UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M.
Paguirigan
PATERNITY AND FILIATION

RODOLFO S. AGUILAR VS. EDNA Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and without debts. Yes. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the
G. SIASAT G.R. NO. 200169, Included in their estate are two parcels of land. requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under
JANUARY 28, 2015 Article 172 of the Family Code. By itself, said document constitutes an
Del Castillo, J. Petitioner Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
respondent Siasat and alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that the instrument and signed by the parent concerned. Petitioner has shown that he
Filiation may be proved by an admission petitioner discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records covering the
of legitimate filiation in a public could have stolen the same. period 1945-1946, when he was born, of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City
document or a private handwritten were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary
instrument and signed by the parent In her Answer,respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a evidence, particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 to prove filiation. It was
concerned, and such due recognition in mere stranger who was raised by' the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness; that petitioner is not a natural erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and
any authentic writing is, in itself, a or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second
consummated act of acknowledgment of latter inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and paragraph of Article 172of the Family Code. It is evidence of filiation under the
the child, and no further court action is sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for first paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public
required. safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. instrument.
Whether the petitioner can prove filiation to the Spouse Aguilar by presenting Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1.
G.R. No. 163362, July 08, 2015 YES. The birth certificate showing that the father had himself caused the
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaqina Arado they produced a son Nicolas. Nicolas later married Florencia but registration of his birth by means of the father’s name appearing in the column
JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO had no offspring. He had an extramarital affair with Francisa and begot a son ,Anacleto, husband of Elenette (herein "Remarks" means that the putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation
ALCORIZA, PEDRO ARADO, respondents). of the birth certificate. Thus, the reliance on his birth certificate as evidence of
HEIRS: JUDITHO ARADO, his paternity was fully warranted.
JENNIFER ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO The petitioners herein are the sister, nephew and niece of Joaqina.
ARADO, SHIRLY ABAD, Anacleto's baptismal certificate was of no consequence in
ANTONIETA ARADO, NELSON Raymundo and Nicolas died. Joaqina later died leaving a will bequeathing the subject properties to Anacleto, but the determining his filiation. While a baptismal certificate may be considered
SOMOZA, JUVENIL ARADO, will was yet to be probated. a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
NICETAS VENTULA, AND NILA sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect
ARADO, PEDRO ARADO, TOMASA The petitioners filed a claim for recovery of properties against respondents claiming that they are the rightful owners to the child's paternity;" and that baptismal certificates were "per
V. as Anacleto was not recognized by Nicolas as his legitimate son. se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation," and thus "cannot be admitted
ARADO, Petitioners, v. ANACLETO indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation
ALCORAN AND ELENETTE Respondents countered that Anacleto can inherit the subject properties since he was recognized by Nicolas as his
SUNJACO, Respondents. illegitimate son as evidenced by his birth certificate, baptismal, school records and a picture. Picture depicting the young Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she
DECISION stood beside the coffin of the departed Nicolas (Exhibit 5) was also
BERSAMIN, J. RTC and CA dismissed the complaint of the petitioners and said that Anacleto established that he was really the undeserved. At best, the picture merely manifested that it was
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. Joaquina who had acknowledged her filiation with Anacleto. A
The birth certificate showing that the photograph with his mother near the coffin of the father cannot and will not
father had himself caused the Whether or not RTC and CA rightly ruled that Anacleto established that he was really the acknowledged illegitimate constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent
registration of his birth by means of the son of Nicolas. that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a
father’s name appearing in the column picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize
"Remarks" means that the putative it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
father, had a direct hand in the
preparation of the birth certificate. Thus, The school records evidencing Joaquina was the guardian of
the reliance on his birth certificate as Anacleto in his grade school years, and the marriage contract
evidence of his paternity was fully between Anacleto and Elenette (Exhibits 8 to 8-C), which indicated
warranted. that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's marriage, did not
have the evidentiary value accorded by the RTC and the CA.
Joaquina's apparent recognition of Joaquina's apparent recognition of Anacleto mattered little, for, the
Anacleto mattered little, for, the recognition "must be made personally by the parent himself or herself, not by
recognition "must be made personally any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a
by the parent himself or herself, not by voluntary declaration by the parent, of if the parent refuses, by judicial
any brother, sister or relative; after all, authority, to establish the paternity or maternity of children born outside
the concept of recognition speaks of a wedlock.".
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
voluntary declaration by the parent, of if

the parent refuses, by judicial authority,
to establish the paternity or maternity of
children born outside wedlock.".
Petitioners and Respondents all claimed to be children... of the late Josefa A. Ara (Josefa), who died on November 18 NO. While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the
G.R. No. 187273, 2002. documents mentioned in the first paragraph (which are practically the... same
February 15, 2017 documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code except for the
ROMEO F. ARA AND WILLIAM A. Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro (Pizarro).was born to Josefa and her then husband, Vicente Salgado (Salgado), "private handwritten instrument signed by the parent himself), he... insists
GARCIA, Petitioners, v. who died during World War II. that he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession... of the
DRA. FELY S. PIZARRO AND status of an illegitimate child," which is now also admissible... as evidence of
HENRY ROSSI, Respondents. Respondent Pizarro claims that, she is the only child of Josefa. Further, petitioner Garcia is recorded as a son of a filiation.
DECISION certain Carmen Bucarin and Pedro Garcia, as evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth and petitioner Ara is recorded as
LEONEN, J. a son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores, evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth. Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967... until 1973, receiving
support from him during that time; that he has been... using the surname
True, birth certificates offer prima Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Rossi verbally sought partition of the properties left by the... Uyguangco without objection from his father and the... petitioners as shown in
facie evidence of filiation. To overthrow deceased Josefa, which were in the possession of respondent Pizarro. his high school diploma, a special power of... attorney executed in his favor by
the presumption of truth contained in a Respondent Pizarro refused to partition these properties. Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has
birth certificate, a high degree of proof is shared in the profits of the copra... business of the Uyguangcos, which is a
needed] However, the circumstances RTC: Awarded strictly family business; that he... was a director, together with the petitioners,
surrounding the delayed registration 1. Baguio property to Henry Rossi, to be... deducted from his share; of the Alu and Sons Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that
prevent us from according it the same 2. Valencia property covered by OCT No. T- 30333; Tamaraw FX and the RCBC Bank Deposit Passbook to defendant in the addendum... to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the
weight as any other birth certificate. Fely S. Pizarro, to be deducted from her share; and petitioners he... was given a share in his deceased father's estate.
With respect to the other properties that may not be... covered... by the foregoing, the same are declared under the co- It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also... allowed... to establish
ownership of all... the plaintiffs and defendant and in equal shares his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a... judicial admission, a family
Pizarro: Ara and Garcia are NOT children of Josefa. They should not have been included in the partition of properties. Bible in which his name has been entered,... common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the... testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds
CA: William A. Garcia and Romeo F. Ara are the illegitimate sons of Josefa Ara. With their birth and baptismal of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
certificates, there is sufficient evidence to hold that all the plaintiffs are indeed the children of the said deceased
Josefa Ara for having possessed and enjoyed the status of recognized. illegitimate children pursuant to the first The problem of the private respondent, however, is that,... since... he seeks to
paragraph of Article 175 of... the Family Code All the plaintiffs and defendant were taken care of and supported by prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article
their mother Josefa Ara, including their education, since their respective birth and were all united and lived as one 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged... father's
family even up to the death and burial of their said mother, Josefa Ara. Their mother had acknowledged all of them as death in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads... as follows:
her children throughout all her life directly, continuously, spontaneously and without concealment The action must be brought within the same period... specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
WHETHER PETITIONERS. MAY PROVE THEIR FILIATION TO JOSEFA THROUGH THEIR OPEN AND which case the action may be brought during the... lifetime of the alleged
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN, FOUND IN THE parent.
SECOND...PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be... allowed... at this time
to introduce evidence of his open and continuous... possession of the status of
an illegitimate child or prove his alleged... filiation through any of the means
allowed by the Rules of Court or... special laws. The simple reason is that
Apolinario Uyguangco is already... dead and can no longer be heard on the
claim of his alleged son's... illegitimate filiation.
Although not raised by petitioners, it may be argued that... petitioner Garcia's

