People of The Philippines vs. Tirso Sibbu

People of the Philippines Vs.
Tirso Sibbu
G.R. No. 214757; March 29, 2017
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the January 6, 2014 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 04127 which affirmed with modification the May 15, 2009 Decision[2] of Branch 11, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laoag City finding Tirso Sibbu (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
murder in Criminal Case No. 11722 and of murder in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723, and 11724.
In Criminal Case No. 11722, appellant, together with Benny Barid (Benny) and John Does charged with
attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of December 2004, in Brgy. Elizabeth, Municipality of Marcos, Province of
Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with an unlicensed firearm, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shot
BRYAN JULIAN y VILLANUEVA, twice but missed, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of
Murder directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced
the said crime, by reason of some cause independent of his will, that is, accused are poor shooters, to the
damage and prejudice of the above-named victim.
That the crime was committed [in] the dwelling x x x of the victim at nighttime and disguise was employed,
with accused Sibbu wearing a bonnet on his face.[3]
In Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723 and 11724, and except for the names of the victims and the location
of their gunshot wounds, appellant together with Benny and John Does, was charged with murder in three
similarly worded Informations[4] allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of December 2004, in Brgy. Elizabeth, Municipality of Marcos, Province of
Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with an unlicensed firearm, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shot
[Trisha May Julian y Villanueva, Ofelia Julian y Bagudan, and Warlito Julian y Agustin], inflicting upon
[her/him] gunshot wounds, which caused [her/his] instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the above-named victim.
That the crime was committed in the dwelling x x x of the victim at nighttime and disguise was employed,
with accused Sibbu wearing a bonnet on his face.
During arraignment held on July 22, 2005, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. After
pre-trial was conducted, trial on the merits followed. On May 31, 2008, appellant’s co-accused Benny was
arrested. However, his trial was held separately considering that the trial with respect to the appellant
was almost finished with the prosecution already presenting rebuttal evidence.[5]
Version of the Prosecution
Bryan Julian (Bryan), the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 11722 and a common witness to all the
cases, testified that between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. of December 6, 2004, he was with his three year old
daughter, Trisha May Julian (Trisha), the victim in Criminal Case No. 11721; his mother Ofelia Julian
(Ofelia), the victim in Criminal Case No. 11723; and his father, Warlito Julian (Warlito), the victim in
Criminal Case No. 11724 in the azotea of his parents’ house in Barangay Elizabeth, Marcos, Ilocos Norte
when he saw from a distance of about five meters a person in camouflage uniform with a long firearm
slung across his chest and a black bonnet over his head. When the armed man inched closer to the house,
he tried to fix his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the opportunity to see his face; Bryan had a clear look
at the armed man because there were Christmas lights hanging from the roof of their porch. Bryan
recognized the armed man as the appellant.[6] Bryan also saw two men in crouching position at a distance
of three meters away from the appellant. Fearing the worst, Bryan shouted a warning to his family.
Appellant then fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and Warlito.
Bryan ran inside the house where he saw his brother, Warlito Julian, Jr. (Warlito Jr.) coming out of the
bathroom. Bryan then proceeded to the pigpen at the back of the house to hide.
Another prosecution witness, Eddie Bayudan (Eddie), testified that on December 6, 2004, he was by a well
near his house when he heard gunshots coming from the house of Warlito and Ofelia. When he turned
towards the direction of the gunshots, he saw a man about five meters away wearing a black bonnet and
a long-sleeved camouflage uniform and holding a long firearm. He also saw another man crouching on the
ground whom he recognized as the accused Benny. Eddie went inside his house for his and his family’s
safety. Afterwards, he heard Bryan shouting for help. When he went out to investigate, he saw the dead
bodies of Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha.
Warlito Jr. also testified that he heard gunshots coming from outside their house. When he went out of
the bathroom, Bryan told him that appellant gunned down their parents and his niece. In his cross-
examination, Warlito, Jr. claimed to have seen the appellant shooting at the porch of their house.[7]
Police Superintendent Benjamin M. Lusad (P/Supt. Lusad), chief of the provincial intelligence and
investigation branch of Ilocos Norte, testified that at 7:00 a.m. of December 7, 2004, he conducted an
investigation and an ocular inspection at the crime scene. He found bloodstains on the floor of the porch,
the cadavers of the victims laid side by side in the sala, and bullet holes in the cemented portion at the
front of the house below the window grill.[8] During his interview with Bryan, the latter pointed to
appellant as the gunman.[9]
SPO1 Eugenio Navarro (SPO1 Navarro) also testified that he went to the crime scene together with Senior
Police Inspector Arnold Dada, PO2 Danny Ballesteros, and SPO1 Lester Daoang, where they found 13 spent
shells and slugs of a caliber .30 carbine. Police Superintendent Philip Camti Pucay who conducted the
ballistic examination confirmed that the recovered shells and slugs were fired from a caliber .30 carbine.
Version of the Defense
The appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi.
Appellant’s father-in-law, Eladio Ruiz (Eladio), testified that on December 6, 2004, appellant did not leave
their house because they had a visitor, Elpidio Alay (Elpidio); moreover, appellant tended to his child.
Eladio stated that the distance between his house and Warlito’s is approximately two kilometers and that
it would take an hour to negotiate the distance by foot.[10]
Eufrecina Ruiz (Eufrecina), mother-in-law of the appellant, also testified that appellant had been living
with them for two years before he was arrested.[11] She narrated that on December 6, 2004, appellant
did not leave their house the whole night as he was tending to his sick child. She also claimed that they
had a visitor who delivered firewood. Eufrecina alleged that appellant did not own any firearm and that
he did not know Benny.
Elpidio testified that on December 6, 2004, he went to the house of Eladio to deliver a wooden divider.[12]
He arrived at around 6:00 p.m. and left at 7:00 a.m. the following day. Elpidio stated that the appellant
did not leave the house that night and that appellant was inside the house when he heard explosions.
Appellant denied the charges against him. He testified that on December 6, 2004, he never left the house
of his in-laws because he was taking care of his sick son. He claimed to have heard the explosions but
thought that those were sounds of firecrackers since it was nearing Christmas.[13] Appellant denied
having any misunderstanding with the Julian family, or knowing Bryan and Benny personally, or possessing
camouflage clothing.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On May 15, 2009, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723, and 11724, and of attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 11722. The
RTC gave credence to Bryan’s positive identification of appellant as the person who shot at him and killed
his daughter, mother and father. On the other hand, the RTC found appellant’s defense of denial and alibi
weak.
The dispositive part of the RTC’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 11721, accused TIRSO SIBBU is hereby declared GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of murder. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of Trisha Mae Julian y Villanueva the [amounts] of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
DOUBT of the crime of attempted murder. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of SIX (6) YEARS
of prision correccional as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum.
Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of Ofelia Julian y Bayudan the [amounts] of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of Warlito Julian y Agustin the [amounts] of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723 and 11724, accused TISO SIBBU is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of
Trisha Mae Julian y Villanueva; Ofelia Julian y Bayudan; and Warlito Julian y Agustin the amount of
P55,602.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Aggrieved by the RTC’s Decision, appellant appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 6, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision with modification as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 15,
2009, issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Laoag City in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11722, 11723
and 11724, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 11721, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby declared Guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further,
he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Trisha May Julian y Villanueva the [amounts] of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at the
legal rate of 6% percent from the finality of this judgment until fully paid;
he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia Julian y Bayudan the [amounts] of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at the legal
rate of 6% percent from the finality of this judgment until fully paid; and
he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia Julian y Bayudan the [amounts] of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at the legal
rate of 6% percent from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Dissatisfied with the CA’s Decision, appellant elevated his case to this Court. On February 9, 2015, the
Court issued a Resolution requiring the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. However,
the appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief since he had exhaustively discussed his arguments
before the CA. The Office of the Solicitor General also manifested that there was no longer any need to
file a supplemental brief since the appellant did not raise any new issue in his appeal before this Court.[16]
Issues
The main issue raised in the Appellant’s Brief concerns Bryan’s identification of the appellant as the
assailant. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) giving undue credence to the testimony
of the alleged eyewitness Bryan; and (2) in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged because
the prosecution failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor.[17] Further,
appellant argues that the aggravating circumstances of treachery, dwelling, and use of disguise were not
sufficiently established.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
We uphold the findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA, that Bryan positively identified
appellant as the person who shot at him and killed Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha. We have consistently ruled
that factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are entitled to respect
and generally should not be disturbed on appeal unless certain substantial facts were overlooked which,
if considered, may affect the outcome of the case. After due consideration of the records of the case and
the evidence adduced, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA did not err in their appreciation of the facts
and evidence.
We find that Bryan was able to identify the appellant as the assailant in the shooting incident; there is no
reason to doubt his positive testimony. As aptly observed by the RTC, Bryan’s narration of how he was
able to recognize the appellant was credible and convincing, to wit:
You said somebody [shot] at you, your father, your mother, and your daughter while you were at the
azotea of the home of your father on December 6, 2004. Did you see the person who shot at you, your
father, your mother, and your daughter?
Yes, ma’am.
xxxx
How far was [the gunman] when you saw him at the west side?
Around five (5) meters away, ma’am.
What was his position at the time you first saw him?
He was at this position, ma’am. (Witness is showing as if a gun was slung on his neck) Then I told my
family, ”Somebody would shoot us, let us all run and hide,” and then he shot [at] me twice, ma’am.
xxxx
How about [his] face x x x, can you x x x describe [it] to us?
a
When he came near us he fixed his bonnet which covered one eye only that is why I recognized him; and
even though his face was covered with [a] bonnet, I could still recognize him because I usually mingled
with him, ma’am.
xxxx
You said you were able to recognize his face because you were familiar with him. Who was that person
whom you recognized?
Tirso Sibbu, ma’am.
If this Tirso Sibbu is inside the courtroom today, would you be able to recognize him?
Yes, ma’am.
Kindly look around the courtroom and point to us if he is inside the courtroom?
(Witness is pointing to a man wearing a black T-shirt with blue denim pants who when asked his name
answered Tirso Sibbu)
You said you were able to recognize the face of this man Tirso Sibbu because you are familiar with him?
Can you tell us why you were familiar with him? What were the circumstances where you mingled with
him?
He was a jueteng collector and he came to our place three (3) times a day to get the bets, ma’am.
xxxx
q
Considering, Mr. Witness, that it was already x x x 6:30 [to] 7:00 in the evening, how were you able to see
the face of Tiso Sibbu?
There was a light in front of the azotea, ma’am.
What was the light in your azotea you are referring to?
Christmas lights that were not blinking, ma’am.[18]
xxxx
Now, Mr. Witness, how far [was the accused when you first noticed his presence]?
More or less 5 meters, sir.
xxxx
By the way, that was the first time [you noticed the presence of] the accused. Was that in the same place
you saw him fire his gun?
He came nearer, sir.
xxxx
Now, Mr. Witness, [how did you recognize the accused]?
a
He fixed his bonnet [his] face was partly covered, sir.
xxxx
That bonnet x x x covered the face, is that correct?
Only one eye was covered so he fixed it sir.
And the whole face was covered except one eye, is that what you want to impress the Honorable Court?
The hole that was meant for his left eye went at his right eye so he stretched the bonnet and his face was
uncovered that is why I recognized him, sir.
You said that his face was uncovered, are you referring, to the whole face that was uncovered?
Because of the stretching, the eyes and the nose were uncovered, sir.[19]
From Bryan’s testimony above, it is clear that he was only five meters away from the appellant when the
shooting incident happened. While the appellant was seen wearing a bonnet over his head, Bryan was
able to get a glimpse of appellant’s face when the latter fixed his bonnet. In addition, Christmas lights
hanging from the roof of the porch provided illumination enabling Bryan to identify the appellant.
Moreover, Bryan is familiar with the appellant’s built, height, and body movements. As correctly pointed
out by the CA:
It is equally of common knowledge that the eyes readily [adjust] to the surrounding darkness even if one
stands in a lighted area, and the distance of five meters is not an impossible or improbable way as to
preclude identification. Besides, Bryan’s identification did not solely rely on facial recognition but also
from appellant’s body built and height, and the way he walked and moved, all proper standards of
identification as corroborated in the testimony of an experienced police officer and PMA graduate Police
Superintendent Benjamin M. Lusad, chief of the provincial intelligence and investigation unit of Ilocos
Norte.[20]
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the RTC and the CA were correct in holding that Bryan
positively identified the appellant as the person who shot at him and killed Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha.
Appellant also questions the RTC’s appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of treachery, dwelling,
and use of disguise. Citing People v. Catbagan,[21] appellant argues that “[t]reachery cannot be
considered when there is no evidence that the accused had resolved to commit the crime prior to the
moment of the killing; or that the death of the victim was the result of premeditation, calculation, or
reflection.”
We disagree. Treachery was correctly appreciated as qualifying circumstance in the instant case.
Treachery is present “when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.”[22]
The case of Catbagan has an entirely different factual context with the case at bar. In Catbagan, the
accused was a police officer who investigated reported gunshots during an election gun ban in the
residence of one of the victims. Prior to the shooting, Catbagan had no intention of killing anyone. It just
so happened that during a heated exchange, Catbagan drew his firearm and shot the victims. In this case
however, before the shooting incident, appellant was seen with a gun slung over his neck and a bonnet
covered his face to conceal his identity. It is clear that appellant’s purpose is to harm and kill his victims.
In this case, the evidence on record reveals that at the time of the shooting incident, Warlito, Ofelia,
Trisha, and Bryan were at the porch of their house totally unaware of the impending attack. In addition,
they were all unarmed thus unable to mount a defense in the event of an attack. On the other hand,
appellant and his cohorts were armed. They also surreptitiously approached the residence of the victims.
Appellant, in particular, wore camouflage uniform to avoid detection. Although Bryan was able to warn
his family about the impending attack, it was too late for the victims to scamper for safety or to defend
themselves. At the time Bryan became aware of appellant’s presence, the latter was already in the vicinity
of about five meters. In fine, appellant employed deliberate means to ensure the accomplishment of his
purpose of killing his victims with minimal risk to his safety. There can be no other conclusion than that
the appellant’s attack was treacherous.
With regard to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the trial court correctly held:
In the instant cases, the victims were at their azotea in their house when accused Tirso Sibbu fired shots
at them. Tirso Sibbu was outside the house of the victims. Under these circumstances, the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated against Tirso Sibbu. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled:
xxxx
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although the triggerman fired the
shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be considered it is not
necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense;
it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised
means to perpetrate the assault from without x x x.[23]
The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Bryan
testified that the appellant covered his face with a bonnet during the shooting incident. There could be
no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over appellant’s face but to conceal his identity, especially
since Bryan and appellant live in the same barangay and are familiar with each other.[24]
As for the defense put up by the appellant that he was inside the house of his in-laws during the shooting,
the Court is unconvinced by his denial and alibi. Aside from being the weakest of all defenses, appellant
was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the
time the shooting incident happened. We have consistently ruled that “for the defense of alibi to prosper,
the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed, but
also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity
through clear and convincing evidence.”[25]
In this case, the crime was committed in the residence of the victims which is located within the same
barangay where appellant resides. In fact, appellant’s father-in-law testified that the distance between
the crime scene and his house is “more or less 1 kilometer,”[26] or two kilometers as he later amended
and that said distance could be traversed in one hour by foot.[27] Verily, appellant’s alibi must fail for
failure to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity
at the time of its commission.
The Court also upholds appellant’s conviction for attempted murder. Appellant commenced the
commission of murder through overt acts such as firing his firearm at the residence of the victims but did
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce murder by reason of some cause other than
his own spontaneous desistance. Appellant simply missed his target; he failed to perform all the acts of
execution to kill Bryan. Appellant is therefore guilty of attempted murder, Unfortunately, Warlito, Ofelia
and Trisha had to bear the brunt of appellant’s firearm.
All told, appellant was correctly convicted of three counts of murder considering the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and one count of attempted murder. Since two aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and use of disguise attended the commission of the crime of murder, appellant should be
sentenced to death in accordance with Article 63[28] of the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 248[29] of
the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Thus under Article 63, the
higher penalty should be imposed. However, because of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now
prohibited. The law provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed with no eligibility for parole. Accordingly, appellant should suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of the death penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723,
11724.
In People v. Jugueta,[30] the Court held that:
x x x [F]or crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary
aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P100,000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary
aggravating circumstances present, the amount of P100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside
from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating
circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at P100,000.00. x x x
xxxx
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. x x x Under
Article 2424 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs
of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. In this case, the Court
now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate damages to P50,000.00.
xxxx
In summary:
l. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes
involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9364:
Civil indemnity – P100,000.00
Moral damages – P100,000.00
Exemplary damages – P100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
Frustrated:
Attempted:
Hence, in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723 and 11724 where the appellant was convicted of murder, the
crime being attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and by the aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and disguise, we further modify the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages to P100,000.00 each for each case. Moreover, since the award of actual damages in the amount
of P55,602.00 pertained to all three cases, the same should be modified to P50,000.00 for each case.
In Criminal Case No. 11722 for attempted murder, the RTC as affirmed by the CA imposed the penalty of
six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years as prision mayor as maximum.
In People v. Jugueta,[31] the Court en banc held as follows:

