MASARYK UNIVERSITY, BRNO

Faculty of Social Studies

Department of International Relations and European Studies

Theory of the Hybrid warfare. Implementations in Ukraine.

Supervisor: Mgr. Zinaida Shevchuk, Ph.D.

Author: Turkiian Nina (UČO 420442)

Study Field: EUP
Year of Enrollment: 2013

In Brno, 2016
 I, hereby, declare that this thesis is entirely my own work, and has not been
taken from the work of others to the extent that such works have been cited,
referenced and acknowledged within the text of my own work.

Date: 09.5.2016. Signature________________________

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 CONTENT
Introduction.......................................................................................................... 4
Chapter I.
1.1. Definition of Hybrid warfare........................................................................ 18

1.2. Causes and Features "hybrid warfare"..................................................... 18

1.3. The stages of a typical hybrid warfare........................................................ 22
1.4. Western understanding of hybrid warfare................................................. 27
1.5. Russian vision of the hybrid warfare........................................................... 31
Chapter II
2.1"Hybrid war" of Russia against Ukraine. Timeline. Facts. Evidence of
Russian troops presence at the territory of Ukraine......................................... 45

2.2. Implementation of the hybrid warfare theory in Ukrainian case............ 80

2.3. The first stage of Russia-Ukraine war........................................................ 80

2.4. The second phase of the war Russia-Ukraine........................................... 82
2.5. The energy component of the "hybrid war" in Ukraine ......................... 92
2.6. Information component of a "hybrid war"" ............................................ 94
Conclusion.......................................................................................................... 100

Bibliography........................................................................................................ 110

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 Introduction

Specificity of the armed conflict, as well as the place and role of the military
in politics argument, naturally determined by the level of development of society
and technology. Process complexity of weapons and methods of warfare is wavy
and simultaneously with the process of the evolution of social organization and
consciousness. Information society creates unique forms of resistance, and it does
not necessarily have to be armed or opened. Analysis of the forms and methods of
armed struggle in the current and future wars (conflicts) in domestic and foreign
scientific publications on military subjects received considerable attention1. This is
how fast their development, which is classified by most experts as the emergence
of a new generation of war and the need to define the strategy of armed defense
states. Analysis of publications devoted to military theory and practice shows that
the traditional understanding of war is changing and requires correction. Actually,
there are two extreme views on the issue. According to one, the traditional vision
of war (way of war) is out of date and can not contribute to solving the security
problems that are posed by the XXI century. Another view argues that transforms
the character and nature of war, but the same is its nature. There is no doubt the
mere fact that the traditional war as a military collision between two states or blocs
with defined political objectives are now obsolete. Thus, there appeared such a
thing as «hybrid warfare» or «network centric warfare» - hybrid warfare and war
interconnected respectively. These terms are intended to give a definition of new
phenomena and phenomena on the battlefields of the XXI century. It should be
emphasized that the development of a theoretical framework (or understanding) in
1
Halaka O. M., Ilʹyashov O. A., Pavlyuk YU. M. Osnovni tendentsiyi rozvytku ta ymovirni formy voyen i zbroynykh konfliktiv maybutnʹoho
/ O. M. Halaka, O. A. Ilʹyashov, YU. M. Pavlyuk // Nauka i oborona.– 2007.– № 4.– S. 10–15.// Галака О. М., Ільяшов О. А., Павлюк Ю. М.
Основні тенденції розвитку та ймовірні форми воєн і збройних конфліктів майбутнього / О. М. Галака, О. А. Ільяшов, Ю. М. Павлюк //
Наука і оборона.–2007.– № 4.– С. 10–15.// Galaka OM, OA Il'yashov, Pavlyuk N. Main Trends development and possible forms of wars and
armed conflicts of the future/ OM Galaka, OA Ilyashov, YM Pavlyuk // Science and oborona.- 2007.- № 4.- P. 10-15.

4
the process, at least in Ukraine. Therefore seems logical to attempt to determine the
nature of the hybrid confrontation and its components. The development of the
information society forms the new context of the confrontation, including armed,
Ukraine and Russia. Features assimilation of norms, values, opportunities
postindustrial world post-Soviet societies led to the specifics of Russian aggression
and pressure, as well as responses and means opposition Ukraine. Competitiveness
in the era of industrial society defined the state's ability to produce heavy weapons,
transport it to the theater of operations and to withstand economic pressures. In the
information age competitiveness associated with military capabilities to process
information and integrate it into military operations, thus ensuring their success.
The nature of present and future wars directly determined trends of the forms and
methods of warfare.

Among them are worth noting:

1. The growth of non-nuclear strategic significance curb the enemy by mass

equipping troops with the latest means of warfare to conduct non-nuclear, non-
contact (distance) hostilities;

2. Enhancing the role of agility and maneuverability in the actions of troops

in isolated areas of the widespread use of the rapid reaction force, airborne troops
and special forces;

3. Expansion of space and scale armed struggle, fighting with the transfer of
land and sea surfaces in the air, under water and in space. Simultaneous burn and
electronic defeat forces behind objects, economy, communications throughout the
enemy;

4. The increasing role of confrontation in the sphere of information and the

use of new information technologies;
5
 5. The fight against international terrorism, the creation of expeditionary
forces for peacekeeping and antiterrorist operations. The above ranking of most
important data trends rather conditional, because it depends on the specific
characteristics of specific countries2.

It should be emphasized that the term "hybrid warfare" is not a proper

military. Traditionally used in military theory a number of specific criteria typing
armed conflict, which enable consideration of all its major aspects. In particular,
the criteria for dividing the types of conflicts are: degree of coverage of reality;
scope; type parties - parties to the conflict; social and political structure of the
parties; nature of socio-political relations; the degree of organization; level
escalation and others. The classification of armed conflicts linked to the main
forms of manifestation and existence. Depending on the manifestations, defined
methods of using military force warring parties apart highlighted the hidden
(latent) and apparent conflicts. The combination of qualitatively different elements
to the conflict leads to a great variety of forms of its existence, which consist of a
combination of three models War - formal, informal and gray war zone. The
formal war is considered a collision of armed forces of one state from the other
armed forces. This collision is accompanied by a formal act of declaring war.
Informal war - is armed conflict, in which at least one or both parties are non-
entities. The new threats that have emerged after the Cold War, led to the
phenomenon of gray zone, ie the combination of war and military actions against
organized. Formal war can acquire traditional and alternative forms. Traditional
war - the fighting is regular armed forces of one country against regular and
irregular armed forces (guerrilla war) other countries with the use of conventional
means of warfare. Traditional war - contact, their further development is associated
2
O. A. Ilʹyashov Viyny maybutnʹoho yak obʺyekt naukovykh doslidzhenʹ / O.A. Ilʹyashov // Nauka i oborona.– 2008.– № 2.– S. 36–40.//
Ільяшов О. А. Війни майбутнього як об’єкт наукових досліджень / О.А. Ільяшов // Наука і оборона.– 2008.– № 2.– С. 36–40.// OA
Il'yashov future wars as an object of research / O.A. Ilyashov // Science and oborona.- 2008.- № 2.- S. 36-40.

6
with the development of new methods and means of warfare. Combined with the
new information technologies they generate forms, such as network and
merezhotsentrychni war3. Content network war is to achieve success in armed
struggle but by superiority in numbers and firepower of troops, and thanks to their
superiority in information and organizational capabilities for building networks.
The solid informatization and intellectualization of control of troops and weapons
changed the qualitative content of military operations. They were called
interconnected operations (wars), held staff in a different types of the tactical
groups managed from a single strategic center and simultaneously act as some key
elements of the public and military administration - parts and units "forces
retaliation" - throughout the enemy. The feature interconnected operations is the
application built on new principles intelligence methods, management and security,
enabling use of force and means of warfare is not a single line, and soon the entire
depth of the theater of military operations in accordance with their fighting and
maneuvering capabilities. The combined use different types of groups of troops
increases the effectiveness of military operations4. Unconventional War - a clash of
the regular armed forces of irregular forces, groups, units that do not recognize the
norms and rules of warfare. Formal and informal military conflicts can be
symmetric and asymmetric. Asymmetric conflict is the participation of entities that
are qualitatively different relation of power capacity and principles of organization
and management. Even without going to war phase asymmetric conflict has some

3
Vasylenko O.V. Osnovni svitovi tendentsiyi rozvytku ozbroyennya ta viysʹkovoyi tekhniky dlya vedennya viyn u maybutnʹomu / O.V.
Vasylenko
// Nauka i oborona. – 2009. – № 4. – S. 18–22.// Василенко О.В. Основні світові тенденції розвитку озброєння та
військової техніки для ведення війн у майбутньому / О.В. Василенко // Наука і оборона. – 2009. – № 4. – С. 18–22.// Vasilenko OV Major
global trends and arms military hardware to wage war in the future / OV Vasilenko // Science and Defence. - 2009. - № 4. - P. 18-22.
4
Khamzatov M.M. Vlyyanye kontseptsyy setetsentrycheskoy voyny na kharakter sovremennykh operatsyy / M.M. Khamzatov // Voennaya
myslʹ. –
2006. – № 7. – S. 13–17.// Хамзатов М.М. Влияние концепции сетецентрической войны на характер современных операций / М.М.
Хамзатов // Военная мисль. – 2006. – № 7. – С. 13–17.// Hamzatov MM Effect of War on the concept setetsentrycheskoy nature sovremennыh
operations / M.M. Khamzatov // Military thinks. -2006. - № 7. - S. 13-17.

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specific characteristics that result from the limited arsenal of tools for the weaker
members.

In asymmetric relationship strong partner usually requires no additional

application of force to impose their will. Therefore, conflict often occurs in a latent
form, only occasionally moving to the armed phase in the form of violent and
seemingly irrational acts, including terrorist acts. Such action is the limited arsenal
of means by which the weaker partner influences (and potentially win) on
stronger5. However, traditional terminological and methodological framework for
determining the nature and character of the war does not exclude the invention and
use of new definitions, such as "hybrid war". Frank Hoffman (Frank G. Hoffman),
consultant of the Ministry of Navy, one of the authors of the concept of "hybrid
warfare" emphasizes that every era has its own specific forms of war. It requires
every new terminological developments. Overall the modern era, according to
Frank Hoffman, characterized by processes of hybridization, including in the
military sphere. Traditional forms of war are mixed with the activities of organized
crime, terrorism and irregular conflicts6. To characterize this new reality, he
proposes to use the term "hybrid war", which though not a purely military one, but
can quickly grab and display the essence of the changes in the nature of modern
warfare. Views on the hybrid nature of war are different options for determining
the hybrid nature of war:

1. military strategy that combines conventional war, war and low cyberwar;

2. The attack using nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, homemade

guns for terrorist attacks and pressure information;
5
Halaka O. M., Ilʹyashov O. A., Pavlyuk YU. M. Osnovni tendentsiyi rozvytku ta ymovirni formy voyen i zbroynykh konfliktiv maybutnʹoho
/ O. M. Halaka, O. A. Ilʹyashov, YU. M. Pavlyuk // Nauka i oborona.– 2007.– № 4.– S. 10–15.// Галака О. М., Ільяшов О. А., Павлюк Ю. М.
Основні тенденції розвитку та ймовірні форми воєн і збройних конфліктів майбутнього / О. М. Галака, О. А. Ільяшов, Ю. М. Павлюк //
Наука і оборона.– 2007.– № 4.– С. 10–15.// Galaka OM, OA Il'yashov, Pavlyuk N. Main Trends development and possible forms of wars and
armed conflicts of the future / OM Galaka, OA Ilyashov, YM Pavlyuk // Science and oborona.- 2007.- № 4.- P. 10-15.
6
Hoffman Frank G. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges / F.G.Hoffman // Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ). – 2009. – Issue 52, Forth Quarter. – P. 34-39

8
 3. sophisticated and flexible dynamic battle space (battlespace), which
provides quick response and adaptation of opposition members;

4. modern kind of guerrilla warfare that combines modern technology and

methods of mobilization (Bill Nemett, Colonel United States Marine Corps);

5. The main method of asymmetric warfare, which is contingent on three

fronts - the population of the conflict zone, logistics people and the international
community (Colonel Jack ArmiyiSShA MakKuen);

6. Frank Hoffman defines hybrid war as an enemy any action that quickly
and flexibly using a variety of combinations of permitted weapons, guerrilla
warfare, terrorism, crimes on the battlefield, and all for political purposes7.

In 2004, commissioned by NATO Multiple Futures study conducted to

identify changes in trends in international security in general and in particular the
method of warfare. In the final report it was also about hybrid war. Further,
although again it comes down to purely military dimension and definition of war as
a hybrid mixture of classical warfare with the use of irregular armed groups. Non-
combat missions performers "can do things that the state itself can not do, because
every state is bound by the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention on the
Laws of War on Land, agreements with other countries. All the dirty work can be
shifted to the shoulders of non-state actors"8. Psychological and informational
aspects also in sight of the NATO expert. Yes, he stressed that the international
community put a fait accompli aggression with complete denial of her own

7
Arzumanyan R.V. Opredelenye voyny v 21 veke. Obzor XXI ezhehodnoy konferentsyy po stratehyy Ynstytuta stratehycheskykh yssledovanyy
Armeyskoho voennoho kolledzha, 6-8 aprelya 2010 / R.V. Arzumyan. – Erevan, 2011// Арзуманян Р.В. Определение войны в 21 веке. Обзор
XXI ежегодной конференции по стратегии Института стратегических исследований Армейского военного колледжа, 6-8 апреля 2010 /
Р.В. Арзумян. – Ереван, 2011. // Arzumanyan RV The definition of war in the 21st century. XXI Annual Review Conference on Strategic
Studies Institute for Strategy Army War College, 6-8 April 2010 / RV Arzumyan. - Yerevan, 2011.
8
Korniyenko S. Putin vede v Ukrayini hibrydnu viynu – heneral Kappen [Elektronnyy resurs]. – Rezhym dostupu:
http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25363591.html// Корнієнко С. Путін веде в Україні гібридну війну – генерал Каппен
[Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25363591.html// Kornienko S. Putin leads in Ukraine
hybrid warfare - General Kappen [Electronic resource]. - Access mode: http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25363591.html

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aggression. In the short term it is a winning tactic. But most weight control
information flows, winning the information war. Information warfare - a
coordinated activity on the use of information as a weapon for warfare. The main
strategic national resource is the information space, ie information network
infrastructure and information technology. Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, NATO chief,
at the NATO summit in Wales today even called Russian actions in this area most
impressive blitzkrieg that saw any history information warfare. Bridlav also noted
that the hybrid approach of the war is trying to use all possible tools to create a
problem and then her Pedal, including using military instruments9. Actually, hybrid
warfare in general terms can be defined as a set of pre-prepared and quickly
realized actions of military, diplomatic, economic, informational nature aimed at
achieving strategic goals. Before the war Hybrid components include traditional
and unconventional threats, terrorism, subversive acts when used or new
unconventional technology to counter enemy superiority in military power.
Emphasize that the idea of hybrid warfare is not new. Military history knows many
examples of asymmetric war tactics using the non-linear and irregular militias who
are older counterparts modern hybrid war. Moreover, the war in general is not
solely confrontation on the battlefield, and includes elements of economic,
psychological confrontation guerilla's activity. Value and measure the impact of
these components on the overall result, their role and place in a particular
confrontation on the level of society and the spirit of the era. Wars and armed
conflicts are space-time processes, which are based on a variety of contradictions,
and the use of different scales military forces in certain areas for certain purposes.
Hybrid power successfully use technologically advanced systems so that they work
to the limit.

9
Vandiver J. SACEUR: Allies must prepare for Russia 'hybrid war' / J.Vandiver [electronic resource]. - Access mode:
http://www.stripes.com/news/saceur-allies-must-prepare-for-russiahybrid-war-1.301464

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 Therefore hybrid forces have an advantage over traditional army, acting
strictly within the statute. Overall, the hybrid threat indicated that blurs the
traditional concept and practice of war. There are generally two approaches to
understanding the essence of war. The first related to the tradition of Carl von
Clausewitz defines war as organized violence that aims to achieve social and
political goals. This approach has distanced itself from the moral, legal and ethical
aspects of war, or takes them through the prism of military and political interests.
The second approach comes from the works of Cicero, who argued that war - is the
legal situation and the conditions that legitimize violence and define its limits.
Thus the notion of "peaceful state" and "state of war", depending on whether the
violence is legitimate. Distinction civilian and military status is critically important
thing. War creates a fundamentally different reality, form their own understanding
of moral, ethical and legal standards which require determination by means of
military law. While the legal framework remains uncertain, we can not speak of
organized warfare and violence can become uncontrolled, which nevertheless does
10
not mean war . Actually, this hybrid and dangerous threat. In hybrid warfare is
difficult to determine an opponent, you're more difficult to talk about the legal,
ethical and moral frames. Without them organized violence leads to the
degradation of local communities. For example, in Ukraine is still an ongoing
debate about the term "anti-terrorist operation" that did not reflect the nature of
events in the conflict zone in the Donbass. On the other hand, the second
opposition party, Russia formally recognizes their participation. Also erased border
war scenarios and the beginning and end. Almost all European political and
military history suggests that elites perceive the beginning and end of the war as

10
Arzumanyan R.V. Opredelenye voyny v 21 veke. Obzor XXI ezhehodnoy konferentsyy po stratehyy Ynstytuta stratehycheskykh yssledovanyy
Armeyskoho voennoho kolledzha, 6-8 aprelya 2010 / R.V. Arzumyan. – Erevan, 2011// Арзуманян Р.В. Определение войны в 21 веке. Обзор
XXI ежегодной конференции по стратегии Института стратегических исследований Армейского военного колледжа, 6-8 апреля 2010 /
Р.В. Арзумян. – Ереван, 2011. // Arzumanyan RV The definition of war in the 21st century. XXI Annual Review Conference on Strategic
Studies Institute for Strategy Army War College, 6-8 April 2010 / RV Arzumyan. - Yerevan, 2011.p.39

11
the ceremony, a specific set of actions. But hybrid warfare least one party lacks
legitimacy. Then come to the aid promotion or creation of puppet governments.
Therefore, the state change from military to peaceful significantly complicated and
hostility grows and spreads beyond the conflict.

