Religion in World Affairs

Judaism and the World: The Holy and the

Profane

by Harvey Sicherman

J
udaism has influenced the world through the Hebrew Bible and the history
of the Jews. The Bible provides the record of divine revelation, later claimed
by Christians and Muslims, while Jewish history tells the unique story of a
small people who survived the loss of both sovereignty and country, held
together nonetheless by beliefs and rules derived from the Bible. Thus, the
approach of Judaism to international relations may be traced through the Bible’s
injunctions on such topics as war and peace, treaties, kingship, and prophecy.
But insofar as the Jews as a sovereign nation affected international relations,
the scope is much more limited. The biblical state of Israel, its subsequent
division into two kingdoms, conquest by Babylon, brief resurrection under the
Hasmoneans, and final subjugation by Rome spanned more than a thousand
years. Nearly two thousand more years passed before a new state of Israel was
born. This modem state, but fifty years old, has had a dramatic career-but as
a democracy, not a theocracy.
Many have written on the role of Judaism in Israel, and this enormous
literature hardly needs yet another article.’ Instead, this essay will examine a
nearly three-thousand-year-old religious tradition for ideas and attitudes on
international relations and state conduct that provide a background for contem-
porary debates. Given the vastness and range of such sources and the argu-
mentative, if not combative, nature of rabbinical interpretation, no single work
can be regarded as either comprehensive or authoritative. What follows therefore

* See, for example, Charles S. Liebman and Eiiezer Don-Yehiya, CivilRel@on in I.uel (Berkeley and I.os
Angeles: University of California Press, 1983); and Shlomo Deshen, Charles S. Liebman, and Moshe Shokeid,
eds., LmeZiJuhism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995). Other recent books that integrate the religious
issues into Israeli politics and so&q are Adam Garfi&le, A&ics and Socfefy in Modem Israel (honk,
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 199n, and Asher Arian, 7he Second Rqx&c: Politics in LwaeJ Khatham, NJ.: Chatham
House Publishers, 1998).

Harvey SicheMlan is president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Dr. Sicherman wishes to thank
Karen Bxunwasser and Bridget Grimes for their assistance and perseverance.

spring 1998 I 195

SICHERMAN

is a tentative “sounding” of selective aspects of Judaism, the Jewish state, and

international relations.

The Bible and Jewish Law on International Relations

Judaism, as found in the Hebrew Bible and Jewish law (haluchu), offers
at least two approaches to international relations, one concerning the here and
now, the other concerning a world yet to come.’ The first may be symbolized
by the figure of the king, the second by the highly charged idea of the Messiah.
The Bible, although often written in a narrative style, is not chiefly concerned
with history but rather the relationship between God and the Jewish people.
It thus contains selections bearing on other events but only as they relate to
the main theme, and refers to other peoples and politics only in passing. The
international system described in these passages contains all the main features
we would recognize today: peoples identified with areas or states (Canaanites,
Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians); a variety of political forms, ranging from
city-state to empire; war-making coalitions (e.g., the four kings versus the five
in Genesis 14); alliances; treaties; covenants (commercial and political); bounda-
ries; and sovereignty. The dominant form of rule is that of a monarch, sometimes
absolute (pharaoh), often limited (most kings of Judah and Israel), especially
by judicial code. Conlkt is found in all of its forms: limited and unlimited, wars
commanded by God, or waged for reasons of state. War is conducted with a
variety of weapons ranging from the simplest (the stone) to the super weapons
of the day, whether they be giant men (Goliath) or strange panic-inducing
animals (the battle elephant). Biblical annals are also well-populated by generals,
diplomats, and spies-some wellbom but ineffective (Moses’ spies), others in
the best traditions of the silent service (Joshua’s spies), and still others who
seduce their victims.
Alongside these descriptions of international politics stands another
tradition: the transformation brought about by the redemption of Israel and
mankind, which relates the practice of international relations to morality. Thus,
the very origins of national differences are to be found in the rebellion against
God symbolized by the Tower of Babel and followed by the disunity of mankind,
divided by language and interests. The sins of the Canaanites in worshiping
idols caused their expulsion in favor of the Jews (Deut. 18.9-13). The Jews
later also suffer harm and eventually exile for the sins of either idol worship

2 For the purpose of this article, these texts include the Five Books of Moxs, and the Prophets and
Writings, what the Christians call the Old Testament. Halachu, the legal code explaining the Mosaic Law,
consists of the so-called Otal Law; the Miihnah (redacted ca. 200 CE.), or digest of laws; and the Gemam
(or Talmud), the discussions of these laws (Jerusalem [Palestinianl
version, 400 c.E.; and Babylonian version,
redacted ca. 5@_l c.E). ‘Ihese were supplemented by fqGutlsa to questions over succeeding centuries from
rabbinical coutts and widely accepted Halachic authorities which stretch to our time. Among modem Jews,
it should be noted that the Orthodox consider halacha as binding on their behavior, Reform Jews do not,
and Conservative Jews accept halacha but have made changes in the ritual and rabbimate (such as ordination
of women) that the Orthodox do not accept.

196 I Orbis
 Judaism and the World

or civil strife. The prophets foresee an era of redemption, the signs of which
are Israel’s repentance and return to God, the defeat of its oppressors, the
revival of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel, and the recognition of Gods
sovereignty by all nations. At that blessed time, “nation shall not lift up sword
against nation, neither shall men learn war any more,” and “swords will be
beaten into plowshares” (Isa. 2.4; Mic. 4.3). Thus, moral rearmam ent will lead
to military disarmament. This transformation is associated with the final redemp-
tion of the messianic era.
In short, the Bible describes two international systems, the one of brutal
realism, the other of noble aspiration. As we shall see, it contains rules that
govern the conduct of the Jewish ruler or state in the context of the world as
it is. The prophets, however, foresee a radical reordering of this context.
Disastrous experience -the loss of sovereignty and eventually the Land of Israel
itself-led both the prophets and later Jewish commentators to link the revival
of a Jewish state with the messianic era, a problematic idea that still influences
Jewish political thought.

The Jewish State and Its International Conduct

International relations play a major role in Judaism because of the

association of religion, people, and land. Judaism is organized around the
covenant between God and the people of Israel, whereby Israel is “chosen” to
be the bearer of divine guidance (the literal meaning of “Torah”>, expressed in
613 commandments (mitzz~t). In return for a faithful fulfilling of the mitzuot,
the “kingdom of priests and holy people” (Num. 19.6) are promised a secure
and prosperous tenure in their territory.
As is clear from the Bible, the Jews were in great need of such divine
protection. The land chosen for them was rich and vulnerable; it possessed
considerable resources (“a land of milk and honey” in Deuteronomy 9.9) and
was located on the best route for the armies of clashing empires working their
way north from Egypt, south from Anatolia, or west from Mesopotamia. Moreover,
the land was not empty when the Israelites arrived from Egypt, and the local
peoples worshipped a crowded pantheon of deities, patrons of places, dynasties,
and forces of nature. In short, the union of God, people, and land plunged
Israel into the maelstrom of international politics from the outset.
The Five Books of Moses, known to Judaism as the Torah, recognize
a world of peoples, states, borders, and sovereignty. ‘Ihe Jews have a special
right to the land of Canaan, but they are not the only nation with rights to
territory. In Deuteronomy 2.3, as the Jews are about to enter the land, God
warned them against taking any of the area belonging to the “descendants of
Esau” because “I will not give to you from this. land.” A similar warning is
issued for the land of Moab, given to the “descendants of Lot.” The holdings
of Esau, the son of Isaac, and Lot, nephew of Abraham, apparently fall under
the covenant made between God and Abraham that promises a broad area-from

Spring 1998 I 197

SICHERMAN

the “River of Egypt to the Euphrates”-to the patriarchs descendants (Gen.