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed
on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder. However,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to
be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without
eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for
each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed
in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from
two (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from
six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts
of attempted murder. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing, the proper imposable penalty for attempted murder and considering the
attendant aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disguise, is four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum. In addition, appellant is liable to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages
at P50,000.00 each. Finally, these monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the January 6, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04127 is
AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATIONS as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 11721, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for
parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Trisha May Julian y Villanueva the amounts of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00, as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P50,000.00 as temperate dmnages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
the crime of Murder. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for
parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia Julian y Bayudan the amounts. of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as
temperate damages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
the crime of murder. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for
parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Warlito Julian, Sr. y Agustin the amounts of P100,000.00
as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00
as temperate damages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
attempted murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
Further, he is ordered to pay Bryan Julian y Villanueva civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages each in the amount of P50,000.00, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204267
LUZ S. ALMEDA, Petitioner
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the September 6, 2012 Oder2 of the Offiee of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao (Ombudsman) in OMB-MIN-01-0183 denying herein petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration3 of the Ombudsman's March 19, 2003 Resolution4 indicting her for violation of Section
3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019),5 and directing that the corresponding Information therefor be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
Factual Antecedents
In 2001, petitioner Luz S. Almeda, then Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DepEd), Surigao del Norte, and several other public officers and employees were
charged administratively and criminally before the Ombudsman, in connection with the alleged improper
use and disbursement of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allotted to petitioner’s co-respondent
Constantino H. Navarro, Jr. (Navarro), Surigao del Norte Congressman, and implemented through the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the DepEd. The criminal charges were
consolidated and docketed as OMB-MIN-01-0183. On March 19, 2003, a Resolution was issued in said
case by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) II Hilde C. dela Cruz-Likit (dela Cruz-Likit), to the
effect that probable cause existed to indict petitioner and her co-accused for violation of Sections 3(e)
and (g) of RA 3019.6 This Resolution was disapproved in part by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo
(Marcelo), who made minor modifications and instructions thereto.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) then took over the case, and it prepared the corresponding
Information against petitioner, which was approved by then Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
and Marcelo. On May 19, 2003, the Information was forwarded to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao,
who in turn indorsed and forwarded the same, together with the Ombudsman’s Resolution, to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte on June 3, 2003, for appropriate filing in court.7
Petitioner received a copy of the Ombudsman’s March 19, 2003 Resolution on May 29, 2003. On July 3,
2003, she filed via a commercial courier service8 her Motion for Reconsideration, with a prayer for
reversal of the Ombudsman’s ruling and to hold in abeyance the filing of an information against her until
the motion is resolved. An advance copy of the motion was transmitted to the Ombudsman by fax on June
16, 2003.9
On July 7, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Filing of Information10 before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte, which in turn referred the said motion to the
Ombudsman.11
On July 18, 2003, dela Cruz-Likit issued an Order12 giving due course to petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and a similar motion filed by one of her co-respondents. The Order states, among others:
In their Motions for Reconsiderations [sic], both respondents-movants are united in pointing to co-
respondent ex-Congressman Constantino H. Navarro, Jr., as the one who entered into the transaction of
purchasing the nine computers delivered to DepEd Siargao, which transaction is made the basis of their
indictment for Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
Before taking further action on the motions thus filed, let copies thereof be served to respondent
Constantino H. Navarro Jr. and to complainant, or them to file their respective Comment or Opposition
thereto.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES considered, this office resolves to give due course to the motions under
consideration. Accordingly, let copies of the Motions for Reconsideration and Motion to Hold in Abeyance
the Filing of Information be served to then Representative Constantino H. Navarro, Jr. and to COA Auditors
Rosalinda G. Salvador and Mila L. Lopez, who are hereby directed to file their Comment and or [sic]
Opposition thereto within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Failure to comply with this order will be
deemed a waiver and the herein motions will be resolved accordingly.
SO ORDERED.13
Navarro filed his Comment14 to petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

On August 25, 2003, petitioner filed before the Ombudsman her Supplemental motion for
reconsideration.15
Through a June 16, 2004 Indorsement of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and all other pleadings, orders, and communications relative thereto were forwarded to
Marcelo for appropriate action, pursuant to Office Order No. 31 entitled "Review and Consideration of
Motions for Reconsideration Filed in Relation to Orders and Resolutions Issued by the Tanodbayan," which
pertains to cases where the Ombudsman disapproves orders, resolutions, or decisions emanating from
sectoral offices, and considering that the OSP has taken over the case.16
In another Indorsement dated October 11, 2004, then Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Antonio E.
Valenzuela forwarded a copy of an October 11, 2004 Order which ultimately closed and terminated OMB-
MIN-01-0183 as far as the Ombudsman for Mindanao is concerned, pursuant to an August 4, 2004 Order
issued by Marcelo ordering the OSP to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.17
On May 25, 2010, petitioner sent a letter of even date to the Ombudsman, seeking the early resolution of
her motions.18 However, the letter was not acted upon, as the handling Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer (GIPO), dela Cruz-Likit, was then on official study leave and no GIPO was as yet
assigned to the case.19
On September 1, 2011, petitioner filed before the Ombudsman a Manifestation,20 seeking resolution of
her Motion for Reconsideration. On November 18, 2011, she filed a second Manifestation21 with the
Ombudsman with a prayer for dismissal of OMB-MIN-01-0183 as against her.
Meanwhile, petitioner received copies of Indorsements dated September 28, 2011 and December 9, 2011
and signed by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Humphrey T. Monteroso, referring and forwarding to
the OSP petitioner’s September 1, 2011 Manifestation and other pleadings and documents filed in OMB-
MIN-01-0183, and noting and informing that the entire record of the case has been forwarded previously
to the OSP.22
On August 8, 2012, petitioner filed a third Manifestation before the Ombudsman, instead of the OSP,
entitled "Manifestation Reiterating the Right of the Accused to Speedy Trial with Prayer for Dismissal of
the Case."23 This time petitioner bewailed the inaction and procedure taken by the Ombudsman and OSP
in not taking cognizance of OMB-MIN-01-0183 and instead indorsing and repeatedly tossing the case back
and forth to each other. She cited a June 18, 2012 Memorandum24 within the OSP recommending that
her Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestations be resolved by the Ombudsman for Mindanao instead
and not the OSP, which had no jurisdiction over petitioner since she is not a high-ranking public official
charged before the Sandiganbayan; she also noted a June 21, 2012 Indorsement25 by the OSP to the
Ombudsman for Mindanao, referring back petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestations for
action by the latter. She claimed that as a result, her Motion for Reconsideration remained unresolved to
date; that said flip-flopping attitude of these two offices resulted in unwarranted delay and unending
torment, which has unduly affected her work; and consequently, her constitutional right to speedy trial
was violated. Petitioner thus prayed for dismissal of her case.
On September 6, 2012, the Ombudsman through dela Cruz-Likit issued the assailed Order denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, stating as follows:
This resolves the Motions for Reconsideration filed by respondents Luz S. Almeda and Miguela S. Ligutom,
seeking reconsideration to [sic] the Resolution dated March 19, 2003, indicting them for Violation of
Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019.
xxxx
The motions should be denied.
As informed by respondent Almeda, she received a copy of the approved Resolution on May 29, 2003.
Her motion for reconsideration dated June 12, 2003, with request to hold in abeyance the filing of the
Information in court, was sent through the Courier on July 3, 2003. On the other hand, respondent
Ligutom’s Motion for Reconsideration, with request to hold in abeyance the filing of the Information in
court, was filed on June 9, 2003. While counsel of respondent Almeda sent by fax an advance copy of the
Motion for Reconsideration on June 16, 2003, both motions were still filed out of time.
Section 7(a), Rule II, of Administrative Order No. 07, which provides for the Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure in criminal cases, states:
"Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be
allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman,
or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where
the information has already been filed in court."
Accordingly, the motions, on procedural grounds, should be denied.

On the other hand, the matters raised by respondents Almeda and Ligutom in their motions for
reconsideration were already passed upon by this Office, and need not be discussed all over again.
Moreover, these are evidentiary in nature, and are best threshed out in court.
xxxx
We also took note of respondents Almeda’s [sic] and Ligutom’s manifestation for the dismissal of the case
for alleged violation of their right to speedy trial, on the ground that until now, no information was filed
in court, and that their Motions for Reconsideration were not resolved despite the lapse of a considerable
period of time.
OMB-MIN could not be faulted for the non-filing of the Information in court because as the records would
show, both respondents Almeda and Ligutom were the ones who moved to hold in abeyance the filing of
the Information. The motions to hold in abeyance the filing of the Information were not only filed with
this Office, but also with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte, and as shown by the
records, the Information was already indorsed to the OPP but was indorsed back to OMB-MIN, in view of
the motions to hold in abeyance the filing of such Information in court. Significantly, OMB-MIN has
nothing to do with the delay in the resolution of the motions for reconsideration because as the records
would show, all motions and pleadings filed by respondents were appropriately and timely acted upon.
WHEREFORE, Premises considered, the motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED. Let the
corresponding Information for Violation of Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019 approved by then Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelo, be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.26
Hence, the instant Petition.
Issues
In a February 5, 2014 Resolution,27 this Court resolved to give due course to the instant Petition, which
contains the following assignment of errors:
V.a
DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT VIOLATE PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND PROMPT
DISPOSITION OF CASES WHEN IT FAILED TO RESOLVE THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION
TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE FILING OF INFORMATION FOR A PERIOD OF NINE (9) YEARS FROM THE DATE
OF ITS FILING?
V.b
GIVEN THE FACTS OF THE CASE, DID THE RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO ORDER THE
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE DESPITE THE CLEAR AND PATENT VIOLATION OF THE PETITIONER’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CASES?28
Petitioner’s Arguments
In seeking reversal of the assailed Order and dismissal of OMB-MIN-01-0183 as against her, with additional
prayer for injunctive relief, petitioner contends in her Petition and Opposition29 to the Ombudsman’s
Comment, which the Court treats as her Reply,30 that the Ombudsman’s failure to promptly act on her
case for nine years from the filing of her motion for reconsideration, or from July 2003 to September 2012,
is a violation of her constitutional right to a speedy disposition of her case; that despite her repeated
manifestations and follow-ups, no action was taken on her case; that the Ombudsman and OSP’s actions
constitute gross neglect and indifference; that the Ombudsman’s erroneous action of endorsing her case
to the OSP despite the fact that the latter had no jurisdiction over her is the sole cause of the long period
of inaction and delay which prejudiced her; and that contrary to the Ombudsman’s argument, she should
not be deemed estopped, for filing a motion to suspend the filing of the information against her, from
claiming her right to a speedy disposition of her case.
Respondents’ Arguments
In their joint Comment,31 respondents contend that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Ombudsman in denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; that her constitutional right to
speedy disposition of her case was not violated, as the delay in the proceedings was not attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive acts on the Ombudsman’s part; that in determining whether the
right is violated, each case must be approached on an ad hoc basis, and the length of and reasons for the
delay, assertion or failure to assert the right, prejudice caused by the delay, and the conduct of the parties,
must be carefully considered and balanced;32 that the delay in the resolution of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and filing of the information in court was justified in that petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was filed out of time and she herself sought to hold in abeyance the filing of the
information; that for being equally responsible for the delay, petitioner is not entitled to dismissal of her
case; and that no injunctive relief should issue as petitioner has no right in esse that needs to be protected
since, as a public officer who serves on public trust, she has no vested right to her position.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that "[a]ll persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This right
applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies;33 it is "not limited
to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in
nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action to [sic] all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice."34 It
"includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial,"35 such as preliminary
investigations and fact-finding investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.36
[T]he right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch
in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its ‘salutary
objective’ is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or,
if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This looming unrest
as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State
and in favor of the individual. x x x37
[T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are
considered.38
"The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case."39 For this reason, "[a] balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis."40
Regarding delays, it may be said that "[i]t is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes
delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and
conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire."41 These principles should apply to respondents in other administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings as well. It must also be remembered that generally, respondents in preliminary investigation
proceedings are not required to follow up on their cases; it is the State’s duty to expedite the same "within
the bounds of reasonable timeliness."42
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring
that the trial is consistent with due process.43
"It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution,
regardless of whether the (respondent) did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his
acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him."44 Failure or inaction
may not have been deliberately intended, yet unjustified delay nonetheless causes just as much vexation
and oppression.45 Indeed, delay prejudices the accused or respondent – and the State just the same.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was
designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and
concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the
most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often,
hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public
obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt.1âwphi1 The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to
carry its burden. x x x46
Not only should the adjudication of cases be "done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the
established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice.
Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution
and by various legislations inutile."47
Finally, the Court has held that inordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases, which warrants
the dismissal of the criminal case.48
Using the foregoing as guides and applying them to the instant case, the Court finds that petitioner’s right
to a speedy disposition of OMB-MIN-01-0183 was violated, which must result in the dismissal thereof.
First of all, the preliminary investigation proceedings in said case took more than 11 long years to resolve,
or from March 23, 2001 when the proceedings were initiated and docketed,49 to September 6, 2012 when
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Secondly, the delay in the proceedings was caused solely by the repeated indorsement of the Ombudsman
and the OSP, which may be attributed to the Ombudsman’s failure to realize that petitioner was not under
the jurisdiction of the OSP or the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, when dela Cruz-Likit, the handling GIPO, went
on official study leave, no GIPO was assigned to OMB-MIN-01-0183; as a result, the case was neglected.
Even if, as respondents argue, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was tardy and that she filed a
motion to defer the filing of the information, these have no bearing as in fact they are irrelevant to the
issue; the fact remains that the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case took too long; the fact that the
ground for denying the Motion for Reconsideration involved a simple procedural issue highlights the
Ombudsman’s failure to timely resolve the same.
Third, petitioner had no hand in the delay. As a matter of fact, she sent a letter and filed written
manifestations seeking the immediate resolution of her case.1âwphi1 While they were filed only in 2010
and 2011, petitioner’s letter and manifestations cannot be considered late, and no waiver or acquiescence
may be attached to the same, as she was not required as a rule to follow up on her case; instead, it is the
State’s duty to expedite the same.
Fourth, the pendency of OMB-MIN-01-0183 undoubtedly prejudiced petitioner. The case hung like a
hangman’s cord above her all these years, causing distress, anxiety, and embarrassment. As was held in
the Corpuz50case, the passage of time affects the parties’ and their witnesses’ ability to prepare a cogent
case or defense; secure witnesses; and preserve honor and reputation, financial resources, memory, and
evidence.
Finally, the Ombudsman's explanation for the delay is not at all acceptable. Instead, it can be seen that it
failed to apply a basic rule that in the investigation and prosecution of public officers and employees
accused of graft, specific rules on jurisdiction based on rank apply. What ensued was an administrative
"ping-pong," as petitioner puts it.
In Coscolluela,51the fact that it took the Ombudsman eight years to resolve a case under preliminary
investigation was considered violative of the right to speedy disposition of cases. In Cervantes,52it took
the OSP six years from the filing of the initiatory complaint before deciding to file an information; this was
struck down as well. In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,53a three-year delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan was considered violative of the right. In Lopez, Jr. v, Office of the
Ombudsman,54 the preliminary investigation was resolved close to four years from the time all the
counter- and reply-affidavits were submitted to the Ombudsman, and this was similarly struck down. In
People v. Sandiganbayan,55the fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation by the
Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months, which the Court considered an inordinate delay.
The same is true in Angchangco, Jr.56and Roque v, Office of the Ombudsman,57 where the delay involved
a period of six years, more or less. In Licaros,58the failure of the Sandiganbayan to decide the case even
after the lapse of more than 10 years after it was submitted for decision was declared to involve "more
than just a mere procrastination in the proceedings."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 6, 2012 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao in OMB-MIN-01-0183 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. OMB-MJN-01-0183 and all proceedings or
actions arising therefrom are ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
DIVISION
[ GR No. 198024, Mar 16, 2015 ]
PEOPLE v. RAFAEL CUNANAN Y DAVID +
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On appeal is the January 27, 2011 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04062,
which affirmed the July 1, 2009 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164 in
Criminal Case No. 15143-D finding appellant Rafael Cunanan y David alias "Paeng Putol" (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs.
Antecedent Facts
On October 19, 2006, an Information[3] was filed charging appellant with the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the accusatory portion of which reads:
On or about October 14, 2006, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
deliver and give away to PO1 Dario Gunda, Jr., a police poseur-buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing two centigrams (0.02gram), of white crystalline substance, which was found
positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.[4]
Appellant pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on April 30, 2007. Trial on the merits immediately
followed. In the course thereof, the testimony of prosecution witness P/Sr. Insp. Lourdeliza G. Cejes (PSI
Cejes), the Forensic Chemist of the Eastern Police District (EPD) Crime Laboratory Office, was dispensed
with after the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following:
That in relation to the arrest of appellant, a request for laboratory examination was made on October 14,
2006 by P/Sr. Insp. Bernouli D. Abalos (PSI Abalos) of the EPD Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task
Force to the Chief of the EPD Crime Laboratory Service;
That attached to the request is one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing an undetermined
amount of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu with markings Exh-A RCD/DG dated October
13, 2006, but not as to the source of the specimen;
That the request together with the specimen were delivered by PO2 Michael Familara (PO2 Familara),
recorded by PO1 Menese and received by PSI Cejes;
That a qualitative examination on the specimen was conducted by PSI Cejes which gave positive result for
the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, as shown in Physical Sciences
Report No. D-452-2006E; and
The regularity and due execution of the Physical Sciences Report.[5]
The prosecution's version of the event as derived from the combined testimonies of PO1 Dario Gunda, Jr.
(PO1 Gunda) and PO2 Familara is summarized as follows:
At about 6:00 p.m. on October 13, 2006, a confidential informant (CI) went to the EPD-District Intelligence
Investigation Division (EPD-DIID) Headquarters of Pasig City and informed PSI Abalos that a certain "Paeng
Putol," later identified as the appellant, was engaged in selling illegal drugs in Purok 4, Barangay Pineda,
Pasig City. Acting on the information, PSI Abalos organized a buy-bust team composed of himself, PO1
Gunda, PO1 Daniel Robiene, PO2 Familara, SPO1 Jessie Bautista, and PO1 Ambrosio Gam, among others,
to entrap appellant. PO1 Gunda was designated as the poseur-buyer and was thus given two 100-peso
bills[6] which he marked with his initials "DG," while the rest of the team would act as back-ups. After a
short briefing, PSI Abalos prepared a Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet[7] and coordinated the
buy-bust operation with the Pasig City Police Station and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Thereafter, the team proceeded to and arrived at the target area at 9:20 p.m. PO1 Gunda and the CI
walked towards a store along an alley while the others strategically positioned themselves some five to
seven meters away. The CI saw a man wearing gloves standing beside the store and informed PO1 Gunda
that the man was the appellant. Together, they approached appellant who is familiar to the CI. PO1
Gunda was introduced to appellant as a drug user who wanted to buy shabu worth P200.00. After
receiving the marked money from PO1 Gunda, appellant entered a narrow alley and came back with a
small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which he handed to PO1 Gunda. Thereupon,
PO1 Gunda gave the pre-arranged signal to inform the buy-bust team of the consummated transaction
and arrested appellant. When asked to empty his pocket, recovered from appellant were the two marked
100-peso bills used as buy-bust money. Appellant was then informed of his constitutional rights and the
nature of the accusation against him and brought to the EPD Headquarters. PO1 Gunda stapled the
marked money on a bond paper and wrote thereon "recovered pre-marked buy-bust money dated
October 13, 2006." He also marked the plastic sachet with "Exh-A RCD/DG 10/13/06." The said items
were likewise brought to the EPD Headquarters and turned over to PO2 Familara for further investigation.
Later, the seized substance were inventoried and photographed. After this, PO1 Gunda and PO2 Familara
brought appellant, together with a request for his drug testing,[8] and the seized substance, as well as a
request for its laboratory examination,[9] to the EPD Crime Laboratory. The substance with the
corresponding marking "Exh-A RCD/DG 10/13/06" on its plastic sachet was received by PSI Cejes in the
morning of October 14, 2006. Per Physical Sciences Report No. D-452-2006E issued by PSI Cejes,[10] the
substance weighing 0.02 gram was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.
Appellant denied the charge and interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up/extortion. He alleged
that after eating dinner on October 13, 2006, he was watching a bingo game when three men arrived and
held him by both hands. They introduced themselves as policemen and told him that they have a warrant
for his arrest. They then handcuffed and frisked him and took away his wallet and cellphone. The men
brought him to a police station where PO2 Familara threatened to file a case against him unless he gives
the police P50,000.00 as settlement. He failed to give the said amount.
Another witness for the defense, Genedina Guevarra Ignacio, testified that she was outside her house
between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of October 13, 2006 when she noticed three men passed by her in haste.
The men approached appellant who was then watching a bingo game across the street and suddenly
handcuffed him. She heard appellant asking the reason for his arrest. She did not know what happened
next since she already went inside her house.
In its July 1, 2009 Decision,[11] the trial court adjudged appellant guilty of the crime charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Rafael Cunanan y David alias "Paeng Putol" GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00) with the accessory
penalties provided for under Section 35 of said R.A. 9165.
The plastic sachet containing shabu (Exhibit "I") is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government
and turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[12]
On appeal, the CA affirmed appellant's conviction in its January 27, 2011 Decision,[13] viz:
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the trial court, the appeal is dismissed. The
assailed Decision dated July 1, 2009 of the RTC, Branch 164, Pasig City, in Criminal Case No. 15143-D, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Hence, this appeal where appellant points out that: (1) there was no in flagrante delicto arrest as he was
not committing any crime at the time he was apprehended but was merely watching a bingo game; (2) it
was inconceivable for him to openly sell illegal drugs as PO1 Gunda himself testified that at the time of
the alleged sale transaction there were many people around the target area; (3) the apprehending officers
failed to comply with the guidelines on the proper custody of the seized dangerous drug, specifically with
respect to its inventory and taking of photograph, and this casts doubt on whether the plastic sachet with
white crystalline substance identified in court was the same item allegedly seized and confiscated from
him; and (4) the testimonies of PO1 Gunda and PO2 Familara as to who was in possession of the seized
item from the target area up to the police station were conflicting.
Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.

