Persons and Family Relations Cases
Republic of the Philippines 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810,
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT
OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,
respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern,
a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is
sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179,
184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337,
355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447,
473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599,
644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935,
961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166,
1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130,
136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199,
202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-
245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289,
291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346,
349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-
440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587,
594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702,
712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281,
1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558,
1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628,
1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734,
1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787,
1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814,
1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840,
1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868,
1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963,
1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145,
2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471,
474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538,
543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594,
598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786,
788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39,
50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-
433, 436-439.
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The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the
petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest
for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case
of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general
rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual
only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to
be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of
that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public
officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be
subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when
the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
Persons and Family Relations Cases
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a
private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings
brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the
position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority
supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to
proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think
that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason
'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if
under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does
not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the
rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule
insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances
which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is
not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal
personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present
petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is
a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the
land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it
would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is
not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
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themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted
that since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official
Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in
the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion
is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides
as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed
by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4]
such documents or classes of documents as may be required so
to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine
from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
Persons and Family Relations Cases
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic
has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time
when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by
the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated,
much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents
and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads:
"There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall"
used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from
such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
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It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice
Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of
instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions
so that the people may know where to obtain their official and
specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s
which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a
law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing
no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree.
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry.
Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
Persons and Family Relations Cases
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the
attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle
of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9
sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said
right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior
to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may
have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears
that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in
the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.
10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their
subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished
PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In
Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled
that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
[penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized
by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment
that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in
the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some
criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
4

general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in
the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to
concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due
process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who
is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act
having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication
required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that
failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a
statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same
category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would,
for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act
is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice
Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies
only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to
Persons and Family Relations Cases
my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is
required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding
force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of
Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the
constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine
Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to
affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause
is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing
paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it
requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I
beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication
in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the
command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is
to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official
Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable
mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that
does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past
presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior
thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have
conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official
Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold
that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such
presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident.
5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due
process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued
5

under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process
of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be
tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further
than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a
legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official
Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the
rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a
legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have
the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or
executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for
a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of
Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus
previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal
character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught,
as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore
unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and
Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring
opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of
norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to
all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only
under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it
is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing
Persons and Family Relations Cases
the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases
that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article
2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be
no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil
Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need
be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly
untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a
different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the
basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of
this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it
"shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2
To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify
the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official
Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and
render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple
expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity
date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its
publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its
proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides
for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state
in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen
(15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that
6

the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy
vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. *
It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice
of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due
process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in
the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes
that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the
proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the
Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the
Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution,
and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It
also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the
Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders
and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in
the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official
Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for
all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an
Persons and Family Relations Cases
earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638,
cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a
provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher
law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires
notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a
law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the
necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and
issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due
publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in
the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to
concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due
process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who
7

is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act
having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication
required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that
failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a
statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same
category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would,
for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act
is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice
Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies
only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to
my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is
required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding
force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of
Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the
constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine
Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to
affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause
is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing
paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it
requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I
beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication
in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the
command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is
to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official
Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable
mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that
Persons and Family Relations Cases
does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past
presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior
thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have
conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official
Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold
that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such
presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident.
5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due
process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued
under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process
of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be
tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further
than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a
legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official
Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the
rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a
legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have
the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or
executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for
a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of
Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus
previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal
character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught,
as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore
unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
8

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and
Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring
opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of
norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to
all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only
under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it
is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing
the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases
that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article
2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be
no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil
Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need
be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly
untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a
different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the
basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of
this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it
"shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2
To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify
the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and
render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple
expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity
date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its
publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its
proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides
for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state
in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen
(15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that
the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy
vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. *
It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice
of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due
process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in
the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes
that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
9
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the

proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the
Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the
Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution,
and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It
also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the
Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders
and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in
the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official
Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for
all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an
earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638,
cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a
provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher
law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires

notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a
law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the

necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and

issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due
publication thereof.

10

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-
appellants.
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were charged
before Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region
stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery.* The Amended
information dated October 11, 1985 charged:
That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of
Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above named two (2) accused,
conspiring, confederating and cooperating with three (3) others
whose identities are still unknown and who are still at large,
armed with bladed weapons by means of force, violence and
intimidation, taking advantage of the nighttime to better realize
their purpose, and in the dwelling of the offended party, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away, with intent to gain, cash amount of Three Hundred
(P300,00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victim
Corazon Aliman and the following personal property: one (1)
adjustable wrench, one (l) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1)
pair of levis pants, one (1) travelling bag and one (1) wallet
containing ten (P10,00) pesos, with a total value of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the
victims Reynaldo Aliman and Josephine Belesario, the over all
Persons and Family Relations Cases
total of cash and personal property being SEVEN HUNDRED
(P700.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, without the consent of
the above-mentioned offended parties and to their damage and
prejudice in the aforestated amount; that by reason or on the
occasion of said Robbery, the above named two (2) accused did
then and there hack victim Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him
and inflicting wounds which required medical attendance of
more than thirty (30) days, as well as inflict physical injuries to
the other victims Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belesario
causing them to sustain injuries requiring medical attendance for
several number of days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp, 92-93, II Record.)
In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305, accused-appellants Alex Mijaque,
Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before the same court
with the crime of robbery with multiple rape, thusly:
That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of
Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named three (3) accused, with
deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, conspiring,
confederating and working together with Richard Doe, Philip
Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large, all armed with firearms
and other deadly weapons, thereby performing [sic] themselves
into a band, entered the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once
inside, with intent to gain and with violence against, and/or
intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away Five Hundred
(P500.00) Pesos in cash, one (1) ring worth Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, and one (1) Seiko wrist watch worth Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, making a total of Six Thousand Five
Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos, against the will and/or consent of
the owner; that on the occasion thereof, the above-named three
(3) accused, conspiring and working together with their
companions who are still at large, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
11

feloniously have sexual intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar,
Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Josephine Belesario,
against their will and consent.1âwphi1.nêt
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 90-91, II Record.)
Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered a
plea of "not guilty" to both crimes charged (p. 103, II Record).
After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing:
Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and
satisfactory proof showing that the accused in these two cases
are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed against
them, they are hereby sentenced as follows:
a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries,
accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque are penalized to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10)
years, and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Corazon Aliman the
amount of P700.00 representing the value of her property
robbed from her and also to indemnify Reynaldo Aliman the
amount of P8,000.00 representing the expenses he incurred for
his medication and hospitalization due to the wounds he
suffered.
b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes,
accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. Alex Mijaque and Nestor Ras are
sentenced to a death penalty and to indemnify the members of
the Carcillar family the amount of P6,500.00 representing the
cash and articles taken from them.
In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 80, Rollo.)
Persons and Family Relations Cases
The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the
following findings:
Criminal Case No. 18376
The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by
accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque, as well as by
their unidentified companions, based on the positive identification made
by complaining witness Corazon Aliman, and corroborated by her son
Reynaldo and the latter's half-sister Josephine Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).
Criminal Case No. 18305
Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras, as
well as an unidentified companion, acted in concert to commit the crime
of robbery with multiple rape. They were positively identified by the
following witnesses. Juliana Carcillar who was raped twice by Alex
Mijaque; Josephine Belisario who was raped once by Alex Mijaque;
Rogelia Carcillar who was raped by Alex Mijaque; and Perpetua Carcillar,
who was raped by Nestor Ras, after Alfonso Patalin, Jr. failed in his
attempt to rape her. Accused-appellant Patalin was likewise identified
by Reynaldo Aliman who personally knew him as former barangay-mate
for a long time, as well as by Corazon Aliman, mother of Reynaldo. The
identification of accused-appellants was facilitated and aided by a bright
full moon and due to the fact that they tarried in the crime scene for a
long period of time, thus allowing their victims to imprint in their
memory the countenance or visage of accused-appellants. Said positive
and clear identification by the complaining witnesses, who were not
shown to have ill motive to falsify the truth and to implicate accused-
appellants, prevail over the latter's defense of denial. Band, nocturnity,
and dwelling, were likewise appreciated against accused-appellant (pp.
78-79, Rollo).
The errors assigned by the accused-appellant in their individual briefs
are summarized as follows: (1) The trial court erred in finding that
accused-appellants are responsible for the crimes charged; (2) The trial
court erred in convicting accused-appellant Patalin notwithstanding the
fact that the latter was arrested without a warrant; (3) Assuming
without conceding that accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed
the crimes charged, the trial court in erred in imposing the penalty of
12

death as the same was suspended upon the ratification of the 1987
Constitution (pp. 86, 146, 204, Rollo).
The prosecution's version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the
testimony of prosecution witnesses Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, Dra. Leticia
Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo Aliman, Josephine Belisario, Juliana Carcillar,
Rogelia Carcillar, and Perpetua Carcillar, is summarized in the Solicitor
General's consolidated Brief, as follows:
At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo
Aliman, his half sister Josephine Belisario, and their mother
Corazon Aliman were having a conversation inside their house at
Barangay Lumanay, municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo,
appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., who was outside the fenced
perimeter of said house, called out Reynaldo Aliman by his
nickname and asked the latter to let him and the other persons
with him in (pp. 5-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986).
Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the
moonlight, saw appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. with (2) other
persons. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. asked again Reynaldo
Aliman to let them in (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Reynaldo Aliman opened
the gate and Alfonso Patalin together with his companions, one
of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, entered the premises (pp. 8,
10-11, ibid.). Immediately upon entering, appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. pointed the beam of his flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman.
At this juncture, appellant Alex Mijaque hacked Reynaldo Aliman
twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the neck, right arm, and the
chest (pp. 14-16, ibid.). Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman
immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.).
Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the
balcony of their house, witnessed the hacking incident and the
former shouted for help (p. 6, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN,
June 30, 1988). Two of the assailants, one of whom is appellant
Alex Mijaque, pushed Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario
inside their house, covered their mouth and told them not to
make any noise. Later, appellant Alex Mijaque dragged Josephine
Belisario to the house of the latter's aunt (sister of Corazon
Aliman) which is beside their house. The other man stayed put
and while holding a double-bladed knife, threatened to kill
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Corazon Aliman if the latter will not give him money. After
Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash,
he ransacked the house and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1)
vise grip, one (1) screw driver one, (1) pair of Levis trousers, one
(1) travelling bag, and one (1) wallet containing ten pesos
(P10.00); the total value thereof is seven hundred pesos
(P700.00) inclusive of the three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash.
Thereafter, the man also dragged Corazon Aliman to her sister's
house (pp. 6-8, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN, June 30,
1988).
Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her
aunt's house which is just twenty (20) meters away, saw six (6)
persons, one of whom is appellant, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., outside
the house of her aunt. Josephine Belisario was forced to call out
her aunt's name and ask that the door be opened for her. While
the door was being opened, it was kicked by one of the six (6)
persons. Alfonso Patalin immediately went in, boxed the aunt of
Josephine Belisario on the body and announced that they are
staging a hold-up. The other companions of appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr., including appellant Alex Mijaque, who were armed
with knive's a bolo and a gun also went in and restrained
Josephine Belisario's cousins, namely Rogelio, Juliana, Perpetua,
Roy, and Victoriano, who are all surnamed Carcillar, (pp. 11-15,
TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 11, TSN, June 29, 1989). Josephine
Belisario together with her aunt and cousins were all forced to
lie face down on the floor of the sala (p. 15, TSN, June 30, 1998; p.
7, TSN, Feb. 15, 1990). Appellant Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs.
Carcillar (Josephine Belisario's aunt and the mother of her
cousins), kicked and boxed the latter and exclaimed: "Money,
money". "It is money we want." Appellant Alfonso Patalin forced
Mrs. Carcillar into a room where the latter gave him money (p.
16, TSN, June 30, 1988; pp. 7-8, February 15, 1990.). Then,
appellants and their companions seized the following
personalities of the Carcillars: (1) one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth
three thousand pesos (P3,000.00), (2) two (2) pairs of lady's
rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3) one (1) pair of
earrings, and (4) two (2) travelling bags (p. 9, TSN, February 15,
1990).
13

Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant
Alex Mijaque who was armed with a butcher's knife and
threatened to kill her if she will not lie down. Because of fear, she
did as she was told (pp. 10, 16-17, TSN, February 15, 1990).
Appellant Alex Mijaque forcibly removed her underwear and
placed himself on top of Rogelia. She tried to resist but appellant
Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife at the former's neck and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 11-12,
ibid.). Thereafter, appellant Alex Mijaque brought her inside the
house and ordered her to lie face down on the floor again (pp.
13-14, ibid.). Then, one of the companions of appellant Alex
Mijaque who was armed with a gun took her outside and brought
her to a place not far from where she was raped (p. 14, ibid.).
This man, at the point of a gun, threatened to kill her if she will
not obey his orders. Rogelia Carcillar, who feared for her life, was
left with no choice but to obey the man's orders. There, she was
raped for the second time by this gun-wielding man (pp. 15-16,
ibid.). While Rogelia Carcillar was being raped, appellant Alfonso
Patalin was also outside the house standing on guard (p. 18,
ibid.).
Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by
appellant Alex Mijaque who, with his knife, tried to rape her but
he initially failed because of her resistance. This angered
appellant Alex Mijaque and he tried to kill Juliana Carcillar by
stabbing the latter but was prevailed upon not to do so by one of
his companions (pp. 12-15, TSN, June 29, 1989).
Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of
Juliana Carcillar, turned her over to one of his companions who
was in the garden outside the house and armed with a gun. This
man threatened her with the gun and mauled her. She was
overpowered and he undressed her. He inserted his finger on her
sex organ and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her (pp. 15-17, ibid.). Then, this companion of appellant
Alex Mijaque brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and
ordered to look for money. When she told him that they have no
more money, he kept on harming her. In the course thereof, he
found and took a Seiko wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar.
Then, he brought her outside the house again where he had a
brief conversation with appellants Nestor Ras and Alfonso
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Patalin. She was then brought back inside the house and ordered
to lie face down on the floor again. While at this position,
appellant Alex Mijaque approached her and brought her outside
the house. She refused to obey appellant Alex Mijaque's order to
lie down on the ground so he pushed her downwards. Her
strength gave out and he succeeded in raping her twice. She was
then brought back inside the house (pp. 18-21, TSN, June 29,
1989).
Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the
sala, was dragged by appellant Alex Mijaque inside one of the
rooms. He threatened her with his knife and was able to undress
her. He fondled her breasts, pulled her pubic hair and eventually
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She was then
left inside the room. Two companions of appellant Alex Mijaque
came in bringing with them her cousins Rogelia and Perpetua
Carcillar. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to
another room. The man demanded money from her but she was
not able to give him money. The man was also carrying a knife
and threatened her with the same. She resisted when he was
forcing her to lie down on the bed but her strength finally gave
out . He likewise succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her. After raping her, the man took a piggy bank which was at the
foot of the bed and brought her back to the room where she was
first raped. Her aunt and cousins were also inside the said room
(pp. 17-25, TSN, June 30, 1988).
Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. While laying face down
on the floor of the living room, she was pulled by the hair by
appellant Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand up. When she
stood up, she realized that her sister were no longer there.
Appellant Alfonso Patalin, armed with a double-bladed knife,
brought her outside the house, ordered her to undress and lie
down. Because of fear, Perpetua Carcillar, who was then only
thirteen (13) years old, obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried
to force his penis into her vagina but did not succeed. Then,
appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to appellant Nestor
Ras, a member of their group who was only about two (2) arms
length away. Appellant Nestor Ras, armed with a double-bladed
knife which he was pointing at Perpetua Carcillar, ordered her to
lie down. He fondled her breasts, kissed her, and succeeded in
14

having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her, appellant
Nestor Ras brought her back inside the house. When she was
returned inside the house, the intruders were still demanding for
money from her mother and were taking turns in beating the
latter (pp.4, 15-23, TSN, July 12, 1990).
Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with
them the valuables stated earlier after threatening them not to
report the matter to the police or else they will return and kill all
of them (p.19, TSN, February 15, 1990).
Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial
Hospital where he received first aid. He was then brought to
West Visayas Medical Center located in Manduriao, Iloilo (pp. 18-
20, TSN, December 16, 1986) and was treated by Dr. Edgardo
Carmelo (p. 4, TSN, May 14, 1986). Reynaldo Aliman sustained
the following injuries: (1) hackwound, mid forearm, area ulnar
side middle third forearm, and (2) hack wound, left side of neck
(pp. 5-6, ibid; Exhibit A). Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the
hospital for almost three (3) months and he spent more than
eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for medicines, food and other
expenditures (p. 19, TSN, December 16, 1986).
Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine
Belisario two days after she was raped. A hematoma, about 3x4
inches in diameter, was found on the left shoulder of Josephine
Belisario which could have been caused by forcing the latter to
lie down on the ground. Josephine Belisario "vagina admits two
(2) fingers". Further, hematoma was noted in the hymen at nine
o'clock and three o'clock positions and fresh lacerations was also
noted at nine, eleven, and three o'clock positions. These are
indications that a foreign object, which could be a human penis,
was inserted in the vagina and caused the lacerations of the
hymen (pp. 6-9, TSN, September 3, 1986).1âwphi1.nêt
Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were
also examined and treated by Dr. Leticia Santiago but such was
conducted three days after the incident (p. 17, ibid).
A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of
Rogelia Carcillar (p. 18, ibid). Her vagina admits two fingers
Persons and Family Relations Cases
snugly and the perineum has a lacerated wound which is one
centimeter in length (pp. 18-19, ibid; pp. 2-3, TSN, November 10,
1986). Fresh lacerations were likewise noted in her hymen at
eight, eleven and three o'clock positions (p. 3, TSN, November 10,
1986). Dr. Santiago further testified that a foreign object was
inserted in the vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September
3, 1986; p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986).
Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the
forehead, left and right side of the face, upper right arm,
uppermost and lower portions of the left thigh, occipital region
of the head and left side of the mouth. She also sustained the
following injuries: (1) 1/2 cm. lacerated wound on the left side of
the lower lip, (2) bite mark with hematoma on the left shoulder,
(3) 1 cm. incised wounds on the right index finger and right
thumb, (4) 4 inches incised wound on the right forearm, and (5)
multiple abrasions at the back including the portion below the
waistline, her vagina admits two fingers and fresh lacerations in
the hymen were noted at eight, eleven, and four o'clock positions
(pp. 10-15, TSN, November 10, 1986).
Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a centimeter lacerated
wound on the perineum which was also swollen. Her vagina
admits two fingers snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A fresh laceration at six
o'clock position and a hematoma also at six o'clock position were
noted on her hymen (Exhibit C, p. 15, Record).
(pp. 300-311, Rollo.)
Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their
testimony and that of their witnesses, Alejandro Tabucan, Felizardo
Lebona, Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina Gumban. The denials, together
with other arguments, are summarized as follows:
Alfonso Patalin
Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only
included by Jesus Larang, whom he described as the land lord of Jesusa
Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters, to force him to reveal the names of the
persons who staged the robbery and rape. Verily, he declared on the
stand that when the victims saw him at the police station, two of them
15

(Josephine Belisario and Reynaldo Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn,
August 13, 1993, pp. 10-11, 19-20).
In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing
that when prosecution witness Josephine Belisario was asked on the
stand if she recognized "the person who called [her] brother Reynaldo,"
said witness responded that she did not know the person who called her
brother, and that she only recognized the caller's voice (tsn, August 11,
1988, pp. 30-31). Further, accused-appellant Patalin also alleges that he
was arrested without a warrant.
Alex Mijaque
Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of
Reynaldo Aliman (p. 3, II Record), there is no mention of his name nor
that of accused-appellant Patalin as the perpetrators of the crimes
charged. Moreover, during the preliminary examination in the lower
court, accused-appellant Mijaque was also not named as one of the
malefactors. He likewise points out that in the police blotter, the first
report mentioned that the alleged offenders were unknown persons. No
rape was reported. In the second report, it was blottered that the alleged
offenders were four unidentified persons. Again, no rape was reported.
Accused-appellant Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given by
Rogelia Carcillar who merely narrated the robbery but did not report
any rape.
According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo,
Manduriao (also referred to in the record as "Mandurriao") received a
complaint from a resident thereat that his television set was stolen
previous to the incidents herein involved. Accused-appellant Mijaque
was suspected as the thief and was picked up by the agents of the
Manduriao Police Station without any warrant of arrest and was thence
detained for three days without any complaint (p. 93, Rollo). Meanwhile,
the robbery at Lambunao, Iloilo was being flashed at all police stations in
Iloilo. The arresting officers of the Manduriao Police Station, so accused-
appellant Mijaque contends, in order to save themselves from charges of
arbitrary detention, immediately referred him for custodial investigation
in regard to the Lambunao robbery. Consequently, three days after his
confinement, a criminal complaint for robbery with physical injuries and
another for robbery with rape was filed against him by the Chief of
Police of Lambunao, Iloilo.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Nestor Pas
The third accused-appellant, Nestor Pas, argues that his name was never
mentioned by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, and that Josephine Belisario was
merely led by the public prosecutor into mentioning his name. He also
states that the witnesses' declarations as regards his identification are
confusing and inconsistent (pp. 208-210, Rollo).
Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by the
public prosecutor about what happened to his sister Perpetua Carcillar,
testified that "Nothing happened to them" (p. 210, id). And when
Perpetua Carcillar and the other female prosecution witnesses reported
the alleged incident to the police authorities, they never mentioned that
they were raped.
As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the
charges, also presented their respective alibis. Accused-appellant Patalin
testified that he was at home with his parents, wife, and children, at
Pandan, Lambunao (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 16-17) at the time of the
incident. As corroborative witness, he presented Felizardo Lebona, the
person in charge of the plantation where he was working, who testified
that accused-appellant Patalin did not leave the plantation house from
August 9 to 12, 1984 (tsn, October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5).
For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no
opportunity to get out of the farm where he was working which was
located in Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993, p. 6). In July, 1985, he was
arrested for theft of a television set and detained in the Lambunao jail
for investigation. Although three of the herein complainants were
brought in front of his detention cell, he was not identified. Instead, the
policemen pointed to him and said, "That is Alex Mijaque who raped you.
If you will not include him, he will file a case against you." Moreover, he
testified that he was mauled in jail (tsn, July 29, 1993, pp. 10-13).
Defense witness, Alejandro Tabucan, neighbor of accused-appellant
Mijaque, corroborated the latter's alibi that on August 11, 1984, they had
a drinking spree from 6 o'clock in the evening to 12 o'clock midnight,
and accused-appellant Mijaque was not able to leave the premises in
Manduriao. Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still asleep the
following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993, pp. 4-5, 10).
16

Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the
province of Antique (particularly, in Igbangkal, Dao) on August 11, 1984
(tsn, December 17, 1993, p. 4). As corroborative witness, he presented
Cristina Gumban, a vendor who testified that on August 11, 1984, she
bought cassava and sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras in
Igbangkal, Dao, Antique from 3 o'clock to 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and
that he saw Ras put the purchased items in a sack (tan, March 4, 1994, p.
4).
We are not persuaded by the above posturing and are compelled to
affirm.
Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle
that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimony is
a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination (People vs.
Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 [1997]). We generally uphold and respect this
appraisal since, as an appellate court, we do not deal with live witnesses
but only with the cold pages of a written record (People vs. Herbieto,
269 SCRA 472 [1997]).
A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution
witnesses' credibility, particularly the ravished victims, who, for
approximately two agonizing hours, were subjected to a hellish
nightmare occurring in the very privacy of their own homes.
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated
brief, the defense was not able to prove any motive on the part of the
private complainants to falsely testify that they were robbed and raped
by accused-appellants. In fact, two of the rape victims, Josephine
Belisario and Rogelia Carcillar, were even married to first cousins of
accused-appellant Patalin (pp. 327-328, Rollo), and would not ordinarily
turn against a relative although this be by mere affinity unless they
really suffered the fate they narrated.
Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the
complaining witnesses. As discussed above in their individual defenses,
they emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman failed to mention the names of the
perpetrators in his sworn statement; that on August 11, 1984, Reynaldo
instructed a relative, Jesus Larang, to report the hacking and robbery
Persons and Family Relations Cases
incidents at the Lambunao Police Department, as well as the robbery
committed in the Carcillar household, and that the police blotter stated
that the alleged offenders were unknown persons but contained no
report of any rape; and that Rogelia Carcillar's report did not mention
that she was raped.
Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal
accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is
satisfactorily explained (People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 [1997]). An
examination of Reynaldo Aliman's sworn statement (p. 3, I Record)
shows that he clearly identified one of the callers as accused-appellant
Alfonso Patalin. Anent his failure to mention accused-appellant
Mijaque's name, he explained on cross-examination that he did not know
yet the name of the person who attacked him with the bolo at the time
he executed his sworn statement (tsn, Dec. 16, 1986, pp. 35, 38-39). It
was only later that he found out that the name of his assailant was Alex
Mijaque. As regards Jesus Larang, the fact that he mentioned "unknown
persons" in his report does not affect Reynaldo's categorical and positive
identification of accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the
perpetrators of the hacking and robbery incidents at his home.
Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told
them not to report the matter to the police, otherwise, the assailants will
return and kill them (tsn, Feb. 15, 1990, p. 19). The victims were
overcome by fear and shame (ibid., p. 31). Besides, the delay in reporting
the multiple rapes was not procrastination as this was only 3 days from
the date of the incident (tsn, June 30, 1988, p. 22), a far shorter period
than those mentioned in People vs. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82 [1996]) where
we held that a delay of 17 or 35 days, or even 6 months, by a victim of
rape in reporting the attack on her honor, does not detract from the
veracity of her charge.
The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the
complaining witnesses, as follows: (1) Juliana Carcillar testified earlier
that the only light in the house came from a kerosene lamp placed on a
small table which was extinguished as a result of it being knocked down,
thus placing the house in darkness, while on the other hand, Perpetua
Carcillar, earlier said that although there was no more light in the house
coming from the lamp, yet she could still see because the light of the
moon still illuminated their house, allegedly through the plastic roofing;
and (2) the prosecution witnesses could not agree concerning the date
17

they went to San Dionisio, Iloilo to identify accused-appellant Nestor
Ras, as well as the date when Ras was arrested.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to
minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony, and do
not impair the credibility of such witnesses where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the
assailant (Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). In
fact, honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to
strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime,
especially so when the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing
to the senses (People vs. Agunias, 279 SCRA 52 [1997]).
With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these
defenses, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters (People vs. Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]).
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181
[1997]). Verily, even if the defense of denial is supported by the
testimony of friends of the accused, it deserves the barest consideration
(People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). It will be given weight only if
it would preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of
commission (People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. De
Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]; People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709 [1995];
People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]; People vs. Dela Iglesia, 241 SCRA
718 [1995]; People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs. Dayson,
242 SCRA 124 [1995]; People vs. Espinosa, Jr. 243 SCRA 7 [1995]; People
vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557 [1995]; People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87
[1995]).
Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in
Manduriao, Iloilo. The overland travel time from the town of Manduriao
to Lambunao is approximately one hour and twenty minutes. Accused-
appellant Patalin testified that he was in Barangay Pandan, which is
merely adjacent to Lambunao. Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras
testified that he was in Antique, a province neighboring Iloilo, which is
Persons and Family Relations Cases
approximately two hours away therefrom via overland transportation.
The defense tried to corroborate these alibis by presenting witnesses
who testified on details which happened ten years prior to the date their
testimony was given, and hence of naturally doubtful credibility.
Mutatis mutandi People vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering
that the places where accused-appellants alleged they were at could be
traversed by motorized vehicles, it was not impossible that accused-
appellants could not have been at the crime scene by 7 o'clock or 7:30
o'clock in the evening on August 11, 1984. More importantly and
damning yet is the positive identification of their presence thereat by the
victims.
The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and dwelling in Criminal Case No. 18376 considering that
nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime and the evidence
shows that accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to
successfully consummate their plans (People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA
798 [1968]). Dwelling is clear from the abuse of confidence which the
victims reposed in the offenders by opening the door to them, as well as
the violation of the sanctity of privacy in the victims' homes. He who
goes to another's house to slander him, hurt him, or do him wrong, is
more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere (Reyes, The Revised
Penal Code — Criminal Law, Vol. I, 1993 ed., citing the dissenting
opinion of Justice Villareal in People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635 [1939] and
Viada, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 323-324). We further affirm the trial court's
finding on the presence of the aggravating circumstance of band
considering that Reynaldo Aliman testified that accused-appellants
Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was later identified as
accused-appellant Mijaque) entered his home (tsn, p. 7, Dec. 16, 1986).
This was corroborated by Josephine Belisario who even saw four (4)
persons enter their gate, one of whom was accused-appellant Patalin
(tsn, p.10, June 30, 1988). These same aggravating circumstances
likewise attended the commission of the crime of robbery with multiple
rape in Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by the
victims thereof who stated that five persons, including accused-
appellant Patalin, armed with a bolo, a knife, and a long gun, entered
their dwelling that unfortunate night (tsn, June 29, 1989, p. 10; February
15, 1990, p. 5).
18

