Gelos vs Court of Appeals

Topic: Definition of Agricultural Tenancy

Facts: The Private Respondent owned the subject land of 25,000 square meters in Laguna. The Landowner then
entered in to a contract with the petitioner and employed him to be laborer on the land with the wage of 5.00 peso
a day. The Petitioner first went the Court of Agrarian Relation and then went to Ministry of Agrarian reform and
asked the court to fix the agricultural lease rental of the land and his request was granted. The private respondent
then filed a complaint of illegal detainer against the petitioner that was that was dismissed by the Ministry of
Agrarian reform for the existence of Tenancy relations between the parties. The Private respondents appealed to
the office of the President alleging that there was no tenancy relation between the parties. The RTC rendered
dismissed the complaint and assailed that there was a tenancy relation between the parties. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Is there a Tenancy relation between the parties?

Held: No, it was clear that the petitioner were not intended to be tenant but a mere employee of the private
respondent as showed in the contract. The petitioner was paid for specific kind of work. The court stressed many
cases that:

"tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a
legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case,
their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important."

It should also be considered that a tenant is defined under Section 5(a) R.A 1199 as a person who himself and with
the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the
share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both,
under the leasehold tenancy system.

The requisites for the tenancy relationship to exist The parties are the landowner and the tenant; The subject is
agricultural land; There is consent; The purpose is agricultural production; There is personal cultivation; and There
is sharing of harvest or payment of rental. Absence of this clearly does not qualify someone to be a tenant. It is
clear that it is not a tenancy relationship that exists between the parties, what they have is employee-employer
relationship.
Gabriel v. Pangilinan

Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of a 169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio Sta.
Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly rental was entered between them. Defendant was
notified that the contract would be terminated, but upon request was extended for another year.

Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the trial court had no jurisdiction. It should
properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship
between the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the
land was originally verbally leased to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted,
subject to the condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and that which was already a
fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the
termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that he could continue leasing as long as he wanted since she
was not in a position to attend to it personally.

Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take cognizance of the
case.

It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings, repairing dikes and such, personally with the
aid of helpers since he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over who said that she
helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who
is residing near the fishpond, defendant’s other children are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all
residing in Manila. None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.

Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No.
1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his immediate farm
household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has been extinguished
(Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy relationship exists
between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested with jurisdiction to try
and decide this case.

Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.

ISSUES:

1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a civil lease and not a
leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction, the cue being that of
an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
HELD:

Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the
law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law
lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy
is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law
that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special
laws.

The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:

1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm
household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of
his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both

There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to
"agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. The mere
fact that a person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview
of Sec 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated
are complied with.

The court doesn’t want to decide on the second requisite since it wasn’t raised. For the third requisite, the tenancy
agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became ill and
incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's immediate farm household work the land. Only the
members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are
dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term
"immediate farm household".

Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. A person, in
order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household
cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he
who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having
abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to
enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.

We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the appellee Trinidad
Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this
case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823,
appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
G.R. No. 108941, July 6, 2000

Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa vs CA, Isabel Candelaria and Jamie Dinglasan

Facts: This case involves two parcels of land located in Oriental Mindoro owned by Isabel Candelaria. October 1974,
Candelaria entered into a 3-year lease agreement with Pio Malabanan wherein Malabanan agreed to clear, clean
and cultivate the land, to purchase calamansi, and other seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants thereon
exist, to make the necessary harvest of fruits. Malabanan, later hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear
it. On May 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a 6-year usufruct over the land. 1983, Malabanan died. Candelaria
constituted Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the land. October 1984,
Candelaria entered into a new lease contract with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a 1-year term. On
December 1984, Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent in consideration of an "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a
term of 1 year.

After the 1 year period, Victoria demanded for Bejasas to vacate, but Bejasas continued to stay and did not give any
consideration for its use, be in rent or share. Candelarian again entered with a 3-year lease agreement with
Dinglasans, and made Jaime her attorney-in-fact again. Jaime then filed a complaint before Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking for ejectment of Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the complaint. Jaime
then filed it with RTC for recovery of possession; the case was referred to DAR. DAR certified that ht e case was not
proper for trial before the civil courts. Trial court dismissed the complaint of Jaime including the leasehold claim of
Bejasas. Bejasas then filed a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and recovery of damages against Candelaria
and Jaime. RTC favored the Bejasas. On appeal, CA reversed the decision saying that (1) there was no tenant
relationship, (2) Bejasas are mere overseers and not as permanent tenants, (3) the pakyaw contract have expired,
(4) sharing of profits was not proven, (5) the element of personal cultivation was not proven.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy in favor of Bejasas.