This war has every chance to develop into endemic and endless violence in
the region. Also destroyed traditional "Trinitarian model" Clausewitz, which
includes the trinity of government, armed forces and people in war. After World
War II this triune model is less applicable. People can fight no government can
fight the terrorist organizations or warlords who often merge with the civilian
population (for example, as did the militants' Hezbollah"). The way out of this
situation could be a return to the legal field, which can be achieved in various
ways, which range from strengthening the institutions of statehood party
opposition (to take a traditional script ceremonial end of the war) the complete
destruction of one party (if, for example, terrorist organizations)11. Hybrid war
modernity fact, a classic example of hybrid warfare believe war waged by
"Hezbollah" in Lebanon in 2006, using classical warfare, irregular militias and
information warfare techniques, causing Israel, according to many experts, the
strategic defeat. As rightly emphasize military analysts, the hybrid threat is able to
neutralize the technological advantage of any army. "Hezbollah" received
psychological victory in 2006, as a fact, right now. Shift the focus in making
decisions on military planes in ethical and moral, to make a choice between
ordinance, law, morality, ultimately discredit the enemy, let whatever decision was
made - that the key points that have achieved superiority "Hezbally"12. Another

11
Kuzʹmovych A.V. Évolyutsyya vz·hlyadov na teoryyu sovremennoy voyny // Armyya y obshchestvo. – № 1 (33) / 2013 [Elektronnyy resurs]. –
http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov-nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny// Кузьмович А.В. Эволюция взглядов на теорию
современной войны //Армия и общество. – № 1 (33) / 2013 [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступа:
http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov-nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny// Kuzmovich AV The evolution of views on the theory of
modern warfare // Army and Society. - № 1 (33) / 2013 [Electron resource]. - mode access: http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-
vzglyadov-nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny
12
Davis J.R. Defending Future Hybrid Threats / J.R. Davis // Military Review. – Fort Leavenworth, September-October 2013. – No.5. – P. 25-

12
example of a hybrid war in which a military aggressor powerful state negotiates
with non-performers - groups of local people and militants - connection with which
it formally denies entirely, a Russian subversive activities in Ukraine in spring
2014. During the conflict, small group of Russian soldiers organized and
coordinated rebel armed groups of the local population in eastern Ukraine,
avoiding direct entry of his troops through Ukrainian border, allowing Russia to
bypass international law. Interests Crimea and its entry into the Russian Federation
has been very successful operation of the hybrid war. The friendly "green men"
armed with the latest Russian weapons, creating favorable to the Kremlin
information background in the Western media, deliberate flooding Ukrainian
segment of Internet misinformation (the classic example - elevated above the
flagship of the Navy of Ukraine "Hetman Sahaidachny" Andrew's flag, as reported
by ITAR-TASS and RIA "News"), Vitaly Churkin diplomatic activity at the UN
Security Council - all components of a hybrid war, which was the culmination of a
referendum and adoption of Crimea and Sevastopol a part of Russia. Obviously,
the pace of action was determined by the weakness of the Ukrainian authorities and
admitted earlier errors. Armed Forces of Ukraine for years preparing for war
industrial era, making parallel demilitarization of society, getting rid of the Soviet
military legacy. Instead, today's "hybrid warfare" revealed not only weaknesses of
all Ukrainian army and society, but also articulated a new challenge to the world in
general and Eastern Europe in particular. Lack of open confrontation, the use of
new tactics, misinformation, creating short time atmosphere of panic and threats,
the use of human shields on civilians demonstrate the helplessness of the army in
the war of a new type. In Ukraine threatened were virtually all aspects of life -
economics, politics, culture and memory consumption information, even identity.

13
 Weak diversification of markets for Ukrainian products to the Russian
market attachment of basic sectors of the national economy, the lack of alternative
sources of resources - all this has become a matter of national security. Industry,
infrastructure are energy-intensive and inefficient. Lack of adequate information
and cultural policy led occupation of the cultural consciousness of a large part of
citizens. Efforts propaganda was imposed artificial problem of discrimination
against Russian-speaking population, fear ephemeral threat "Bandera". Ukrainian
information space without proper Russian-speaking and English-language content
was a closed, non-competitive, not ready to bring Ukrainian position to the
international community. Obviously, modern hybrid threat to Ukrainian statehood
by Russia requires not just search for adequate responses to everyday challenges.
At the time of system development is the answer, strategy in the years ahead. This
is not possible without understanding the theoretical and methodological hybrid
nature of war and the global experience of confrontation hybrid threat. The course
of modern wars suggests the need to consider and take into account not only the
purely military aspects, but also the political, socio-cultural, technical, economic
and geopolitical military conflict frames. Finally emphasize that despite erasing
traditional notions of war, which are based on the work of Clausewitz, his thesis
that the war is continuing nature and variable in nature, remains valid (though not
all share this view, believing that the nature of war may change during the impact
of new technologies and forms of war, that war can be a "second grammar" which
will be based on insurgent operations)13. And the analysis of hybrid wars of our
time is important to remember and distinguish their nature and character. The key
to finding answers to the challenge is a hybrid evaluation of social and

13
Arzumanyan R.V. Opredelenye voyny v 21 veke. Obzor XXI ezhehodnoy konferentsyy po stratehyy Ynstytuta stratehycheskykh yssledovanyy
Armeyskoho voennoho kolledzha, 6-8 aprelya 2010 / R.V. Arzumyan. – Erevan, 2011// Арзуманян Р.В. Определение войны в 21 веке. Обзор
XXI ежегодной конференции по стратегии Института стратегических исследований Армейского военного колледжа, 6-8 апреля 2010 /
Р.В. Арзумян. – Ереван, 2011. // Arzumanyan RV The definition of war in the 21st century. XXI Annual Review Conference on Strategic
Studies Institute for Strategy Army War College, 6-8 April 2010 / RV Arzumyan. - Yerevan, 2011.p.31-32

14
technological contexts an understanding of the structure element of the conflict
remain unchanged, and that evolutionary14. Therefore, war is always an act of
violence, which aims to force the opponent to execute your will. Motives for War,
Thucydides formulated, as will be unchanged - fear, pride and profit. The nature
and form of the war largely depends on the technology and economy and social
development of the actors. For example, the use of drones and robots in combat is
already familiar. Non-state actors can also be a party military confrontation,
moreover, their share in military conflicts likely to increase. With the development
of computer networks cyberwar weapons are terrorist organizations and elements
of the hybrid wars.

Hybrid conflict can be described as the simultaneous use of traditional

means of warfare with non-traditional.

This combination of classic armed conflict with the guerrilla tactics of war,
terrorist acts, directed against a variety of purposes, including against civilians to
intimidate him, the use of gangs to destabilize the society, as well as psychological
and increasingly dangerous cyber attacks.

To participate may be drawn several types of troops, beginning with the

regular units and special units up to the irregular militias and armed men in
camouflage with no insignia, so-called "little green men", as in the Crimea. Acting
with them in an exciting country, the aggressor can actively foment and support
local riots, conduct economic and diplomatic war, to carry out attacks in
cyberspace and to conduct an information and awareness campaign.

Therefore, the purpose of the master's work is more acquainted with the
current state of international peace influenced by the relentless growth of
14
Hoffman Frank G. Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict / F.G.Hoffman // Strategic Forum. –
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National DefenceUniversity (NDU). Washington, DC, April 2009. – No. 240. – Р. 2 - 8.

15
innovative technologies, development and inhibition of economies of different
subjects of international law, strengthen information transmission apparatus data
and other modern means undermined as a result of discovery of a new
phenomenon of "hybrid warfare".

The author is highlighting a theory of the hybrid warfare and

implementation in Ukraine:

- Concept of hybrid warpresentation and analysis history of the Ukraine -

NATO' relations, from the 1992 till 2014, including cooperation within the
PfP frameworks;
- analysis of the geopolitical and strategic tensions and clashes with a position
of the Russian Federation;
- highlighting benefits and difficulties which will face Ukraine and NATO, in
case of membership of Ukraine in the NATO;
- Politic of NATO enlargement;
- contribution and skills of Ukraine which can be brought to the Euro-Atlantic
security system, including geostrategic policy of NATO;
- analyze, based on the information given in previous chapters, of future
development of Ukraine and NATO relations
- changes of the national opinion pull and intensification/decreasing in the
relations through the prism of political processes in Ukraine and influence of
the Russian Federation on it.
- forms of the cooperation, which could be chosen for Ukraine by the NATO -
analyze of its preferences and lacks and an analyze of the perspective of the
closer cooperation with NATO, will it lead to the stability of the region or no.

This work consists of an introduction, three chapters and conclusions

16
 The study covers the disclosure of the theories and concepts of "hybrid
warfare" and its implementations in Ukraine:

Theoretical part:

- Definition of the Hybrid warfare.

- Causes and Features "hybrid warfare"

- Three stages of a typical hybrid warfare

- Western theory of hybrid warfare

- Russian theory of the hybrid warfare

Practical part

- "Hybrid war" of Russia against Ukraine. Timeline. Facts. Evidence of Russian

troops presence at the territory of Ukraine.

- Implementation of the hybrid warfare theory in Ukrainian case

- Stages of Russia-Ukraine war

- Information component of a "hybrid war"

- The energy component of the "hybrid war" in Ukraine

This work consists of an introduction, two chapters and conclusions

17
 Chapter 1.
1.1. Definition of Hybrid warfare.

Hybrid Warfare - a term proposed in the late XX century in the United

States to describe a military strategy that combines a conventional war, small war
and cyber war. Also, expression "hybrid warfare" can be used to describe attacks
with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, improvised explosive devices and
information warfare. This approach to managing conflict is a kind of war.

1.2. Causes and Features "hybrid warfare"

Thus, the characteristics of "hybrid warfare" are: aggression without formal

declaration of war; concealment aggressor countries of their participation in the
conflict; widespread use of irregular armed groups (including under cover of the
civilian population); neglect aggressor international norms of warfare and existing
agreements and arrangements achievements; reciprocal measures of political and
economic pressure (for formal conservation relations between the two countries);
extensive propaganda and counter-propaganda with the use of "dirty" information
technology; confrontation in cyberspace.

Today the theme of "hybrid +`warfare" is widely covered in the media, and
is the subject of special studies. In particular, these studies were conducted by
experts renowned world-class in t. H. Frank Hoffmann, Daniel Lasikom, George
Davis (USA) and Frank van Kappen (Netherlands)15.

15
Hoffman F.G. «Hybrid Threats»: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable, available at:
http://operationaladaptation.com/unify_uploads/files/Hoffman%202010%20Hybrid%20Threats.pdf.

18
 In this regard, we consider to begin with the causes of the very concept of
"hybrid warfare" and explain why it is widely used by different countries to
achieve their goals.

According to Hoffman future threats could increasingly be characterized as a

hybrid combination of traditional and irregular tactics, this decentralized planning
and execution, participation of non-state actors using both simple and complex
technologies. Hybrid threats include a number of different modes of warfare,
including the standard weapons, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts
(including violence and coercion), and criminal disorder. Hybrid War can also be
multilevel (conducted and states, and various non-state actors). These multimodal /
multilevel actions carried out or different units or the same. In such conflicts,
opponents (states, groups of state-sponsored or entities that finance their activities
themselves) will use the access to modern military capabilities, including
encrypted command systems, portable missiles "ground-to-air" and other modern
lethal system; and - promote the organization of protracted guerrilla warfare, which
use ambushes, improvised explosive devices and murder. It is possible to combine
high-tech features of states, such as anti-satellite protection against terrorism and
financial cyberwar, but, as a rule, operational and tactical directed and coordinated
within the framework of major combat operations in order to achieve synergies in
the physical and psychological dimensions of the conflict. Results can be obtained
at all levels of war16.

16
Hoffman F.G. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, P.72

19
 One of the main reasons is the availability of powerful new weapons
(Weapon of mass destruction), making classical war is extremely dangerous for
both the aggressor and the entire world. After all, this will lead to massive civilian
casualties, there will be large-scale refugee flows, disintegrate transport and
industrial infrastructure (including critical and dangerous nuclear and chemical
facilities), burst existing trade and economic relations and so on.

An equally important factor is the desire of the aggressor to downplay its

role in conflict resolution in order to avoid sanctions by other countries and
international organizations as well as to prevent the loss of its prestige and position
in the world17.

17
Hoffman F.G. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges. Joint Force Quarterly, 2009, 1st Quarter, No 52, pp. 34

20
 Another reason for not massive use of military force is aggressor countries
attempt to establish control over the objects of aggression (including integration
them into their political, economic and security systems) without undue damage to
them, which can damage the attackers in implementing their own geopolitical and
economic interests.

At the same time driving "hybrid war" requires or create certain

preconditions required internal and external nature.

First of all, the aggressor country should have a strong and effective
government, able, despite the existing problems, to rally the public around a
common national idea.

Second, the successful application of "hybrid warfare" in the aggressor

should be an advantage over the enemy in military, economic and information
fields that provide it with the necessary leverage (influence) on the object of
aggression, exhausting morally and psychologically and economically.

Thirdly, the success of "hybrid warfare" with the object of aggression is

possible only if the weakness of his government, international isolation, a split in
society, economy degradation and demoralization reduce capacity and power
structures.

In any case, the aggressor country must be prepared to repel the aggression
of the object, and the fact that the latter will have the support of other countries and
international organizations (in terms of providing political, economic, information
and military assistance and sanctions against the aggressor).

21
 1.3. The stages of a typical hybrid warfare

Considering all mentioned above, as well as the existing experience, the

typical "hybrid warfare" consists of three main stages: preparatory, active and
final18.

1.3.1. The first stage - preparatory

At the preparatory stage (which may take several years) leadership

aggressor, with the active involvement of special services, taking steps to build
ideological, political and military prerequisites for future aggression. These
measures include:

- strengthening the system of government in the country, including the

strengthening of control over all spheres of life;

18
Hoffman F.G. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges. Joint Force Quarterly, 2009. p. 57

22
 - indoctrination own population to unite around the ideas of nationalism,
chauvinism, protection of so-called "national values and interests" against
"external enemy" and in a "besieged fortress", etc., and the maximum weakening
the opposition in all its forms;

- capture information space enemy country and use it to their advantage to

create a mood in society;

- destruction of the state government, the object of aggression, including

bribery: influential government officials, politicians and the leadership of law
enforcement agencies; promoting agents of influence for positions in state
government; inciting confrontation between political forces and establish control
over them (primarily among ideologically close and corrupt parties and
movements);

- making a split among the population rival by stimulating internal

contradictions of political, interethnic and inter-religious character (in particular in
the framework of the creation and support of different parties, movements and
organizations relevant, even the extremist ones);

- weakening the country round object of aggression, undermining confidence

in the government, and the spread of protests and separatist sentiments in society in
a way to provoke social, economic and other problems by applying the elements of
trade-economic and energy wars;

- discredit foreign and domestic policy of the enemy to impose its leadership
and the population of certain ideas and civilizational values through active

23
information campaign with special methods of "zombie" society with active
participation of both public and non-governmental organizations19.

1.3.2 Step Two - active

In the active phase (usually lasting one year) held a hidden aggression
against the chosen country for direct implementation of the goals. To do this,
include the following steps:

- country-created object of aggression illegal armed groups with

representatives of local anti-government forces, which are involved in the security
services, mercenaries and militants;

- the country's internal conflict provoked by the political, social, economic,

religious and interethnic basis and stimulated processes of its transformation into
mass demonstrations population demonstrators, confusion and clashes of protesters
with the police;

- positioned (appointed) leaders of protests from representatives of

opposition political parties of national or local levels, and they created alternative
"authorities";

- protesters seize, involving illegal armed groups and the security services of
the country-aggressor, government buildings and important industrial facilities and
transport infrastructure and power structures blocking activity (including the use of
civilians as "human shields");

- the territory of the object of aggression entered the regular armed forces of
aggression under the guise of local armed forces ( "self-defense squads", "militias",
etc.) to help the opposition and separatists to seize power in the country or in its

19
Hoffman F.G. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges. Joint Force Quarterly, 2009. p.35

24
individual regions. This possible hidden part of regular armed forces aggressor in
the fighting on the side of the opponents of the current government's object of
aggression;

- conducted extensive information campaigns in support of anti-forces in the

country object of aggression, and to discredit the actions of its leadership to ensure
the constitutional order in the country.

1.3.3 Stage three - the final.

At the final stage (unlimited duration) aggressor held the following work to
consolidate its position in the country the object of aggression:

- given the full support of the new (the former opposition) authorities in the
country of the object of aggression or separatist regimes in some of its regions
(including the creation of the authorities and security forces separatists);

- assisted in carrying out "referendum" about the direction of the external

and internal policy of the country object of aggression, the status of its regions,
etc., and in the conduct of "elections" of central and local, including breakaway
authorities;

-legalized self-proclaimed state of education in the country object of

aggression tightened processes address the situation in its territory under the
pretext of brokering participate in peace talks. In this case, the aggressor country in
no way considers himself a party to the conflict;

the conditions for a military presence in the country-aggressor object of

aggression on the long-term / permanent basis (in the form of "peacekeeping

25
forces" or separatist militias) and to implement other, for example economic
interests20.

The geopolitical system of coordinates of war is controlled chaos is the

geopolitical destruction of the State of the victim, the neutralization of its
geopolitical characteristics - size of territory, population, the status of the state of
the world, economic opportunities, military power, cumulative potential.

In such a war in the State to the victim or in its individual regions initiated
by certain political processes which are essentially shares the strategy of controlled
chaos. The true role, location, interests and goals of the aggressor state are
removed from the sphere of public attention, hiding behind the "information
garbage" and demagoguery.

In general, a war, or a hybrid of controlled chaos involves three stages:

• Loosening of the situation and inspiration through the crisis of internal

conflict in the country of the victim.

• degradation, destruction and disintegration of the country and its

transformation into a so-called "dysfunctional" state.

• Change of political power in a fully controlled by the aggressor.

Starting from the second half of the 90s of last century, components and
technology concept of "hybrid warfare" applied by Russia in Transnistria,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as US, NATO and the
EU - Kosovo, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Since the early 2000s similar script actively
used the Russian Federation as well as to Ukraine (in the establishment of Russian

20
Freier N. Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe… Don’t Define, available at: http:// smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/343-
freier.pdf

26
control over the post-Soviet space under the slogan of building a "Russian
world")21.

1.4. Western understanding of hybrid warfare

At the West, a new type of war is called "hybrid war". The conceptual
justification for this war for the XXI century. engaged primarily American military
theorists R. Glenn, J. Gordon D. Kilkallen, John. Makkuen, John. Mattis, James.
Matsumura, William Nemeth, E. Simpson, R. Wilkie, N. Freyyer, F. Hoffman,
Norwegian specialist H. Carlsen, Netherlands - Frank van Kappen et al.

While some foreign scientists (K. Lowe, P. Mansour, William Murray, H.

Yamaguchi and others) believe that this concept has nothing new for the theory of
military art, as one or another form of hybrid threats and hostilities have existed in
military practice of the past22.

According to Lieutenant Colonel US Marine Corps W. Nemeth, hybrid

warfare - a "modern kind of guerrilla warfare," which "combines modern
technology and modern methods of mobilization." N. Freier of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (USA) has identified four hybrid threat of war:

1) traditional;

2) non-standard;

3) terrorism;

21
Dugin A. Filosofiya voiny [Philosophy of war]. Moscow, Yauza, 2004, 256 р. [in Russian].

22
Gordon J., Matsumura J. The Army's role in overcoming anti-access and area denial challenges, available at:
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR229/ RAND_RR229.pdf.

27
 4) blasting, which uses technology to counter the advantages of military
force23.

Kilkallen D., author of «The Accidental Guerilla», claims that hybrid

warfare - a better definition of modern conflicts, but stressed that it is a
combination of guerrilla and civil wars and insurgency and terrorism24.

"Hybrid warfare - a hodgepodge of classic warfare using armed groups. The

state, which is in a hybrid war, concludes conspired with non-artists - militants
groups of local people, organizations, communication some of which is formally
denied completely. These artists can do things that the state itself cannot do
because any state bound by the Geneva and Hague Conventions on the Laws of
War on Land, agreements with other countries. All dirty work can be shifted to the
shoulders of non-state actors "- explains Major General Frank van Kappen, retired,
former adviser on security in the UN and NATO25.