With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque's defense that
they were arrested without warrants, suffice it to say that any objection,
defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea (Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402 [1997]). As
correctly pointed out in the People's consolidated brief, the record
shows no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial
(p. 324, Rollo).
It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the
crimes in both Criminal Cases No. 18376 and 18305. In the first criminal
case, the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellants Patalin and
Mijaque, together with unidentified companions, committed the crime
charged. Said culprits shared the common criminal objective of robbing
the victims and inflicting wounds upon Reynaldo Aliman on the occasion
of the robbery. In the second case, all three accused-appellants (together
with unidentified companions), who were positively identified by the
victims themselves, undoubtedly had the common criminal design of
robbing the household of Jesusa Carcillar, and of committing multiple
rape on the occasion of the robbery. Accused-appellant Mijaque dragged
Josephine Belisario to her aunt's house and the other culprits followed
suit. Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and announced
that they were staging a hold-up. After robbing the household, they
proceeded in ravishing the four young female victims, Rogelia, Juliana,
Josephine, and Perpetua, one after the other, thus truly exhibiting their
concerted acts.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (People
vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). It cannot be merely presumed. Similar
to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual
agreement among accused-appellants adduced at the trial —
. . . direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be
shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The
existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy
maybe, and from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be,
inferred by the court from proof of facts and circumstances
Persons and Family Relations Cases
which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely
parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment, then a conspiracy maybe inferred though no actual
meeting among them to concert means is proved (People vs.
Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868; See also People vs. Viray, 147 SCRA 146;
People vs. Balignasay, G.R. No. 76743, May 22, 1992; People vs.
Galit, 230 SCRA 486). . .
( People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620
[1995]).
Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited
by the straightforward testimony of the victims themselves.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the
death penalty. At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984,
robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art. 294, Revised Penal
Code). However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death
penalty was abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not be imposed
upon accused-appellants. Said provision reads as follows:
Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect
upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. However, said provision
left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its
discretion, "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Simply
stated, it did not prevent the legislature from reimposing the death
penalty at some future time (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 507-508).
19

Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act
No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law which took effect on January 1, 1994.
Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitution's
abolition of the death penalty had retroactive effect, being beneficial to
the accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on
January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact
that the decision was rendered by the trial court on June 14, 1995, when
the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect.
Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
At the time of the commission of the crime in 1984, as held by the trial
court, robbery with rape, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death (Article 294[2], Revised Penal Code [as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 767]).
True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to
Congress' future restoration thereof "for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes." At the time of such ratification, the instant case was still
at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been imposed. Considering
that the provision provides that "[a]ny death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua," it is clear that the framers
intended said provision to have a retroactive effect on cases pending
without any penalty of death having been imposed yet. Consequently,
upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty already
imposed is automatically — without need for any executive action —
commuted (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508).
The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was
abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused-
appellants, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future act
restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them? An affirmative
answer would free accused-appellants from the fatal clutches of the
death penalty.
Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an individual
may be compelled to hold his life (or lose it), or the means of living, at
the mere will of another, is intolerable in any country where freedom
Persons and Family Relations Cases
prevails (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 [1919]). Before us is a
heinous crime indeed where people were harmed, robbed, ravished, and
abused in the defaced sanctity of their own homes. It is but human
nature to feel some measure of loathing, disgust, and hatred for the
offenders considering the inhuman aspect of the crime committed.
However, the ascendancy of the law is axiomatic in our type of
government. Every official act must be based on and must conform to the
authority of a valid law, lacking which the act must be rejected (Cruz,
Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 51). The nobility of our intention is
insufficient.
There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987
retroactively affected and benefited accused-appellants. Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal . . . although at the time of the publication of such laws
a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the
same."
A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed
against the state (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 5).
The above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in character since
it deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. This penal
provision may be given retroactive effect during three possible stages of
a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the
prosecution began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service
has not begun; and (c) when the sentence is being carried out (Gregorio,
Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1988 ed., p. 167, citing Escalante
vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483 [1932]).
In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the
abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused-appellants.
Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect
them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be
passed by Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659)
can only have prospective application (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution
the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508, citing I
RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers,
1995 ed., p. 227, citing I Record, p. 747-748).
20

There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law
which entitles him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit,
nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute which
precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a
particular matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied
retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law (Agpalo,
Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372
[1946]). Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent
their retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or
interfere with vested or existing rights. Clearly, accused-appellants' right
to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued or attached
by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be
taken away from them.
Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested (Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515
[1992]), the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose
and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used
(Balatbat vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).
By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits
accruing to workmen under the old law cannot be taken away from them
by a succeeding law. In the case at bar, there is greater reason to apply
this principle since the very taking of life is involved and is at issue.
As regards accused-appellant's civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal
Case No. 18376, correctly awarded P700.00 to Corazon Aliman
representing the total value of the cash and personal property forcibly
taken, and P8,000.00 to Reynaldo Aliman representing expenses
incurred for medication and hospitalization. However, in Criminal Case
No. 18305, the trial court failed to order indemnification for the multiple
rapes. Thus, in line with the pronouncement in People vs. Victor (G.R. No.
127903, July 9, 1998) wherein we said:
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for
rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in
the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like
considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect
Persons and Family Relations Cases
should follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at
bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by
any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the
victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than
P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over
time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over
the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.
accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as
indemnification for five counts of rape (considering that Juliana Carcillar
was twice raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in addition to the sum of
P6,500.00 representing the value of the cash and articles that were taken
from the victims. In line with the recent ruling in People vs. Prades (G.R.
No. 127569, July 30, 1998), moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
for each count of rape, or a total of P250,000.00 is likewise awarded.
Lastly, so that the instant case may serve as an object lesson to the
public, exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000 per count of rape is
further awarded (People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293 [1997]).
Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and
Mijaque are jointly and severally liable for the amounts awarded in
Criminal Case No. 18376; whereas all three accused-appellants are
solidarily liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18305.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by
the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with
the following modifications:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, considering that the aggravating circumstances of band,
nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission of the crime, accused-
appellants Patalin and Mijaque are hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum;
(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held
liable for the amounts awarded by the trial court in said criminal case,
particularly, the amount of P700.00 representing the total value of the
21
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

cash and articles taken from Corazon Aliman, and P8,000.00
representing the expenses incurred by Reynaldo Aliman for medication
and hospitalization;
(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to
reclusion perpetua; and
(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial
court to the Carcillar family representing the value of the cash and
articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case No. 18305 are hereby
awarded an additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of rape,
P50,000.00 for each count of rape as moral damages, and P10,000 for
each count of rape as exemplary damages, for which amounts all the
three accused-appellant are jointly and severally liable.
Information and to dismiss Criminal Case No. 18835 was filed by
the prosecution. As a result, two cases were jointly tried by the
lower court, namely, Criminal Case No. 18305 entitled "The
People of the Phils. v. Alfonso Patalin, Alias "Alpoc", Nestor Ras,
and Alex Mijaque, Alias "Aprik" for Robbery in band with rape,
and Criminal Case No. 18376 entitled "The People of the Phils, v.
Alfonso Patalin, Jr. Alias "Alpoc", and Alex Mijaque, Alias "Aprik"
for robbery with physical injuries (pp 74-76, 86, 88-93, 11
Record).

SO ORDERED

Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynarez-Santiago,
JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes

* On January 21, 1985, an Information for robbery with multiple rape

was filed against Alfonso Patalin and was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 18305. Said criminal case was consolidated with Criminal Case No.
18376 based on an Information for robbery with physical injuries
against the same accused and was heard by Branch 25, Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo City (pp. 1-2, 53-55, 11 Record).

On July 1, 1985, a motion for consolidation was filed by private

prosecutor Rodolfo Valera Cabado manifesting that another
information was filed against Nestor Ras for robbery in band
with multiple rape, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18835, which
was founded on the same facts presented in the first two
criminal cases. Eventually, the three cases were consolidated.
Later, Alex Mijaque was identified and apprehended as an
additional conspirator in the aforesaid Criminal Cases No. 18305
and 18835. Subsequently, a motion to admit Amended
22
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Republic of the Philippines than capital Goods

SUPREME COURT
Manila Domestic Purchases- Services P16,455,868.10 P1,645,586.81

SECOND DIVISION Total Input Tax P9,355,809.80

[G.R. NO. 190102 - July 11, 2012] Zero-rated Sales P316,113,513.34

ACCENTURE, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL Total Sales P335,640,544.74

REVENUE, Respondent.
Accenture filed its Monthly VAT Return for the month of September
DECISION 2002 on 24 October 2002; and that for October 2002, on 12 November
2002. These returns were amended on 9 January 2003. Accenture s
SERENO, J.: Quarterly VAT Return for the first quarter of 2003, which included the
period 1 September 2002 to 30 November 2002 (2nd period), was filed
This is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil on 17 December 2002; and the Amended Quarterly VAT Return, on 18
Procedure, praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Tax June 2004. The latter contains the following
Appeals En Banc (CTA En Banc ) dated 22 September 2009 and its information:6ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
subsequent Resolution dated 23 October 2009.1ςrνll
Purchases Amount Input VAT
Accenture, Inc. (Accenture) is a corporation engaged in the business of
providing management consulting, business strategies development, and Domestic Purchases- Capital
P80,765,294.10 P8,076,529.41
selling and/or licensing of software.2 It is duly registered with the Goods
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a Value Added Tax (VAT) taxpayer
or enterprise in accordance with Section 236 of the National Internal Domestic Purchases- Goods other
P132,820,541.70 P13,282,054.17
Revenue Code (Tax Code).3ςrνll than capital Goods
Domestic Purchases-Services P63,238,758.00 P6,323,875.80
On 9 August 2002, Accenture filed its Monthly VAT Return for the period
1 July 2002 to 31 August 2002 (1st period). Its Quarterly VAT Return for Total Input Tax P27,682,459.38
the fourth quarter of 2002, which covers the 1st period, was filed on 17
September 2002; and an Amended Quarterly VAT Return, on 21 June Zero-rated Sales P545,686,639.18
2004.4 The following are reflected in Accenture s VAT Return for the
fourth quarter of Total Sales P P572,880,982.68
2002:5ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The monthly and quarterly VAT returns of Accenture show that,
Purchases Amount Input VAT notwithstanding its application of the input VAT credits earned from its
zero-rated transactions against its output VAT liabilities, it still had
Domestic Purchases- Capital Goods P12,312,722.00 P1,231,272.20 excess or unutilized input VAT credits. These VAT credits are in the
Domestic Purchases- Goods other P64,789,507.90 P6,478,950.79 amounts of P9,355,809.80 for the 1st period and P27,682,459.38 for the
2nd period, or a total of P37,038,269.18.7ςrνll

23

Out of the P37,038,269.18, only P35,178,844.21 pertained to the
allocated input VAT on Accenture s "domestic purchases of taxable
goods which cannot be directly attributed to its zero-rated sale of
services."8 This allocated input VAT was broken down to P8,811,301.66
for the 1st period and P26,367,542.55 for the 2nd period.9ςrνll
The excess input VAT was not applied to any output VAT that Accenture
was liable for in the same quarter when the amount was earned or to
any of the succeeding quarters. Instead, it was carried forward to
petitioner s 2nd Quarterly VAT Return for 2003.10ςrνll
Thus, on 1 July 2004, Accenture filed with the Department of Finance
(DoF) an administrative claim for the refund or the issuance of a Tax
Credit Certificate (TCC). The DoF did not act on the claim of Accenture.
Hence, on 31 August 2004, the latter filed a Petition for Review with the
First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (Division), praying for the
issuance of a TCC in its favor in the amount of P35,178,844.21.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), in its Answer,11 argued
thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1. The sale by Accenture of goods and services to its clients are not zero-
rated transactions.
2. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant, and
Accenture has failed to prove that it is entitled to a refund, because its
claim has not been fully substantiated or documented.
chanrobles virtual law library
In a 13 November 2008 Decision,12 the Division denied the Petition of
Accenture for failing to prove that the latter s sale of services to the
alleged foreign clients qualified for zero percent VAT.13ςrνll
In resolving the sole issue of whether or not Accenture was entitled to a
refund or an issuance of a TCC in the amount of P35,178,844.21,14 the
Division ruled that Accenture had failed to present evidence to prove
that the foreign clients to which the former rendered services did
business outside the Philippines.15 Ruling that Accenture s services
would qualify for zero-rating under the 1997 National Internal Revenue
Code of the Philippines (Tax Code) only if the recipient of the services
Persons and Family Relations Cases
was doing business outside of the Philippines,16 the Division cited
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Burmeister and Wain Scandinavian
Contractor Mindanao, Inc. (Burmeister)17 as basis.
Accenture appealed the Division s Decision through a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR).18 In its MR, it argued that the reliance of the
Division on Burmeister was misplaced19 for the following
reasons:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1. The issue involved in Burmeister was the entitlement of the applicant
to a refund, given that the recipient of its service was doing business in
the Philippines; it was not an issue of failure of the applicant to present
evidence to prove the fact that the recipient of its services was a foreign
corporation doing business outside the Philippines.20ςrνll
2. Burmeister emphasized that, to qualify for zero-rating, the recipient of
the services should be doing business outside the Philippines, and
Accenture had successfully established that.21ςrνll
3. Having been promulgated on 22 January 2007 or after Accenture filed
its Petition with the Division, Burmeister cannot be made to apply to this
case.22ςrνll
chanrobles virtual law library
Accenture also cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American
Express (Amex)23 in support of its position. The MR was denied by the
Division in its 12 March 2009 Resolution.24ςrνll
Accenture appealed to the CTA En Banc. There it argued that prior to the
amendment introduced by Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9337, 25 there was no
requirement that the services must be rendered to a person engaged in
business conducted outside the Philippines to qualify for zero-rating.
The CTA En Banc agreed that because the case pertained to the third and
the fourth quarters of taxable year 2002, the applicable law was the
1997 Tax Code, and not R.A. 9337.26 Still, it ruled that even though the
provision used in Burmeister was Section 102(b)(2) of the earlier 1977
Tax Code, the pronouncement therein requiring recipients of services to
be engaged in business outside the Philippines to qualify for zero-rating
was applicable to the case at bar, because Section 108(B)(2) of the 1997
24

Tax Code was a mere reenactment of Section 102(b)(2) of the 1977 Tax
Code.
The CTA En Banc concluded that Accenture failed to discharge the
burden of proving the latter s allegation that its clients were foreign-
based.27ςrνll
Resolute, Accenture filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc, but
the latter affirmed the Division s Decision and Resolution.28 A
subsequent MR was also denied in a Resolution dated 23 October 2009.
Hence, the present Petition for Review29 under Rule 45.
In a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues, the parties and the Division
have agreed to submit the following issues for
resolution:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1. Whether or not Petitioner s sales of goods and services are zero-rated
for VAT purposes under Section 108(B)(2)(3) of the 1997 Tax Code.
2. Whether or not petitioner s claim for refund/tax credit in the amount
of P35,178,884.21 represents unutilized input VAT paid on its domestic
purchases of goods and services for the period commencing from 1 July
2002 until 30 November 2002.
3. Whether or not Petitioner has carried over to the succeeding taxable
quarter(s) or year(s) the alleged unutilized input VAT paid on its
domestic purchases of goods and services for the period commencing
from 1 July 2002 until 30 November 2002, and applied the same fully to
its output VAT liability for the said period.
4. Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to the refund of the amount of
P35,178,884.21, representing the unutilized input VAT on domestic
purchases of goods and services for the period commencing from 1 July
2002 until 30 November 2002, from its sales of services to various
foreign clients.
5. Whether or not Petitioner s claim for refund/tax credit in the amount
of P35,178,884.21, as alleged unutilized input VAT on domestic
purchases of goods and services for the period covering 1 July 2002 until
30 November 2002 are duly substantiated by proper documents.30ςrνll
Persons and Family Relations Cases
chanrobles virtual law library
For consideration in the present Petition are the following
issues:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1. Should the recipient of the services be "doing business outside the
Philippines" for the transaction to be zero-rated under Section
108(B)(2) of the 1997 Tax Code?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. Has Accenture successfully proven that its clients are entities doing
business outside the Philippines?
chanrobles virtual law library
Recipient of services must be doing business outside the Philippines for
the transactions to qualify as zero-rated.
Accenture anchors its refund claim on Section 112(A) of the 1997 Tax
Code, which allows the refund of unutilized input VAT earned from zero-
rated or effectively zero-rated sales. The provision reads:ςrαlαω
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. -
(A) Zero-Rated or Effectively Zero-Rated Sales. - Any VAT-registered
person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within
two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of
creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except
transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been
applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of zero-
rated sales under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108
(B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds
thereof had been duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further,
That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods of properties or
services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be
directly and entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be
allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales. Section
108(B) referred to in the foregoing provision was first seen when
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 199431 amended Title IV of P.D. 1158,32
25

which is also known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977.
Several Decisions have referred to this as the 1986 Tax Code, even
though it merely amended Title IV of the 1977 Tax Code.
Two years thereafter, or on 1 January 1988, Executive Order No. (E.O.)
27333 further amended provisions of Title IV. E.O. 273 by transferring
the old Title IV provisions to Title VI and filling in the former title with
new provisions that imposed a VAT.
The VAT system introduced in E.O. 273 was restructured through
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7716.34 This law, which was approved on 5 May
1994, widened the tax base. Section 3 thereof reads:ςrαlαω
SECTION 3. Section 102 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:ςrαlαω
"SEC. 102. Value-added tax on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
"(b) Transactions subject to zero-rate. The following services performed
in the Philippines by VAT-registered persons shall be subject to
0%:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
"(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons
doing business outside the Philippines which goods are subsequently
exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign currency
and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
"(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding sub-
paragraph, the consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign
currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)."
chanrobles virtual law library
Essentially, Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code as amended by P.D.
1994, E.O. 273, and R.A. 7716 provides that if the consideration for the
Persons and Family Relations Cases
services provided by a VAT-registered person is in a foreign currency,
then this transaction shall be subjected to zero percent rate.
The 1997 Tax Code reproduced Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code in
its Section 108(B), to wit:ςrαlαω
(B) Transactions Subject to Zero Percent (0%) Rate. - The following
services performed in the Philippines by VAT- registered persons shall
be subject to zero percent (0%)
rate.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons
doing business outside the Philippines which goods are subsequently
exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign currency
and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP);
(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the
consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency and
accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP); x x x.
chanrobles virtual law library
On 1 November 2005, Section 6 of R.A. 9337, which amended the
foregoing provision, became effective. It reads:
SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of
Properties. -
(B) Transactions Subject to Zero Percent (0%) Rate. - The following
services performed in the Philippines by VAT-registered persons shall
be subject to zero percent (0%)
rate:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
26

(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons
doing business outside the Philippines which goods are subsequently
exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign currency
and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP);
"(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraph
rendered to a person engaged in business conducted outside the
Philippines or to a nonresident person not engaged in business who is
outside the Philippines when the services are performed, the
consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency and
accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP); x x x." (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The meat of Accenture s argument is that nowhere does Section 108(B)
of the 1997 Tax Code state that services, to be zero-rated, should be
rendered to clients doing business outside the Philippines, the
requirement introduced by R.A. 9337.35 Required by Section 108(B),
prior to the amendment, is that the consideration for the services
rendered be in foreign currency and in accordance with the rules of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). Since Accenture has complied with all
the conditions imposed in Section 108(B), it is entitled to the refund
prayed for.
In support of its claim, Accenture cites Amex, in which this Court
supposedly ruled that Section 108(B) reveals a clear intent on the part of
the legislators not to impose the condition of being "consumed abroad"
in order for the services performed in the Philippines to be zero-
rated.36ςrνll
The Division ruled that this Court, in Amex and Burmeister, did not
declare that the requirement that the client must be doing business
outside the Philippines can be disregarded, because this requirement is
expressly provided in Article 108(2) of the Tax Code.37ςrνll
Accenture questions the Division s application to this case of the
pronouncements made in Burmeister. According to petitioner, the
provision applied to the present case was Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax
Code, and not Section 108(B) of the 1997 Tax Code, which was the law
Persons and Family Relations Cases
effective when the subject transactions were entered into and a refund
was applied for.
In refuting Accenture s theory, the CTA En Banc ruled that since Section
108(B) of the 1997 Tax Code was a mere reproduction of Section 102(b)
of the 1977 Tax Code, this Court s interpretation of the latter may be
used in interpreting the former, viz:ςrαlαω
In the Burmeister case, the Supreme Court harmonized both Sections
102(b)(1) and 102(b)(2) of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended, pertaining
to zero-rated transactions. A parallel approach should be accorded to the
renumbered provisions of Sections 108(B)(2) and 108(B)(1) of the 1997
NIRC. This means that Section 108(B)(2) must be read in conjunction
with Section 108(B)(1). Section 108(B)(2) requires as follows: a)
services other than processing, manufacturing or repacking rendered by
VAT registered persons in the Philippines; and b) the transaction paid
for in acceptable foreign currency duly accounted for in accordance with
BSP rules and regulations. The same provision made reference to Section
108(B)(1) further imposing the requisite c) that the recipient of services
must be performing business outside of Philippines. Otherwise, if both
the provider and recipient of service are doing business in the
Philippines, the sale transaction is subject to regular VAT as explained in
the Burmeister case x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the Supreme Court s pronouncements in the Burmeister case
requiring that the recipient of the services must be doing business
outside the Philippines as mandated by law govern the instant
case.38ςrνll
Assuming that the foregoing is true, Accenture still argues that the tax
appeals courts cannot be allowed to apply to Burmeister this Court s
interpretation of Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code, because the
Petition of Accenture had already been filed before the case was even
promulgated on 22 January 2007,39 to wit:ςrαlαω
x x x. While the Burmeister case forms part of the legal system and
assumes the same authority as the statute itself, however, the same
cannot be applied retroactively against the Petitioner because to do so
will be prejudicial to the latter.40ςrνll
27

