUITTED. .

 PEOPLE v. GUILLERMO ARINGUE supra

G.R. No. 116487 (1997)

NATURE:

Appeal from the decision rendered by the RTC convicting Michael Cabal and
Perciverando Pitao of murder and thereby sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua.

FACTS:

On August 5, 1989, the victim Nicomedes A. Salas, together with his wife Leticia and
daughter Lotlot attended a school party. At 8:45 in the evening, they left school and proceeded
to their jeep, parked in front of the school's main gate.

Outside SJIT, Mr. Salas called his driver Rogelio Amora. Amora took the driver's seat
and started the engine. Mrs. Salas was about to board the jeep when she heard a gunshot
coming from her left side. She turned her head towards that direction and saw her husband fall
on the ground face down. At the same time, she noticed a man running away. In a split second,
another man pointed his gun at her. The man did not shoot her, but fired at Mr. Salas, hitting
him on the chest. Amora also saw the shooting. The man then fled. Mrs. Salas and Amora
identified the man as Perciverando Pitao. They brought Mr. Salas to Santos Clinic where he
died at 9:30 p.m.
On August 8, 1989, at about six o'clock in the evening, Sgt. Leonardo Amora of the Philippine
Constabulary's, received information that the suspects in the killing of Nicomedes Salas were in
Barangay Sumilihon. Upon request of Sgt. Amora, accused Pitao and Cabal voluntarily went to
the Butuan City police station.

At about 11 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Cpl. Cipriano Cabaitan investigated
accused Cabal. Atty. Roldan Torralba was asked by the police to assist in the
investigation. After the investigation, Cpl. Cabaitan read and translated in Visayan what he had
typed to accused Cabal. Atty. Torralba, Capt. Arturo Pojas, and the Station Commander were
present as the statement was read to accused Cabal. In his statement, Cabal admitted he
killed Salas for P5,000.00. He implicated accused Pitao as the other assailant and
accused Aringue as the mastermind. Accused Cabal affixed his signature to the statement
after Atty. Torralba had signed it.
With accused Cabal's revelation, accused Aringue was invited for questioning. Cpl. Cabaitan
asked accused Aringue whether he was willing to accept Atty. Torralba as counsel. When
accused Aringue acceded, Cpl. Cabaitan took his statement. After the investigation, the
statement was read to accused Aringue. Accused Aringue declared he planned the
assassination of his half brother Nicomedes Salas. Allegedly, Salas refused to deliver his
share in the profits of San Jose Institute of Technology (SJIT), notwithstanding that it was
established with his money. He admitted providing the firearms used in the killing.

On August 9, 1989, radio reporter Vicente "Boy" Montederamos went to the Butuan
City Police Station when he learned that the suspects in the Salas' killing had been
arrested. The Chief of Police gave him permission to interview the suspects. In the tape
recorded interview, the three accused admitted they killed Nicomedes Salas.
Montederamos made a transcription[11] of the taped interview and submitted it before the court.

In the evening of August 9, 1989, Mrs. Salas arrived at the police station. She identified
accused Pitao as the second man who fired at her husband.

To avoid conviction, the three accused offered alibi and repudiated their extrajudicial
confessions during the trial.

In his defense accused CABAL testified he was forced to confess. Sgt. Amora then
ordered him to point at Aringue as the mastermind because the latter had a serious
disagreement with Nicomedes Salas.

On the other hand, accused PITAO maintains he was not present at the scene of the
crime for he was working at their farm in Sumilihon. He denied leaving Sumilihon, except when
he attended a bible seminar in Sto. Tomas, Davao del Norte.

Accused ARINGUE testified that policemen came at his house and brought him to the
police station. After his fingerprints were taken, he was made to sit on a chair while handcuffed
to an old folding bed. A policeman with armalite guarded him. The policeman approached him
and pointed the armalite at his temple. The policeman asked him to confess. He said that
accused Cabal and Pitao had already confessed. Then, they threatened to shoot him.
Frightened, he admitted the crime. Then the policemen led him to the second floor. He asked for
Atty. Wilfred Asis and Corporal Cabaitan assured him that Atty. Asis would be
contacted. However, he was interrogated at 12:00 midnight despite the absence of Atty. Asis.
Then, he was brought to the office of Col. Polientes where he found Cpl. Cabaitan, Pfc. Dacillo,
Sgt. Amora and Atty. Torralba inside. Atty. Torralba asked him why he confessed. He told him
he was afraid of the policemen.