Ruling: There is no tenancy relationship. There was no proof of shared harvests. Between Candelaria (as owner)
and the Bejasas, there is no relationship. Candelaria never gave her consent. As to the authority of Dinglasans, they
had authority to bind the owner in a tenancy agreement, but there is no proof of such presented.
Anastacio Victorio vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Dominador Fernandez G.R. No. 110012 (March 28,
2001)

Facts: Sometime in 1967, Alfredo Victorio (as lessee) and Tomas Fernandez (as lessor), the fathers of herein
petitioner Anastacio Victorio and private respondent Dominador Fernandez, respectively entered into a lease
contract over a fishpond located in Brgy. Balangobon, Lingayen, Pangasinan for a 10-year period. After the said
contract expired in 1977, the same was renewed, albeit verbally, for another 10 years until 1987 but adopting the
terms and conditions of the original contract. When the second contract expired, private respondent repeatedly
asked petitioner to vacate the premises but the latter adamantly refused. Consequently, a case for ejectment was
filed by respondent against petitioner but was consequently dismissed by the trial court on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. On appeal, the regional trial court revised the decision holding that the lease contract is a civil law
lease agreement and ordering petitioner to vacate the fishpond in question and surrender peaceful possession
thereof.

Petitioner having been rebuked on reconsideration, elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on a petition for
certiorari. However, the Court of Appeals turned down the appeal, in effect, ratiocinating that the court is strongly
convinced and hereby finds and holds that the agreement entered into by the parties is a civil law contract of lease
and not one under the agricultural leasehold system as expressly termed under R.A. No. 3844, as amended. The
petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Republic Act No. 3844 and thus entitled to security
of tenure over the fishpond in question, or a mere civil lessee whose right over the subject premises ceased upon
the expiration of the contract of lease?

Held: The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2)
the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to
create a tenancy relationship between the parties (Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 [1198]; Oarde vs. Court
of Appeals, 280 SCRA 235 [1997]; Odsique vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 [1994]; see also Sintos vs. Court of
Appeals, 246 SCRA 223 [1995).

Petitioner's right to the fishpond emanated from the lease contract between his father and private respondent's
father wherein petitioner's father was designated as a "lessee" and not as a "tenant". Petitioner cannot, therefore,
be more than a lessee like his father because "the spring cannot rise higher than its source". Secondly, there was no
stipulation regarding the sharing of the harvest, whether explicitly or implicitly. One of the essential requisites for
existence of tenancy relationship is sharing by the landowner and tenant of the produce, and no proof of this fact
has been shown in this case. What the parties agreed upon, as established by the evidence, was for the petitioner
to pay private respondent a yearly lease rental, with an advance payment of 3 years' rental. This is not the case
obtaining in a tenancy relationship where the parties share in the produce of the land as this falls due, or as it
becomes available, during harvest time.
Teodoro vs. Macaraeg 27 SCRA 7 (1969)

Facts: Macaraeg had been the lessee of the property of Teodoro for the past seven (7) years when he was
advised by the latter to vacate the property because it would be given to another tenant. Thereafter, a new
tenant was installed who forbade Macaraeg from working on the riceland. On the other hand, Teodoro denied
that Macaraeg was his tenant and claimed that he had always leased all of his 39-hectare riceland under civil
lease. He further claimed that after the expiration of his "Contract of Lease" with Macaraeg in 1961, the latter
did not anymore renew his contract.

Held: The Contract of Lease between the parties contains the essential elements of a leasehold tenancy
agreement. The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to agricultural production.
More specifically, the parties stipulated that "the property leased shall be used or utilized for agricultural
enterprise only." Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the farmland must be used for rice production as
could be inferred from the stipulation that "the rental of nine (9) cavans of palay per hectare for one agricultural
year . . . must be of the same variety (of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE."

The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an area of only four and a half (4-1/2)
ha. This court has held that even a bigger area may be cultivated personally by the tenant, singly or with the help
of the members of his immediate farm household.