15.18).
Several implications can be drawn from this and other references
scattered throughout the Bible. First, territory, sovereignty, and borders can be
fured or altered by agreement, and are not determined only by geography,
demography, or force. “In the world of the Hebrew Bible . . . artificial separations
and boundaries integrate the distinct territorial entities into a single system of
relations.“3 There are no “free” or “common areas,” an argument John Selden
was to use in the sixteenth century to oppose Hugo Grotius’s proposition that
the high seas were naturally open to free concourse by all nations.*
Moreover, the covenant that entitles the Jews to the Land of Israel is
special in that it comes from God, however much other people might contest
Jewish claims. Judges 11.12-29 records the argument between Yiftach, a local
Israelite strongman, and the king of Ammon. The king accuses Israel of seizing
his land, but Yiftach rebuts the king by reminding him that Israel avoided the
Edomites and Moabites when refused safe passage on the way to Canaan, and
concludes “that which your god Chemosh has caused you to inherit, that is
what you will inherit, as that which the Lord our God has caused us to inherit
(now), that we will inherit” (v. 24). This theme of Israel’s contested title and
Jewish insistence that it derives from God sounds through the ages. Josephus,
author of Be J&b Wan and Contra Apion (ca. 80 C.E.), refutes the charge
that Israel “stole” its land, an accusation popular enough to be repeated by the
Roman historian Tacitus. Nearly a thousand years later, the authoritative medieval
Bible commentator, Rabbi Soloman Itzchaki (1040-l 109, known by the acronym
Rashi, found it necessary to state that the reason God began the Bible with
Genesis was to establish His right to dispose of the world as He saw fit, including
the assignment of the Holy Land to Israel, not to anyone else-a comment
that perhaps should be seen in the context of the First Crusade (lO96), when
both Christians and Muslims were at war over possession of Palestine!
A second implication is that the specific area of the Land of Israel can
be precisely delineated. Indeed, Moses points out the areas in some detail when
he takes leave of the twelve tribes just before his death. This conception,

3 See Abraham Berkowia, “John Selden and the Biblical Origins of the Modem International System,”
Jew&b PolihLal Studkzs Reuiew 6, Spring 1994, pp. l-2.
* Ibid.
5 See Peter Schaefer, Judeophbia: Attitudes Tocuard the Jews in tbeAncient World (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1997).
6 See Rabbi Abraham Ben Isaiah, and Rabbi Benjamin Sharfman, in collaboration with Dr. Harry M.
Orlinsky and Dr. Moms U-tamer, ne Pentateucb and Rash’s Commen&my, A Linear Tmnslarion into En@.&
(Brooklyn, N.Y.: S.S.&R. Publishing, 1950). Rashi quotes the Midrusb Tanhma, a book of exegesis composed
some centuries earlier. The placement of this comment at the beginning of Genesis may be related to the
iaunching of the Fit Crusade by Pope Urban II at Clermont, who in 1095 argued that the Holy Land
belonged to the Christians. Rashi lived in Troyes, about two hundred miles away from Clemtont. See also
Rliezer Tevito, “‘Ihe Historical Element of Rashl’s Commentary on Genesis,” in Rush, ed. 2. Steinfeld (Ramat
Gan, Israel: Bar Ran University, 1993, pp. 101-102. See Steven Runciman, Hkkny of the Crusades: 7%eFirst
Crusade and the Foundation of the King&m ofJensakm, vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1995). for the pope’s homily.

198 I Orbis
 Judaism and the World

however, was not rigid around the edges. Two and one-half of the tribes
decided to take their inheritance to the other side of the Jordan River because
of its pasturage, an area clearly not of the Promised Land of Israel. Thus, the
Promised Land is not necessarily the same as Israel’s political jurisdiction.
The interplay between religious concepts and boundaries may also be
illustrated by the concept of “holiness” as it applies to the Land of Israel. This
holiness is instrumental; many mitzvot such as temple tithes, first fruit offerings
and sacrifices depended upon designation of the land as “holy,” i.e., “dedicated.“’
The Talmud (Babylonian, tractate Hullin, p. 7; Jerusalem, tractate Shviit) distin-
guishes two sanctifications of the land: the first by Joshua, which lapsed with
the Babylonian Exile following the destruction of the First Temple in 586 B.c.E.,
and the second by Ezra after the return seventy years later, which is permanent.
Many reasons are given for this, notably, the idea that the “holiness” of the
land conquered by Joshua had lapsed because it had been taken in war and
lost in war, while that secured by Ezra-a much smaller area-had been
acquired peacefully and so could not be lost again8
Several “maps” of the Promised Land are given in the Bible. The most
extensive territory (Num. 34.2-13) ranges from the Mediterranean to the Jordan
River in the east; some miles beyond Sidon in the north to encompass the
Syrian plateau before swinging back around the Sea of Galilee and back over
to the Jordan; and in the south to tidesh and on to the “River of Egypt.” ‘Ihis
area, however, was only briefly under Israelite control. Despite thirty years of
warfare and a few spectacular miracles, Joshua had not succeeded in capturing
the coastal area known as Philistia (also known as Phoenicia or, in Latin,
Palestina), a portion of what is today the Lebanese coast, or the Syrian plateau;
nor did the Israelites control such major cities as Jerusalem, Megiddo, Acre, and
Tyre (Josh. 13.1-6). The tribe of Dan, not strong enough to claim its inheritance
in Philistia, eventually relocated far to the north (Judg. 18). Only the later
kingdoms of David and Solomon encompassed the area roughly assigned by
the Bible. Tellingly, when borders had to be set for the collection of the tithe,
the rabbinical authorities in the early talmudic period excluded such towns as
Caesaria (between modem Tel Aviv and Mt. Carmel) and Bet Shean (the lower
Galilee), apparently because they were not part of the area sanctified by Ezra
or the Jewish population was too small. In another example, the city of Acre
is divided in half for the purpose of giving evidence in divorce cases.9 Thus,
the Torah and halacba recognize different religious, political, and legal borders,
allowing for the expansion and contraction of states in the normal course of

’ “The Land of Israel is the holiest of alI lands and what is its holiness! That they bring out of it the
Omer, the fitst fruits and the breads (for the temple). . . .‘I Mishnah Kelim, 1.6.
8 See hkximonides,chap. 1 of “Laws of Offerings,” in Misbneb Ton&. Maimonides (1135-1204) axnposed
a digest of Jewish law in a concise style; his brevity and lack of citations gave birth to a vast industty of
comnxmtators that still continues to this day. Chapter 8 in Rabbi J. David Bleich, Contanpomty Hukubic
AoMems, vol. 2 (New Yak: Yeshiva University Press, 19831, has an excellent summary of this controversy
as it applies to modem problems.
9 See Babylonian Talmud, tractate Hullin, p. 6b; and Babylonian Talmud, hactate Gittin, p. 2a. See also
Gedalii Alon, l%e/eus and thirLmd Age vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 19841, p. 731.
in the Talmudic

spring 1998 I 199

SICHERh4AN

history without necessarily losing their essential identities in the broader scheme
of things.
A third implication is that peoples may lose their titles to land because
of immoral behavior. This theme echoes throughout me Bible: the generations
of the flood are destroyed, as are Sodom and Gomorrah; mankind forfeits its
unity because the Tower of Babel challenges God; and the Canaanites pollute
the Holy Land with idolatry and lose their right to settlement (Lev. X2-28).
Put another way, domestic behavior has international consequences. The Jews
are subjected to similar rules, Moses tells the people that exile is in store for
disobedience, that Israel will be outcast among the nations, and that God will
“hide his face” and withdraw divine favor (Deut. 27.36). Some prophets even
see other nations as divinely appointed scourges of Israel. Unlike the Canaanites,
however, the Jews never lose the Covenant entirely. If they repent they will
be restored or redemption will occur according to a hidden divine plan (cf.
Isa. 40, 49). Thus, as noted earlier, the holiness of both people and land endure
because they are both inseparably linked to the divine.

War, Peace, and Other Nations

Judaism emphasizes the importance of peace. The high priest concludes

his three-fold blessing with peace (Num. 6.22-27). Hillel, a prominent talmudic
sage of the first century B.c.E.,advises: “Be of the disciples of Aaron [the first
high priest], loving peace and pursuing peace” 0viishnah Avot 1.21, echoing the
Psalmist (34.15), “Seek ye peace and pursue it.” Rabbi Simon ben Gamelial,
father of Rabbi Judah, the redactor of the Mishnah, the digest of talmudic laws
derived from the Bible, observed: “By three things is the world preserved: by
justice, by truth, and by peace” (Mishnah Avot 1.8). And the ancient kaddish
prayer, still recited today, closes with an appeal to “He who makes peace” to
“make peace upon u5 and on all Israel.”
The emphasis on peace is reinforced by regard for the value of human
life. “Whosoever preserves a single soul (of Israel), scripture ascribes merit to
him as though he had preserved an entire world,” reads one talmudic injunction
(Babylonian Talmud, tractate Sanhedrin, p. 37a; some texts omit the reference
“of Israel”). According to ha&ha the saving of life, including one’s own, takes
precedence over all other mitzvot. Self-sacrifice is justified only when the
alternative is to commit murder, idol worship, or sexual transgressions such as
rape (Babylonian Talmud, tractate Sanhedrin, p. 74a). While the Torah contains
a large number of crimes punishable by death, the court cannot enforce the
death penalty in the absence of prior warning and two witnesses (Deut. 17.6;
Mishnah Maccot 1.9). Even the common tribal custom of allowing families to
avenge accidental homicide is abridged by setting aside cities of refuge for the
perpetrator (Deut. 19.4-10).
Judaism, however, does not prescribe pacifism. The Talmud advises “If
one seeks to kill you, kill him first” (Babylonian, tractate Sanhedrin, p. 72a).
The Torah also instructs the Jews about two types of war, obligatory and