The CTA en banc is of the opinion that Accenture cannot invoke the non-
retroactivity of the rulings of the Supreme Court, whose interpretation of
the law is part of that law as of the date of its enactment.41ςrνll
We rule that the recipient of the service must be doing business outside
the Philippines for the transaction to qualify for zero-rating under
Section 108(B) of the Tax Code.
This Court upholds the position of the CTA en banc that, because Section
108(B) of the 1997 Tax Code is a verbatim copy of Section 102(b) of the
1977 Tax Code, any interpretation of the latter holds true for the former.
Moreover, even though Accenture s Petition was filed before Burmeister
was promulgated, the pronouncements made in that case may be applied
to the present one without violating the rule against retroactive
application. When this Court decides a case, it does not pass a new law,
but merely interprets a preexisting one.42 When this Court interpreted
Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code in Burmeister, this interpretation
became part of the law from the moment it became effective. It is
elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part
of that law from the date it was originally passed, since this Court's
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the interpreted law carried into effect.43ςrνll
Accenture questions the CTA s application of Burmeister, because the
provision interpreted therein was Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code.
In support of its position that Section 108 of the 1997 Tax Code does not
require that the services be rendered to an entity doing business outside
the Philippines, Accenture invokes this Court s pronouncements in
Amex. However, a reading of that case will readily reveal that the
provision applied was Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code, and not
Section 108 of the 1997 Tax Code. As previously mentioned, an
interpretation of Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code is an
interpretation of Section 108 of the 1997 Tax Code, the latter being a
mere reproduction of the former.
This Court further finds that Accenture s reliance on Amex is misplaced.
We ruled in Amex that Section 102 of the 1977 Tax Code does not
require that the services be consumed abroad to be zero-rated.
However, nowhere in that case did this Court discuss the necessary
Persons and Family Relations Cases
qualification of the recipient of the service, as this matter was never put
in question. In fact, the recipient of the service in Amex is a nonresident
foreign client.
The aforementioned case explains how the credit card system works.
The issuance of a credit card allows the holder thereof to obtain, on
credit, goods and services from certain establishments. As proof that this
credit is extended by the establishment, a credit card draft is issued.
Thereafter, the company issuing the credit card will pay for the
purchases of the credit card holders by redeeming the drafts. The
obligation to collect from the card holders and to bear the loss in case
they do not pay rests on the issuer of the credit card.
The service provided by respondent in Amex consisted of gathering the
bills and credit card drafts from establishments located in the
Philippines and forwarding them to its parent company's regional
operating centers outside the country. It facilitated in the Philippines the
collection and payment of receivables belonging to its Hong Kong-based
foreign client.
The Court explained how the services rendered in Amex were
considered to have been performed and consumed in the Philippines, to
wit:ςrαlαω
Consumption is "the use of a thing in a way that thereby exhausts it."
Applied to services, the term means the performance or "successful
completion of a contractual duty, usually resulting in the performer s
release from any past or future liability x x x." The services rendered by
respondent are performed or successfully completed upon its sending to
its foreign client the drafts and bills it has gathered from service
establishments here. Its services, having been performed in the
Philippines, are therefore also consumed in the Philippines.44ςrνll
The effect of the place of consumption on the zero-rating of the
transaction was not the issue in Burmeister. Instead, this Court
addressed the squarely raised issue of whether the recipient of services
should be doing business outside the Philippines for the transaction to
qualify for zero-rating. We ruled that it should. Thus, another essential
condition for qualification for zero-rating under Section 102(b)(2) of the
1977 Tax Code is that the recipient of the business be doing that
business outside the Philippines. In clarifying that there is no conflict
28

between this pronouncement and that laid down in Amex, we ruled
thus:ςrαlαω
x x x. As the Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American
Express International, Inc. (Philippine Branch), the place of payment is
immaterial, much less is the place where the output of the service is
ultimately used. An essential condition for entitlement to 0% VAT under
Section 102 (b) (1) and (2) is that the recipient of the services is a
person doing business outside the Philippines. In this case, the recipient
of the services is the Consortium, which is doing business not outside,
but within the Philippines because it has a 15-year contract to operate
and maintain NAPOCOR s two 100-megawatt power barges in Mindanao.
(Emphasis in the original)45ςrνll
In Amex we ruled that the place of performance and/or consumption of
the service is immaterial. In Burmeister, the Court found that, although
the place of the consumption of the service does not affect the
entitlement of a transaction to zero-rating, the place where the recipient
conducts its business does.
Amex does not conflict with Burmeister. In fact, to fully understand how
Section 102(b)(2) of the 1977 Tax Code and consequently Section
108(B)(2) of the 1997 Tax Code was intended to operate, the two
aforementioned cases should be taken together. The zero-rating of the
services performed by respondent in Amex was affirmed by the Court,
because although the services rendered were both performed and
consumed in the Philippines, the recipient of the service was still an
entity doing business outside the Philippines as required in Burmeister.
That the recipient of the service should be doing business outside the
Philippines to qualify for zero-rating is the only logical interpretation of
Section 102(b)(2) of the 1977 Tax Code, as we explained in
Burmeister:ςrαlαω
This can only be the logical interpretation of Section 102 (b) (2). If the
provider and recipient of the "other services" are both doing business in
the Philippines, the payment of foreign currency is irrelevant. Otherwise,
those subject to the regular VAT under Section 102 (a) can avoid paying
the VAT by simply stipulating payment in foreign currency inwardly
remitted by the recipient of services. To interpret Section 102 (b) (2) to
apply to a payer-recipient of services doing business in the Philippines is
Persons and Family Relations Cases
to make the payment of the regular VAT under Section 102 (a)
dependent on the generosity of the taxpayer. The provider of services
can choose to pay the regular VAT or avoid it by stipulating payment in
foreign currency inwardly remitted by the payer-recipient. Such
interpretation removes Section 102 (a) as a tax measure in the Tax Code,
an interpretation this Court cannot sanction. A tax is a mandatory
exaction, not a voluntary contribution.
xxx xxx xxx
Further, when the provider and recipient of services are both doing
business in the Philippines, their transaction falls squarely under Section
102 (a) governing domestic sale or exchange of services. Indeed, this is a
purely local sale or exchange of services subject to the regular VAT,
unless of course the transaction falls under the other provisions of
Section 102 (b).
Thus, when Section 102 (b) (2) speaks of "services other than those
mentioned in the preceding subparagraph," the legislative intent is that
only the services are different between subparagraphs 1 and 2. The
requirements for zero-rating, including the essential condition that the
recipient of services is doing business outside the Philippines, remain
the same under both subparagraphs. (Emphasis in the original)46ςrνll
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that prior to the promulgation of
Burmeister, Congress had already clarified the intent behind Sections
102(b)(2) of the 1977 Tax Code and 108(B)(2) of the 1997 Tax Code
amending the earlier provision. R.A. 9337 added the following phrase:
"rendered to a person engaged in business conducted outside the
Philippines or to a nonresident person not engaged in business who is
outside the Philippines when the services are performed."
Accenture has failed to establish that the recipients of its services do
business outside the Philippines.
Accenture argues that based on the documentary evidence it
presented,47 it was able to establish the following
circumstances:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
29

1. The records of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) show
that Accenture s clients have not established any branch office in which
to do business in the Philippines.
2. For these services, Accenture bills another corporation, Accenture
Participations B.V. (APB), which is likewise a foreign corporation with no
"presence in the Philippines."
3. Only those not doing business in the Philippines can be required
under BSP rules to pay in acceptable currency for their purchase of
goods and services from the Philippines. Thus, in a domestic transaction,
where the provider and recipient of services are both doing business in
the Philippines, the BSP cannot require any party to make payment in
foreign currency.48ςrνll
chanrobles virtual law library
Accenture claims that these documentary pieces of evidence are
supported by the Report of Emmanuel Mendoza, the Court-
commissioned Independent Certified Public Accountant. He ascertained
that Accenture s gross billings pertaining to zero-rated sales were all
supported by zero-rated Official Receipts and Billing Statements. These
documents show that these zero-rated sales were paid in foreign
exchange currency and duly accounted for in the rules and regulations of
the BSP.49ςrνll
In the CTA s opinion, however, the documents presented by Accenture
merely substantiate the existence of the sales, receipt of foreign currency
payments, and inward remittance of the proceeds of these sales duly
accounted for in accordance with BSP rules. Petitioner presented no
evidence whatsoever that these clients were doing business outside the
Philippines.50ςrνll
Accenture insists, however, that it was able to establish that it had
rendered services to foreign corporations doing business outside the
Philippines, unlike in Burmeister, which allegedly involved a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines.51ςrνll
We deny Accenture s Petition for a tax refund.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
The evidence presented by Accenture may have established that its
clients are foreign. This fact does not automatically mean, however, that
these clients were doing business outside the Philippines. After all, the
Tax Code itself has provisions for a foreign corporation engaged in
business within the Philippines and vice versa, to wit:
SEC. 22. Definitions - When used in this
Title:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
xxx xxx xxx
(H) The term "resident foreign corporation" applies to a foreign
corporation engaged in trade or business within the Philippines.
(I) The term nonresident foreign corporation applies to a foreign
corporation not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines.
(Emphasis in the original)
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Consequently, to come within the purview of Section 108(B)(2), it is not
enough that the recipient of the service be proven to be a foreign
corporation; rather, it must be specifically proven to be a nonresident
foreign corporation.
There is no specific criterion as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging
in" or "transacting" business. We ruled thus in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. British Overseas Airways Corporation:52ςrνll
x x x. There is no specific criterion as to what constitutes "doing" or
"engaging in" or "transacting" business. Each case must be judged in the
light of its peculiar environmental circumstances. The term implies a
continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates,
to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some
of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of
commercial gain or for the purpose and object of the business
organization. "In order that a foreign corporation may be regarded as
doing business within a State, there must be continuity of conduct and
intention to establish a continuous business, such as the appointment of
a local agent, and not one of a temporary character."53ςrνll
30
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

A taxpayer claiming a tax credit or refund has the burden of proof to

establish the factual basis of that claim. Tax refunds, like tax exemptions,
are construed strictly against the taxpayer.54ςrνll

Accenture failed to discharge this burden. It alleged and presented

evidence to prove only that its clients were foreign entities. However, as
found by both the CTA Division and the CTA En Banc, no evidence was
presented by Accenture to prove the fact that the foreign clients to
whom petitioner rendered its services were clients doing business
outside the Philippines.

As ruled by the CTA En Banc, the Official Receipts, Intercompany

Payment Requests, Billing Statements, Memo Invoices-Receivable, Memo
Invoices-Payable, and Bank Statements presented by Accenture merely
substantiated the existence of sales, receipt of foreign currency
payments, and inward remittance of the proceeds of such sales duly
accounted for in accordance with BSP rules, all of these were devoid of
any evidence that the clients were doing business outside of the
Philippines.55ςrνll

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The 22 September 2009

Decision and the 23 October 2009 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals
En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 477, dismissing the Petition for the refund of the
excess or unutilized input VAT credits of Accenture, Inc., are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion or
the Court's Division.

31

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE
GUZMAN, RUBEN P. ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P.
DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R. LICUANAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS,
INC., and SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Trial judges should not immediately issue writs of execution or
garnishment against the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
and instrumentalities to enforce money judgments.1 They should bear in
mind that the primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims
of any sort due from the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
and instrumentalities pertains to the Commission on Audit (COA)
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines).
The Case
On appeal by the University of the Philippines and its then incumbent
officials (collectively, the UP) is the decision promulgated on September
16, 2005,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80, in Quezon City that directed the
garnishment of public funds amounting to ₱ 16,370,191.74 belonging to
the UP to satisfy the writ of execution issued to enforce the already final
and executory judgment against the UP.
Antecedents
Persons and Family Relations Cases
On August 30, 1990, the UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva,
entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern
Builders Corporation (Stern Builders), represented by its President and
General Manager Servillano dela Cruz, for the construction of the
extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences
Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños
(UPLB).3
In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders
submitted three progress billings corresponding to the work
accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The third billing
worth ₱ 273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the
Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the
UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz to
sue the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing
and to recover various damages. The suit, entitled Stern Builders
Corporation and Servillano R. Dela Cruz v. University of the Philippines
Systems, Jose V. Abueva, Raul P. de Guzman, Ruben P. Aspiras, Emmanuel P.
Bello, Wilfredo P. David, Casiano S. Abrigo, and Josefina R. Licuanan, was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-14971 of the Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City (RTC).4
After trial, on November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision in favor
of the plaintiffs,5 viz:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to
pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the following, to wit:
1. ₱ 503,462.74 amount of the third billing, additional
accomplished work and retention money
2. ₱ 5,716,729.00 in actual damages
3. ₱ 10,000,000.00 in moral damages
4. ₱ 150,000.00 and ₱ 1,500.00 per appearance as attorney’s
fees; and
5. Costs of suit.
32

SO ORDERED.
Following the RTC’s denial of its motion for reconsideration on May 7,
2002,6 the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002.7 Stern Builders
and dela Cruz opposed the notice of appeal on the ground of its filing
being belated, and moved for the execution of the decision. The UP
countered that the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary
period because the UP’s Office of Legal Affairs (OLS) in Diliman, Quezon
City received the order of denial only on May 31, 2002. On September
26, 2002, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having
been filed out of time and granted the private respondents’ motion for
execution.8
The RTC issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002,9 and the
sheriff of the RTC served the writ of execution and notice of demand
upon the UP, through its counsel, on October 9, 2002.10 The UP filed an
urgent motion to reconsider the order dated September 26, 2002, to
quash the writ of execution dated October 4, 2002, and to restrain the
proceedings.11 However, the RTC denied the urgent motion on April 1,
2003.12
On June 24, 2003, the UP assailed the denial of due course to its appeal
through a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 77395.13
On February 24, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari upon
finding that the UP’s notice of appeal had been filed late,14 stating:
Records clearly show that petitioners received a copy of the Decision
dated November 28, 2001 and January 7, 2002, thus, they had until
January 22, 2002 within which to file their appeal. On January 16, 2002
or after the lapse of nine (9) days, petitioners through their counsel Atty.
Nolasco filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision,
hence, pursuant to the rules, petitioners still had six (6) remaining days
to file their appeal. As admitted by the petitioners in their petition
(Rollo, p. 25), Atty. Nolasco received a copy of the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration on May 17, 2002, thus, petitioners still has
until May 23, 2002 (the remaining six (6) days) within which to file their
appeal. Obviously, petitioners were not able to file their Notice of Appeal
on May 23, 2002 as it was only filed on June 3, 2002.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
In view of the said circumstances, We are of the belief and so holds that
the Notice of Appeal filed by the petitioners was really filed out of time,
the same having been filed seventeen (17) days late of the reglementary
period. By reason of which, the decision dated November 28, 2001 had
already become final and executory. "Settled is the rule that the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted
by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect
that appeal renders the challenged judgment final and executory. This is
not an empty procedural rule but is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice." (Ram’s Studio and
Photographic Equipment, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 691, 696).
Indeed, Atty. Nolasco received the order of denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration on May 17, 2002 but filed a Notice of Appeal only on
June 3, 3003. As such, the decision of the lower court ipso facto became
final when no appeal was perfected after the lapse of the reglementary
period. This procedural caveat cannot be trifled with, not even by the
High Court.15
The UP sought a reconsideration, but the CA denied the UP’s motion for
reconsideration on April 19, 2004.16
On May 11, 2004, the UP appealed to the Court by petition for review on
certiorari (G.R. No. 163501).
On June 23, 2004, the Court denied the petition for review.17 The UP
moved for the reconsideration of the denial of its petition for review on
August 29, 2004,18 but the Court denied the motion on October 6,
2004.19 The denial became final and executory on November 12,
2004.20
In the meanwhile that the UP was exhausting the available remedies to
overturn the denial of due course to the appeal and the issuance of the
writ of execution, Stern Builders and dela Cruz filed in the RTC their
motions for execution despite their previous motion having already been
granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June
11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9,
2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on
October 4, 2002).21
On June 23, 2003 and July 25, 2003, respectively, the sheriff served
notices of garnishment on the UP’s depository banks, namely: Land Bank
33

of the Philippines (Buendia Branch) and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), Commonwealth Branch.22 The UP assailed the
garnishment through an urgent motion to quash the notices of
garnishment;23 and a motion to quash the writ of execution dated May
9, 2003.24
On their part, Stern Builders and dela Cruz filed their ex parte motion for
issuance of a release order.25
On October 14, 2003, the RTC denied the UP’s urgent motion to quash,
and granted Stern Builders and dela Cruz’s ex parte motion for issuance
of a release order.26
The UP moved for the reconsideration of the order of October 14, 2003,
but the RTC denied the motion on November 7, 2003.27
On January 12, 2004, Stern Builders and dela Cruz again sought the
release of the garnished funds.28 Despite the UP’s opposition,29 the RTC
granted the motion to release the garnished funds on March 16, 2004.30
On April 20, 2004, however, the RTC held in abeyance the enforcement
of the writs of execution issued on October 4, 2002 and June 3, 2003 and
all the ensuing notices of garnishment, citing Section 4, Rule 52, Rules of
Court, which provided that the pendency of a timely motion for
reconsideration stayed the execution of the judgment.31
On December 21, 2004, the RTC, through respondent Judge Agustin S.
Dizon, authorized the release of the garnished funds of the UP,32 to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no more legal
impediment for the release of the garnished amount in satisfaction of the
judgment award in the instant case, let the amount garnished be
immediately released by the Development Bank of the Philippines,
Commonwealth Branch, Quezon City in favor of the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
The UP was served on January 3, 2005 with the order of December 21,
2004 directing DBP to release the garnished funds.33
Persons and Family Relations Cases
On January 6, 2005, Stern Builders and dela Cruz moved to cite DBP in
direct contempt of court for its non-compliance with the order of
release.34
Thereupon, on January 10, 2005, the UP brought a petition for certiorari
in the CA to challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in issuing the order of
December 21, 2004 (CA-G.R. CV No. 88125).35 Aside from raising the
denial of due process, the UP averred that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling
that there was no longer any legal impediment to the release of the
garnished funds. The UP argued that government funds and properties
could not be seized by virtue of writs of execution or garnishment, as
held in Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations
Commission,36 and citing Section 84 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 to
the effect that "revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury
or depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other
specific statutory authority;" and that the order of garnishment clashed
with the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-
Telan37 to the effect that the funds belonging to the UP were public
funds.
On January 19, 2005, the CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
upon application by the UP.38
On March 22, 2005, Stern Builders and dela Cruz filed in the RTC their
amended motion for sheriff’s assistance to implement the release order
dated December 21, 2004, stating that the 60-day period of the TRO of
the CA had already lapsed.39 The UP opposed the amended motion and
countered that the implementation of the release order be suspended.40
On May 3, 2005, the RTC granted the amended motion for sheriff’s
assistance and directed the sheriff to proceed to the DBP to receive the
check in satisfaction of the judgment.41
The UP sought the reconsideration of the order of May 3, 2005.42
On May 16, 2005, DBP filed a motion to consign the check representing
the judgment award and to dismiss the motion to cite its officials in
contempt of court.43
34

On May 23, 2005, the UP presented a motion to withhold the release of
the payment of the judgment award.44
On July 8, 2005, the RTC resolved all the pending matters,45 noting that
the DBP had already delivered to the sheriff Manager’s Check No.
811941 for ₱ 16,370,191.74 representing the garnished funds payable to
the order of Stern Builders and dela Cruz as its compliance with the
RTC’s order dated December 21, 2004.46 However, the RTC directed in
the same order that Stern Builders and dela Cruz should not encash the
check or withdraw its amount pending the final resolution of the UP’s
petition for certiorari, to wit:47
To enable the money represented in the check in question (No.
00008119411) to earn interest during the pendency of the defendant
University of the Philippines application for a writ of injunction with the
Court of Appeals the same may now be deposited by the plaintiff at the
garnishee Bank (Development Bank of the Philippines), the disposition
of the amount represented therein being subject to the final outcome of
the case of the University of the Philippines et al., vs. Hon. Agustin S.
Dizon et al., (CA G.R. 88125) before the Court of Appeals.
Let it be stated herein that the plaintiff is not authorized to encash and
withdraw the amount represented in the check in question and enjoy the
same in the fashion of an owner during the pendency of the case
between the parties before the Court of Appeals which may or may not
be resolved in plaintiff’s favor.
With the end in view of seeing to it that the check in question is
deposited by the plaintiff at the Development Bank of the Philippines
(garnishee bank), Branch Sheriff Herlan Velasco is directed to
accompany and/or escort the plaintiff in making the deposit of the check
in question.
SO ORDERED.
On September 16, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision
dismissing the UP’s petition for certiorari, ruling that the UP had been
given ample opportunity to contest the motion to direct the DBP to
deposit the check in the name of Stern Builders and dela Cruz; and that
the garnished funds could be the proper subject of garnishment because
Persons and Family Relations Cases
they had been already earmarked for the project, with the UP holding
the funds only in a fiduciary capacity,48 viz:
Petitioners next argue that the UP funds may not be seized for execution
or garnishment to satisfy the judgment award. Citing Department of
Agriculture vs. NLRC, University of the Philippines Board of Regents vs.
Hon. Ligot-Telan, petitioners contend that UP deposits at Land Bank and
the Development Bank of the Philippines, being government funds, may
not be released absent an appropriations bill from Congress.
The argument is specious. UP entered into a contract with private
respondents for the expansion and renovation of the Arts and Sciences
Building of its campus in Los Baños, Laguna. Decidedly, there was
already an appropriations earmarked for the said project. The said funds
are retained by UP, in a fiduciary capacity, pending completion of the
construction project.
We agree with the trial Court [sic] observation on this score:
"4. Executive Order No. 109 (Directing all National Government
Agencies to Revert Certain Accounts Payable to the Cumulative
Result of Operations of the National Government and for Other
Purposes) Section 9. Reversion of Accounts Payable, provides
that, all 1995 and prior years documented accounts payable and
all undocumented accounts regardless of the year they were
incurred shall be reverted to the Cumulative Result of Operations
of the National Government (CROU). This shall apply to accounts
payable of all funds, except fiduciary funds, as long as the
purpose for which the funds were created have not been
accomplished and accounts payable under foreign assisted
projects for the duration of the said project. In this regard, the
Department of Budget and Management issued Joint-Circular No.
99-6 4.0 (4.3) Procedural Guidelines which provides that all
accounts payable that reverted to the CROU may be considered
for payment upon determination thru administrative process, of
the existence, validity and legality of the claim. Thus, the
allegation of the defendants that considering no appropriation
for the payment of any amount awarded to plaintiffs appellee the
funds of defendant-appellants may not be seized pursuant to a
writ of execution issued by the regular court is misplaced. Surely
when the defendants and the plaintiff entered into the General
35

Construction of Agreement there is an amount already allocated
by the latter for the said project which is no longer subject of
future appropriation."49
After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration on December 23,
2005, the petitioners appealed by petition for review.
Matters Arising During the Pendency of the Petition
On January 30, 2006, Judge Dizon of the RTC (Branch 80) denied Stern
Builders and dela Cruz’s motion to withdraw the deposit, in
consideration of the UP’s intention to appeal to the CA,50 stating:
Since it appears that the defendants are intending to file a petition for
review of the Court of Appeals resolution in CA-G.R. No. 88125 within
the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of resolution,
the Court agrees with the defendants stand that the granting of plaintiffs’
subject motion is premature.
Let it be stated that what the Court meant by its Order dated July 8, 2005
which states in part that the "disposition of the amount represented
therein being subject to the final outcome of the case of the University of
the Philippines, et. al., vs. Hon. Agustin S. Dizon et al., (CA G.R. No. 88125
before the Court of Appeals) is that the judgment or resolution of said
court has to be final and executory, for if the same will still be elevated to
the Supreme Court, it will not attain finality yet until the highest court
has rendered its own final judgment or resolution.51
However, on January 22, 2007, the UP filed an Urgent Application for A
Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary Injunction,52
averring that on January 3, 2007, Judge Maria Theresa dela Torre-Yadao
(who had meanwhile replaced Judge Dizon upon the latter’s
appointment to the CA) had issued another order allowing Stern
Builders and dela Cruz to withdraw the deposit,53 to wit:
It bears stressing that defendants’ liability for the payment of the
judgment obligation has become indubitable due to the final and
executory nature of the Decision dated November 28, 2001. Insofar as
the payment of the [sic] judgment obligation is concerned, the Court
believes that there is nothing more the defendant can do to escape
liability. It is observed that there is nothing more the defendant can do to
Persons and Family Relations Cases
escape liability. It is observed that defendant U.P. System had already
exhausted all its legal remedies to overturn, set aside or modify the
decision (dated November 28, 2001( rendered against it. The way the
Court sees it, defendant U.P. System’s petition before the Supreme Court
concerns only with the manner by which said judgment award should be
satisfied. It has nothing to do with the legality or propriety thereof,
although it prays for the deletion of [sic] reduction of the award of moral
damages.
It must be emphasized that this Court’s finding, i.e., that there was
sufficient appropriation earmarked for the project, was upheld by the
Court of Appeals in its decision dated September 16, 2005. Being a
finding of fact, the Supreme Court will, ordinarily, not disturb the same
was said Court is not a trier of fact. Such being the case, defendants’
arguments that there was no sufficient appropriation for the payment of
the judgment obligation must fail.
While it is true that the former Presiding Judge of this Court in its Order
dated January 30, 2006 had stated that:
Let it be stated that what the Court meant by its Order dated July 8, 2005
which states in part that the "disposition of the amount represented
therein being subject to the final outcome of the case of the University of
the Philippines, et. al., vs. Hon. Agustin S. Dizon et al., (CA G.R. No. 88125
before the Court of Appeals) is that the judgment or resolution of said
court has to be final and executory, for if the same will still be elevated to
the Supreme Court, it will not attain finality yet until the highest court
has rendered its own final judgment or resolution.
it should be noted that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme
Court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the release or
withdrawal of the garnished amount. In fact, in its present petition for
review before the Supreme Court, U.P. System has not prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the Court doubts
whether such writ is forthcoming.
The Court honestly believes that if defendants’ petition assailing the
Order of this Court dated December 31, 2004 granting the motion for the
release of the garnished amount was meritorious, the Court of Appeals
would have issued a writ of injunction enjoining the same. Instead, said
36

appellate court not only refused to issue a wit of preliminary injunction
prayed for by U.P. System but denied the petition, as well.54
The UP contended that Judge Yadao thereby effectively reversed the
January 30, 2006 order of Judge Dizon disallowing the withdrawal of the
garnished amount until after the decision in the case would have become
final and executory.
Although the Court issued a TRO on January 24, 2007 to enjoin Judge
Yadao and all persons acting pursuant to her authority from enforcing
her order of January 3, 2007,55 it appears that on January 16, 2007, or
prior to the issuance of the TRO, she had already directed the DBP to
forthwith release the garnished amount to Stern Builders and dela Cruz;
56 and that DBP had forthwith complied with the order on January 17,
2007 upon the sheriff’s service of the order of Judge Yadao.57
These intervening developments impelled the UP to file in this Court a
supplemental petition on January 26, 2007,58 alleging that the RTC
(Judge Yadao) gravely erred in ordering the immediate release of the
garnished amount despite the pendency of the petition for review in this
Court.
The UP filed a second supplemental petition59 after the RTC (Judge
Yadao) denied the UP’s motion for the redeposit of the withdrawn
amount on April 10, 2007,60 to wit:
This resolves defendant U.P. System’s Urgent Motion to Redeposit
Judgment Award praying that plaintiffs be directed to redeposit the
judgment award to DBP pursuant to the Temporary Restraining Order
issued by the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and
countered that the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Supreme
Court has become moot and academic considering that the act sought to
be restrained by it has already been performed. They also alleged that
the redeposit of the judgment award was no longer feasible as they have
already spent the same.
It bears stressing, if only to set the record straight, that this Court did not
– in its Order dated January 3, 2007 (the implementation of which was
restrained by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated January 24,
2002) – direct that that garnished amount "be deposited with the
garnishee bank (Development Bank of the Philippines)". In the first
Persons and Family Relations Cases
place, there was no need to order DBP to make such deposit, as the
garnished amount was already deposited in the account of plaintiffs with
the DBP as early as May 13, 2005. What the Court granted in its Order
dated January 3, 2007 was plaintiff’s motion to allow the release of said
deposit. It must be recalled that the Court found plaintiff’s motion
meritorious and, at that time, there was no restraining order or
preliminary injunction from either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court which could have enjoined the release of plaintiffs’ deposit. The
Court also took into account the following factors:
a) the Decision in this case had long been final and executory
after it was rendered on November 28, 2001;
b) the propriety of the dismissal of U.P. System’s appeal was
upheld by the Supreme Court;
c) a writ of execution had been issued;
d) defendant U.P. System’s deposit with DBP was garnished
pursuant to a lawful writ of execution issued by the Court; and
e) the garnished amount had already been turned over to the
plaintiffs and deposited in their account with DBP.
The garnished amount, as discussed in the Order dated January 16,
2007, was already owned by the plaintiffs, having been delivered to
them by the Deputy Sheriff of this Court pursuant to par. (c), Section 9,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the judgment
obligation has already been fully satisfied as per Report of the Deputy
Sheriff.
Anent the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court,
the same has become functus oficio, having been issued after the
garnished amount had been released to the plaintiffs. The judgment debt
was released to the plaintiffs on January 17, 2007, while the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court was received by this
Court on February 2, 2007. At the time of the issuance of the Restraining
Order, the act sought to be restrained had already been done, thereby
rendering the said Order ineffectual.
37