Certificate of Live Birth obtained in 2003 through a... late registration of his
birth is a record of birth appearing in the... civil register under Article 172 of
the Family Code.
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True, birth certificates offer prima facie evidence... of filiation. To overthrow

the presumption of truth contained in a... birth certificate, a high degree of
proof is needed.
However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration prevent... us

from according it the same weight as any other birth certificate.
There is a reason why birth certificates are... accorded such... high evidentiary
value.
Further, the birth must be registered within 30 days from... the time of birth.
The immediacy of the... reporting, combined with the participation of
disinterested attendants... at birth, or of both parents, tend to ensure that the
report is a... factual reporting of birth. In other words, the circumstances in
which... registration is made obviate the possibility that registration is caused...
by ulterior motives. The law provides in the case of illegitimate... children that
the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly... by the parents of the
infant or only by the mother if the father... refuses. This ensures that
individuals are not falsely named as... parents.
National Statistics Office Administrative Order No. 1-93 also... contemplates

that reports of birth may be made beyond the 30-day period:
A delayed registration of birth, made after the death of the... putative parent,
is tenuous proof of filiation.
Thus, we are unable to accord petitioner Garcia's delayed registration... of birth

the same evidentiary weight as regular birth... certificates.
Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a... final
judgment, filiation may still be established after the death of a... putative
parent through an admission of filiation in a public document... or a private
handwritten instrument, signed by the parent... concerned.[64]
However, petitioners did not present in evidence any admissions of... filiation.
The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures with Josefa and
petitioners' relatives, and testimonies do not show that Josefa is their mother.
They do not contain any acts, declarations, or... omissions attributable directly
to Josefa, much less ones pertaining to... her filiation with petitioners.
Although petitioner Garcia's Baptismal Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and

Certificate of Live Birth... obtained via late registration all state that Josefa is
his mother, they... do not show any act, declaration, or omission on the part of
Josefa.
Josefa did not participate in making any of them. The same may be said... of
the testimonies presented. Although Josefa may have been in the...
photographs, the photographs do not show any filiation. By definition,... none
of the evidence presented constitutes an admission of filiation... under Article
172 of the Family Code.
ARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v. On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas NO. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence
ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, (petitioner) before the RTC-Cabanatuan City. Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo. We have
Respondent. G.R. No. 180284, Paulo Salas who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is
then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower and that he has no more companion in life because his not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
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September 11, 2013, VILLARAMA, children are all grown-up. Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did
JR., J.: former boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of her and marry her. She not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought that she and her child will have a better life. Thereafter, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can
Time and again, this Court has ruled that they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her money for her child. When she became pregnant with petitioner’s such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has
a high standard of proof is required to child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed no probative value to establish filiation. As to the Baptismal Certificate of
establish paternity and filiation. An order it because he wanted to have another child. She eventually gave birth to their child. She filled out the form for the Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that
for recognition and support may create child’s birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. Petitioner rented an apartment while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can
an unwholesome situation or may be an where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so
irritant to the family or the lives of the operation and hospital confinement. However, on the 18th day after the baby’s birth, petitioner went to Baguio City specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries
parties so that it must be issued only if for a medical checkup. He confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife was also informed about his having sired therein with respect to the child’s paternity. Pictures taken of the mother and
paternity or filiation is established by an illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt the baby and just give respondent money so she can go abroad. her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove
clear and convincing evidence. When she refused this offer, petitioner stopped seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived paternity. Exhibits “E” and “F”32 showing petitioner and respondent inside the
through the help of relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought to rented apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of
the hospital by Murillo who paid the bill. Petitioner, in his answer, described respondent as a woman of loose morals, Account (Exhibit “C”) from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where
having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy. Respondent had seduced a senior respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove
police officer in San Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against said police officer was later withdrawn in exchange that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner’s admission
for the quashing of drug charges against respondent’s brother-in-law who was then detained at the municipal jail. It in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondent’s
was at that time respondent introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as she was pregnant with child as an act of charity. As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and
another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts,
genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent’s these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner
chicanery and deceit designed to “scandalize” him in exchange for financial favor. As evidence, respondent presented as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission
the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were
not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the
she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein. The rest of respondent’s documentary Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an
evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
inside their rented apartment unit. RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent, ordering the defendant to give as concerned. Reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals is misplaced. In
monthly support of P2,000.00 for the child Christian Paulo through the mother. CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling. the said case, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission
that he is the father of private respondent’s daughter and were signed by him.
Does the evidence presented by respondent sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of The Court therein considered the totality of evidence which established beyond
petitioner? reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of private respondent’s
daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals, the Court sustained
the appellate court’s finding that private respondent’s evidence to establish her
filiation with and paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the
latter’s public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private
respondent’s mother, and private respondent as his own child through acts and
words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was fully supported by
documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced
sufficient proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child.
Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence
insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo. The
testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of
Christian Paulo, petitioner’s financial support while respondent lived in
Murillo’s apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though
replete with details, do not approximate the “overwhelming evidence,
documentary and testimonial” presented in Ilano. In sum, we hold that the
testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof
of paternity and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish
Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner. Time and again, this Court has ruled
that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An
order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or
may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be
issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence. Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner’s
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counsel informing this Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010. The
action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still
alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2) of the Family Code. We have also
held that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action commenced
during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child. The rule on
substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, thus applies
JAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for YES. The results of blood grouping test is conclusive to prove non-paternity.
No. L49162. July 28, 1987. | J. recognition and support with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against Perico V. Jao. The latter denied No evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing methods
Padilla, Second Division paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by the NBI upon order of employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of
the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test, held January 21,1969, indicated that Janice could not have been the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately
the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado. The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally reflecting a scientific fact. In jurisdictions like the United States, the
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusive but upon plaintiff’s second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-paternity has already been
conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support. JAO appealed to the CA, questioning the trial passed upon in several cases. Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood
disprove paternity, rulings have been court’s failure to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there was tests is also in force in several states. Tolentino, affirms this rule on blood tests
much more definite in their conclusions. any irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests should have been as proof of non-paternity, thus — Medical science has shown that there are four
For the past three decades, the use of conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity. The CA upheld JAO’s contentions and reversed the trial types of blood in man which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the
blood typing in cases of disputed court’s decision. In its decision, the CA held that JAO never recognize JANICE as his own, in fact he even filed a presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not indicate that one
parentage has already become an petition that his name as father of JANICE in the latter’s certificate of live birth be deleted, evidencing his repudiation, was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will
important legal procedure. There is now rather than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in cohabiting with ARLENE, the attention given to her during her indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the
almost universal scientific agreement pregnancy and the financial assistance extended to her cannot overcome the result of the blood grouping test. These supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they
that blood grouping tests are conclusive acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn JANICE as his own as the possession of such status cannot cannot be father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today
as to non-paternity, although be founded on conjectures and presumptions JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on par. 2 of Art. regard a blood test exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of
inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the 283 in relation to Art. 289 of the NCC which provides: "When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child non-paternity. Moreover, the cohabitation between the mother and the
fact that the blood type of the child is a of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter. Nor can there be compulsory recognition under pars. 3 or 4 of said supposed father cannot be a ground for compulsory recognition if such
possible product of the mother and article which states: (3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed cohabitation could not have produced the conception of the child. This would
alleged father does not conclusively prove father; (4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. As aptly appreciated be the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place outside of the period of
that the child is born by such parents; by the court below, JANICE could have been conceived from November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed, conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that the
but, if the blood type of the child is not the ARLENE claims that her first sexual intercourse with JAO was on November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was one child and the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the
possible blood type when the blood of the week after January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy par. 3 as above-quoted, JANICE must have been conceived when cohabitation by itself cannot be a ground for recognition
mother and that of the alleged father are ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one another. Since ARLENE herself testified that their cohabitation started
crossmatched, then the child cannot only after December 16, 1967, then it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived during this cohabitation.
possibly be that of the alleged father. Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition cannot be had under par. 4 as JANICE has no other evidence
or proof of her alleged paternity.
Whether or not the results of blood grouping test is conclusive to prove non-paternity.
ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner, vs. Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata. YES. The private respondent is the spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled
THE COURT OF APPEALS and Artemio was one of the clients of Atty. Virata. Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as to support. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time
MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO, Namarco distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they renewed acquaintances. Merceditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of
represented by her mother, Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of marriage, they the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in
LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are
Respondent. G.R. No. 104376 entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil
February 23, 1994, NOCON, J. On December 30, 1963, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth Code.
The belated denial of paternity after the was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia de los Santos and Artemio Ilano. Inasmuch as it was
action has been filed against the putative already past 7:00 in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning for his signature. However, he However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition
father is not the denial that would destroy left an instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning. of paternity either voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal
the paternity of the child which had During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the father principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights
already been recognized by defendant by of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the from his parents or to their estate because his rights spring not from the
various positive acts clearly evidencing fourth and fifth grading periods as her parent. Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one filiation or blood relationship but from his acknowledgment by the parent. In
that he is plaintiff's father. A recognition whom she recognized as her Daddy. He treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the
once validly made is irrevocable. It and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep.
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cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of true or real child of his parents but because under the law, he had been
mind would be incompatible with the They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally transferred to Gagalangin recognized or acknowledged as such a child.
stability of the civil status of person, the in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped coming home. Petitioner's defense was a total
permanence of which affects public and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia and Merceditas. He stopped visiting her in March or April, 1963
interest. because he planned to get married with another which he eventually did in September, 1963. Nilda Ilano Ramos, While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to
daughter of petitioner, alleged that she does not know Leoncia; neither has she been brought to their family home in recognize the child as his natural child, for the purpose of the present case,
Imus, Cavite. Nilda further alleged that on December 30, 1963, she denied that her father was at the Manila petitioner is obliged to recognize Merceditas as his spurious child. In reversing
Sanitarium, instead, her father was at their home because he got sick on December 25, 1963 and was advised to have the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is likewise our
a complete bed rest. Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner's wife, further corroborated the previous testimonies about finding, that private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with and
petitioner's sickness on December 30, 1963 and hospitalization on January 7, 1964. It could not be true that her the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside
husband, during the years 1963 to 1968, lived three (3) times a week with a certain Leoncia de los Santos because her by the highly improbable and fatally flawed by the inherently weak denials of
husband never slept out of their house and that in his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of the Filipinas petitioner.
Telephone Company he does not go to Guagua even once a year.
The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidences as sufficient to
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial court was not fully satisfied establish that plaintiff was in continuous possession of status of a child in view
that petitioner is the father of Merceditas. On appeal, CA concluded that petitioner is her father, entitling her to of the denial by appellee of his paternity, and there is no clear and sufficient
support. Subsequent MR was denied. Hence, this petition. evidence that the support was really given to plaintiff's mother. The belated
Is Merceditas entitled to support from Artemio? denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the putative father is
not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child which had already
been recognized by defendant by various positive acts clearly evidencing that
he is plaintiff's father. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot
be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability
of the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects public interest.
Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of
such act will not revoke the recognition itself.
To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an

illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential
requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues. The possession of such status means that the
father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through other,
spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity. There must
be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection
and care.
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas at the
Manila Sanitarium and Hospital.
Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination by Artemio.

After delivery, they went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and
driven by Artemio himself.
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the
totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs
to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was
falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Merceditas is not
appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio
himself in order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had

long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that
defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the
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father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures and
handwriting.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the
relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as
circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and
supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary
evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may
not be infirmed by his belated denials.
Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to
render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence
submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet
requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last
paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as
provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, Private respondent EMILIE CUYUGAN, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed Yes. Although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private
petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child
APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations
CUYUGAN, respondent. The complaint alleges: “Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further that
G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992, defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who died intestate on September 28, 1983; Plaintiff has been estranged the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim
REGALADO, J. from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
Key Doctrine: we hold that the right of had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened
action of the minor child (Chad) bas been Chad; Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had been sired, showered with exceptional affection, The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition
vested by the filing of the complaint in fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and has prescribed. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
court under the regime of the Civil Code documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder reproduced; . . . Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
and prior to the effectivity of the Family Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save my heart during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
Code. The fact of filing of the petition to you and to Chad. . . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my name
already vested in the petitioner her right and let me entitle him to all what I am and what I've got. . . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir. . . .” (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
to file it and to have the same proceed to The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
final adjudication in accordance with the (petitioner), Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad. attainment of his majority;
law in force at the time, and such right Petitioner, as defendant, maintained by way of affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of
can no longer be prejudiced or impaired action; that the action is premature; that the suit as barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
by the enactment of a new law. judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court was no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
there is improper joinder of causes of action. same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. CA affirmed the RTC’s Order. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
Whether the action to compel recognition and to claim for inheritance should prosper? which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the
record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of
the child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed
instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child.
However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the
child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action
must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the
complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father,
failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is
controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child,
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the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of
majority of the minor child.
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore,
to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for
recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of
action of the minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court
under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. The fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right
to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with
the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or
impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in
question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of
procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of
the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used
to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since
procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question
of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced.
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private
respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of
which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court
is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code
and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed an action for support against the Carlito before We find no merit in the petition.
AL. vs. the RTC of QC. The court, finding that “there is nothing in the material allegations in the complaint that seeks to Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the
THE COURT OF APPEALS and compel Carlito to recognize or acknowledge petitioners as his illegitimate children,” dismissed the complaint. On presence of Carlito in the baptism of Claro. These photographs are far from
CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ G.R. No. February 19, 1987, they filed another action for recognition and support against Carlito before another branch of the proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by
108366, February 16, 1994, PUNO, RTC of QC. Carlito, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro.
J.: Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing Carlito showering
The evidence shows that Violeta Esguerra is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, Claro Antonio affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity. As we
and John Paul. She met Carlito sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. Violeta pointed to Carlito held in Tan vs. Trocio, viz:
as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their . . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman,
first meeting. She did not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. She averred they were another maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like
married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license which they playing with him and giving him paternity. Said evidence is inconclusive to
used was spurious. prove paternity and much less would prove violation of complaint's person and
honor.
Petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent
Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent Thirdly, the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro naming private
Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of Carlito and Claro taken respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that
at the home of Violeta. They also presented four witnesses. The first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta private respondent participated in its preparation. In Macandang vs. Court of
Esguerra had, at different times, introduced the private respondent to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the Appeals (1980), we also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the latter's considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
baptism. administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
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In defense, Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect
the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the testimony of an officemate of to the child's paternity.
Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism. Carlito also presented a waiter of the
Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and respondent Carlito frequented the said Fourth, the certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private
restaurant during their affair. respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their
paternity. Again, the records do not show that private respondent had a hand
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the decision was in the preparation of said certificates.
set aside and petitioners’ complaint dismissed by the respondent CA.
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the
Are the evidence presented by petitioners sufficient to prove paternity and filiation? No. petitioners and we are satisfied that the respondent appellate court properly
calibrated their weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of Father
Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner Claro. On
cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be shown a
picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private
respondent. There is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta
and Carlito which should render unquestionable his identification of the
private respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this
proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who officiates
numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents
of the children he has baptized.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the