The trial court rendered a decision dated December 10, 1993 convicting accused
Pitao and Cabal of murder and thereby sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. However, accused Aringue was acquitted on reasonable doubt.

On December 22, 1993, accused Pitao and Cabal filed their Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellants inspite their alleged
inadmissible confession.

RULING:

No. It is incorrect for appellants to make it appear that they were convicted solely on the
basis of their extrajudicial confessions. In truth, the trial court disregarded their confessions
after finding that they were extracted without the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel. But, even without their confessions, the trial court found enough
evidence to convict them.

Appellant Pitao was positively identified by Leticia Salas and Rogelio Amora, the
wife and the driver of the victim, respectively. The trial court noted that Mrs. Salas was face to
face with Pitao when the latter pointed his gun at her

On the other hand, ample circumstantial evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that
Cabal is one of Nicomedes Salas' two assailants. First, Leticia Salas testified she saw two (2)
men fire at her husband, although she was unable to recognize the first one who was already
running when she caught sight of him.

Secondly, prosecution witness Armando Bernal testified that a few minutes after the
shooting, Pitao and Cabal requested him to transport them from Butuan City to Sumilihon.[33]
Thirdly, while detained at the Butuan City Jail, Cabal freely admitted his complicity to radio
reporter, Vicente "Boy" Montederamos.

His confession to Montederamos, a private person, is admissible against him, not

having been extracted under custodial investigation.

And last, Cabal escaped while detained at the Butuan City Jail. Escape is evidence of
guilt.

Appellants' alibi is unconvincing. Both alleged they were in Sumilihon when Nicomedes
Salas was killed in Butuan City. However, not a single person corroborated their alibi. On the
contrary, Pitao was positively identified while Cabal was seen by witness Bernal in Butuan City
on that fatal night.
  People v Suarez, 267 scra 119

NATURE: This is an appeal made by Lara to the decision of the trial court convicting the accused of the
crime of robbery with homicide by challenging the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions on the
ground that such was obtained through force and intimidation and without the benefit of an effective
counsel.

FACTS: This is a crime of robbery with homicide initiated by the husband of the victim’s adopted
daughter days before Christmas.

Estrellita Guzman adopted Maria Victoria Suarez, Marivic for short. Marivic and his husband
Ferdinand Suarez, alias “jojo” lived on the bungalow house of Estrellita together with Cristy and the
helper Arlene and the other adopted daughter Babyruth.

Ferdinand and Estrellita were not in good terms, and based on the testimonies obtained, the
spouses wanted to grab their possible inheritance ahead of schedule.

Jojo plotted the demise of Estrellita by looking for persons who could kill the latter. He met
Arthur Lara, the appellant in this case, and told him that he is looking for some men who will kill his
aunt.

Lara asked Larry Reyes, also known as “Dondon” and his group to do the job. Dondon cannot
believe what he heard so Lara brought Jojo with them to confirm the evil plot. Jojo told them that in
exchange for the job, he would allow them to steal what they wanted from the house, in addition to
giving them P100,000.00 after one month from the killing of Estrellita.

2 am of Dec 8 1987, the felony materialized, with Jojo playing as if he was also a victim of the
crime. He gave the accused a duplicate copy of the house. He was with the them, but pretended as if he
was also held hostage by them.

Estrellita was stabbed by the accused, other than Jojo of course, after the former related where
she placed her jewelry. Jojo even cooked the accused a whole chicken using the microwave oven in the
house, but it was only half eaten for it was half-cooked.

As police were getting no leads about the identity of the malefactors, the lawyer of the family of
the deceased sought the help of NBI, and the case was assigned to Atty Salvador Ranin. Atty Ranin
concluded that the perpetrators could not have entered the house without the aid of somebody inside
as the bolt lock of the kitchen door can only be released from within. He had one suspect in mind, that is
Jojo.

Things then lit up as Jojo executed a sworn statement before NBI. He told NBI Dondon
approached him during the last week of November asking him to allow Dondon to rob their house as
they needed money for the Christmas season. He was threatened that he will be killed if he won’t
accede to their demand. Jojo, according to him, agreed on the condition that they would only steal.
Abaw!

Dondon was apprehended by the NBI, admitted the crime and he implicated Lara.

On arraignment, however, all of them plead not guilty with Lara and Dondon providing an alibi
that they were in Montalban and Samar Respectively.
ISSUE: whether the extrajudicial declaration of his co-accused admissible against Lara

HELD: Yes.