Some sources indicate that the term was used for the first time and continued
to be used in the American 'Reviews on the defensive" in 2006, 2009 and 2014,
respectively. Also mentioned in the book in 2007, "Conflict in the XXI century.
The emergence of hybrid warfare " ( Hoffman) and in 2009 "Air power for hybrid
war "(Institute of Mitchell Association, US Air Force, Michael Ayshervu). Online
Defense Technical Information Center March 30, 2007 was placed the report under
the name of "Hybrid war: a new paradigm for stability operations in failing states
", compiled under the direction of Dr . Janeen Klinger26.

23
Freier N. The Defense Identity Crisis: It’s a Hybrid World. Parameters, 2009, Vol. XXXIX, Autumn, p. 1.

24
Kilcullen D. The Accidental Guerilla. Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. David Kilcullen. New York, Oxford University Press,
2009, p.287
25
Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds. New
York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, P.310
26
Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds. New
York, Cambridge University Press, 2012,p.157

28
 Interpretation of the notion hybrid warfare according to Lieutenant Colonel
US Marine Corps Nemeth is a "modern form of guerrilla warfare," which
"combines modern technology and modern methods of mobilization." 27

Nathan Freier from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was
one of the key people initially identified threats which includes hybrid warfare:
traditional; custom; catastrophic terrorism; blasting when technologies are used to
withstand the advantages of military force28.

A retired colonel of the US Army John McCuen defined hybrid warfare as

the main method of action in asymmetric warfare waged on three sample types
battlefield: the population of the conflict zone; logistics population; international
community29.

David Kilkallen, author of " «The Accidental Guerilla) claims that hybrid
warfare - this is the best definition of modern conflicts, but stressed that it includes
a combination of guerrilla and civil wars and insurgency and terrorism30.

Journalist Frank Hoffman defines hybrid warfare as any action the enemy
which instantly and consistently uses a complex combination of permitted
weapons, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and criminal behavior on the battlefield to
achieve political goals.

Deputy Secretary of the Navy Robert Orton Vork says that enemy forces
could use "hybrid soldiers" are in conspiracy among the civilian population.

27
Nemeth W.J. Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002, available at:
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/ theses/2002/Jun/02Jun_Nemeth.pdf.
28
Freier N. Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe… Don’t Define, available at: http:// smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/343-
freier.pdf
29
McCuen J.J. Hybrid Wars. Military Review, 2008, April-May, pp. 107–113
30
Kilcullen D. The Accidental Guerilla. Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. David Kilcullen. New York, Oxford University Press,
2009

29
 In the editorial preface guide Military Balance +2015 «hybrid warfare" is
interpreted as "the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign
aimed at achieving surprise, delight and initiatives receiving psychological benefits
of using diplomatic opportunities; scale and rapid information, electronic and
cyber-pirates; cover and concealment of military and intelligence operations;
combined with economic pressure. "31

Examples

Lebanon. One recent example is the hybrid war actions of Hezbollah in the
Lebanon war of 2006. During the conflict, Hezbollah neutralized the efforts of the
Israeli army, using the hidden underground tunnels and position (same actions
Vietcong), or using infantry maneuvers in Lebanese villages. The result of this
tactic is that the IDF failed to win any of the villages along the border between
Lebanon and Israel two weeks for all the attacks on Hezbollah positions. All the
benefits of the Israeli army - the availability of modern and efficient aircraft and
ground forces - has been reduced to zero Hezbollah members who used the
fortified bunkers and modern Russian antitank guided missile, capable of
destroying all known types of armored vehicles. In one case, Hezbollah has used
anti-ship missiles C-802, seriously injuring an Israeli navy corvette «Hanit» and
killing four sailors on board. This is supplemented by successful attempts to break
Hezbollah on Israeli communications and mobile military to get the latest
information about the behavior of the enemy, their interaction and losses.

Resonant world events of recent years, including the revolutionary change of

power and armed conflict in North Africa, the Middle East and the former Soviet

31
The Military Balance http://www.freepaperdownload.us/1519/Journal0459-7222Page1.htm

30
Union suggest the emergence of new forms and methods resorted to the major
powers trying to achieve its foreign policy goals and settle inter-state differences.

Therefore, to replace classical military aggression when applied forces,

come the so-called "hybrid war". They are hidden and observed mainly in the
political, economic, information and special areas. Host for specific tasks involved
in small quantities. The essence of this approach is the shift of the center of effort
of the physical destruction of the enemy as part of a major war to use tools of "soft
power" against enemy countries with the aim of disintegration and changes to its
management, including its sphere of influence32.

1.5. Russian vision of the hybrid warfare

The very genesis of the Russian phenomenon "hybrid war" refers to the
period of Russia to rethink its place in the world and the region. The main
characteristic of the Yeltsin era losses geopolitical position, international political
influence of status and would reformat the European geo-strategic space, which
ended with a significant expansion of NATO and the EU. In this case, even the
objective components of the relevant geo-economic and geopolitical trends all the
more perceived predominantly through the subjective lens of resentment and
nostalgia for the lost. In concentrated form, this nostalgia back in 2005 Vladimir
Putin expressed in his message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation:
"... We must recognize that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest
geopolitical catastrophe of the century. For the Russian people, it became a real
drama. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves
outside Russian territory.33"

32
Deyvi M. Evolyutsiya voyn [Evolution of war]. Moscow, ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2009, p. 282
33
Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931

31
 We could even say that in many respects the geopolitical revanchist mood
Putin and his hard-line attitude to any "revolutionary" political changes due to his
personal experience: he saw the destruction of the Berlin Wall, which destroyed
the entire world, which, as Vladimir Putin understood and considered.

It is the coming to power of Vladimir Putin can be considered the beginning

of the search for Moscow's own "geostrategy revenge", the aim of which is a
complex task, the key of which - a gradual but steady restoration of Russian
influence and importance in the international arena. However, more than difficult
international context, and given the significant shortage of necessary resources
(from the purely economic to military information and communication), the base
of the Russian "geostrategy revenge" could only be an asymmetric approach34.

The period from 2001 to 2014. It can be attributed to the time of search
forms and methods that would help to implement the relevant geopolitical
intentions. This was carried out in parallel and the "geopolitical mobilization" of
the population of the state. It is implemented through the classic mechanisms of
imposing their own people the images of the "external enemy", a sense of Russia
as a "besieged fortress" and the total recovery of the anti-Western (mainly anti-US)
rhetoric.

The change of political regimes in the CIS (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova,

Kyrgyzstan), most likely, Russia perceived as a threat to its externally imposed
ideas of geopolitical revenge. This forced the Russian Federation intensively
preparing for the next big confrontation. Especially since the idea of a "big war",

34
Kuz'movich A.V. Evolyutsiya vzglyadov na teoriyu sovremennoy voyny // Armiya i obshchestvo. – № 1 (33) / 2013 [Yelektronniy resurs]. –
Rezhim dostupa: http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov-nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny// Кузьмович А.В. Эволюция взглядов
на теорию современной войны // Армия и общество. – № 1 (33) / 2013 [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступа:
http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov-nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny// 12. AV Kuzmovich The evolution of views on the theory
of modern warfare // Army and Society. - № 1 (33) / 2013 [Electron resource]. - Access: http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov-
nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny

32
which recently said presidential advisor S. Glazyev, obviously, is really dominant
in the present Russian establishment. And the conclusion Glaziev also, most likely,
the dominant among these circles: Russia is not ready for a new war (and willing to
not be), and therefore, should provoke her before, and achieve their objectives even
now35.

Obviously, the problem for some time remained the question of how to
implement your own ideas in a rather limited (and in many respects ostentatious)
readiness, the constraints of international law, the geopolitical status quo and as a
consequence - the unavailability of real starting full-scale war. It can be assumed
that approximately in the middle of the 2000s. a solution was found:. "asymmetric
responses" part of a larger "hybrid war"

It is pertinent to note that the Russian Federation has not established its
strategy from scratch. Here there is a certain continuity of Soviet practices. Some
researchers attribute the origins of Russian practices "hybrid warfare" to the 20-th
years of XX century. (Methods of "active intelligence"). However, in our opinion,
it is better to pay attention to the final stages of the US-Soviet confrontation during
the Cold War. Then, in response to the announced US program for strategic
defense initiative (SDI) Gorbachev 12 October 1986, during a press conference in
Reykjavik, said: "The answer to the SDI will be asymmetrical. At the same time
we do not have to sacrifice significantly. "

In January 2013, Moscow hosted the general meeting of the Academy of

Military Sciences, which was addressed by Chief of the General Staff of the
Russian Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov. It was a peculiar result of long
work of military analysts and experts of the General Staff, who for some time have

35
Glazyev S."Good war" in Europe// "Khoroshaya voyna" v Evrope//"Хорошая война"в Еропе http://www.specnaz.ru/articles/214/2/2070.htm

33
conceptualized the problem and looking for mechanisms to address it. That report
General Gerasimov - a kind of "point of no return" in the manifestation of Russian
views on modern war. It was pointed out, should be developed as a modern
military-political conflict, what elements it should be involved and at what stages.
The report emphasized the growing role of non-military methods of pressure on the
enemy, primarily through political, economic and humanitarian elements.
Information confrontation is generally defined as a cross-cutting activity in all
phases of conflict: its origin, maintenance and post-conflict period. Pay attention to
the "asymmetrical measures", which have been ranked as the activities of special
forces, the development of the internal opposition, as well as a steady increase in
the influence of the information on the object of attack36.

Much of what he was talking in his speech, General Gerasimov (this, in

particular, the importance of non-military methods of pressure, information
warfare, etc.) has already been used first in the Crimea, and then in the east of
Ukraine. Thus, we can say that Ukraine is full against the war - "hybrid" in the
form of "asymmetrical" in content.

In addition to purely military methods of classical, Russia within the

framework of "hybrid war" Do not just used on a large scale for the first time the
concept of "war three quarters." Its essence boils down to the fact that the modern
soldier must be prepared: in one quarter - to conduct combined arms battle in the
second - to carry out police functions, in the third - to carry out humanitarian
missions37.

36
Valeriy Gerasimov Tsennost' nauki v predvideni// Валерий Герасимов Ценность науки в предвидении// Valery Gerasimovi Value of
Science in prevision
http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632
37
Shmitt K. Ponyatie politicheskogo [The concept of political] Voprosy sotsiologii, 1992, Vol. 1, № 1, pp. 40–53 [in Russian] 126 ISSN 1681-
116Х. Український соціум. 2014. №3 (50)

34
 Ukraine for the first time directly confronted with this phenomenon. At the
same time military experts with this type of warfare known for a long time.

The problem is, in its modernist sense began to be developed in the years
1960-70 in the writings of the "rebellion-wars" Yevgeny Messner - a former
colonel of the General Staff of the Russian tsarist army.

He, in particular, wrote: "In previous wars of conquest of the territory was
regarded as important. Henceforth, the most important will be honored winning
souls in the Warring States. Fighting will not be a two-dimensional surface as of
old, not in three-dimensional space, as it was during the time of the birth of
military aviation, and four where the mentality of warring peoples is the fourth
dimension ... "; " rebels, saboteurs, terrorists, saboteurs, propagandists take huge
size in the future ...38"

In this new war, the emphasis is on the use of the civilian population for the
injection of mass hysteria and legitimate power and resistance as "human shields"
to cover armed militants.

At the same time the main component plays perhaps the most important role
for the formation of the "correct" in terms of the image of the victim of the
aggressor in this war more important than getting the actual victory. Murder
foreign soldier ceases to be the main goal - to kill enough hybrid war his soldiers
and to ensure at the same time the required information support.

During this war, the aggressor is the victim attributes to what he does.

38
Messner E.E. Vsemirnaya myatezhevoina [World war of the rebellion]. Zhukovskiy; Moscow, Kuchkovo pole, 2004, 512 р. [in Russian]

35
 The main object of the impact of the war in a hybrid is not the enemy, and a
population that is "exempt." Objectives and method of such a war - the motivation
of citizens to change their own state and support the aggressor.

Also use all the means for forming the preferred pattern for the invader of
events in the perception of the international community.

Non-standard kind of war is in the non-involvement of the aggressor state

non-state actors - "volunteers".

An important characteristic of a hybrid war is the active use of asymmetric

warfare, which are characterized by significant differences in military power, and
the strategies and tactics of the parties involved.

Such a scheme of warfare is extremely difficult to deal with because there

are no formal reasons to fight with the aggressor country, which is only informally
(but overactive) support the militants and terrorists.

Russia actively uses methods of information-psychological war, seeking to

destroy the morale of the troops and the civilian population of our country.

Using Russian Life News channel, Russia Today, and the like are "dual-use
arms", acting as the formation of the "right image" for propaganda purposes and
reconnaissance and subversive function as agents of the Russian secret services.

Russian military experts and scientists for a long time and quite deeply
develop the theme of information and information-psychological wars39.

39
SIPRI 2013: ozbroennya, rozzbroennya ta mizhnarodna bezpeka [SIPRI 2013: armament, disarmament and international security]:
Shchorichnyk; per. z angl. Stokgolm. mizhnar. in-t doslidzhennya myru; Ukr. tsentr ekon. i polit. doslidzhen im. O. Razumkova; Redkol. ukr.
vyd.: L. Shangina (editor-in-chief) ta in. Kyiv, Zapovit, 2014, 520 р. [in Ukrainian]

36
 In particular, it is extremely thoroughly modern phenomenon of information
warfare investigated in his monograph "State information policy in special
circumstances," the Russian scientist, a graduate of the Academy of the Federal
Security Service Manoilo.

The author defines the status of a new war, "information-psychological war

[...] at the moment it is the most dangerous form of social [...] warfare carried out
by violent means and methods of influence on information-psychological sphere of
the enemy with the purpose of solving strategic tasks."40

Here are a few more common in expert media-related definitions of

information warfare as an integral component of a hybrid war

Information warfare (Information Warfare) - targeted actions to ensure

information superiority by damaging information, information processes and
information systems of the enemy, while ensuring the protection of their own
information, information processes and information systems. It is "information-
psychological" part of the information war (information and psychological
warfare) and "cyber war» (cybernetic warfare).

Information-psychological warfare - focused on the implementation of a

specific impact on the military and the civilian population of the country - the
impact of an object through the dissemination of the information provided in the
information and psychological operations.

Cyber War - part of the information war, aimed at causing damage to or

destruction of the enemy information infrastructure (including hardware and

40
Malysheva E.M. Mirovye voiny i lokalnye voennye konflikty v istorii: posledstviya, uroki [World wars and local military conflicts in history:
consequences and lessons]. Vestnik Adygeyskogo gos. un-ta, 2005, № 1, pp. 69–78 [in Russian]

37
software) through operations to access this infrastructure, including the method of
unauthorized access41.

Information weapons - a set of technical and other means, methods and

technologies, which is determined not so much by their own properties as
properties of the object against which it is applied. Information weapons - a
concept that integrates all means of influence on the basis of any society -
information.

To understand the policies and actions of the enemy it is expedient to specify

the main approaches to the implementation of the information war.

Russian specialists define the information war as a confrontation between

the states in the information space for the purpose of damaging information
systems, processes and resources, critical structures, undermining political,
economic and social systems, as well as the massive psychological manipulation of
the population in order to destabilize society and the State.

The basic training of the Russian power structures experts stated:

- The main form of event information war are secret information and
psychological operations carried out by the managed information impact on the
individual, group or mass consciousness, the will of the citizens of another country,
their feelings, misinformation subjects of political, economic and other
management decisions of the undermining of the information infrastructure the
opponent and the media in these countries;

41
Deyvi M. Evolyutsiya voyn [Evolution of war]. Moscow, ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2009, 382 р. [in Russian]

38
 - The aim of these measures is the implementation of a negative impact on
the consciousness and system knowledge and understanding the target country and
the formation of the desired information influence beyond its borders;

- For the implementation of these steps must act reconnaissance and

Information Centre, operated by the real-time;

- Hostilities should precede the ability to provide fast disabling infrastructure

of political and economic control of the enemy, as well as communication systems
and electronic warfare;

- An important component of modern warfare (not just an information war)

is a moral factor. Creating a system of moral and psychological training of the
Russian Federation armed forces and development of algorithms to undermine the
morale of the enemy - the decisive factors in modern warfare.

The objects of destruction while determined:

- Information infrastructure of the state;

- Consciousness, will and feelings of the various military and civilian

segments of the population, especially during the election and crisis situations;

- Management decision-making system in the political, economic, social,

scientific and technical spheres and in the sphere of national security and defense;

- Critical contingent (the opposition, dissidents, criminals, etc.) as a means

of strengthening the crisis in the society of the enemy.

39
 The latent (hidden network) measures the enemy. When a certain
stabilization of the situation, and false statements about a peaceful settlement of the
war of Russia is actively using the religious factor42.

A separate area, which is actively used, is the spread of rumors. Distribution

tool are not only individual active persons, Russian TV, and informational
messages that are submitted in the written press, postcards and programs of local
cable operators.

Lack of implementation of the necessary measures: the internal nature of the

threat is resistance inherited bureaucratic system that does not meet the challenges
of the time.

Hybrid warfare can be interpreted as a model of war, which is trying to hide

its military character, as well as the participation of the state structures.

This is why it greatly increases the role of the information component as real
physical contexts they are replaced by inadequate information, and closing hiding
the real situation more intensively than is the case in conventional war order.

Unfolding situation does not, as a rule, unparalleled in history, so it allows

for a multiplicity of interpretations. And this again requires hard work is
information mechanisms that are trying to send in the wrong direction, as the
consciousness of the enemy and their own population.

Hybrid war is a small portion of the actual fighting, but spreads throughout
the space of peace connecting to conflicts absolutely all resources, including
artists, writers, politicians of other countries.

42
Popov I.M. Voyna budushchego: vzglyad iz-za okeana. Voennye teorii i kontseptsii sovremennykh SShA [The war of the future: a view from
across the ocean. Military theories and concepts of modern USA]. Moscow, AST, 2004, P.444

40
 Hybrid warfare is likely to be defined as non-military war, because a large
amount of activities carried out on a joint military - civilian population.

Military begin to disguise themselves as civilians and civilian, in turn, are in

arms.

An example of a pair of "military - civilian" can serve as a "green men" in

the Crimea, where the Russian propaganda refused for a long time to recognize the
armed forces, as they did not have identification marks.

However, the weapon was, but they tried not to use it, it served as a
deterrent.

J. Bertolini adds in such a war and infiltration -Infiltration includes

connecting both human and imaginary objects.43

This also should include and diligent support of the Russian diaspora. For
ideological support Russia attaches a set of virtual structures. He includes
European political parties from the extreme right to the extreme left, commercial
organizations, lobbies and more fragmented network.

While the concept info-war is stronger than it was during the Cold War,
infiltration is significantly weaker.

The latter observation can be explained by the fact that infiltration takes a
long time for its implementation, as is the effect on foreign soil, where it is
required to rely on foreign citizens, that is a definite need for an active position of
citizens. At the same time, the information war is aimed at programming the same
people from the outside, that is required passive response.

43
Bertolin G. Conceptualizing Russian information operations: InfoWar and infiltration in the context of hybrid warfare // IO Sphere. - 2015.

41
 Hybrid War - a network wars. Typically, the network war has been
described as a struggle against a network hierarchy. However, there is a slightly
different between the hybrid war

- The inclusion of a variety of networks, instead of one,

- State models as well as their occurrence one of the networks or any of its
components, for example, in the form of arms supplies or making trainers

- People in order to survive and are forced to unite in their own networks.