respondent court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED.
CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner, Florencia Regodos filed a a petition for recognition and support in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Yes. The trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Regodos. Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent. She recounted that after her husband left private respondent was based on the testimony of the childs mother and the
CAMELO REGODOS, respondents. her, she was hired as petitioner’s household help. It was while working there as a maid that petitioner brought her to personal appearance of the child. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a
G.R. No. 124814. October 21, 2004, Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. She discovered she was carrying high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order
CORONA, J. petitioner’s child 27 days after their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated. Later, on suspicion that for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be
Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only
In this age of genetic profiling and where he rented a house for her. Assisted by a hilot in her aunts house, she gave birth to her child, private respondent. if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He testified he hired Florencia as a servant at home.
the extremely subjective test of physical The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
resemblance or similarity of features will During the course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
not suffice as evidence to prove paternity the following morning. This displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she was told to look for another job. Then, Florencia following:
and filiation before the courts of law. asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Years Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
up and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant
with the child of her husband. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
Florencia went to petitioners house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. She was re-hired. or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
However petitioners wife noticed that her stomach was bulging. She told petitioners wife that the baby was by her Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
husband. She was again told to go home. RTC ruled in favor of Florencia, declaring that The child was presented before same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
the court and, based on the personal appearance of the child, there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the
child of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia Regodos. It also set aside the fact that Florencia lied Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
when she said she was a widow. CA affirmed. preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
Whether the court a quo erred in declaring Camelo Regodos (private respondent) as petitioner’s child based on the competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
personal appearance? father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar
has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the
information of a third person.
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In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of
the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, certificates issued by the
local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for
her in Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient
proof of voluntary recognition. We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias
testimony. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid
subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child
born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the
extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will
not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had five children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. As to Delia and Edmundo (Yes) Yes, a challenge to the validity of the adoption
SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct
SAYSON-LIRIO, Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, who claim to be their children. proceeding frontally addressing the issue. If this were not the rule, the status
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and of adopted children would always be uncertain. The decree was issued way
JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners, On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother back in 1967. Assuming the petitioners were proper parties, what they should
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF (Petitioners), filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel. Delia, have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth
APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson (Respondents) resisted the action and claimed successional rights to the disputed estate. of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
assisted by her husband, CIRILO On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the
CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. The Respondents decree of adoption was issued. Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue
AND DORIBEL SAYSON, asserted the defense they raised in the 1st case, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. The
respondents. G.R. Nos. 89224-25 the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to
January 23, 1992, CRUZ, FIRST estate by right of representation. annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and
DIVISION Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try
Both cases were decided in favor of the respondents based on the same facts that: (1) Delia and Edmundo were adopted to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple. On
Paternity and filiation - The birth children based on the decree of adoption and (2) Doribel is a legitimate child based on her birth certificate. On appeal, top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to
certificate offers only prima facie the case was consolidated. The 1st case was affirmed by the CA while the 2nd2 was modified since Delia and Edmundo challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. The
evidence of filiation and may be refuted are merely adopted, they cannot inherit from Eleno and Rafaela. finality of the adoption decree must be upheld. As to Doribel (yes) Yes,
by contrary evidence. The presumption Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the
of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does Petitioners maintain that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on prescribed means ofrecognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article
not have this purely evidential February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. Thus Art. 335 of the Civil Code3 applies. 172 of the Family Code. It is true, that the birth certificate offers only prima
character. It serves a more facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However,
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a Are respondents the legitimate children of Teodoro and Isabel? such evidence is lacking in the case at bar4. Another reason why the petitioners'
civil status for the child born in wedlock, challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that
and that civil status cannot be attacked purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition
collaterally. and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
Respondents’ status as heirs in the 1st and 2nd cases 1st case (teodoro and
Intestate succession - The relationship isabel’s estate) - In consequence of the above observations, that Doribel, as the
created by the adoption is between only legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as
the adopting parents and the adopted their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
10 | P a g e
child and does not extend to the blood deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 9795. The philosophy
relatives of either party underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among
his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring
properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for
them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this
earth. 2nd case (Eleno and Rafaela’s estate) - There is no question that as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and
Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution
of the intestate estate of her grandparents. But a different conclusion must be
reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were
total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not
include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend
to the blood relatives of either party. CA decision affirmed.
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented Petition William Liyao, Jr. (Billy), represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed an action for compulsory NO.
by his mother Corazon Garcia vs. recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita, Pearl, Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, et al. Tita Rose and Linda. celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
G.R. No. 138961, 2002-03-07, DE dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
LEON, JR., J. Corazon alleged that she is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten years at the
KEY DOCTRINE: It is settled that a time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William from 1965 up to the time of his Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
child born within a valid marriage is death in 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazon's two children from her subsisting marriage, Enrique physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first
presumed legitimate even though the and Bernadette. This was with the knowledge of William’s legitimate children, Tita Rose and Linda, from his subsisting one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth
mother may have declared against its marriage with Juanita. of the child.
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. Tita Rose and Linda were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were This physical impossibility may be caused: 1) By the impotence of the husband;
then vice president and president, respectively. In 1975, Corazon gave birth to Billy. William secured a copy of Billy's 2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
birth certificate and likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy and gave weekly amounts to be access was not possible; 3) By the serious illness of the husband.
deposited therein. William would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon, had been living separately for ten
taken together. Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or years from her husband, Ramon, at the time that she cohabited with the late
acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter's direct and overt acts. William supported Billy and paid for his food, William and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with
clothing and other material needs. Several witnesses also testified for the petitioner, confirming that Corazon and Ramon when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim,
William did live together and that Billy is their son. petitioner presented a document entitled, "Contract of Separation," executed
and signed by Ramon indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any
Respondents, on the other hand, stated that they were living together with William until his death. William and Juanita property that Corazon might acquire in the future. The fact that Corazon Garcia
were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why they would institute legal separation had been living separately from her husband, Ramon, at the time petitioner
proceedings. William believes that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a home. William suffered was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the
two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death. He then stayed in the house for two to three months for his husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for
therapy and acupuncture treatment. Linda testified that she knew Corazon is still married to Ramon. Corazon was not impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for
legally separated from her husband. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any formal demand to impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil
recognize Billy as an illegitimate son of her father. Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under
the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Billy. On appeal, the CA reversed the said decision saying that the law legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. The CA gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
for the respondents that Corazon and Ramon who were still legally married and have not secured legal separation, confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
that William did not sign the passbook, birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of Billy, and that neither do family produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity
pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. The CA also denied the MR. Hence, this petition. or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside
May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William? of these cases, none even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount
to an insult to his memory.
11 | P a g e
It is therefor clear that the present petition to compel recognition by

respondents of Billy, as the illegitimate son of the late William cannot prosper.
It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate
even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his
present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the
husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself
cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does
not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and
the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother's alleged paramour. On
the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child
cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the
presumption.
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of

Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to
impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter? We think not. As earlier stated, it
is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest
the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that
Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner
nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was
initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not
through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the
child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law.
INKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in 1964 and during this marriage, petitioners, YES. How Filiation of Illegitimate Children is Established
JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, Jacqueline de Jesus and Jinkie de Jesus were born. However, in a notarized document, Juan Dizon acknowledged 1. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established
minors, represented by their Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina. Subsequently, Juan died intestate by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS v. leaving behind a considerable amount of assets. On the strength of the notarized acknowledgment, petitioners filed a (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate. handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. On the other hand, the respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent, 2. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case. They argued that continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
MARYLIN DIZON and as proper petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo and Carolina to instead be the illegitimate children 3. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied their motion to dismiss as well as their motion statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., for reconsideration, which prompted the respondents to elevate the issue before the Court of Appeals. The appellate consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action
FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered that case be remanded for further proceedings. is required.
and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & Years later, the respondents filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal of the complaint. They Authentic Writings are deemed in itself a Voluntary Recognition
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. contended that the action instituted was made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate 4. Any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
G.R. No. 142877 , October 2, 2001, children of decedent Juan Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
THIRD DIVISION, VITUG, J. have been able to establish their status as such heirs. separate action for judicial approval.
At this instance, the trial court favored with the respondents and dismissed the complaint of the 5. Where a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
petitioners for lack of cause of action and being improper. The petitioners went before the Supreme Court and tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement
The due recognition of an illegitimate maintained that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, was before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
child in a record of birth, a will, a in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and did not require a separate action for judicial approval. applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
statement before a court of record, or in acknowledgment.
any authentic writing is, in itself, a Children Born during the Marriage of their Parents are Legitimate
consummated act of acknowledgment of Is the acknowledgement of an illegitimate in writing sufficient to establish filiation without judicial approval? 6. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and
the child, and no further court action is founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
required. presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
12 | P a g e
7. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that

