 Module 9: The Human Person and His Intersubjectivity

At the end of this module, I can:

*Define intersubjectivity

*Realize that intersubjectivity requires accepting differences.

*Show an appreciation of the talents and contributions to society of persons with disability and
of people from the underprivileged sectors of society.

*Compare and contrast the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre on human
intersubjectivity.

*illustrate the concept of human reality's intersubjectivity.

Man as Being-in-the-World

In module 5, you learned that the human being is the Dasein, which means "Being there."
Martin Heidegger further claims that Being-in is "the formal existential expression of the being
of dasein, which has being-in-the-world as its essential state."

The concept of facticity implies that an entity within-the-world has a being-in-the-world in

such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its "destiny" with the being of those
entities which it encounters within its own world

-Martin Heidegger, Being and Time

Heidegger argues that a human person is not a spiritual thing misplaced into a space. Human
reality's "being-in-the-world" is a definite way of "being-in" -undertaking something,
interrogating something, producing, considering.. all these ways have concern.

Your reality as a human person suggests that your existence is manifested by your doing and
by your "destiny" to understand that you are the other Dasein. You have to recognize and
accept that "being-in" is a form of doing. It may be the recognition of the metaphysical concept
that you are a spirit, but the reality is, you are in the world with others.

Man as Being-for-Others

Jean Paul Sartre, in his 1943 book, Being and Nothingness, explains that it is through the
"other-as a-look" that the "I" experiences the self or is revealed. Here, what is meant by the
"Other" is the other conscious for-itself who, like the l or the Being, is a lack and appropriates
one's possibilities. As stated in module 5, the act of freedom is to transcend these many
possibilities, but one recognizes the issue of bad faith where he or she refuses to choose or is
therefore objectified the "look of the other" This distinction between the I and the Other
presents a conflict. Thus, any meaningful encounter with the other is always a conflict. The I and
the Other objectifies each other by the act of the "look" because by doing so, the Other is
alienated to transcend his or her possibilities. Sartre claims that when you look at a person, this
act of objectification allows you to capture that person's freedom to be what he or she wants to
be. That is, you are limiting a person 's possibilities by a look. This is evident when you
stereotype or label a person based on his or her appearance or certain actions. Sartre argues
take away that freedom to choose to become that human person has many possibilities, but
when you label a person through a look, you take away that freedom to choose to become.

This concept of the lack of intersubjectivity (the human person's ability to empathize) due to
conflict (I against the Other) might be argued through the concept of "We". Sartre recognized
that the concept of conflict may be an incomplete characterization; hence, he analyzed
humanity's use of the term "We."

In the "We", nobody is the object. The We includes a plurality of subjectives, which recognize
one another as subjectivities.Nevertheless this recognition is not the object of an explicit thesis;
what is explicitly posited is a common action or the object of a common perception "We" resist,
We advance to the attack We condemn the guilty, We look at this or that spectacle. Thus the
recognition of subjectivities is analogous to that of the self recognition of the nonthetic
consciousness More precisely, it must be effected laterally by a nonthetic consciousness whose
thetic object is this or that spectacle in the world.

- Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness

How is the notion of We-subjects experienced? Consider this scenario You are in the school
cafeteria. You are observing the other customers and you are being experienced by other
observed as well (here, the presence of conflict is evident) when suddenly, two cars collide
outside the cafeteria. Immediately, everyone becomes the spectators- the "I" is no longer
objectified; the patrons became "We" in looking at and participating at the event. Sartre
claimed that there is definitely an experience of "we"; however:
 The "We" is experienced by a particular consciousness; it is not necessary that all the patrons
at the cafe should be conscious of being We in order for me to experience myself as being
engaged in a We with them. This implies that there are aberrant consciousnesses of the We-
which, as such, are nevertheless perfectly normal consciousnesses if this is the case, then in
order for a consciousness to get the consciousness of being engaged in a We, it is necessary that
the other consciousnesses which enter into community with it should be first given in some
other way that is, either in the capacity of a transcendence-transcending or as a transcendence-
transcended. The We is a certain particular experience which is produced in special cases on the
foundation of being-for-others in general. The being for-others precedes and founds the being-
with-others.

-Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness

Through the "We" there is a certain particular experience where the being-for-others reveal
ots foundation, but it only happens in special cases. The collective consciousness of treating
others as subject does not happen all the time. There will still be impositions because it is not
always the case that a consciousness becomes a spectator and allows for the projection of
possibilities to happen.

According to Sartre, the concepts of "Us" and "They" as two different forms of the experience
of the "We". One is "being in the act of looking" and the other "being looked at in common" (in
the situation given, the latter could refer to the people involved in the collision) as foundations
of being-with-others.