200 I Orbis
 Judaism and the World

permitted or optional. The obligatory war is to be directed at the people of

Canaan (the seven nations), because they are idolators, and Amalek, singled
out for special treatment because of its attack on the Jews in the desert prior
to their entry into the land. The strictures are severe: utter destruction and no
mercy (Deut. 20.16-18). Moses condemns the raid against Midian when the
war party returns with cattle and slaves. And Samuel withdraws divine sanction
on the first Israelite king, Saul, when he fails to destroy all of Amalek, bringing
the bounty back instead (1 Sam. 15).
This war of obligation, however, was clearly not as complete or extensive
as suggested by the text. A large, non-Jewish population evidently remained,
to judge by the prophetic condemnation of the Jews for adopting their idolatrous
ways. At least one of the seven nations, Girgashi, is not mentioned by the time
of the Israelite conquest. (Later Jewish commentators suggest that they fled to
North Africa to found Carthage, whose inhabitants worshiped the Canaanite
gods, including the rite of child sacrifice. The famous Carthaginian general
Hannibal’s name means “favored by Baal.“) Joshua is also deceived into making
a treaty with the Gibeonites that allows them to survive on the condition that
they abandon idol worship and serve the Jews. Despite the deception, he will
not violate his oath. Later, King David offers compensation after the Israelites
attack them (Josh. 9; 2 Sam. 21.1-6).
These facts suggested to the rabbis either that Joshua and his righteous
successors had failed in their duty (unthinkable), or that the Torahs instructions
should be understood differently. Combining the injunction to destroy the
Canaanites with other instructions to offer peace before making war, the
commentators softened the impact of the plain verse. For example, the Jerusalem
Talmud (tractate Shviit, chap. 6), records the view that Joshua offered the
Canaanites three choices: (1) to flee, (2) to make peace, or (3) to make war.
A condition of peace was to abandon idolatry for the universal moral code,
the so-called Seven Laws of Noah, that applies to all nations except Israel.”
The obligatory war was, in any event, a matter of history and had
become moot by the end of the First Temple (586 B.c.E.) with the exception
of the struggle against Amalek, which was eternal, if, of course, Amalek could
still be identified. The biblical rules for the second type of war, the permitted
or optional, are therefore of more lasting interest. Found primarily in Deutero-
nomy 20 they include the following:

(1) Peace must be offered first, the conditions being

acknowledgement of Israel’s sovereignty and a tax.

(2) If peace is refused, males of military age are to

be killed, the women, children, animals, and posses-
sions are to be confiscated.

10‘Ihis Is the view of Maimonides in hisauthoritative twelfth-centuty code Mtinah Tomb. R&ad of
Posquieres severely aiticizes Maimonides on this pint and even suggests that the text is defective because
it seems to contradict the Torah’s instructions to destroy the seven nations, but mast other commentators
reject the aiticism.

Spring 1998 I 201

SICHERMAN

(3) In siege warfare, fruit-bearing trees are not to be

uprooted (w. 19-20).

(4) A captured woman cannot be taken into the

household until a month elapses and a religious
conversion of free will takes place.
Before making “war on your enemies,” the priest must make a speech
to the soldiers (w. l-10) and tell the army that God is on their side, hence
they should not be fearful or lack courage. Officers appointed by the judiciary
then prune the ranks, exempting from battle:

(1) men recently engaged to be married;

(2) those who just built new homes but who had
not “dedicated’ them;

(3) those who planted new vineyards;

(4) those fearful and faint of heart.
The connecting principle seems to be that such soldiers will be too
distracted or anxious about what is being left behind, leading to an infectious
loss of morale. (In Judges 49, Gideon, at Gods instruction, goes beyond this,
compelling each of his soldiers to drink water, kneeling before a pool before
he accepts them, apparently judging from the man’s posture whether he had
been accustomed to worship idols.)
Maimonides, the great twelfth-century rabbi, philosopher, and physician,
adds a few more strictures to these rules (chaps. 5-8 in “Laws of Kings and
Their Wars,” in Mz$.vz& Torah). Once in enemy territory, soldiers are to be
exempt from the dietary laws because armies of old had to live off the land.
A rear guard is to be appointed, with authority to prevent desertion. Exemptions
do not apply to an obligatory war, which includes a war of self-defense.
Exemptions apply only if the excusing event occurred within the same year.
Those exempt on account of fear are to serve in the logistics. In a siege, an
escape route should be left so that the enemy can flee rather than fight. War
is also permitted on the Sabbath. The dead are to be buried on site. Those
who allow themselves to be distracted by family or friends and those who fail
to do their utmost “have blood on their hands.” There should be no forced
conversions of the captives.
The Torah also contains some instructions about relations with other
nations. As noted earlier, Israel is to regard the seven nations and Amalek with
permanent enmity; Arm-non and Moab are also singled out. The latter three
behaved badly toward the Israelites on their way into the Holy Land, either by
refusing hospitality or attacking weak points of their camp. Otherwise, Jews
are instructed to respect the rights of other peoples and, above all, not to
oppress the foreigner or “stranger, ” “because ye were slaves in the Land of
Egypt” (Num. 24.17-22). ‘Ihe temple service on the Jewish Festival of Tabernacles
provides for seventy sacrifices on behalf of the traditional seventy nations who
comprise the world.

202 I Orb&i
 Judaism and the World

Treaties, compacts, and agreements are very important and are not to
be violated. Keeping one’s obligation, both as an individual and nation, is of
the highest order. Even where that treaty may violate another law of the
Torah-as some commentators say about the case of the Gibeonites-failure
to abide by one’s word amounts to the crime of “profaning Gods name” and
thus violates the Torah’s injunction for Israelites to be a holy people (Babylonian
Talmud, tractate on Divorce, p. 46a).
Most importantly, the Torah prescribes a separate existence for the Jews.
They are not to adopt the habits of other peoples, but to follow the Torah.
This separation of the Jews was much remarked upon by ancient peoples: the
worship of a deity without an image was thought to be atheism, or perhaps
star worship, by the Greeks and Romans, although the philosophically minded
developed high respect for Judaism.” The worship of one God to the exclusion
of others also prevented Jewish participation in the sacred feasts of the sacrifices,
and dietary laws made the customary social exchanges difficult. The separateness
of the Jews was therefore sometimes used by their enemies to charge that
Judaism rejected the community of nations.12

The Messiah (Anointed) King

The constitutional arrangements in any state offer an important com-

mentary on its approach to foreign policy. In 1787, for example, the makers
of the American Constitution assigned the role of cornman der in chief to the
president, but withheld from him the dictatorial powers they feared by giving
Congress alone the right to declare war, ratify treaties, and raise money. By
contrast, most European kings of that era made treaties and wars on their own
prerogative.
The Bible recognizes three main branches of government: a king or
executive, judges, and priests. In addition, the prophet plays a role independent
of the others. These separate authorities have their own obvious functions-
judges to run courts, priests to run the temple-and some analysts see a kind
of federalism in this structure, especially when placed atop what was originally
a confederation of tribes. i3 Deuteronomy 16 contains the major instructions
about kings: ‘When you enter the land that the Lord your God is giving to
you, and you inherit it and dwell therein and you will say, I will put upon me
a king like all the nations that are around me. You shall put upon yourself a
king that God your Lord will choose.” Subsequent verses specify that the
monarch be Jewish and male, and, among other things, that he not multiply
his horses, wives, or treasure. He must also write a Torah, which he must keep

11 See Louii H. Feldman, Jew and Gbntik in tbe Ancient World (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press,
1993).
‘* See Schafer, Judqbobia.
13 See Daniel J. Elazar, “Israel as a Jewish State,”Jew&b Political Shah Reoiew 2, Fall 1990, pp. 3-4, for
a good review of the classical Jewish political stmcmre.

Spring 1998 I 203

SICHERMAN

beside him and observe its laws. The king is enjoined not to be arrogant or
vain.
The Bible records, however, that when the people demanded a “king
like all the nations to judge them and conduct their wars” (1 Sam. 8.4-22),
Samuel, the judge and leader of Israel, was horrified. He warned the people
that a king would exact a high price from them in horses, weapons, men,
property, and even “your daughters will he take” (into the royal kitchen): “You
will be slaves to him.” But God comforted Samuel, saying that the people were
rejecting Him, not the judge, and Samuel was advised to grant their demand.
Using pure olive oil, Samuel eventually anointed Saul, of the tribe of Benjamin,
as the first king of Israel (1 Sam. 10.1).
This ceremony gave the king a special legitimacy, because he was
“anointed” by God as the ruler. The Hebrew word for the anointed one, Ma&ah
or Messiah, thus designated the special status of the king and gave him religious
sanction for the mundane activities of war and judgment. Indeed, as explained
by later commentators in the Talmud and Codes, the king has powers that
exceed those of a court, especially on capital punishment: he can execute rebels
without warning or witnesses, and he can punish for offenses to his dignity,
which he cannot compromise. The king has special rules for his household
(e.g., his widow cannot remarry, and his utensils must be burned after his
death), and all but the high priest must bow before him.14
Limits on the king’s power, however, reflect some of the skepticism
shown by Samuel’s reaction and indeed the rules in Deuteronomy. These relate
to important restrictions not only on his personal morality but on his ability to
carry on foreign relations. For example, according to Maimonides, he is limited
in toto to eighteen wives, including concubines-about the number of King
David rather than Solomon’s reported one thousand wives. Marriages for reason
of state were the common coin of alliances in ancient (and even modem) times,
and the Bible evidently feared that the Judaism of the royal household would
be compromised by too many foreign women (some of Solomon’s wives did
indeed introduce idolauy). The wives must profess Judaism, and even the
concubines are to enjoy the protection of a marriage contract. The king is also
not to accumulate personal wealth and should own no horses beyond his
chariot. He must pay for personal services. Most importantly, he cannot declare
an optional war unless approved by the largest Jewish court, a Sanhedrin of
seventy-one members. l5 To be sure, the king may tax, draft, seize the property
of those he executes, and claim half of the booty and all of the lands seized
in war. But as Maimonides concluded, “One does not appoint a king at all
except to do justice and make wars” (chap. 4 of “Laws of Kings,” in Mi.sbmb
Torah).
Compared to his peers, therefore, the Jewish king emerges as a
surprisingly limited figure in the conduct of international relations. He is not

l4 Mamonides, chaps.l-5 of “Lawsof Kings,”III Mishneh Torah.