there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child.
8. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify
Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
Only the Father or in Exceptional Case, the Latter’s Heirs may Impugn the
Legitimacy of a Child Born to his Wife
9. In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus.
10. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents.
11. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
12. It is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that
the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Declaration of Legitimacy by Law Cannot be Attacked Collaterally 13. This
issue of whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate
offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action
having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the
children of Danilo and Carolina born in lawful wedlock.
14. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of
legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
13 | P a g e
ESTATE OF LOCSIN vs. JUAN C. Eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. Exhibit 8 for the petitioners.
LOCSIN filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City , a "Petition for Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested
G.R. No. 146737, December 10, Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child. The trial parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D,"
2001 court issued an order setting the petition for hearing which order was duly published, thereby giving notice to all more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court should have
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.: persons who may have opposition to the said petition. been presented by respondent.
Before the scheduled hearing, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of
Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition. They averred that respondent is not a respondent's birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago.
child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa.
name. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on
Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging her general impressions of the existing records in that Office.
that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil
estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition of Ester Locsin Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry
Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in
respondent and the deceased. more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's
explanation not convincing.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased, respondent submitted a machine
copy of his Certificate of Live Birth found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was
of Iloilo City which contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be
informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures. To prove the existence and authenticity of used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "x x
Certificate of Live Birth, respondent presented the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Respondent also offered in x during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the
evidence a photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958
dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members Revised Form." The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It
of the deceased. does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1,
1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier.
Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate
of Live Birth found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila indicating that the birth of respondent was reported Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil
by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised in
observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the
January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. 1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958
form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
The trial court found that the Certificate of Live Birth and the photograph are sufficient proofs of respondent's
illegitimate filiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the order of the trial court. Petitioners moved for There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The
reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Both motions were denied by the back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn.
Appellate Court. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other
entries.
Which of the two documents — Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine. The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D"
is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because
the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates
are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D"
does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion,
race, occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an entry of
the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a
purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date
and other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer
had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a
bookbinder."
14 | P a g e
The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit
"8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given
more faith and credence by the courts below.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs.
Local Civil Registrar that:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
. . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out
of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made
by him, but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which
he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority
to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of
a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed
only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said
child."
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated
in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals where this Court said that "a birth certificate
not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not
competent evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil
Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and
filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation
and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be
sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity
or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in
the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine
copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file
in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live
Birth.
GERARDO CONCEPCION v. CA Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married and after a year, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. Yes. The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of
AND MA. THERESA ALMONTE However, their relationship was short-lived and Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa the Family Code is clear.
G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he married Ma. Theresa, she had married
THIRD DIVISION (Corona, J.) Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario but averred that A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all. The court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
“The status and filiation of a child to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: The child shall be
cannot be compromised. Article 164 of bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded
15 | P a g e
the Family Code is clear. A child who is to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
conceived or born during the marriage Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the "bastardization" of Gerardo. She moved legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The law requires that
of his parents is legitimate. As a for the reconsideration of the decision insofar only as that portion of the decision which granted Gerardo every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We
guaranty in favor of the child and to visitation rights. She argued that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of
protect his status of legitimacy, Article father of an illegitimate child." She further maintained that Jose Gerardo's surname should be changed from Appeals: The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration
167 of the Family Code provides: The Concepcion to Almonte, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother's surname. However, in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural
child shall be considered legitimate the court denied Ma. Theresa's motion which was affirmed by the CA invoking the “best interest of the child” justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to
although the mother may have declared policy. Further, that an illegitimate child cannot use the mother's surname motu proprio. The child, represented protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
against its legitimacy or may have been by the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to
sentenced as an adulteress.” effect the correction in the civil registry. Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration, the CA reversed its earlier Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no
ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa's
marriage. The CA brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy
their son and gave little weight to Jose Gerardo's birth certificate showing that he was born a little less than a of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child
year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married. is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very
Is Jose Gerardo a legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario? beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right
to impugn the legitimacy of her child
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,

particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption
on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the
husband to father the child.
Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved,

unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The
presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the
evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child. To rebut the presumption, the separation between the
spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may take
place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and
they were never together during the period of conception. Or, the husband
was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual
union took place through the violation of prison regulations.
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together
in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in
Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers
apart. Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but
also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access
between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation
between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such
as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat
the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There
is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose
Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and
Mario, stands.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is misplaced. It has

no evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before
the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which
16 | P a g e
has not been formally offered. Moreover, the law itself establishes the status
of a child from the moment of his birth. Although a record of birth or birth
certificate may be used as primary evidence of the
filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof
of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being
questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following
the termination of marriage is sought to be established. Here, the status of
Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be
contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in
extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy
in this case was improper and uncalled for.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his
legitimacy. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the
surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with
the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A person's surname or family
name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent
to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is,
in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
EDGARDO TIJING & Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila . Petitioner Bienvenida detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
BIENVENIDA TIJING vs. served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila . rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
COURT OF APPEALS thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
(G.R. No. 125901; March 8, According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of
2001) Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four- his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors,
month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying
Quisumbing, J.: Bienvenida was doing laundry. rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for
the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. It must be stressed
Upon her return, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in too that in habeas corpusproceedings, the question of identity is relevant and
Tondo, Manila , but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the
and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita person.
had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence
unmoved by her pleas for assistance. presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent
first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez
Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Second, there is strong evidence which
her demand to do so. directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin
Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
son. Petitioners presented two witnesses. The 1st, witness is Vasquez who testified that she assisted in the delivery of adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez,
one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic. The 2nd, Benjamin Lopez who declared that his brother admitted had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had
to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children. lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife. Under the law, the attending
birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila . She physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of
added, though, that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez. She said the birth of John such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register
Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August the birth of his child. Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when
4, 1989. the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in
their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor
and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish
17 | P a g e
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have parentage. Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also held that the minor and respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of
Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are the minor and petitioner concerned. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she
one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners. assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike
private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book,
The sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.
stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to petitioner
Edgardo Tijing. All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is
indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain
The Court of Appeals reversed and expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the custody of said child
evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the
lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person. A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy? Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of test19 for identification and parentage testing. The University of the
petitioners? Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage.20 Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.21 Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.22
Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in
future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution
of parentage and identity issues.
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN v. HON. Fe and her son Martin sued the latter’s alleged biological father, Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite 1) YES. It must be noted, however, that the assailed resolution and order in the
COURT OF APPEALS and minor before the RTC of QC. Fe Angela alleged that Arnel courted her in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate case at bar did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but
MARTIN JOSE relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday which was on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against the
PROLLAMANTE, represented by insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence
his mother/guardian FE ANGELA at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the of acknowledgment. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively
PROLLAMANTE father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martins integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was
G.R. No. 162571, 15 June 2005, support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel valid and in accordance with jurisprudence.
Corona, J. also denied having fathered the child.
Whether or not respondent [a person] is In Tayag v. Court of Appeals, we allowed the integration of an action to compel
entitled to support depends completely On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking recognition with an action to claim
on the determination of filiation. A lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia one’s inheritance.
separate action will only result in a and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support.
multiplicity of suits, given how Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in
intimately related the main issues in In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether
both cases are. Hence, integration in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover, a certain Jun. Arnel or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the
of an action to compel recognition with admitted that he never really fell in love with Fe not only because of her secret lover but also because she proved to be determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of
an action to claim one’s inheritance is scheming and overly demanding and possessive. suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To
allowed. paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these
As a result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What started as a romantic liaison between two consenting adults proceedings.
eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction where Fe became so obsessed with Arnel, to the point of even
entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ways and means to alienate him from his 2) YES. The Court proceeded to extensively discuss a historical sketch of its
wife and family. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing , even discussing American
18 | P a g e
still treated her as a friend. Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had another secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his jurisprudence on the matter, essentially upholding the constitutionality of
entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June, Arnel learned that Fe was telling submitting to DNA testing.
people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their last intimacy was
sometime in 1998. With regard to the parking lot incident, Arnel alleged that Fe followed him there to demand that he SC’s Epilogue:
acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
that he had no alternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body. Finally, Arnel claimed choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martin’s birth technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and
certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and
that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964. have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect
time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative
In Arnel’s pre-trial brief, he vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully
to settle the case. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
DNA paternity testing. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and
moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the motion to dismiss and ordered the parties to submit to WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED.
DNA testing. The CA affirmed this ruling, hence this petition.
) Can a complaint for support be integrated with a petition for recognition? YES
2) Can DNA paternity testing be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner’s
constitutional right to privacy? YES
In Re: Petition for Change of Name Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change of name Reason of petitioner (convenience) does not justify a grant of
of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his change of name
(2005) registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
G.R. No. 159966 | 2005-03-30 Weighing petitioner's reason of convenience for the change of his name against
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in February 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show
A change of name is a privilege and not a not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently married in September 1998, they executed a deed of that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant
right. Question of proper and reasonable legitimation of their son so that the child's name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan favorable action on his petition.
cause is left to the sound discretion of the Wang.
court. The reason of petitioner The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon,
(convenience) does not justify a grant of The parents of petitioner plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together with where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for
change of name his sister, Wang Mei Jasmine. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their
in a person's name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against. Julian and his sister discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change
might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the
in Singapore's Mandarin language since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence
for these reasons that the name of petitioner is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang. of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore.
The RTC denied the petition. It ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child and does not The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had
fall under the grounds provided in the law. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to during that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition
bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from to the fact of therein petitioner's election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the
petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner reaches the age of Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood
majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name. Motion for by a name different from her registered name and she had not used her
reconsideration was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) to the Supreme registered name in her school records and voter's registration records; thus,
Court. The issue is whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174of the Family denying the petition would only result to confusion. In Calderon, the court
Code. granted the petition for change of name filed in favor of a minor child.
Is convenience a good ground to justify a change on name? NO. However, it is manifest that the Court, in granting the petition for change of
name, gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor
petitioner therein. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner
for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change
of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
19 | P a g e
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation

on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the
age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this
point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
A change of name is a privilege and not a right