In general we can say that in this case the military is hiding peaceful.
Therefore, it becomes an important component of the denial of the state's military
involvement in the conflict. State begins to pretend to be a detached observer.

All this requires the participation of the most powerful propaganda. On the
one hand, it inflates guilt other parties to the conflict, on the other hand, most
denied their own involvement. That is, we face a completely different rhetoric than
the rhetoric of the war in its purest form.

In parallel, left active anti-Western propaganda, which the injection was not
so fit.Russia generally leaves from the recognition of their active participation.

Hybrid war propaganda needs the support of a number of reasons.

Firstly, it has a constant need for interpretations and reinterpretations, as it

happens quite fast change of events.

Secondly, the actual happening at odds with the propaganda picture that
requires constant strengthening advocacy support. Third, in a hybrid war is a
complex situation in which a lot to hide, and a lot of effort, for example, there is a
clear division into / another, but they are also localized on the area.

42
 It appeared in a quasi-military taxonomy military purposes, since there is not
a military operation, but rather a rebel, a revolutionary. And nobody really focused
shift priorities in the grips on the mainland Ukraine - is the administrative building,
the police and the Security service of Ukraine. The last two to capture weapons44.

Actively simulated seizure of power would like the citizens, in which other
people act as military intimidation factor. Thus the rhetoric becomes another: one
is the protection of the population against another. A military take on the role of
liberators in the internal confrontation. That is, external intervention is closed by
internal strife.

Galeotti prefers the term nonlinear war. He takes his Surkov. Peter
Pomerantcev extends the use of the principle of non-linearity, leaving on its
application in international politics: "Nonlinear Kremlin's logic is clearly
manifested in manipulating the Western media and politics45.

If in the twentieth century, the Kremlin could lobby for their interests only
through the left parties sympathetic to the Soviets, now he uses a kaleidoscope of
contradictory messages to forging an alliance with the different groups.

European ultra-nationalist parties, such as "Jobbik" in Hungary and the

National Front in France, seduced by the rhetoric, directed against the European
Union, the ultra bribe words about the fight against hegemony of the United States,
religious conservatives in America are impressed by the fact that the Kremlin does
not accept homosexual propaganda.

44
Trebin M. Informatsiine suspil’stvo. Viiny novoi epokhy [Informational society. Wars of new era] Viche, 2015, № 4, pp. 64–65 [in
Ukrainian]

45
Peter PomerantsevNon-Linear War http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2014/03/28/peter-pomerantsev/non-linear-war/

43
 The result is a polyphonic ring tone or acting on the Western audience with
different positions and creates the overall effect of the Kremlin's support. "

P. Pomerantcev says a new type of promotion the following "The essence of

this new promotion is not the belief of someone, and capture and hold the viewer
to interrupt the Western narrative, rather than offer a counter narrative. It is a
perfect genre for conspiracy theories, which are well represented on Russian
television. "46

It should be remembered, and to himself, and does not slip into another
conspiracy. After all, the conspiracy theories provides the most simple and
comprehensible explanations, connecting with the existing situation and separate
objects.

Dominance of ideology is present everywhere, but it becomes dangerous

intensity of dominance when using ideology not begin to solve strategic and urgent
tasks. S. Samadashvili, for example, uses the term, as an ideological engineering.

She writes as follows: "In addition to creating the news Russian TV

channels are also widely used entertainment genres for propaganda purposes.
Military victories and triumphs of Russia became the central theme of ideological
engineering of Putin. "47

But many are inclined to believe that hybrid warfare combines the old
components, for example, regular, irregular and terrorist. It is their combination
creates complexity.

Western analysts in this respect more clearly articulate the situation:

46
Peter PomerantsevNon-Linear War http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2014/03/28/peter-pomerantsev/non-linear-war/
47
Salome Samadashvili Muzzling the Bear http://www.martenscentre.eu/sites/default/files/publication-files/information-warfare-europe-defence-
russia_0.pdf

44
 "Hybrid warfare, known as non-linear war in Russian, is a simultaneous
combination and the use of numerous military and non-military instruments of
government in the conflict, but their successful use is based on an effective
information campaign for the conduct of the operations supported by the
coordinated special operations, leading an irregular war. Nonlinear War includes
various elements of conventional warfare, irregular warfare, political and even
economic resources, but its success is based on the original information operation,
which was later used special operations forces, when it reaches a certain level. "48

However, there is a pattern that does not happen linear solutions to solve
nonlinear problems. And all our institutions are built exclusively for the generation
of solutions is linear, this feature of the bureaucracy.

In a hybrid war is not one person, it changes all the time, including in terms
of information. Therefore it is necessary to introduce a so-called proactive
management to operate with it as future situations start to play in advance.
Otherwise, the reaction to what is happening will always be delayed.

Another characteristic of a hybrid war - it is not part of fighters from the

state. States may also turn their ordinary units in irregular and apply new tactics.

Hybrid warfare adopts any methods. This is possible because the main
player is hidden behind the "small players." His power is just manifested to try not
to show. And it is not the fire itself, and "small players", which is activated
struggling.

The main attacks as a result, they need to reflect, and not he. And all this
requires a maximum voltage of "information power".
48
Vasilenko O.V. Osnovn sv tov tendents rozvitku ozbro nnya ta v ys kovo tekhn ki dlya vedennya v yn u maybutn'omu / O.V. Vasilenko //
Nauka í oborona. – 2009. – № 4. – P. 18// Василенко О.В. Основні світові тенденції розвитку озброєння та військової техніки для ведення
війн у майбутньому / О.В. Василенко // Наука і оборона. – 2009. – № 4. – С. 18// 1. Vasilenko OV Osnovnі svіtovі tendentsії rozvitku
ozbroєnnya that vіyskovoї tehnіki for conducting vіyn in maybutnomu / OV Vasilenko // Nauka i defense. - 2009. - № 4. - p 18

45
 Massive cyber war. It should be noted that in 2004, Russian Defense
Minister announced the beginning of the development of empowerment of the
cyber war and bringing to realization of the strategy of the leading IT-companies,
scientific and educational institutions in the US example.

Russian structures involved in the event of cyber war, disguised as

"anonymous hackers", individuals and organizations.

46
 Chapter II

2.2. "Hybrid war" of Russia against Ukraine. Timeline. Facts. Evidence

of Russian troops presence at the territory of Ukraine.

The main goal of Russia concerning Ukraine - to weaken and decentralize

our country, to bring to power pro-Russian leadership under control, disrupt its
European course, turning Ukraine under Russian control. Thus the strategy and
tactics of action against Ukraine in Moscow includes successive steps for the
implementation of the above approaches.

Since the 2000s in Ukraine launched a large-scale information policy of the

Russian anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda and agitation active doctrine
of "Russian World" about reunification supposedly most of the divided nation in
the world - "n". The ideological basis of the doctrine serves Russian revanchism
for the collapse of the Soviet Union, which is the restoration of the borders of the
Soviet Union until 1991 and restoration of the former "zone of influence within the
Soviet bloc" countries of Europe and Asia.49

According to the doctrine of "Russian World", "n" are three categories of the
world:

1. Ethnic Russians, regardless of where they live;

2. The Russian-speaking population, regardless of nationality;

3. countrymen who ever lived in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and
other public entities, and their descendants;50

49
Vladimir Gorbulin Gibridnaya voyna: vse tol'ko nachinayetsya http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html//
Владимир Горбулин Гибридная война: все только начинается http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html//
Vladimir Gorbulin Hybrid War: everything is just beginning http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html
50
Dugin A. Filosofiya voiny [Philosophy of war]. Moscow, Yauza, 2004, 256 р. [in Russian].

47
 Since November 2013, with locking Viktor Yanukovych legislated course of
European integration and the outbreak of the country's Revolution dignity Kremlin
propaganda evolved into openly chauvinistic, aggressive imperial, false and fascist
information war against Ukraine, which was aimed to prepare public opinion in the
world to external aggression the Russian Federation to Ukraine.

Since the beginning of resistance Ukraine military aggression of the Russian

Federation in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and occupation and annexation of
Crimea, the information policy of re-trained in all-out military aggression
deceptive, intended to demonize in the eyes of Russian society and global
leadership of Ukraine.

2.2.1. Export blockade of Ukraine by Russia

On 20th July 2013 the numbers on the Ukrainian-Russian border customs of

the Russian Federation initiated a total review unfounded vehicles Ukrainian
producers. July 29, at the conclusion of Rospotrebnadzor, the Customs Service of
the Russian Federation was a ban on imports of the Customs Union of chocolate
and other products of the Ukrainian company «Roshen». According to the
independent expertise health services Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova and
Tajikistan Office of claims were refuted and reduced supply of confectionery
companies to their countries, bypassing Russia.

14 August Customs Service of the Russian Federation to the list of "risk"

was included without exception Ukrainian exporters and effectively blocked their
products to Russia for an indefinite time, in consequence of which at border
checkpoints were formed queues of several hundred trucks and rail cars of
Ukrainian goods. Presidential adviser Sergei Glazyev Russia following authorities

48
were associated with the association Ukraine and the European Union, and stressed
the strengthening of customs administration in the case of Ukraine signed an
association agreement with the European Union. August 19 between the Ministry
of income and charges of Ukraine and the Federal Customs Service of the
negotiations, the results of which were announced suspension of export Ukraine
blockades Russia. However, in practice the "additional control procedure" by
Russian customs was stopped51.

2.2.2. The occupation by Russia of ARC

20 February 2014 Russia launched an intervention to Ukraine Autonomous

Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol with subsequent occupation of the peninsula.
February 27 Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the form of unmarked
captured and locked office buildings, airports, communication agencies, media in
Simferopol and Sevastopol and the Crimean Parliament, which were taken hostage
of deputies and forced to ads to hold a May 25 referendum on the extension of the
Crimean autonomy. Soon after the referendum date was changed twice: first
postponed to March 30, and then - on March 16. In a referendum was attended by
about 30 per cent of citizens with the right electoral vote. According to organizers
announced the results of the referendum for joining to Russia in Crimea allegedly
voted 96.77% of the vote in Sevastopol - 95.6%. Online Council under the
President of Russia on the development of civil society and human rights briefly
appeared that the referendum was attended by no more than 30%, of which 50%
voted for joining Russia., Information about 30-40 interest and turnout unveiled

51
Trebin M. Informatsiine suspil’stvo. Viiny novoi epokhy [Informational society. Wars of new era] Viche, 2015, № 4, pp. 64–68 [in
Ukrainian]

49
Majlis of Crimean Tatar people. In Sevastopol held a separate referendum because
the city is formally not part of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea52.

There have been changed and the wording of the question - instead of
expanding the autonomy announced accession to Russia.

March 11, 2014 under the pressure of Russian security forces Supreme
Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea adopted a Declaration of
Independence of the Republic of Crimea, whereby the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, including Sevastopol is a sovereign state, which for the relevant results of
the referendum may apply to Russia's inclusion territory of the federation on the
rights of the subject. March 16 psevdoreferendum held on the status of Crimea,
which according to official figures attended 96.77% of the inhabitants of the
Crimean Peninsula, including 123% of the inhabitants of Sevastopol. March 17 the
Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea proclaimed independence
of the Republic, and on 18 March in St. George Hall of the Kremlin Russian
President Vladimir Putin together with the self-appointed Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of Crimea Sergey Aksenov, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of
Crimea Volodymyr Kostantynovym and head of SSGA Alexei Chalym signed an
agreement on adoption Republic of Crimea to Russia. March 21 the Federation
Council of Russia passed the law on ratification of the Agreement of 18 March and
the law on the formation of new Federation - Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol
city of federal significance53.

2.2.3.The first wave of international sanctions and restrictions on the

Russian Federation

52
Vladimir Gorbulin Gibridnaya voyna: vse tol'ko nachinayetsya http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html//
Владимир Горбулин Гибридная война: все только начинается http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html//
Vladimir Gorbulin Hybrid War: everything is just beginning http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html
53
Magda Ê.M. Gíbridna víyna: sutníst' ta struktura fenomenu// Магда Є.М. Гібридна війна: сутність та структура феномену// Magda Є.M.
Gіbridna vіyna: sutnіst structure that phenomenon http://journals.iir.kiev.ua/index.php/pol_n/article/viewFile/2489/2220

50
 March actions of the government of the Russian Federation with the
occupation of the territory of a neighboring sovereign state and interference in its
internal affairs, have caused massive discontent and subject barrage of criticism of
the world community over the last year that called military aggression of the
Russian Federation, international crime against peace and security of mankind, and
annexation of Crimea - a violation of applicable law sovereign Ukraine,
fundamental norms of international law and a number of international agreements,
including:

• Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the inviolability of borders in Europe;

• 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances Ukraine;

• Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and

Russia in 1997;

• Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Ukrainian-

Russian state border on 28/01/2003.

March 27, 2014 at the General Assembly of the United Nations resolution
number 68/262 confirmed "the territorial integrity of Ukraine internationally
recognized borders." Resolution supported by 100 countries, 58 - abstained and 11
voted against. Later, it was suspended the membership of Russia in the
international club of advanced economies "Big Eight" and introduced the first
stage of the three-tier plan personal and economic sanctions against the banking
system of the Russian Federation and citizens of Russia and Ukraine directly
involved in the occupation of the peninsula, mostly in the form of asset freezes and
bans on entry.

2.2.4. Russian energy blackmail

51
 March 31, 2014 the State Duma of the Russian Federation unilaterally was
denounced by the Kharkiv agreements, which allowed to extend Black Sea Fleet in
Sevastopol from 2017 to 2042 by $ 100 million a year and provided a discount
Ukraine the price of gas up to 100 US dollars per thousand cubic meters of
installed current contract between NJSC "Naftogaz of Ukraine" and "Gazprom".
The next day, "Gazprom" Russia raised the price of natural gas for "Naftogaz
Ukraine" from 485 to 268.5 US dollars per 1,000 m3 each54.

In order to settle claims Russian gas during April - May 2014 with the
participation of Ukraine, European Union and Russia held nine rounds of talks.
June 9 Russian government announced an ultimatum to reduce the price of 485 to
385 dollars per 1000 m3 in exchange for recognition and payment of Ukraine to 16
June gas debt with customs duties assessed after the annexation of the Crimea $ 4.5
billion. US dollars. Ukrainian and European sides called Kremlin extortion
demands, unreasonably overstated the amount of debt, and the price much higher
than the market, in consequence of which the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine filed
a lawsuit on "Gazprom" in the Stockholm arbitration.

2.2.5. Pro-Russian propaganda action in southern and eastern Ukraine

During March-April 2014 with the participation of Russian special services

in the eastern, central and southern regions of Ukraine organized a series of
promotional actions for the separation of the south and east of Ukraine and joining
these regions of the Russian Federation, a referendum on a federal structure in the
country, the Russian language status second state and against the Ukrainian
government.

54
Putin vede v Ukraini gibrydnu viinu – general Kappen [Putin leads a hybrid war in Ukraine – General Kappen], available at:
http://geostrategy.org.ua/ua/komentari/item/409-putin-vede-vukrayini-gibridnu-viynu-–-general-kappen [in Ukrainian]

52
 The occupation of the Crimea and the Russian Federation displays Ukraine-
phobia pro protesters in southern and eastern Ukraine caused great indignation of
the population in the country, which in many days turned into mass protests and
led to the persecution non-uktainians in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Odessa.
March 2 antimilitary protest against the aggression of the Russian authorities in
Ukraine were also in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kaluga, in which the Russian
authorities had detained 285 members, most of which are charged with the article
"disobeying a lawful order of a police officer."55

March 15, 2014 in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Samara,

Magadan and other cities of the first anti-war "March for peace and freedom"
military aggression directed against Russian President Vladimir Putin to Ukraine,
hatred and forcing the closure of free media. The number of participants in
Moscow alone is officially estimated at about 50 thousand people.

2.2.5.The military invasion of the Russian Federation to the east

Ukraine

March 1, 2014 the Federation Council of the Russian Federation adopted the
appeal of Russian President Vladimir Putin for permission to use the Armed Forces
of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. In mid-March 2014 Ukrainian-Russian
border in the Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kursk, Rostov Region and Krasnodar
Territory of the Russian Federation was stationed over a hundred Russian military
bases on the territory of which focused heavy military equipment and a contingent
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in an amount of 30-40 thousand
people.

55
Trebin M. Informatsiine suspil’stvo. Viiny novoi epokhy [Informational society. Wars of new era] Viche, 2015, № 4, pp. 64–68 [in
Ukrainian]

53
 During April - May 2014 by the Federal Security Service, the Central
Intelligence Agency of the Russian Federation and the illegal armed groups among
the mercenaries of various nationalities while wearing military weapon systems
was carried out an armed attack on local authorities and key infrastructure and
mass -MEDIA in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions.

According to the Central Intelligence Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the

Donbass placed 9.1 thousand of Russian forces soldiers and one army corps in the
NPT and the FSC, under which there are 33.4 thousand terrorists. In major
command and staff positions in them are Russian staff officers. Ranks by more
than half equipped with contractors and mercenaries from Russia. Support for
armed units engaged in the Donbas group of Southern Military District in Rostov-
on-Don and Novocherkassk total of 50.5 thousand soldiers.

The immediate organizer of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the head of
all armed groups in Donbas became Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, First
Deputy Defense Minister Army General Valery Gerasimov.

By command of Russian-terrorist forces are also included Chief of Staff of

the Land Forces of Russia, first deputy chief of JI, Colonel-General Alexander
Lyentsov, who replaced Colonel General Sergey Istrakov, Colonel-General
Alexander Galkin. Delivery of weapons and equipment deals at Donbass
Lieutenant-General Andrei Serdyukov.

In November 2015 Sergey Istrakov personally led a commission of 40

officers of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, which conducted inspections
readiness units to the resumption of hostilities in Donbas.

Russian Armed Forces involved in the military aggression against Ukraine

54
 1. The military forces of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation

2. The General Intelligence Agency

3. The 14th separate brigade of Special purpose CPD Defense Ministry

4. 22nd Separate Guards special purpose brigade CPD Russia

5. 33rd separate reconnaissance group

6. 100th separate reconnaissance group

7. Army

8. Airborne troops

9. Part 76 Guards landing-assault Chernigov Red Banner Division

10. 234 Guards landing-assault regiment the Black Sea Kutuzov Order of the
Alexander Nevsky

11. 104th Guards Red Banner landing regiment assault

12. Part 98 Red Guards Svirsky Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree Airborne
Division

13. 331 Guards Parachute Regiment commando

14. Parts of the 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 2nd
degree division

15. 137th Guards Parachute landing Kuban Cossack Regiment of the Order
of the Red Star

16. 11th Separate Guards landing-assault brigade VAT

55
 17. 31st Separate Guards Order of Kutuzov II Degree Assault Landing
Brigade

18. 45th Separate Guards Order of Kutuzov Order of Alexander Nevsky

Regiment, Special Purpose VAT

19. Motorized troops

20. 8 th Separate Guards Motorized Brigade

21. 9th Motorized separate Vislenska Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and
Kutuzov Brigade

22. The 15th separate motorized rifle brigade of Russian peacekeepers

23. 17th Separate Guards Motorized Orders of Suvorov and Alexander

Nevsky brigade

24. The 18th separate motorized rifle brigade

25. 21st Separate Guards Red Banner Omsk-Novobugsky Order of Bogdan

Khmelnitsky 2nd degree motorized rifle brigade

26. 23rd Separate Guards Motorized Brigade

27. The 34th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 49th Combined Arms
Army of Southern PA

28. 138th Separate Guards Red Banner Order of Lenin Krasnoselsky

Motorized Brigade

29. 200th separate Motorized Brigade of Pechenhska

30. Rocket Forces and Artillery

56
 31. 439th Guards Artillery Brigade Perekopskaya Order of Kutuzov

32. 1140 Guards Red Banner twice artillery regiment

33. armor

34. 4th Guards Tank Division

35. The sixth Czestochowa Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree
separate tank brigade

36. Special troops

37. The 59th separate brigade Sivashsky Chervonopraporna management of

the Central Military District

38. Navy

39. Coastal troops

40. 336th Brigade Marines

41. The 159th detachment SF BPDSS Pacific Fleet56

2.2.6. Announcement in Ukraine of "special operation"

During April - June 2014 to avoid military sabotage on the territory of

Ukraine was strengthened protection of strategic facilities, social infrastructure,
public authorities, state border node communications, railways and highways, and
brought law enforcement system , government security forces and other institutions
in Ukraine full alert in case of direct military aggression by the Russian Federation.