‘5 Ibid.

204 I Orbis
 Judaism and the World

considered a divinity, as were most ancient rulers, but an anointed agent ruling
over a people who owe their allegiance to God and a superseding legal code,
the Torah.16 In theory, he cannot go to war without the consent
of a legal body, the rules of war limit both the size of his army The Jewish
and some of his tactics (as noted earlier), and he is apparently
prohibited from obtaining either the personal fortune or large king emerges
standing cavalry common to kings. His ability to forge alliances as a
is also constrained by rules (number of wives, etc.) intended to surprisingly
reinforce both the practice of Judaiim and the king’s modesty
limited figwe
before his subjects. As the king goes about the mundane, if not
profane, business of politics, he carries a heavy sacred yoke, ifl
right down to the presence of a Torah at his side. international
After Saul’s false start, David and Solomon raised the relations
.
kingdom of Israel to its apogee of power, wealth, and influence.
Solomon’s temple also represented the fulfillment of Judaism. But this golden
age did not outlast Solomon, and the rest of the biblical narrative recounts the
moral and political failings of various rulers that lead to a split of the kingdom
into a northern state of Israel (ten tribes) and a southern state of Judah (two
tribes), still centered in Jerusalem. Both were destroyed; the ten tribes were
exiled and lost to history, if not to myth, while the others (Judah and the Levites)
survived their brief stay in Babylon to return to Jerusalem by permission of
Cyrus the Great. But the monarchy, assigned to the family of David by hereditary
right, disappeared in the destruction of the temple, the Babylonian Exile, and
the establishment of an autonomous religious community under the scribes
EUa, Nehemiah, and the Great Assembly. ‘The temple was rebuilt, but under
new conditions: Judaiim would be practiced in the Land of Israel without Jewish
sovereignty, especially the conduct of war or foreign policy, The absence of
political independence, however, could not be entirely compensated by auton-
omy. After falling under the sway of Alexander the Great and his successors,
the Jews themselves fell into civil war over the attempts by Antiochus Epiphanes
to hellenize Judean religion and culture in the face of the new power of Rome.
In the year 168 B.c.E.,the high priestly family known as the Hasmoneans
led a successful revolt (remembered by Hanukkah or Festival of Lights), purified
the temple, but did not restore the Davidic monarchy. Their success in
reestablishing a Jewish state was facilitated by a timely alliance with the Roman
general Pompey, but this gave the Second Commonwealth only a fleeting
independence under increasing Roman domination. Once more an international
presence, the Jewish kingdom flourished for a time, and achieved real power
under Herod the Great (37-4 B.c.E.), who rebuilt and enlarged the temple. Still,
the Roman overlordship eventually provoked the Jewish Revolt of 66 C.E., and
four years later the Second Temple was destroyed.
This cursory history reveals that by the end of the Second Commonwealth,
Judaism had experienced a loss of sovereignty, religious freedom, or both. The
16Rabbi Niiim of Gerondi (125%13&N?), an authoritative Spanish Halachist, reduces the king to a kind
of glotified civil servant who backstops the judicial system. See R. Niiim [b. Reuben Gerondi (Ran)], Lkrusbot,
ed. Leon A. Feldman Qerusalem: (Hebrew1 Institute Shalom, 1973), pp. l&?+l%.

Spring 1998 I 205

SICHERMAN

unity of people, land, and Torah broke down: the prophets of the First Temple
era attributed this to Israel’s own sins, manifested by the blunders of the various
kings. By Roman times, events are explained in a similar fashion: the Babylonian
Talmud states that the Second Temple was destroyed by “baseless hatred”
between brothers and the breakdown of national unity into quarreling political
and religious sects (tractate on Day of Atonement, p. 9b). Josephus, the first
century Jewish priest, soldier, and eventual ally of the Romans during the Jewish
War, explains that the Roman siege of Jerusalem succeeded because its defenders
impaired military operations through civil strife, including the burning of food
supplies. *’ This connection between Israel’s national morality and the recovery
of independent political existence becomes a main theme of the later prophets
as they foresee a redemption led by a messianic king.

The Prophets and International Relations: Exile and Hope

Prophecy played an essential role in ancient Judaism. As the recipients

of a divine message, prophets counseled kings and commoners, and while they
occasionally served up political advice, their main message was about sin,
repentance, and redemption. The future they foresaw was conditional upon
Israel’s action: repentance could stay the punishment decreed for sins. The
prophets’ primary purpose therefore was to bring about a moral renewal before
it was too late.
Most failed, as the Bible records. For violating the covenant by which
Israel took title to its land, the fitting punishment was a loss of sovereignty
followed by exile. Thus, the disasters that befell the kingdoms of Judah and
Israel at the hands of foreign nations were related by the prophets to the
iniquities of both domestic policy (idol worship, murder, theft, fratricide) and
foreign policy (relying on foreign princes, futile revolts against superior force,
excessive pride in one’s own strength, hypocrisy).18 Israel was not alone in
bearing the prophetic wrath: Egypt, Assyria, Edom, Babylon, and others were
all consigned to a bad end (Jer. 46X
While the prophets have plenty to say about international relations,
“this fascination with international political activity is in reality only a commentary
upon the acts of God for his people, Israel, and for the salvation of the world.“19
In the absence of repentance, the future holds exile and suffering. But the
message is supplemented by another: eventually there will be a redemption,
either through repentance or as the culmination of human history according to
a hidden divine timetable.
This prophetic vision foresees a two-stage redemption. The main
characteristic of the first stage is the restoration of Israel to its land and sovereignty,
often the outcome of some stupendous battle accompanied by earthquakes
l7See Josephus, 7beJec&b War, trans. G. A. Williamson (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 19701, pp. 276-325.
I8 See, for example, Hm 7, 8; and Isa. 9.
l9 No- K. Cottwald, AU the Kingdoms of the Earth (New York: Harper & Row, 1960, p. 348.

206 I Orbis
 Judaism and the World

(Ezek. 38-39). Judah and Israel will be reunited and reconciled, the exiles will
return, and the nations of the world will either recognize Gods kingdom or
suffer accordingly.
The second stage is the miraculous redemption itself, characterized by
resurrection of the dead, the unity of mankind, acknowledgement by all of the
one, true God, and his overlordship of the universe (Ezek. 37). This is the
moment of universal peace and in a sense, the end of history as we know it;
the Messiah-king of the house of David ushers in the “messianic age,” preceded
by the prophet Elijah or, in some views, by a Messiah-king of the house of
Joseph, representing the ten lost tribes. In these prophetic visions one encounters
the notion that Israel, reborn as ruler of its own land, is a sign of the messianic
era. This powerful theme gathered force in Judaism as the uplifting answer to
the depressing question of Israel’s destiny once its political sovereignty had
been lost.
The Talmud relates that during the Roman siege of Jerusalem, one
leading rabbi, Yohanan ben Zakkai, concluded that the city and the Second
Temple were lost. Smuggling himself out in a coffin, he was taken to the Roman
general Vespasian, whom he addressed presciently as “emperor.” Vespasian
acceded to his requests that he be given control of the town of Yabne and its
suburbs, where he promptly established a court and an academy (Babylonian
Talmud, tractate on Divorce, p. 56a; he also asked that the descendants of the
royal house of David be spared). Thus, when the temple was destroyed and
part of the Judean state abolished (the puppet ruler Agrippa still retained nominal
control of Galilee and part of the coast), the rabbinical school of the Pharisees
found themselves as the sole surviving institution of Judaism.
The loss of the temple, if not the land itself, was a catastrophic blow
which instantly impaired the practice of Judaism. Most of the commandments
associated with the temple, its ritual, sacrifices, and taxes, its priests and Levites,
were lost. Some part of the population was deported, and all Jews fell under
Roman suspicion. Judaism, however, was still physically rooted in the Land of
Israel through the surviving community.
The rabbis promptly constructed a series of substitutions for the lost
mitzzot, using prayers instead of sacrifices and the synagogue instead of a
temple. The details of sacrifice and ritual were also carefully preserved through
study; priests and Levites retained certain preferences and performed as much
of their function as possible. This structure proved sufficiently strong enough
to deal with the next catastrophe: an uprising led by one Simon Bar-Co&a
some sixty years after the ruin of the temple, the first occasion when the
restoration of Jewish rule through the defeat of the enemy in battle was hailed
as a “messianic” event. Bar-Coziba’s initial astonishing victories over the Remans
led the renowned Rabbi Akiba to rename him Bar-Cochba (son of the Star of
Redemption) and hail him as Messiah, but other rabbis were skeptical of the
claims0 Emperor Hadrian savagely suppressed the revolt in 135 C.E. and both
za‘Grass will gruw through your eye sockets, Akiba, and the Messiah will still not have come.” Midrash
on Lamentations cakd EicbaR&i, 4.