Appellant was lawfully arrested after he
was caught in flagrante delicto selling an
illegal drug in a buy-bust operation; contrary
to his contention, it was not inconceivable
that he would openly sell an illegal drug
in public.
Appellant assails the legality of his arrest contending that he was not caught in flagrante delicto.
Appellant's contention fails to convince. The testimony of PO1 Gunda who acted as the poseur-buyer in
the buy-bust operation clearly recounts how the sale transaction between him and appellant transpired,
viz:
Q-
After you were introduced by this confidential informant to Paeng Putol that you are user of illegal drugs,
what was the reaction of the target person, this Paeng Putol?
A-
The confidential [informant] asked him, "Paeng, halagang dos, meron ka ba[?], kukuha kami.
Q-
What was the reply of this alias Paeng Putol?
A-
Akina iyong pera, sabi niya.
Q-
What did you do?
A-
I gave to him the two pieces of one[-]hundred peso bill[s].
Q-
What happened?
A-
Sinabi niya na antayin ninyo ako diyan. Pumasok siya sa eskinita, hindi kalayuan, mga two to three meters.
Q-
What did he do?
A-
He returned and gave me one plastic sachet containing suspected shabu.
Q-
After he handed to you that plastic sachet, what did you do next?
A-
Nag pre-arranged signal ako para tulungan ako sa paghuli kay alias Paeng Putol.
xxxx
Q-
What happened?
A-
Hinawakan ko siya. Tapos pinakuha ko kung ano iyong laman ng bulsa niya. Ayun na recover ko sa kanyang
possession iyong dalawang daan.[15]
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that a sale transaction took place between appellant and PO1 Gunda.
That the said transaction involved the illegal sale of dangerous drug was sufficiently shown by the
prosecution through its establishment of the following elements of the offense: "(1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor."[16] Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto
selling shabu in a buy-bust operation.
In any event, jurisprudence is settled that "any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be
timely raised in a motion to quash the Information at any time before arraignment, failing [in] which, he
is deemed to have waived"[17] his right to question the regularity of his arrest. As the records show,
except during the inquest proceedings before the prosecutor's office, appellant never objected to the
regularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, he even actively participated in the trial of the case.
With these lapses, he is estopped from raising any question regarding the same.[18]
Also not persuasive is appellant's argument that it is inconceivable that he would openly sell an illegal
drug in a place where there were many people. The Court has already stated that drug pushers now sell
their prohibited articles to any prospective customer, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in public
places, and even in daytime.[19]
The identity and evidentiary value of the
seized item have been preserved.
Appellant assails the proof of the corpus delicti by pointing out the arresting officers' non compliance with
the procedure on the proper custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21 of RA 9165 and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations, particularly with respect to the inventory and taking of
photograph of the seized item. He contends that while PO1 Gunda testified that an inventory of the seized
item was made and a photograph thereof was taken, such inventory and photograph were not offered as
evidence.
Appellant's contention is untenable. "This Court has consistently ruled that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of [RA] 9165 will not necessarily render the [item] seized or confiscated in a
buy-bust operation inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is
a clear showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized [item] have been preserved, i.e., the
[item] being offered in court as [exhibit is], without a specter of doubt, the very same [one] recovered in
the buy-bust operation."[20] Thus, the primordial concern is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.[21]
Here, the records reveal that after the consummation of the sale and the consequent arrest of appellant,
the plastic sachet sold by appellant was marked with "Exh-A RCD/DG/10/13/06"[22] by PO1 Gunda at the
place where it was confiscated. Thereafter, appellant and the seized drug were brought to the police
station. And as stipulated by the parties, a request for laboratory examination of a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance with marking "Exh-A RCD/DG/10/13/06" was prepared; the said
request and specimen were delivered by PO2 Familara and PO1 Menese to EPD Crime Laboratory and
received by PSI Cejes; and, a qualitative examination of the specimen by PSI Cejes revealed that the same
is positive for metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. During trial, the marked
plastic sachet was presented and identified by PO1 Gunda as the same item sold to him by appellant.
From this sequence of events, the prosecution was able to show an unbroken link in the chain of custody
of the subject item which is the proof of the corpus delicti. Its integrity and evidentiary value were shown
not to have been compromised notwithstanding the fact that the inventory and photograph thereof which
PO1 Gunda claimed to have been made were not offered in evidence. Besides, "[t]he integrity of the
evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that
the evidence has been tampered with."[23] In this case, the defense failed to prove ill motive on the part
of the apprehending officers that would have impelled them to fabricate a serious crime against appellant.
Also, the alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of PO1 Gunda and PO2 Familara as to who was in
possession of the item from the police station to the EPD crime laboratory did not create any doubt that
what was submitted for laboratory examination and later presented in court as evidence was the same
drug actually sold by the appellant.
Appellant's defenses of denial and
frame-up/extortion must fail.
Appellant's defenses of denial and frame-up/extortion must fail in light of the positive testimony of PO1
Gunda, the poseur-buyer, that appellant sold to him the illegal drug. Moreover, it was not shown that
appellant filed any criminal or administrative charges against the apprehending officers, thus clearly
belying his claim of frame-up/extortion against them.
All told, appellant's violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 was duly established beyond reasonable
doubt by the prosecution. Hence, the Court affirms his conviction.
Penalty
Under RA 9165, the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity, carries with it the
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million. Here, the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon appellant by the RTC and affirmed
by the CA are in order. It must be added, however, that appellant shall not be eligible for parole.[24]
WHEREFORE, the January 27, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04062, which
affirmed the July 1, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 164 in Criminal Case
No. 15143-D finding appellant Rafael Cunanan y David guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, is AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant shall not be eligible
for parole.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191060 February 2, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
TOMAS DIMACUHA, JR., EDGARALLEN ALVAREZ, ROD EL CABALLERO, LUIS EVANGELISTA, RICKY
BARRIAO, LITO GUALTER, TESS GUALTER, BOGS EVANGELISTA, alias THEO, alias NONONG, alias JOHNY
and JOHN DOES, Accused,
EDGAR ALLEN ALVAREZ and RODEL CABALLERO, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez (Alvarez) and Rodel Caballero (Caballero), together with the accused who
remain at-large, were charged with the crime of murder1 for the fatal shooting of Nicanor Morfe Agon
(Agon).2 During the arraignment, appellants entered separate pleas of not guilty.3 After trial, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 2, rendered a Decision4 dated May 11, 2007 finding the
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, accused EDGAR ALLEN ALVAREZ and RODEL CABALLERO, are
hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, with the qualifying and/or aggravating circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation and
both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Theyare further
ordered to pay the heirs of Nicanor Agon y Morpe jointly and severally the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil
liability and to pay the costs. Considering that accused Tomas Dimacuha, Jr., Luis Evangelista, Ricky
Barriao, Alias Joey, Alias Theo, Alias Nonong, Alias Johny and John Does are still at large, let the charges
against them be archived subject to revival upon their apprehension.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for his information of the procedural lapses
in the selection of George Vitan as prosecution witness and for his appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In a Decision6 dated October 8, 2009, the
CA affirmed withmodifications the ruling of the RTC, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED insofar as the Accused-Appellants
Edgar Allen Alvarez and Rodel Caballero are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and are
penalized with imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. However, the award of civil indemnity is REDUCED
from One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00). In addition,
the Accused-Appellants are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally,the heirs of Nicanor Morfe Agon the
amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(Php25,000.00) as exemplary damages. Costs against the Accused-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, this appeal.
In a Resolution8 dated August 16, 2010, the Court directed the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desire. Both, however, opted to adopt the briefs they submitted before the CA as their
supplemental briefs.9
Appellants insist that the evidencewas insufficient to warrant their conviction. First, the witnesses for the
prosecution did not testify on the material allegations stated in the complaint sheet and the sworn
statements, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to cross-examine said witnesses. Second, there
was no proof that Agon and the person referred to in the death certificate are one and the same. Third,
the prosecution failed to present in court the murder weapons, as well as the slugs. Fourth, there was no
testimony proffered on the caliber of the gun used in shooting Agon. And lastly, appellants maintainthat
they were denied due process when the RTC ordered the discontinuance of their presentation of
additional witnesses.
The Court is not convinced.
The elements of the crime of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him orher; (3) the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.10 These requisites have been established
by the prosecution.
The gunman himself who testified for the prosecution, George Vitan (Vitan), testified that his group "Black
Shark" killed Agon. One of the responding policemen PO2 Arnold Abdon, for his part, testified that he
went to the hospital where Agon was taken and the latter was already dead when he arrived. Further, the
Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, testified on the post-mortem examination he conducted
upon Agon which showed that the latter sustained six gunshot wounds, two of which were fatal. The
element therefore that a person was killed is obtaining in this case.
That appellants killed Agon was established through the prosecution witnesses composed of Vitan and
two other self-confessed former members of "Black Shark", Arnel Balocon and Romulo Gasta. Their
testimonies pointed to appellants as among those who planned and executed the killing of Agon.
The fatal shooting of Agon was attended by treachery, a qualifying circumstance listed under Article 248
and notably, alleged in the Information. For treachery to be properly appreciated, two conditions must be
present: (1) at the time of the assault, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.11
These conditions were present in the killing of Agon. The assault upon Agon was deliberate, swift and
sudden, denying him the opportunity to protect or defendhimself. He was unarmed and unaware of the
plot of appellants to kill him. Moreover, the means, method or manner of execution of the attack was
deliberately and consciously adopted by appellants, the same being in accordance with their group’s plan
to liquidate Agon. As aptly ruled by the RTC:
The prosecution evidence show that herein accused, together with their group deliberately executed their
aggression without any risk arising from their victim, who was caught unaware, helpless and defenseless.
At the time the group commenced their aggression, Nick Agon was entirely unsuspecting, as he was on
board his Mitsubishi Pajero traversing a narrow street leading to the highway. He (Agon) was surprised
when Theo and George Vitan suddenly approached from the right side of his vehicle and promptly fired
at him successively. This manner purposely adopted by the duo coupled with the help given by their
comrades to ensure the commission of the crime clearly constitutes treachery; x x x.12
Finally, the killing of Agon was neither parricide nor infanticide.
All the elements of the crime of murder being present in this case, the RTC and the CA thus correctly ruled
in finding appellants guilty of the said crime.
It must be noted as wellthat the evidence adduced by the prosecution is also sufficient to establish the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, which has the following elements:
(1) the time when the offender determined to committhe crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and
execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.13 Vitan testified that the plan
to kill Agon was conceived a day before the victim was fatally shot. Appellants and their cohorts therefore,
had adequate time to reflect on the consequences of their contemplated crime prior to its execution. The
period of time when appellants planned tokill Agon and the time when they implemented such plan
afforded them the opportunity for meditation and reflection on the consequences of the murder they
committed.
The lower courts’ finding of conspiracy must also be sustained. There is conspiracy "when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises
on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide
to pursue it."14 Here, the evidence is sufficient to prove that appellants conspired to murder Agon. Vitan
testified that onFebruary 21, 2004, he, the accused and appellants agreed to murder Agon. In accordance
with their plan, they proceeded the next day, February 22, 2004, to the cockpit arena, a place which they
knew that Agon would be at on that particular day. Upon their arrival thereat, the members of the group
which included appellants positioned themselves according to their plan and waited for Agon to leave.
Later on, Caballero signaled Vitan and the other alleged gunman, accused Theo (Theo), that the target
had left the arena and that his vehicle was already approaching their position. When Agon’s vehicle came,
Vitan and Theo fired at him. Vitan, Caballero, Alvarez, who acted as one of the back-ups, and the rest of
the group then fled the scene of the crime. Clearly, there was unity of action and purpose among the
members of "Black Shark," which include appellants in killing Agon. Conspiracy having been established,
evidence as to who delivered the fatal blow is no longer indispensable. Hence, it is immaterial if
Caballero’s role was merely to signal the gunmen and Alvarez’s, to act as back-up. Each of the offender is
equally guilty of the criminal act since in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.15
Anent appellants’ claim of denial of due process since their presentation of additional witnesses was
disallowed by the RTC, the Court finds that the CA had already amply and correctly addressed this issue,
thus:
x x x We find that the RTC had every reason to discontinue the presentation of evidence by the Accused-
Appellants. They sought postponements, to reiterate, not only once or twice, but on many instances.
Considering that the RTC and its entire staff had to travel outside the province of Batangas, and the fact
that the Accused-Appellants intended to present other witnesses, they should have therefore been more
discerning in seeking the resetting of the trial proceedings to avoid unreasonable delay.
As the RTC correctly held, the concept of speedy trial is available not only to the accused but also the State
because, while an accused does have rights, let it not be forgotten that the aggrieved also have the same
rights. Thus, the Accused-Appellants were not denied due process considering that they were able to
testify on their own behalf and thatit is within their power, which they miserably failed, to ensure that
they are able to present their case without delay16
In the same vein, appellants’ other arguments, i.e., that there was no testimony respecting the complaint
sheet; that the murder weapons and the slugs were not presented in evidence; and that the medico-legal
officer who conducted the post-mortem examination on Agon did not testify on the identity and caliber
of the firearms used in the killing, do not deserve credence. The non-presentation of such items and
testimonies is not indispensable to the successful prosecution of the appellants since they are not
elements of the crime of murder.17
As to the alleged failure of the prosecution witnesses to testify on their sworn statements, suffice it to say
that the failure of the prosecution witnesses to reiterate the contents of their sworn statements during
trial does not affect their credibility and render the sworn statementsuseless and insignificant, as long as
they are presented as evidence in open court. The sworn statements and the open court declarations
must be evaluated and examined together to obtain a thorough determination of the merits of the case.
The presentation of these sworn statements during the trial and the attestation of the prosecution
witnesses thereto render the same admissible in evidence. Moreover, appellants’ contention that they
were denied the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on the contents of their
sinumpaang salaysay(s) has no factual basis. The records reveal that they cross-examined the witnesses
after the prosecution’s direct examination.
It must be noted that in the face of the glaring evidence against them, appellants could only muster the
defenses of denial and alibi.As consistently ruled by the Court, denial and alibi are disfavored on account
of the facility with which they can be concocted to suit the defense of an accused. Being negative defenses,
they must be corroborated and substantiated by clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, they would
merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater value in evidence than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.18 In this case, appellants failed to proffer corroborative
evidence in spite of the opportunities providedto them. Hence,their self-serving testimonies of denial and
alibi cannot prevail over Vitan’s positive identification of them as perpetrators of the crime. Indeed, their
defenses do not deserve any weight in evidence.
Going now to the imposable penalty, the crime of murder is punished by reclusion perpetuato
death.1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA were correct in ruling that the attendant circumstance of treachery
qualified the killing to murder. However, with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation also
found to be present, the greater penalty of death is the imposable penalty pursuant to Article 6319 of the
RPC. Nevertheless, in lieu of death penalty, the imposition upon appellants of the penalty of reclusion
perpetuain this case is proper pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.20 It must also be added that appellants
are not eligible for parole.21
With respect to damages, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages
awarded by the CA must be µicreased to ₱100,000.00 each in line with prevailing jurisprudence.22
Moreover, temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 must also be awarded in view of the absence
of evidence of burial· and funeral expenses. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all the
awards of damages from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.23
WHEREFORE, the October 8, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 03048 affirming
the conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 2 of appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez and
Rodel Caballero of the crime of murder for which they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that (1) appellants are not eligible for parole; (2) the awards
of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages to the victim's heirs are each increased to
₱100,000.00; (3) appellants are further ordered to pay the victim's heirs temperate damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00; and, (4) all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid .
SO ORDERED.
G.R No. 189812 September 1, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
REYNALDO BATURI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the July 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02929
that affirmed in toto the May 30, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan,
Branch 53, in Criminal Case No. 4938-R, finding appellant Reynaldo Baturi (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 91653 and imposing upon him
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.
Factual Antecedents
The Information4 contained the following accusatory allegations against appellant:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 2005, in the morning, in Brgy. Carmen East, Municipality of
Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to gain and without being authorized by law to possess and [sell], did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously[sell] ten (10) sachet[s] of heat[-]sealed transparent plastic bags
containing white crystalline substance known as "shabu" with a total weight of 49.1 grams, a dangerous
drug.
Contrary to Article II, Section 5, Republic Act 9165.5
During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." After the pretrial conference, trial ensued.