After a careful and thorough study of the arguments advanced by the
parties, the Court is of the considered opinion that there is no legal basis
to grant defendant U.P. System’s motion to redeposit the judgment
amount. Granting said motion is not only contrary to law, but it will also
render this Court’s final executory judgment nugatory. Litigation must
end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final
the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest. This doctrine
of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice. In fact, nothing is more settled in law
than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable
and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of
the land.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding defendant U.P. System’s
Urgent Motion to Redeposit Judgment Award devoid of merit, the same
is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The UP now submits that:
I RESOLUTION DATED 24 JANUARY 2007.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DISMISSING
THE PETITION, ALLOWING IN EFFECT THE GARNISHMENT OF UP
FUNDS, WHEN IT RULED THAT FUNDS HAVE ALREADY BEEN
EARMARKED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION PROJECT; AND THUS, THERE IS
NO NEED FOR FURTHER APPROPRIATIONS.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN ALLOWING
GARNISHMENT OF A STATE UNIVERSITY’S FUNDS IN VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 5(5) OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
III
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE UNIVERSITY INVOKES EQUITY AND THE
REVIEW POWERS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT TO MODIFY, IF NOT
TOTALLY DELETE THE AWARD OF ₱ 10 MILLION AS MORAL DAMAGES
TO RESPONDENTS.
IV
THE RTC-BRANCH 80 COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN ORDERING THE
IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE JUDGMENT AWARD IN ITS ORDER
DATED 3 JANUARY 2007 ON THE GROUND OF EQUITY AND JUDICIAL
COURTESY.
V
THE RTC-BRANCH 80 COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN ORDERING THE
IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE JUDGMENT AWARD IN ITS ORDER
DATED 16 JANUARY 2007 ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER
UNIVERSITY STILL HAS A PENDING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF THE ORDER DATED 3 JANUARY 2007.
VI
THE RTC-BRANCH 80 COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN NOT ORDERING
THE REDEPOSIT OF THE GARNISHED AMOUNT TO THE DBP IN
VIOLATION OF THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
The UP argues that the amount earmarked for the construction project
had been purposely set aside only for the aborted project and did not
include incidental matters like the awards of actual damages, moral
damages and attorney’s fees. In support of its argument, the UP cited
Article 12.2 of the General Construction Agreement, which stipulated
that no deductions would be allowed for the payment of claims,
damages, losses and expenses, including attorney’s fees, in case of any
litigation arising out of the performance of the work. The UP insists that
the CA decision was inconsistent with the rulings in Commissioner of
Public Highways v. San Diego61 and Department of Agriculture v.
NLRC62 to the effect that government funds and properties could not be
38

seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgment
awards.
Furthermore, the UP contends that the CA contravened Section 5, Article
XIV of the Constitution by allowing the garnishment of UP funds, because
the garnishment resulted in a substantial reduction of the UP’s limited
budget allocated for the remuneration, job satisfaction and fulfillment of
the best available teachers; that Judge Yadao should have exhibited
judicial courtesy towards the Court due to the pendency of the UP’s
petition for review; and that she should have also desisted from
declaring that the TRO issued by this Court had become functus officio.
Lastly, the UP states that the awards of actual damages of ₱ 5,716,729.00
and moral damages of ₱ 10 million should be reduced, if not entirely
deleted, due to its being unconscionable, inequitable and detrimental to
public service.
In contrast, Stern Builders and dela Cruz aver that the petition for
review was fatally defective for its failure to mention the other cases
upon the same issues pending between the parties (i.e., CA-G.R. No.
77395 and G.R No. 163501); that the UP was evidently resorting to
forum shopping, and to delaying the satisfaction of the final judgment by
the filing of its petition for review; that the ruling in Commissioner of
Public Works v. San Diego had no application because there was an
appropriation for the project; that the UP retained the funds allotted for
the project only in a fiduciary capacity; that the contract price had been
meanwhile adjusted to ₱ 22,338,553.25, an amount already more than
sufficient to cover the judgment award; that the UP’s prayer to reduce or
delete the award of damages had no factual basis, because they had been
gravely wronged, had been deprived of their source of income, and had
suffered untold miseries, discomfort, humiliation and sleepless years;
that dela Cruz had even been constrained to sell his house, his
equipment and the implements of his trade, and together with his family
had been forced to live miserably because of the wrongful actuations of
the UP; and that the RTC correctly declared the Court’s TRO to be
already functus officio by reason of the withdrawal of the garnished
amount from the DBP.
The decisive issues to be considered and passed upon are, therefore:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
(a) whether the funds of the UP were the proper subject of garnishment
in order to satisfy the judgment award; and (b) whether the UP’s prayer
for the deletion of the awards of actual damages of ₱ 5,716,729.00, moral
damages of ₱ 10,000,000.00 and attorney’s fees of ₱ 150,000.00 plus ₱
1,500.00 per appearance could be granted despite the finality of the
judgment of the RTC.
Ruling
The petition for review is meritorious.
I.
UP’s funds, being government funds,
are not subject to garnishment
The UP was founded on June 18, 1908 through Act 1870 to provide
advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and
to give professional and technical training to deserving students.63
Despite its establishment as a body corporate,64 the UP remains to be a
"chartered institution"65 performing a legitimate government function.
It is an institution of higher learning, not a corporation established for
profit and declaring any dividends.66 In enacting Republic Act No. 9500
(The University of the Philippines Charter of 2008), Congress has
declared the UP as the national university67 "dedicated to the search for
truth and knowledge as well as the development of future leaders."68
Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality,69 performing the
State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible
education.70 As a government instrumentality, the UP administers
special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act
No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714,71 and from the
yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of
Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500.72 All the funds going
into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the
deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special
trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with
the UP’s mission and purpose,73 and should always be subject to
auditing by the COA.74
Presidential Decree No. 1445 defines a "trust fund" as a fund that
officially comes in the possession of an agency of the government or of a
39

public officer as trustee, agent or administrator, or that is received for
the fulfillment of some obligation.75 A trust fund may be utilized only for
the "specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds
received."76
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character.
They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to
the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional
objectives.77 Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly
made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The
adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had
impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution
against the UP,78 because suability of the State did not necessarily mean
its liability.79
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its
liability. As the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando,
La Union v. Firme:80
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability.
"Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is
suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it
can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is
not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued.
When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
Also, in Republic v. Villasor,81 where the issuance of an alias writ of
execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment was nullified, the
Court said:
xxx The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued
by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s
action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is
based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
Persons and Family Relations Cases
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law.
The UP correctly submits here that the garnishment of its funds to
satisfy the judgment awards of actual and moral damages (including
attorney’s fees) was not validly made if there was no special
appropriation by Congress to cover the liability. It was, therefore, legally
unwarranted for the CA to agree with the RTC’s holding in the order
issued on April 1, 2003 that no appropriation by Congress to allocate
and set aside the payment of the judgment awards was necessary
because "there (were) already an appropriations (sic) earmarked for the
said project."82 The CA and the RTC thereby unjustifiably ignored the
legal restriction imposed on the trust funds of the Government and its
agencies and instrumentalities to be used exclusively to fulfill the
purposes for which the trusts were created or for which the funds were
received except upon express authorization by Congress or by the head
of a government agency in control of the funds, and subject to pertinent
budgetary laws, rules and regulations.83
Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment
that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual damages (including
attorney’s fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary
liabilities were not covered by the "appropriations earmarked for the
said project." The Constitution strictly mandated that "(n)o money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law."84
II
COA must adjudicate private respondents’ claim
before execution should proceed
The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the
primary jurisdiction of the COA. This was expressly provided in Section
26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, to wit:
Section 26. General jurisdiction. - The authority and powers of the
Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to
auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general
accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining
40

thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the
books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and
settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property
received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the
examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due
from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned
or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-
governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as
herein prescribed, including non governmental entities subsidized by
the government, those funded by donations through the government,
those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which
the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by
the government.
It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already
validated the claim against the UP. The settlement of the monetary claim
was still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite the final
decision of the RTC having already validated the claim.85 As such, Stern
Builders and dela Cruz as the claimants had no alternative except to first
seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim.
On its part, the RTC should have exercised utmost caution, prudence and
judiciousness in dealing with the motions for execution against the UP
and the garnishment of the UP’s funds. The RTC had no authority to
direct the immediate withdrawal of any portion of the garnished funds
from the depository banks of the UP. By eschewing utmost caution,
prudence and judiciousness in dealing with the execution and
garnishment, and by authorizing the withdrawal of the garnished funds
of the UP, the RTC acted beyond its jurisdiction, and all its orders and
issuances thereon were void and of no legal effect, specifically: (a) the
order Judge Yadao issued on January 3, 2007 allowing Stern Builders
and dela Cruz to withdraw the deposited garnished amount; (b) the
order Judge Yadao issued on January 16, 2007 directing DBP to
forthwith release the garnish amount to Stern Builders and dela Cruz; (c)
the sheriff’s report of January 17, 2007 manifesting the full satisfaction
of the writ of execution; and (d) the order of April 10, 2007 deying the
UP’s motion for the redeposit of the withdrawn amount. Hence, such
orders and issuances should be struck down without exception.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Nothing extenuated Judge Yadao’s successive violations of Presidential
Decree No. 1445. She was aware of Presidential Decree No. 1445,
considering that the Court circulated to all judges its Administrative
Circular No. 10-2000,86 issued on October 25, 2000, enjoining them "to
observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of
writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government
agencies and local government units" precisely in order to prevent the
circumvention of Presidential Decree No. 1445, as well as of the rules
and procedures of the COA, to wit:
In order to prevent possible circumvention of the rules and
procedures of the Commission on Audit, judges are hereby enjoined
to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the
issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against
government agencies and local government units.
Judges should bear in mind that in Commissioner of Public Highways v.
San Diego (31 SCRA 617, 625 1970), this Court explicitly stated:
"The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s
action ‘only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution’ and that the power of the Court ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is
based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law.
Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of
State liability, the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof
must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures
laid down in P.D. No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines (Department of Agriculture v.
NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, 701-02 1993 citing Republic vs. Villasor, 54
SCRA 84 1973). All money claims against the Government must first
be filed with the Commission on Audit which must act upon it
within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant
41

to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in
effect, sue the State thereby (P.D. 1445, Sections 49-50).
However, notwithstanding the rule that government properties are not
subject to levy and execution unless otherwise provided for by statute
(Republic v. Palacio, 23 SCRA 899 1968; Commissioner of Public
Highways v. San Diego, supra) or municipal ordinance (Municipality of
Makati v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 206 1990), the Court has, in
various instances, distinguished between government funds and
properties for public use and those not held for public use. Thus, in
Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo (49 Phil 52 1926, the
Court ruled that "where property of a municipal or other public
corporation is sought to be subjected to execution to satisfy judgments
recovered against such corporation, the question as to whether such
property is leviable or not is to be determined by the usage and
purposes for which it is held." The following can be culled from Viuda de
Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo:
1. Properties held for public uses – and generally everything held
for governmental purposes – are not subject to levy and sale under
execution against such corporation. The same rule applies to funds
in the hands of a public officer and taxes due to a municipal
corporation.
2. Where a municipal corporation owns in its proprietary capacity, as
distinguished from its public or government capacity, property not used
or used for a public purpose but for quasi-private purposes, it is the
general rule that such property may be seized and sold under execution
against the corporation.
3. Property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely
because it is temporarily used for private purposes. If the public use is
wholly abandoned, such property becomes subject to execution.
This Administrative Circular shall take effect immediately and the Court
Administrator shall see to it that it is faithfully implemented.
Although Judge Yadao pointed out that neither the CA nor the Court had
issued as of then any writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the release
or withdrawal of the garnished amount, she did not need any writ of
injunction from a superior court to compel her obedience to the law. The
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Court is disturbed that an experienced judge like her should look at
public laws like Presidential Decree No. 1445 dismissively instead of
loyally following and unquestioningly implementing them. That she did
so turned her court into an oppressive bastion of mindless tyranny
instead of having it as a true haven for the seekers of justice like the UP.
III
Period of appeal did not start without effective
service of decision upon counsel of record;
Fresh-period rule announced in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals
can be given retroactive application
The UP next pleads that the Court gives due course to its petition for
review in the name of equity in order to reverse or modify the adverse
judgment against it despite its finality. At stake in the UP’s plea for
equity was the return of the amount of ₱ 16,370,191.74 illegally
garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the
judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UP’s appeal, which the RTC
declared on September 26, 2002. The CA upheld the declaration of
finality on February 24, 2004, and the Court itself denied the UP’s
petition for review on that issue on May 11, 2004 (G.R. No. 163501). The
denial became final on November 12, 2004.
It is true that a decision that has attained finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and cannot be modified in any respect,87 even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,
and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by
this Court as the highest court of the land.88 Public policy dictates that
once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the
prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of victory by some
subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the
enforcement of such judgment sets at naught the role and purpose of the
courts to resolve justiciable controversies with finality.89 Indeed, all
litigations must at some time end, even at the risk of occasional errors.
But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been
absolute, and has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the
correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that
cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its
42

execution unjust and inequitable.90 Moreover, in Heirs of Maura So v.
Obliosca,91 we stated that despite the absence of the preceding
circumstances, the Court is not precluded from brushing aside
procedural norms if only to serve the higher interests of justice and
equity. Also, in Gumaru v. Quirino State College,92 the Court nullified the
proceedings and the writ of execution issued by the RTC for the reason
that respondent state college had not been represented in the litigation
by the Office of the Solicitor General.
We rule that the UP’s plea for equity warrants the Court’s exercise of the
exceptional power to disregard the declaration of finality of the
judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of the UP’s right to due
process.
Both the CA and the RTC found the filing on June 3, 2002 by the UP of the
notice of appeal to be tardy. They based their finding on the fact that
only six days remained of the UP’s reglementary 15-day period within
which to file the notice of appeal because the UP had filed a motion for
reconsideration on January 16, 2002 vis-à-vis the RTC’s decision the UP
received on January 7, 2002; and that because the denial of the motion
for reconsideration had been served upon Atty. Felimon D. Nolasco of
the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002, the UP had only until May 23,
2002 within which to file the notice of appeal.
The UP counters that the service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco was defective considering that its
counsel of record was not Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office but the
OLS in Diliman, Quezon City; and that the period of appeal should be
reckoned from May 31, 2002, the date when the OLS received the order.
The UP submits that the filing of the notice of appeal on June 3, 2002 was
well within the reglementary period to appeal.
We agree with the submission of the UP.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon
Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual
because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. The rule
is that it is on the counsel and not the client that the service should be
made.93
Persons and Family Relations Cases
That counsel was the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City, which was served
with the denial only on May 31, 2002. As such, the running of the
remaining period of six days resumed only on June 1, 2002,94 rendering
the filing of the UP’s notice of appeal on June 3, 2002 timely and well
within the remaining days of the UP’s period to appeal.
Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could
only be validly made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. The fact that
Atty. Nolasco was in the employ of the UP at the UPLB Legal Office did
not render the service upon him effective. It is settled that where a party
has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such counsel.95
Service on the party or the party’s employee is not effective because
such notice is not notice in law.96 This is clear enough from Section 2,
second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that:
"If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made
upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is
ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he
shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the
opposite side." As such, the period to appeal resumed only on June 1,
2002, the date following the service on May 31, 2002 upon the OLS in
Diliman of the copy of the decision of the RTC, not from the date when
the UP was notified.97
Accordingly, the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC, being
devoid of factual and legal bases, is set aside.
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid
and effective, such that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely
appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find
that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due
to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002.
In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA
and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for
filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC
might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then
prevailing.
43

However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UP’s favor of
the fresh-period rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of
2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,98 viz:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law
that aims "to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution,"99 is impervious to any serious challenge. This is because
there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.100 A law or regulation
is procedural when it prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order
that courts may be able to administer justice.101 It does not come within
the legal conception of a retroactive law, or is not subject of the general
rule prohibiting the retroactive operation of statues, but is given
retroactive effect in actions pending and undetermined at the time of its
passage without violating any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected.
We have further said that a procedural rule that is amended for the
benefit of litigants in furtherance of the administration of justice shall be
retroactively applied to likewise favor actions then pending, as equity
delights in equality.102 We may even relax stringent procedural rules in
order to serve substantial justice and in the exercise of this Court’s
equity jurisdiction.103 Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in
cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or
legal jurisdiction.104
It is cogent to add in this regard that to deny the benefit of the fresh-
period rule to the UP would amount to injustice and absurdity –
injustice, because the judgment in question was issued on November 28,
2001 as compared to the judgment in Neypes that was rendered in 1998;
absurdity, because parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders
issued in the year 1998 would enjoy the benefit of the fresh-period rule
but the later rulings of the lower courts like that herein would not.105
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when
Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UP’s filing on June 3, 2002 of the
notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period
rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002,
which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or
June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with
Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of
the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the
next working day."
IV
Awards of monetary damages,
being devoid of factual and legal bases,
did not attain finality and should be deleted
Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution prescribes that express
findings of fact and of law should be made in the decision rendered by
any court, to wit:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor.
Implementing the constitutional provision in civil actions is Section 1 of
Rule 36, Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A judgment or final
order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally
and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk
of the court. (1a)
The Constitution and the Rules of Court apparently delineate two main
essential parts of a judgment, namely: the body and the decretal portion.
Although the latter is the controlling part,106 the importance of the
44

former is not to be lightly regarded because it is there where the court
clearly and distinctly states its findings of fact and of law on which the
decision is based. To state it differently, one without the other is
ineffectual and useless. The omission of either inevitably results in a
judgment that violates the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and
the Rules of Court.
The term findings of fact that must be found in the body of the decision
refers to statements of fact, not to conclusions of law.107 Unlike in
pleadings where ultimate facts alone need to be stated, the Constitution
and the Rules of Court require not only that a decision should state the
ultimate facts but also that it should specify the supporting evidentiary
facts, for they are what are called the findings of fact.
The importance of the findings of fact and of law cannot be overstated.
The reason and purpose of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in
that regard are obviously to inform the parties why they win or lose, and
what their rights and obligations are. Only thereby is the demand of due
process met as to the parties. As Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained in
Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals:108
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be
informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot
simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just
leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher
court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how
it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal.
Here, the decision of the RTC justified the grant of actual and moral
damages, and attorney’s fees in the following terse manner, viz:
xxx The Court is not unmindful that due to defendants’ unjustified
refusal to pay their outstanding obligation to plaintiff, the same suffered
losses and incurred expenses as he was forced to re-mortgage his house
and lot located in Quezon City to Metrobank (Exh. "CC") and BPI Bank
Persons and Family Relations Cases
just to pay its monetary obligations in the form of interest and penalties
incurred in the course of the construction of the subject project.109
The statement that "due to defendants’ unjustified refusal to pay their
outstanding obligation to plaintiff, the same suffered losses and incurred
expenses as he was forced to re-mortgage his house and lot located in
Quezon City to Metrobank (Exh. "CC") and BPI Bank just to pay its
monetary obligations in the form of interest and penalties incurred in
the course of the construction of the subject project" was only a
conclusion of fact and law that did not comply with the constitutional
and statutory prescription. The statement specified no detailed expenses
or losses constituting the ₱ 5,716,729.00 actual damages sustained by
Stern Builders in relation to the construction project or to other
pecuniary hardships. The omission of such expenses or losses directly
indicated that Stern Builders did not prove them at all, which then
contravened Article 2199, Civil Code, the statutory basis for the award of
actual damages, which entitled a person to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. As
such, the actual damages allowed by the RTC, being bereft of factual
support, were speculative and whimsical. Without the clear and distinct
findings of fact and law, the award amounted only to an ipse dixit on the
part of the RTC,110 and did not attain finality.
There was also no clear and distinct statement of the factual and legal
support for the award of moral damages in the substantial amount of ₱
10,000,000.00. The award was thus also speculative and whimsical. Like
the actual damages, the moral damages constituted another judicial ipse
dixit, the inevitable consequence of which was to render the award of
moral damages incapable of attaining finality. In addition, the grant of
moral damages in that manner contravened the law that permitted the
recovery of moral damages as the means to assuage "physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury."111 The
contravention of the law was manifest considering that Stern Builders,
as an artificial person, was incapable of experiencing pain and moral
sufferings.112 Assuming that in granting the substantial amount of ₱
10,000,000.00 as moral damages, the RTC might have had in mind that
dela Cruz had himself suffered mental anguish and anxiety. If that was
the case, then the RTC obviously disregarded his separate and distinct
personality from that of Stern Builders.113 Moreover, his moral and
emotional sufferings as the President of Stern Builders were not the
45
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

sufferings of Stern Builders. Lastly, the RTC violated the basic principle
that moral damages were not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the
expense of the defendant, but to restore the plaintiff to his status quo
ante as much as possible. Taken together, therefore, all these
considerations exposed the substantial amount of ₱ 10,000,000.00
allowed as moral damages not only to be factually baseless and legally
indefensible, but also to be unconscionable, inequitable and
unreasonable.
Like the actual and moral damages, the ₱ 150,000.00, plus ₱ 1,500.00 per
appearance, granted as attorney’s fees were factually unwarranted and
devoid of legal basis. The general rule is that a successful litigant cannot
recover attorney’s fees as part of the damages to be assessed against the
losing party because of the policy that no premium should be placed on
the right to litigate.114 Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code,
indeed, such fees could be recovered only when there was a stipulation
to that effect. It was only under the present Civil Code that the right to
collect attorney’s fees in the cases mentioned in Article 2208115 of the
Civil Code came to be recognized.116 Nonetheless, with attorney’s fees
being allowed in the concept of actual damages,117 their amounts must
be factually and legally justified in the body of the decision and not
stated for the first time in the decretal portion.118 Stating the amounts
only in the dispositive portion of the judgment is not enough;119 a
rendition of the factual and legal justifications for them must also be laid
out in the body of the decision.120
the supporting facts and law "is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction" and that "(d)ecisions or orders issued in
careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and
must be struck down as void."124 The other item granted by the RTC
(i.e., ₱ 503,462.74) shall stand, subject to the action of the COA as stated
herein.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals under
review; ANNULS the orders for the garnishment of the funds of the
University of the Philippines and for the release of the garnished amount
to Stern Builders Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz; and DELETES
from the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated November 28, 2001
for being void only the awards of actual damages of ₱ 5,716,729.00,
moral damages of ₱ 10,000,000.00, and attorney's fees of ₱ 150,000.00,
plus ₱ 1,500.00 per appearance, in favor of Stern Builders Corporation
and Servillano dela Cruz.
The Court ORDERS Stem Builders Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz
to redeposit the amount of ₱ 16,370,191.74 within 10 days from receipt
of this decision.
Costs of suit to be paid by the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

That the attorney’s fees granted to the private respondents did not LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
satisfy the foregoing requirement suffices for the Court to undo Associate Justice
them.121 The grant was ineffectual for being contrary to law and public
policy, it being clear that the express findings of fact and law were WE CONCUR:
intended to bring the case within the exception and thereby justify the
award of the attorney’s fees. Devoid of such express findings, the award
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
was a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to Associate Justice
speculation and conjecture.122 Acting Chairperson, First Division
Nonetheless, the absence of findings of fact and of any statement of the
law and jurisprudence on which the awards of actual and moral MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
damages, as well as of attorney’s fees, were based was a fatal flaw that Associate Justice Associate Justice
invalidated the decision of the RTC only as to such awards. As the Court
declared in Velarde v. Social Justice Society,123 the failure to comply ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
with the constitutional requirement for a clear and distinct statement of Associate Justice

46
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

47
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Republic of the Philippines would be sold to and purchased exclusively by NPC.San Roque
SUPREME COURT commenced commercial operations in May 2003.
Manila
San Roque alleged that in 2006, it incurred creditable input taxes from
FIRST DIVISION its purchase of capital goods, importation of goods other than capital
goods, and payment for the services of non-residents. San Roque
G.R. No. 205543 June 30, 2014 subsequently filed with the BIR separate claims for refund or tax credit
of its creditable input taxes for all four quarters of 2006. San Roque
SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, averred that it did not have any output taxes to which it could have
vs. applied said creditable input taxes because: (a) the sale by San Roque of
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. electricity, generated through hydropower, a renewable source of
energy, is subject to 0% VAT under Section 108(B)(7) of the National
DECISION Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended; and (b) NPC is
exempted from all taxes, direct and indirect, under Republic Act No.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: 6395, otherwise known as the NPC Charter, so the sale by San Roque of
electricity exclusively to NPC, under the PPA dated October 11, 1997, is
effectively zero-rated under Section 108(B)(3) of the NIRC of 1997, as
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 16,
amended.4 When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) failed to
Section 1 of A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, otherwise known as the Revised
take action on its administrative claims, San Roque filed two separate
Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Petitions for Review before the CTA, particularly, C.T.A. Case No. 7744
Court, filed by San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque), seeking the
(covering the first, third, and fourth quarters of 2006) and C.T.A. Case
reversal of the Decision1 dated June 4, 2012 and Resolution2 dated
No. 7802 (covering the second quarter of 2006). The two cases were
January 21, 2013 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) en bane in C.T.A. EB
consolidated before the CTA First Division.
No. 789. The CTA en bane, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the
Decision3 dated January 10, 2011 of the CTA First Division in C.T.A. Case
Nos. 7744 & 7802, which dismissed the judicial claims of San Roque for The details concerning the administrative and judicial claims of San
the refund or tax credit of its excess/unutilized creditable input taxes for Roque for refund or tax credit of its creditable input taxes for the four
the four quarters of 2006; and in its assailed Resolution, denied the quarters of 2006 are summarized in table form below:
Motion for Reconsideration of San Roque.
Tax VAT Return Administrative Judicial Claim
San Roque is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the power- Period Claim
generation business. It is registered with the Board of Investments on a 2006
preferred pioneer status for the construction and operation of
First Filed: April 21, Filed: April 11, 2007 Filed: March 28,
hydroelectric power-generating plants, as well as with the Bureau of
Quarte 2006 Amount: 2008
Internal Revenue (BIR) as a Value-Added Tax (VAT) taxpayer.
r Amended: ₱2,857,174.95 CTA Case No. 7744
November 7, Amount:
On October 11, 1997, San Roque entered intoa Power Purchase
2006 Amended: March 10, ₱12,114,877.34
Agreement (PPA) with the National Power Corporation (NPC) to develop
2008 (for 1st, 3rd, and
the San Roque hydroelectric facilities located at Lower Agno River in San
Amount: 4th
Miguel, Pangasinan (Project) on a build-operate-transfer basis. During
₱3,128,290.74 Quarters
the co-operation period of 25 years, commencing from the completion
of 2006)
date of the power station, all the electricity generated by the Project
48
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Second Filed: July 15, Filed: July 10, 2007 Filed: June 27, second quarter claim, and December 30, 2007 toJanuary 28, 2008 for its
Quarte 2006 Amount: 2008 third and fourth quarters claims pursuant to Section 112(D) of the NIRC
r Amended: ₱15,044,030.82 CTA Case No. 7802 in relation to Section 11 of [Republic Act No.] 1125, as amended by
November 8, Amount: Section 9 of [Republic Act No.] 9282. Unfortunately, the Petitions for
2006 Amended: March 10, ₱15,548,630.55 Review on March 28, 2008 for the first, third and fourth quarters claims
Amended: 2008 and on June 27, 2008 for the second quarter claim, were filed beyond the
February 5, Amount: 30-day period set by law and therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction to
2007 ₱15,548,630.55 entertain the subject matter of the case considering that the 30-day
appeal period provided under Section 11 of [RepublicAct No.] 1125 is a
Third Filed: October 19, Filed: August 31, Filed: March 28, jurisdictional requirement as held in the case of Ker & Co., Ltd. vs. Court
Quarte 2006 2007 2008 of Tax Appeals,
r Amended: Amount: CTA Case No. 7744
February 5, ₱4,122,741.54 Amount: x x x:
2007 ₱12,114,877.34 xxxx
Amended: (for 1st, 3rd, and
September 21, 4th Likewise, if we reckoned the one hundred twenty[-]day period from the
2007 Quarters date of the amended applications for refund on March 10, 2008 for the
Amount: of 2006) first and second quarters claims and September 21, 2007 for the third
₱3,675,574.21 and fourth quarters claims, both Petitions for Reviewwould still be
Fourth Filed: January 22, Filed: August 31, Filed: March 28, denied.
Quarte 2007 2007 2008
r Amended: May 12, Amount: CTA Case No. 7744 With respect to the amended application for refund of input tax for the
2007 ₱6,223,682.61 Amount: first and second quarters of 2006 on March 10, 2008, the Commissioner
₱12,114,877.34 of Internal Revenue has one hundred twenty days or until July 8, 2008
Amended: (for 1st, 3rd, and within which to make a decision. After the lapse of the said 120-day
September 21, 4th period, [San Roque] had thirty days or until August 7, 2008 within which
2007 Quarters to appeal to this Court.[San Roque], however, appealed via Petitions for
Amount: of 2006) Review on March 28, 2008 for its first quarter claim and on June 27,
₱5,311,012.39 2008 for its second quarter claim, which are clearly before the lapse of
the 120-day period. This violates the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
On January 10, 2011, the CTA First Division rendered a Decision on the
consolidated judicialclaims of San Roque, with the following findings: xxxx