Spring 1998 I 207

SICHERMAN

Bar-Coziba and Rabbi Akiba met a martyr’s death. A greater part of the Jewish
population was forcibly dispersed. Thereafter the Romans referred to the country
as Palestine, effacing the name Judea.
While a substantial Jewish community remained in Palestine for centuries,
with institutions capable of creating the Jerusalem Talmud, the center of Judaism
moved to Mesopotamia, where the Babylonian Talmud was created, thence to
the Mediterranean littoral, and eventually north and east in Europe. These
communities were sometimes influential in international trade and certainly in
the transmission of civilization. They retained a vestigial structure from the old
state: an exilarch, sometimes from the descendants of David, served as the
political representative or head of the community; a court, headed by a chief
justice, developed the Jewish law derived from the Bible; and, as noted earlier,
priests and Levites continued to perform limited functions. Hence, the Jews,
though deprived of temple and state alike, found in the commandments
themselves the ultimate vehicle to preserve both people and religion.
As the years of exile turned into centuries, the prophetic legacy that
linked the recovery of Jewish sovereignty with the messianic era naturally
became the subject of intense speculation. The Talmud and associated biblical
commentaries known as Midrash contain numerous references to the messianic
era, including the suffering that precedes it.” One of the most intriguing is the
saying of the sage Samuel: “The only difference between this world and the
time of the Messiah will be Israel’s servitude to the nations.“** When, in the
twelfth century, the great Maimonides composed his code of Jewish law, he
used this source for his own conclusion that the messianic era would be “part
of history” rather than the end of it and would be inaugurated by the resumption
of Jewish sovereignty in the Promised Land. The agency of Jewish leadership
would be a king, required by the Torah, who, in his messianic form, will usher
in the redemption.
This association of the messianic era with the resumption of Israel’s
place among the nations under the supremacy of the king was much contested
by subsequent commentators. 23 Among them, the fifteenth-century diplomat,
financier, and scholar Don Isaac Abravanel(1437-1509) had the most political
experience. He had been counsellor to the kings of Portugal and Spain, debated
divine right theory before Ferdinand and Isabella, and led the Jews expelled
from Spain in 1492-the Holocaust of that time. Abravanel thought and hoped
the time of the Messiah was near, because of Jewish suffering and the wars
between Christians and Turks whom he identified with Gog and Magog of
Ezekiel. He admired the republican constitution of Venice and argued that
Maimonides’ idea of kingship ignored both the biblical antipathy to kingly vices

*I See Babylonian Talmud, tractate Sanhedrin, p. 97, for a collection of thase views, many of which
portray anarchic and decadent conditions before the messianic anival, e.g., Rabbi Judah’s description of a
“gene&on with a dog’s face [shamelessly] berefi of truth.”
22 Babylonian Talmud, tractate on the Sabbath, p. 151.
23 See David Polish, “@biic Views on Kingship: A Study in Jewish Sovereignty,” in Jew13 Politic&
Studies Review 3, Spring 1991, pp. l-2

208 I Orbis
 Judaism and the World

and the record of history, inasmuch as kings meant war and oppression. Most
of all, he attacked the notion that the messianic era would resemble the known
world (except insofar as Israel would regain its independence), because this
implied a mere repetition of human history rather than the transformation of
history, as was envisioned by the prophets.”
As we shall see, this medieval argument over the Jewish state and the
messianic era would echo in later debates over the meaning of
modem Zionism for Judaism. To Maimonides, the rationalist,
statehood and the messianic era appear almost as “normal”
The medieval
phenomena: history continues, only the society of nations, a argument over
closed club during the exile, must now admit a triumphant the Jewish
Jewish state led by the Messiah-king. For Abravanel, the su-
state and the
premely experienced statesman, history and international politics
are a profane arena, the king an undesirable leader, and the messianic era
messianic era, to be holy, must effect a transformation of hu- echoes in
manity.*5 today’s debates
Messianic expectation, fed by a series of calamities that
befell the major Jewish communities in Europe during the Thirty
over Zionism
Years War, found another catastrophic outlet in the person of and Judaism.
Sabbatai Sevi. Proclaimed Messiah in 1665,Sabbatai created an
international sensation. Rumors spread of miraculous doings, and many Jews
made preparations to return to Palestine; even rabbinical authorities found it
hard to oppose him. But the Ottoman Sultan subjected the new Messiah to a
traditional Turkish interrogation in September 1666, and Sabbatai found it
prudent to convert to Islam. The letdown for the Jews was severe, with enduring
ramifications.26
Over the centuries, the longing for the restoration of Zion became an
integral part of Judaism-in prayer, poetry, philosophy, and jurisprudence. It
could not be otherwise, so long as huZucba emphasized the commandments
as the key measure of Jewish practice and the covenant that linked God, Israel,
and the Promised Land as the ultimate source of Jewish destiny. While relatively
strong Jewish communities could be established in Palestine-the Galilean
rabbii of Safed in the sixteenth century even experimented with a revived
Sanhedrin, and Suleiman the Magnificent’s Jewish courtiers paid for repairs to

24For a succinct statement of his view, see Don.Isaac Abravanel, Sefm Y&mot M’Sbkx: Concerning
Questions ofRt%demptionand tbeMessiab, 2nd ed. &rusalem: Library of Jewish Philosophy, 1%7), pp. 30-33.
Abtavanel analyzes over 150 references to the Messiah in the Talmud and Midmsh. See also B. Netanyahu,
Bon kac Abratmnel: Statesman and Pbihqober (Philadelphia, Pa.: Jewish Publication Society of America,
1968), pp. 150-250.
25 See Abravanel, Se& YeshuotM’Sbiko. Abravanel describes the later Hasmonean period as the first stage
of the exile, a daring concept that Israel could, in effect, be in “exile” even when in the Holy Land if its
societywascormpt.Heakousesthisaspolemicagainst Chri&nity by conuasting the prophetic premises
of the messianic era against the conflict and oppression in the Chriskn world
26 See Gershom Scholem, Sabhatzzi Setk 7be Mjstica Messiab, Blooington Series XCIII, trans. RJ. Zwi
Werblowsky (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). See also Scholem, 7he Mesianic Idea fnJuda&m
and other Essays in J&b S’rituuli~ (New York: Schocken Pxs, 1971).

Spring 1998 I 209

SICHERMAN

Jerusalem-sovereignty was beyond practical reach. The prophetic heritage

that foresaw Israel’s restoration as the trigger for the messianic era remained a
powerful idea that, however comforting its promise, had produced nothing but
disaster. Many Jews concluded that Gods hand should not be forced. The
redemption, and with it a Jewish state, became for most a miraculous event to
be hastened only by repentance and adherence to the commandments, not by
military or political action. 27 Adherents of this view quoted the observation of
Rabbi Yose Ben-Hanina that after the temple’s destruction, Israel swore not to
recapture the Promised Land nor to rebel against the nations, while the nations
swore not to oppress Israel too much (Babylonian Talmud, tractate on Marriage
Contracts, p. 111).