From the testimonies6 of PO3 Marlo Velasquez (PO3 Velasquez) and Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Emelda
Besarra-Roderos (P/Insp. Roderos), the following facts emerged:
On August 6, 2005, a confidential informant reported to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
office in Dagupan City the illegal drug activities of appellant, a.k.a. Naldong, in Brgy.Carmen East, Rosales,
Pangasinan. PO3 Velasquez received and relayed the information to SP02 Pedro Rabago (SPO2 Rabago),
the Special Enforcement Team Leader of the PDEA, who, in turn, ordered the former to conduct a
surveillance to verify the information.
Together with SPO1 Flash Ferrer (SPO1 Ferrer) and the confidential informant, PO3 Velasquez proceeded
to Brgy. Carmen East to conduct the surveillance. Upon reaching the area, the confidential informant
introduced PO3 Velasquez to appellant as a buyer of shabu. The two closed a deal regarding the sale of
10 "bultos" of shabufor the discounted price of ₱90,000.00 that would transpire the next day in
appellant’s house.
SPO2 Rabago thus immediately formeda team to conduct an entrapment operation where PO3 Velasquez
was to act as poseur-buyer and SPO1 Ferrer as back-up. The buy-bust teamthen placed on top ofa bundle
of boodle money a 500-peso bill marked with the initials of PO3 Velasquez and SPO1 Ferrer which were
MMV and FF, respectively. It was further agreed that SPO1 Ferrer would give PO3 Velasquez a call in his
cellularphone as a pre-arranged signal that the sale of shabuis already consummated.
The next day, August 7, 2005, the buy-bust team coordinated with the police authorities stationed in the
Municipality of Rosales and held a final briefing before proceeding to appellant’s abode. Upon arrival
thereat, PO3 Velasquez and the confidential informant approached appellant who was sitting in front of
his house while SPO1 Ferrer positioned himself about15 meters away from them. When PO3 Velasquez
informed appellantthat he already had the payment, appellant took out a carton, opened it and showed
the contentsthereof to PO3 Velasquez, who, in turn, gave the boodle money.
PO3 Velasquez examined the contents of the carton and upon seeing that it contained plastic sachets with
white crystalline granules, he made the pre-arranged signal. SPO1 Ferrer immediately showed up and
recovered the buy-bust money from appellant, while PO3 Velasquez seizedthe carton containing the
sachets of white crystalline granules. After informing appellant of his rights, the police officers arrested
and took him to the PDEA office for further investigation.
A Certificate of Inventory was thenprepared by the police authorities which was signed by two
barangayofficials and a media representative. Appellant was requested to sign the certificate of inventory
which he refused. This whole process was photographed. Thereafter, on the basis of a formal request,7
the seized shabuwas referred and delivered to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Provincial Crime
Laboratory on August 8, 2005. P/Insp. Roderos issued Chemistry Report No. D-121-2005-U8 stating that
the white crystalline substance was positive for shabu. Version of the Defense Appellant denied selling
shabuand claimed that he was a victim of frameup by the PDEA. He recalledthat on August 7, 2005, he
was standing at the street corner near his house waiting for the funeral processionof his deceased
nephew, Ricky Baturi, to pass. Police operatives arrived shortly and asked if he is Naldong. After he
answered in the affirmative, he was asked as to the whereabouts of a former co-worker, Kamlon Montilla
(Montilla). Appellant replied that he had no knowledge of the present location of Montilla. Dissatisfied
with his answer, the police apprehended and took him inside their van. This was witnessed by his children.
He was brought to Villasis where he was repeatedlyasked at gunpoint about the whereabouts of Montilla
to which he consistently replied that he did not know. He was thereafter detained. Appellant claimed that
it was only during his arraignment that he discovered that hewas being charged with illegal sale of shabu.9
Appellant’s daughters Maribel Baturi and Rizalyn Raquedan corroborated his testimony.10
Giving credence to PO3 Velasquez’ testimony, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime charged and
disposed of the case in its May 30, 2007 Decision11 as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused REYNALDO
BATURIGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Sale of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
or "shabu" in violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Considering that the penalty of death was abolished, this Court hereby sentence[s] the accused to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00.
The sachets of shabu are hereby confiscated in favor of the government. Let the same be turned over to
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.12
Appellant filed a notice of appeal,13 which was approved by the RTC. Hence, the entire records of the
case were forwarded to the CA.14
In his Brief,15 appellant pointed out that the buy-bust team failed to comply with the procedure governing
the handling,custody and disposition of the illegal drugs. Because of this, there was failure on the part of
the prosecution to establish the corpus delicti. Hence, the RTC erred in finding him guilty of the crime
charged.
Negating appellant’s claims, appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), averred that the
confiscated drug was properly inventoried and this was even witnessed by two barangay kagawads, a
representative of the media and appellant himself. A Certificate of Inventory was then prepared which
was signed by the said two barangay kagawadsand the media representative. Then, a request letter for
laboratory examination was signed by SPO4 Rabago. Contained in the said letter was the fact that PO3
Velasquez delivered the seized drug to the Crime Laboratory and that P/Insp. Roderos received the same.
To the OSG, these circumstances clearly showedthat the prosecution was able to prove the unbroken
chain of custody of the confiscated drug. Moreover, there was no reason for the police to falsely testify
against appellant. In view of these, the presumption that the police authorities regularly performed their
duties must be upheld.16
Finding that the seizure, handling, custody and examination of the seized drug were properly documented
and undertaken in an uninterrupted manner, and the consummation of illegal sale of shabuduly
established by the prosecution, the CA, in its July 7, 2009 Decision,17 ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED, and accordingly, the herein assailed May
30, 2007 Decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, this appeal.
Assignment of Error
Appellant imputes error upon the RTC19 and the CA20 in finding him guilty of the crime charged despite
the prosecution’s failureto prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
Elements for the Prosecution of Illegal Sale of Shabu
In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur: "(1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. x x x What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or saleactually took place, coupledwith the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti"21 or the illicit drug in evidence.
In this case, the prosecution successfully established all the essential elements of the illegal sale of shabu.
PO3 Velasquez, who acted as poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabuand
categorically testified that the shabuwas received by him, and the payment therefor by appellant, in a
legitimate buy-bust operation. He narrated, viz:
A - That on or about 11:00 o’clock the morning of August 6, 2005 a certain confidential informant reported
to ouroffice about the illegal activity of one @ "Naldong" of Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan, sir.
Q - Did he give you the real name of that alyas Naldong?
A - No, sir, only a.k.a. Naldong.
Q - To whom did this confidential asset report?
A - To me, sir.
Q - And what action did you take when that information was relayed to you?
A - I relayed the information to our Special Enforcement Team Leader, sir.

Q - Who is your team leader then?
A - SPO2 Pedro S.Rabago, sir.
Q - And what measures did Police Officer Rabago take, if any, upon receiving that information relayed by
you?
A - They tasked us to conduct surveillance, sir.
Q - Did you conduct that surveillance asordered by your superior officer?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How did you conduct that surveillance?
A - We went to the place and as part ofour surveillance, [I] and the CI went directly to the place ofa.k.a.
Naldong, sir.
Q - Where?
A - In Brgy. Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan, sir.
COURT:
Q - What is that CI?
A - Confidential informant, your Honor.

PROSECUTOR MATRO: (CONTG)
Q - Aside from your confidential informant, did you have any companion at that time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Who?
A - SPO1 Flash Ferrer, sir.
Q - Did you reach that place of alyas Naldong?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - What transpired, if any, when you reached that place?
A - The confidential informant introduced me as a buyer, sir.
Q - To whom?
A - To a.k.a. Naldong, sir.
Q - How did you know that the CI introduced you to Naldong?
A - The CI said "this is the buyer of shabu" then Naldong said, "I will give a discount if you will buy a large
amount of shabu", sir.
Q- When alyas Naldong told you that, what was your reply?
A- I told Naldong that I am going to buy 10 bultos of shabu, sir.
Q- When you said bultos,what does that mean?
A - It was placed in a shabu [sic] weighing more or less 4.5 grams or 5 grams, sir.
Q - And what else did you talk about?
A - When I told x x x Naldong that x x x I am going to buy 10 bultos, I asked him how much is the cost of
that and he told me ₱9,500 per bulto but since I ordered large amount of shabu, he said he will give it for
₱9,000 or ₱90,000 for ten (10) bultos, sir.
Q - So do we understand that the cost of one (1) bulto is ₱9,500 but if you order large quantity you will be
given a discount of ₱500 per bulto?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - So the 10 bultos you ordered is worth ₱90,000?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - And was that your final agreement?
A - The CI and I closed the deal and we [had] an agreement that we will come back the following day to
givethe money and pick up the shabu, sir.
Q - And what happened after that?
A - We returned to our office, sir.

Q - When you reached your office, what happened there?
A - We relayed our agreement to our Team Leader, sir.
Q - What did you relay to your Team Leader?
A - We relayed the agreement that the amount of shabu is₱90,000 and that we will be returning x x x the
following day at 11:00 A.M. for the payment and to pick up the shabu, sir.
Q - And after you relayed that to your Team Leader, what action did he take?
A - He formed a team to conduct buy[-]bust operation and I was designated as the poseur[-]buyer and
SPO1 Flash Ferrer [as] the immediate back[-]up and then they gave us the buy-bust money and we
prepared the boodle money and we agreed that the pre-arranged signal is by ringing the cellphone, sir.
Q - So the following day that is August 7, 2005, what happened then?
A - At around 10:30 A. M. of August7, 2005 we coordinated [with] the PNP Rosales and after the briefing
we immediately proceeded to the place of operation, sir.
Q - Before coming to Rosales, what happened [in] your office, if any?
A - We marked the money, sir.
Q - What money did you mark?
A - The ₱500 bill, sir.
Q - How many ₱500 bill[s] did you mark x x x?

A - One (1) piece of ₱500 bill, sir.
Q - Who made the markings, Mr. Witness?
A - [I] and SPO1 Flash Ferrer, sir.
Q - I have here x x x one (1) piece of ₱500, xerox copy, doyou know where [the original is]?
A - We submitted [it] to the Court, sir.
PROSECUTOR MATRO:
May we ask that the original of the ₱500 bill be brought out.
Q - You mentioned about the boodle money, what do you mean? We know what is boodle money but for
record purposes?
A - Paper cut[-]outs, sir.
Q - So this ₱500 plus boodle money was supposed to be the ₱90,000 to be used in buying the 10 bultos
of shabu, is that what you mean?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - After you have coordinated withthe Police Station of Rosales, Pangasinan, what happened next?
A - We [had] the final briefing and after that we immediately proceeded to the place, sir.
Q - I am showing to you this ₱500 which was previously submitted to the Clerk of Court of this Honorable
Court, will you please examine if this is the same ₱500 bill thatyou are referring to?
A - Yes, sir, this is the same money that we used in buying shabu.
Q - Where is the marking?
A - At the right upper corner below the number 500, this is my initial MMV, sir.
Q - What about the markings made by SPO1 Flash Ferrer?
A - This FF at the right lower corner of the money, sir.
PROSECUTOR MATRO:
May we ask the good counsel for the defense to make[a] comparison between the original and the xerox
attached to the record.
ATTY. NGIPOL:
We confirm that the xerox copy attached to the record is a religious reproduction of the original, your
Honor.
PROSECUTOR MATRO:
Q - So after the final briefing madeat the Rosales Police Station, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A - We proceeded to the place of operation, sir.
Q - Where you able toreach that place?

A - Yes, sir.
Q - And where was this alyas Naldong when you reached the place?
A - He was in front of the house sitting, sir.
Q - Did he have any companion at that time?
A - None, sir?
Q - And what transpired next?
A - We proceeded directly to where a.k.a. Naldong was, sir.
Q - You said "we", who was your companion?
A - The CI, sir.
Q - How about Police Officer Flash Ferrer, where was he at that time?
A - He was at a distance as myimmediate back[-]up, sir.
COURT:
Q - How far?
A - About 10 to 15 meters, sir.
PROSECUTOR MATRO:
Q - Prior to that, do you have agreement about your signal?
A - Ringing of cellphone, sir.
Q - Who will ring?
A - [I], sir.
Q - And what happened when youapproached alyas Naldong?
A - I told him that I already have the ₱90,000 then a.k.a. Naldong took a carton of medicine below and
took the shabu and showed it to me, he gave it to me, the medicine box and I handed to him the money,
sir.
Q - After alyas Naldong handed to you that box of medicine where the shabu was placed inside, what did
you do?
A - I examined if it is really shabu and when I found that it is x x x shabu, I gave to him the buy-bust money
and immediately I gave the [prearranged] signal which is the ringingof the cellphone then I introduced
myself as PDEA agent, sir.
Q - After that, whathappened next?
A - When I arrested him, SPO1 Flash Ferrer arrived and we conducted a body search if there is a bladed
weapon, sir.
Q - Who recovered the buy[-]bust money from his possession?
A - It was SPO1 Flash Ferrer, sir.