56
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 March 13, 2014 decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine was restored
National Guard of Ukraine as a military force of the law enforcement and military
service and functions based on Internal Troops of Ukraine.

March 17 order of the Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov

launched the first wave of mobilization in the special period of 45 days, during
which the call was made conscripts and reservists to the Armed Forces, National
Guard, Security Service, State Border Service, State Special transport service and
other military formations of Ukraine.

April 18, 2014 Chairman of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine

Arsen Avakov was decided to establish a regional Corps special forces of public
order Interior Ministry of Ukraine, subordinated to the relevant Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine in the fields - regiments, battalions and mouth patrol special
police.

April 30, 2014 in the areas of structural Ukraine started forming military
units of territorial defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the respective
regional administrations - territorial defense battalions Ukraine.

May 6, 2014 order of Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov

launched a second wave of partial mobilization lasting 45 days, during which the
battle was brought into the state of 53 units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and
parts of 18 other military formations.

June 16 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine initiated staffing and

training special military units operating Corps Reserve and Special National Guard
of Ukraine, made up of volunteers:

• Special Purpose Regiment National Guard reservists Ukraine "Azov";

58
 • 1st Battalion operational purpose reserve them. General Kulczycki
National Guard of Ukraine;

• 2nd Battalion of special purpose of National Guard reservists Ukraine

"Donbass";

• 4th Battalion operational purpose reserve National Guard of Ukraine

"Crook".

2.2.7.The Geneva agreement and revitalization of the OSCE Special

Monitoring Mission

April 17, 2014 in Geneva with the participation of senior diplomatic

representatives of Ukraine, the EU, US and Russia held quadripartite talks on de-
escalation of armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

The position of the Ukrainian side demanded the implementation of the 5

basic requirements:

1. Stop supporting terrorists in the eastern regions of Ukraine;

2. Revoke their commandos from there;

3. Revoke their special troops;

4. Cancel the Duma decision about permission to use troops on the territory
of Ukraine;

5. Turn annexed Crimea.

Following the six-hour meeting, the parties agreed to a series of diplomatic

agreements. Russian Federation is obliged to disarm his illegal armed formation
and return of illegally seized property of their legal owners. In turn, the Ukrainian

59
side is guaranteed amnesty to protesters, except those who will be found guilty of
committing a serious crime; and pledged to provide a comprehensive, transparent
and accountable constitutional process in the country. The meeting strongly
condemned and rejected all manifestations of extremism, racism and religious
intolerance, including anti-Semitism and ordered the parties to the conflict to
refrain from any form of violence, intimidation or provocation. The issue of the
return of the Crimean Autonomous Republic and Ukraine withdrawal of Russian
troops on the eastern Ukrainian border had not been resolved.57

For the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the above steps,

negotiators initiated the establishment of the Special OSCE monitoring mission
consisting of international observers to 57 countries, including representatives of
the Russian Federation.

Proclamation of the "People's Republic" and the second wave of

international sanctions and restrictions on the Russian Federation

During the military intervention in Ukraine, Russia Bolshevik widely used

type of warfare, after an ideological split in the population, in some areas of the
state created a parallel illegal alternative government, which had close ties with the
Kremlin. To further maintain the life of such a pro-government and avoid direct
violation of international law in the field of war, the Russian Federation carried out
a gradual erosion of public trust in official government through active information,
advocacy flushing of the local population, combined with sabotage committed by
the illegal groups of criminals, mercenaries and radical people, organized and
managed by special services of Russia.

57
Magda Ê.M. Gíbridna víyna: sutníst' ta struktura fenomenu// Магда Є.М. Гібридна війна: сутність та структура феномену// Magda Є.M.
Gіbridna vіyna: sutnіst structure that phenomenon http://journals.iir.kiev.ua/index.php/pol_n/article/viewFile/2489/2220

60
 2.2.8. Countries that imposed sanctions and members of the European
Union

Within 7 - 27 April, like "Crimean scenario", "green men" was proclaimed

"Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic". May 15, 2014 the Prosecutor General
of Ukraine terrorist's data was classified as terrorist organizations by armed
violently-terror exercise in eastern Ukraine.

On 28 April 2014 the governments of European, North American countries,

Oceania countries and international organizations introduced additional and
expanded existing sanctions against individuals and entities from Russia and
Ukraine are directly involved in military aggression against Ukraine, as well as
enhanced economic blockade of the Crimea.

2.2.9.Anti-terroristic operation in Ukraine

Given the military superiority of the Russian Federation, a position of

leadership on the classification of foreign military aggression of Russia as an
internal threat to Ukraine in order to prevent further introduction of regular
Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine covered with "peacekeeping mission"
and implement "the Abkhaz-Ossetian scenario", 14 April 2014 in Ukraine was
initiated anti-terrorist operation without imposition of martial law. Zone of the
antiterrorist operation covered Donetsk and Lugansk regions and Izyumsky district
and the city. Raisins Kharkiv region58.

2.2.10. Armed conflict

April 13, 2014 Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov said that
in order to stop the rampant terrorism, organized by the Russian special services in

58
Rokovyny ATO. Dumky, tsyfry, mohyly// Роковини АТО. Думки, цифри, могили// Anniversary ATO. The opinions numbers grave
http://kyiv1.org/news/rokovini-ato-dumki-cifri-mogili-041353/

61
the eastern regions of Ukraine, National Security and Defense Council launched a
large-scale anti-terrorist operation involving the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He said
that

April 14, 2014 Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov has appointed

Lieutenant-General Vasyl Krutov first deputy head of the Security Service and
head of anti-terrorist center at SBU. In March 2014 he recorded a personal appeal
to the Russian government to stop the escalation of the situation in Ukraine, which
could lead to war.

According to one of the leaders counterintelligence SBU Vitaly Naida,

Russian troops have the task to kill hundreds of people in Ukraine, and then enter
the military forces on the territory of Ukraine.

According to the head of the SBU Valentin Nalyvaychenko as of May 19 in

Donetsk region has 500-600 separatists, including about 50 of their leaders who
control Donetsk, Gorlovka and Slavyansk and about 300 - in the Luhansk region,
which in the hands of a counter-terrorist operation killed 24 Ukrainian soldiers.

May 15, 2014 special battalion "Donbass" employed Velyka Novosilka

Raion, Donetsk region, and started patrolling with local volunteers, and after
storming his local police precinct local staff was brought to re oath of allegiance to
the people of Ukraine. At the same time Novosilka chairman of district council and
head of the local police precinct fled in an unknown direction. However, to the
village of Velyka Novoselka pushed battalion "Vostok" unrecognized Donetsk
People's Republic.

May 11, 2014, according to Acting Head of Presidential Administration of

Ukraine Serhiy Pashinsky, anti-terrorist operation in the cities Krasny Liman,
Slavyansk and Kramatorsk in the Donetsk region moved to the final stage. Later on
62
May 15 hosted the final stage of the antiterrorist operation Ukrainian security
forces near the village. Starovarvarivka, near the city of Kramatorsk and near
Kramatorsk.

May 21, 2014 after being in positions of acting anti-terrorist operation

President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov set the task before the Ukrainian
security forces "to completely clear the region from terrorists" and "restore peace
and tranquility in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions."

As of May 21 under the control of Ukrainian security forces units were 6

districts of Donetsk region, including the city. Dobropole, Dobropilskiy,
Alexander, Velykonovosilkivskyy areas controlled special battalion "Donbass",
and Velykonovosilkivskyy, Volnovakha, and Maryinsky Starobeshivskiy areas
controlled by units of the National Guard. The next day one of the units of the
battalion "Donbass" took custody of the office buildings in Volodarsky district.

June 3 during the antiterrorist operation was completely cleared of terrorists

north of Donetsk region, destroyed bases and military camps of militants in the
region and captured their main fortified area in the village Semenovka, established
control over the city of Krasny Liman. In battles over 500 militants killed near the
village Semenovka in Slavic. Losses of Ukrainian soldiers made three dead and 50
wounded.59

2.2.11. The attacks on border outposts on the border between Ukraine

and Russia

May 19, 2014 near Amvrosiyivka Donetsk region near the checkpoint of the
state border of Ukraine "Uspenka" group of pro-Russian militants carried out an
armed attack on a checkpoint of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As a result of
59
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63
conflict, the perpetrators were destroyed, part of them arrested and brought to
criminal responsibility.

At midnight on June 2 pro-Russian militants carried out the assault Luhansk

border basis and during the 6-hour fight enthusiastically building collateral.

June 5th a group of armed militants crossed the Russian border and attacked
a border checkpoint Marinovka of the Russian Federation, resulting in the
wounding of five border of Ukraine. In order to prevent the penetration of military
units and import of military equipment from the Russian Federation was involved
unit is connected to the State Border Service and the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
During the operation, according to pro-terrorist groups that tried to break through
in the Ukraine, suffered two devastating airstrikes, resulting neutralized 15
militants destroyed their armored personnel carriers, car "Ural-375" and two
KAMAZ trucks. Some insurgents fled back to Russia freely and were based there
and the rest were strengthened in snowy Donetsk region and to monitor the actions
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and adjustments shelling from Russia, created a
fortified point at the height of Saur-Tomb.

Needing to regain control over the state border of Ukraine, to stop the
uncontrolled movement of people from the Russian Federation and further
preventing penetration into the territory of Ukraine military equipment, the same
day the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine decided to close eight border crossing
points and during the following days organized reinforced protection of strategic
facilities and patrol roads on the state border of Ukraine in Donetsk and Lugansk
regions, particularly in the interval-Uspenka-Marinovka Dyakov-Zelenopillya
Dovzhansky-border, National Guardy and Ukrainian military.

64
 June 12 by the National Guard and the Armed Forces of Ukraine blocking
the columns of Russian military equipment and militants in the south-eastern and
southern Amvrosiivskyi Shakhtarsky areas. During the operation was also an
attempt to regain control over the mound Saur-Tomb, the strategic importance of
which is associated with a traceable surrounding area radius of 30-40 kilometers
and a large section of the border Ukraine and the Russian Federation. As a result of
the armed conflict killed 3 and wounded 12 soldiers 79th separate airborne brigade
Mykolaiv and 3 special purpose regiment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

On the night of June 17 the city of Donetsk region Snow pro-Russian

militants made another driving military equipment from the Russian Federation,
the species structure which includes tanks, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft artillery,
heavy machine guns and mortars. During the smuggling of weapons near the
village Alekseevskoe Amvrosiivskyi Donetsk region pro-Russian militants
attacked on Border Protection division of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As a result
of injuries soldiers were killed.60

May 5 armed pro-Russian militants attempted to break with Ukrainian

security forces surrounded the city Slavyansk. During the raid, terrorist group was
liquidated, the remains of offenders back into the city. As a result, opposition
fighters killed 4 Security Service and Interior Ministry of Ukraine, one man
received serious injuries.

May 13, about 30 pro-Russian militants ambushed on the outskirts of the

village Oktjabrskoe Slavic area and attacked the convoy of Ukrainian paratroopers.
As a result sentry armed opposition fighters killed 7 95th separate airborne brigade
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 9 troopers received injuries of varying severity
60
Prykordonnyky vkotre fiksuyutʹ fakty rosiysʹkoyi prysutnosti v zoni ATO// Прикордонники вкотре фіксують факти російської присутності
в зоні АТО// Border guards once again captures the fact russian presence near ATO http://mediarnbo.org/2014/07/08/prikordonniki-dali-
fiksuyut-fakti-ro/

65
and concussion. After inspecting the site, the site of the ambush early detection
feature position containers on Russian launchers RPG-18 «Fly» RPG-26 "Aglen"
and the barrel of sniper rifles. Militants moved several minibuses and cars.

May 24 about 17:00 on the northern outskirts of Slavic near the village
Karpovka near the intersection of highways E40M03 and T 0513 pro-Russian
militants using mortars and grenades attacked the checkpoint in the National Guard
of Ukraine. During the firing the militants damaged homes and psychiatric hospital
in Slavic. As a result, two-hour armed opposition killed a soldier of the National
Guard of Ukraine, an Italian journalist and Russian translator 4 soldiers wounded.

June 4 pro-Russian militants damaged water supply, thus temporarily left

without water Slovyansk, Druzhkivka, Dzerzhinsk, Kostyantynivka and
Kramatorsk.

June 6 at pro-Russian militants from the territory of the church with mortars
shelled checkpoint of Ukraine. One person was killed, two police officers were
seriously injured.

June 13 and a half kilometers from the pro-Russian Slavic militants fired
Ukrainian military convoy. 2 Killed soldier 25th Airborne Brigade Airborne Forces
of Ukraine

On the night of June 26 to June 27 near the Slavic village in the area of
peaceful pro-Russian militants using mortars and tanks made 8 assault checkpoint
Armed Forces of Ukraine. One tank and one mortar Ukrainian servicemen were
killed, another captured enemy tank, 4 Ukrainian BTR suffered damage. Due to the
attack killed five paratroopers Airborne Forces of Ukraine and one National Guard
soldier Ukraine, 5 people were injured.

66
 June 28 near the intersection of highways E40M03 and T 0513 pro-Russian
militants carried out a second mortar attack checkpoint Armed Forces of Ukraine.
3 Killed soldier 95th separate airborne brigade Airborne Forces of Ukraine.61

2.2.12. Aviation terroristic acts and troops clashes at the East of

Ukraine

April 25, 2014 at the airport of Kramatorsk Donetsk region because of pro
fighters shot with PTKR was destroyed by a helicopter of the Armed Forces
Ukraine Mi-8.

May 2 near Slavyansk Donetsk region of portable anti-aircraft missile

system gunmen shot down two helicopters of the Armed Forces Ukraine Mi-24,
killing five people, one person was injured and taken prisoner by criminals.

May 5 at the Slavonic by gunfire from pro-Russian forces heavy machine

gun was damaged helicopter of the Armed Forces Ukraine Mi-24. The helicopter
landed in the river, the crew survived and was evacuated.

May 29 near Slavyansk pro-Russian militants helicopter was shot down

National Guardy of Ukraine Mi-8 after unloading food and rotation of personnel
returning from the area Karachun Mountain. 12 people were killed, six soldiers of
the National Guard of Ukraine, including two crew members and six helicopters -
Interior Ministry special forces personnel Ukraine, among them - Major General
SP Kulchytsky; one person seriously injured.

June 4 at the Slavyansk by gunfire from militants was crushed Armed Forces
of Ukraine helicopter Mi-24. The damaged helicopter was able to land, the crew
managed to leave the car before it caught fire. Both crew members were injured.

61
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67
 June 6, about 17:00 Slavyansk pro-Russian militants from the city center
was fired airplane aircraft of Armed Forces of Ukraine AN-30B that flew from city
to Nikolayevka Izyum and performed reconnaissance flight. In consequence of
engine damage plane almost fell on the city. Five people were killed, three injured
crew member.

June 21 in Zmiiv district crashed helicopter of State Emergency Service of

Ukraine Mi-8T. The accident killed three crew members.

June 24 at the pro-Russian Slavyansk troops downed helicopter of Armed

Forces of Ukraine Mi-8, shortly after takeoff from the area Karachun Mountain. A
helicopter returning from a checkpoint with specialists that installed the equipment
for the purpose of monitoring and recording space armistice violations in the area
of anti-terrorist operations. Killing all 9 people who were on board.

April 17, 2014 near the Donetsk region Slavyansk forces reconnaissance and
commando units of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was captured TV radio reproductive
center on Mount Karachun then made its disconnection from the Ukrainian TV and
radio channels and established the first multiplex broadcast digital TV of Russian
Federation.

May 3 Airborne Forces of Ukraine has resumed control of the TV tower and
increased patrols organized strategic object. May 15 Ukrainian military forces were
abolished newly strengthening of Russian fighters in the five kilometer zone
around a television tower.

Because of the strategic importance of the mountain, its dominant height

over the city and the location of her TV tower, pro-Russian militants in May-June
2014 were carried out repeatedly attempts to assault the mountain and its regular
68
shelling. May 19 fighters was made an unsuccessful attempt to re-capture facility:
as a result of shelling by Russian militants from the territory of large-kindergarten
weapons checkpoint landing troops Ukraine died of wounds paratrooper Armed
Forces of Ukraine. 29 May and 24 June Russian militants near Mount Karachun
committed two aviation crashes, killing 21 people.62

In the night from June 30 to July 1, when a massive fire attack of Karachun
Mountain by Russian military special troops, TV tower was destroyed.

During 3-4 June the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of Interior
of Ukraine conducted a special operation to arrest the criminals pro in Krasny
Liman, during which were eliminated fortified military equipment stronghold of
insurgents captured in mid-April in the city hospital. As a result of the operation
killed one person. June 5 was recovered City Council and the police.

June 19 Armed Forces of Ukraine Russian fighters destroyed fortifications

in the South District Krasnolymanska. During the raid of criminals were detained
and brought to criminal responsibility. However, the majority of Russian fighters
moved the city Slavyansk. As a result of the operation killed 16 paratroopers 24th
mechanized, the 25th Airborne and 95th separate air crews and Airborne Forces of
Ukraine.

May 11, 2014 in Krasnoarmeysk, Donetsk region near the city council pro-
Russian militants carried out the attack on the police. As a result of the fight one
person was killed and another was wounded.

On the morning of May 23 in the village Karlivka Maryinsky district pro-

Russian militants, equipped with armored personnel carriers, heavy armament and
sniper, ambush committed an armed attack against a convoy of National Guard
62
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69
transport Ukraine. As a result, 4-hour battle killed 5 and wounded six soldiers of
the battalion of special purpose of National Guard reservists Ukraine "Donbass".
Part of National Guard Of Ukraine soldiers were caught by pro-Russian militants
captured and subjected to inhuman torture.

On the same day near the village Novopavlovka Volnovakha district pro-
Russian militants with automatic weapons shelled the ambulance car, in
consequence of which killed a soldier of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, one person
was injured

23 May and 21 June near the village Dobropolye pro-Russian militants

from firing a sniper rifle carried checkpoint Armed Forces of Ukraine. 3 Killed
soldier 93-th separate mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

May 22, 2014 at approximately 4:30 am near Volnovakha Donetsk region

there was an attack on pro-Russian militants Ukrainian military checkpoint 51st
Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In an attack by pro-Russian
militants killed 18 people, 32 people were injured.