This doctrine of interlocking confessions has been accepted and recognized in numerous decisions of
this Court as an exception to the res inter alios acta rule and the hearsay rule. Dondon’s confession is
thus admissible against Lara to show the probable involvement of the latter in the perpetration of the
crime. Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of
participation by an accused co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against him.

Extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, almost identical with each other in
their essential details which could have been known only to the declarants, and corroborated by other
evidence against the person or persons implicated to show the probability of the latter' s actual
participation in the commission of the crime, are thus impressed with features of voluntariness in
their execution. Also, the failure of an accused to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges
against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests
voluntariness in the execution of the confession.

Lara’s participation to the crime however was not shown to be that of the principal, hence he will be
convicted only as an accomplice.

 PEOPLE V SALCEDO, 273 SCRA 473

Nature: Appeal from the decision of RTC of Masbate (8 accused)

A voluntary extrajudicial confession of an accused, even where it reflects the truth, if given without
the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver thereof is inadmissible in evidence against him.

Were the statements in the unconselled confession are reitreated in open court, or where other
conclusive evidence proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should not
hesistate to convict and mete the proper penalty.

FACTS: About 8:00 pm of June 20, 1988 Edwin Cortes and his family was with the victim, Aparejado.
They were in the former’s house when Salcedo shouted for him and the victim to come out of the
house. Cortes and Aparejado were ordered to lie on the ground where they were hogtied. They were
told to getup and were led nearby the creek, then told to lie down again. There Salcedo shot Aparejado
twice, then hacked him. His companions likewise hacked the victim. Afterwards, they turned
Aparejado’s body around, opened his stomach and took out his liver. His kneecap was also removed.
Cortes claimed to have witness all the since the accused had a flashlight and the moon was just rising.

After the accused left, cortes ran towards a grassy area and was able to untie his hands. Cortez
reported the incident to the authority the following morning.

P/sgt Jose Bajar testified that he had conducted the investigation of accused Laurio, Sual,
Banculo and the investigation was in the form of questions and answers in vernacular which were
reduced into writing. During cross-examination, he admitted that the three were not assisted by
consel when they signed their respective waivers-neither during the investigation nor at the time they
affixed their signatures to their respective statement.
 Arresting officer Equilona also admitted that he was not armed with a warrant when he
effected the arrest of six of the accused. At the time of the arrest, he also recovered an armalite and
fatigue uniforms of the house where the three were arrested.

On defense, Banculo gave an alibi that he was in Masbate when the crime happened, and he
confessed participation in the killing of Aparejado for he could not bear the maltreatment of the police
who further threatened to kill him.

Salcedo likewise denied complicity in the murder of Aparejado, by giving an alibi that he was in
Manila working as a construction labourer. When asked who his employer was, he could not name who
it was.

All accused gave their own self-serving alibis.

The inclusion of accused Manlapaz, Reynaldo Cortes and Esquilona in the charge was based solely on the
extra judicial confession of Edison Banculo, Sual and Daniilo Laurio which, absent of independent proof
of conspiracy, were not admissible in evidence against the alleged co-conspirators.

Judgment of lower court:

Banculo, Sual, and Laurio as accomplice

Esquilona, Reynaldo cortez and manlapa acquitted

Issue: whether the uncounselled confessions Banculo, Sual and Laurio be admissible in evidence (or will
it be ground for their acquittal)

(Accused alleged that they were maltreated by the apprehending officer and forced to sign the
statements prepared by the investigator, they were simply described as company of Salcedo)

Ruling: NO.

Under Sec. 12, par. 1, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, any person under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel. The right to be informed carries with it the correlative obligation on the part
of the investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject
understanding what is being conveyed. Since what is sought to be attained is comprehension, the
degree of explanation required will vary and depend on education, intelligence and other relevant
personal circumstances of the person being investigated. In further ensuring the right to counsel of the
person being investigated, it is not enough that the subject be informed of that right; he should also
be asked whether he wants to avail himself of the same and should be told that he can hire a counsel
of his own choice if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he decides not to
retain a counsel of his choice or avail himself of one to be provided him and, therefore, chooses to
waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of
counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer.