Q - Did you see him recover that money?
A - Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR MATRO: (CONTG.)
Q - How about the bulto of shabu, who was in possession?
A - It [was] in my possession, sir.
Q - After you x x x apprehended him, what transpired next?
A - After telling him his constitutional right[s], we brought him to our office, sir.22
During the continuation of his direct examination, PO3 Velasquez identified appellant as the perpetrator
of the crime, viz.:
Q - In the last hearing, you were asked to identify the person of the accused but the accused was not here.
Will you please look around inside the courtroom and see if the accused Reynaldo Baturi is inside this
court?
A - He is here, sir.
Q - Will you please stand and point to the accused?
A - The one wearing a white polo shirt.(Witness pointing to a person who[,] when asked his name[,]
answered Reynaldo Baturi).23 In addition, the white crystalline granules sold by appellant, when
examined by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Roderos, were found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. This finding is contained in Chemistry Report Number D-121-2005-U24 and was testified to by
P/Insp. Roderos.25
Clearly, the prosecution,through the testimoniesof PO3 Velasquez and P/Insp. Roderos, was able
tosuccessfully establish the elements of illegal sale of shabu.
The Court acknowledges that "[p]rosecutions for illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the
police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation."26 In this case, the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses cannot be doubted. Aside from the fact that both lower courts are one in finding that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were direct and definite, the said testimonies are also consistent
with each other and with the physical evidence. Besides, "the trial court’s determination on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and its consequent findings of facts must be given great weight and respect on
appeal x x x. This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts are in a better position to decide
the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during trial."27
The Defenses of Denial and Frame-Up are Unavailing.
In view of the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s defense of denialbecomes
unavailing. "It has been consistently held that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a
prosecution witness. A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative
matters."28
Appellant’s defense of frame-up likewisefails. "[F]rame-up is viewed with disfavor since, like alibi, it can
easily beconcocted and is a common ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Law."29 Appellant’s claim that he was framed by the police officers for refusing toreveal the whereabouts
of a drug pusher by the name of Montilla is not worthy of belief. For the police officers to frame him, they
must haveknown appellant prior to the incident.30 Here, the police officers do not personally know
appellant prior to the incident. In fact, appellant himself testified that whenthe police operatives
approached him, they still asked him if he is Naldong. Neither did the appellant claim that he knows the
police officers who apprehended him. Also, if appellant was indeed a victim of frame-up by police officers,
he should have filed the proper charges against them. "The fact that no administrative or criminal charges
were filed lends cogency to the conclusion that the alleged frame-up was merely concocted as a defense
scheme. This inaction clearly betrays appellant’s claim of frame-up."31
Moreover, there is no allegation or evidence whatsoever that the members of the entrapment team were
actuated by improper motive or were not performing their duty in accordance with law. They are
therefore entitled to the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions and their
testimonies are accorded full faith and credence.32
Failure to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule is not Fatal.
The Court is not persuaded by appellant’s averment that the prosecution failed to establish that the
shabuallegedly seized from him was the same shabu submitted for laboratory examination. The following
negates appellant’s claim: (1) the police officers inventoried the confiscated shabuimmediately after its
seizure from appellant. The process was witnessed by barangayofficials and a media representative who
affixed their signatures in the Certificate of Inventory;33 (2) the inventory-taking was photographed and
the photographs show that the actual conduct of inventory was witnessed by appellant himself;34 (3) it
is undisputed that appellant was asked to affix his signature in the Certificate ofInventory but he
refused;35 (4) it was shown that a PDEA personnel thereafter prepared a formal request and the white
crystalline granules contained in the plastic sachets seized from appellant were indorsed and delivered
promptly by PO3 Velasquez to P/Insp. Roderos to the crime laboratory.36
It is true that the prosecution did not formally offer in evidence the Certificate of Inventory and the formal
request for examination of the confiscated substance. Be that asit may, the Court has previouslyheld that
even if an exhibit is not formally offered, the same "may still be admitted against the adverse party if,
first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in
the records of the case."37 PO3 Velasquez categorically testified that an inventory of the seized drugs was
performed, a corresponding certificate was prepared, and a formal request for examination was made.
He further narrated that together with the formal request, he submitted and delivered the confiscated
drugs to the crime laboratory. On the basis of the said formal request, P/Insp. Roderos examined the
specimen and she likewise testified on this. Appellant’s counsel even asked the saidprosecution witnesses
regarding these documents.38 Considering the said testimoniesand the fact that the documents were
incorporated in the records of the case, they are therefore admissible against appellant.
Besides, the failure of the police officersto comply strictly with the chain of custody rule is not fatal. Itwill
not render the arrestof appellant illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible.39 "What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."40
In this case, the Court finds no hiatusor confusion in the confiscation, handling, custody and examination
of the shabu.1âwphi1 The illegal drug that was inventoried at the PDEA office, subjected to qualitative
examination at the crime aboratory, and finally introduced in evidence against appellant was the same
illegal drug that was confiscated from him when he was caught injlagrante delicto selling the same. No
apparent irregularity is sufficiently shown to have attended the chain of custody of the shabu. Its identity,
integrity and probative value were preserved and kept intact by the police officers.
Penalty
All told, there is no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165. Under this law, the penalty for the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and
purity, is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000.00 to ₱10 million. However, with
the enactment of RA 9346,41 only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed42 upon appellant, without
eligibility for parole pursuant to Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 7, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02929 which
affirmed the Decision dated May 30, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53,
in Criminal Case No. 4938-R, convicting appellant Reynaldo Baturi for violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 9346, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he shall not be
eligible for parole.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199442 April 7, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABAIGAR, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An Information1 was filed charging appellant Francisco Abaigar with the crime of murder, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 11th day of July 2001, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Rosalim,
Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any
justifiable cause, with intent to kill, and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault
and use personal violence upon the person of JOSEPH GABUY A by shooting him with the use of a
homemade shotgun locally known as "Bardog", which the accused had conveniently provided himself for
the purpose, hitting the victim's left side of the face and behind the head, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
During his arraignment on August 4, 2004, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.3
On December 6, 2007, the trial court rendered its Judgment4 finding appellant guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Francisco Abaigar is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and is hereby meted the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Said accused shall also indemnify the heirs of deceased Joseph Gabuya death indemnity in the amount of
Php75,000.00, moral damages of Php50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of Php20,000.00.
In line with Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Warden of the Sub-Provincial Jail,
Calbayog City, is hereby directed to immediately transmit the living body of accused Francisco Abaigar to
the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, where he may remain to be detained.
In the service of his sentence he shall be credited for the period he was under preventive detention,
provided he has previously expressed his written conformity to comply with the discipline, rules and
regulations by the detention center otherwise he shall be entitled to only 4/5 thereof pursuant to Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court lent credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Relecita del Monte (Relecita) that at
about 9 o’clock in the evening of July 11, 2001, at a distance of about 3 1/2 meters, she saw appellant
shoot Joseph Gabuya (Gabuya) from behind hitting the victim at the back of his head. The trial court
disregarded appellant’s denial and alibi. It found incredulous appellant’s claim that he returned to sleep
immediately after hearing bursts of gunshots near his house and his disavowal of any knowledge about
the death of Gabuya whose house is just 30 arms length away from his house. His flight after the incident
was considered an indication of guilt. The trial court also found that treachery attended the killing as the
victim was merely in the act of opening the front door of his house without any inkling of the impending
attack coming from behind.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed before the Court of Appeals. In a Decision6 dated June 22, 2010, the
appellate court affirmed in full the Judgment of the trial court, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, of Gandara, Samar, in Criminal
Case No. 02-0100 finding accused-appellant, Francisco Abaigar, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, this appeal.

In a Resolution8 dated January 25, 2012, we required both parties to submit their Supplemental Briefs but
they opted to adopt the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals.
Appellant basically argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in lending credence to the
testimony of eyewitness Relecita. Appellant claims that Relecita could have forewarned the victim of his
presence if indeed Relecita saw him in the vicinity; and that it was improbable that Relecita could see him
considering the poor lighting condition of the place.
We are not persuaded.
It is settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province and expertise of the
trial court. In this case, we find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the trial court. The court
below categorically found that Relecita had no ill motive to testify against appellant; she "has no reason
to impute on him the heinous crime of murder had she not witnessed the actual killing of the victim."9
Similarly, the appellate court found Relecita to have "positively identified the appellant as the perpetrator
of the crime."10 Also, the failure of Relecita to warn the victim of the appellant’s impending attack should
not be taken against her.
Neither should it be taken as a blemish to her credibility.
As regards the visibility, the appellate court correctly ruled that the distance between Relecita and
appellant, the light coming from a 50-watt bulb on the street post about eight meters away from the place
where the victim was shot, the light coming from passing vehicles, and the light coming from the kerosene
lamp in the house of the appellant are enough to illuminate the place and for Relecita to positively identify
the appellant.
We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that treachery attended the commission of the
crime. Records show that the victim was about to enter his house when suddenly he was shot from behind
by the appellant hitting him at the back of his head. The victim suffered five gunshot wounds, four of
which proved fatal.
Considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery, appellant was correctly found guilty of murder;
there being no aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, both the
trial court and the appellate court correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. However, he is not eligible for parole.11
As regards the damages awarded, we note that the trial court did not award actual damages.1âwphi1 In
lieu thereof, the heirs of the victim are entitled to an award of temperate damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00 "as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the [victim] suffered pecuniary loss although the exact
amount was not proved."12 "This award is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be
recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification."13 Exemplary damages must
likewise be increased to ₱30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, all damages awarded
shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The June 22, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00866 which affirmed in full the December 6, 2007 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Gandara, Samar, Branch 41, finding appellant Francisco Abaigar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant is without eligibility for parole; he is
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; and the award
of exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00. In addition, interest on all damages awarded is imposed
at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194157 July 30, 2014
ROMEO R. ARAULLO, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, HON. GERARDO C. NOGRALES, HON.
ROMEO L. GO, HON. PERLITA B. VELASCO, HON. ARDEN S. ANNI, ATTY. FILOMEMO B. BALBIN, ATTY.
ERNESTO P. TABAO and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Romeo R. Araullo (Araullo) to assail an undated
Resolution2 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing his criminal complaint docketed as OMB-
C-C-09-0410-H.
The records indicate that Araullo had previously obtained a favorable judgment in a labor complaint for
illegal dismissal which he filed against Club Filipino.3 He first worked for Club Filipino as an electrician,
and was Maintenance Supervisor at the time of his dismissal from employment on December 23, 2000.4
His labor complaint was initially dismissed by Labor Arbiter Fedriel Panganiban (LA Panganiban), whose
ruling was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Upon appeal, however, both the
Court of Appeals and this Court ruled that Araullo was illegally dismissed from employment. Club Filipino
was then ordered to reinstate Araullo and to pay him his full backwages and other monetary benefits.5
Following the finality of the decision in his favor, Araullo filed with LA Panganiban a motion for issuance
of a writ of execution. LA Panganiban, however, inhibited from further hearing the action, resulting in a
re-raffle and assignment of the case to LA Arden S. Anni (LA Anni).6 Araullo’s motion for execution was
approved by LA Anni, who issued a writ of execution ordering the sheriff’s collection of the amount of
2,338,152.25, as determined by the Computation and Examination Unit.7 The issuance of the writ was
questioned by Club Filipino on the ground that it had filed a Motion to Recompute8 the judgment award,
which remained unresolved by the LA. Club Filipino then filed its Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.9
Before the motion to quash could be heard, LA Anni issued an Order10 dated August 12, 2008 quashing
the writ and lifting the notice of garnishment that was previously servedby Sheriff Noli S. Nicdao upon
Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands. LA Anni also later inhibited from further hearing the case,
concerned that his impartiality might be questioned because Club Filipino’s President, Atty. Roberto F. De
Leon (Atty. De Leon), and counsel, Atty. Ernesto P. Tabao (Atty. Tabao), were his fraternity brothers in San
Beda College of Law.11
Dissatisfied with the quashal of the writ, Araullo filed a petition12 to set aside LA Anni’s order, which was
denied in a Resolution13 dated October 29, 2008 issued by the NLRC First Division, composed of NLRC
Chairman Gerardo C. Nograles(Chairman Nograles), Commissioner Romeo L. Go (Commissioner Go) and
Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco (Commissioner Velasco). The NLRC ordered that the case records be
forwarded to the arbitration branch of origin, which should decide on the issues leading to the final
computation of the award and the issuance of a writ of execution.14
When Araullo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC,15 he filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman the criminal complaint docketed as OMB-C-C-09-0410-H against respondents LA Anni,
Chairman Nograles, Commissioner Go, Commissioner Velasco, Atty. Tabao, Atty. De Leon and Atty.
Filomemo B. Balbin (Atty. Balbin).16 He charged them of violating Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) and Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Office of the Ombudsman summarized his arguments as follows:
[Araullo] alleged that [LA Anni] is guilty of issuing an unjust interlocutory order for granting the motion to
quash filed by Club Filipino despite the fact that his counsel was not furnished with a copy of the said
motion. [LA Anni] ordered the quashal of the writ of execution without conducting any hearing which was
tantamount to a denial of [Araullo’s] right to due process. The order of [LA Anni] was issued hastily and
purposely to delay the execution of the judgment in the labor case which was decided in [Araullo’s] favor.
The act of [LA Anni] in ordering the quashal of the writ of execution and lifting the notice of garnishment
and thereafter inhibiting himself from taking further cognizance ofthe case were done in order to give
undue advantage and benefit toClub Filipino whose President and counsel were fraternal brothers of [LA
Anni].
The belated appearance of [Atty. Balbin] also as counsel of Club Filipino at the stage of execution of the
labor judgment was considered highly irregular by [Araullo] who submitsthat Atty. Balbin was hired only
to influence the decision of the public respondents as he was the former Executive Assistant IV of retired
NLRC Chairman Roy Señeres.
[Araullo] averred that [LA] Anniand the lawyers of Club Filipino conspired together to delay the
implementation of the decision of the court in the labor case. Thus, he also sued [Atty. De Leon], [Atty.
Tabao] and [Atty. Balbin] for graft and corruption and held them responsible for the issuance of an unjust
interlocutory order.
On the other hand, the act of the respondent NLRC Commissioners in sustaining the unjust interlocutory
order of [LA] Anni made them responsible for issuing their own unjust interlocutory order. The manifest
partiality of [LA Anni] towards his fraternity brothers was tolerated and supported by the respondent
Commissioners when they affirmed the order that quashed the writ of execution and lifted the notice of
garnishment. As a result[,] [Araullo] was back to where he started and would have to undergo through all
the efforts again ifonly to receive the award due him in the labor case. The delay caused [Araullo] so much
pain and stress that he sued the respondent Commissionersfor causing undue injury to him. Moreover,
the affirmation given by the respondent Commissioners to [LA] Anni only meant that the said
Commissioners gave undue advantage and favor also to Club Filipino.17
Araullo’s charges were dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman via the now assailed resolution18
issued by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Romualdo V. Francisco and approved by then
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez. It reasoned that the deferral in the execution of the judgment
in favor ofAraullo could not be attributed to the respondents in the criminal complaint.19 The
presumption that the respondents regularly performed their official duty was not overcome by sufficient
evidence. The LA’s and NLRC’s rulings were rendered pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. This
finding then barred a prosecution for violation of Article 206 of the RPC. For the claim of violation of R.A.
No. 3019, the Office of the Ombudsman also found no probable cause given Araullo’s failure toestablish
that the respondents to his complaint gave undue advantage to Club Filipino, or that they acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, orgross and inexcusable negligence.
Feeling aggrieved, Araullofiled this petition for certiorarito assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s dismissal
of his criminal complaint.
The Court dismisses the petition.
The Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman, except
in a clear case of grave abuse of discretion. The Court has emphasized in Casing v. Ombudsman20 the
nature and extent of the powers, authority and findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, as we held:
The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the
exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public
officials and employees. Specifically, the determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that
belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its call.
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the
Office of the Ombudsman which, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrityof the public service." While the Ombudsman’s findings as to whether probable
cause exists are generally not reviewable by this Court, where there is an allegation of grave abuse of
discretion, the Ombudsman’s act cannot escape judicial scrutiny under the Court’s own constitutional
power and duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.21 (Citations
omitted)
Given the subject of the present petition, the Court’s inquiry shall then be limited to the question of
whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint filed by Araullo. By jurisprudence, "[g]rave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsicalexercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse must be in
a manner so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."22
Upon review, the Court has determined that the Office of the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse
of discretion. Explained clearly in the assailed resolution were the grounds that supported its finding of
lack of probable cause, and which then justified the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed by Araullo.
Probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed, and that the persons being charged are probably guilty thereof.23 "[It] can only find
support in facts and circumstances that would leada reasonable mind to believe that the person being
charged warrants a prosecution."24 To establish probable cause, Araullo, being the complainant, then
should have proved the elements of the crimes alleged to have been committed. In addition, there should
have been a clear showing of the respective participation of the respondents, to at least support a ruling
that would call for their further prosecution.
Specifically for the charge of violation of Article 20625 of the RPC which penalizes the issuance of unjust
interlocutory orders, it was necessary to show that, first,the orders issued by the respondents to his
complaint were unjust, and second, the said orders were knowingly rendered or rendered through
inexcusable negligence or ignorance. On this matter, the Office of the Ombudsman correctly held that LA
Anni’s order for the quashal of the writ of execution, and the NLRC’s resolution affirming it, were not
unjust. Contrary to Araullo’s claim, the rulings of the labor officials were in accordance with law and the
rules of the NLRC, specifically since Rule XI, Section 4 of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure
provided that:
Sec. 4. Computation during execution. – Where further computation of the award in the decision,
resolution or order is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no writ of execution shall
be issued until after the computation has been approved by the [LA] in an order issued after the parties
have been duly notified and heard on the matter.
Given this provision, the quashal of the writ was then only necessary to rectify LA Anni’s prior issuance of
a writ of execution notwithstanding a pending motion for re-computation that was filed by Club Filipino.
Araullo failed to establish that the labor officials were impelled by any motive other than the correction
of this error. At any rate, this issue on the propriety of the quashal of the writ had been resolved by the
Court in an earlier review. In Romeo R. Araullo v. Office of the Ombudsman,26 which was an appeal from
the Office of the Ombudsman’s dismissal of Araullo’s administrative complaint for grave misconduct
against the same labor officials herein charged and also on the same basis ofthe quashal of LA Anni’s writ
of execution, the Court declared:
There is no doubt that [LA]Anni’s July 29, 2008 Writ of Execution was procedurally irregular,as it pre-
empted the NLRC Rules which require that where further computation of the award in the decision is
necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no Writ of Execution shall be issued until after
the computation has been approved by the [LA] in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified
and heard on the matter. When the writ was issued, there was as yet no order approving the computation
madeby the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, and there was a pending and unresolved Motion
to Recompute filed by Club Filipino. A cursory examination of the motion reveals that it raised valid issues
that required determination in order to arrive at a just resolution, so that none of the parties would be
unjustly enriched. For example, it appears that petitioner owed Club Filipino a substantial amount of
money which the latter sought to deduct from the judgment award by way of compensation; ifthis is true,
then the necessary adjustment in the award may be made to allow Club Filipino to recover what petitioner
owes it, to the extent allowable by law.
Since the Writ of Execution was issuedin contravention of the law, it is irregular and defective, and there
was no need to further hear Club Filipino’s motion to quash the writ; [LA] Anni’s issuance of the August
12, 2008 Order quashing the writ ahead of the scheduledAugust 20, 2008 hearing is therefore not
improper. "A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent. x x x."
xxxx
On the part of the respondent Commissioners, the Court detects no irregularity in their actions either.
While petitioner accuses them of gross misconduct for improperly affirming, through their October 29,
2008 Resolution, [LA] Anni’s order quashing the Writ of Execution, the Court believes otherwise; they
acted pursuant to the NLRC Rules, and averted further mistake and damage by affirming the quashing of
an otherwise improvident writ.
The Court fails to discern any indication of malice, bad faith, misconduct, or even negligence in the
respondents’ actions. Nor are there signs of partiality or attempts to favora party to the case. All their
actions were aboveboard. x x x.27 (Citation omitted)
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable
cause for violation of Article 206 against the respondents labor officials. Without a finding of probable
cause against these labor officials, the dismissal of the charge against Atty. Balbin, Atty. Tabao and Atty.
De Leon, being private individuals who did not appear to conspire with their co-respondents for the
commission of a criminal offense, was also warranted.
Similarly, there was no grave abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the complaint for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. A violation under this provision entails the following:
(1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he
must have acted with manifestpartiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his
action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.28
The second and third elements are wanting in this case.1âwphi1 With the Court’s finding on the
correctness of the LA’s and NLRC’s rulings, there could have been no undue injury suffered by Araullo
notwithstanding the mentioning that notwithstanding the labor officials’ rulings, Araullo was not even left
without any remedy to enforce the final judgment in his favor. The NLRC’s endorsement of his case to the
arbitration branch of origin was merely for the resolution of pending incidents in the case. It was necessary
to hear these matters first in order to ensure that all the parties to the case were afforded due
process.Time and again, the Court has emphasized that "[p]rocedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be
relaxed."29
There was also no showing that the labor officials’ actions were performed with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence. The Court explained in People v. Atienza30 that in order to
determine whether any of these circumstances attends a case, the following parameters should be
considered:
There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor
one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgmentbut also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing
for some perverse motive or ill will. x x x [It] contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable
negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.31 (Citation omitted)
Araullo failed to prove that the respondents were impelled to act by any of such motives. The records
instead indicate that the labor officials only wanted to satisfy the demands of law and their procedural
rules.
Finally, the mere fact that Araullo’scounsel was not furnished with a copy of Club Filipino’s motion to
quashthe writ also failed to support Araullo’s criminal complaint. As the Court had declared in Araullo, "it
appears that the apparent failure of petitioner's counsel to be served with a copy of the assailed decision
did not prejudice [Araullo's] rights."32
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the December 12,
2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 affirming with modification the June
25, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-163806-
10 finding Carlos L." Tanenggee (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five counts of estafa
through falsification of commercial documents. Likewise questioned is the CA's September 6, 2007
Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration5 and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.6
Factual Antecedents
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations7 for estafa through falsification of commercial documents
were filed against petitioner. The said Informations portray the same mode of commission of the crime
as in Criminal Case No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of the checks and promissory
notes involved and the dates and amounts thereof, viz:
That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private
individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud, thru falsification of commercial
document, the METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by its Legal officer, Atty.
Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in the following manner: herein accused, being then the Manager of the
COMMERCIO BRANCH OF METROBANK located at the New Divisoria Market Bldg., Divisoria, Manila, and
taking advantage of his position as such, prepared and filled up or caused to be prepared and filled up
METROBANK Promissory Note Form No. 366857 with letters and figures reading "BD#083/97" after the
letters reading "PN", with figures reading "07.24.97" after the word "DATE", with the amount of
₱16,000,000.00 in words and in figures, and with other words and figures now appearing thereon, typing
or causing to be typed at the right bottom thereof the name reading "ROMEO TAN", feigning and forging
or causing to be feigned and forged on top of said name the signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own
signature at the left bottom thereof purportedly to show that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said
note by Romeo Tan, thereafter preparing and filling up or causing to be prepared and filled up
METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK NO. CC 0000001531, a commercial document, with date reading "July 24,
1997", with the name reading "Romeo Tan" as payee, and with the sum of ₱15,362,666.67 in words and
in figures, which purports to be the proceeds of the loan being obtained, thereafter affixing his own
signature thereon, and directing the unsuspecting bank cashier to also affix his signature on the said check,
as authorized signatories, and finally affixing, feigning and forging or causing to be affixed, feigned and
forged four (4) times at the back thereof the signature of said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear, as it
did appear that Romeo Tan had participated in the preparation, execution and signing of the said
Promissory Note and the signing and endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK and that he
obtained a loan of ₱16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well
knew, such was not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain such loan from METROBANK, neither
did he participate in the preparation, execution and signing of the said promissory note and signing and
endorsement of said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK, much less authorize herein accused to prepare,
execute and affix his signature in the said documents; that once the said documents were forged and
falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused released, obtained and received from the
METROBANK the sum of ₱15,363,666.67 purportedly representing the proceeds of the said loan, which
amount, once in his possession, with intent to defraud, he misappropriated, misapplied and converted to
his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said METROBANK in the same sum
of ₱15,363,666.67, Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a plea.9
The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
The proceedings before the RTC as aptly summarized by the CA are as follows:
During the pre-trial, except for the identity of the accused, the jurisdiction of the court, and that accused
was the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from July 1997 to December 1997, no other
stipulations were entered into. Prosecution marked its exhibits "A" to "L" and sub-markings.
xxxx
The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be prepared promissory notes
and cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of the bank since he has substantial
deposits in his account, in connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter from the bank.
Appellant approved and signed the cashier’s check as branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch.
Appellant affixed, forged or caused to be signed the signature of Tan as endorser and payee of the
proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to show that the latter had indeed endorsed the same for
payment. He handed the checks to the Loans clerk, Maria Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said
documents were forged and falsified, appellant released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of
the alleged loan and misappropriated the same to his use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular
loans, an internal audit was conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of
Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement (marked as Exhibit "N") in the form of
questions and answers.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank, testified that he
conducted and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in said interview, appellant admitted
having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the promissory notes; that the
proceeds of the loan were secured or personally received by the appellant although it should be the client
of the bank who should receive the same; and that all the answers of the appellant were contained in a
typewritten document voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit "N").
Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager, testified that the signatures appearing on the
promissory notes were not the signatures of Romeo Tan; that the promissory notes did not bear her
signature although it is required, due to the fact that Romeo Tan is a valued client and her manager
accommodated valued clients; that she signed the corresponding checks upon instruction of appellant;
and that after signing the checks, appellant took the same which remained in his custody.
Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting expert, testified that the signatures appearing
on the promissory notes and specimen signatures on the signature card of Romeo Tan were not written
by one and the same person.
Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that several cashier’s
checks were issued in favor of Romeo Tan; that appellant instructed her to encash the same; and that it
was appellant who received the proceeds of the loan.
For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a Masters degree from the
Asian Institute of Management, and was the Branch Manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from 1994
until he was charged in 1998 [with] the above-named offense. He was with Metrobank for nine (9) years
starting as assistant manager of Metrobank Dasmariñas Branch, Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw
the day to day operations of the branch, solicited accounts and processed loans, among others.
Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan as a client-depositor when he was the branch
manager of Metrobank Commercio. As a valued client, Romeo Tan was granted a credit line for forty
million pesos (₱40,000,000.00) by Metrobank. Tan was also allowed to open a fictitious account for his
personal use and was assisted personally by appellant in his dealings with the bank. In the middle of 1997,
Tan allegedly opened a fictitious account and used the name Jose Tan. Such practice for valued clients
was allowed by and known to the bank to hide their finances due to rampantkidnappings or from the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or from their spouses.
According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing credit line (through promissory notes) for five (5) times
on the following dates: 1) 24 July 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00), 2) 27 October 1997 for
six million pesos (₱6,000,000.00), 3) 12 November 1997 for three million pesos (₱3,000,000.00), 4) 21
November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000,00), 5) 22 December 1997 for two million pesos
(₱2,000,000.00). On all these occasions except the loan on 24 July 1997 when Tan personally went to the
bank, Tan allegedly gave his instructions regarding the loan through the telephone. Upon receiving the
instructions, appellant would order the Loans clerk to prepare the promissory note and send the same
through the bank’s messenger to Tan’s office, which was located across the street. The latter would then
return to the bank, through his own messenger, the promissory notes already signed by him. Upon receipt
of the promissory note, appellant would order the preparation of the corresponding cashier’s check
representing the proceeds of the particular loan, send the same through the bank’s messenger to the
office of Tan, and the latter would return the same through his own messenger already endorsed together
with a deposit slip under Current Account No. 258-250133-7 of Jose Tan. Only Cashier’s Check dated 21
November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00) was not endorsed and deposited for, allegedly,
it was used to pay the loan obtained on 24 July 1997. Appellant claimed that all the signatures of Tan
appearing on the promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were the genuine signatures of Tan although
he never saw the latter affix them thereon.
In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the Commercio Branch
for more than a week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-Chan, senior
vice president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following day. When appellant arrived
at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven (7) other people present: two (2) senior branch
officers, two (2) bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform and the other in plain clothes), and a
representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank, Valentino Elevado.
Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit "N") in connection with the audit
investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any explanation; that he
was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be brought to the precinct if he will
not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not apprised of the purpose of the meeting;
and that "just to get it over with" he signed the paper which turned out to be a confession. After the said
meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but was unable to find the latter. He also tried to phone
him but to no avail.10
After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision11 dated June 25, 1999 finding petitioner
guilty of the crimes charged, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo Tanenggee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents charged in each of the five (5) Informations
filed and hereby sentences him to suffer the following penalties:
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-163806, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8)
years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the
accessory penalties provided by law.
accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱16 Million with interest at
18% per annum counted from 27 November 1997 until fully paid.
18% per annum counted from 27 October 1997 until fully paid.
18% per annum counted from 22 December 1997 until fully paid.
18% per annum counted from 12 November 1997 until fully paid.
Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.
As mandated in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum duration of the sentence imposed
shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties
imposed upon him and such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
23653. On December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision13 affirming with modification the RTC
Decision and disposing of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated 25 June 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 convicting the accused-appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee on five
counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that in Criminal Case No. 98-163806, he is further ordered to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱16 Million
with interest at 18% per annum counted from 24 July 1997 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.14
On December 29, 2006,15 petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied per its September
6, 2007 Resolution.16
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the basic
issues of: (1) whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the petitioner’s written
statement based on its finding that he was not in police custody or under custodial interrogation when
the same was taken; and, (2) whether the essential elements of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents were established by the prosecution.17
The Parties’ Arguments