Judaism and Zionism

The traditional Jewish community, the bearer of Judaism in exile, broke

down under the impact of Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The
Christian states of western and central Europe gave way to secular ones that
demanded the loyalties of subjects and citizens as individuals rather than groups.
Invited to join European societies so long as they gave up their “separatism,”
Jews began to shed their religious allegiances.28 Some accepted baptism into
Christianity. Others embraced a Reformed Judaism that regarded huluchaas a
guide, but not as a binding rule for Jewish life. The Reformers also carefully
revised Jewish liturgy and ceremonies to eliminate or minimize yearnings for
a return to Zion or a separate national existence.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the Palestinian Jewish community cen-
tered in Jerusalem had lost economic vitality, as had most of the country.
Dependent on foreign charity and devoted to prayer, it was in no position to
be a model for Jewish life. Yet the religious potential of a return to Zion arose
in the writings of two traditional rabbis, Yehuda Hai Alkalay (17981878) and
Zvi Hirsch Kalisher (17951874). Alarmed at the breakdown in religion that
increasingly made Jews of different countries remote from each other, they
advocated a revival of the Jewish population in Palestine as the single act that
would renew Judaism in exile as well. Both sought practical action: the Jews
should create political and financial institutions designed to establish a self-suf-
ficient presence in Palestine. They also favored the revival of Hebrew as a
spoken language to unite the Jews.
Would this be tampering with Gods timetable? Alkalay relies upon the
two-stage thesis of redemption to argue that the “history” portion of the era of
Redemption-traditionally assigned to Messiah Ben Joseph-was indeed in

n A byproduct of the Christian Protestant h%illiian expectations of the seventeenth century was the
notion that the return of the Jews to Pakstine, followed by their conversion to Christianity, was the critical
step toward the second coming of Jesus, an idea still advanced by some Chdstian supporters of Zionism.
For a popular review of the issue see Jausalem Rqort, Feb. 19, 1998.
m Arthur Hertzberg, TbeFremb Edightenmoztand the/em (New York: Columbii University Press, 196@.

210 I Orbis
 Judaism and the World

Jewish hands to inaugurate. This would be a slow and arduous process, but
“The Redemption will begin with efforts by the Jews themselves; they must
organize and unite, choose leaders, and leave the lands of exile.“B
Alkalay and Kalisher saw little result from their efforts in their lifetimes,
but they did inspire French Jewish magnates (the Rothschild family in particular)
to found agricultural settlements in Palestine. They were careful to specify that
this return of the Jews did not aim at state-building. The Jews would remain
loyal to the Ottoman Sultan.
Alkalay is the most intriguing of these early “Zionist” rabbis not only
because of his quest for a “middle way” between passive acceptance of exile
and a heretical messianic fervor but because one of his most devoted supporters
was one Simon Loeb Herzl, the grandfather of Theodore Her& who invented
modem political Zionism. The two were close, but there is no evidence that
the grandson was familiar with Alkalay’s proposals. In any event, as Herzl’s
diaries reveal, he was inspired primarily by the Dreyfus aI7ai.rin France and his
experiences in Vienna, capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the birthplace
of modem political anti-Semitism.30
Herzl argued that the Jews were trapped between the new virulent
nationalist hatreds of secular Europe and the traditional theologically based
hatred of Christian Europe. Assimilation was impossible and Jewish survival
questionable. Herzl’s solution was to “internationalize” the Jewish question. He
advocated a Jewish state in Palestine that would restore the exiles to the ranks
of self-respecting nations, thus rescuing the Jews from increasing spiritual and
physical dangers.
Herzl was surprised to learn that small organizations already existed to
promote the return to Zion, but he considered their efforts as too little, too late.
A mass rescue of Jews could be affected only through international politics. He
therefore sought patrons from the great powers of his day and recruited
anti-Semites themselves to advance his cause. Zionism would allow European
states to rid themselves of the “Jewish problem”-if they wished-by endorsing
the project, Jewish bankers would relieve the Ottoman Sultan of his debilitating
debt to European financiers and governments; and the new state, endorsed by
all, would be no danger to anyone, In sum, it was “the dream of normalizing
the status of the Jewish people through the attainment of political sovereignty.“31
This is not the place to enter in details about Herzl’s incredible career.
Suffice it to say that by the time of his premature death at the age of forty-four
in 1904, he had created a “state mentality” through the Zionist Congress and
put the return to Zion on the international agenda. Her&s ideas about the
Jewish state, however, were political rather than religious. As his deputy, the
distinguished psychiatrist and author Max No&u, explained, “the New Zionism
has grown only in part out of the inner impulses of Judaism itself.“32 Instead,
29See Arhr Hertzberg, ed., 7be Zionist Idea (New York: Atheneum, 1%9), p. 106.
31 ?%eLIiuriesof 7hoabr Herd, ed. and trans. Martin L.owenthal(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1978).
3 Shlcmo Avineri, 7be Making of Modem Zionism: i%e InteUec~ Origins of the Jewish Sk& (Crucker,
MO.: Basis Books, 1981), p. 217.
s2 Hemberg, Tbe Zionist Idea, p. 242.

Spring 1998 I 211

SICHERMAN

Herzl’s Zionism was a device to rescue a people from anti-Semitism and

nationalism; as his critics noticed, there was not much Judaism but a great deal
of Central European culture in his ideas for a Jewish state. As Herzl put it in
his utopian novel Altneuland, “Matters of faith were once and for all [to be]
excluded from public influence.”
Most of the Jews who flocked to Zionism were also secular, although
many came from religious homes. They were in revolt against the old ways,
whether it be political passivity or traditional Judaism. Yet the early Zionists
were not prepared to abandon a spiritual life or, for that matter, accept the
idea that a reborn Jewish state would be “normal,” that is, like all other states.
Among the new thinkers, the intellectual Achad Haarn (the pen name
of Asher Ginsburg, 18561927) deserves close attention because he attempted
to extract from Judaism a public ethic for a new Jewish “center” in Palestine.
A scion of a Hasidic family from an isolated part of the Russian empire, he
prided himself on his realistic approach to Zionist prospects. Criticizing Herzl
as a romantic, he doubted especially that the Great Powers would readily grant
the Jews sovereignty over Palestine. Steeped in Jewish tradition (unlike Herzl),
he attacked the lack of Jewish content in Herzl’s Jewish state. Achad Haam’s
cultural Zionism sought to find moral ideas in Judaism that could form a new
Jewish society, but that need not rely on divine sanction. He bitterly contested
Zionist “neutrality” on such issues as the Sabbath, arguing that this classic
institution had saved the Jews (“More than Israel has kept the Sabbath, the
Sabbath has kept them”), and it could still be observed with a new, secular
rationale (a respite from the rigors of modem industrialism). He also asserted
that Judaism, unlike Christianity, offered a practical morality for international
relations. “Love thy neighbor as thyself” (Lev. 19.18) in the Christian ideal meant
the suppression of one’s ego, which was impractical for most individuals and
impossible for nations, Instead he wrote, societies and nations would be better
advised to follow the talmudic sage Hillel, ‘What is unpleasant to you, do not
do unto thy neighbor.“33
More than any other of the secular Zionists, Achad Haam sought to use
Zionism to salvage what he considered to be the essence of Judaism. But he
joined the others in repudiating the notion that the state’s purpose was religious.
In this, the Zionists were influenced by Spinoza’s philosophy of the state that
relied on secular law rather than divine sanction for its moral order, and the
eighteenth-century philosopher Moses Mendelson’s view of Judaism as a religion
of individual reason more than mass obedience.%
Searching for an alternative to traditional religion, some of the secularists,
such as Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, sought to root the new
state in the Bible itself, dispensing with rabbinical laws as a product of the
exile. (He even established a Bible study group in his house; Joshua was his

33 See Leon Simon, Acbad Haum, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Phaidon Press, l%@, pp. 136-37.
34 I am indebted to Judge Izhak Fnglard of the Israeli Supreme Court for this view, expressed in the
Caroline Zelaznik GIUSSand Joseph S. Grw Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.,
September 23, 1997.

212 I o&s
 Judaism and the World

favorite character.35) Still others, such as Zeev Jabotinsky (ideologue of today’s

Likud party), idealized “muscular Jewry,” especially a Jewish military capacity
and an efficient state, as the key to the Jewish future. To the left, the socialists
and kibbutz movements sought to exemplify Marxist or egalitarian ideals in the
new Zion.
What did the Orthodox rabbis think of Zionism?~ Most opposed it.
Maimonides still dominated religious thought on politics, as noted earlier, and
he saw the state as the instrument of Judaism. Thus, a Jewish state that would
not be guided by ha&ha seemed heretical; the charge of dual loyalty was a
potent one in a Europe of seething nationalisms; and the secular Zionists’
disregard for tradition proved most offensive?’ But those Zionists who were
religious took their cue from Rabbi Alkalay, whose ideas gained their fullest
exposition by Rabbi Abraham Yitzchak Hacohen Kook (1870-l%), Ashkenazi
chief rabbi of Palestine for much of the British Mandate period. A philosopher,
poet, and mystic, Rabbi Kook rejected the division of sacred and secular which,
he argued, did not apply to the Jewish people:

The spirit of Israel is so closely lied to the spirit of God that a Jewish nationalist,
no matter how secularist his intention may be, is, despite himself, imbibed with the
Divine spirit even against his own will. , . . Au of its (Israel’s) most cherished
possessions -its land, language, history and customs-are vessels of the spirit of the
Lord.38

The expression “vessels” is drawn from the k&bulub, a collection of

Jewish mystical texts that describe the exile of Israel as a “breaking” of vessels
conveying the immortal spirit to the mortal world.39 The objective of man’s
activity is to “repair the world,” thereby healing the breach between God and
mankind. Thus, according to Rabbi Kook, Zionism and the Zionists, even those
hostile to Judaism are unwitting mechanics of the divine plan. Religious Jews
should therefore join the movement, cultivate the spark of Judaism even in the
most hostile, and join in a project of cosmic significance.
Rabbi Kook brought to Zionism the old prophetic strand of Judaism,
the vision of the redemption of Israel and the transformation of all mankind.