As to [San Roque’s] original applications for refund is concerned, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenuehas one hundred twenty days or until
August 9, 2007, November 7, 2007 and December 29, 2007 within which
to make decision. After the lapse of the one hundred twenty[-]day
period, [San Roque] should have elevated its claim with the Court within
thirty (30) days starting from August 10, 2007 to September 8, 2007 for
its first quarter claim, November 8, 2007 to December 7, 2007 for its
The premature invocation ofthe court’s intervention, like the instant
Petitions for Review, is fatal to one’s cause of action; and the case is
susceptible of dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. Moreover,
such premature appeal will also warrant the dismissal of the Petitions
for Review inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the Court in line
with the recent pronouncement made by the Supreme Court in the case

49

of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia,
Inc.
As far as the amended application for refund covering the third and
fourth quarter[s] filed on September 21, 2007 is concerned, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has one hundred twenty days or until
January 19, 2008 within which to make a decision. After the lapse of the
said one hundred twenty day[-]period, [San Roque] should have
elevated its claim with the Court within thirty (30) daysstarting from
January 20, 2008 to February 18, 2008. Unfortunately, the Petition for
Review covering said third and fourth quarter[s] was filed March 28,
2008 beyond the 30-day period set by law and therefore, the Court has
no jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of the case.
Other issues raised now become moot and academic.5
The dispositive portion of the foregoing Decision of the CTA First
Division reads:
WHEREFORE, these consolidated Petitions for Review, CTA Case Nos.
7744 covering the first, third and fourth quarter[s] and 7802 covering
[the] second quarter are hereby DISMISSEDsince the Court has no
jurisdiction thereof.6
San Roque filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the
CTA First Division in a Resolution7 dated May 31, 2011.
San Roque filed a Petition for Review before the CTA en banc, protesting
against the retroactive application of Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.8 In Aichi, promulgated on October
6, 2010, the Supreme Court strictly required compliance with the
120+30 day periods under Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended.
In its Decision dated June 4, 2012, the CTA en bancupheld the
application of Aichiand explained that there was no retroactive
application of the same. The 120+30 day periods had already been
provided in the NIRC of 1997, as amended, evenbefore the promulgation
of Aichi. Aichi merely interpreted the provisions of Section 112 of the
NIRC of 1997, as amended.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
The CTA en bancapplied the 120+30 day periods and found, same as the
CTA First Division, that while San Roque timely filed its administrative
claims for refund or tax credit of creditable input taxes for the four
quarters of 2006, it filed its judicial claimsbeyond the 30-day
prescriptive period, reckoned from the lapse of the 120-day period for
the CIR to act on the original administrative claims. The CTA en
bancstressed that the 30-day period within which to appeal with the
CTA is jurisdictional and failure to comply therewith would bar the
appeal and deprive the CTA of its jurisdiction.9
The CTA en bancfurther stated in its Decision that even if it counted the
120-day period from the filing of the amended administrative claims for
refund on March 10, 2008 for the first and second quarter claims, and on
September 21, 2007 for the third and fourth quarter claims, the CTA still
did not acquire jurisdiction over C.T.A.Case Nos. 7744 and 7802.
Following the 120+30 day periods, the judicial claims of San Roque for
the first and second quarters were prematurely filed,while the judicial
claims for the third and fourth quarters were filed late.
Lastly, the CTA en bancadjudged that San Roque cannot rely on San
Roque Power Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
promulgated on November 25, 2009 [San Roque (2009)],10 which
granted the claims for refund or tax credit of the creditable input taxes of
San Roque for the four quarters of 2002, on the following grounds: (a)
The main issue in San Roque (2009)was whether or not San Roque had
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales in 2002, to which the creditable
input taxes could be attributed, while the pivotal issue inthe instant case
is whether or not San Roque complied with the prescriptive periods
under Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, when it filed its
administrative and judicial claims for refund or tax credit of itscreditable
input taxes for the four quarters of 2006; (b) The claims for refund or tax
credit in San Roque (2009) involved the four quarters of 2002,when
sales of electric power by generation companies to the NPC were
explicitly VAT zero-rated under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9136,
otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of
2001. Eventually, Republic Act No. 9337, otherwise known as the
Extended VAT Law (EVAT Law), took effect on November 1, 2005, and
Section 24 of said law already expressly repealed Section 6 of the EPIRA;
and (3) In San Roque (2009), San Roque failed to comply with Section
112(A)11 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, and prematurely filed its
administrative claim for the third quarter of 2002 on October 25, 2002,
50

when its zero-rated sales of electric power to NPC were made only in the
fourth quarter of 2002, which closed on December 31. 2002. In the
instant case, San Roquedid not comply with the 120+30 day periods
under Section 112(C) of the NIRC, as amended, thus, the CTA did not
acquire jurisdiction over the judicial claims.
In the end, the CTA en bancdecreed:
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the assailed Decision dated
January 10, 2011 and Resolution dated May 31, 2011 rendered by the
First Division in C.T.A. Case Nos. 7744 and 7802.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is
hereby DENIED, and accordingly DISMISSEDfor lack of merit.12
In its Resolution dated January 21, 2013, the CTA en bancdenied the
Motion for Reconsideration of San Roque.
Hence, San Roque filed the Petition at bar assigning six reversible errors
on the part of the CTA en banc, viz:
I.
THE HONORABLE CTA EN BANCCOMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DISMISSING [SAN ROQUE’S] PETITIONS FOR REVIEW AND APPLYING
RETROACTIVELY THE AICHI RULING IN THAT AT THE TIME IT FILED
ITS PETITIONS FOR REVIEW, [SAN ROQUE] ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE THEN PREVAILING RULE AND
JURISPRUDENCE CONSISTENTLY UPHELD FOR ALMOST A DECADE BY
THE HONORABLE CTA IN THE ABSENCE THEN OF A RULING FROM
THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II.
THE HONORABLE CTA EN BANCCOMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
APPLYING THE AICHI RULING TO [SAN ROQUE’S] CLAIM FILED YEARS
BEFORE ITS PROMULGATION IN THAT THE AICHI RULING, WHICH
LAID DOWN A NEW RULE OF PROCEDURE WHICH AFFECTS
SUSBSTANTIVE RIGHTS, SHOULD BE APPLIED PROSPECTIVELY IN
LIGHT OF THE LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE UPHOLDING THE
PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTIVITY.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
III.
THE HONORABLE CTA EN BANCCOMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE AICHI RULING IN THAT ITS
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION TO [SAN ROQUE’S] PENDING CLAIM WILL
BE UNJUST AND UNFAIR AND WILL CERTAINLY PRODUCE
SUBSTANTIAL INEQUITABLE RESULTS AND GRAVE INJUSTICE TO [SAN
ROQUE] AND MANY TAXPAYERS WHO RELIED IN GOOD FAITH ON ITS
THEN CONSISTENT RULINGS FOR ALMOST A DECADE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE CTA EN BANCCOMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE AICHI RULING IN THAT ITS
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION GOES AGAINST THE BASIC POLICIES AND
THE SPIRIT OF THE EPIRA LAW.
V.
[SAN ROQUE] SHOULD BE GIVEN THE SAME TREATMENT AS THOSE
DECIDED IN PRECEDENT CASES PROMULGATED PRIOR TO THE
PROMULGATION OF THE AICHI RULING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
DOCTRINEOF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
VI.
RECENTLY, THIS HONORABLE COURT EN BANCHAS CATEGORICALLY
RULED THAT THE AICHI RULING SHALL BE APPLIED
PROSPECTIVELY.13
There is no merit in the instant Petition.
At the crux of the controversy are the prescriptive periods for the filing
of administrative and judicial claims for refund or tax credit of creditable
input taxes under Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, which
provide:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
51

(A) Zero-Rated or Effectively Zero-Rated Sales. – Any
VATregistered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance
of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or
paidattributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to
the extent thatsuch input tax has not been applied against output
tax: x x x
xxxx
(C) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes
shall be Made.– In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a
refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes
within one hundred twenty (120) daysfrom the date of
submission of complete documentsin support of the application
filed in accordance with Subsection (A) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or
the failure on the partof the Commissioner to act on the application
within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within
thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or
after the expiration ofthe one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the
decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeal. (Emphases
supplied.)
Contrary to the assertion of San Roque, it was only in Aichithat the issue
of the prescriptive periods under Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997, as
amended, was first squarelyraised before and addressed by the Court.
The Court significantly ruled in Aichithat: (a) Section 112 of the NIRC of
1997, as amended, particularly governs claims for refund or tax credit of
creditable input taxes, which is distinct from Sections 204(C) and 229 of
the same statute which concern erroneously or illegally collected taxes;
(b) The twoyear prescriptive period under Section 112(A) of the NIRC of
1997, as amended, pertains only to administrative claims for refund or
tax credit of creditable input taxes, and not to judicial claims for the
same; (c) Following Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant
Pagbilao Corporation,14 the two-year prescriptive period under Section
112(A) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, is reckoned from the close
ofthe taxable quarter when the sales were made; (d) In determining the
end of the two-year prescriptive period under Section 112(A) of the
Persons and Family Relations Cases
NIRC of 1997, as amended, the Administrative Code of 1987 prevails
over the Civil Code, so that a year is composed of 12 calendar months;
and (e) The 120-day period, under what is presently Section 112(C) of
the NIRC of 1997, asamended, is crucial in filing an appeal with the CTA,
for whether the CIR issues a decision on the administrative claim
beforethe lapse of the 120-day period or the CIR made no decision on
the administrative claim after the 120-day period, the taxpayer has 30
days within which to file an appeal with the CTA.
The Court en banchad the opportunity tofurther expound on the
prescriptive periods under Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended,
in its Decision in the consolidated cases of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Philex Mining Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, promulgated in 2013 [San Roque
(2013)].15
According to the Court in San Roque (2013), the prescriptive periods
under Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997, asamended, shall be interpreted
as follows:
Section 112(A) and (C) must be interpreted according to its clear, plain,
and unequivocal language. The taxpayer can file his administrative claim
for refund or credit at anytime within the two-year prescriptive period.
If he files his claim on the last day of the two-year prescriptive period,
his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner will have 120 days from
such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the claim on
the 120th day, or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30
days to file his judicial claim with the CTA. This is not only the plain
meaning but also the only logical interpretation of Section 112(A) and
(C).16 (Emphasis deleted.)
The Court emphasized in San Roque (2013)that a claim for refund or tax
credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is construed strictly against the
taxpayer. It cited Aichiand pointed out that one of the conditions for a
judicial claim for refund or tax credit under the VAT system is
compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods
under Section 112(C) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended.17
Guided by the aforementioned law and jurisprudence, the Court now
determines whether or not San Roque complied in the instant case with
52
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

the prescriptive periods under Section 112 ofthe NIRC of 1997, as Quarter
amended.
First Quarter April 20, 2006 April 20, 2008 April 11, 2007
As the following tables will show, San Roque filed its administrative
claims for refund or tax credit of its creditable input taxes for the four Second July 20, 2006 July 20, 2008 July 10, 2007
quarters of 2006 within the two-yearprescriptive period under Section Quarter
112(A) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, whether reckoned from the Third October 20, 2006 October 20, 2008 August 31,
close of the taxable quarter when the relevant zero-rated or effectively Quarter 2007
zero-rated sales were made, in accordance with Mirantand Aichi; or
from the date of filing of the quarterly VAT return and payment of the Fourth January 21, January 21, 2009 August 31,
tax due 20 days after the close of the taxable quarter, following Atlas Quarter 200619 2007
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue18:
San Roque, however, failed to comply with the 120+30 day periods for
the filing of its judicial claims, as can be gleaned from the table below:
According to Mirant and Aichi
Tax Period Close of Quarter End of the Two- Date of Filing Tax Date of End of End of 30- Date of No. of
2006 When Relevant Year of Period Filing of 120-Day day Actual Days:
Sales Prescriptive Administrative 2006 Administrative Period for Period to Filing End of
were Made Period Claim Claim CIR to File of 120-
Decide Appeal Judicial day
First Quarter March 31, 2006 March 31, 2008 April 11, 2007 with Claim Period
CTA to
Second June 30, 2006 June 30, 2008 July 10, 2007
Filing
Quarter
of
Third September 30, September 30, August 31, Judicial
Quarter 2006 2008 2007 Claim

Fourth December 31, December 31, August 31, First April 11, 2007 August 9, September March 232
Quarter 2006 2008 2007 Quarter 2007 8, 28, days
200720 2008

According to Atlas Second July 10, 2007 November December June 27, 233
Quarter 7, 7, 2008 days
Tax Period Filing of Returns End of the Two- Date of Filing 2007 2007
2006 and Year of
Payment of Taxes Prescriptive Administrative Third August 31, December January March 90 days
20 Period Claim Quarter 2007 29, 28, 28,
Days after the 2007 2008 2008
Close Fourth August 31, December January March 90 days
of Taxable Quarter 2007 29, 28, 28,

53

2007 2008 2008
Because San Roque filed C.T.A. Case Nos. 7744 and 7802 beyond the 30-
day mandatory period under Section 112(C) of the NIRC of 1997, as
amended, the CTA First Division did not acquire jurisdiction over said
cases and correctly dismissed the same.
San Roque in the present case is in exactly the same position as Philex
Mining Corporation (Philex) in San Roque (2013). Hence, the ruling of
the Court on the judicial claim of Philex in San Roque (2013) is worth
reproducing hereunder:
Philex timely filed its administrative claim on 20 March 2006, within the
two-year prescriptive period. Even if the two-year prescriptive period is
computed from the date of payment of the output VAT under Section
229, Philex still filed its administrative claim on time. Thus, the
Atlasdoctrine is immaterial in this case.The Commissioner had until 17
July 2006, the last day ofthe 120-day period, to decide Philex’s claim.
Since the Commissioner did not act on Philex’s claim on or before 17 July
2006, Philex had until 17 August 2006, the last day of the 30-day period,
to file its judicial claim. The CTA EB held that 17 August 2006 was indeed
the last day for Philex to file its judicial claim.However, Philex filed its
Petition for Review withthe CTA only on 17 October 2007, or four
hundred twenty-six (426) days after the last day of filing. In short, Philex
was late by one year and 61 days in filing its judicial claim.As the CTA EB
correctly found: Evidently, the Petition for Review in C.T.A. Case No.
7687 was filed 426 days late.Thus, the Petition for Review in C.T.A. Case
No. 7687 should have been dismissed on the ground that the Petition for
Review was filed way beyond the 30-day prescribed period; thus, no
jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA Division; x x x.
Unlike San Roque and Taganito, Philex’s case is not one of premature
filing but of late filing. Philex did not file any petition with the CTA
within the 120-day period. Philex did not also file any petition with the
CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the 120-day period. Philex
filed its judicial claim long afterthe expiration of the 120-day period, in
fact 426 days after the lapse of the 120-day period. In any event,
whether governed by jurisprudence before, during, or after the Atlas
case, Philex’s judicial claim will have to be rejected because of late
Persons and Family Relations Cases
filing.Whether the two-year prescriptive period is counted from the date
of payment of the output VAT following the Atlasdoctrine, or from the
close of the taxable quarter when the sales attributable to the input VAT
were made following the Mirantand Aichidoctrines, Philex’s judicial
claim was indisputably filed late.
The Atlas doctrine cannot save Philex from the late filing of its judicial
claim. The inactionof the Commissioner on Philex’s claim during the
120-day period is, by express provision of law, "deemed a denial" of
Philex’s claim. Philex had 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day
period to file its judicial claim with the CTA. Philex’s failure to do so
rendered the "deemed a denial" decision of the Commissioner final and
inappealable. The right to appeal to the CTA from a decision or "deemed
a denial" decision of the Commissioner is merely a statutory privilege,
not a constitutional right. The exercise of such statutory privilege
requires strict compliance with the conditions attached by the statute for
its exercise. Philex failed to comply with the statutory conditions and
must thus bear the consequences.21 (Citations omitted.)
Both the CTA First Division and CTA en bancwent a step further and also
computed the 120+30 day periods from the date of filing by San Roque
of its amended administrative claimson March 10, 2008 for the first and
second quarters of 2006, and on September 21, 2007 for the third and
fourth quarters of 2006. According to the CTA First Division and CTA en
banc, if the 120-day period was reckoned from the dates of filing of the
amended administrative claims, the judicial claims for the first and
second quarters were premature, while the judicial claims for the third
and fourth quarters were late.
For the Court, there is no morepoint in considering the amended
administrative claims for the first and second quarters of 2006. The
amended administrative claims were filed on March 10, 2008after the
120+30 day periods for filing the judicialclaims, counting from the date
of filing of the original administrative claims for the first and second
quarters of 2006, had already expired on September 8, 2007and
December 7, 2007, respectively. Taking cognizance of the amended
administrative claims in such a situation would result in the revival of
judicial claims that had already prescribed.
Meanwhile, San Roque filed its amended administrative claims for the
third and fourth quarters of 2006 on September 21, 2007, before the end
54
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

of the 120-day period for the CIR to decide on the original administrative It is still necessary for the Court toexplain herein how BIR Ruling No. DA-
claims for the same taxable quarters. Nonetheless, even if the Court 489-03 is an exception to the strict observance of the 120+30 day
counts the 120+30 day periods from the dateof filing of said amended periods for judicial claims. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 affected only the
administrative claims, the judicial claims of San Roque would still be 120-day period as the BIR held therein that "a taxpayer-claimant need
belatedly filed: not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial
relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review. Neither is it required
that the Commissioner should first act on the claim of a
Tax Date of End of 120- End of Date of No. of
particulartaxpayer before the CTA may acquire jurisdiction, particularly
Period Filing of Day Period 30-day Actual Days:
if the claim is about to prescribe." Consequently, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-
2006 Administrative for Period Filing End of
03 may only be invoked by taxpayers who relied on the same and
Claim CIR to to File of 120-
prematurely filedtheir judicial claims before the expiration of the 120-
Decide Appeal Judicial day
day period for the CIR to act on their administrative claims, provided
with Claim Period
that the taxpayers filed such judicial claims from December 10, 2003 to
CTA to
October 6,2010. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 did not touch upon the 30-
Filing
day prescriptive period for filing an appeal with the CTA and cannot be
of
cited by taxpayers, such as San Roque, who belatedly filedtheir judicial
Judicial
claims more than 30 days after receipt of the adverse decision of the CIR
Claim
on their administrative claims or the lapse of 120 days without the CIR
Third September 21, January 19, February March 69 days acting on their administrative claims. Pertaining to the similarly situated
Quarter 2007 2008 18, 28, Philex, the Court ruled in San Roque (2013) that:
2008 2008
Philex’s situation is not a case of premature filing of its judicial claim but
Fourth September 21, January 19, February March 69 days of late filing, indeed verylate filing. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 allowed
Quarter 2007 2008 18, 28, premature filing of a judicial claim, which means nonexhaustion of the
2008 2008 120-day period for the Commissioner to act on an administrative claim.
Philex cannot claim the benefit of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 because
Unable to contest the belated filing of its judicial claims, San Roque Philex did not file its judicial claim prematurely but filed it long after the
argues against the supposedly retroactive application of Aichiand the lapse of the 30-day period following the expiration of the 120-day
strict observance of the 120+30 day periods. period. In fact, Philex filed its judicial claim 426 days after the lapse of
the 30-day period.23
As the CTA en bancheld, Aichiwas not applied retroactively to San Roque
in the instant case. The 120+30 day periods have already been San Roque harps that the Court itself categorically declared in the
prescribed under Section 112(C) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, when following paragraph in San Roque (2013)that Aichishall be applied
San Roque filed its administrative and judicial claims for refund or tax prospectively:
credit of its creditable input taxes for the four quarters of 2006. The
Court highlights the pronouncement in San Roque (2013)that strict Taxpayers should not be prejudiced by an erroneous interpretation by
compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for the judicial the Commissioner, particularly on a difficult question of law.The
claim to prosper, except for the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling abandonment of the Atlasdoctrine by Mirantand Aichiis proof that the
No. DA-489-03 on December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010when Aichiwas reckoning of the prescriptive periods for input VAT tax refund or credit
promulgated, which again reinstated the 120+30day periods as is a difficult question of law. The abandonment of the Atlasdoctrine did
mandatory and jurisdictional.22 not result in Atlas, or other taxpayers similarly situated, being made to

55

return the tax refund or credit they received or could have received
under Atlasprior to its abandonment. This Court is applying Mirantand
Aichi prospectively.Absent fraud, bad faith or misrepresentation, the
reversal by thisCourt of a general interpretative rule issued by the
Commissioner, like the reversal of a specific BIR ruling under Section
246, should also apply prospectively.x x x.24 (Emphases included.)
The Court is not persuaded. The aforequoted paragraph should be
understood in the context of the entire San Roque (2013). The statement
of the Court on applying Mirantand Aichiprospectively should be
understood relative to, and never apart from, Atlasand BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03.
The Court explained in San Roque (2013), under the heading "Effectivity
and Scope of the Atlas, Mirant and Aichi Doctrines," that:
The Atlasdoctrine, which held that claims for refund or credit of input
VAT must comply with the two-year prescriptive period under Section
229, should be effective only from its promulgation on 8 June 2007 until
its abandonment on 12 September 2008 in Mirant. The Atlasdoctrine
was limited to the reckoning of the two-year prescriptive period from
the date of payment of the output VAT. Prior to the Atlasdoctrine, the
two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund or credit of input VAT
should be governed by Section 112(A) following the verba legisrule. The
Mirantruling, which abandoned the Atlas doctrine, adopted the verba
legisrule, thus applying Section 112(A) in computing the two-year
prescriptive period in claiming refund or credit of input VAT.
The Atlasdoctrine has no relevance to the 120+30 day periods under
Section 112(C) because the application of the 120+30 day periods was
not in issue in Atlas. The application of the 120+30 day periods was first
raised in Aichi, which adopted the verba legisrule in holding that the
120+30 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional. x x x.
xxxx
To repeat, a claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption,
is construed strictly against the taxpayer. One of the conditions for a
judicial claim of refund or credit under the VAT System is compliance
with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict
compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to
Persons and Family Relations Cases
prosper, whether before, during, or after the effectivity of the
Atlasdoctrine, except for the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the
Aichidoctrine was adopted, which again reinstated the 120+30 day
periods as mandatory and jurisdictional.25 (Emphases supplied.)
As for BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, the Court clarified its period of
effectivity, thus:
There is no dispute that the 120-day period is mandatory and
jurisdictional, and that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over a
judicial claim that is filed before the expiration of the 120-day period.
There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. The first exception is if
the Commissioner, through a specific ruling, misleads a particular
taxpayer to prematurely file a judicialclaim with the CTA. Such specific
ruling is applicable only to suchparticular taxpayer. The second
exception is where the Commissioner, through a general interpretative
rule issued under Section 4 of the Tax Code, misleads all taxpayers into
filing prematurely judicial claims with the CTA. In these cases, the
Commissioner cannot be allowed to later on question the CTA’s
assumption of jurisdiction over such claim since equitable estoppel has
set in as expressly authorized under Section 246 of the Tax Code.
xxxx
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule because it was
a response to a query made, notby a particular taxpayer, but by a
government agency tasked with processing tax refunds and credits, that
is, the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center of
the Department of Finance. This governmentagency is also the
addressee, or the entity responded to, in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.
Thus, while this government agency mentions in its query to the
Commissioner the administrative claim of Lazi Bay Resources
Development, Inc., the agency was in fact asking the Commissioner what
to do in cases like the tax claim of Lazi Bay Resources Development, Inc.,
where the taxpayer did not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period.
Clearly, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 isa general interpretative rule. Thus,
all taxpayers can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its
issuanceon 10 December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichion
56
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

6 October 2010, where this Court held that the 120+30 day periods are CERTIFICATION
mandatory and jurisdictional.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
Based on the foregoing, "prospective application" of Aichiand Mirant, in conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
the context of San Roque (2013), only meant that the rulings in said before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
cases would not retroactively affect taxpayers who relied on Atlasand/or Division.
DA-489-03 when they filed their administrative and judicial claims for
refund or tax credit of creditable input taxes during the period when MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Atlasand DA-489-03 were still in effect. Aichiand Mirantcan still be Chief Justice
applied to cases involving administrative and judicial claims filed prior
to the promulgation of said cases and outside the period of effectivity of
Atlas and DA-489-03, such as the instant case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is

DENIED and the Decision dated June 4, 2012 and Resolution dated
January 21, 2013 of the Court of Tax Appeals en bane in C.T.A. EB No.
789 are AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

