Rizza Jane N.

Morada

G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,

Vs.

JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the Court of

First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent -appellees
FACTS:
The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under
Philippine laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by
Filipino citizens, in its application filed on December 1, 1976 in the Makati
branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prayed for the confirmation of
its title to two lots with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square meters,
located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3, 270 (LRC Case No. N-
9485, LRC No. N-50801).

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the grounds

that the applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable
public lands and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not
been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application. The Meralco appealed to this Court under Republic Act
No. 5440. It contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the
concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than
thirty years, had become private land in the hands of the latter, and, therefore,
the constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from acquiring
alienable public land, is not applicable to the said land.

ISSUE:

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Whether Meralco as a juridical person is allowed under the law to hold lands
of public domain and apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

RULING:
The Public Land Law provides:

CHAPTER VIII. — Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As
amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the public domain not in
possession of the qualifications specified in the last preceding section may
apply for the benefits of this chapter.

The court held that, as between the State and the Meralco, the said land
is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of
the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b).
Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
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disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's
application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.

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 G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,

Vs.

JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the Court of

First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,

Respondent –appellees

Justice Teehankee DISSENT

ISSUE:
Is the land ipso jure or by operation of law converted into private land upon
completion of the 30th year of continuous and unchallenged occupation of the
land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and
owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent judge
in the Meralco case, remain part of the public domain and does not become
private land until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and the formal
court order for the issuance of the certificate of title?

Dissent:
1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925
case of Susi vs. Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is
established doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous,
adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the
period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time
(from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law) by a private individual
personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on
said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public
domain and becomes private property.

2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed

by this Court in a long unbroken line of cases, as follows:
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 In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of
possession, the land in question became private property on the strength of
the Susi doctrine.

In Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of
the above-quoted ruling of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus: The Director
of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the
plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.

If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had
already become, operation of law, private property, there is lacking only
the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an
action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.

3. Since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription

of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section
48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of law
and the public land is converted to and becomes private property
upon a showing of open and unchallenged possession under bona
fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest
for the statutory period of thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive
presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute that the
possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant," the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be
barred as a corporation from filing the application for registration of
the private property duly acquired by it.
4. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had therefore acquired by
operation of the Public Land Act a Government grant to the
property, as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of
acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby became private
property. The very definition of prescription as a mode of acquiring
ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that
"By prescription one acquires ownership and other real rights
through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid
down by law." The law does not provide that one acquires ownership
of a land by prescription only after his title thereto is judicially
confirmed.
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5. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being
transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio — for it
is not claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing
spouses transferring the ownership of the land to others (whether
natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even
before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them.
6. o uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of
their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for registration in the name
of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to
the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against
the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of
the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the
end result of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not
be necessary to go through all the rituals as the great cost of refiling
of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now.
7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the
Iglesia case, save that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the
Iglesia application was granted because the Republic presented no
evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in
effect that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain
and had become private property, the title to which could be duly
issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors-
in-interest.
8. In no way, may the letter, intent and spirit of the prohibition of the
1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue control and
exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by
corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or
disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar since we are

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 talking about small parcels of land. The two corporations in truth
and in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at bar for their own
use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public.
9. "As interpretated in several cases . . . the possessor is deemed to
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The
and, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent
and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent."

This argument only points out that, the express provisions of Art. XIV, section
9 15 and section 14 as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935
Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-owned corporations to
own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is
section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in
area.

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