Even assuming that in the instant case the extrajudicial confession made by appellant spoke the truth
and was not extracted through violence or intimidation, still the failure of the police investigators to
inform appellant of his right to remain silent, coupled with the denial of his right to a competent and
independent counsel or the absence of effective legal assistance when he waived his constitutional
rights, rendered the confession inadmissible under Sec. 12, par. 3, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution

 PEOPLE V LORENZO

Note: difference between confession and admission

NATURE: this is an appeal to the decision of RTC convicting the accused Lorenzo of the crime of
parricide for killing her husband Agapito Lorenzo.

FACTS: In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Dolores Lorenzo stabbed and hacked her husband using a
bolo and a fan knife. She surrendered with Policeman Eclipse who rushed to the scene after receiving a
report from a tricycle driver of a stabbing incident.

Dolores immediately surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo, and a fan knife and told him, “I
killed my husband”.

On arraignment, Dolores plead not guilty and averred that it wasn’t her but a certain Robert Santos, that
she was simply uncomposed when she turned over the knife and bolo, that she did not file a case
against santos because she fond herself the suspect and later on the accused.

The trial court rejected the story of Dolores and characterized it as “palpably a put-up
scenario”.. a story which runs agains the grain of ordinary reality, controverts logic and assails common
sense.

ISSUE: Whether Liban’s testimony must corroborate Eclipse’s testimony or the confession of the
appellant sicne without such corroboration Eclipse’s testimony would have no probative value

HELD: NO

Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. — An extrajudicial confession made
by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti.

Note that what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the
person to whom the confession is made, and the corroborative evidence required is not the testimony
of another person who heard the confession but the evidence of corpus delicti. Except when expressly
required by law, the testimony of a single person, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court as
to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. In determining the value
and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.

As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant herself does not question its presence
because she knows that it has been overwhelmingly established in this case. Corpus delicti is the body
(material substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or
the charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a
crime was committed. It is made up of two elements:
(a) that a certain result has been proved, for example a man has died or a building has been burned,
and

(b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act.

Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not mean that every element of the crime charged must
be clearly established by independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that there
should be some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession.
Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in
addition to the confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify conviction independently of
such confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence need not, independently of the confession,
establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.

Since the corroboration of Isabelo Liban's testimony was unnecessary, we need not discuss its intrinsic
merits, more especially on its alleged inconsistencies vis-a-vis the testimony of Eclipse which
inconsistencies we, nevertheless, find to be on minor matters. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the
credibility of witnesses; on the contrary, they even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their
credibility because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.

NOTE: SC HOWEVER, disagree with the trial court's characterization of the appellant's
declaration that she killed her husband as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. It is clear
from Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that there is a distinction between an admission
and a confession. These sections reads as follows:

Sec. 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or admission of a party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.

In a confession. there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to

statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the
accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 24 Wharton 25 defines
confession as follows:

A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to
the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish
the ultimate fact of guilt.

Underhill26 distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:

A confession is defined as an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged or of the facts which
constitute the crime; but it is an admission and not a confession if the facts acknowledged raise an
inference of guilt only when considered with other facts.
While Wigmore 27 says:

A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of
the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it. 28

Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible against the appellant and,
having been duly proved, together with the other facts and circumstances, the burden of the evidence
was shifted to the appellant to disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the admission or,
admitting it, to prove that she was not guilty of killing her husband. As earlier shown, the trial court
characterized her story as "palpably a put-up scenario

(What must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the person to
whom the confession is made, and the corroborative evidence required is that of the corpus delicti. An
extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti” note that what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial
confession and not the testimony of the person to whom confession is made, and corroborative
evidence required is not the testimony of another person who heard the confession but the evidence of
corpus delicti.)

In determining the value and credibility of evidence, witness are to be weighed, not numbered. Except
when expressly required by law, the testimony of a single person, if credible and positive and if it
satisfies the cot as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict.

 PEOPLE V FRANCO 269 SCRA 211

NATURE: This is an appeal to the decision of RTC of Manila convicting Julito Franco Y Tianzon of robbery
with homicide

FACTS: The security guard of Dunkin Donut, Aurelio Cuya, was found lifeless at around 6:45 am on Aug
9, 1991. The supervisor learned that the their sales for the previous day was also missing, so he
suspected the accused to be the perpetrator.

Acting on the allegation of the supervisor, the police proceeded to the place of appellant and
were able to interview Diong and Dolera. The police then tried to convince both to state that Franco
killed the guard. Diong and Dolera were not presented in court to substantiate their affidavits.

Franco was then apprehended based on the affidavit.

He made a confession, allegedly on his freewill and with the assistance of a lawyer.