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a
right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him
either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.
Grounds for change of name

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be 'proper and
reasonable cause' for which the change is sought. To justify a request for
change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage,
all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.
Question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound

discretion of the court
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence
available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results
in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.
Characteristics of names
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper
name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which
is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies
20 | P a g e
the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics:

(a) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with
others.
(b) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name.
(c) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be
changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings.
(d) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and
intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa.
(e) It is imprescriptible.
Relevance of middle names

The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does
not seek to replace an exisitng name but to drop the middle name altogether.
Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name
usually deal with requests for change of surname or change of given name.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as
well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name
and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives
legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their
father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father's
surname. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father
does not have a middle name.
JOEY D. BRIONES v. MARICEL P. Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against Loreta P. Miguel, Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca YES. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family
& LORETA P. this Court on March 11, 2002, ordering Miguel, et al. to produce before the Court the living body of the minor Michael Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that illegitimate children shall use
MIGUEL Kevin Pineda. the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
G.R. No. 156343, 18 October 2004, shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. This is the rule
THIRD DIVISION (Panganiban, J.) Briones alleged that Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with Loreta P. Miguel, being born in Japan on regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
September 17, 1996. Loreta is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.
An illegitimate child is under the sole The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
parental authority of the mother. In the He caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children --
exercise of that authority, she is entitled and enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City. Briones’s parents, both legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
to keep the child in her company. The retired and receiving monthly pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child. One day, Maricel P. Miguel and children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid
Court will not deprive her of custody, Francisca P. Miguel came to his house on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
absent any imperative cause showing be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store.
her unfitness to Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally
exercise such authority and care. They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which he agreed. However, Maricel and Francisca placed under one category, without any distinction between natural and
did not bring Michael back as promised by them. Briones went several times to Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao spurious. The concept of natural child is important only for purposes of
City but he was informed that the child is with Loreta at Batal Heights, Santiago City. legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an
illegitimate child.
When he went there, Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and to bring him back to
him, but all his efforts were futile.
21 | P a g e
Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as

Loreta P. Miguel denied Briones’s allegation that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines and stated there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a
that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their agreement. She alleged that sometime in October 2001, legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth.
Briones was deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was found to have violated or
committed an infraction of the laws of Japan. Since the time he arrived in the Philippines, he has not been gainfully Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant
employed. The custody of the child, according to Loreta was entrusted to Briones’s parents while they were both to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Loreta,
working in Japan. She added that even before the custody of the child was given to his parents, she has already been notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him.
living separately from Briones in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by
woman until his deportation. the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not
custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental
Her marriage to a Japanese national is for the purpose of availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the
to pursue her work so she could be able to send money regularly to her son in the Philippines. Loreta prays that the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative
custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be
the Civil Code of the Philippines. considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
The CA awarded the custody of Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Loreta P. Miguel, and granted Briones There is thus no question that Loreta, being the mother of and having sole
visitorial rights. parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has
the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and
May Briones, as the natural father, be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the she may not even renounce or transfer it except in the cases authorized by law.
mother who is away?
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to exercise
sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and
the award of custody to someone else. In the past, the following grounds have
been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and
affliction with a communicable disease.
GRANDE VS. ANTONIO Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at NO. The father cannot compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
G.R. No. 206248. February 18, that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on children upon his recognition of their filiation.
2014.| J. Velasco Jr., En Banc February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The children were not expressly recognized by respondent
as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however, eventually Art. 176 as amended by RA 9255 reads:
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
from ambiguity. And where there is no Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
The use of the word "may" in the RTC of Cagayan, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children. surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their
provision readily shows that an father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent Antonio. Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
no compulsion to use the surname of his grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
illegitimate father. The word "may" sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children. regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
is permissive and operates to confer illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
discretion upon the illegitimate children. CA then modified RTC’s ruling and granted the sole custody of the children with the mother, Grace Grande and instead
just gave visitation rights to Antonio. From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father’s recognition of his children, the mother provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons. Since respondent expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the
Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the children or civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children. handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such
Also, CA maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
by the children of the surname "ANTONIO." surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
22 | P a g e
Not satisfied with CA’s decision, Grande interposed this petition, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
it decreed the change of the minors’ surname to "Antonio." In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code––as ambiguity, it must be taken to
amended by RA 9255, couched as it is in permissive language–– may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother. interpretation. Respondent’s
position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has
Whether or not a father has a right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition no legal basis.
of their filiation. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to the
rule requiring that the
child be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the
father’s surname upon
his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the IRR of RA 9255.
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot
amend a legislative act. In
MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation, this Court held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the
legislative
enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot
extend the
law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested
in the
Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing
rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be
broadened
by a mere administrative issuance — an administrative agency certainly cannot
amend
an act of Congress.
Thus, by virtue of Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution, this Court exercise
this power in voiding
the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the
mandatory use by
illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition of
his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment.
The clear, unambiguous,
and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate
father’s surname
discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the
surnames by which they
will be known.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to YES.
Petitioner, versus, TRINIDAD R.A. Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In the said petition, Capote, as Giovanni's guardian ad litem averred that As to substantive law
CAPOTE, Respondent. Giovanni N. Gallamaso is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. He was born When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the
G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007, on July 9, 1982. His mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them. Family Code of the Philippines), the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then
CORONA, J. Giovanni has been known by that name since birth as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register. as regards his use of a surname, read:
Applying these laws, an illegitimate The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, failed to take up his Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use
child whose filiation is not recognized by responsibilities to him on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. Being now fully aware of the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural
the father bears only a given name and how he stands with his father, he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s surname. Giovanni’s child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.
his mother mother might eventually petition him to join her in the US and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural child.
23 | P a g e
surname, and does not have a middle The local civil registrar gave due course to the petition. Consequently, the petition was published and the OSG was Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers surname
name. It is only when the illegitimate sent a copy of the petition. Having no opposition and objection to the petition, respondent moved forleave of court to from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of
child is legitimated by the subsequent present her evidence ex parte. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change Giovanni’s putative father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to
marriage of his of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:
parents or acknowledged by the father Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
in a public document or private From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
handwritten instrument that he bears error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the proceedings were conformity with this Code. xxx xxx xxx
both his mothers surname sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.
as his middle name and his fathers Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
surname as his surname, reflecting his In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which granted the Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
status as a legitimated child or an petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. Petitioner cites Republic of the Wang is enlightening:
acknowledged child. Philippines v. Labrador and claims that the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children
by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial. shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives
legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
Should the change of name be allowed? while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their
father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers
surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not

recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother
surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such.
It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father
in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he
bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child
or an acknowledged child.
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons

name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional
rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child.
As to procedural law
Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court
affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition
sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is
entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his
mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase
the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her
in the US. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother
and son.
While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name
should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the trial court
on account of its own failure to participate therein.
As correctly ruled by the CA, Capote complied with the requirement for an
adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice
of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy
24 | P a g e
thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition
including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive
the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding
less adversarial in nature.
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the
rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole
world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court
gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the
requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all
interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were
afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona. Their daughter was Maria Rosario de Santos. After No, this is not the situtation contemplated under Art. 2691. In other words, a
PETITIONER, VS. HON. some time, their relationship became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the
ADORACION G. ANGELES, doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949 In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private
AND CONCHITA and married Conchita in Japan and subsequently in the Philippines after Sofia’s death. Conchita and Antonio had 11 respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when
TALAG DE SANTOS, children. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of P15M. the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. It may be
RESPONDENTS. added here that he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for
G.R. No. 105619, December 12, Conchita sought the issuance of letters of administration in her favor and met resistance when Maria opposed the after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another
1995, ROMERO, EN BANC petition claiming that Conchita’s children are illegitimate. The court a quo declared Conchita’s ten children legitimated marriage with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.
and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with Maria and Conchita, as the heirs of Antonio.
Legitimation is not a "right" which is Maria contends that since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading
demandable by a child. It is a privilege, as legitimated her half brothers and sisters. of "Paternity and Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children,"
available only to natural children Article 89, a provision subsumed under the general title on "Marriage," deals
proper, as defined under Art. 269. Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized? principally with void and voidable marriages and secondarily, on the effects of
said marriages on their offspring. It creates another category of illegitimate
children, those who are "conceived or born of marriages which are void from
the beginning," but because there has been a semblance of marriage, they are
classified as "acknowledged natural children" and, accordingly, enjoy the same
status, rights and obligations as such kind of children. In the case at bench, the
marriage under question is considered "void from the beginning" because
bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting. It
follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural
children proper for at the time of their conception, their parents were
disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior
subsisting marriage.
It is thus incongruous to conclude, Maria's half siblings can rise to her level by
the fact of being legitimized, for two reasons: First, they failed to meet the most
important requisite of legitimation, that is, that they be natural children within
the meaning of Article 269; second, natural children by legal fiction cannot
demand that they be legitimized simply because it is one of the rights enjoyed
by acknowledged natural children.
Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege,

available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although
natural children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural
children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they
25 | P a g e
likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially,
as in this case, when the legally existing marriage between the children's father
and his estranged first wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between
their parents.
Even if the marriage in the Philippines was celebrated after the death of Sofia,
natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. Our
archaic law on family relations, patterned as it is after Spanish Civil Law,
frowns upon illegal relations such that the benefits of legitimation under
Chapter 3 of Title VIII do not extend, nor were they intended to extend, to
natural children by legal fiction. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of
legitimation to natural children as defined thereunder.
ADOPTION
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which denied the petition for annulment of 1. The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court
JOANNE BENEDICTA judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the
CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. that granted Rs’ decree of adoption. favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
"MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO"
AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated later on due to their When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any
Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of
LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or
MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Castro (Petitioner). perjured testimony during the trial.
Respondents. G.R. No. 188801, Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable
October 15, 2014; LEONEN, J.: On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to
was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since
Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no
petition was granted. other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the
decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing 2. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out
support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the
Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)
adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied
the allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it was often As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law,
declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children that’s why he adopted them. Later on Atty. however, provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
Castro died. where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In
this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of the TC approving Jed must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
and Regina’s adoption.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as Rosario’s affidavit of consent remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be
was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the
is Jose, while another set of NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that Jed and Regina are adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are
of their birth. CA denied the petition. 10 years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled that there is “no For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act
explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be personally notified of the No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the
hearing.” spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are
protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for substantive statutory rights.
annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for
annulment of judgment.
26 | P a g e
1. Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case? Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of
2. Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is required? the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then 6 years old and Art. 246 of the FC provides for retroactive effect of relevant provisions thereof,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and who had been living with her family since he was 4 months old, before the RTC of Legaspi City, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not
ZENAIDA C. BOBILES On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Jason freed from all legal obligations of prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of Civil Code or other laws. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title
REGALADO, J.: the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations
Adoption statutes, as well as matters of the surname of the petitioner. The CA affirmed. created after the right has vested.
procedure leading up to adoption,
should be liberally construed to carry The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare When Zenaida filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and
out the beneficent purposes of the Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file
adoption. However, while the case was pending on appeal in the CA, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in
Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be
Petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. Jurisdiction being a
private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Art. 185 of the FC. It argues that the Family matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
Code must be applied retroactively as Zenaida did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason by the mere filing jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
of her petition for adoption. commencement of the action.
Should the petition for adoption be dismissed for violation of Art 185 of the FC? No. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which
May the petition for adoption be granted in favor of both spouses? Yes. was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption
was sufficient in form and substance in accordance
with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires
jurisdiction and retains it until it fully
disposes of the case.
On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the FC should
not apply retroactively, the CA should have modified the trial court's decision
by granting the adoption in favor of Zenaida only, her husband not being a
petitioner.
Although Dioscoro was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for
adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition and
expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined
his wife in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written consent read
as follows:
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire to
adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT …
3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said minor
child, JASON CONDAT …
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in

open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must
have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed
to make him a party to the petition.
It is a settled rule in American law that adoption statutes, as well as matters of

procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out
the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted
child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption.
27 | P a g e
The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption

proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain
facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to those
interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it
is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially
complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court
jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the
court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child
and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life."
HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married begot three children, namely: Yes. However, the Court finds that petitioner in this case did not abandon his
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony. However, Anna Marie learned of her husbands alleged extramarital children. Records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled
RONALD V. CLAVANO affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, children as to constitute abandonment.
respondents. Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic
G.R. No. 105308. September 25, Relations Court of Cebu, which approved the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses to live separately. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
1998, ROMERO, J . tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie which was granted, absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and
Physical estrangement alone, without including the sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation to petitioner legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained
financial and moral desertion, is not Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. He divorced his regular communication with his wife and children through letters and
tantamount to abandonment. American wife and never remarried. telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
While admittedly, petitioner was While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the
physically absent as he was then in the month a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his children’s expenses and another, deposited in the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had
United States, he was not remiss in his bank in the name of his children. deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. These pieces of evidence are
natural and legal obligations of love, all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts below simply
care and support for his children. He Meanwhile, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the
maintained regular communication sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before RTC Cebu. The petition emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead,
with his wife and children through bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit the courts below emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his
letters and telephone. He used to send of consent alleging that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her brothers and children and the fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these were
packages by mail and catered to their sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be withdrawable by him alone. Simply put, the courts below attached a high
whims. going to the United States to attend to a family business, leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally premium to the prospective adopters financial status but totally brushed aside
hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad; and that her husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological
due to the legal separation case. wellbeing of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition However, his seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony
thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of is contradicted by his feelings towards his father as revealed in his letters to
supporting the children while his finances were too meager compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow him.
anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children. RTC granted the petition for adoption in favor
of respondents. CA affirmed, finding petitioner to have abandoned the minor children, thus his written consent was Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could
not necessary. give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent.
Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, the Court awarded custody of a minor
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor
that the latter has abandoned them? instead of to his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the
child opted to go with his mother.
A close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister

Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that
they just wanted to keep the children away from their father. One of the
overriding considerations for the adoption was allegedly the state of Anna
Maries health she was a victim of an almost fatal accident and suffers from a
28 | P a g e
heart ailment. However, she herself admitted that her health condition was not
that serious as she could still take care of the children. An eloquent evidence of
her ability to physically care for them was her employment at the Philippine
Consulate in Los Angeles - she could not have been employed if her health were
endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos attempt at depriving petitioner
of parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that he was an
inveterate womanizer.
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer

and father to the sons of Wilma Soco. As to whether he was telling the truth is
beside the point.
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents reliance on the

manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie
which became the basis of the decree of legal separation. The transfer of
custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the
purpose of placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code
states: . . . in case of legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the court. In awarding custody, the court
shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the
following policies in the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998: (a) To ensure that
every child remains under the care and custody of
his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security
towards the full and harmonious development of his/her personality; (b) In all
matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest
shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in
the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child; (c) To prevent
the child from unnecessary
separation from his/her biological parent(s).
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the

domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all
actuations should be in the best interests of the child. Said
petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their
father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned
them.
IN THE MATTER OF THE This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF In a resolution, dated 5 October 1987, the Court resolved to issue the writ returnable to the adoption testified that she had interviewed respondent Gina Carreon on 24
HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR Executive Judge, RTC of Pasig at the hearing of 12 October 1987 at 8:30 a.m. Said Judge was directed to hear the case June 1987 in connection with the contemplated adoption of the child. During
ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, and submit his report and recommendation to the Court. the interview, said respondent manifested to the social worker her desire to
NELSON L. CERVANTES and have the child adopted by the petitioners. In all cases involving the custody,
ZENAIDA CARREON Angelie Anne Cervantes born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado and Gina, who are common-law husband care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount.
CERVANTES, vs. and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida
GINA CARREON FAJARDO and and Nelson Cervantes, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5)
CONRADO FAJARDO, Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was aso executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule
G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1989, 1987. otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost
PADILLA, J. consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned,
29 | P a g e
In all controversies regarding the The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by herein petitioners over the child before the which, on 20 August taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the
custody of minors, the foremost 1987, rendered a decision granting the petition. The court ordered that the child be "freed from contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.
consideration is the moral, physical and parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a
social welfare of the child concerned, on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the
taking into account the resources and capable of inheriting their estate." latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation
moral as well as social standing of the with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable
contending parents Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-
the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. minded person. Besides, respondent Gina had previously given birth to
As a result, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three
petitioners' residence on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor like Angelie
Anne to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also
Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her house in Parañaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand,
of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically,
affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future
that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00. better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains
an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Should the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be granted? Yes. Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full
knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect,
among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the
adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall
be exercised jointly by both spouses.
The Petition is GRANTED.
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air No, The principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
TAMARGO and AURELIA rifle. Accordingly, a complaint for damages was filed by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under
TAMARGO, petitioners, vs. HON. petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent Sps. Bundoc, Adelberto's Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed
COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. Prior to the incident, the Sps. Rapisura had by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain
ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a
Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents —
Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA This petition for adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. their parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and
BUNDOC, respondents. Sps. Bundoc contests that since parental authority has shifted to the Sps. Rapisura, it should be the latter that should disciplining of the child.
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992, be impleaded as indispensable parties to the case.
FELICIANO, THIRD DIVISION Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled
The RTC ruled in favor of the Sps. Bundoc and dismissed the complaint. The CA dismissed the appeal by the petitioners with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties
Retroactive a(e)ffect may perhaps be on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only
given to the granting of the petition for presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the
adoption where such is essential to May the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned be given retroactive effect so as to make the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good
permit the accrual of some benefit or adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by father of a family to prevent the damage.
advantage in favor of the adopted child. the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents?
(but not in a case where the retroactive In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide
application would be unjust and through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto,
unconscionable) however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground
The basis of parental liability for the that he bad acted without discernment.
torts of a minor child is the relationship
existing between the parents and the They based their argument on Sec. 36 of the child and youth welfare code
minor child living with them and over stating - Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the
whom, the law presumes, the parents Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the
exercise supervision and control evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is
qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody
period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall
30 | P a g e
be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall state the
name by which the child is thenceforth to be known
The SC nevertheless ruled on the merits of the case invoking its power to
suspend technical rules. In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It
would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the
minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The argument based on the Child and Youth welfare code is misplaced. Under
the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the
relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them
and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control
in accordance with Article 584 of the code and Art. 2215 of the FC Code, re-
enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil
Code.
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law
ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom, a childless couple, took into their care Isabelita’s nephew Jose NO. In Republic vs. CA, a petition to adopt Jason was filed by Zenaida in
MELVIN SIBULO Melvin Sibulo and brought him up as his own. In 1971, the couple decided to file a Febtuary 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code allowed an adoption to
G.R. No. 143989, 2003-07-14, petition for adoption. Thereafter, an order granting the petition was issued and as an effect, the Civil Registrar changed be sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered
VITUG, J. Jose’s surname from Sibulo to Lahom. its decision and while the case was still pending on appeal, the FC, mandating
The action for rescission of the adoption joint adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued
decree, having been initiated by In December of 1999, Isabellita commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the RTC. She averred that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Zenaida alone. The
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come that Jose refused to change his surname to Lahom to the utter disregard of the feelings of the petitioner. Further, it Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute
into force, no longer could be pursued was said that Jose remained indifferent to her and would only visit her once a year and that Jose was just after his in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt
alleged rights over the properties of the petitioner and her late husband clearly shown by his filing of an action for Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still
partition against Isabelita, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards Jose, rendering the decree of in effect, the right of Zenaida to file the petition alone, according to the Court
adoption for negated for had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller, spouses Miller, both aliens, sought
which reason there is no more basis for its existence. to adopt Michael. In July 1988, the couple filed a petition to adopt Michael
having theretofore been taken into their care. At that time, P.D. No. 603
Prior to the institution of the case, R.A. No. 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act went into effect. The new statute allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal before
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. The the CA, the FC was enacted into law disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino
adopters may only disinherit the adoptee for valid causes provided by the law. Banking on the new law, Jose moved to children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree.
dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioner had no cause of action The SC found it untenable and ruled that the controversy should be resolved in
against him in view of the enactment of RA 8552. the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. It was months
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action because of the deletion of the right to rescind an revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had
adoption by the new law. Assuming arguendo that the petitioner’s right to rescind under the FC should be respected, already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code
the action still had already prescribed for being filed more than 5 years from the time the legal ground had been and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
discovered and known (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court). Hence, this petition.
Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that
Petitioner insists that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
then in force. Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the
adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of
31 | P a g e
May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree
R.A. No. 8552? after the lapse of that period. THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT WITHIN A
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IS A CONDITION THAT COULD NOT FULFILL
THE REQUIREMENTS OF A VESTED RIGHT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION.
It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory
privileges.
While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right
merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the state's
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of
the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of
an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime
before it has been exercised.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a

consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the
hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties
of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and,
by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.
IN THE MATTER OF THE Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged YES.
ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name -
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a
HONORATO B. CATINDIG her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, middle name. Even Article 176[ of the Family Code, as amended by Republic
G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
THIRD DIVISION, SANDOVAL- Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child
GUTIERREZ, J. The trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 may use.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her of the Family Code, she was now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Thereafter, Honorato filed a motion for
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name. The middle name or the mother's surname is only considered in Article 375(1),
entitled to all the rights provided by law Trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between
to a legitimate child without adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
discrimination of any kind, including the mother's surname shall be added.
right to bear the surname of her father The Republic, through the Office of Solicitor General, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural
and her mother, as discussed above. mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
189 she remained to be an intestate heir of her mother. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear
the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating
the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle "(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of
name? the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to
use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, in the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted
shall bear the surname of the adopters." Again, it is silent whether he can use
a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
32 | P a g e
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance
of the decree of adoption.
The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted Child - Adoption

is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a
juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to
establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989,
when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the
Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
is geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known
as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998," secures these
rights and privileges for the adopted.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate

child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the
Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is

entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention
of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed.
In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her

mother's surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her
natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living
together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose,
Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely
attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa".
Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use
her mother's surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued
loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption -

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The
33 | P a g e
interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfil these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological
2006 children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological
Petitioner, and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution parents cannot be obtained.
vs. of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
Respondent. intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
CALLEJO, SR., J.: A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The consent of the biological parent(s) of she voluntarily consented.
the child, if known is necessary to the The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity
adoption. The written consent of the However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child
legal guardian will suffice if the written Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
consent of the biological parents cannot to the adoption may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner
be obtained. failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and
legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for
a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense
with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have
existed at the time of adoption.
34 | P a g e

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan

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PATERNITY AND FILIATION

voluntary declaration by the parent, of if

Although not raised by petitioners, it may be argued that... petitioner Garcia's

True, birth certificates offer prima facie evidence... of filiation. To overthrow

However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration prevent... us

National Statistics Office Administrative Order No. 1-93 also... contemplates

Thus, we are unable to accord petitioner Garcia's delayed registration... of birth

Although petitioner Garcia's Baptismal Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and

To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an

Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination by Artemio.

It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the

It is therefor clear that the present petition to compel recognition by

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of

7. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,

Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved,

The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is misplaced. It has

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation

A change of name is a privilege and not a right

Grounds for change of name

Question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound

A name is said to have the following characteristics:

Relevance of middle names

Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not

The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons

Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege,

The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in

It is a settled rule in American law that adoption statutes, as well as matters of

The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption

A close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister

Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer

In this regard, this Court notes private respondents reliance on the

Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a

The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted Child - Adoption

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her

Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption -

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