April 16, 2014 at 20.30 am pro-Russian militants armed with automatic

weapons, grenades and bags of incendiary mix, in order to capture military
weapons attacked the military in the city of Mariupol, Donetsk region. Security
Forces and the city Police Department Ukraine militant assault was repulsed. As a
result of the confrontation killed 3 and wounded 15 people, burned the vehicle and
two buildings63.

May 9, 2014 dozens of pro-Russian militants armed with sniper, automatic,

heavy weapons and grenades, blocking the streets and committed attempt to
capture the city office of the Interior Ministry of Ukraine and National Guard
63
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70
military unit Ukraine. Given the scale of the attack, the movement of public
transport in the city was stopped and engaged armed forces of Ukraine with the use
of armored vehicles in the resulting conflict killed 9 and injured 42 people,
damaged water supply, buildings Mariupol City Council, prosecutors, military
units, houses and building of the city police station police burned to the ground.
Among those killed 1 soldier National Guard of Ukraine, 3 members of Territorial
Defence of Ukraine "Dnepropetrovsk" and "Azov" and 2 workers Mariupol city
department of the Interior Ministry of Ukraine, including the head of Mariupol
City Department of Traffic Police Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Sayenko and
commander of Dnipropetrovsk battalion of territorial defense, Colonel Sergei
Demidenko, which Russian militants cut off his ears and gouged out his eyes.

June 13 at 4:50 am involving soldiers of the National Guard of Ukraine,

Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and Ukraine territorial defense "Azov" and
"Dnepr-1" anti-terrorist operation launched by terrorist cells to total elimination of
the pro-Russian criminals in Mariupol. During the operation, law enforcement
bodies of Ukraine were destroyed strongholds of pro-Russian militants eliminated
their military equipment, neutralized the attackers themselves and restored control
of all the illegal seizure of the city.

June 14 on the outskirts of town, near the plant "Azovstal" pro-Russian

militants ambush with a sniper, and large-automatic weapons fire columns made
cars of the State Border Service. 5 Killed border, another 7 people were injured64.

May 22, 2014 near the city of Lugansk region Rubizhne pro-Russian
militants ambushed got 30th detached mechanized brigade Novograd Volyn 8th
Army Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which moved across the bridge

64
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71
highway towards the city Novodruzhesk. The militants, mostly Chechen, were
appointed to positions on the banks of the Seversky Donets River and attacked a
column of mechanized platoon with the use of small arms and grenades. As a result
of clashes killed 3 people, 5 more people - seriously injured.

June 2 in the city of Luhansk pro-Russian militants carried out the shelling
of MANPADS Ukrainian aircraft that performed reconnaissance flight. One of the
shells militants released was assigned to Luhansk regional state administration,
killing 8 and injuring 28 people.

June 17 Metalist, near the village, 10 kilometers from Luhansk pro-Russian

militants ambush crossfire of large-weapon military convoy was attacked by the
Armed Forces of Ukraine, moved to the checkpoint on the outskirts of the village.
During the 20 hours of clashes killed 16 soldiers 128-th separate Guards mountain
infantry brigade Turkestans'ko-Zakarpattia, 80th separate airborne brigade of the
13th Army Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and territorial defense battalion
Ukraine "Aydar". At noon the next day by the ATO for the reinforcement of some
units of the National Guard Ukraine the village has been completely cleared of the
pro-Russian militants destroyed several of their block-posts and two amphibians.
During the fighting killed two journalists from the Russian Federation illegally
crossed the Ukrainian-Russian border and were part of the pro-Russian militants.

June 18 urban villages near Stanitsa Luhansk pro-Russian militants have

fired units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. During the armed confrontation was
surrounded by Russian mercenaries and corrupt Ukrainian T-64B. The two man
crew died, severing a grenade in the middle of the tank. 21 August settlement was
liberated from the militants.

2.2.12.1.Whipping IL-76 in Luhansk

72
 June 14, 2014 at approximately 1 hour 10 minutes a night landing at the
airport "Lugansk" pro-Russian militants was hit with "Igla" and heavy machine
gun military transport aircraft of the 25th military transport wing of the Air Force
of Ukraine Il-76MD. On board were 40 paratroopers of 25th separate
Dnepropetrovsk Airborne Brigade and 9 crew members. The shelling entire crew
that was aboard the downed aircraft was killed. The tragedy was the largest since
the beginning of the antiterrorist operation and the largest simultaneous loss of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine for the period of Ukraine's independence.

On the night of May 18, 2014 near the city of Kharkiv region Raisins pro-
Russian militants attacked the camp soldiers Ukraine. As a result of armed clashes
injured two soldiers of the National Guard of Ukraine.

May 22 near the city Barvinkove pro-Russian militants carried out the
shelling checkpoint of the National Guard of Ukraine.

May 29 near the village of Kamenka region Kharkov region Izyum attack
took place pro-Russian militants military convoy Armed Forces of Ukraine,
Ukraine Natshvardiyi soldiers and volunteers after the delivery of food and
household items at checkpoints near the Slavic Donetsk region back to town
Raisins. As a result of a terrorist act killed soldiers of the National Guard of
Ukraine65.

2.2.12.2. Boeing 777 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17

July 17, 2014 in the controlled zone of the terrorist organization "DNR"
between the villages of Hornbeam and loose Shakhtarsky Donetsk region Ukraine
as a result of the crash Boeing 777 airline Malaysia Airlines, Flight MH17

65
Spysok voyakiv, yaki zahynuly cherez pidbyttya litaka u Luhansʹku // Список вояків, які загинули через підбиття літака у Луганську // List
of soldiers who were killed by summing the plane in Luhansk
http://expres.ua/news/2014/06/15/107985-spysok-voyakiv-zagynuly-pidbyttya-litaka-lugansku

73
Amsterdam - Kuala Lumpur, killing 298 people - citizens of Australia, Belgium ,
Great Britain, Vietnam, Israel, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Canada, Malaysia, the
Netherlands, Germany, New Zealand, South Africa, Romania, USA and the
Philippines.

Following the investigations conducted during July-September 2014 by the

Security Council of the Netherlands, the National Bureau of investigation of
aviation accidents and incidents of civil aircraft, The Boeing Company, the
International Civil Aviation Organization, the European Commission, the
European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, the International Criminal
Police Organization, European police, the European aviation safety agency, the
National Council on transport safety, as well as experts from Australia, Great
Britain, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Germany, Russia, USA, France revealed that
the cause of the crash was his destruction warhead model 9N314M missiles
"ground-to-air" series 9M38, which are equipped with anti-aircraft missile systems
"Buk" at a distance of about one meter from the front left upper fuselage airliner at
13:20:03 at 10, 1 km and fired from pro-Russian militants occupied territory to the
southeast from the town of Torez. Instead versions of involvement in the incident
Ukrainian military attack on board an aircraft piloting errors and technical
problems of the aircraft implicitly refuted.

Since July 17, the airspace over the territory of Ukraine controlled by pro-
Russian troops to support operations against terrorism for civil aviation was
closed.66

2.2.13. The third wave of international sanctions and restrictions on

food and Russian embargo

66
Rozsliduvannya katastrofy litaka Boeing 777// Розслідування катастрофи літака Boeing 777// Investigation of the crash Boeing 777
http://www.nbaai.gov.ua/news.html?id=6&lang=ua

74
 Terrorist attack in Ukraine July 17, 2014 caused a wide resonance in the
world, was the immediate cause "of international economic isolation of Russia
from the civilized world," proclaimed 41 countries and several international
organizations, led the third wave of sanctions against individual sectors and
tightened restrictions on cooperation and technological support of.

August 6, 2014 order of the President of the Russian Federation "On the
application of certain special economic measures to ensure the security of" a ban
on the import to Russia of certain agricultural products, raw materials and food,
countries that have applied economic sanctions against Russian businesses and
individuals. American, European and Russian experts actions of the government of
the Russian Federation condemned and called politically motivated and not
reasonable, which, to a greater extent hurt Russia itself, as a country that officially
declared "trade war" is about 3% of world GDP, instead, States opponents have a
total weight of more than 40% of world GDP. Over the next half of Russia is
suffering a deep economic crisis, the collapse of the ruble, the jump in prices,
falling real incomes and the reduction of the state budget.67

2.2.14.Cattle of Ilovaisk

Since mid-August 2014 offensive Ukrainian security forces gradually

blocked due to counter remnants of illegal armed groups backed by army personnel
of the Russian Federation. During the military confrontation, pro-Russian forces
increasingly used the second Chechen war tactics with devastating bombardment
of settlements sighting massive fire from heavy artillery, mortars and howitzers.
However, the most critical was the situation near Ilovaisk. During 24-30 August
armed terrorist formations and units of the regular army was surrounded and

67
Viyna na skhodi Ukrayiny// Війна на сході України// The war in eastern Ukraine http://energy.gift/viyna-shodi-ukraini_4733981.html

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shelled approximately 600 soldiers of the Armed Forces and the Interior Ministry
of Ukraine. 186 people died, hundreds of soldiers were wounded and captured by
terrorists captured68.

2.2.15. The rapid reaction force in Europe and the European shaft

The tragedy near Ilovaisk temporarily paralyzed the antiterrorist operation in

Ukraine significantly complicated the already not simple Ukrainian-Russian
relations and led to the adoption in North America and Europe collective protective
measures against Russia. From 4 to 5 September 2014 in Newport South Wales
UK during the 26th Summit of Heads of State and Heads of Government of
member countries of NATO, in addition to representatives of the Russian
Federation, it was decided to create a rapid reaction force in the territories of
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia , Lithuania, Poland and Romania, and the main base and
command center of power in the UK. The system aims to increase the combat
readiness of European countries in the case of violation of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance Russian
Federation.

In order to improve security at land border between Ukraine and Russia,

September 3, 2014 the Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk presented
fortificated project "Wall." 10 September draft was approved by the President of
Ukraine Petro Poroshenko and started building fortifications. The project envisages
the construction of two defensive lines, about 1,500 kilometers of trenches and
communication trenches, over 8,000 trenches for equipment, more than 4,000
dugouts and 60-kilometer fence without Explosives. In connection with the control
of the border area Ukraine illegal armed pro-Russian forces and Russian troops, the

68
Viyna na skhodi Ukrayiny// Війна на сході України// The war in eastern Ukraine http://energy.gift/viyna-shodi-ukraini_4733981.html

76
project is in two phases: the first phase of the construction of fortifications on
Ukrainian-Russian border in Chernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv regions; the second - in
the Lugansk and Donetsk regions. As of October 1, according to the State Border
Service of Ukraine carried out the implementation of the first phase of "The Wall".

2.2.16. De-escalation of the conflict

2.2.16.1. Minsk agreement

September 5, 2014 in Minsk in the building "President Hotel" hosted the

third meeting Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, in which the parties to the
conflict agreed performance "plan of peaceful settlement of the situation in the east
of Ukraine" PA Poroshenko, given initiatives of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The agreement entered into force on the same day from 19:00 p.m.

September 20, 2014 decision of the fourth meeting of the Contact Group
adopted a memorandum on bilateral cease use of weapons, which interpreted the
ways of implementation of decision 1 point protocol.

Since September 2014 started the Working Group Joint Center for
monitoring and coordination of the ceasefire and the gradual stabilization of the
boundary sides in eastern Ukraine, composed of representatives of the Ukrainian
side, the monitoring group of the OSCE and 76 servicemen of the Armed Forces
headed by the Deputy Chief of the Land Russian troops, Lieutenant-General A.
Lentsov.69

EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Federica Mogherini

at the hearing on October 6 in the European Parliament said that he sees no

69
Minsk agreement http://web.archive.org/web/20150213142137/http://www.osce.org/ru/cio/140221?download=true

77
military solution to the conflict. Speaking about the situation in Ukraine, Mogerini
also stressed the need for full implementation of the Minsk agreements.

As for Russia, depending on developments as possible the introduction of

new sanctions and mitigation: "We can soften sanctions if the situation will
improve, but also can and deepen them. This effectiveness of this mechanism - its
flexibility. " In terms of the EU, "Russia remains a strategic country for the
international community", though not currently a partner of the EU. This position
differs from the position of the US president, who in 201 * year took place of a
regional leader.

Federica Mogherini also stressed the need for daily diplomatic support for
the peace plan of President of Ukraine: "We have the day to day work with the
Ukrainian side, helping President Poroshenko, who is trying to make their own
steps to address this situation." According to her, Ukraine can expect full support
in terms of institutional reforms, as well as answers to "economic and energy
challenges."

Since the agreement on its implementation actually worked only Ukrainian

side. The top of and managed its militants showed continuous sabotage their
obligations.

2.2.16.2. Changes to Minsk II Agreement

During 11 -12 February 2015 at the Palace of Independence in Minsk took

place while the third meeting of leaders of the Normandy format Ukraine-
Germany-France-Russia Poroshenko, Merkel, Francois Hollande, Putin and fourth
trilateral meeting of the Contact Group on peaceful settlement of the situation in
the east Heidi Tagliavini Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, Mikhail Zurabov, Igor
carpenter, Alexander Zakharchenko and other senior people. February 12 during a
78
16-hour negotiations the Minsk summit, the parties to the conflict had agreed a set
of additional measures to implement the Minsk agreements of September 5,
201470.

2.2.16.3. The agreement on the withdrawal of weapons in eastern

Ukraine

September 29, 2015 the parties Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine

prepared "agreement on the withdrawal of weapons in eastern Ukraine."

October 2, 2015 in Paris during the fourth meeting of the leaders of the
Normandy format Ukraine-Germany-France-Russia discussed ways to implement
the Agreement and agreed to a number of questions:

• Diversion of weapons of all caliber smaller than 100 mm both sides at a

distance of 15 km from the boundary line for 41 days.

• Clearance areas in parts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine.

• Extension of the mandate and increase the number of OSCE mission in

Ukraine.

• The extension of the international and humanitarian organizations to freely

carry out their activities throughout the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine.

• Holding local elections in some regions of Donetsk and Lugansk regions of

Ukraine under the existing laws of Ukraine and to ensure the smooth and efficient
monitoring and verification of the electoral process by international observers of
the OSCE.

70
Minsk agreement on Ukraine crisis: text in full http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11408266/Minsk-agreement-on-
Ukraine-crisis-text-in-full.html

79
 • Release Ukrainian hostages in the temporarily occupied territories and
Ukrainian political prisoners held in the Russian Federation.

• Prohibition to use Russian facilities warfare against the OSCE.

The issue of Ukraine's sovereignty over the Autonomous Republic of

Crimea were not resolved.

During 3-19 October 2015 the Armed Forces of Ukraine implemented the
first stage of the Agreement diversion of arms in the sector "North", which covers
part of the Luhansk region, October 3-6, pulled tanks 9-11 October - artillery guns
and mortars.

October 20, 2015 the Armed Forces of Ukraine started the second phase of
the agreement withdrawal of armaments sector "South", covering the Donetsk
region and the western part of Luhansk region, and has to continue 24 days.

2.3. Implementation of the hybrid warfare theory in Ukrainian case

2.3.1. The first stage of Russia-Ukraine war

The first (preparatory) stage - from the early 2000s to mid-2013, included
the following:

- during the second presidential term of Leonid Kuchma - strengthening

Russian influence on the leadership of Ukraine and through it making favorable for
Russia. The consequence of this was the refusal of the Ukrainian government on
course to join NATO and the EU (in 2003 after the so-called "Kolchuga scandal")
and "determination" "heir" of Kuchma protégé Viktor Yanukovych. However,
because of the "orange" revolution, Russia has not achieved the desired;

80
 - under President Yushchenko - large-scale measures to discredit the ideas of
"orange" revolution and the leadership of Ukraine and its European and Euro-
Atlantic course; destabilization of the situation in Ukraine and deepening the split
in Ukrainian society into supporters of the West and Russia; undermine the
Ukrainian economy a reduction of trade and economic relations with Russia and
use the energy factor as an instrument of pressure on Ukraine (in t. h. under t.
called. "gas wars"). This paved the way for the victory of Viktor Yanukovych in
the presidential election and to "swing the" motion vector of our country from
West to East;

- during the reign of Yanukovych regime - consolidation of the

achievements of the Russian Federation to Ukraine and its final shift to Russia in a
way, bribery and corruption of the Ukrainian authorities; implementing agent of
Russian influence in the leadership of Ukraine; weakening and demoralization of
the Ukrainian security forces, especially in Crimea (almost all heads of law
enforcement agencies in times of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych were Russian
citizens); strengthening Russian presence in the Ukrainian economy; dissemination
of ideas in our country joining the Russian integration initiatives in exchange for
loans and economic preferences; deployment of large-scale pro-Russian
movements in Ukraine and its specific regions (primarily in the Crimean peninsula
and the eastern and southern regions).71

The consequence of this policy was the refusal of Moscow leadership of

Ukraine Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013 and re-orientation
of Russia and the Customs Union, which sparked a "revolution of dignity."

71
Vladimir Gorbulin Gibridnaya voyna: vse tol'ko nachinayetsya http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-
nachinaetsya-_.html// Владимир Горбулин Гибридная война: все только начинается http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-
vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html// Vladimir Gorbulin Hybrid War: everything is just beginning http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-
voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html

81
 2.3.2 The second phase of the war Russia-Ukraine

In the second (active) phase - from approximately early November 2013, the
following measures:

- in preparation for the seizure of Crimea and further disintegration of

Ukraine:

- deployment of large-scale information campaign to discredit the

"revolution of dignity" in Ukraine (as "fascist rebellion") and the new government
of our country (as "military junta"), and imposing ideas on "the need to protect the
Russian-speaking population in the Ukrainian territory";

- organization in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine v. BC. "Self-defense units"

among locals and Russian citizens in t. H. Special services, military special forces
members and other Cossack paramilitaries;

- creating groups of troops intended to invade the ARC and a show of force
near the borders of Ukraine under the guise of training and safety of the Winter
Olympic Games in Sochi in January and February 2014.72

Thus their active actions in Ukrainian Crimea Russia started in the most
favorable moment for her, which was characterized by the weakening of the
Ukrainian authorities through an objective temporary absence of the president,
prime minister and heads of law enforcement agencies (who fled to Russia) and
personal demoralization of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies in terms of
revolutionary events in our country;

72
Vladimir Gorbulin Gibridnaya voyna: vse tol'ko nachinayetsya http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-
nachinaetsya-_.html// Владимир Горбулин Гибридная война: все только начинается http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-
vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html// Vladimir Gorbulin Hybrid War: everything is just beginning http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-
voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html

82
 - during the annexation of the Crimea:

- seizure of Russian security services (under the guise of "unknown

persons") government buildings in Simferopol and removal from power
management ARC;

- deployment in Crimea so. called. "Self-defense groups" ( "little green

men"), which took control of the power structures of the Crimean peninsula and
the key features of its infrastructure, security forces blocked the departments of
Ukraine in the Crimea;

- introduction of Russian troops in the Crimea under the guise of military

exercises and related articles under cover of the Agreement on the conditions of the
Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine;

"Legalizing" the fact of occupation of Crimea through "referendum" on the

status of Crimea and decision-making by the Parliament and the President of the
Russian Federation for inclusion of Crimea to Russia as a subject of the Russian
Federation;

Final disposition of Ukrainian authorities in Crimea and the displacement of

Ukrainian troops from the Crimean peninsula.