Ailthe civilizations of the world will be renewed by the renaissance of our spirit. All
quarrels will be resolved, and our revival will cause all life to be luminous with the
joy of fresh birth. All religions will don new and precious raiment.‘@

35 Ben-Gurion was assisted by the late professor Chaim Gevaryahu,founder of the Israeli Society for
Biblical Reseat& I am indebted to his son Gii Gevqahu for this information.
36 The Reform tabbinate opposed Zionism until Israel was established. lhe Conservatives, largely an
American phenomenon, supposted Zionism from the outset.
f7 See for example the statements by the Lubavitcher and Gexer Rebbes-both Chasidim, sometimes
called Ulha-Onhodox-in Michael Seizer, ed., Zionism Ret- 7be ReJaZion ofJewish ilbmaky (New
York: Maanillan, 1970).
3s Hertzberg, ne ZionistIdea, p. 430.
39 See Gershom Scholem, Ku&&b (New York: Quadrangle,1974).
a Henzberg, TheZionistIdea, p. 423.

Spring 1998 I 213

 SICHERMAN

On a practical level, this renaissance of the Jewish spirit can be brought about
by settling the Land of Israel and building the Jewish community, which, to
quote the official prayer for the Israeli state, is, “the beginning of the flowering
of our redemption.”
It is sometimes argued that Zionism’s attempt to “normalize” the Jews
is a fundamental challenge to Judaism, a reborn heresy reminiscent of Samuel’s
time, when the Israelites wanted a king “like all the other nations.” There is
indeed a severe tension over how much of Israel’s life will be governed by
halacha, the current argument over Orthodox control of conversion being only
the latest example of a persistent controversy that dates from Zionism’s earliest
days. On a larger scale, however, there are two remarkable coincidences of
view between the secular and the religious Zionists.
The first is that Israel is different, even unique. Herzl sought to establish
a Jewish state through international political action, but he believed that the
support of the Great Powers, the state’s neutrality, and the benefits it would
shower on Jews, Muslims, and Christians alike, would exempt it from “normal”
balance-of-power politics. Achad Haam, the Socialists, and the other secular
Zionists, such as Ben-Gurion who worked to create a “new Jew,” rooted to the
land, often invoked Isaiah’s “light unto the nations”: Israel would not only be
a new state, but a new society setting an example for the entire world. Thus,
the prophetic idea that the return of Israel to its land would be of global
significance-important to all humanity-resonates through virtually all of the
secular and religious streams of Zionism alike.41
The second is a certain fear or mistrust of the state, or to be more
precise, what the state might become if it succumbed to the “nom-& demands
of international politics. Her& as noted above, hoped to avoid power politics
altogether. Achad Haam, near the end of his life, feared worship of the state:

Are we really doing it (Zionism) only to add in an Oriental comer a small people of
new Levantines tiho vie with other Levantines in shedding blood, in desire for vengeance,
and in angry violence? If this be the Messiah then I do not wish to see his coming.42

Rabbi Kook also recoiled from this “unclean” aspect of a reborn Jewish
sovereignty, which is why he argued that the redemption must be universal.
The Jewish people had not been corrupted by power during the exile and
must avoid such corruption in its new life. “It is not fitting for Jacob (Israel) to
engage in political life at a time when statehood requires bloody ruthlessness
and demands a talent for evil.“43

41 Of the major early Zionists, Vladimir (Zeev) Jabotinsky (18&W-1%0), founder of the Revisionist Zionists
(the forerunner of the Likud party), has the least to say on thii score, arguing, as Hetzi did before him, that
tire Jews needed a state and self-defense, Iike aII other nations, before the “luxury” of the “purely spiritual
aspects of Jewish nationalism” could be indulged. See his statement to the Peel Commission, 1937, in ibid.,
p. 559. Jabotinsky’s successors, especiaIIy Prime Miier Menachem Begin, spoke freely of Zionism’s
transcendental importance to Judaism if not to the rest of the world. See, for example, his remarks on
Jerusalem at the signing of the Camp David accords in Washington.
42 Ibid., p, 204.
43 Ibid., p. 423.

214 I Orbis
 Judaism and the World

The Jewish State and the Land of Israel

None of these early leaders imagined the evil that was about to befall
Jewry. At first, all went reasonably well. The Balfour Declaration of 1917, a
triumph of Hen&an-style political Zionism, offered the Zionists a “homeland in
Palestine,” and through much of the 1920s under the British Mandate, the
Jewish community grew substantially. Elsewhere, in Europe, the post-World
War I democracies in Central Europe and the New Economic Policy of the
Soviet Union offered the Jews- if not Judaism-some breathing space.
These circumstances changed rapidly. By the early 193Os, the growth
of Nazism began to imperil the Jews of Europe. The British Mandate came to
grief over violent Arab opposition and the impending world war, and British-
controlled Palestine joined the list of countries unwilling to accept Jewish
refugees on the eve of the Holocaust. Israel’s birth in 1948 was thus preceded
by the most awful catastrophe ever to befall the Jews and Judaism.
The leaders of the new state were determined to build up a new
community that could accommodate the ingathering of the exiles, beginning
with the sorry remnants of European Jewry. They also had to deal with the
continuing violent opposition of Israel’s Arab neighbors and to position the
new state in the developing cold war between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Under these circumstances, the Zionist leaders rapidly reached compro-
mises that would avoid damaging national unity in time of crisis.
The domestic arrangements of the Jewish state were also influenced
by Zionist politics. Every Israeli coalition government required the support of
one or more of the religious parties: the Zionists of the National Religious Party,
the non-Zionist Aguda, or more recently, the Sephardic Shas. While stipulating
that Israel was a state of law rather than haZacbu, the Labor party and its Likud
rival generally accepted a mixed system. Certain areas of public and private
life (dietary laws, marriage, divorce, conversion, and the like) were given to
the chief rabbinate. A separate religious public school system was also established.
All of these compromises have been sources of trouble, most notably
the issue of Who is a Jew?-that is, what criteria qualify one for Jewish identity
and thereby automatic citizenship in the state. This debate has intensified as
the secular Zionist ideologies have faded. Today there is a quest for a “renewed”
identity that seeks to draw upon both Judaism and democracy.44 For the student
of international relations, however, the tension between religion and politics,
Judaism and the Jewish state over the Land of Israel itself is of more interest.
This issue was largely dormant between 1948and 1967.But when, after six
days of lightning war, Israel emerged triumphant over her enemies, disciples
of Rabbi Kook-his son Zvi Yehuda and the yeshiva (seminary) he ran-saw
the conflict as much more than just another clash at arms with the Arabs. Israel’s
seemingly miraculous victory and its seizure of old Jerusalem and historic Judea

44 See Lilly We&rod, “Israeli Identity in Transition,” in Frvm Rabin to Netanph, ed. Efraim Kamh
@v.ion: Frank Cass, 1997).

Spring 1998 I 215

SICHERMAN

and Samaria (heartland of the biblical states) seemed to signify the beginnings
of the messianic era. A group of enthusiasts calling themselves Gush Emunim
(Bloc of the Faithful) announced that Jewish settlement in these areas was of
the highest religious signCance.45
The Gush never succeeded in recruiting many settlers (most Jews living
in Judea and Samaria today were drawn there by cheaper suburban housing),
but they did magnify the important religious issue of the holiness of the land.
Even the secular parties, whether Labor or Likud, believed in Jewish rights to
the whole Land of Israel. The Gush maintained that Jewish law forbade the
return of any part of the Land of Israel to non-Jewish hands once it had been
recovered.& Invoking Rabbi Kook, they also argued that to do so would “set
back” the cycle of redemption, delaying the messianic era.
As we have seen, the exact borders of the Land of Israel were always
subject to dispute although a permanent sanctity was attached to the area
reclaimed by Ezra after the Babylonian exile. 47Most sensitive of all was Jerusalem.
The temple mount’s special holiness was judged by the rabbinical authorities
from talmudic times to be perpetual because Gods presence had touched it
through the temple itself.@ (A Hebrew name for God is Shechina, derived from
the word meaning “place” or dwelling.) Jews were thus forbidden by the chief
rabbinate to wander the Muslim compound and the mosques near the temple
site lest they trespass on areas reserved by halacha for priests and the ritually
pure. The old city could not be yielded, a point that gave pause to one senior
National Religious Party minister, Moshe Chairn Shapiro, when, early in the
1967 war, the Israeli cabinet hesitated about seizing the old city. He warned
that once taken, it could never be given up.49
Since 1967, and even more so since the Oslo Accords of 1993, a war
of Halachic rulings has ensued, pitting eminent rabbis against each other. The
operating principle seems to be this: given that the preservation of human life
has the highest priority in Judaism, does Israeli withdrawal from part of the
Holy Land pose greater or lesser risk? The most prominent of those who support
a territorial compromise, the former Sephardic chief rabbi and mentor of the