While he admits signing a written statement,18 petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof and
alleges that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said written
statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly
of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the
same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
maintains that petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence since the constitutional
proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context of private employment
but is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus prays for the affirmance of the
appealed CA Decision.
Our Ruling
We find the Petition wanting in merit.
Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is
applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a
person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement
thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.19 In the present case, while it is undisputed
that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch
he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority
but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor
restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be
said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during
the taking of his written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right to counsel "applies only
to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation."
Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service
Commission:21
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant
to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2),
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those
made in an administrative investigation.22
Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in
giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.
Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already prepared
typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition is just an
afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress and intimidation.
Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved
and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary."23 Petitioner failed to overcome this
presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been executed freely and
consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that only
a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained therein attest to its voluntariness. As
correctly pointed out by the CA:
As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details which could
only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence which cannot be
associated with a mind to which intimidation has been applied. Appellant’s answers to questions 14 and
24 were even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the corrections made therein. The response to
every question was fully informative, even beyond the required answers, which only indicates the mind
to be free from extraneous restraints.24
In People v. Muit,25 it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of petitioner’s
extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not
have known and could not have supplied without the knowledge and information given by him."
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or
administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and
forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that where
the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was
presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed.26
Neither will petitioner’s assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before affixing his
signature thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the instant Petition. To recall, petitioner has a masteral
degree from a reputable educational institution and had been a bank manager for quite a number of
years. He is thus expected to fully understand and comprehend the significance of signing an instrument.
It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due diligence in the conduct of his own affairs. He can
therefore expect no consideration for it.
Forgery duly established.
"Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of another’s name with intent to
defraud."27 It can be established by comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic or genuine
one. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of government handwriting experts
whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge is not precluded but is even authorized
by law28 to conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the promissory notes
and cashier’s checks was not anchored solely on the result of the examination conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner. The trial court also made an independent examination
of the questioned signatures and after analyzing the same, reached the conclusion that the signatures of
Tan appearing in the promissory notes are different from his genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit
Account Information and Specimen Signature Cards on file with the bank. Thus, we find no reason to
disturb the above findings of the RTC which was affirmed by the CA. A rule of long standing in this
jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight and
respect. Absent any reason to deviate from the said findings, as in this case, the same should be deemed
conclusive and binding to this Court.
No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed light on the matter. His
non-presentation created the presumption that his testimony if given would be adverse to the case of the
prosecution. Petitioner thus contends that the prosecution suppressed its own evidence.
Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the evidence or the
witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to how it should present its case.29 Moreover, the
presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the
disposal of both the defense and the prosecution.30 In the present case, if petitioner believes that Tan is
the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability by establishing that it was Tan and not him
who signed the subject documents, the most prudent thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway,
petitioner has the right to have compulsory process to secure Tan’s attendance during the trial pursuant
to Article III, Section 14(2)31 of the Constitution. The records show, however, that petitioner did not
invoke such right. In view of these, no suppression of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.
Petitioner’s denial is unavailing.
The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the loans
covered by the promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were personally transacted by Tan against his
approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his signature thereto. Again, this
allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported by established evidence. "It is settled that denials
which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. They
merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters."32 The chain of events in this case, from the preparation
of the promissory notes to the encashment of the cashier’s checks, as narrated by the prosecution
witnesses and based on petitioner’s own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that he
committed the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.
Elements of falsification of commercial documents established.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee, who did not take
advantage of his official position, of public, private or commercial document. The elements of falsification
of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual
or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed
any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;33 and, (3) that the falsification was
committed in a public, official or commercial document.
All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private individual.
Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioner’s (1) counterfeiting or imitating the handwriting or
signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2) causing
it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third,
the falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks which are commercial documents.
Commercial documents are, in general, documents or instruments which are "used by merchants or
businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions."34 Promissory notes facilitate credit
transactions while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of money for convenience in
business transactions. A cashier’s check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person
whose name and signature appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated
therein.35
Falsification as a necessary means to commit estafa.
When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, theft or
malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are two classes of
a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.
In Domingo v. People,36 we held:
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa,
because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has
already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has
already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another
is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to
commit estafa.
"Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by
means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation."37 Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury."38
The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing that Tan requested him to process
purported loans on the latter’s behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan in the
cashier’s checks.1âwphi1 Through these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from the bank.
Once in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same in Eurocan Future
Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take hold of the money, misappropriated
and converted it to his own personal use and benefit, and these resulted to the damage and prejudice of
the bank in the amount of about ₱43 million.
Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner could not have withdrawn the money without
falsifying the questioned documents. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to commit
estafa, and falsification was already consummated even before the falsified documents were used to
defraud the bank. The conviction of petitioner for the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of
Commercial Document by the lower courts was thus proper.
The Proper Imposable Penalty
The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the RPC is prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than ₱5,000.00.
The penalty in estafa cases, on the other hand, as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period39 if the amount
defrauded is over ₱12,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds the latter
sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period with an
incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 but in no case shall the total penalty
exceed 20 years of imprisonment.
Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial document. The crime of falsification was established to be a necessary means
to commit estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case should be
that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The
applicable penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, being the more serious offense than falsification.
The amounts involved in this case range from ₱2 million to ₱16 million. Said amounts being in excess of
₱22,000.00, the penalty imposable should be within the maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months
and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor, adding one (1) year for each additional
₱10,000.00. Considering the amounts involved, the additional penalty of one (1) year for each additional
₱10,000.00 would surely exceed the maximum limitation provided under Article 315, which is twenty (20)
years. Thus, the RTC correctly imposed the maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
There is need, however, to modify the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the CA in each
case respecting the minimum term of imprisonment. The trial court imposed the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum which is beyond the lawful range.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the penalty should be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed for the
estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty
next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods which has a duration
of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus, the Court sets the minimum
term of the indeterminate penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Petitioner
is therefore sentenced in each case to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed upon the petitioner
should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179031 February 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff Appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On November 14, 2012, this Court rendered its Decision1 in this case finding accused-appellant Benjamin
Soria y Gomez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 01442 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is
also ordered to pay "AAA" the amounts of ₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. "AAA" is entitled to an interest on all damages awarded at the
legal rate of 6% per annum :from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.2
The said Decision supposedly became final and executory on December 20, 2012.3 Subsequently,
however, the Court received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing us of the death of accused-
appellant on August 16, 2012. In compliance with our directive, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
submitted on November 11, 2013, a certified true copy of the death certificate4 of accused-appellant.
Clearly, accused-appellant’s demise on August 16, 2012 transpired before the promulgation of this Court’s
Decision on November 14, 2012 or before its finality on December 20, 2012. Therefore, when accused-
appellant died, his appeal before this Court was still pending resolution.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Amistoso,5 this Court encountered a similar situation wherein the accused-appellant died
before his appeal could be resolved. The Court explained the implications of the accused-appellant’s
demise as follows:
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery
of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of its
Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and
unresolved.1âwphi1 The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it was not immediately
informed of his death.
Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court’s Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though
affirming Amistoso’s conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become
final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
The Court had no course of action but to set aside its Decision and dismiss the criminal case against
Amistoso by reason of his death.
Likewise, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape had become irrelevant and ineffectual by reason of his death on
August 16, 2012. Consequently, the same must be set aside and the case against accused-appellant must
consequently be dismissed.
ACCORDINGLY, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. Q-01-
98692 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, is DISMISSED on account of accused-
appellant's demise.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 177751
Appellee,
Present:
- versus -
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
FLORENCIO AGACER,
BERSAMIN,
EDDIE AGACER,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ELYNOR AGACER,
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
FRANKLIN AGACER and