Thus Russia annexed Crimea and established a "reason" for its integration
into the Russian Federation. At the same time Russian Crimean annexation was not
recognized by the overwhelming majority of countries and caused a negative
reaction of the USA, the EU and its partners have introduced sanctions against
Russia;

when creating "New Russia" and resolution of armed conflict in eastern

Ukraine:

83
 - destabilization of eastern and southern regions of Ukraine by organizing
mass anti govermental protests, clashes with police and supporters of the unity of
Ukraine, as well as the seizure of administrative buildings;

- implementation of "Crimean" scenario in the Donetsk and Lugansk

regions, t. h. establish control over part of their territories, the creation of "militias"
made up of representatives of the Russian special services, law enforcement and
criminalized local pro-Russian forces;

"Legalization" sp-called. Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic (DNR and

LNR) through appropriate "referendum" and "elections" their "government";

Russia to provide comprehensive support to the separatists, in t. ch. on the

financing of their activities, training militants and supplying them weapons,
military equipment and ammunition, as well as the introduction of Russian troops
on the territory of the NPT and FSC;

- the implementation of Russia's political and economic pressure on Ukraine,

as well as increasing group of Ukrainian Armed Forces near the border;

- discredit Ukraine military operation against the Russian-terrorist groups

and the disintegration of the country, attempts to apply this operation as "punitive
against its own population."73

The use of military force, not given opportunities to fully implement the
"Crimean" scenario in the east of Ukraine. In fact, "hybrid warfare" against
Ukraine Russia has turned into an armed conflict between two countries with direct

73
SIPRI 2013: ozbroennya, rozzbroennya ta mizhnarodna bezpeka [SIPRI 2013: armament, disarmament and international security]:
Shchorichnyk; per. z angl. Stokgolm. mizhnar. in-t doslidzhennya myru; Ukr. tsentr ekon. i polit. doslidzhen im. O. Razumkova;
Redkol. ukr. vyd.: L. Shangina (editor-in-chief) ta in. Kyiv, Zapovit, 2014, 520 р. [in Ukrainian]

84
troops on both sides. However, despite the efforts of the Russian side to hide part
of their armed forces in that conflict, this fact has been recognized by the
overwhelming majority of the international community, leading to increased US
and EU sanctions against Russia.

Now Russia is trying to implement the second phase of "hybrid warfare"

against Ukraine and at the same time (since September. after reaching Minsk
agreements) to perform some elements of the third stage. For example, Russia is
trying to "freeze" the conflict in eastern Ukraine, forcing us to recognize separatists
" The negotiators "and start negotiations with them on their, in fact - Russian
conditions. To this end, Russia increases pressure on Ukraine, by increasing the
number of its troops near the Ukrainian border and in our occupied territories.
Russia denies its involvement in the conflict and simultaneously conducting a
large-scale information campaign anti-Ukrainian orientation.

Based on the above, it should be borne in mind that Russia will try to
implement their plans in the form of a continuation of "hybrid warfare" (creeping
spread of instability to other Ukrainian regions), and the open aggression of large-
scale use of military force.

Armed aggression against the Russian Federation, Ukraine has become a

long-term factor of influence on the Ukrainian political, economic, military and
social reality. Due to the actions of the Russian Federation in 2014 it was deformed
system of global and regional security, as well as the existing system of
international law. Almost all international security guarantees for Ukraine (in
particular in the framework of the Budapest Memorandum) proved ineffective in
an environment where the aggressor was made by one of the guarantors - the
Russian Federation. Russia used against Ukraine the concept of "hybrid war",

85
which in many ways is unique to the structural and functional point of view: it is in
the form "hybrid", but by the content - "asymmetric". Most clearly the nature of a
new type of war, demonstrated first annexation of the Russian Federation in the
spring of 2014 the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and then - to
support local radical elements and full-scale invasion of Russian troops in the
eastern regions of Ukraine. Although each specific element of this "hybrid war" is
not new per se and has been used in almost all the wars of the past, but the unique
consistency and the relationship of these elements, the dynamism and flexibility of
their application, as well as the growing importance of the information factor.
Moreover, the information factor in some cases, becomes an independent
component and is no less important than the military. Although many scientists and
researchers point to the "hybrid" nature of this war, conceptualization in this sense,
is ambiguous and incomplete. So, there is the concept of "hybrid warfare" in the
western scientific thought roughly since the mid-2000s, but in many cases it is
interpreted in different terms and concepts than there is now. To characterize the
modern conflict between Ukraine and Russia may be used such terms as
"unconventional war" (unconventional warfare), "irregular warfare" (irregular
warfare) or "mixed War" (compound warfare), or a state-sponsored "hybrid war" (
State-Sponsored Hybrid). In all these points to the "hollowing out" the outlines of
the military conflict and the involvement in it of non-military means, which in the
normal state are not directly related to the classic military confrontation 74.
However, the measures that are used to implement the Russian aggression against
Ukraine, in their entirety and were not fully conceptualized neither domestic nor
Western scholars. The very genesis of the formation of the Russian concept of

74
Bachmann, Sascha-Dominik Oliver Vladimir and Gunneriusson, Hakan, Hybrid Wars: The 21st-Century’s New Threats to Global
Peace and Security (September 16, 2014). Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 43, No. 1, 2015, pp. 77 –
98 -http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2506063

86
"hybrid war", the stages of its deployment, components, state of implementation of
the "hybrid" confrontation in Ukraine and possible ways of countering the plans of
the Russian Federation in this field should be further explored and developed.
Geopolitical revenge: from the idea to the main strategy in the current
confrontation between Ukraine and Russia is that it is the logical conclusion of a
long-term "geo-strategy of revenge", which for a long time to turn out Moscow.
The very genesis of the Russian phenomenon "hybrid war" refers to the period of
Russia to rethink its place in the world and the region. The main characteristic of
the Yeltsin era losses geopolitical position, international political influence of
status and would reformat the European geo-strategic space, which ended with a
significant expansion of NATO and the EU.

In this case, even the objective components of the relevant geo-economic

and geopolitical trends all the more perceived predominantly through the
subjective lens of resentment and nostalgia for the lost. In concentrated form, this
nostalgia back in 2005 Vladimir Putin expressed in his message to the Federal
Assembly of the Russian Federation: "... We must recognize that the collapse of
the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century for the
Russian people, it became a real drama Tens of millions of our fellow citizens.. and
countrymen found themselves outside Russian territory. " You could even say that
in many respects the geopolitical revanchist mood Putin and his hard-line attitude
to any "revolutionary" political changes due to his personal experience: he saw the
destruction of the Berlin Wall, which destroyed the entire world, which, Putin
understood and considered his. It is the coming to power of Vladimir Putin can be
considered the beginning of Moscow's own search "geostrategy revenge", which
aims to complex problems, the key of which - a gradual but steady restoration of
Russian influence and importance in the international arena. However, more than

87
difficult international context, and given the significant shortage of necessary
resources (from the purely economic to military information and communication),
the base of the Russian "geostrategy revenge" could only be an asymmetric
approach. The period from 2001 to 2014. It can be attributed to the time of search
forms and methods that would help to implement the relevant geopolitical
intentions. This was carried out in parallel and the "geopolitical mobilization" of
the population of the state. It is implemented through the classic mechanisms of
imposing his own people images "external enemy", a sense of Russia as a
"besieged fortress" and the total recovery of the anti-Western (mainly anti-US)
rhetoric75. The change of political regimes in the CIS (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova,
Kyrgyzstan), most likely, Russia perceived as a threat to its externally imposed
ideas of geopolitical revenge. This forced the Russian Federation intensively
preparing for the next big confrontation. Moreover, the idea of "big war", which
recently said presidential advisor S. Glazyev, obviously, is really dominant in the
present Russian establishment. And the conclusion Glaziev also, most likely, the
dominant among these circles: Russia to a new war is not ready (and willing to not
be), and therefore, should provoke her before, and achieve their objectives even
now. Obviously, the problem for some time remained the question of how to
implement your own ideas in a rather limited (and in many respects ostentatious)
readiness, the constraints of international law, the geopolitical status quo and as a
consequence - the unavailability of real full-scale war. It can be assumed that
approximately in the middle of the 2000s. a solution was found: "asymmetric
responses" part of a larger "hybrid war". It is pertinent to note that the Russian
Federation has not established its strategy from scratch. Here there is a certain
continuity of Soviet practices. Some researchers attribute the origins of Russian
practices "hybrid warfare" to the 20-th years of XX century. (Methods of "active
75
Belov A.K. Iskusstvo partizanskoi voiny [The art of guerrilla warfare]. Moscow, Grand: FAIR-press, 2003, 303 р.

88
intelligence"). However, in our opinion, it is better to pay attention to the final
stages of the US-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War. Then, in response to
the announced US program for strategic defense initiative (SDI) Gorbachev 12
October 1986, during a press conference in Reykjavik, he said: "The answer to SDI
will be asymmetric, but will Here we do not have to sacrifice significant.." . In
January 2013, Moscow hosted the general meeting of the Academy of Military
Sciences, which was addressed by Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed
Forces General Valery Gerasimov. It was a peculiar result of long work of military
analysts and experts of the General Staff, who for some time have conceptualized
the problem and looking for mechanisms to address it. That report General
Gerasimov - a kind of "point of no return" in the manifestation of Russian views on
modern war. It was pointed out, should be developed as a modern military-political
conflict, what elements it should be involved and at what stages. The report
emphasized the growing role of non-military methods of pressure on the enemy,
primarily through political, economic and humanitarian elements. Information
confrontation is generally defined as a cross-cutting activity in all phases of
conflict: its origin, maintenance and post-conflict period. Pay attention to the
"asymmetrical measures", which have been ranked as the activities of special
forces, the development of the internal opposition, as well as a steady increase in
the influence of the information on the object of attack. Much of what he was
talking in his speech, General Gerasimov (this, in particular, the importance of
non-military methods of pressure, information warfare, etc.) has already been used
first in the Crimea, and then in the east of Ukraine76.

76
1Iskusstvo voyny: Antologiya voennoi mysli [The art of war: anthology of military thought]. Sost., podgot. teksta, predisl.,
komment. R. Svetlova. St-Petersburg, TID «Amfora», 2004, 542 р. [in Russian]

89
 Thus, we can say that Ukraine is full against the war - "hybrid" in form,
"asymmetric" in content. The Ukrainian-Russian "hybrid warfare": the practice of a
new concept in general, the correct conclusion Chief of Staff General Gerasimov
wars of a new type - namely, that in such wars military forces are used only in the
final stages - provided a well-designed campaign was justified in the Crimea,
however, it was not confirmed in the Donbas. The annexation of the territory of
Crimea was largely successful due to not only develop an action plan in detail, but
the right to choose the moment for its implementation. This, in particular: - the
weakening of the central government and a partial "anarchy" on the background of
the change of government; - The growth of differences (or rather - Update existing)
between the center and the regions; - Poor psychological and logistical Ukrainian
state security structures; - The antagonism between the different law enforcement
agencies; - Especially active outreach Russia was in the Crimea in all the years of
Ukraine's independence. All this has caused, if not ideal, it is very close to them
the conditions of a special operation by the annexation of the Crimea. However, in
the events unfolding in the regions of eastern Ukraine, a significant number of
these conditions are not met, forcing Russia to move to the format of a
conventional military invasion. And it is a large-scale introduction of military
equipment in different forms (direct transfer across the border, through the delivery
of "convoys"), but the complete denial of such administration, distinguishes the
Ukrainian-Russian conflict from all others. Of course, the tactics of the terrorists of
weapons, fighting against your enemy is not new. However, the current situation is
unique and virtually unprecedented. This manifests itself primarily in the military
and military-technical plans. Priority actions of the Russian character acquired
reconnaissance and sabotage groups, terrorist acts and use guerrilla methods to
control engagement of the so-called militia of the local people and criminals, as
well as Russian mercenaries. They are used against the Ukrainian army and
90
battalion tactical groups of Russian troops. In particular, it was observed in the
battles of Ilovaiskaya in the second half of August. Quite high is the threat of a
second front in the south of Ukraine (in particular, with the southern Rostov
region) to the west in order to create a land corridor to the Crimea, and under
favorable conditions - even get a connection with the Pridnestrovian Moldavian
Republic. Russia has used the conflict in the east of Ukraine and to test new
weapons, excercise new tactics of warfare and receive military units fighting
experience. In the Donbass war special forces from almost all regions of Russia.77

By rotational scheme operating in the conflict zone and units of airborne

troops, marines. Thus, Russia is using the Eastern Ukraine as a large landfill,
which hones in practice new methods and means of warfare. And it is difficult not
to agree with the President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaite, said: "Ukraine is
struggling for the sake of the whole world, for all of us if a terrorist state, which is
an open aggression against its neighbor, do not stop, it will spread to Europe and
beyond.". In addition to purely military methods of classical, Russia within the
framework of "hybrid war" is hardly the first time a large scale used the concept of
"war three quarters." Its essence boils down to the fact that the modern soldier
must be prepared: in one quarter - to conduct combined arms battle in the second -
to carry out police functions, in the third - to carry out humanitarian missions.
Even in 1991, the Israeli polemology M. van Creveld defined characteristic of
modern "post postmodern" type war period "because they do not fit in the triple
scheme: the government - the army - the population". About the change of
paradigm of war in the sense of engaging in non-military structures and F. van says
Kapp: "hybrid warfare" - a mix of classical type of war using irregular military
77
Kaftan V.V. Partizanskaya voyna i terrorizm: k proyasneniyu sushchnosti ponyatiy [Guerrilla war and terrorism: towards clarification of
the concepts]. Prostranstvo i vremya, 2012, № 3 (9), pp. 88–93 [in Russian].

91
formations. The state, which is "hybrid war", implementing an agreement with
non-artists - militants, local community groups, organizations, and the relationship
is completely negated. These artists can do things that make the state itself can not
... All the dirty work can be passed on to non-State actors ". The concept of" war
three quarters ", which implements the Russian in Ukraine demonstrates the
validity of these arguments. This was particularly evident in during the annexation
of the Crimea. However, it said the concept was not implemented in the "spatial"
and in a "temporary", the same "reverse" its dimension. at first "green men"
appeared in the Crimea as a mission to ensure the "Russian / Russian-language
rights population. "But gradually shifted to the performance of the functions of this
mission to ensure the desired Moscow of the" referendum ". Soon they were
carried out and military function to forcibly impose the implementation of the
results" a referendum ". However, the Russian" military crime "company took
place in Crimea is almost bloodless, in eastern Ukraine has become a real tragedy.
An attempt to repeat the success of the Crimean drowned in a full-scale armed
confrontation. Accordingly, Russia is forced to return to the classic scenario of
"frozen conflicts" such as Transnistria or Karabakh. 78

2.4. The energy component of the "hybrid war" in Ukraine

An important element of conducting a "hybrid war" that has demonstrated

the Russian aggression, is the impact on the functioning of society. This energy
infrastructure has become a subject of special attention on the part of the aggressor,
because its capture (or destruction) not only causes considerable economic
damage, but also threatens the sustainable functioning of society life-support

78
Vladimir Gorbulin Gibridnaya voyna: vse tol'ko nachinayetsya http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-
nachinaetsya-_.html// Владимир Горбулин Гибридная война: все только начинается http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-
vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html// Vladimir Gorbulin Hybrid War: everything is just beginning http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-
voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html

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systems as a whole. It should be noted that the use of energy as a potential
"energy" weapon was openly proclaimed in 2003 in the Energy Strategy of the
Russian Federation up to 2020 .: the document noted that a powerful fuel and
energy complex of Russia "is the basis of economic development tool for the
implementation of internal and foreign policy." And this is not just a declaration of
intentions, but a real instrument of influence that Russia has repeatedly taken
advantage of (including through the weakening of all the ways of the energy
infrastructure of potential adversaries). An example of this is the almost
simultaneous explosions of energy infrastructure, which stopped supplying natural
gas and electricity to Georgia in January 2006, which was an element of further
pressure on Georgia. An explosion on a gas pipeline in Turkmenistan in April
2009, helped Russia to suspend inconvenient for her agreement with Turkmenistan
and virtually eliminate a competitor from the European market. So in 2006 it was
stopped to repair the pipeline, to ensure the supply of oil to the refinery in
Mazeikiai in Lithuania, and it is at a time when Lithuania decided to sell the
factory of the Polish company. It is obvious that Russia deliberately use attacks
against critical infrastructure, in particular energy, how to achieve their goals in the
political and economic spheres, as well as to reduce the military and economic
potential of the state in the shortest possible time. All of this can be seen in the
Ukrainian-Russian confrontation. This energy infrastructure (due to its
geographical dispersion) can indirectly threaten objects located far away from the
79
immediate attack. Thus, annexing Crimea, military units of the Russian
Federation actually gained control of the Ukrainian energy facilities, which are
located outside the administrative borders of the Crimea. As a result of the

79
Magda Ê.M. Gíbridna víyna: sutníst' ta struktura fenomenu// Магда Є.М. Гібридна війна: сутність та структура феномену//
Magda Є.M. Gіbridna vіyna: sutnіst structure that phenomenon http://journals.iir.kiev.ua/index.php/pol_n/article/viewFile/2489/2220

93
annexation of Ukraine has not just been captured and energy facilities in the
Crimea, and by capturing energy infrastructure (pipelines and compressor stations)
actually stolen oil producing fields offshore and natural gas directly in the amount
of 2 billion cubic meters. m annually. In the future, this element of conducting a
"hybrid war" even on a large scale the aggressor used in some areas of Lugansk
and Donetsk regions. Targeted actions many coal mines were actually destroyed,
blocked and destroyed transport infrastructure. In turn, this has led to problems
with the supply of already mined coal to consumers, primarily - on the thermal
power plant, which was a challenge for the stable functioning of the unified energy
system of Ukraine. As a consequence of deteriorated and socio-economic situation
not only in the eastern regions, but in the whole Ukraine. In addition, it has formed
a long-term challenge to the energy security of the state as a whole. Further work
has gone into the information component of a "hybrid war": the Ukrainian
government adopted anti-crisis solutions in the energy sector have been actively
used to form a negative attitude to the state authorities, officials and the leadership
of the state. The same information and actively used to form a negative image of
Ukraine among the neighboring countries and partners of Ukraine.