57

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147817 August 12, 2004
FELICISIMO RIETA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime. It may be
proven by the credible testimonies of witnesses, not necessarily by
physical evidence. In-court identification of the offender is not essential,
as long as the identity of the accused is determined with certainty by
relevant evidence. In the present case, there is no doubt that petitioner
was the same person apprehended by the authorities and mentioned in
the Information. His possession of the smuggled cigarettes carried the
prima facie presumption that he was engaged in smuggling. Having
failed to rebut this presumption, he may thus be convicted of the crime
charged.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the December 22, 2000 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 17338. The CA affirmed with modification
the February 18, 1994 Consolidated Judgment3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC)4 of Manila (Branch 46) in Criminal Case Nos. CCC-VI-
137(79) and CCC-VI-138(79), finding Felicisimo Rieta guilty of
smuggling. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED as
follows:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
(a) The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the trial court finding
Felicisimo Rieta, Arturo Rimorin, Pacifico Teruel and Carmelo
Manaois GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime
charged.
(b) Appellants Ernesto Miaco, Guillermo Ferrer, Fidel Balita,
Robartolo Alincastre and Ernesto de Castro are ACQUITTED as
recommended by the Solicitor General."5
Reconsideration was denied in the April 16, 2001 CA Resolution,6 which
petitioner also assails.
Petitioner and his six co-accused -- Arturo Rimorin, Fidel Balita, Gonzalo
Vargas, Robartolo Alincastre, Guillermo Ferrer and Ernesto Miaco --
were charged in an Information, which reads:
"That on or about October 15, 1979, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, with the evident intent to
defraud the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the
legitimate duties accruing to it from merchandise imported into
this country, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully [and]
fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines or assist in so
doing contrary to law, three hundred five (305) cases of assorted
brands of blue seal cigarettes which are foreign articles valued at
P513,663.47 including duties and taxes, and/or buy, sell,
transport or assist and facilitate the buying, selling and
transporting of the above-named foreign articles after
importation knowing the same to have been imported contrary
to law which was found in the possession of said accused and
under their control which articles said accused fully well knew
have not been properly declared and that the duties and specific
taxes thereon have not been paid to the proper authorities in
violation of said Sec. 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34, in
relation to Sec. 3602 of said Code and Sec. 184 of the National
Internal Revenue Code."7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution (Respondent)
58

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)8 presents the prosecution's
version of the facts as follows:
"On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson, the[n] Chief of the
Police Intelligence Branch of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group (MISG for brevity), received information that
certain syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling activities
somewhere in Port Area, Manila. It was further revealed that the
activities [were being] done at nighttime and the smuggled
goods in a delivery panel and delivery truck [were] being
escorted by some police and military personnel. He fielded three
surveillance stake-out teams the following night along Roxas
Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby
they were to watch out for a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167
bound for Malabon. Nothing came out of it. On the basis of his
investigation, [it was discovered that] the truck was registered in
the name of Teresita Estacio of Pasay City.
"At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col.
Lacson and his men returned to the same area, with Col. Lacson
posting himself at the immediate vicinity of the 2nd COSAC
Detachment in Port Area, Manila, because as per information
given to him, the said cargo truck will come out from the
premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. COSAC stands for
Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime Battalion. The night watch
lasted till the wee hours of the following morning. About 3:00
a.m. an Isuzu panel came out from the place of the 2nd COSAC
Detachment. It returned before 4:00 a.m. of [the] same day.
"At around 5 minutes before 4:00 o'clock that morning, a green
cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 came out from the 2nd
COSAC Detachment followed and escorted closely by a light
brown Toyota Corona car with Plate No. GR-433 and with 4 men
on board. At that time, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information
whatsoever about the car, so he gave an order by radio to his
men to intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo truck was
intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that the Toyota car following the
cargo truck suddenly made a sharp U-turn towards the North,
unlike the cargo truck [that] was going south. Almost by impulse,
Col. Lacson's car also made a U-turn and gave chase to the
speeding Toyota car, which was running between 100 KPH to
Persons and Family Relations Cases
120 KPH. Col. Lacson sounded his siren. The chase lasted for less
than 5 minutes until said car made a stop along Bonifacio Drive,
at the foot of Del Pan Bridge. Col. Lacson and his men searched
the car and they found several firearms, particularly: three (3)
.45 cal. Pistols and one (1) armalite M-16 rifle. He also
discovered that T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the driver of the
Toyota car, and his companions inside the car were Sgt.
Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre,
[all] belonging to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found
not to be equipped with mission orders.
"When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched,
305 cases of blue seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside.
The cargo truck driver known only as 'Boy' was able to escape
while the other passengers or riders of said truck were
apprehended, namely: Police Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City
Police Force, Pat. Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police Force, and
Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Lacson's men hauled the intercepted vehicles, the arrested men
and confiscated goods to Camp Crame, Quezon City. All the 371
cases (305 + 66) of blue seal cigarettes were turned over to the
Bureau of Customs. Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba executed an Affidavit
of Arrest together with Arnel Acuba. The Booking and
Information Sheet of Ernesto de Castro showed that he was
arrested by the MISG after delivering assorted blue seal
cigarettes at 185 Sanciangco St., Tonsuya, Malabon."9
Version of the Defense (Petitioner)
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied any knowledge of the alleged
smuggling of the blue-seal cigarettes. He sets forth his version of the
facts as follows:
"Petitioner Rieta testified that he was a policeman assigned at
Kawit Cavite. In the early morning of October 15, 1979, he was in
Manila together with Boy. He met Boy in 1978 when the latter
figured in a vehicular accident in Kawit, Cavite. x x x After a
week, Boy visited him at the Kawit Police Station and thereafter,
59

met him four to five times. He learned that Boy was a
businessman hauling slippers, fish and vegetables from Divisoria.
For several times, he had accompanied Boy on his business trips
when [the latter] hauled fish, vegetables and slippers from
Divisoria to Cavite. He was requested by Boy to accompany him
on his various trips because there were times when policemen
on patrol were demanding money from [the latter]. At other
times, other policemen accompanied Boy aside from him, on his
trips.
"In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he met Boy in front of
the Kawit Town Hall. He learned that Boy will haul household
appliances from Divisoria. They boarded a jeep driven by Boy
and they proceeded to Cartimar, Pasay City. At Cartimar, Boy left
him at a gasoline station, and told him to standby because Boy
will get the cargo truck they will use. When Boy returned, he had
companions, who were introduced to him as Gonzalo Vargas and
Sgt. Rimorin, the petitioner's co-accused in Criminal Case No. CC-
VI-138 (79). From Cartimar, the four (4) of them proceeded to
Divisoria and they passed under the Del Pan Bridge. While
passing therein, he told Boy that he was hungry, so that when
they passed by a small restaurant, he alighted and Sgt. Rimorin
followed. Boy told them that he and Gonzalo will proceed to the
Port Area and will be back. After thirty to forty five minutes, Boy
and Gonzalo returned, and he and Sgt. Rimorin boarded the truck
and proceeded to Roxas Boulevard. While they were along Roxas
Boulevard near the Daily Express Building, two (2) vehicles
intercepted them and ordered them to pull-over. The passengers
of the said vehicles introduced themselves as Metrocom soldiers,
and ordered them to alight and to raise their hands while poking
guns at them. They were ordered to l[ie down] flat on their belly
on the pavement and were bodily frisked and searched. The
Metrocom soldiers did not find anything from their bodies.
Thereafter, they (Rieta, Rimorin and Gonzalo) were ordered by
the Metrocom soldiers to transfer to a jeep. While they were
aboard the jeep, he overheard from the Metrocom soldiers that
their driver was able to escape. Likewise, they were also
informed by the Metrocom soldiers that the cargo truck was
loaded with blue seal cigarettes. The cargo truck was not opened
in their presence, nor were the contents thereof shown to them
upon their apprehension. From the time he boarded the cargo
Persons and Family Relations Cases
truck in Cartimar until he and Sgt. Rimorin alighted to take their
snacks, up to the time they were apprehended by the Metrocom
soldiers, he had not seen a pack of blue cigarette in the cargo
truck. He did not notice whether the Metrocom soldiers opened
the cargo truck. At Camp Crame, he was investigated without the
benefit of counsel, but, nonetheless, he executed and signed a
statement because as far as he was concerned he has done
nothing wrong. He was detained at Bicutan for more than a year.
"In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he was not carrying
any firearm because he has no mission order to do so, and
besides Manila was not his jurisdiction. He was suspended from
the service, but was reinstated in January 1981. After he was
released from Bicutan, he looked for Boy so that he could clear
the matter, but he [did not find] Boy anymore.
"In corroboration with the testimony of petitioner Rieta, accused
Rimorin, a policeman assigned at Pasay City, testified that the
first time he met Boy was in 1978 in the wake and internment of
the Late Police Officer Ricardo Escobal. Thereafter, Boy dropped
by on several occasions at the Pasay Police Station to request for
assistance. Prior to October 15, 1979, Boy again dropped by at
the police station and asked him if he had an appointment on the
next day. He told Boy that he had no appointment, and the latter
requested to accompany him to Sta. Maria, Bulacan to get some
rice. Prior thereto, in one of their casual conversations, he
learned that Boy was a businessman engaged in hauling various
merchandise. He agreed to the request of Boy to accompany him
to Sta. Maria, Bulacan. At Sta. Maria, Bulacan, they proceeded to a
warehouse containing bags of rice, and they hauled several bags
into a truck, and thereafter, proceed[ed] to Quezon City. As
compensation Boy gave him a sack of rice. The said transaction
was followed by another on October 15, 1979. In the afternoon of
October 14, 1979, Boy again dropped by at the police station and
requested him to accompany him to haul household fixtures.
They usually haul vegetables and rice early in the morning to
avoid the traffic and that was the reason why they met in the
early morning of October 15, 1979. He told [Boy] that he will see
if he will have [the] time, but just the same they made
arrangements that they will see each other at Cartimar, Pasay
City not later than 2:30 a.m. in the early morning of October 15,
60

1979. At the appointed time and place, he met Boy with a
companion, who was introduced to him as Gonzalo Vargas, his
co-accused in the instant case. Thereafter, they proceeded to a
gasoline station nearby. At the gasoline station, at the corner of
Taylo and Taft Avenue, near Cartimar, they picked up another
person who was later on introduced to him as Felicisimo Rieta.
Then the four of them (Boy, Gonzalo, Rieta and Rimorin) boarded
the cargo truck and they proceeded to Divisoria. It was Boy who
drove the cargo truck, while petitioner was seated next to Boy
while accused Rimorin and Gonzalo to his right. While enroute to
Divisoria, along Roxas Boulevard before reaching Del Pan Bridge,
Boy turned right under the bridge. He commented that it was not
the route to Divisoria, and Boy answered 'meron lang ikakarga
dito'. On the other hand, Rieta told Boy that he was hungry, and
thus, Boy pulled-over at a carinderia at Del Pan Bridge near
Delgado Bros. When Rieta alighted he followed, while Boy and
Gonzalo proceeded. After less than an hour, Boy and Gonzalo
returned. They then proceeded towards Roxas Boulevard,
Bonifacio Drive, and Boy drove straight at the corner of Aduana
to Roxas Boulevard. When he noticed that the truck was not
bound for Divisoria as earlier informed, he asked Boy why they
were not taking the route going to Divisoria. Boy replied 'bukas
na lang wala ng espasyo'. Immediately, they were intercepted by
two vehicles and one of the occupants thereof ordered the driver
to pull over. The driver pulled over, and they were ordered to
raise their hands and to lay flat on their belly on the pavement
right in front of the truck, and they were bodily frisked but they
found nothing. He asked the Metrocom soldiers what was it all
about, but the Metrocom soldiers were shouting 'asan ang blue
seal'. Then they were ordered to board a jeep owned by the
Metrocom soldiers, and they were brought to Camp Crame.
Before they left the area, he did not see the Metrocom soldiers
open the cargo truck. He was brought to the MISG at Camp
Crame. When they arrived at Camp Crame, the soldiers thereat
were clapping their hands, thus he asked 'ano ba talaga ito' and
he got an answer from Barrameda, 'yun ang dahilan kung bakit
ka makukulong', pointing to a truck. When he saw the truck, it
was not the same truck they boarded in the early morning of
October 15, 1979. The truck they boarded was galvanized iron
pale sheet covered with canvass while the one at Camp Crame
was color red and not covered. He entertained the idea that they
Persons and Family Relations Cases
were being framed-up. Two days after, he was interrogated and
the alleged blue seal cigarettes were shown to him, and he was
informed by the investigator that the same blue seal cigarettes
were the contents of the cargo truck. When the alleged blue seal
cigarettes were taken out of the cargo truck, he was not asked to
be present. He asked for the whereabouts of Boy, but he was
informed that the latter escaped. The more he believed that there
was something fishy or wrong in their apprehension. It was very
[conspicuous] that the driver was able to escape because at the
time they were apprehended they were the only people at
Bonifacio Drive, and thus the possibility of escape was very
remote, considering that they were unarmed and the Metrocom
soldiers were all fully armed. In both cases at bar, there were
about three Pasay policemen who were apprehended. He was
detained at Camp Bagong Diwa for more than a year. He knew
nothing about the charge against him. When he was at Camp
Crame he tried getting in touch with a lawyer and his family, but
the MISG did not let him use the telephone."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the RTC, the CA noted that while petitioner and his co-accused
had mainly raised questions of fact, they had nonetheless failed to point
out specific errors committed by the trial court in upholding the
credibility of the prosecution's witnesses. The defense of denial
proffered by petitioner was considered weak and incapable of
overturning the overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence of
respondent. Further, the appellate court ruled that the non-presentation
in court of the seized blue-seal cigarettes was not fatal to respondent's
cause, since the crime had sufficiently been established by other
competent evidence.
The CA rejected the belated claim of petitioner that his arrest was
irregular. It ruled that the alleged defect could not be raised for the first
time on appeal, especially in the light of his voluntary submission to and
participation in the proceedings before the trial court.
The appellate court, however, found no sufficient evidence against the
other co-accused who, unlike petitioner, had not been found to be in
possession of blue-seal cigarettes.
61

Hence, this Petition.11
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the
Court's consideration:
"1. The respondents trial and appellate courts committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack and/or excess of
jurisdiction when [they] convicted herein petitioner
notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to prove the guilt of
the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
"2. The evidence obtained against the accused is inadmissible in
evidence because petitioner and his co-accused were arrested
without a warrant but by virtue of an arrest and seizure order
(ASSO) which was subsequently declared illegal and invalid by
this Honorable Supreme Court."12
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
Petitioner contends that the existence of the untaxed blue seal cigarettes
was not established, because the prosecution had not presented them as
evidence. He further argues that there was no crime committed, as the
corpus delicti was never proven during the trial.
Corpus Delicti Established
by Other Evidence
We do not agree. Corpus delicti refers to the specific injury or loss
sustained.13 It is the fact of the commission of the crime14 that may be
proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses.15 In its legal sense, corpus
delicti does not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered,16
to the firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of unlicensed
firearms,17 to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for
Persons and Family Relations Cases
ransom,18 or -- in the present case -- to the seized contraband
cigarettes.19
In Rimorin v. People,20 the petitioner therein similarly equated the
actual physical evidence -- 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes -- with the
corpus delicti. The appellate court allegedly erred in not acquitting him
on reasonable doubt arising from the non-presentation in court of the
confiscated contraband cigarettes. Holding that corpus delicti could be
established by circumstantial evidence, the Court debunked his
argument thus:
"Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the
crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness'
uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be
established by circumstantial evidence.
"Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been
competently established by respondent's evidence, which
consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and the
Custody Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs for the
confiscated goods.
"Col. Panfilo Lacson's testimony on the apprehension of
petitioner and on the seizure of the blue seal cigarettes was clear
and straightforward. He categorically testified as follows:
Q Let us go back to the truck after you apprehended
the COSAC soldiers on board the [C]orona car, what did
you do thereafter?
A We took them to the place where the cargo truck
was intercepted, Sir.
Q What did you notice thereat?
A Inside the truck were hundreds of cases of blue seal
cigarettes, and I also found out that my men were able to
apprehend the occupants of the cargo truck although
they reported to me that the driver managed to make
good escape, Sir.
62

Q Now you stated that a search was made on the truck
and you found how many cases of blue seal cigarettes?
A Three hundred five (305) cases, Sir.
Q Blue seal cigarettes?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What do you mean by blue seal cigarettes?
A Blue seal cigarettes are untaxed cigarettes, Sir.
Q Did you find out how many were there on board the
truck which was intercepted by your men per your
order?
A Yes, Sir, [there] were three.
Q Who?
A They were P/Sgt. Arturo Rimorin, Sr.
Q P/Sgt. Of what department?
A Of Pasay City Police Force, Sir, and Pat. Felicisimo
Rieta.
Q Of that police department?
A Of Kawit, Cavite Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas,
Sir.
Q Who is this Gonzalo Vargas?
A Civilian Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Macaraeg:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
I am showing to you a Custody Receipt dated
October 15, 1979, which states: Received from Lt.
Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, AC of S, M2/CC, MISG. PC
METROCOM
(Thru S/Sgt. Rodolfo Bucao, PC) THREE
HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE (371) cases of assorted
brands of 'Blue Seal' Cigarettes, which were
intercepted and confiscated by elements of the
MISG, PC METROCOM on or about 0400 15
October 79 along Bonifacio Drive, Manila, which
for [purposes] of identification we respectfully
request that it be marked [on] evidence as Exhibit
'A'.
COURT:
Mark it Exhibit 'A'.
Fiscal Macaraeg:
Q Will you please do examine Exhibit 'A' and tell us
whether this is the same receipt?
A This is the same receipt, Sir.
Q By the way, were photographs taken of the car as
well as the vehicle involved in this case, together with the
blue seal cigarettes that were confiscated?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you have copies of these photographs?
A The copies are with our evidence custodian, Sir.
Q Can you bring those pictures if required next time?
A Yes, Sir.
63

"So, too, did Gregorio Abrigo –customs warehouse storekeeper of
the Bureau –categorically testify that the MISG had turned over
to him the seized blue seal cigarettes, for which he issued a
Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979.
"We find no reason to depart from the oft repeated doctrine of
giving credence to the narration of prosecution witnesses,
especially when they are public officers who are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner."21
Petitioner argues that the receipt issued by Abrigo, a customs official,
was beset with doubt because: 1) it did not state specifically that the
blue-seal cigarettes identified therein had been confiscated from
petitioner and turned over to Abrigo by Colonel Lacson and/or his men;
and 2) it mentioned 371 (instead of 305) cases of confiscated blue-seal
cigarettes.
We note, however, that Colonel Lacson himself identified the Custody
Receipt as the same one issued for the 305 cases of cigarettes found in
the cargo truck, in which petitioner and his co-accused rode, and from
which the 66 cases of cigarettes -- subject of Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-
138(79) -- were confiscated in Malabon, Metro Manila.22 This fact (305
plus 66) explains why 371 cases were indicated therein. At any rate,
petitioner argues on minor discrepancies that do not affect the integrity
of the Receipt, issued in due course by a customs official who was duty-
bound to put the seized contraband cigarettes in safekeeping.
The existence of the 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes found in the
possession of petitioner and his co-accused was duly proven by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses -- Lacson and Abrigo. They had
testified in compliance with their duty as enforcers of the law. Their
testimonies were rightly entitled to full faith and credit, especially
because there was no showing of any improper motive23 on their part
to testify falsely against petitioner. Further, the Court accords great
respect to the factual conclusions drawn by the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the appellate court as in this case.24
Absurd is the claim of petitioner that, because Colonel Lacson was not
the officer who had actually intercepted the cargo truck in which the
former rode, the latter's testimony was therefore hearsay. The testimony
Persons and Family Relations Cases
of the colonel on his participation in the apprehension of the truck
sufficiently rebutted this contention.
Lacson testified that he had personally received information regarding
the smuggling activities being conducted by a syndicated group in that
place. He was also informed that smuggled items would be transported
from the 2nd COSAC Detachment in the Port Area to Malabon by a cargo
truck with Plate No. T-SY-167. During the stakeout surveillance on the
night of October 14, 1979, he saw -- from his post within the vicinity of
the 2nd COSAC Detachment -- the identified cargo truck coming out of
the Port Area. While trailing behind, he radioed his men posted along
Roxas Boulevard to stop the truck. Later in court, he described how his
men had actually intercepted it.25
Petitioner insists that Colonel Lacson, who had given chase to a Toyota
car and was not among the officers who had intercepted the truck, could
not have seen him as one of the passengers of the latter vehicle. Notably,
however, the chase of the Toyota car had lasted no more than 5 minutes,
and the colonel's team immediately returned to the subject truck after
the chase.26 Lacson, however, categorically said that he had seen 305
cases of blue-seal cigarettes inside the cargo vehicle, and that petitioner
was one of its passengers.
It should be borne in mind that Colonel Lacson -- as head of that
particular surveillance operation -- had full knowledge, control and
supervision of the whole process. He had organized the surveillance
teams and given orders to his men prior to the apprehension of the
vehicles suspected of carrying smuggled items. Furthermore, he was
present during the surveillance operations until the apprehension of the
cargo truck. Thus, he was clearly competent to testify on the matter.
The denial by petitioner that he was among the occupants of the truck is
highly self-serving and riddled with inconsistencies. He had been
directly identified as one of its passengers. Besides, he himself admitted
that he had been on board the vehicle when it was intercepted, and that
there were no other person in the area.
Courtroom Identification Unnecessary
Next, petitioner belabors the failure of the prosecution to ask Colonel
Lacson to identify him in open court. However, the colonel's positive and
64

categorical testimony pointing to him as one of the passengers of the
cargo truck, as well as petitioner's own admission of his presence
therein, dispelled the need for a courtroom identification. In People v.
Quezada, the Court said:
"x x x. While positive identification by a witness is required by
the law to convict an accused, it need not always be by means of
a physical courtroom identification. As the Court held in People v.
Paglinawan:
'x x x. Although it is routine procedure for witnesses to
point out the accused in open court by way of
identification, the fact that the witness x x x did not do so
in this case was because the public prosecutor failed to
ask her to point out appellant, hence such omission does
not in any way affect or diminish the truth or weight of
her testimony.'
"In-court identification of the offender is essential only when
there is a question or doubt on whether the one alleged to have
committed the crime is the same person who is charged in the
information and subject of the trial."27
In the present case, there is no doubt that petitioner was a passenger of
the truck, that he was apprehended by the authorities, and that he was
the same individual charged under the Information in Criminal Case No.
CCC-VI-137(79).
Prima Facie Proof of
Nonpayment of Taxes Sufficient
There is no merit, either, in the claim of petitioner that the prosecution
failed to prove the nonpayment of the taxes and duties on the
confiscated cigarettes. There is an exception to the general rule
requiring the prosecution to prove a criminal charge predicated on a
negative allegation, or a negative averment constituting an essential
element of a crime. In People v. Julian-Fernandez, we held:
"Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof,
or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge
of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. Stated
Persons and Family Relations Cases
otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce
positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of
which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and
which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production
of documents or other evidence within the defendant's
knowledge or control. For example, where a charge is made that
a defendant carried on a certain business without a license x x x,
the fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiar[ly]
within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer
conviction."28 (Emphasis supplied)
The truth of the negative averment that the duties and specific taxes on
the cigarettes were not paid to the proper authorities is fairly indicated
by the following circumstances that have been established: (1) the cargo
truck, which carried the contraband cigarettes and some passengers
including petitioner, immediately came from the 2nd COSAC
Detachment; (2) the truck was intercepted at the unholy hour of 4:00
a.m.; (3) it fitted the undisclosed informer's earlier description of it as
one that was carrying contraband; and (4) the driver ran away. Hence, it
was up to petitioner to disprove these damning circumstances, simply by
presenting the receipts showing payment of the taxes. But he did not do
so; all that he could offer was his bare and self-serving denial.
Knowledge of the Illegal
Nature of Goods
The fact that 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes were found in the cargo
truck, in which petitioner and his co-accused were riding, was properly
established. Nonetheless, he insists that his presence there was not
enough to convict him of smuggling, because the element of illegal
possession had not been duly proved. He adds that he had no knowledge
that untaxed cigarettes were in the truck.
Petitioner's contention is untenable. Persons found to be in possession
of smuggled items are presumed to be engaged in smuggling, pursuant
to the last paragraph of Section 3601 of the
Tariff and Customs Code.29 The burden of proof is thus shifted to them.
To rebut this presumption, it is not enough for petitioner to claim good
faith and lack of knowledge of the unlawful source of the cigarettes. He
65

should have presented evidence to support his claim and to convince the
court of his non-complicity.
In the case adverted to earlier, Rimorin v. People, we held thus:
"In his discussion of a similarly worded provision of Republic Act
No. 455, a criminal law authority explained thus:
'In order that a person may be deemed guilty of
smuggling or illegal importation under the foregoing
statute three requisites must concur: (1) that the
merchandise must have been fraudulently or knowingly
imported contrary to law; (2) that the defendant, if he is
not the importer himself, must have received, concealed,
bought, sold or in any manner facilitated the
transportation, concealment or sale of the merchandise;
and (3) that the defendant must be shown to have
knowledge that the merchandise had been illegally
imported. If the defendant, however, is shown to have had
possession of the illegally imported merchandise, without
satisfactory explanation, such possession shall be deemed
sufficient to authorize conviction.'"30 (Emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, the explanation given by petitioner was found to be
unacceptable and incredible by both the RTC and the CA, which said:
"Now on the explanations of Police Sgt. Rimorin of Pasay City
Police Force and Pat. Rieta of Kawit Police Force, riders in the
loaded cargo truck driven by 'Boy.' Their claim that they did not
have any knowledge about the cargo of blue seal cigarettes is not
given credence by the court. They tried to show lack of
knowledge by claiming that along the way, 'Boy' and Gonzalo
Vargas left them behind at a certain point for snacks and picked
them up later after the cargo had been loaded. The Court cannot
see its way through how two policemen, joining 'Boy' in the dead
of the night, explicitly to give him and his goods some protection,
which service would be paid, yet would not know what they are
out to protect. And neither could the Court see reason in 'Boy's'
leaving them behind when he was going to pick up and load the
blue seal cigarettes. 'Boy' knew the risks. He wanted them for
Persons and Family Relations Cases
protection, so why will he discard them? How so unnatural and
so contrary to reason."31
Being contrary to human experience, his version of the facts is too pat
and stereotyped to be accepted at face value. Evidence, to be believed,
not only must proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must also
be credible in itself, as when it conforms to common experience and
observation of humankind.32
The absence of any suspicious reaction on the part of petitioner was not
in accordance with human nature. The involvement or participation he
and his co-accused had in the smuggling of the goods was confirmed by
their lack of proper and reasonable justification for the fact that they had
been found inside the cargo truck, seated in front, when it was
intercepted by the authorities. Despite his protestation, it is obvious that
petitioner was aware of the strange nature of the transaction, and that
he was willing to do his part in furtherance thereof. The evidence
presented by the prosecution established his work of guarding and
escorting the contraband to facilitate its transportation from the Port
Area to Malabon, an act punishable under Section 3601 of the Tax Code.
Second Issue:
Validity of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure
Order (ASSO) No. 4754 was invalid, as the law upon which it was
predicated -- General Order No. 60, issued by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos -- was subsequently declared by the Court, in Tañada v.
Tuvera,33 to have no force and effect. Thus, he asserts, any evidence
obtained pursuant thereto is inadmissible in evidence.
We do not agree. In Tañada, the Court addressed the possible effects of
its declaration of the invalidity of various presidential issuances.
Discussing therein how such a declaration might affect acts done on a
presumption of their validity, the Court said:
"x x x. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
66