RTC convicted Franco on the basis principally of his alledged extra-judicial confession which was
not offered in evidence in court.

ISSUE: whether Exhibit N, be a used by the court to convict Franco if not formally offered in evidence

HELD: NO.

The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his finding of facts and his judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit.
Gospel truth as it may seem, we cannot stamp with approval the trial court’s undue consideration and
realiance on this extra-judicial confession for, as the record reveal, the same was not offered in evidence
by the prosecution. Neither were its contents recited by the appellant in this testimony.

Franco was acquitted

*the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it
has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party

 ENRIQUEZ V PEOPLE 331 SCRA 538

RES INTER ALIOS ACTA: 2ND BRANCH, PREVIOUS CONDUCT

NATURE: petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting Enriquez and
Espinosa of the crime of malversation of public funds

FACTS: Enriquez was Municipal Treasurer while ESPINOSA was the Administrative Officer and Acting
Municipal Cashier of the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig.

The audit team headed by Carmencita Antasuda conducted an audit examination of the cash
and accounts of Pasig Treasury covering the period from May 4,1987 to Nov 30, 1987 and found a
shortage of P3,178,777 on Enriquez’ account which was mainly due to a dishonoured check in the
amount of P3,267,911.1 which was drawn by one “D Noble, and indorsed by Enriquez . Said check was
deposited with QC District Treasury Office as part of the Pasig Treasury.

COA send a demand letter to ENRIQUEZ to restitute the value of the dishonoured check which
ENRIQUEZ denied responsibility and pointed to ESPINOSA as the one to whom the letter of demand
should be addressed as the custodian of the said check.

Information was filed dated Feb 5, 1980 charging Enriquez together with Espinosa with
MALVERSATION OF FUNDS.

SANDIGANBAYAN convicted the accused, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Enriquez and Espinosa had incurred a shortage in their accounts as Municipal treasurer
and Admin Officer which they had attempted to conceal thru a bad check

HELD: NO

The crime of malversation for which Enriquez and Espinosa have the following elements:

1. That the offender is a public officer

2. That he has the custody or control of funds or proterty by reason of the duties ofhis office

3. That those funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable

4. That he appropriated, took,, misappropriated or consented or , thru abandonment or

negligence, permitted another person to take them.
Verily, the first 2 elements are present, it is the last 2 elements, i.e., whether or not the amont
represented in the dishonoured check constituted pubic funds and whether Enriquez and Espinosa really
misappropriated said funds, where the instant petitions focus themselves.

We are constrained to conclude that the prosecution, upon whose burden was laden the task of
establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners had committed the offense charged, failed
to discharge this obligation.

There IS NO EVIDENCE THAT Enriquez or Espinosa had received such an amount which they
could no longer produce or account for at the time of the audit. The Sandiganbayan merely speculated
that it was surreptitiously enchased with the municipal treasury thru a revenue collection clerk or
someone performing collection tasks or it was borrowed from the account holder for the purpose of
covering up missing collections.

(ON EVIDENCE, RES INTER ALIOS ACTA)

The sandiganbayan clearly erred in inferring from the incident that transpired on September
23, 1987, wherein ESPINOSA deposited checks with the QC treasury for which she was issued an
official receipt in the amont of P3,583,084.18, but which she later corrected to conform to the actual
amont of the checks as P583,084.14 as indicative of a modus operandi to cover-up a shortage in the
amount of 3M. ESPINOSA has explained, and her testimony remains unrebutted, that she requested
that the correction be made because she discovered 15 minutes after she was issued the O.R that the
checks and the accompanying statements of checks had not been endorsed and signed by ENRIQUEZ.

Moreover, the general rules is that the law will not consider evidence that a person has done a certain
act at a particular time as probative contention that he has done a similar act at another time. This is the
rule of res inter alios acta. Such incident could not even sufficiently establish a plan or scheme between
Enriquez and Espinosa.

 NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN
OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents.

Nature: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the judgment, was lost or
destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the
Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and
the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his
continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due
process.

The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper
remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which
rendered the decision.

Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as
required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the
trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such
judgment.

In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence
of a legal ground for petitioner’s continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and
under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment is not authorized.

Issue: Whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner

Held: Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on
record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention.
Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".

In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the finding that during the trial
and on manifestation and arguments made by the accused, it appears clear and indubitable that the
accused admitted in open Court that a decision was read to him in open Court by a personnel of the
respondent Court sentencing him to Life Imprisonment (Habang buhay)..."