From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as that produced by the LESSEE," it can
reasonably be inferred that the intention of the parties was that Macaraeg personally work the land, which he
did as found by the Agrarian Court, thus: "In the instant case, petitioner (Macaraeg) cultivated the landholding
belonging to said respondent (Teodoro) for the agricultural year 1960-61 in consideration of a fixed annual
rental." (italics supplied) Moreover, there is no evidence that Macaraeg did not personally cultivate the land in
dispute. Neither did Teodoro allege, much less prove, that Macaraeg availed of outside assistance in the
cultivation of the said riceland.

Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he delivered the possession thereof to
Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid in produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold
tenancy agreement. Moreover, the provision that the rental be accounted in terms of produce — 9 cavans per
hectare — is an unmistakable earmark, considering the other stipulations, that the parties did actually enter into
a leasehold tenancy relation (at 16-17; underscoring supplied).

Agricultural tenancy relation is different from farm employer-farm employee relation. The Court clarified the
difference in the case ofGelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608 (1992), as follows:

On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1) the selection and engagement
of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the
employee's conduct — although the latter is the most important element.

According to a well-known authority on the subject, tenancy relationship is distinguished from farm employer-
farm worker relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the
agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee thereof. In tenancy
relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural
worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the
employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or
harvest." (at 614)
Valencia vs CA

Jeremias vs Estate of Irene P. Mariano

Ceneze vs Ramos

Zamoras vs. Su, Jr. 184 SCRA 248 (1990)

Facts: Zamoras was hired by Su as overseer of his coconut land in Dapitan City. Zamoras was tasked to have the
land titled in Su's name. He was also "assigning portions of the land to be worked by tenants, supervising the
cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the land, the harvesting of coconuts and selling of the copra." As
compensation, he was paid salary of P2,400 per month plus 1/3 of the proceeds of the sales of the copra. Su got
another 1/3 of the proceeds while the other third went to the tenants. In 1981, Su obtained a loan from Anita
Hortellano and the latter was authorized by Su to harvest the coconuts. Meanwhile, he informed Zamoras that
he was being temporarily laid-off until the loan is settled. Zamoras filed a case for illegal termination and breach
of contract before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of Labor. The Labor Arbiter held that Zamoras'
dismissal was without just cause and ordered Zamoras reinstatement. On appeal, the National Labor Relation
Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter by holding that there is no employee-employer relation existing between
the parties but a landlord-tenant relation hence jurisdiction rests with the agrarian court. Zamoras assailed the
decision of NLRC.

Held: The NLRC's conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Su and Zamoras is not
supported by the evidence which shows that Zamoras was hired by Su not as a tenant but as overseer of his
coconut plantation. As overseer, Zamoras hired the tenants and assigned their respective portions which they
cultivated under Zamoras' supervision. The tenants dealt directly with Zamoras and received their one-third
share of the copra produce from him. The evidence also shows that Zamoras, aside from doing administrative
work for Su, regularly managed the sale of copra processed by the tenants. There is no evidence that Zamoras
cultivated any portion of Su's land personally or with the aid of his immediate farm household.

The following circumstances indicate an employer-employee relationship between them: 1. Zamoras was
selected and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut plantation. 2. His duties were specified by Su. 3. Su
controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. He determined to whom Zamoras should sell the copra
produced from the plantation. 4. Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-third of the copra sales
every two months as compensation for managing the plantation."

There is no tenancy relation because the element of personal cultivation does not exist.

Bernas vs. Court of Appeals 225 SCRA 119 (1993)

Facts:Natividad Deita is the owner of a 5,831-sq m property which she entrusted to her brother, Benigno, so that
he could use the fruits thereof to defray the cost of his children's education in Manila. The property was leased
by Bernas pursuant to a production sharing arrangement executed between Bernas and Benigno. Natividad
played no part in this arrangement. In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister but when the owners
sought to take possession, Bernas refused to relinquish the property. Bernas was claiming that he was an
agricultural lessee entitled to security of tenure. Natividad filed an action for recovery of possession. The trial
court ruled in favor of Bernas but this was subsequently reversed by the CA.

Issue: Is consent by a legal possessor, even if without the consent of landowner, sufficient to create tenancy
relationship?

Held: Yes. As legal possessor of the property, Benigno had the authority and capacity to enter into an agricultural
leasehold relation with Bernas. "The law expressly grants him, as legal possessor, authority and capacity to
institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he legally possessed." (at 125-126)

For agricultural tenancy to exist, the subject of the agreement must be an agricultural land.