ERIC⃰ AGACER,
Promulgated:
Appellants.
December 14, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This case involves a man who was killed by his own relatives. Convicted for the crime of murder by the
lower courts, the indicted relatives are now before us assailing their guilty verdict.
Factual Antecedents
This is an appeal from the November 17, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01543, affirming with modification the August 7, 2001 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
8, Aparri, Cagayan which found appellants Florencio Agacer (Florencio), Franklin Agacer (Franklin), Elynor
Agacer (Elynor), Eric Agacer (Eric) and Eddie Agacer (Eddie), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder for the killing of Cesario Agacer (Cesario).
As mentioned, all the appellants were related to Cesario. Florencio was Cesarios nephew and is the father
of Franklin while the brothers Elynor, Eric and Eddie are his nephews.
On March 2, 1999, an Information[3] for Murder was filed against the five appellants, the accusatory
portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about April 2, 1998, in the municipality of Sta. Ana, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction [of] this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a long firearm, a bow and
arrow, a bolo and stones, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring
together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack,
stone and shoot one Cesario Agacer, inflicting upon the latter [bruises] and multiple gunshot wounds in
his body which caused his death.
That the killing was aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On October 14, 1999, Florencio, Elynor, Franklin and Eric entered separate pleas of not guilty during their
arraignment.[5] On January 11, 2000, Eddie likewise pleaded not guilty.[6] Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecutions version of the events is as follows:
Cesario was a 55-year old farmer and owner of a ricefield situated in Dungeg, Santa Ana, Cagayan. On
April 2, 1998, at around 9:00 a.m., he was clearing a section of his farm and preparing the beddings for
the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Farm laborers Genesis Delantar (Genesis), his
brother Andy, Rafael Morgado and brothers Roden (Roden) and Ric (Ric) Vallejo were nearby in a separate
section of the same ricefield harvesting Cesarios palay.
According to prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden, it was at that moment while Cesario was tending
to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby banana plantation and surrounded Cesario.
Visibly intimidated, Cesario moved backwards and retreated to where the other farm laborers were
working. However, Franklin set afire the rice straws that covered Cesarios rice seedlings. This prompted
Cesario to return to put out the fire and save his rice seedlings. At this point, Franklin and Eric started
throwing stones at Cesario which forced the latter to retreat again. Thereafter, Florencio, while standing
side by side with Eric, signaled Cesario to come closer. Cesario obliged but when he was just around five
meters away from the group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a sack and, without
warning, shot Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost simultaneously, Elynor took aim
at Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his mark. As Cesario fell, appellants fled towards the
irrigation canal, where another gunshot rang. Thereafter, a short firearm was thrown from where the
appellants ran towards the direction of Cesarios fallen body. Appellants then immediately left the scene
of the crime onboard a hand tractor and a tricycle.
After these events unfolded, Genesis and the other farm laborers scampered away in different directions.
Genesis then reached Barangay Capanikian and informed Cesarios son, Neldison Agacer (Neldison), of the
death of his father. At around 3:00 p.m., Cesarios friends in said barangay went to the scene of the crime
and retrieved his corpse. During the autopsy, a total of eight entrance wounds were found, mostly on the
chest of Cesarios cadaver. According to the Medico-Legal Officer, the fatal gunshot wounds were inflicted
by the use of a firearm capable of discharging several slugs simultaneously.
The appellants denied the accusations against them and claimed that Florencio only acted in self-defense
and in defense of relatives. As proof, appellants presented Florencio who testified that on April 2, 1998,
he proceeded to Dungeg, Sta. Ana, Cagayan, from his residence in Merde, also in Sta. Ana, Cagayan, to
prepare seed beddings in the ricefield over which he and his uncle Cesario had an existing dispute. At
around 8:00 a.m., he claimed that Cesario attempted to prevent him from preparing the seed beds. When
Florencio persisted and argued that he inherited the land from his father, Cesario departed through a
cogonal area. Moments later, Cesario returned and shouted at him not to continue working on the land.
At that time, Florencio noticed that Cesario was holding an object. Suspecting that Cesario may be armed,
he shouted to Eric, Franklin, Eddie and Elynor, who had just arrived, to run away. The four heeded his
warning and scampered in different directions. Cesario then chased Florencio who ran and jumped into
the irrigation canal to hide in the tall cogon grasses. However, Cesario was not deterred and continued to
search for him. When Florencio saw that Cesario was already close, he suddenly grabbed Cesarios
buckshot gun and successfully disarmed him. Thereupon, Cesario drew another firearm and shot Florencio
several times. As Cesario was shooting him, Florencio also fired the gun he earlier grabbed from Cesario
and hit the latter. Finding out that he too was hit in the arm, he shouted to his nephews for help. They
responded by taking him to a hospital for treatment. On April 16, 1998, he went to the police to surrender.
Elynor and Eddie corroborated this version in their respective testimonies.[7]
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found the prosecutions evidence sufficient to prove
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It held that appellants acted in conspiracy in inflicting upon
Cesario, in a treacherous manner, multiple gunshot wounds. However, the trial court did not appreciate
evident premeditation as a qualifying aggravating circumstance for failure to establish its elements as
clearly as the criminal act itself. It also did not consider as aggravating circumstance the use of an
unlicensed firearm since the firearm used in the killing was not presented in evidence.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision[8] of August 7, 2001, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused FLORENCIO AGACER, EDDIE AGACER, ELYNOR AGACER,
FRANKLIN AGACER and ERIC AGACER GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified
[by] treachery and hereby sentence[s] them to:
1. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties;
2. indemnify the heirs of the victim, the amount of P75,000.00 as death indemnity; the amount of
P40,000.00 as actual damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as and by way of Attorneys fees.
3. pay the costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal,[10] which was approved by the trial court in its Order[11] of August
17, 2001. Pursuant thereto, the records of the case were elevated to this Court. However, in view of the
Courts ruling in People v. Mateo[12] allowing an intermediate review by the CA where the penalty
involved is death, reclusion perpetua as in this case, or life imprisonment, the case was transferred to said
court for appropriate action and disposition.[13]

The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all respects. It also awarded moral damages pursuant to
the rule laid down in People v. Dela Cruz[14] and People v. Panela.[15] The dispositive portion of the
November 17, 2006 Decision[16] of the CA reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant appeal, and
accordingly AFFIRMING in toto the herein impugned August 7, 2001 Decision of the RTC, Branch 08, of
Aparri, Cagayan. Additionally, the amount of P50,000.00 is hereby awarded in favor of Cesario Agacers
surviving heirs as and by way of moral damages pursuant to the doctrine in the cases of Dela Cruz and
Panela, as heretofore stated.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, the present appeal.
Assignment of Errors
In their Brief,[18] appellants assigned the following errors:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED [AMONG] THE HEREIN ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS IN THE KILLING OF CESARIO AGACER.
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THAT
TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
III
THE LOWER COURT FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILT HAS BEEN
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[19]
Appellants contend that both lower courts erred in finding that they conspired to kill Cesario. They argue
that there was no evidence sufficient to establish their intentional participation in the crime to achieve a
common purpose. Thus, they claim that the criminal culpability arising from their acts, even if the same
were all directed solely against one victim, is individual and not collective. Put differently, each of them is
liable only for his own acts.
Appellants also contend that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime. They assert that
treachery cannot be appreciated when an altercation precedes the killing. Here, Cesario already had a
previous heated altercation with Florencio. Appellants aver that Cesario had only himself to blame for
obliging when Florencio summoned him to come near considering that they just had a heated argument.
According to them, Cesario literally courted danger by approaching Florencio instead of running away
from him.
Lastly, appellants posit that they cannot be held guilty of murder since the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was not alleged with clarity nor specified in the Information as required by Sections 8 and 9,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
In its Brief,[20] the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains
that there was conspiracy among the appellants as shown by their collective acts before, during, and after
the perpetration of the crime. Their specific acts are in fact indicative of a common design and intent to
ensure the commission of the crime.[21] The OSG also belies the assertion of the appellants that treachery
does not exist in this case. It insists that their attack on Cesario was sudden and unexpected, thereby
depriving him of a chance to defend himself and ensuring its commission without risk to the appellants
and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.[22]
Our Ruling

Conspiracy was sufficiently established
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.[23] In conspiracy, it is not necessary to adduce direct evidence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime.[24] It may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest.[25] Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential but the fact
that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices.[26]
Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among appellants to commit the crime and while
it was established during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario, the acts of all appellants before, during and
after the incident establish the existence of conspiracy to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt. First, all
of them emerged at the same time from a banana plantation beside the ricefield. Second, they surprised
Cesario by immediately surrounding him. Third, all of them were armed at the time of the incident. Eddie
had a shotgun concealed in a sack, Florencio was armed with a bolo, Elynor had a bow and arrow, while
Eric and Franklin had stones in their hands. Fourth, Eric and Franklin struck Cesario with stones moments
before the shooting. Fifth, Eddie immediately shot Cesario at close range while the latter was approaching
the group of appellants upon being summoned by Florencio. Sixth, Florencio, Franklin, Eric and Elynor
stood just a meter away from Eddie when he shot Cesario, but did not do anything to stop or dissuade
Eddie from the assault. Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all appellants departed from the scene of the
crime together.
Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity in design, intent and
execution.[27] They performed specific acts with closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate
a common purpose and design[28] to ensure the death of Cesario. We thus uphold the lower courts
finding that appellants conspired to commit the crime of murder against Cesario.
Having established conspiracy, appellants assertion that each of them can only be made liable for his own
acts deserves no merit. Evidence as to who among the appellants delivered the fatal blow is therefore no
longer indispensable since in conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another.[29]
In a conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.[30]
Essence of Treachery; Elements
We are also unimpressed with appellants contention that both the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling
that treachery qualified the killing of Cesario to murder. They maintain that since the attack on Cesario
was frontal, there was therefore no element of surprise on the victim or suddenness of the assault that
characterizes treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.[31] Two conditions
must concur for treachery to be appreciated. First, is the employment of means of execution that gives
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Second, the means of execution was
deliberate or consciously adopted.[32] The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an aggressor
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. [33]
In this case, treachery is evident from the same circumstances we have already discussed above. From
the facts, Cesario could not have been aware that he would be surrounded, attacked and killed by the
appellants who were all related to him. He could not have also been aware that Eddie had a shotgun
concealed in a sack because if he was, he would not have casually approached Florencio when the latter
summoned him. Unfortunately, while Cesario was advancing towards Florencio, Eddie shot him at close
range without any warning whatsoever. Evidently, the crime was committed in a manner that there was
no opportunity for Cesario to defend himself. Also, the mode of attack did not spring from the unexpected
turn of events but was clearly thought of by the appellants. Hence, it no longer matters that the assault
was frontal since its swiftness and unexpectedness deprived Cesario of a chance to repel it or offer any
resistance in defense of his person.[34]
Appellants contention that treachery was not alleged with certainty in the Information is also devoid of
merit. In People v. Villacorta[35] the Court appreciated treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it having
been alleged in the Information and proved during trial that the x x x accused, armed with a sharpened
bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x.
Similarly, we hold that treachery was sufficiently alleged in the Information when it reads, viz:
x x x the above-name[d] accused, armed with a long firearm, a bow and arrow, a bolo and stones, with
intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring together and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stone and shoot one
Cesario Agacer, inflicting upon the latter [bruises] and multiple gunshot wounds in his body which caused
his death.[36] (Emphasis supplied.)
Well-settled is the rule that when x x x treachery x x x is present and alleged in the Information, it qualifies
the killing and raises it to the category of murder.[37]
Appellants failed to discharge their burden to prove Florencios claim that he acted in self-defense and in
defense of relatives.
Florencio admits that he shot Cesario but invokes defense of himself and of his relatives to escape criminal
liability.
The Court is not convinced.
While it is the burden of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
this burden shifts when the accused admits the killing and pleads self-defense by way of justification. It
therefore becomes vital for the accused to show clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-
defense. In so doing, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecutions evidence.[38]
The accused must also prove the following elements of self-defense: (1) there was unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
attack; and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[39] In the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non.[40] Self-defense,
complete or incomplete, cannot be considered a justification, unless the victim commits an unlawful
aggression against the person defending himself.[41]
Here, Florencio failed to prove that he defended himself against the unlawful aggression of Cesario. He
failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim that there was an actual or imminent peril to his
life or limb. Aside from his unreliable and self-serving claim, there is no proof that Cesario assaulted and
shot him with a firearm during their struggle or, if at all, that there was indeed a struggle between them.
On the other hand, the separate testimonies of prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden negate
Florencios claim of unlawful aggression. The testimonies of these witnesses established that it was the
appellants who emerged from a nearby banana plantation; that they surrounded Cesario and set to fire
the rice straws covering his rice seedlings; that appellants were armed with different kinds of weapons,
while Cesario was not; that Franklin and Elynor cast stones upon Cesario; and, that the one who pulled a
gun from a sack and shot Cesario was Eddie, not Florencio. We thus hold that if there was unlawful
aggression here, it came from appellants end and not from Cesario. Hence, there being no unlawful
aggression on the part of Cesario, Florencios claim of self-defense must fail.
Another basis for appellants conviction is the finding of the medico-legal expert that the cause of Cesarios
death was multiple gunshot wounds found mostly at the infero-lateral portion of the anterior chest, right
side. This corroborates the testimonies of Genesis and Roden that Cesario was shot in his chest. These
dovetailing findings of the medico-legal expert and the eyewitness accounts of Genesis and Roden also
deserve more credence than the unsubstantiated claim of self-defense of Florencio, who, interestingly,
gave contradictory testimony. Florencio claimed that he could not see the gun used by Cesario in shooting
him as tall cogonal grass obstructed his view, yet he could clearly recall that he saw the bullet-riddled
Cesario fall.[42] These contradictory statements of Florencio all the more convince us to believe the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses that no exchange of gunfire actually transpired between Cesario and
Florencio. Rather, it was only Eddie who wielded a gun and shot Cesario.
Florencio also invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives, which has three elements, to
wit, (1) there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case of provocation given by the person being attacked,
the person making defense had no part therein.[43] Like in the case of self-defense, unlawful aggression
is also an indispensable element in defense of relative. As discussed, there is no unlawful aggression on
the part of Cesario. Hence, Florencios reliance on this justifying circumstance is likewise unavailing.
Similarly, Florencios subsequent presentation of himself at the police station cannot be considered as a
voluntary surrender which would mitigate the penalty imposed. A surrender to be voluntary must be
spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either
because (a) he acknowledges his guilt or (b) he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture.[44] Here, Florencio cannot be considered to have surrendered
voluntarily since his act did not emanate from a natural impulse to admit the killing of Cesario or to save
the police officers the effort and expense that would be incurred in his search and incarceration. Although
he submitted a medico-legal certificate purportedly to show that his injuries prevented him from
immediately surrendering to the authorities, same, however, does not certify as to the period of his
incapacity or the period during which he required medical attendance. Thus, there can be no explanation
why he surrendered only on April 16, 1998 or 14 days after the commission of the crime. To us, Florencios
surrender was a mere afterthought undeserving of any consideration. Indeed, the failure of Florencio to
immediately surrender militates against his claim that he killed Cesario in self-defense and in defense of
relatives since an innocent person will not hesitate to take the prompt and necessary action to exonerate
himself of the crime imputed to him.
All told, we find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA. The
testimonies of the eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution were given in a clear, natural and
spontaneous manner. Their positive identification of the appellants as the persons responsible for the
death of Cesario has been clearly, categorically and consistently established on record. Moreover, we note
that no evidence was presented to establish that these eyewitnesses harbored any ill-will against the
appellants or that they have reasons to fabricate their testimonies.[45] These kinds of testimonies are
accepted as true for being consistent with the natural order of events, human nature and the presumption
of good faith.[46]
The Proper Penalty
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. As correctly imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the CA, appellants must suffer the prison
term of reclusion perpetua, the lower of the said two indivisible penalties, due to the absence of an
aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime.
The Civil Liability
For the victims death resulting from the crime, the heirs are entitled to the following awards: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.[47]
Civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other
than the commission of the crime.[48] Moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 shall be awarded despite
the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victims heirs.[49] As borne out by human
nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish
on the part of the victims family.[50] Also under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may
be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, like
treachery,[51] as in this case. Thus, the award of P30,000.00 for exemplary damages is in order.[52]
As regards actual damages, the son of Cesario, Neldison, testified that the sum of P40,000.00 was spent
for the coffin of his father but was unable to present receipts to substantiate such claim. Where the
amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be ascertained due to the absence of receipts to
prove them, temperate damages in the sum of P25,000.00 may be granted, as it is hereby granted, in lieu
thereof.[53] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be
denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.[54]
The heirs of Cesario are also entitled to an interest on all the amounts of damages we have awarded at
the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.[55]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 17, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01543 which affirmed the August 7, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri,
Cagayan, finding appellants Florencio, Franklin, Elynor, Eddie and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with the following modifications:
(1) actual damages is DELETED;
(2) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
and
(3) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum on all the amounts of damages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.
People of the Philippines vs. Florante Relanes alis “Dante”
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Oftentimes in criminal cases, the issue presented for resolution is mostly confined to a question of
credibility, a weighing of the prosecutions evidence against that of the defense. In rape cases, if the
testimony of the victim passes the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted solely on that basis[1]
for [r]ape is generally unwitnessed and oftentimes, the victim is left to testify for herself.[2] From our
thorough review of the instant case, we find that the trial court, as well as the appellate court, committed
no reversible error in extending superior credit to the prosecutions evidence particularly the victims
testimony.
This is an automatic review of the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 17, 2006 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 00675 affirming with modification the Joint Decision[4] dated October 29, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 51, Sorsogon City, in Criminal Case Nos. 2003-5882
and 2003-5883, finding herein appellant Florante Relanes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, in both cases, committed against his own daughter AAA[5] and imposing on him the supreme
penalty of death for each act of rape.
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations both dated March 14, 2003 with the crime of rape
committed against AAA, his own daughter, during the first week of August 2002 and on January 9, 2003.
The Informations upon which appellant stood indicted read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2003-5882