The situation involves the I confronting the Other. Either the I looks at the Other or the other
looks at the I. Clearly, the look once again creates the transcending transcended -the
possibilities for each of the I and the Other are dead. Supposed the Other is I, then a Third came
in and looks at the I. The I feels that the Other and the Third forms a "community of "They-
subject", the notion of the objectification of the I never changes. The I is still alienated and
objectified by the look not only of the Other but now of the Third. According to Sartre, this
situation of apprehending will become complicated only when the Third looks at the Other
looking at the I. Where now, the I apprehends the Third through the Other-as-looked at. Why is
this situation complicated?
 There is constituted here a metastable state which will soon decompose depending upon
whether I ally myself to the Third so as to look at the Other who is then transformed into our
object-and here I experience the We-as-subject or whether I look at the Third and thus
transcend this third transcendence which transcends the Other. In the latter case the Third
becomes an object in my universe, his possibilities are dead-possibilities, he can not deliver me
from the Other. Yet he looks at the Other who is looking me. There followsa situation which we
shall call indeterminate and inconclusive since I am an object for the other who is an object for
the Third who is an object for me. Freedom alone by supporting itself on one or the other of
these relations can give a structure to this situation.

-Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness

What Sartre means is that this relation of being for others change depending on where the
look is directed to. Each look changes the structure of the relation of being-for-others.
Accordingly,

These few remarks do not claim to exhaust the question of the "We".They aim only at
indicating that the experience of thewe-subject has no value as a metaphysical revelation; it
depends strictly on the various forms of the for-others and is only an empirical enrichment of
certain of these forms. It is to this fact evidently that we should attribute the extreme instability
of this experience.It comes and disappears capriciously, leaving us in the face of others-as-
objects or else of a "They" who look at us. It appears as a provisional appeasement which is
constituted at the very heart of the conflict not as a definitive solution of this conflict. We
should hope in vain for a human "we" in which the intersubjective totality would obtain
consciousness of itself as a unified subjectivity.

-Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness

This Sartrean conception of intersubjectivity reveals that the original relationship is a conflict.
The I and the Other treat each other as object through the "look." This means that it is
impossible for an intersubjective relationship to occur. For Sartre, it is evident that the "we-
subject" has a feature of objectification when the They looks at Us as Others-as-objects.

Dasein's Being as Care

The beginning of this section asserts that Dasein exists and it is a being-in-the-world. Dasein's
being-in-the-world is characterized by care. This care is revealed in different concerns. These
concerns arise from the fact that Dasein finds himself in the world, understands the world, and
expresses his understanding in discourse.

Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein and its being toward the world is concern.
Concern means engaged-having to do with equipment-a way of being-in-the-world. Concern is
disclosedness. Dasein's being-in is what Heidegger calls the disclosedness of "Dasein." Dasein's
engagement with things, discloses (reveals) the thing. For example, to say that man lives an
environment, though ontically trivial (ontical inquiries itself through engagement are concerned
about the being of entities which are not with things in two ways (Dasein), presents that each
time man engages himself with the environment, the nature of Dasein as being-in the-world
reveals to him the environment. Man can know the environment if it is being disclosed to him.
At the same time, according to Heidegger, it presents an ontological problem, because as Dasein
engages with the environment, it discloses itself to itself in its engagement with things.

How does Dasein disclose itself to itself? Heidegger names two modes of disclosedness Dasein's
being: affectedness (mood) and understanding. These are both basic and not derivable or
reducible from one another

Affectedness is being in a mood or being in an affective state. In mood Dasein is disclosed to

itself in the thatness of its there. That I am, and have my being to be, is something that I find,
rather than choose. The "there" of Dasein is something to which Dasein is delivered over. I am
responsible for what I make of myself, how I

exist, which possibilities of being I realize, but I am not responsible for having this responsibility.
I find myself existing and with the responsibility of existing Mood, my affective state, discloses
the "that I am and have to be" in a way that a purely cognitive state could never do.

-Gorner, Heidegger's Being and Time

Dasein is disclosed to itself as itself of being there, in the world. This disclosedness is when
humanity engages with the world, that aside from knowing the entities in the world, Dasein is
revealed as itself in the act of knowing. Here, you will be reminded of how Daseinis said to be
"thrown," as discussed in module 5.

Only an essentially mooded being can be affected by entities. Such affection cannot be reduced
to objects having a causal impact on the organs of sense. Only an essentially mooded being can
have a world and be "in" the world. Being-in-the-world, or transcendence, is a condition of the
possibility of intentionality.