RA 6657 defines the term "agricultural land" as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." (see discussion on scope of CARP,
Chapter I). Under RA 3844, "agricultural land" refers to land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to
crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned land.

The area of agricultural land that a lessee may cultivate has no limit, but he should cultivate the entire area
leased. The three (3) hectare limit under RA 6657 applies only to the award that may be given to the agrarian
reform beneficiary.

Consent by landholder: As discussed earlier, consent must be given by the true and lawful landholder of the
property. In Hilario vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573 (1987), the Supreme Court held that tenancy relation does not exist
where a usurper cultivates the land.

Hilario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 148 SCRA 573 (1987)

Facts: Salvador Baltazar was working on the land pursuant to a contract executed between him and Socorro
Balagtas involving a two (2)-ha property. According to Baltazar, in 1965, he relinquished 1.5 ha to certain
individuals and what remained under his cultivation was ½-ha owned by Corazon Pengzon. After Socorro's death,
no new contract was executed. Sometime in 1980, the Hilarios started cultivating a 4,000-sq m portion of the
property and enjoined Baltazar from entering the same. The Hilarios claimed that they acquired the landholding
from the Philippine National Bank after a foreclosure proceeding. On the other hand, Corazon Pengzon explained
that she did not get any share from the produce of the land since 1964 and she would not have accepted it
knowing that she did not own the property anymore.

Held: Baltazar is not a tenant because no consent was given by Pengzon. As held in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals,
130 SCRA 482, tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder
through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation. "So the mere cultivation of the land by usurper
cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of tenure
of the law(Spouses Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482)."

Successors-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave the consent are bound to recognize
the tenancy established before they acquired the agricultural land.

Tiongson vs CA

Endaya vs. Court of Appeals 215 SCRA 109 (1992)

Facts: Spouses San Diego owned a 2.0200-ha rice and corn land. The property has been cultivated by Pedro Fideli
as a tenant of the couple under a 50-50 sharing agreement. In 1974, a lease contract was executed between
spouses San Diego and a certain Regino Cassanova for a period of four (4) years at P400.00 per ha per annum
rental and gave him the authority to oversee the planting of crops. The contract was subsequently renewed to
last until 1980. In both cases, Fideli signed as witness. While the contract was subsisting, Fideli continuously
worked on the property, sharing equally with Cassanova the net produce of the harvests. In 1980, the land was
sold to spouses Endaya. Fideli continued tilling the land despite the Endaya's demand to vacate the property.
Fideli refused to leave and deposited with Luzon Development Bank the landowner's share in the harvests. Fideli
filed a complaint praying that he be declared the agricultural tenant of the Endayas. The trial court ruled in favor
of the Endayas but the same was subsequently reversed by the CA holding that Fideli is an agricultural lessee
entitled to security of tenure.

Held: It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent of the true and
lawful owners is absent. But this doctrine contemplates a situation where an untenanted farm land is cultivated
without the landowner's knowledge or against her will or although permission to work on the farm was given,
there was no intention to constitute the worker as the agricultural lessee of the farm land. The rule finds no
application in the case at bar where the petitioners are successors-in-interest to a tenanted land over which an
agricultural leasehold has long been established. The consent given by the original owners to constitute private
respondent as the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding binds private respondents who, as successors-in-
interest of the Spouses San Diego, step into the latter's shoes, acquiring not only their rights but also their
obligations. (at 118;underscoring supplied). Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has
been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.

Reyes vs Joson

Adriano vs Tanco

Caballes vs. Department of Agrarian Reform 168 SCRA 248 (1988)

Facts: Spouses Caballes acquired subject land from the Millenes family. Prior to the sale, Abajon constructed his
house on a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental to the owner. Abajon was also allowed to plant on a
portion of the land and that the produce thereof would be shared by them on a 50-50 basis. When the new
owners took over, they told Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the southern portion of the property because they
would be building a poultry near Abajon's house. Later, the Caballes asked Abajon to leave because they

needed the property. Abajon refused. During the trial the former landowner testified that Abajon dutifully gave
her 50% share of the produce of the land under his cultivation.
Held: The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. The circumstances of this case
indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of
benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side
rather than a tenant of the said portion. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the
arrangement, it is clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes.
Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a
tenant of the herein petitioner.

Evangelista vs CA

De Jesus vs IAC

Bonifacio vs Dizon

Oarde vs CA

Matienzo vs Servidad

Isidro vs CA

Cornea vs Leal Realty