Petitioners declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under Section 23 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption that no man would declare
anything against himself, unless such declaration were true, particularly with respect to such grave
matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule 129,
"[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does
he deny making such admissions.

The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of then Judge
Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under
Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein
stated.

Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of Peoples Journal dated January 18, 1985,
page 2, issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner was convicted of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper
articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed“ and are therefore not only inadmissible but
without any probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than
proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as evidence
that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.
Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, petitioners release from
confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court .

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

 ATTY VALENZUELA V JUDGE BELLOSILLO

General rule on hearsay: AFFIDAVIT IS HEARSAY ABSENT THE PRESENTATION OF AFFIANT IN CROSS-
EXAMINATION

Nature: this is an administrative complaint filed against respondent Judge Reynaldo Blanco Bellosillo of
MTC for gross violation of the constitutional right of the subject accused to assistance by counsel of her
own choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial ethics.

Facts: Atty Valenzuela filed a motion praying that his client Meriam V. Colapo accused in a BP 22 case
pending in MTC presided by the respondent Judge, be allowed to post bail for her provisional liberty.
Respondent before acting on the motion allegedly talked to the accused and ordered her to replace
her counsel with Atty Puhawan of PAO.

Atty Valencia filed this complaint on the basis of the affidavit of Colapo to the effect that Judge
suggested Colapo that she should change her counsel.

However, Meriam Colapo was not presented by complainant to testify because she was
presently in Brunei.

ISSUE: Whether the affidavit of Colapo is valid absent cross-examination

HELD: NO.

An affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented for cross-examination. Apart from his testimony
and affidavit-complaint, complaint did not adduce enough evidence to prove his charges. He did not
even present his primary witness, Meriam Colapo, to support the charge that respondent Judge
Bellosillo pressured the latter to replace him as defense counsel. The affidavit of Meriam Colapo cannot
be given credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant placed on the witness stand to give the
respondent Judge an opportunity to test the veracity of affiant’s allegations. An affidavit is a hearsay
unless the affiant is presented for cross-examination.

 People versus Silvestre 307 SCRA 68 (1998)

Nature:

This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon,
Branch 72, dated August 7, 1996, finding the accused–appellant Jose Silvestre y Cruz alias
Jojo Bungo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No.
16579-MN
Facts:
The accused, Jose Silvestre y Cruz alias Jojo Bungo, was charged with the crime of murder in an
information[2] that reads:
“That on or about the 18th day of January, 1996, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation while armed with a gun, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot one LUISITO PALENCIA y TOBIAS hitting him four (4) times on the
different parts of his body, as a consequence said LUISITO PALENCIA y TOBIAS, sustained injuries which
directly caused his death.”

On April 24, 1996, accused-appellant was arraigned whereupon he entered a plea of not guilty to the
crime charged.[3]

The prosecution presented three witnesses: the victim’s widow, Marina Palencia; an eyewitness to the
shooting, Felicitas Torres; and the arresting officer, SPO2 Benjamin Querubin.

Marina Palencia testified that she was the widow of the victim, Luisito Palencia; that they have three
children: Harry, 18; Regine, 16; and Carmille, 11; and that when he was alive, he was employed as an
installer and repairman of P.L.D.T. earning P14,877.00 a month. As a consequence of the death of her
husband, she had incurred actual expenses in the amount of P66,500.00.[4]

Felicitas Torres testified that on 11:45 a.m. of January 18, 1996, she bought bread from the Concepcion
Bakery in Malabon, Metro Manila. While waiting for a ride in front of the said bakery, she observed a
man and a woman talking with each other. She then heard two shots fired. When she turned her head,
she saw a man on the ground face down and beside him, a man holding a gun. She sought cover “for a
short while”, then saw the man with a gun fire two more times at the fallen man. She boarded a jeep
after the last two shots were fired. While boarding, she heard someone say “binaril na ni Jojo si
Palencia”.

On February 5, 1996, she went to the branch office of P.L.D.T. in Malabon to pay for the
telephone bill of her employer. While there, she overheard that no one was willing to testify
about the shooting. She informed one of the employees that she was a witness to the
incident, and was brought to the manager who asked her to testify as one of the witnesses in
the case. On the same day, she was accompanied by a certain Jun, an employee of the
P.L.D.T., to the police station to give her statement.