As explained in the previous accounts, the possibility of intersubjectivity in Heidegger's Being in

Time involved the essence of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Dasein in its mode of being
disclosed is affectedness or being-in-the-mood to be affected by other entities (ontical),
including other Daseins (ontological). The possibility of encounter is due to this being-in-the-
world, the possibility of intentionality or a consciousness being directed toward an object of
intention.

The other basic mode of disclosedness is Verstehen (understanding). In the hermeneutic

tradition the term Verstehen is used to refer to a special mode of knowledge or cognition which
is contrasted with Erklaren (explanation). It is the kind of knowledge we have of other human
beings, their mental life and the outward expressions of this mental life-in texts,works of art,
institutions and so on..

-Gorner, Heidegger's Being and Time

Understanding as a mode of disclosedness is not an ability but a way in which Dasein is. As
repeatedly expressed, being-in is engaging or being disclosed or revealed. Dasein knows himself
as Dasein as he is disclosed. Since it is not a simple ability, Dasein, in its understanding,
understands his own being as existing.

Such understanding is its ability to be. Dasein is what it can be, it is its possibility. As applied to
Dasein, possibility as ability-to-be be, is peculiar to Dasein It is not a dispositional property of
the kind we attribute to other entities.Verstehen in the sense of ability-to-be, knowing how to
be, is a mode of disclosedness which is 'equiprimordial' with state-of-mind or affectedness.
Dasein's ability-to-be. knowing how to be, is ability-to-be-in-the-world, knowing how to be in-
the-world. Being-in-the-world encompasses being towards entities within-the-world, being
towards- or with others and being towards oneself. Understanding as knowing how to be is
knowing how to be in all these basic modes. Understanding discloses Dasein's possibilities of
being and because comportment to entities other than itself is an essential feature of Dasein's
being, understanding also discloses the possibilities of entities other than Dasein. 'Not only is
the world, qua world, disclosed as possible significance, but when that which is within-the-
world is itself freed, this entity is freed for its own possibilities. That which is ready-to-hand is
discovered as such in its serviceability, its usability, and its detrimentality'

-Gorner, Heidegger's Being and Time

Now, you have a different perspective on the intersubjectivity of the human person. Heidegger's
concept of Dasein as care exposes Dasein as having mood and understanding. disclosing Dasein
itself to itself and the possibilities of encounter with other Dasein as essentially its being-in-the-
world. Due to the mode of affectedness, a Dasein can recognize others without judgment but an
acceptance of how other human beings as Dasein are also constituted as Dasein itself. On the
other hand, understanding contains within itself the possibility of development, in the sense of
the appropriation of what is understood in understanding.

Man as a Historical Being

A human person's intersubjectivity may also be described from a historicalbperspective- Dasein

is a product of history. As Gorner points out, "Human beings are historical beings in the sense
that each of us has a history. We belong to communities which themselves have a history."

As discussed in module 5, Dasein is temporal. To understand its being-in-the-world or

thrownness is to take into account Dasein's past and the projection of its possibilities in the
future.

Heidegger claims that "underlying all these facts" is the Ontological truth that the being of
Dasein is constituted by historicity (Geschichtlichkeit). Historicity is not something different
from temporality but is the concrete form which the existential past (having-been-ness) can be
seen to take when we consider the ontological truth that the being of Dasein is being-with
(Mitsein). Historicity concerns Dasein's past in the sense of what it has been Dasein is its past,
its has-been (Gewesen) Its past in the existential sense is not a property which it somehow
continues to possos and which every now and then exerts its influence Historicity in this
ontological sense (that is, as an essential feature of the being of Dasein) is not the same as
occurring in history understood as a sequence of events But, as we shall see, nor is it the same
as history in the sense of the intellectual discipline of that name Historicity in the ontological
sense is the condition of the possibility of both of these things

- Gomer, Heidegger's Being and Time

Heidegger recognizes that the human person is involved, much like the I of Sartre Thus
historicity means that Dasein has a past, and his involvement with other Daseins implies that
they also have past, a shared past. When Dasein projects his possibilities into the future, part of
it is the past that has been inherited.

Dasein as such is determined by tradition, but it can also "explicitly pursue tradition. The
discovery of tradition and the disclosure of what it transmits' and how this is transmitted can be
undertaken as a task in its own right" In other words, Dasein can become historical in the sense
of engaging in the discipline of history

-Gorner, Heidegger's Being and Time

From what this account exemplifies, Dasein as a product of history will be able to disclose itself
to itself on the grounds of its temporality together with the temporality of other Dasein. It will
be able to engage itself of its past that will push it forward to its possibilities in the future. It is,
as stated, going backward and forward because temporality is part of the nature of Dasein