45 See Gidon Aran, “A Mystic-Messianic Interpretation of Modem Israeli History: ‘Ihe Six Day War in the
Religious Culture of Gush Emunim,” in LwueliJudairm, ed. Deshen, L.iebman, and Shokeid.
46 Exponents of this position rely on Nahmanides, a twelfth-century Spanish authority who interprets
Numbers 33.53, “and you shall take possession of the land,” to mean that once possessed it cannot be given
away to another people. See also Babylonian Talmud, tmctate on Idol Worship, p. 2Oa, where Deuteronomy
7.1-2, “have no mercy upon them,” is interpreted to mean “do not give them a hold on the land.” The
question is whether this applies only to the Canaanites or also to all other nations. Most authorities, among
them Rabbi Kook himself (Response Mishpat Cohen, no. 63), rule that sale or assignment of land to Muslims
is petitted.
47 See Bleich, Conteqfwra y Hakzcbic Pmblems. See also Haim Bar-Drama, And 7bi.sShall Be the Border
of the Land (Ezekiel 47.15): 7be Tnre Bounaianks of the Land According to the Sources (leNsalem: B.E.R.
Publishing Co., 1958). This book exceeds 800 pages!
46 See, for example, Maimonides, chap. 6, pt. I6 of “Iaws of the Chcsen House [the temple],” in MI&&J
Torah.
49See J. Robert Moskii, Among Lt0n.s(New York: Arbor House, 1982>, p 299.

216 I Or&
 Judaism and the World

Shas religious party, Ovadia Yosef, caught the pragmatic temper of this debate
when he wrote, “If the military commanders along with the members of the
cabiiet decide that it is an issue of saving human life . . . that if territories are
returned, then the threat of war shall be decreased . . . it is permissible.“50
Those opposed to withdrawal invoke the same principle: “experience has taught
that surrender of territories has provided Israel with (at best) a piece of paper.
Hence, since it is forbidden to jeopardize the lives of Israel’s residents, it is
forbidden, under any circumstances, to surrender any part of the Holy Land.“51
Predictably, the opposing camps have recruited eminent generals and strategists
in support of their positions. An extremist fringe (among them Prime Minister
Rabin’s assassin) have also sought rabbi& sanction for violence against the
government ifit decides on withdrawal. While even the current Likud government
is working from a map that will yield more territory to the Palestinians, the
most cruel test will come in the event that settlements have to be removed,
i.e., the forcible “uprooting” of Jews from the Holy Land by a Jewish government.

The Holy and the Profane

The modem state of Israel is a secular democracy, not a theocracy. It

originated, however, in Judaism’s idea of a return to Zion and a messianic
redemption, including other nations. As Israel’s first prime minister, David
Ben-Gurion, declared: “National redemption means the ingathering of the
scattered sons of Israel . . . and the redemption of Israel is bound up with the
redemption of the world. . . .“52 Moreover, as we have seen, debates over the
state’s purposes and even over the tactics of territorial compromise have been
strongly influenced by religious ideas. While it is often stated that only about
25 percent of Israelis are religious, the reality is much more complex. Many of
Judaism’s 613 commandments are ethical, not only ritual; 248 are positive (“thou
shalt”) and 365 are negative (“thou shalt not”). The levels of observance are
wide-ranging and the state continues to draw heavily on religious symbols: the
flag is the color of the prayer shawl; the Knesset numbers 120, or twelve tribes
times ten, the minimum number of a prayer quorum; the calendar reflects the
religious holidays.53
Even this year’s fiftieth anniversary of Israel has been tied to the biblical
Jubilee, when in ancient times, slaves were freed, the land lay fallow, and its

w Rabbi Ovadiah Ycsef, Torah .%e&x’alpeh, vol. 21, p. 14.

s1 Excerpt from a Halachic ruling issued by 250 Israeli rabbii, including former members of the Supreme
Rabbinical Court and former Ashkenazic chief rabbi Abraham Shapira. See hW York ?%es, Jan. 20,199&
sec. A, p. 9.
s2 David Ben-Gurion, Lrrael: A Pemonai H&toy (New York: Funk & WagnaIls, 19721, p. 488.
53 Shlomit Levi, Hana Levinson, and Elihu Katz, Belie@ and Religious Obberyances in Social Rekations
Among the Jewisb P@ukdom of Ismel @zusakm: Louis Guttman Israel Institute on Applied Social Research,
1993); Deshen, Liebman, Shokeid, Isrueli Judaism, chaps. 3, 12, 13.

Spring 1998 I 217

SICHERMAN

ownership reverted to the old tribal lines-although nothing so revolutionary

as this has been proposed to mark the occasion!
It is more difficult to trace specific Israeli foreign policies to religious
impulses. A clear example, the ingathering of the exiles, which has led successive
Israeli governments to effect the rescues of Ethiopian Jewry and to work for
the immigration of Russian Jews, can be traced to the prophetic idea of the
return. For the most part, however, Israel’s international actions reflect the
dilemma that faces all hard-pressed small countries: how to survive by a
combination of internal strength and external alliance.
More useful, therefore, would be a summary of Judaism’s approach to
international relations, emphasizing several concepts along a spectrum ranging
from holy to profane. Holy, in this case, means the ideal; profane, a less-than-holy
reality.
First, Judaism associates a particular people, a territory, and God to an
extraordinary degree. A perfect world for Judaism is one in which the Jews,
living in a Jewish state encompassing the Land of Israel, fulfill the Torah in
divine obedience, This combination of circumstances existed for only a short
time, and by the end of the Second Temple, a revived Jewish state had become
associated with the messianic idea of redemption. But this ideal of the holy has
its profane counterpart: Israel’s right to take its place among the nations with
its own land and government.
Secondly, Judaism prescribes an international “order.” The ideal, in the
prophetic vision, includes the elimination of war and division through the unity
of mankind under the sovereignty of God. Such a transformation is to occur
in the course of restoring Israel to its rightful place through the Messiah-king
of the house of David. This holy order, in turn, has as its profane counterpart
an international system bound by rules and limits. The so-called optional war,
the role of the king, treaties, covenants, and the like are all regulated with an
eye to minimize the loss of life and physical damage and to control the ruler’s
ego. Intended originally only for the Jews, some of these biblical injunctions
have made their impact on history largely through Christian and Islamic
jurisprudence.
Thirdly, Judaism connects domestic behavior with international conse-
quences. Ideally, by following the Torah, the Jews achieve the ultimate security
in that God is enlisted on their side. Being holy, the state is protected by divine
power. In contrast, a sinful social order-whether stained by idol worship,
injustice to the weak, or excessive pride in one’s own strength-leads to a
downfall. The state has violated Gods law, and it suffers the consequences of
defeat, including the exile of its people. Again, these strictures apply primarily
to the Jewish state, although both the Five Books of Moses and the prophets
illustrate the same principle at work in other nations such as Canaan and the
Babylonian monarchy (e.g., the “handwriting on the wall”).
Lastly, Judaism prescribes a higher allegiance beyond the state. The
ideal Jewish polity, like its ruler, is measured by its subservience to the Torah
and the commandments. It exists to carry these out. The king’s command (or
the state’s laws) do not supersede or negate the law of God. While the personal

218 I Or&
 Judaism and the World

oath to a monarch carries great importance-as do all others in the Bible-it

cannot override the covenant with God. The profane counterpart to this ideal
is that authority is very important and anarchy must be avoided. Thus, the
saying ‘Yiftach in his generation is like Samuel in his generation” (Babylonian
Talmud, tractate on New Year, p. 105b) means that while today’s leaders may
be quite inferior when measured against their predecessors, allegiance to them
is necessary for society to function. The state, imperfect and rough, cannot be
negated. “Pray for the government,” advises Rabbi Chanina (first century C.E.),
“for without fear of it men would swallow each other alive” (Mishnah Avot
3.2). Thus, the state, while not the ultimate allegiance of the citizens, offers an
important instrument whereby society can be preserved if not perfected.
Beyond these general observations, Judaism has bequeathed a final,
unsettling idea to the state of Israel and the Jewish people: a pervasive feeling
that the Israeli state will simply never be “normal,” that is, not quite like other
states. It has some sort of unique destiny, whether to be a “light unto the
nations,” to be a model of a just society, to redeem the Jews at the onset of
the messianic era, or to renew a Judaism so long out of contact with the
Promised Land-just to name a few. This notion pervades virtually every
ideology of Zionism and unites the often conflicting streams of Judaism as well,
regardless of their attitude toward hulucbu. Will Israel become just another
“Levantine” state making its way more or less by the brutal dictates of international
realities? Or will the state nurture a society that carries a special meaning for
Jewish history, if not for all mankind? These questions may never be
answered by the actions of imperfect statesmen, but they give to their
deliberations an undeniably transcendental quality of biblical origin.

Spring 1998 I 219