2.5. Information component of a "hybrid war" in Ukraine

While the military component of the conflict objectively remains the main
factor of its deployment, the scale of the use of the information component more
increase. The scale information war launched by Russia against Ukraine, most
accurately said Commander of NATO forces in Europe F.Bridlav: "This is the
most amazing information blitzkrieg that we have ever seen in the history of
information warfare." Info Front "hybrid war" takes place on several fronts. First
of all: 1) the population in the conflict zone; 2) among the population of the
country, against which the aggression, but the area which is not covered by the

94
conflict; 3) among the citizens of the aggressor country and 4) among the
80
international community. Although the information component has indeed
become a cross-cutting theme of "hybrid warfare", but it does not perform an
independent and auxiliary role, mostly accompanying the military phase of the
operation. However, in the Ukrainian case, we are dealing not just with the hostile
propaganda, and that experts rightly described as "a war of meanings" (the
beginning of which could be related to 2006-2007.). Relay For these senses
involved the whole set of channels to deliver information. The main structural
element in this war become simulacra - images of what in reality does not exist. An
example of such simulacra are "fascists in Kyiv", "atrocities destroyer battalions",
"crucified boys", the use of prohibited weapons by Ukraine. The strategic goal of
the operation of these simulacra - replace objective representation of target groups
about the nature of the conflict, "phantoms information" necessary aggressor. The
active phase of military confrontation, which began with the end of February -
beginning of March 2014, was accompanied by tactical information support, which
just used the techniques of construction and operation of simulacra. Ukraine
managed to quickly adapt and respond in part to this challenge. "Crimean
campaign" showed the weakness of the Russian version of the information
component of a "hybrid war" - it does not stand the constant nagging media view.
Accordingly, almost the first thing that made various "militias" and "green men" in
the occupied territories - is disabled Ukrainian TV channels and massively
including Russian. Formation of a single and fully controlled information space - a
clear strategy for the deployment of information component of the conflict on the
part of the aggressor. So it is not surprising that already at the time of the events in
selected cities of Donetsk and Lugansk regions militants have established the

80
Military review. Events in the field of defense and safety in a mirror of mass media. Monitoring of mass media in a week with 25 till
31.01.2016 http://csef.ru/en/articles/print/6539

95
process of finding pro-Ukrainian streamers and systematically obstructed their
activities (for example, the situation with streamers Luhansk journalists or Internet
TV). It is important to note that the Russian Federation has deployed one of the
fronts of "hybrid warfare" against the citizens of the state, forming there a model of
behavior that is largely responsible message of the Federal Press (her complete
trust in almost 60% of Russians). The reluctance of a significant number of
Russian citizens to look at things from a different point of view and due to the fear
of occurrence of cognitive dissonance between reality formed by the Russian
media, and real events. So what is really in many ways about the Russians can say
what about the people who "first fell under the pressure of its own TV." Another
important information front - outside. The scope of activity of "funds", "cultural
communities", "think tanks" and just "experts" pro-Russian orientation in Europe
as well as the activities of the RT channel, is really significant. However, even then
it affects the overall concept of "hybrid war" "in Russian": the part of such experts
simply invent, and on their behalf, publish the necessary comments and
conclusions - the last such case was a fictional German expert.

Now about the extent of penetration of the Russian information display and
Europe. In 2014, Latvian Center for Strategic Communications NATO (NATO
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence) was established, among whose
tasks - to provide an adequate response to the attempts of other countries to
influence the information environment of NATO members. The importance of
strategic communications was highlighted after the NATO summit in Wales. In
particular, it explicitly states that the established center should deal with the
"hybrid war". At the center of power to counter Russian propaganda hope in some
countries, in particular Poland and the Baltic countries. For several warnings to the
Russian TV channel RT foreign language did media regulator British Ofcom for

96
violations during the lighting of the Ukrainian crisis. An important cross-border
space of conducting information warfare has become the Internet. Various real and
imaginary "hacktivists", "cyberpartisans", as well as special units of the various
security agencies to conduct confrontation in cyberspace - they are an important
element of cyber attacks, as well as for special psychological operations in the
social networks and the Internet in general, (organization of the Russian special
services of protests internal troops near the presidential administration in October
2014), however, is completely to win the information space of Russia failed - many
advocacy statements by Russian television on Ukrainian topics quickly denied
themselves Internet users, who are increasingly becoming "ordinary information
warfare. " Implications for Ukraine early as 1975, a British scientist in
international E.Makk made an important conclusion: in most contemporary
conflicts are not a strong country suffered a military defeat, they were defeated in
the political sense - have not been able to impose his will on the enemy. Political
weak side victory lay in the fact that she - through the use of asymmetric methods
of warfare (mostly partisan) - managed to drain the will of a strong enemy to
continue the war and achieve their goals. Accordingly, the double task of Ukraine
in the current asymmetrical confrontation - dimensional. In the external dimension
- not to succumb to the imposition of external us, unquestionably destructive to our
state, the Kremlin's political will, but at the same time - to drain the enemy. And in
the internal dimension - to ensure the domination of our political will in problem
regions, not allowing them to have exhausted economically and politically. At the
same time, the current priority - provide effective and meaningful response
primarily to the military, as well as information on the aggression against our
country.81

81
Limonov D. Partizan – voin ili mstitel’? [Guerrilla – warrior or an avenger?] Spetsnaz Rossii, 2010, № 5(165), available at:

97
 In the military sphere, much will depend on external factors (in particular,
international assistance). Probably, Ukraine will continue to need substantial
support from its partners in the military sphere is to be ready to resist the military
in the event of a further escalation of the military components of the "hybrid war".
Equally important is the task of forming a system of risk analysis and protection of
critical infrastructure. So, it is obvious that the protection of energy infrastructure
(particularly in the area close to the ATO) should be a priority for the state. Given
the importance of energy infrastructure for the life of society and its protection
system must have the proper level. Because now the majority of business entities
in the energy sector private, responsible for ensuring the protection of critical
infrastructure of the country should be held as corresponding to public authorities
and the private sector (energy infrastructure operators). However, other
stakeholders, in particular local authorities and the population should also be
involved in activities in this area. A more coherent response and should be on the
82
information aggression. Already a number of measures mainly restrictive, but
whether it can hardly be a comprehensive response to such challenges. Much will
depend on the media sector, and civil society activists, since the lion's share of the
Russian state propaganda limit often fail. However, we must create the conditions
under which it will replace all the information quality domestic product. It should
be strengthened and the implementation of state information policy in the occupied
territories by Russian troops. It not fully used the potential of the information
resistance in the international arena: Foreign Minister of Ukraine, and even doing a
lot, but is unlikely to be able to close all the problem areas. Accelerated

http://www.specnaz.ru/article/?1680 [in Russian]

82
Malysheva E.M. Mirovye voiny i lokalnye voennye konflikty v istorii: posledstviya, uroki [World wars and local military conflicts
in history: consequences and lessons]. Vestnik Adygeyskogo gos. un-ta, 2005, № 1, pp. 69–78 [in Russian]

98
implementation requires the establishment of an effective foreign broadcasting -
should be recognized that at present there is more than de jure than de facto.
Activity must use the tools of public diplomacy. We have to stop ignoring the
complexity of the work in the Russian information space, although the latter Russia
actively shuts off any third-party participants. An example of this - the last legal
decision to limit foreign ownership in the media. In the online space, active
unfolded Roskomnadzor, which is directly involved in the censorship. However,
despite this, the Ukrainian state should find mechanisms of information exchange
with the Russian audience. Confront Russia in "hybrid war" it will be difficult. The
enemy was preparing for this confrontation for years and clearly knows what he
wants. However, the government must learn to resist calls "hybrid war". If this
confrontation will not be won, we will always have to deal with self-healing hydra,
which appears in place already supposedly defeated enemy.

99
 Conclusions

Considering such a concepts as "hybrid," "nonlinear" or "war of controlled chaos"

we came to the conclusion that this war combines military, information, terrorism
and other aggressive actions, coordinated from a single center and designed to
achieve the strategic goal.

In geopolitical coordinates entity controlled chaos of war is geopolitical

destruction of a victim, neutralizing its geopolitical characteristics - size territory,
population, the status of state in the world, economic opportunities, military power,
cumulative potential.

During this war victims in the country or in certain regions initiated some internal
processes that, in fact, shares strategies is controlled chaos. True role, location,
interests and goals of the aggressor State derived from the field of public attention,
hiding the "information trash" and demagoguery.

Overall controlled hybrid warfare involves three stages:

• undermining the situation, the crisis and internal conflict in the country of the
victim,

• degradation, devastation and disintegration of the country from turning it into a

so-called "incapacitated" state.

• Changes in political power entirely controlled by the aggressor.

Objectives and methods of such a war - Encouraging citizens to betray their own
state and support the aggressor.

100
Also, all the means utilized to form the desired pattern for the invader events in the
perception of the international community.

An important characteristic of hybrid warfare is the use of asymmetric active

hostilities, characterized by significant differences in military power and strategy
and tactics of the participating parties.

This pattern of warfare is extremely difficult to deal with because there is no

formal grounds to fight against the aggressor country, which only unofficially (but
overactive) supports militants and terrorists83.

Ukraine for the first time directly confronted with this phenomenon. For more than
two years, Ukraine has confronted Russian-terrorist forces and large-scale Russian
aggression in the form of a hybrid war. For that Ukraine is faced with all of its key
forms, highlighted earlier in this article, - direct military aggression, the use of
DRGs, attacks quasi military structures (such as "militia" or "Cossacks"), constant
replenishment of separatist movements in Ukraine, economic pressure, diplomatic
pressure on all levels (local, regional and international), permanent psychological
war and now, perhaps, the world's first successful cyber attack on critical
infrastructure (Prykarpattya regional energy department).

We should not forget that the aggression itself was made possible not only because
Russia had the physical capability to carry it out. The weak reaction of the West in
2008 to Russian aggression in Georgia has created the Russian leadership a feeling
of permissiveness and impunity. However, when talking about the Russian hybrid
war in Ukraine, often overlooked, that the aggression unleashed against Ukraine a
country with nuclear weapons and from time to time to remind the rest of the world

83
Ol'shanskiy D.V. Psihologiya terrorizma [Psychology of terrorism]. St-Petersburg, Piter, 2002, 288 р. [in Russian]

101
about it. Again, it is difficult to ignore the purely quantitative superiority of Russia
over Ukraine in manpower and weapons. The objectives of the Russian Federation
with regard to Ukraine can be defined as the creation of the Ukrainian state in the
uncontrolled territory of the Ukrainian leadership, the overall destabilization of the
socio-political situation, the economic exhaustion of Ukraine, Ukrainian pulling
resources away from current problems, block the European integration processes.

However, it should be noted that Ukraine still has an active resistance, which,
however, does not mean reducing the threats posed by the Russian Federation. And
direct military aggression is still a real and tangible threat to Ukraine (and it is
quite possible - and many Eastern European countries). In the first place, in line
with Gerasimov abstracts, there is a gradual transition from a mass mobilization
army to high levels of permanent readiness and improvement of inter-service
cooperation. Become more focused efforts to create a professional army.
interspecific coordination has been improved through the creation of five strategic
commands - it allowed the commanders on the ground to monitor all types of sun
in his area of responsibility.

As already noted, Ukraine is in its own way in a unique situation - Ukraine has not
just become the first country in which the full-bodied (as previously it tried to do in
Georgia) tried a new aggression of the model used by the Russian Federation.
Ukraine was able to defend itself and to develop mechanisms to counteract the
most aggressive methods of hybrid attacks and still positional struggle with a much
more powerful enemy. Ukrainian experience not only worthy of scrutiny (as it is
already doing, NATO structures or representatives of certain Eastern European
countries) - it only in terms of assessing the threats the world (primarily Europe)
will face in the near future.

102
As part of its "hybrid strategy" and a course on the anarchy of global security space
we can expect from the Russian-conscious re-entry of a number of "frozen
conflicts", particularly in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and other regions.

Hybrid operation Russia transform the entire area into a single international
security "risk zone", it creates a situation where the hybrid aggression can be
implemented resolutely against any country or group of countries (that we can see
by the actions of Russia in the EU's information and political space). Including
military (quasi military) methods. Returning to the Ukrainian context, it should be
clearly understood that even if the military action will not be renewed (to acquire a
full-scale in nature, as it was during the summer of 2014 - winter 2015th), even if
the Russian side will perform absolutely all points of the Minsk agreements and
return control of the borders of Ukraine, even in the case of hybrid warfare will not
stop and will only partially transformed. It is already clear that in addition to
strengthening of informational pressure and turning "DNI" - "LNR" in the long-
term destabilizing factor of Ukrainian life, Russia, as well as in Europe, uses
tactics against Ukraine to provoke radical events.

Hybrid warfare in Ukraine is an indicator of the system, not just a system to

guarantee the national security of Ukraine, but also of regional and global security
- that as a premise, which has taken advantage of for aggression against Ukraine
and undermine the existing system of world order. The situation is the conflict
between Russia and Ukraine, that this state of their relationship when conflict
between them (in particular on European and Eurasian integration projects) cannot
be solved except by using "soft" or / and "hard" power.

The name "hybrid warfare" did not fully disclose the nature of the conflict, as
covering a broad class of complex conflicts using non-traditional, diverse

103
capabilities in the political, military, information, economic, energy, humanitarian
spaces. Each of these conflicts accurately characterize not only the name "hybrid"
as extent and form of hybridity. The names of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict -
secret, hidden, shadow war, the war of controlled chaos, etc. - are also
conditionally correct, as describing only some of its aspects.

Speaking of hybrid warfare as the specifics of international relations, it should be

noted that it appears not only involved in the space of capabilities but also in space
receptors, values, strategic and tactical objectives consequences. And all these
spaces and processes they do not exist separately, but closely interrelated, making
only the landscape of world order.

2. hybrid warfare causes difficulty in estimates of early aggression identification

aggressor in understanding the interaction of different elements within a single
technology to achieve goals. It should be noted that Russia, despite some progress
after its war with Georgia, this technology is not yet perfected.

If the Russian-Ukrainian conflict political, economic, energy, information tools are

used almost exclusively, the purely military means used varied, but the limited
extent necessary to achieve tactical objectives.

In turn, from the Ukraine and the international community have not perfected the
technology counter latent aggression. Countermeasures are implemented with a
delay, not always intentionally, without proper coordination.

Today there is sufficient evidence of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Feeling

humiliated by losing the Cold War, phantom pain from the collapse of the USSR,
the inability to effectively promote their neo-imperial claims in the existing world
order, namely Russia threw an open challenge to international norms, global and
regional centers of power in the face of the US, EU, NATO
104
• choosing this some of the weakest victims (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Baltic
and Balkan countries)

• bought using the support of radical political forces in developed countries in

order to reduce their resistance,

• trying to win over the country s authoritarian government, which is the same as
Russia threatens a general trend of democratization and liberalization within it
natural - and not just imposed from the outside - the results of the discontent of the
people rule applicable modes (another thing that the results of protests and
revolutions are the third force in their own interests).

Statements Russia over the fact that it is the object of aggression hybrid of the
West, is no more than a propaganda, an attempt to create a Russian zone of
"information room" and look poorly justified.84

One of the main challenges for the party victims of modern wars is generated by
the hybrid uncertainty (objects, time strikes, the range of capabilities, methods of
use, etc.). To minimize this effect, it is necessary the introduction of a
fundamentally different crisis management based on a qualitative analysis of the
stages of escalation of conflicts (conflicts preconditions appearance, display the
most controversy, aggravation of tension, conflict, its solving and overcoming the
consequences). Each of these phases is characterized by specific capabilities, their
method of use and, accordingly, specific means and methods to counter. Moreover,
based on the cross-border nature of many threats seem most appropriate
transnational system of forecasting, monitoring threats and crisis response.

84
Trebin M.P. Teroryzm yak destruktyvnyi modus buttya [Terrorism as a destructive modus of existance] Suchasnist’, 2003, № 2, pp. 77–
89 [in Ukrainian]

105
One of the manifestations of hybrid warfare is the network nature of modern
conflict, a combination of regular party aggressor forces and collected in the
network (as active nodes) self-assembled structures. It requires sacrifices party
involvement in combating not only regular armed forces and other state security
forces, but also the creation of similar network structures, including "vigilance
committees", volunteer organizations and groups information resistance.

We should consider that the statement that a military solution to the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict does not exist. It should recognize that there is not a diplomatic,
economic or any other single solution. It should also be recognized that any war - it
is the defeat of diplomacy. Hybrid aggression, if it failed to prevent it through
diplomatic and other means requires complex asymmetric reactions, which
include:

• sanctions able to convince the aggressor in the pointlessness of continuing

aggression;

• tough, active defense, which makes little sense for the enemy offensive;

• diplomacy with a focus not only on finding appropriate format of negotiations as

- and above all - the content of the negotiating positions, forming countermeasures
and mechanisms of influence on parties to the conflict;

• International support country-sacrifice and isolation of the aggressor country,

eliminating sources last resource, political and moral support;

106
• stabilization and consolidation of forces in the country for victims of grounds
increasing confidence in the government, which is derived from the impact of
social and economic policy.85

Given the range of activities and resource opportunities in Ukraine, such a reaction
to aggression should be based on broad participation of representatives of the
international community and activities in accordance with international law.

An important condition for the effectiveness of complex reactions to hybrid

aggression - as one of the elements mentioned above crisis management - is to
coordinate activities for the mentioned areas, over time, results, performers
resources. One of the conclusions of this statement reads as follows: a truce in
armed conflict, which could be used for diplomatic negotiations, defined by
offensive and defensive capabilities of the parties on the contact line.

The reaction of the West is not decisive and effective because of the special
relationship of Western countries to Russia (fear provoking of Putin's reluctance to
lose the Russian market concerns critical limit energy sources, etc.).

In turn, the inability of modern Western institutions quickly and efficiently on the
basis of existing international law to resolve conflicts themselves these questions
the rules and attractiveness of these institutions. Requirement of international
agreements, including the Budapest memorandum undermines the nuclear
disarmament process, encouraging countries to purchase their own deterrence as
the only guarantee of security you can trust.

85
Tyushkevich S.A. Zakony voiny: sushchnost’, mehanizm deistviya, faktory ispol’zovaniya [Laws of war: the nature, mechanism of
action, factors]. Moscow, Kniga i biznes, 2002, 360 р. [in Russian]

107
The existing world order has reached the limits of effectiveness in combating
international conflicts synergistic and requires revision. Basis, native new world
order will be a coalition of interested in it actors - states, international
organizations, non-state actors. Countries that are on the "border" integration
projects suffer the most tension and danger zones are potential conflicts.

Most international integration is conditioned externally and internally processes.

Internal criteria for the possibility of creating coalitions and efficiency are:

• proximity values;

• consistency interests and ways of their implementation;

• consistency of positions in assessments of threats and ways to counter;

• the availability of resources, their willingness to pooling and sharing; it is

important to note that one of the types of resources include trust between
partners.86

The existing world order has reached beyond which Westphalian paradigm and
built on the basis of norms of international relations system are not effective -
neither in terms of development, either in terms of security. This is a challenge for
humanity, a crisis of international relations and requires the coordinated efforts of
all the progressive application of force. In general terms, it provides:

86
Hofmayster H. Volya k voyne, ili Bessilie politiki: Filosofsko-politicheskii traktat [The will to war, or political impotence: philosophical
political treatise]. Per. s nem. i poslesl. O.A. Koval. St-Petersburg, Gumanitarnaya Akademiya, 2006, 288 р. [in Russian]

108
• comprehensive assessment of new trends generated by their sources and catalysts
problems, weaknesses in the existing system of international relations and the
reasons hindering its adaptation to new conditions;

• defining the desired state of international relations and a perspective view of

international institutions, norms and rules that ensure this situation;

But until the realization of the desired (ideal) state of the world and all subjects of
international relations always stay in the transition, experiencing instability,
difficulties, difficulties related to the changes that take place87.

The hybrid nature of contemporary conflicts are not always tangible links between
elements of technology and escalating implementation, determine the need for
thorough study, a comprehensive study and take immediate changes in the
structures and methods of use of national, regional and global security. Particular
attention should be paid to the implementation at all levels of qualitatively new
crisis management structures and network security, which would be able to
effectively respond not only to the conflicts themselves, but also - and above all -
the processes of escalation and prevent them.

87
Simpson E. Thinking about Modern Conflict: Hybrid Wars, Strategy, and War Aims. Erin Simpson. Conference paper presented at
the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, April 7, 2005, available at:
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84945_index. html.

109
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