'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the
Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. x x x It is
quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must
be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects –with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed
to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of
its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which
have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal,
and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.'
xxxx xx xxx
"Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is 'an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration x x x that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.'"34
The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada advocates that, prior to the
nullification of a statute, there is an imperative necessity of taking into
account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the acceptance
of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done
while the legislative or the executive act was in operation should be duly
Persons and Family Relations Cases
recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects.35 The ASSO that
was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 -- long before our
Decision in Tañada and the arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact that
can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored.
Furthermore, the search and seizure of goods, suspected to have been
introduced into the country in violation of customs laws, is one of the
seven doctrinally accepted exceptions36 to the constitutional provision.
Such provision mandates that no search or seizure shall be made except
by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge who has personally determined
the existence of probable cause.37
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may be
made even without a warrant for purposes of enforcing customs and
tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial
warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass
through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building that
is not a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any
vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person
on board; or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.38
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,* Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
67

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 149285 : August 30, 2006]
GODOFREDO MORALES, Petitioner, v. SKILLS INTERNATIONAL
COMPANY AND/OR MAHER DAAS AND MARIVIC DAAS AND/OR
WALLAN AL WALLAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Court of Appeals' Decision 1 dated 28 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
58795. The Court of Appeals' Decision dismissed petitioner's Petition for
Certiorari and had, in effect, affirmed the Resolution 2 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which in turn sustained the
findings of the Labor Arbiter 3 that petitioner did not have a cause of
action against respondent Skills International Company (Skills
International).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 1 September 1997, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondent
Skills International before the NLRC claiming that he was illegally
dismissed from service by his foreign employer, Wallan Al Wallan. In his
Complaint, 4 petitioner sought the payment of the following: unpaid
salaries for one and one-half months; refund of his plane fare; illegal
deductions; attorney's fees and litigation expenses; and moral and
exemplary damages. The complaint was amended on 2 October 1997 5 to
implead respondents Maher Daas, Marivic Daas, and Wallan Al Wallan.
Petitioner likewise sought the payment of these items: the six and one-
half months unexpired portion of his contract; refund of the amount of
5,000.00 Saudi Riyals allegedly deducted from his salary; unpaid
overtime pay and medical care.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
In his Position Paper, 6 petitioner alleged that his employment was
illegally terminated on 14 April 1997 in gross violation of the
Constitution and of the Labor Code. Because of this, he claimed that he
was entitled to receive payment for the unexpired portion of his
employment agreement as well as moral, exemplary, and nominal
damages, and attorney's fees.
For its part, respondent Skills International alleged that it previously
deployed petitioner for work abroad in April 1995 until he came home in
July 1996. Later on, petitioner met his new employer at respondent
Skills International's office in Malate, Manila. Respondent Skills
International, however, clarified that petitioner's new employer, Wallan
Al Wallan, was not its accredited principal. This being the case, it argued
that petitioner did not have any cause of action against it because as a
recruitment agency, it could only be held solidarily liable with the
employer if the latter is an accredited principal of the agency.
Respondent Skills International also averred that petitioner's
deployment was processed under the Balik Manggagawa program of the
government so that he could immediately return to work abroad.7
On 31 July 1998, Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati rendered a Decision 8
dismissing the case for lack of merit stating that if there was anyone
liable for petitioner's illegal dismissal, it was none other than his foreign
employer, Wallan Al Wallan.
Petitioner then filed an appeal with the NLRC but the same was resolved
against him 9 prompting petitioner to elevate his case to the Court of
Appeals. In the Decision now assailed before us, the Court of Appeals
dismissed his Petition for Certiorari with the decretal portion of the
Decision stating:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.10
In sustaining the NLRC, the Court of Appeals stated that petitioner's
arguments were a mere reiteration of those he earlier presented before
the NLRC and which were already passed upon by the latter.11 The Court
of Appeals also held that petitioner failed to present any basis to support
his argument that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
resolving the case in favor of respondent Skills International.12
68

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied; 13
hence, the present recourse where petitioner argues that the Court of
Appeals erred in its findings that:
A. ) There is no formal, valid and signed contract of employment that
binds the petitioner and the private respondents;
b.) Petitioner was hired directly by his foreign employer and was
processed as a Balik-Manggagawa; and
c.) Petitioner did not pay any placement fee and he did not mention that
he was deducted placement fee by the respondent [Skills
International].14
Petitioner claims that the relationship between Wallan Al Wallan and
respondent Skills International was sufficiently established when the
latter stated in its Position Paper that it was in its office in Malate,
Manila, where petitioner met his new employer. Petitioner insists that if
Wallan Al Wallan were not an accredited principal of respondent Skills
International, then he had no business being in the latter's office. But
since as petitioner and Wallan Al Wallan met each other within the
confines of respondent Skills International's office, it can be said that
respondent Skills International had a hand in their meeting. More than
this, it was respondent Skills International which handled his
deployment for work abroad as a balik-manggagawa.
Petitioner also points out that in the medical examination report dated 6
September 1996 issued by Angelina Apostol Punzalan Medical Clinic, 15 it
is clearly stated that it was respondent Skills International which
recommended him for physical examination. He argues that the medical
clinic would not have attended to him had it not been for the referral of
respondent Skills International as under Section 3, Rule VII, Book II of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, 16 "[m]edical examination
of workers for overseas employment shall be conducted only after the
agency and/or its principal shall have interviewed and trade tested or
have pre-qualified the worker for an existing overseas position duly
covered by an approved job order." 17
Likewise, in the Standard Employment Contract for Various Skills 18
which petitioner signed, it is stated that his local placement agency is
Persons and Family Relations Cases
respondent Skills International while his principal in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, is Wallan Al Wallan. Petitioner claims that while he signed and
even affixed his thumbmark on said contract, he avers that he could not
explain why no responsible officer or employee of respondent Skills
International signed said document.
In addition, petitioner maintains that he does not fall within the category
of balik-manggagawa as the term refers to "a landbased contract worker
who is on vacation or on emergency leave, and who is returning to the
same work site to resume his employment." 19 Obviously then, he should
not have been considered as a balik-manggagawa since he was neither
here on vacation nor on emergency leave; instead, he went back abroad
under an entirely new employment contract.
As for the lack of placement fee he paid to respondent Skills
International, petitioner claims that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the
Court of Appeals failed to take notice of the receipt, written in Saudi
Arabian language, showing that his employer abroad deducted 5,000
Saudi Riyals from his salary as placement fee.20
Given these circumstances, petitioner concludes that respondent Skills
International should be held liable to him for the illegal dismissal
perpetuated by its accredited principal, Wallan Al Wallan, as provided
for under Section [60] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 21 which states:
Section 60. Solidary Liability. - The liability of the principal/employer
and the recruitment/placement agency on any and all claims under this
Rule shall be joint and solidary. This liability shall be incorporated in the
contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for
its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable
for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers.
If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate
officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves
be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for
the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the
employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution,
69

amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the
said contract.
On the other hand, respondent Skills International insists that this
Petition should be dismissed as it seeks a review of the factual findings
of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals - a task which
clearly does not fall within the ambit of a Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Nevertheless, respondent Skills International proceeded to
address the matters stated in the Petition. It contends that although it
had previously deployed petitioner abroad, such deployment was for its
accredited principal, the Saudi Automotive Services Company and not
for Wallan Al Wallan. While it may be true that Wallan Al Wallan and
petitioner met one another at its office, respondent Skills International
argues that this does not readily lead to the conclusion that Wallan Al
Wallan was its accredited principal. As one of its officers is from the
Middle East, respondent Skills International avers that it is customary
that it invites visitors from said region to come to their office.
Anent the medical examination which was undergone by petitioner,
respondent Skills International claims that it could not have possibly
recommended him for such a procedure as precisely, there was no job
order as far as Wallan Al Wallan's company was concerned.
Respondent Skills International also denies having facilitated
petitioner's deployment as an alleged balik-manggagawa as petitioner's
Balik-Manggagawa Information Sheet does not indicate the name of any
local placement or recruitment agency. Moreover, on 19 June 1998,
POEA Administrator Felicisimo Joson issued an Order, 22 the pertinent
portion of which reads:
The issue posed for Our resolution is whether or not the respondent
agency (herein respondent) should be held liable for withholding
worker's salaries should be resolved in the negative. As discussed,
complainant (herein petitioner) was hired directly by his employer and
the respondent agency had no participation whatsoever in his overseas
employment. Wanting in factual and legal [bases], the charged offense
must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the instant case be, as it is hereby
ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.23
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Respondent Skills International also insists that it did not receive
placement fee from petitioner for the simple reason that it did not
deploy him to work abroad for Wallan Al Wallan and that only petitioner
and said employer are the ones privy to the circumstances surrounding
the alleged salary deductions committed by the latter.
The petition must fail.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the resolution of the issue of
whether respondent Skills International could be held solidarily liable
for the alleged illegal dismissal of petitioner necessarily hinges on the
primordial question of whether respondent Skills International was the
one responsible for his deployment abroad. This indubitably raises a
question of fact which is not a proper subject of a Petition for Review on
Certiorari. It is axiomatic that in an appeal by certiorari, only questions
of law may be reviewed.24
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact was
comprehensively discussed in the case of Microsoft Corporation v.
Maxicorp, Inc., 25 thus:
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled.
A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what
the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this
delineation seems simple, determining the true nature and extent of the
distinction is sometimes problematic. For example, it is incorrect to
presume that all cases where the facts are not in dispute automatically
involve purely questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved
without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review
of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query
requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence
or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each
other, the issue in that query is factual.26
In this case, the issues brought for our consideration calls for the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the parties and the
70

determination of whether the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of
Appeals erred in their respective evaluation of the same. This we cannot
do without blurring the difference between a question of fact and a
question of law - a significant distinction as far as the remedy of appeal
by certiorari is concerned.
Furthermore, factual findings of administrative agencies that are
affirmed by the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not
reviewable by this Court.27 This is so because of the special knowledge
and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial agencies from presiding
over matters falling within their jurisdiction.28 So long as these factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court will not
disturb the same.29
As earlier stated, in this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court
of Appeals are unanimous in their factual conclusions that Wallan Al
Wallan is not an accredited principal of respondent Skills International
and we sustain said findings. As aptly observed by the NLRC'
In the instant case, the alleged Employment Contract, Annex "A" for the
complainant (herein petitioner) appears to be one which is not perfected
by herein parties, because said contract does not bear the signatures of
the respondents or any of their authorized representatives. It only bears
the signature and thumbmark of the complainant. On its face, the
Employment Contract readily shows that respondent agency has neither
participated nor is it a [privy] to any party who executed the contract
binding it to the terms and conditions of the same.
Even in the Complainant's Overseas Employment Certificate No.
144592-A, the name of respondent agency does not appear to be the one
that recruited and deployed the complainant. Likewise, the Balikbayan
Info Sheet of complainant does not indicated that herein respondent
agency is the contracting agency in the Philippines. x x x.
Complainant failed to submit evidence to disprove the allegations of the
[respondents] that they neither participated in the contract of
employment of complainant (Annex "A" for the complainant) nor were
they privy to the terms and conditions appearing therein. The evidence
submitted are not sufficient to hold respondent agency liable. The copy
of the receipt for the alleged placement fee was not issued by the
respondent agency but by the employer of complainant which is not its
Persons and Family Relations Cases
accredited principal - another fact which was never controverted by the
complainant. This being the case, complainant has no cause of action
against herein respondent and therefore, his money claims could not
prosper in the instant case.
The Solidary Liability under Section [60] of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas and Filipino Act of
1995, will only apply if there is an existing valid contract and signed by
the parties concerned.30
To this, we add our own observations. Petitioner insists that he does not
qualify as a balik-manggagawa as the term is defined under the law.
Nevertheless, it does not escape us that in his pleadings, 31 he asserts
that respondent Skills International handled his deployment as a balik-
manggagawa to expedite his deployment abroad. In addition, he never
denied having filled-up the entries in the Balik-Manggagawa
Information Sheet leaving the portion pertaining to the name of the
placement or recruitment agency blank. To our mind, it is clear that
petitioner utilizes the Balik-Manggagawa program of the government
whenever it is convenient for him. Thus, he availed himself of said
program in order to fast-track his deployment abroad and yet now that
said Info Sheet is being used against him, he claims that he could not
have been processed as a balik-manggagawa as defined by law. We
simply cannot countenance such trifling regard for the law by awarding
to petitioner the money claims he is seeking in the present case.
As for the medical examination result which petitioner belatedly
presented before the Court of Appeals, the law clearly requires that
there should first be a job order relating to an existing overseas position
before a worker shall be subjected to a medical examination. In this case,
as petitioner is the one insisting that a job order exists, he bears the
burden of producing the same. After all, the rule is settled that he who
alleges must prove.32 Petitioner miserably failed to discharge this
burden.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 November
2000 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 58795, affirming the Resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated 31 January 2000, is AFFIRMED. No
costs SO ORDERED.
71
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Republic of the Philippines of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a
SUPREME COURT lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its
Manila urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”9cralaw
virtualaw library
EN BANC
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013 (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order
for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
MEDADO, Petitioner.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant
RESOLUTION Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys.11cralaw virtualaw library
SERENO, C.J.:
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory
conference on the matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by
Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The
petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).
OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the
that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner
degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and passed the same year’s bar
could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll
examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2cralaw virtualaw
of Attorneys.15cralaw virtualaw library
library
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine
instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
International Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar
Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.6cralaw
disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical
virtualaw library
transgressions of members of the Bar.
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files,
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that
he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance
when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
record.7cralaw virtualaw library
We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to
petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated
his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When
that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was
asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant
not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the
petition, Medado very candidly replied:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing
72

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you
say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s
gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and
anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I
have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for
disqualification from the practice of law,17 which is more than what we
can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members
of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that
petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the
profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the
character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal
practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18
Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and
the Energy Development Corporation.19cralaw virtualaw library
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member
of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege
from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to
withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all
liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period
spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
“neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment.”22cralaw virtualaw library
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from
the legal consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24
a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because
everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25
Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first
operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he
had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the
Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado
should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in
spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without
taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for
admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s
assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such
without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however,
is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the
filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it
appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of
court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain
from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal
charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise
transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice
of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because
at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized
practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9
73
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

have warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As

Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the
practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin
to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1)
year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the
prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it
fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period,
petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of
law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of
law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with
severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is

hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution.
Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is
NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing
any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Abad, Perez, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., On leave.
Peralta, Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., On official leave.

74

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991
REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Pedro G. Peralta for petitioner.
Florentino G. Libatique for private respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded,
as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San
Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On
the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio
Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one
part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement
flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and
fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian,
were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San
Fernando, La Union, for medical treatment. Upon medical examination,
petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm
and forehead, specifically described as follows: lacerated wound,
forehead; abrasion, elbow, left; abrasion, knee, left; abrasion, lateral
surface, leg, left. 1
On 14 July 1973, while injured. passengers were confined in the hospital,
Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for
their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner
P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in going home
from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured
Persons and Family Relations Cases
passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit
which stated, among other things:
That we were passengers of Thames with Plate No. 52-222 PUJ
Phil. 73 and victims after the said Thames met an accident at
Barrio Payocpoc Norte, Bauang, La Union while passing through
the National Highway No. 3;
That after a thorough investigation the said Thames met the
accident due to mechanical defect and went off the road and
turned turtle to the east canal of the road into a creek causing
physical injuries to us;
xxx xxx xxx
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or
civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because
it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said
Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon
our injuries.
xxx xxx xxx 2
(Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the then
Court of First Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover
compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in the complaint that her
injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap had left her with a
conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead,
generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part; and
that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her
friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and
deprived her of opportunities for employment. She prayed for an award
of: P10,000.00 for loss of employment and other opportunities;
P10,000.00 for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her
forehead; P30,000.00 for moral damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to
force majeure, and that petitioner had already been paid and moreover
75

had waived any right to institute any action against him (private
respondent) and his driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint
Affidavit on 14 July 1973.
After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that
when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished
any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had
against respondent and the driver of the mini-bus.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal
of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages:
We are not in accord, therefore, of (sic) the ground of the trial
court's dismissal of the complaint, although we conform to the
trial court's disposition of the case — its dismissal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations, there being no
error committed by the lower court in dismissing the plaintiff-
appellant's complaint, the judgment of dismissal is hereby
affirmed.
Without special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 3
In the present Petition for Review filed in forma pauperis, petitioner
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask this Court to award
her actual or compensatory damages as well as moral damages.
We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no
valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by petitioner. The
relevant language of the Joint Affidavit may be quoted again:
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or
civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames,
because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the
said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated
upon our injuries. (Emphasis supplied)
Persons and Family Relations Cases
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in
clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of
a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. 4 A
waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms
thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a
right vested in such person.
The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported
waivers is illustrated in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit
(supra), where the Court in reading and rejecting a purported waiver
said:
. . . It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte Provincial
Hospital, appellees were asked to sign as, in fact, they signed the
document Exhibit I wherein they stated that "in consideration of
the expenses which said operator has incurred in properly giving
us the proper medical treatment, we hereby manifest our desire to
waive any and all claims against the operator of the Samar
Express Transit."
xxx xxx xxx
Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned above
will readily show that appellees did not actually waive their right
to claim damages from appellant for the latter's failure to comply
with their contract of carriage. All that said document proves is
that they expressed a "desire" to make the waiver — which
obviously is not the same as making an actual waiver of their right.
A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and
unequivocal (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of July 8,
1887) — which is not the case of the one relied upon in this
appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Susaya, we would have to
conclude that the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot
be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and unequivocal" terms. Moreover,
the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by
petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she
was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in
the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form
of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading
76

the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other
passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too
signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety.
Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt
whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit
(prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and
whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action
against private respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier
for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a
common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe
any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For
a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals,
public policy or good
customs. 5 To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages
by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this
case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary
diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render
that standard unenforceable. 6 We believe such a purported waiver is
offensive to public policy.
Petitioner Gatchalian also argues that the Court of Appeals, having by
majority vote held that there was no enforceable waiver of her right of
action, should have awarded her actual or compensatory and moral
damages as a matter of course.
We have already noted that a duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in
protecting the safety of its passengers is imposed upon a common
carrier. 7 In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory
presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted
negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." 8 In fact, because of
this statutory presumption, it has been held that a court need not even
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common
carrier in order to hold it liable. 9 To overcome this presumption, the
common carrier must slow to the court that it had exercised
extraordinary diligence to prevent the injuries. 10 The standard of
extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably
more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence, i.e., the
diligence of a good paterfamilias established in respect of the ordinary
Persons and Family Relations Cases
relations between members of society. A common carrier is bound to
carry its passengers safely" as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due
regard to all the circumstances". 11
Thus, the question which must be addressed is whether or not private
respondent has successfully proved that he had exercised extraordinary
diligence to prevent the mishap involving his mini-bus. The records
before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Curiously,
respondent did not even attempt, during the trial before the court a quo,
to prove that he had indeed exercised the requisite extraordinary
diligence. Respondent did try to exculpate himself from liability by
alleging that the mishap was the result of force majeure. But allegation is
not proof and here again, respondent utterly failed to substantiate his
defense of force majeure. To exempt a common carrier from liability for
death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of force
majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of
the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it
was impossible to avoid. Any participation by the common carrier in the
occurrence of the injury will defeat the defense of force majeure. In
Servando v. Philippine Steam Navigation Company, 12 the Court summed
up the essential characteristics of force majeure by quoting with
approval from the Enciclopedia Juridica Española:
Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate
and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from
liability non-performance. The Partidas, the antecedent of Article
1174 of the Civil Code, defines "caso fortuito" as 'an event that
takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.
Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire,
shipwreck, violence of robber.
In its dissertation on the phrase "caso fortuito" the Enciclopedia
Juridica Española says: 'In legal sense and, consequently, also in
relation to contracts, a "caso fortuito" presents the following
essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with his obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2) it
must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the
"caso fortuito", or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
77

avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4)
the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
Upon the other hand, the record yields affirmative evidence of fault or
negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. In her direct
examination, petitioner Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the
vehicle went off the road and into a ditch, a "snapping sound" was
suddenly heard at one part of the bus. One of the passengers, an old
woman, cried out, "What happened?" ("Apay addan samet nadadaelen?").
The driver replied, nonchalantly, "That is only normal" ("Ugali ti makina
dayta"). The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong
with the bus. Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the
same "snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions.
This could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or
mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound"
which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed
to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating
condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers
dictated that the bus be checked and repaired. The obvious continued
failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the
bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus
after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm
from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical
safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of
respondent and his driver.
We turn to petitioner's claim for damages. The first item in that claim
relates to revenue which petitioner said she failed to realize because of
the effects of the vehicular mishap. Petitioner maintains that on the day
that the mini-bus went off the road, she was supposed to confer with the
district supervisor of public schools for a substitute teacher's job, a job
which she had held off and on as a "casual employee." The Court of
Appeals, however, found that at the time of the accident, she was no
longer employed in a public school since, being a casual employee and
not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her employment as a
substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. In view of her
employment status as such, the Court of Appeals held that she could not
be said to have in fact lost any employment after and by reason of the
Persons and Family Relations Cases
accident. 13 Such was the factual finding of the Court of Appeals, a
finding entitled to due respect from this Court. Petitioner Gatchalian has
not submitted any basis for overturning this finding of fact, and she may
not be awarded damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture. 14
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar
on her forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical
integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished,
actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are
due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as
nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A
scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the
infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise
to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante. If the scar is
relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of
surgery may be expected to be correspondingly modest. In Araneta, et al.
vs. Areglado, et al., 15 this Court awarded actual or compensatory
damages for, among other things, the surgical removal of the scar on the
face of a young boy who had been injured in a vehicular collision. The
Court there held:
We agree with the appellants that the damages awarded by the
lower court for the injuries suffered by Benjamin Araneta are
inadequate. In allowing not more than P1,000.00 as
compensation for the "permanent deformity and — something
like an inferiority complex" as well as for the "pathological
condition on the left side of the jaw" caused to said plaintiff, the
court below overlooked the clear evidence on record that to
arrest the degenerative process taking place in the mandible and
restore the injured boy to a nearly normal condition, surgical
intervention was needed, for which the doctor's charges would
amount to P3,000.00, exclusive of hospitalization fees, expenses
and medicines. Furthermore, the operation, according to Dr. Diño,
would probably have to be repeated in order to effectuate a
complete cure, while removal of the scar on the face obviously
demanded plastic surgery.
xxx xxx xxx
The father's failure to submit his son to a plastic operation as
soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is not called
78
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

for. The damage to the jaw and the existence of the scar in
Benjamin Araneta's face are physical facts that can not be
reasoned out of existence. That the injury should be treated in
order to restore him as far as possible to his original condition is
undeniable. The father's delay, or even his negligence, should not
be allowed to prejudice the son who has no control over the
parent's action nor impair his right to a full indemnity.
. . . Still, taking into account the necessity and cost of corrective
measures to fully repair the damage; the pain suffered by the
injured party; his feelings of inferiority due to consciousness of
his present deformity, as well as the voluntary character of the
injury inflicted; and further considering that a repair, however,
skillfully conducted, is never equivalent to the original state, we
are of the opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court
should be increased to a total of P18,000.00. (Emphasis
supplied)
reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as atttorney's fees is
in fact even more modest. 19
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October
1980, as well as the decision of the then Court of First Instance of La
Union dated 4 December 1975 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Respondent is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner Reynalda
Gatchalian the following sums: 1) P15,000.00 as actual or compensatory
damages to cover the cost of plastic surgery for the removal of the scar
on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30,000.00 as moral damages; and 3)
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at the
legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the promulgation of this
decision until full payment thereof. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petitioner estimated that the cost of having her scar surgically removed
was somewhere between P10,000.00 to P15,000.00. 16 Upon the other
hand, Dr. Fe Tayao Lasam, a witness presented as an expert by
petitioner, testified that the cost would probably be between P5,000.00
to P10,000.00. 17 In view of this testimony, and the fact that a
considerable amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973 which
may be expected to increase not only the cost but also very probably the
difficulty of removing the scar, we consider that the amount of
P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable.