At the police station, she identified the only person presented to her for purposes of
identification as the assailant. She was later informed that this person was Jojo Bungo. In
court, Torres also identified the accused Jojo Bungo, whose real name is Jose Silvestre, as
the assailant.[5]

The parties dispensed with the presentation of Dr. Alberto Bondoc by making admissions
concerning the manner and nature of his testimony, to wit:

“1. that he is duly qualified and competent as a physician and medico-legal officer who had
conducted an autopsy examination;
2. that he conducted the actual autopsy on the cadaver of the victim in this case by the name
of Luisito Palencia to be marked as Exhibit B;
3. that in the course of the autopsy examination the witness prepared a sketch of the human
body showing the locations and number of gunshot wounds sustained by the victim marked
as Exhibit C;
4. that in the course of its examination he extracted a slug embedded on the said victim
which cannot be traced to any gun because there was no ballistic examination; and,
5. that the final report containing the findings and conclusions particularly with respect to
the fact and cause of death was prepared, thereby dispensing with the actual presentation of
Dr. Bondoc as a prosecution witness.”[6]

The prosecution’s last witness was SPO2 Benjamin Querubin who testified that on
February 5, 1996, Jojo Bungo was arrested outside his residence at Bagong Bantay, Quezon
City after a six-hour stakeout. At the time of arrest, a .38 snub nose “paltik” revolver was
recovered from Silvestre after he was frisked. He also identified Jojo Bungo in court.

On cross-examination, Querubin testified that there was a witness who gave her statement
regarding the crime committed on January 18, 1996 but that she did not cooperate and even
failed to subscribe to her statement.[7]

The defense presented SPO2 Angelito Balacaña, the investigating officer, who testified[8]
that he was the officer who took the statement of Felicitas Torres. On cross-examination, he
stated that there was no line-up made when Torres identified the accused because when
Torres’ statement was taken, she readily mentioned the name of the suspect. When he
presented the suspect to Felicitas, the latter identified him as the one who shot Luisito
Palencia.

The defense next called SPO1 Crizaldo Castillo who did not appear despite his being
subpoenaed. Castillo was supposed to testify on a statement made by a certain Bernadette
Matias, a witness to the shooting, who was not presented at the trial. His testimony was
dispensed with when the prosecution admitted the existence and the contents of her written
statement after the Court persuaded both parties to stipulate on his testimony.[9]
The prosecution objected to the purpose for which the exhibit was offered since the affidavit
was not presented for identification; and the Court admitted it only as proof of its existence
and contents.

The prosecution objected to the purpose for which the exhibit was offered since the affidavit
was not presented for identification; and the Court admitted it only as proof of its existence
and contents.

The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder.
Issues:
WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED
SOLELY BASED ON THE LONE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION’S PRINCIPAL
WITNESS WHO IS NOT CREDIBLE AND POSITIVE.
WHETHER THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN TREATING JUDICIAL
ADMISSION OF THE PARTIES AS HEARSAY IN CHARACTER.
Ruling:

The testimony of a witness is more credible than affidavit.

With regard to appellant’s argument that there was an inconsistency between Torres’ sworn statement
and her testimony in court, we agree with appellee that the alleged inconsistency pertains to a trivial
matter. While she stated in her sworn statement that the accused was in front of (“sa harapan”) the
victim she thereafter testified that the gunman was “beside” the victim. This statement refers only to
how the accused stood in relation to the victim and is not sufficient to weaken her positive assertion
that she saw the accused shoot the victim two times after hearing two shots previously fired. This Court
has repeatedly ruled that inconsistencies between the sworn statements and direct testimony given in
open court do not necessarily discredit the witness since affidavits are oftentimes incomplete and are
generally inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court.

As regards the affidavit of Bernadette Matias, the same is hearsay as she was not presented
as witness. The appellee’s admission only referred to the fact that the statement was made by
Matias. In People vs. Gaddi,[31] it was ruled that when testimony is presented to establish
not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that the statement was made, it is not
hearsay.[32] The lower court was therefore correct in admitting only the existence and
contents and not the truth or veracity of the unsworn statement of Matias as an
“independently relevant statement”[33] This statement cannot be used to establish the
veracity of it; it would be hearsay as Matias was not presented in Court.
 People versus Panida

Nature

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch
47 in Criminal Case Nos. U-8202 and U-8203 convicting the accused of the crime of murder.
Facts/Issue/Ruling

Accused-appellants were charged with the slaying of a tricycle driver and the taking of his
vehicle

Accused-appellant Hora tries to extricate himself by claiming that he did not know what the
others (Alex Panida and Ernesto Eclera) were planning to do and that he was so shocked he
fainted at the sight of Andres Ildefonso being killed.