That sometime in the first week of August 2002 at Barangay CCC, Municipality of DDD, Province of EEE,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd
designs, armed with a bolo and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and felonious[ly], have sexual intercourse with AAA, his 13-year old daughter, thereby
impregnating her, against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2003-5883
That on or about the 9th day of January, 2003, at Barangay CCC, Municipality of DDD, Province of EEE,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd
designs, armed with a bolo and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and felonious[ly], have sexual intercourse with AAA, his 14-year old daughter, thereby
impregnating her, against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two criminal
actions were jointly tried. In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented private complainant AAA,
Dr. Ronald Lim, and BBB, complainants mother. For its part, the defense presented the sole testimony of
the appellant.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The pertinent facts are faithfully stated in the Decision of the appellate court, viz:
AAA, the private complainant herein, testified that she was only eight (8) years old when her father,
accused Florante started to rape her and continued sexually abusing her until January 9, 2003; that as a
result of such abuse, she got pregnant and that despite knowledge of her pregnancy, the accused
continued to have sexual intercourse with her. The witness further narrated that the sexual abuse began
after her whole family, including her two sisters transferred from Manila to CCC, DDD, EEE and that the
very first time she was sexually abused by her father was on the occasion when her mother was away
vending vegetables. This sexual encounter was followed by countless instances, whenever her mother
was not at home and vending vegetables, where she was sexually abused by her father at bolo-point and
threats were made against her life and that of her family, as well, in order to prevent her from telling
anyone about the incidents. As recounted by AAA, such sexual abuse happened once a week, usually on
a Thursday at around 7:00 oclock in the evening when her mother was away spending the night with her
aunt in FFF, EEE which was nearer to the market. Such sexual abuses were done by her father at their
house and usually in the room of her parents and also, sometimes in the room where she and her siblings
sleep. In describing how her father sexually abused her, AAA stated that her father would mount x x x her
and insert his penis into her vagina and do a push and pull movement and in three occasions, her father
even turned her backwards against him.
xxxx
Despite her pregnancy, her father continued to have sexual intercourse with her until January 9, 2003
when her father left for Manila on January 11, 2003. On January 24, 2003, while her father was still in
Manila, AAA finally had the courage to tell her mother about her sexual ordeals in the hands of her father.
They went to the authorities to have [her] father arrested and there she executed a sworn statement
about the rape incidents and likewise submitted herself to medical examination.
In this connection, Dr. Ronald Lim, the physician who examined AAA and who is the Municipal Health
Officer of DDD, EEE testified that on January 27, 2003, he conducted a physical examination of AAAs
reproductive organ and found healed lacerations on the victims genitalia indicating that a man had sexual
intercourse with her. From the said examination, he also discovered that the victim was pregnant.
In the meantime, BBB, the mother of private complainant, testified that she and accused Florante are the
parents of AAA. She related that on October 22, 1987, she and accused Florante were married and that
on July 5, 1988, AAA was born from their union. She recalled that on January 24, 2003, AAA informed her
that she had a problem and then proceeded to tell her that she was pregnant. When she asked who the
father was, AAA replied that it was her own father, BBBs own husband who made her pregnant. The two
of them then went to the police station to report the incident and to have Florante arrested and at the
same time, have AAA medically examined. The witness stated that the result of the medical examination
confirmed that AAA was indeed pregnant.
x x x x[8]
Evidence for the Appellant
During the trial, appellant initially denied that he raped AAA in August 2002. But during the presentation
of the defense evidence, he admitted having sexual intercourse with AAA during that time. Appellant,
however, stood pat in denying the accusation against him in Criminal Case No. 2003-5883, asserting in the
main that he had already left for Manila prior to the alleged rape on January 9, 2003.
The trial court found the testimony of AAA in relating her horrible misfortune at the hands of her own
father to be consistent and steadfast. It discredited appellants defense of alibi holding that it cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of AAA. The dispositive portion of its Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused FLORANTE RELANES guilty of the crime of Rape beyond reasonable
doubt in both Criminal Case Nos. 2003-5882 [and] 5883, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of double death and to pay the victim [AAA] the civil indemnity in the amount of Php50,000.00,
Php75,000.00 [as] moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages in each case.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In a Decision dated March 17, 2006, the CA affirmed with modification the trial courts Joint Decision
convicting appellant. Like the trial court, the CA also found the testimony of AAA clear, positive and
consistent with the circumstances surrounding the rape incidents disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision dated October 29, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 51 of Sorsogon City, in Criminal Case Nos. 2003-5882 and 2003-5883 finding accused-appellant
Florante Relanes alias Dante GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and imposing
upon him the death penalty in both cases is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that, accused-appellant is
hereby ordered to pay AAA the following amounts, in each case: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[10]
From the CA, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. In its Resolution[11] dated January
30, 2007, this Court required the parties to submit Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from notice thereof
if they so desire.
In a Manifestation[12] filed on March 14, 2007, appellant manifested that he is no longer filing a
Supplemental Brief but adopts his arguments in the Appellants Brief[13] submitted before the CA.
Appellee, for its part, manifested[14] that it is dispensing with the filing of a Supplemental Brief as the
facts, issues and pertinent arguments have already been discussed in its Appellees Brief[15] dated
September 20, 2005. Hence, this case was submitted for deliberation on the basis of Appellants Brief and
Appellees Brief filed with the CA.
Issues
In the Brief he filed with the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the incredible testimony of
the private complainant.
II. The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the
failure of [the] prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[16]
Our Ruling
We sustain the assailed Decision of the CA.
At the core of almost all rape cases, the credibility of the victims testimony
is crucial in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only the participants therein can testify to its
occurrence. In this regard, a restatement of a consistent ruling is in order. The rule is that the findings of
fact of trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not
conclusive effect.[17] This is especially true if such findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
thereby making such findings generally binding upon this Court.
We have thoroughly reviewed the records and found that indeed the prosecution has sufficiently and
convincingly proved that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through force and intimidation
sometime in August 2002 and on January 9, 2003. Records bear out the convincing manner in which AAA
testified and did so with candor and consistency in recounting the material points of the criminal incidents.
She vividly recounted the sexual ordeal that she suffered sometime in August 2002 at the hands of her
father, thus:
xxxx
Q. Why did you file a complaint against your father?
A. I want him to pay [for] what he did to me.
The victim is crying, Your Honor.
Q. Tell us, what did your father do to you?
A. He raped me.
Q. Where did that happen?
A. In our house.
Q. Where is that house?

A. In CCC.
Q. When did it happen?
A. The last time was on January 9, maam
Q. What year?
A. 2003.
Q. You said that the last time your father raped you was on January 9, 2003, it means that there were
other times, am I right?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. When was the first time that he raped you?
A. When I was in grade 2, maam.

Q. How old were you then?
A. I was 8 years old.
Q. And were you still living in CCC then?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. What about your mother, where was she when you were first raped by your father?
A. She was out of the house vending.
Q. What?
A. Selling vegetables.
Q. You were first raped when you were in grade 2, when else [was that] done to you?
A. It was in [the] month of August.

Court (to witness)
Q. August of what year?
A. 2002.
xxxx
Court: (to witness)
Q. Whenever he raped you, what actually did your father do with your body?
A. He used to [carry] me and he always [had] a bolo with him.
Pros. Gabito
Q. And what does he tell you when he has that bolo?
A. He told me that whenever I report the matter to everybody, he will kill us all.
Q. After he tells you that, what did he do to you?
A. He raped me.
Court (to witness)
Q. What do you mean by rape, what does he do to you?
A. He undressed me.
Q. And when you [were] already naked, what [did] he do?
A. He mounted x x x me.
Q. And when he is on top of you, what else did he do?
A. Whenever he went on top of me, he told me not to tell anybody or else I will be killed.
Q. Is he naked while he is on top of you?

A. Yes, maam.
Q. And [when] he goes on top of you, what does he do x x x to you in your private parts?
A. He raped me.
Q. When you said [rape], what does he use to rape you?
A. His penis.
Q. What does he do with his penis?
A. He inserted it to mine.
Q. When you said mine, are you referring to your vagina?
A. Yes, maam.
xxxx
Q. And except from your description that he mounted x x x you, insert his penis [into] your vagina, did he
do any other position or style to you?
A. He let me [turn] my back [to him].
The witness broke into tears again and cried and may we ask for a recess.
Court Recess for five minutes.
Atty. Gabito
Q. And when your back is already turned towards him[,] your back?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. And what does he do to you when your back is towards him and he is behind you?
A. He inserted his penis.

Court (to witness)
Q. When his penis is inside your vagina, what did he do?
A. [Hes] doing a push and pull movement.[18]
As to the alleged rape committed on January 9, 2003, AAA stated:
Q. You said, the last time that your father had sexual intercourse was on January 9, that was two days
before he left for Manila, am I right?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Now, where did that last rape incident happen?
A. In our house.
Q. Who were there when that happened?
A. Nobody, maam.
Q. Only you and your father?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Before he [raped] you, what were you doing?
A. I was cleaning the house.
Q. And what about your father, what was he doing then?
A. Nothing, he was just there.
Q. Where were your two sisters and your mother then?
A. My other sister was in school while the other one was in my grandmothers house.
Q. What about your mother?
A. She was vending.
Q. While you were cleaning the house, what did your father do?
A. He let me go inside the bedroom.
Q. And did you follow him, his instruction to go to that bedroom?
A. It took me a long time before I went inside the room.
Q. Why?
A. I was afraid.
Q. But did you eventually enter the room?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Why?
A. He threatened me.
Q. And while you were already inside the bedroom, what did he do?
A. He undressed me.
Q. What about himself, what did he do?
A. He also undressed himself.
Q. Were you totally naked?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. What about him?

A. He was also naked.
Q. So after both of you [were already] naked, what else happened?
A. He mounted x x x me.
Q. Where were you lying then?
A. [On] a bed.
Q. After he mounted x x x you, what else did he do to his penis?
A. He inserted his penis [into] my vagina.
Q. And while his penis was inserted [into] your vagina, what [was] he doing?
A. He was doing a push and pull movement.
Q. After he was [through] doing that, what else happened?
A. He ordered me to go on top of the divider of our house and he [told me to jump].

Q. Why?
A. Because he wanted to [terminate a pregnancy].[19]
Based on the foregoing narrations, bolstered by appellants own admission that he raped AAA in August
2002, we find conclusive evidence that AAA was undoubtedly raped against her will with the use of force
and intimidation, not once, but many times at the hands of her own father.
Moreover, AAAs testimony is corroborated by the findings of the examining physician, Dr. Ronald Lim.[20]
The doctor found healed lacerations at 6, 11 and 2 oclock positions on AAAs hymen which according to
him could have been caused by sexual intercourse. When a rape victims account is straightforward and
candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, the same is sufficient to
support a conviction for rape.[21]
AAA cried while recounting her awful experience at the hands of her own father so that the court had to
order a brief recess for her to regain her composure.[22] Such display of emotion is a clear indication
regarding the truth of the rape charges.[23] As has been repeatedly held, no young girl would concoct a
sordid tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo medical examination,
then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive [was] other than a
fervent desire to seek justice.[24]
Appellants belabored attempt to characterize the testimony of AAA as incredible lacks merit. His claim
that it was not possible for him to rape AAA everytime her mother was in the market on Thursdays
because she (AAA) attended classes from Monday to Friday was completely debunked by the appellate
court in this wise:
Accused-appellants position that the testimony of the rape victim is too incredible to be believed owing
to the fact that the January 9, 2003 rape incident could not have been committed as the rape victim herself
admitted that she was in school from Mondays to Fridays and stayed there from morning until afternoon
is untenable. First, such admission does not in any way contradict the victims testimony of rape as it does
not exclude the possibility that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her on the date in question.
Second, AAA herself clarified during her cross-examination that the sexual abuse by accused-appellant
usually happened on a Thursday around 7:00 oclock in the evening, after classes in school, and on the
occasion when her mother was not at home.[25]
Appellants defense of denial and alibi should be dismissed outright in light of his positive identification by
the victim AAA. It is an established jurisprudential rule that denial and alibi, being negative self-serving
defenses, cannot prevail over the affirmative allegations of the victim and her categorical and positive
identification of the accused as her assailant.[26] Denial and alibi must be proved by the accused with
clear and convincing evidence otherwise they cannot prevail over the positive testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[27] The assertion of appellant that he was in Manila on
January 9, 2003 does not inspire belief since it remained uncorroborated by clear and convincing evidence
that he was really in Manila when the last rape was committed. But what sealed appellants fate is his plea
for forgiveness to his wife, daughter, his parents and members of his family.[28] Evidently, no one would
ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered
as analogous to an attempt to compromise.[29] Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.[30] Under the
circumstances obtaining, appellants plea for forgiveness should be received as an implied admission of
guilt.
With all the foregoing, this Court entertains no doubt that the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant raped his daughter AAA under the circumstances mentioned in Article
266-A, paragraph 1(a)[31] of the Revised Penal Code which, pursuant to Article 266-B[32] of the same
Code, warrants the imposition of the death penalty. To justify the imposition of death penalty, however,
it is required that the special qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the
appellant be properly alleged in the Information and duly proved during the trial. All these requirements
were duly established in this case. In the two Informations, it was alleged that AAA was 13 years old and
14 years old when the incidents happened. AAAs minority was buttressed not only by her testimony
during the trial but likewise by her Certificate of Live Birth showing that she was born on July 5, 1988.[33]
Appellant categorically admitted that he was legally married to AAAs mother and that AAA is his
daughter.[34] Thus, appellant was correctly sentenced to death in both cases by the courts below.
However, since the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346,[35] the
death penalty imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.[36]
Regarding damages, we sustain the appellate courts award of civil indemnity to AAA in the amount of
P75,000.00 for each case. [I]f the crime of rape is qualified by circumstances which warrant the imposition
of the death penalty by applicable amendatory laws, the complainant should be awarded P75,000.00 for
each count of rape as civil indemnity.[37] We also affirm the award of moral and exemplary damages. In
rape cases, [m]oral damages are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of
rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries for the experience she underwent.[38]
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are given by way of public example and to protect the young from
sexual abuse. However, the moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively, should be increased to P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 consistent with relevant
jurisprudence.[39] In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all
damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment, likewise pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.[40]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 17, 2006 finding appellant Florante
Relanes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the penalty of death imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346; and (2) the award of moral and exemplary
damages are increased to P75,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively, in each case. The award of civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 for each case is maintained. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

People of The Philippines vs. Tirso Sibbu

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People of The Philippines vs. Tirso Sibbu

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People of the Philippines Vs.

G.R. No. 214757; March 29, 2017

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

The appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The dispositive part of the RTC’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Aggrieved by the RTC’s Decision, appellant appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appeal is unmeritorious.

Around five (5) meters away, ma’am.

How about [his] face x x x, can you x x x describe [it] to us?

Tirso Sibbu, ma’am.

There was a light in front of the azotea, ma’am.

Christmas lights that were not blinking, ma’am.[18]

More or less 5 meters, sir.

He came nearer, sir.

Now, Mr. Witness, [how did you recognize the accused]?

That bonnet x x x covered the face, is that correct?

Only one eye was covered so he fixed it sir.

In People v. Jugueta,[30] the Court held that:

Civil indemnity – P100,000.00

Moral damages – P100,000.00

Exemplary damages – P100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

Civil indemnity – P75,000.00

Moral damages – P75,000.00

Exemplary damages – P75,000.00

Civil indemnity – P50,000.00

Moral damages – P50,000.00

Exemplary damages – P50,000.00

In People v. Jugueta,[31] the Court en banc held as follows:

LUZ S. ALMEDA, Petitioner

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Navarro filed his Comment14 to petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The motions should be denied.

Accordingly, the motions, on procedural grounds, should be denied.

Hence, the instant Petition.

The Court grants the Petition.

[ GR No. 198024, Mar 16, 2015 ]

PEOPLE v. RAFAEL CUNANAN Y DAVID +

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The regularity and due execution of the Physical Sciences Report.[5]

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

With costs against the accused.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appeal is without merit.

was caught in flagrante delicto selling an

illegal drug in a buy-bust operation; contrary

to his contention, it was not inconceivable

that he would openly sell an illegal drug

What was the reply of this alias Paeng Putol?

Akina iyong pera, sabi niya.

What did you do?

I gave to him the two pieces of one[-]hundred peso bill[s].

What did he do?

He returned and gave me one plastic sachet containing suspected shabu.

seized item have been preserved.

Appellant's defenses of denial and