On the other hand, accused-appellants Panida and Ernesto Eclera claim it was accused-
appellant Hora who alone killed the victim and detached the sidecar from the motorcycle
ROCKY ECLERA This witness comparatively, was the youngest of the group. He was only 16
years old when he testified in Lingayen, Pangasinan before Branch 38. After more than one
year, he was presented anew not as witness for the prosecution, but as witness for the
defense.

The sworn statement was in fact offered in evidence not just by the prosecution as its Exhibit
D, but also by all accused-appellants as their Exhibit 1. Moreover, the affiant, Rocky Eclera,
was presented as witness by both prosecution and the defense.[47] A sworn statement is
hearsay only when the affiant is not presented in court.[48] Both sides had opportunity to
cross-examine Rocky Eclera. The defense presented Rocky to dispute his own statement,
but the trial court, in a well-reasoned decision, supported by evidence on record, found
Rocky’s retraction to be without merit. The determination of the credibility of witnesses is
a task best left to trial courts, given their unparalled opportunity for observation of the
deportment of witnesses on the stand. For this reason, their findings are accorded great
respect in the absence of any compelling reasons for concluding otherwise
The Court observes that when presented as witness for the accused ALEX PANIDA and
ERNESTO ECLERA, Rocky Eclera evinced hesitancy in his answers. He generalized his
denials as to inculpatory matters respecting accused ALEX PANIDA and ERNESTO ECLERA as
due to his being confused and frightened.

His recantation was not unexpected, considering his reticence and recalcitrance to testify
for the State. In fact, during the time that he testified recanting his testimony in Court as
well as his damaging and inculpatory declarations in his sworn statement against the other
accused Alex Panida and Ernesto Eclera, he oftenly stammered, pondering with difficulty
his recantation.

In recanting having stated that accused Alex Panida and Ernesto Eclera helped detached
the side car of the motorcycle as declared in Court, he wants to ascribe falsification in court
proceedings. He claims that the testimony was never made.
The ease with which he ascribes falsification in so far as his cousins are concerned, but with
steadfastness in so far as accused ALEX HORA is concerned, reveals he is being manipulated
to pollute the truth inceptually disclosed by him in his Sworn Statement.

A witness’ prior inconsistent statement can be used to impeach his credibility, but the
converse does not necessarily follow. Retractions are disfavored in law.
PEOPLE v. SILVANO
G.R. No. 127356 (1999)

NATURE:

Automatic appeal, appellant assails the decision of RTC - Quezon convicting the
accused of the crime of rape of his own daughter, thus, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death.

FACTS:

On January 23, 1996 at 10:30 in the evening, while Sheryl was sleeping in her room at
the second floor of their house located at 134-C Scout Rallos Street, Barangay Sacred Heart,
Quezon City, she was awakened by her father, the accused in this case. The accused then
started scolding Sheryl for her coming late. The accused who appeared tipsy, started
undressing Sheryl by lifting her T-shirt, as a form of punishment for her coming home late, which
punishment she has been experiencing from the accused since she was 13 years old. Sheryl
tried to resist and stop his father’s lustful act of kissing her breast and organ; but the accused
successfully inserted his private organ into the private organ of Sheryl. Subsequently, the
accused's private organ was removed from the private organ of Sheryl and the accused rubbed
his organ with the private organ of Sheryl. Thereafter, Sheryl felt something cold which was a
sticky liquid emitted from the private organ of the accused and which the accused scattered in
between Sheryl's private organ and on her stomach.

ISSUE:

Whether the prosecution satisfactorily proved that the accused was the father of the
victim which constitutes aggravating circumstance in this case.

RULING:

YES. In the case at bench, there is no dispute that appellant is the father of the victim, a
fact which he even admitted during his direct examination and is further corroborated by
the victims duly certified Certificate of Live Birth which indicates appellant as her father.
Moreover, such admission is sufficient to establish paternity without further proof. This
is so because, acts and declarations about pedigree which includes relationship is an
admissible hearsay under the rules. (Rule 130, Sec 39) Besides, appellant interposed no
objection to the victims testimony when she positively identified the former as the one who
raped her on January 23, 1996. Such relationship of father-daughter in rape cases is considered
an aggravating circumstance under Article 15 of the RPC.