Turning to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the long-established

rule is that moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on
the part of the common carrier is shown. 18 Since we have earlier
concluded that respondent common carrier and his driver had been
grossly negligent in connection with the bus mishap which had injured
petitioner and other passengers, and recalling the aggressive manuevers
of respondent, through his wife, to get the victims to waive their right to
recover damages even as they were still hospitalized for their injuries,
petitioner must be held entitled to such moral damages. Considering the
extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a
result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her
forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a

79

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 116631 October 28, 1998
MARSH THOMSON, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE
AMERICAN CHAMPER OF COMMERCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC,
Respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals on May 19, 1994, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY SET ASIDE.
ANOTHER JUDGMENT IS ENTERED ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
MARSH THOMSON TO TRANSFER THE SAID MPC [Manila Polo Club]
SHARE TO THE NOMINEE OF THE APPELLANT.
The facts of the case are:
Petitioner Marsh Thomson (Thomson) was the Executive Vice-President
and, later on, the Management Consultant of private respondent, the
American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Inc. (AmCham) for
over ten years, 1979-1989.
While petitioner was still working with private respondent, his superior,
A. Lewis Burridge, retired as AmCham's President. Before Burridge
decided to return to his home country, he wanted to transfer his
proprietary share in the Manila Polo Club (MPC) to petitioner. However,
through the intercession of Burridge, private respondent paid for the
share but had it listed in petitioner's name. This was made clear in an
employment advice dated January 13, 1986, wherein petitioner was
informed by private respondent as follows:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
xxx xxx xxx
11. If you so desire, the Chamber is willing to acquire for your use a
membership in the Manila Polo Club. The timing of such acquisition shall
be subject to the discretion of the Board based on the Chamber's
financial position. All dues and other charges relating to such
membership shall be for your personal account. If the membership is
acquired in your name, you would execute such documents as necessary
to acknowledge beneficial ownership thereof by the Chamber. 2
xxx xxx xxx
On April 25, 1986, Burridge transferred said proprietary share to
petitioner, as confirmed in a letter 3 of notification to the Manila Polo
Club.
Upon his admission as a new member of the MPC, petitioner paid the
transfer fee of P40,000.00 from his own funds; but private respondent
subsequently reimbursed this amount. On November 19, 1986, MPC
issued Proprietary Membership Certificate Number 3398 in favor of
petitioner. But petitioner, however, failed to execute a document
recognizing private respondent's beneficial ownership over said share.
Following AmCham's policy and practice, there was a yearly renewal of
employment contract between the petitioner and private respondent.
Separate letters of employment advice dated October 1, 1986 4, as well
March 4, 1988 5 and January 7, 1989 6, mentioned the MPC share. But
petitioner never acknowledged that private respondent is the beneficial
owner of the share as requested in follow-up requests, particularly one
dated March 4, 1988 as follows:
Dear Marsh:
xxx xxx xxx
All other provisions of your compensation/benefit package will remain
the same and are summarized as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
80

9) The Manila Polo Club membership provided by the Chamber for you
and your family will continue on the same basis, to wit: all dues and
other charges relating to such membership shall be for your personal
account and, if you have not already done so, you will execute such
documents as are necessary to acknowledge that the Chamber is the
beneficial owner of your membership in the
Club. 7
When petitioner's contract of employment was up for renewal in 1989,
he notified private respondent that he would no longer be available as
Executive Vice President after September 30, 1989. Still, the private
respondent asked the petitioner to stay on for another six (6) months.
Petitioner indicated his acceptance of the consultancy arrangement with
a counter-proposal in his letter dated October 8, 1989, among others as
follows:
11.) Retention of the Polo Club share, subject to my reimbursing the
purchase price to the Chamber, or one hundred ten thousand pesos
(P110,000.00). 8
Private respondent rejected petitioner's counter-proposal.
Pending the negotiation for the consultancy arrangement, private
respondent executed on September 29, 1989 a Release and Quitclaim, 9
stating that "AMCHAM, its directors, officers and assigns, employees
and/or representatives do hereby release, waive, abandon and discharge
J. MARSH THOMSON from any and all existing claims that the AMCHAM,
its directors, officers and assigns, employees and/or representatives
may have against J. MARSH THOMSON." 10 The quitclaim, expressed in
general terms, did not mention specifically the MPC share.
On April 5, 1990, private respondent, through counsel sent a letter to the
petitioner demanding the return and delivery of the MPC share which "it
(AmCham) owns and placed in your (Thomson's) name." 11
Failing to get a favorable response, private respondent filed on May 15,
1990, a complaint against petitioner praying, inter alia, that the Makati
Regional Trial Court render judgment ordering Thomson "to return the
Manila Polo Club share to the plaintiff and transfer said share to the
nominee of plaintiff." 12
Persons and Family Relations Cases
On February 28, 1992, the trial court promulgated its decision, 13 thus:
The foregoing considered judgment is rendered as follows:
1) The ownership of the contested Manila Polo Club share is adjudicated
in favor of defendant Marsh Thomson; and;
2) Defendant shall pay plaintiff the sum of P300,000.00
Because both parties thru their respective faults have somehow
contributed to the birth of this case, each shall bear the incidental
expenses incurred. 14
In said decision, the trial court awarded the MPC share to defendant
(petitioner now) on the ground that the Articles of Incorporation and
By-laws of Manila Polo Club prohibit artificial persons, such as
corporations, to be club members, ratiocinating in this manner:
An assessment of the evidence adduced by both parties at the trial will
show clearly that it was the intention of the parties that a membership to
Manila Polo Club was to be secured by plaintiff [herein private
respondent] for defendant's [herein petitioner] use. The latter was to
execute the necessary documents to acknowledge ownership of the Polo
membership in favor of plaintiff. (Exh. C par 9) However, when the
parties parted ways in disagreement and with some degree of bitterness,
the defendant had second thoughts and decided to keep the membership
for himself. This is evident from the exhibits (E & G) where defendant
asked that he retained the Polo Club membership upon reimbursement
of its purchase price; and where he showed his "profound
disappointment, both at the previous Board's unfair action, and at what I
consider to be harsh terms, after my long years of dedication to the
Chamber's interest."
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding all these evidence in favor of plaintiff, however,
defendant may not be declared the owner of the contested membership
be compelled to execute documents transferring the Polo Membership to
plaintiff or the latter's nominee for the reason that this is prohibited by
Polo Club's Articles & By-Laws. . . .
81

It is for the foregoing reasons that the Court rules that the ownership of
the questioned Polo Club membership be retained by defendant. 15 . . . .
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, private respondent appealed
to the Court of Appeals.
On May 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals (Former Special Sixth Division)
promulgated its decision 16 in said CA-G.R. CV No. 38417, reversing the,
trial court's judgment and ordered herein petitioner to transfer the MPC
share to the nominee of private respondent, reasoning thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The significant fact in the instant case is that the appellant [herein
private respondent] purchased the MPC share for the use of the appellee
[herein petitioner] and the latter expressly conformed thereto as shown
in Exhibits A-1, B, B-1, C, C-1, D, D-1. By such express conformity of the
appellee, the former was bound to recognize the appellant as the owner
of the said share for a contract has the force of law between the parties.
(Alim vs. CA, 200 SCRA 450; Sasuhura Company, Inc., Ltd. vs. IAC, 205
SCRA 632) Aside from the foregoing, the appellee conceded the true
ownership of the said share to the appellant when (1) he offered to buy
the MPC share from the appellant (Exhs. E and E-1) upon the
termination of his employment; (2) he obliged himself to return the MPC
share after his six month consultancy contract had elapsed, unless its
return was earlier requested in writting (Exh. I); and (3) on cross-
examination, he admitted that the proprietary share listed as one of the
assets of the appellant corporation in its 1988 Corporate Income Tax
Return, which he signed as the latter's Executive Vice President (prior to
its filing), refers to the Manila Polo Club Share (tsn., pp. 19-20, August
30, 1991). . . . 17
On 16 June 1994, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 18 of said
decision. By resolution 19 promulgated on August 4, 1994, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
In this petition for review, petitioner alleges the following errors of
public respondent as grounds for our review:
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the Decision
dated 28 February 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch 65,
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Makati, Metro Manila, in its Civil Case No. 90-1286, and in not confirming
petitioner's ownership over the MPC membership share.
II. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that "the Quitclaim
executed by AmCham in favor of petitioner of September 29, 1989 was
superseded by the contractual agreement entered into by the parties on
October 13, 1989 wherein again the appellee acknowledged that the
appellant owned the MPC share, there being absolutely no evidence to
support such a conclusion and/or such inference is manifestly mistaken.
III. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in rendering judgment
ordering petitioner to transfer the contested MPC share to a nominee of
respondent AmCham notwithstanding that: (a) AmCham has no standing
in the Manila Polo Club (MPG), and being an artificial person, it is
precluded under MPC's Articles of Incorporation and governing rules
and regulations from owning a proprietary share or from becoming a
member thereof: and (b) even under AmCham's Articles of
Incorporation, the purposes for which it is dedicated, becoming a
stockholder or shareholder in other corporation is not one of the express
implied powers fixed in AmCham's said corporate franchise. 20
As posited above, these assigned errors show the disputed matters
herein are mainly factual. As such they are best left to the trial and
appellate courts' disposition. And this Court could have dismissed the
petition outright, were it not for the opposite results reached by the
courts below. Moreover, for the enhanced appreciation of the jural
relationship between the parties involving trust, this Court has given due
course to the petition, which we now decide.
After carefully considering the pleadings on record, we find there are
two main issues to be resolved: (1) Did respondent court err in holding
that private respondent is the beneficial owner of the disputed share?
(2) Did the respondent court err in ordering petitioner to transfer said
share to private respondent's nominees?
Petitioner claims ownership of the MPC share, asserting that he merely
incurred a debt to respondent when the latter advanced the funds for
the purchase of the share. On the other hand, private respondent asserts
beneficial ownership whereby petitioner only holds the share in his
name, but the beneficial title belongs to private respondent. To resolve
the first issue, we must clearly distinguish a debt from a trust.
82

The beneficiary of a trust has beneficial interest in the trust property,
while a creditor has merely a personal claim against the debtor. In trust,
there is a fiduciary relation between a trustee and a beneficiary, but
there is no such relation between a debtor and creditor. While a debt
implies merely an obligation to pay a certain sum of money, a trust
refers to a duty to deal with a specific property for the benefit of another.
If a creditor-debtor relationship exists, but not a fiduciary relationship
between the parties, there is no express trust. However, it is understood
that when the purported trustee of funds is entitled to use them as his or
her own (and commingle them with his or her own money), a debtor-
creditor relationship exists, not a trust. 21
In the present case, as the Executive Vice-President of AmCham,
petitioner occupied a fiduciary position in the business of AmCham.
AmCham released the funds to acquire a share in the Club for the use of
petitioner but obliged him to "execute such document as necessary to
acknowledge beneficial ownership thereof by the Chamber". 22 A trust
relationship is, therefore, manifestly indicated.
Moreover, petitioner failed to present evidence to support his allegation
of being merely a debtor when the private respondent paid the purchase
price of the MPC share. Applicable here is the rule that a trust arises in
favor of one who pays the purchase money of property in the name of
another, because of the presumption that he who pays for a thing
intends a beneficial interest therein for himself. 23
Although petitioner initiated the acquisition of the share, evidence on
record shows that private respondent acquired said share with its funds.
Petitioner did not pay for said share, although he later wanted to, but
according to his own terms, particularly the price thereof.
Private respondent's evident purpose in acquiring the share was to
provide additional incentive and perks to its chosen executive, the
petitioner himself. Such intention was repeated in the yearly
employment advice prepared by AmCham for petitioner's concurrence.
In the cited employment advice, dated March 4, 1988, private
respondent once again, asked the petitioner to execute proof to
recognize the trust agreement in writing:
The Manila Polo membership provided by the Chamber for you and your
family will continue on the same basis, to wit: all dues and other charges
Persons and Family Relations Cases
relating to such membership shall be for your personal account and, if
you have not already done so, you will execute such documents as are
necessary to acknowledge that the Chamber is the beneficial owner of
your membership in the Club. 24
Petitioner voluntarily affixed his signature to conform with the
employment advice, including his obligation stated therein - for him to
execute the necessary document to recognize his employer as the
beneficial owner of the MPC share. Now, we cannot hear him claiming
otherwise, in derogation of said undertaking, without legal and equitable
justification.
For private respondent's intention to hold on to its beneficial ownership
is not only presumed; it was expressed in writing at the very outset.
Although the share was placed in the name of petitioner, his title is
limited to the usufruct, that is, to enjoy the facilities and privileges of
such membership in the club appertaining to the share. Such
arrangement reflects a trust relationship governed by law and equity.
While private respondent paid the purchase price for the share,
petitioner was given legal title thereto. Thus, a resulting trust is
presumed as a matter of law. The burden then shifted to the transferee
to show otherwise, that it was just a loan. Such resulting trust could have
been rebutted by proof of a contrary intention by a showing that, in fact,
no trust was intended. Petitioner could have negated the trust
agreement by contrary, consistent and convincing evidence on rebuttal.
However, on the witness stand, petitioner failed to do so persuasively.
On cross-examination, the petitioner testified as follows:
ATTY. AQUINO (continuing)
Q. Okay, let me go to the cash advance that you mentioned Mr. Witness,
is there any document proving that you claimed cash advance signed by
an officer of the Chamber?
A. I believe the best evidence is the check.
Q. Is there any document?
COURT
83

Other than the Check?
MR. THOMSON
Nothing more.
ATTY. AQUINO
Is there any application filed in the Chamber to avail of this cash
advance?
A. Verbal only.
Q. Nothing written, and can you tell to this Honorable Court what are the
stipulations or conditions, or terms of this transaction of securing this
cash advance or loan?
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
How are you going to repay the cash advance?
MR. THOMSON
The cash advance, we never stipulate when I have to repay it, but I
presume that I would, when able to repay the money. 25
In deciding whether the property was wrongfully appropriated or
retained and what the intent of the parties was at the time of the
conveyance, the court must rely upon its impression of the credibility of
the witnesses. 26 Intent is a question of fact, the determination of which
is not reviewable unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is one which
could not reasonably be drawn. 27 Petitioner's denial is not adequate to
rebut the trust. Time and again, we have ruled that denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are deemed negative
and self-serving evidence, unworthy of credence. 28
The trust between the parties having been established, petitioner
advanced an alternative defense that the private respondent waived the
Persons and Family Relations Cases
beneficial ownership of MPC share by issuing the Release and Quitclaim
in his favor.
This argument is less than persuasive. The quitclaim executed by private
respondent does not clearly show the intent to include therein the
ownership over the MPC share. Private respondent even asserts that at
the time the Release and Quitclaim was executed on September 29,
1989, the ownership of the MPC share was not controversial nor
contested. Settled is the rule that a waiver to be valid and effective must,
in the first place, be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave
no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. 29 A waiver may not be attributed to a person
when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent
to abandon a right vested in such person. 30 If we apply the standard rule
that waiver must be cast in clear and unequivocal terms, then clearly the
general terms of the cited release and quitclaim indicates merely a
clearance from general accountability, not specifically a waiver of
AmCham's beneficial ownership of the disputed shares.
Additionally, the intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown
clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in
what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and
indicative of, an intent to voluntarily relinquish the particular right or
advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is
possible. 31 Considering the terms of the quitclaim executed by the
President of private respondent, the tenor of the document does not lead
to the purported conclusion that be intended to renounce private
respondent's beneficial title over its share in the Manila Polo Club. We,
therefore, find no reversible error in the respondent Court's holding that
private respondent, AmCham, is the beneficial owner of the share in
dispute.
Turning now to the second issue, the petitioner contends that the
Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of Manila Polo Club prohibit
corporate membership. However, private respondent does not insist nor
intend to transfer the club membership in its name but rather to its
designated nominee. For as properly ruled by the Court of Appeals:
The matter prayed for does not involve the transfer of said share to the
appellant, an artificial person. The transfer sought is to the appellant's
nominee. Even if the MPC By-Laws and Articles prohibit corporate
84

membership, there would be no violation of said prohibition for the
appellant's nominee to whom the said share is sought to be transferred
would certainly be a natural person. . . .
As to whether or not the transfer of said share the appellant's nominee
would be disapproved by the MPC, is a matter that should be raised at
the proper time, which is only if such transfer is disapproved by the
MPC. 32
The Manila Polo Club does not necessarily prohibit the transfer of
proprietary shares by its members. The Club only restricts membership
to deserving applicants in accordance with its rules, when the amended
Articles of Incorporation states that: "No transfer shall be valid except
between the parties, and shall be registered in the Membership Book
unless made in accordance with these Articles and the By-Laws". 33 Thus,
as between parties herein, there is no question that a transfer is feasible.
Moreover, authority granted to a corporation to regulate the transfer of
its stock does not empower it to restrict the right of a stockholder to
transfer his shares, but merely authorizes the adoption of regulations as
to the formalities and procedure to be followed in effecting transfer. 34
In this case, the petitioner was the nominee of the private respondent to
hold the share and enjoy the privileges of the club. But upon the
expiration of petitioner's employment as officer and consultant of
AmCham, the incentives that go with the position, including use of the
MPC share, also ceased to exist. It now behooves petitioner to surrender
said share to private respondent's next nominee, another natural person.
Obviously this arrangement of trust and confidence cannot be defeated
by the petitioner's citation of the MPC rules to shield his untenable
position, without doing violence to basic tenets of justice and fair
dealing.
However, we still have to ascertain whether the rights of herein parties
to the trust still subsist. It has been held that so long as there has been no
denial or repudiation of the trust, the possession of the trustee of an
express and continuing trust is presumed to be that of the beneficiary,
and the statute of limitations does not run between them. 35 With regard
to a constructive or a resulting trust, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the trustee clearly repudiates or disavows the trust
and such disavowal is brought home to the other party, "cestui que
trust". 36 The statute of limitations runs generally from the time when
Persons and Family Relations Cases
the act was done by which the party became chargeable as a trustee by
operation of law or when the beneficiary knew that he had a cause of
action, 37 in the absence of fraud or concealment.
Noteworthy in the instant case, there was no declared or explicit
repudiation of the trust existing between the parties. Such repudiation
could only be inferred as evident when the petitioner showed his intent
to appropriate the MPC share for himself. Specifically, this happened
when he requested to retain the MPC share upon his reimbursing the
purchase price of P110,000, a request denied promptly by private
respondent. Eventually, petitioner refused to surrender the share
despite the written demand of private respondent. This act could then be
construed as repudiation of the trust. The statute of limitation could
start to set in at this point in time. But private respondent took
immediate positive action. Thus, on May 15, 1990, private respondent
filed an action to recover the MPC share. Between the time of implicit
repudiation of the trust on October 9, 1989, as evidenced by petitioner's
letter of said date, and private respondent's institution of the action to
recover the MPC share on May 15, 1990, only about seven months bad
lapsed. Our laws on the matter provide that actions to recover movables
shall prescribe eight years from the time the possession thereof is lot, 38
unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription for a
less period of four years if in good faith. 39 Since the private respondent
filed the necessary action on time and the defense of good faith is not
available to the petitioner, there is no basis for any purported claim of
prescription, after repudiation of the trust, which will entitle petitioner
to ownership of the disputed share. As correctly held by the respondent
court, petitioner has the obligation to transfer now said share to the
nominee of private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 19, 1994, is AFFIRMED.
COSTS against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
85

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11555 January 6, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GABINO SOLIMAN, defendant-appellant.
Francisco Sevilla for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record conclusively discloses that the defendant and
appellant in this case, Gabino Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the
course of another criminal case in which he, with several others, was
charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of fact.
On that occasion he testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in
evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect an
extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed voluntarily,
and that its execution had not been procured by the police by the use of
force, intimidation and prolonged torture.
The trial judge who presided in the former case acquitted the accused on
the ground that there was room for reasonable doubt as to whether the
extrajudicial confession had been made voluntarily, and his action in this
regard clearly establishes the materiality of the false testimony
submitted in that case; moreover, the materiality of the evidence is
manifest without considering the judgment in the case in which it was
submitted, since, if accepted as true, this false testimony necessarily had
the effect of rendering wholly incompetent the evidence as to the
extrajudicial confession which otherwise would almost conclusively
sustain and necessitate a conviction. (U. S. vs. Estraña, 16 Phil. Rep., 520.)
There can be no doubt that the accused was guilty of the crime of perjury
as defined and penalized in section 3 of Act No. 1697 and that the
Persons and Family Relations Cases
sentence of six months' imprisonment and P300 fine imposed by the
trial judge was correctly imposed under the provisions of that statute.
It appears however that since judgment was entered in this case on
November 23, 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 has been expressly
repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code, which became
effective on July 1, 1916, and it has been suggested that the judgment
convicting and sentencing the accused under the provisions of that
statute should not be sustained, and that the repeal of the statute should
be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal
responsibility of the accused incurred under the provisions of the
repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code. We
cannot agree with the proposition thus stated.
In the case of United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil. Rep., 241), we held as
follows:
The rule of interpretation of English and American common law,
by virtue of which the repeal of a law prescribing penalties is
held to have the effect of remitting or extinguishing any penalty,
loss of rights or responsibility incurred under such law, as to all
persons who have not been convicted and sentenced under the
provisions of such law prior to the enactment of the repealing
law, is not and has not been the accepted doctrine in these
Islands.
Where an Act of the Commission or of the Philippine Legislature
which penalizes an offense, such repeal does not have the effect
of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict
and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law
prior to its repeal.
A question does arise, however, as to the penalty which should be
impose upon the convict.
If the repealing statute provides or has the effect of providing new
penalties for the commission of the acts penalized under the repealed
statute, should the penalty be imposed in accordance with the old or the
new statute?
86

Article 1 of the Penal Code in force in these Islands defines crimes and
misdemeanors as voluntary acts or omissions penalized by law; and
complementary to this provision, article 21 provides that no crime or
misdemeanor shall be punished with a penalty which has not been
prescribed by law prior to its commission. In accordance with these
provisions the question whether an act is punishable or not depends
upon the question whether or not at the time of its commission, there was
a law in force which penalized it; this rule being modified, however, by
article 22 of the same code, which provides that penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor persons convicted of a crime or
misdemeanor.
The courts of Spain and the learned commentators on Spanish law have
construed these provisions to mean that such penal laws are to be given
a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the defendant charged
with a crime or a misdemeanor, and that, when a penal law is enacted
repealing a prior law, such repeal does not have the effect of relieving an
offender in whole or in part of penalties already incurred under the old
law, unless the new law favors the defendant by diminishing the penalty
or doing away with it altogether, and then only to the extent to which the
new law is favorable to the offender. In other words, that the enactment
of new penal laws, notwithstanding the fact that they contain general
repealing clauses, doe not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law
prior to the date when the repealing law goes into effect, unless the new
law wholly fails to penalties the acts which constituted the offense
defined and penalized in the repealed law.
Thus Pacheco, commenting upon the new Penal Code of 1848-1850, of
which article 506 provided that all general penal laws were repealed by
its publication, says:
At this time when the Penal Code is being put into effect and
given force, we have in fact two criminal laws in Spain, and close
attention is necessary to apply them properly. There may be
prosecutions which it is necessary to dismiss, as, for example,
those for sodomy; others which it may be necessary to decide in
conformity with the provisions of the new codes, as, for example,
those for carrying concealed weapons; and others which must be
judged in accordance with the old provisions, as, for example.
many cases of robbery. The rules of procedure in one or other
Persons and Family Relations Cases
manner being furnished us by the former article (article 19 of the
Penal Code of Spain identical with article 21 of the Penal Code of
the Philippines), and the present article (article 20 of the Penal
Code of Spain and article 22 of the Philippine Code). Has the code
increased the penalty? Then it is not applicable to crimes
committed prior to its enactment. Has it extinguished or
diminished them? Then it is clearly applicable to them. (1
Pacheco, 296.)
And a similar construction was placed upon the provisions of the Penal
Code of 1870 by the supreme court of Spain. Article 626 of this code
(which is substantially identical with article 506 of the Penal Code of
1848 and article 611 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands)
repealed all general penal laws prior to its promulgation, but the court
held that, where a crime was committed prior to the publication of the
reformed code, the penalty prescribed by the code of 1850 (the code
prior to that of 1870) being more favorable to the accused, that must be
applied. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, 17th of January, 1873.)
We conclude therefore that in any case in which a statute prescribing a
penalty for the commission of a specific offense is repealed, and in which
the new statute provides new and distinct penalties for the commission
of such offense, the penalty which must be imposed on one who
committed the offense prior to the enactment of the repealing statute is
that one which is more favorable to the convict. (U. S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil.
Rep., 241.)
It seems important, then, to determine whether the repeal of section 3 of
Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code had the effect
of providing new and distinct penalties for the commission of the crime
of perjury, and whether the new penalties are or are not more favorable
to the convict in the case at bar than those imposed by the trial judge.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of
perjury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code defining and
penalizing the crime of perjury, not expressly, but by implication, and we
are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of
the code. (U. S. vs. Concepcion, 13 Phil. Rep., 424; U. S. vs. Estraña, 16 Phil.
Rep., 520.)
87

In the absence of the most express language to the contrary it will not be
presumed that it was the intention of the legislator to let false swearing
as to a material matter in a court of justice go unpunished, and such
would be the effect of the repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697, unless we
held that the repeal had the effect of reviving the old statute.
At the common law the repeal of a repealing act revived the former act
(6 Co., 199; 1 Gray, 163; 7 W. & S., 263; 2 Blackstone, 32; 54 N. J. L. J.,
175); and the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
repeal of a repealing law has this effect, unless the language of the
repealing statute or some general statute provides otherwise. (U. S. vs.
Otis, 120 U. S., 52 [115].)
Manifestly, with this rule in mind, section 12 of the Administrative Code
(Act No. 2657) which is found in Article III, [Chapter I] dealing with the
form and effect of laws in general, provides that "when a law which
expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed the law first repealed shall
not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided." From which it may
fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force where a law which
repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed;
and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior
law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise.
Applying this rule, we conclude that the express repeal of section 3 of
Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No.
2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which
were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the
enactment of Act No. 1697.
A comparison of the penalties prescribed in the Penal Code for the
commission of the acts of which the accused in the case at bar was
convicted, giving him as we should the benefit of the provisions of Act
No. 2142, discloses that the penalty prescribed therein is less than that
imposed upon the appellant under the provisions of section 3 of Act No.
1697, and we conclude from what has been said already that the penalty
imposed by the court below should be revoked and that in lieu thereof
the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be imposed upon the
convict.
A question has been raised as to whether, admitting that the provisions
of the Penal Code touching perjury have been revived, the accused can
Persons and Family Relations Cases
be convicted and penalized thereunder, it appearing that at the time
when he testified falsely he was testifying in his own behalf in a criminal
case in which he himself was the accused, on trial for the commission of
a grave offense.
In the case of United States vs. Gutierrez (12 Phil. Rep., 529), we said,
speaking through Chief Justice Arellano, that, "Perjury committed by a
party in his own cause would not be punishable under Spanish
legislation, because in said legislation no one was a witness in his own
cause, and could not therefore become guilty of giving false testimony in
a civil cause in which he was either the plaintiff or the defendant; but
under the procedure in force by virtue of Act No. 190, a party to a suit
may testify in his own behalf, and if he declares falsely under oath as a
witness in his own cause, like any other witness, he incurs the penalty by
which false testimony in civil matters is repressed and punished. This
court has so held, it being a settled rule, that the false testimony given by
a litigant as a witness constitutes the crime of giving false testimony
inasmuch as such a declaration, according to the new laws in force, may
determine a judgment in his favor and to the prejudice of the adverse
party, and that a litigant who, in sworn testimony given by him as a
witness in a civil cause, shall pervert the truth and give false testimony,
incurs as such witness the penalties imposed by article 321 of the Penal
Code."
Analogous reasoning leads to a like conclusion as to the criminal liability
for perjury of a defendant in a criminal case testifying falsely in his own
behalf. Under the provisions of General Orders No. 58 an accused person
may, if he so desires, testify under oath in his own behalf, and in that
event, "if he declares falsely as a witness in his own cause, like any other
witness, he incurs the penalty by which false testimony" in criminal
matters "is repressed and punished."
It has been suggested that such a ruling will have a tendency to expose
accused persons to vexatious criminal prosecutions by prosecuting
officers, who, having failed to secure a conviction on the original charge,
may be disposed to institute criminal prosecutions for perjury from a
vindictive unwillingness to let the defendant escape scot free from the
meshes of the law. It is said also that the fear of subsequent prosecution
for perjury will tend to embarrass accused persons in their efforts to
defend themselves by testifying in their own behalf. But similar
objections may be advanced against the prosecution of any of the
88

witnesses called for the defense on charges of perjury, and it must not be
forgotten that the right of an accused person to testify under oath in his
own behalf is secured to him, not that he may be enabled to introduce
false testimony into the record, but to enable him to spread upon the
record the truth as to any matter within his knowledge which will tend
to establish his innocence.
Of course much must be left to the good sense and sound judgment of
the prosecuting officer in determining whether a prosecution for perjury
should be instituted against an accused person whose testimony in his
own behalf would seem to be perjured.
Due regard for the situation in which an accused person finds himself
when testifying in his own behalf in a criminal proceeding will restrain a
prudent prosecuting officer from the filing of charges of perjury in every
case in which he may have reason to believe that the accused has not
adhered strictly to the truth, in his anxiety to shield himself from
punishment. But when, as in the case at bar, an accused person
voluntarily goes upon the witness stand and falsely imputes some other
person the commission of a grave offense, it would seem to be highly
proper that he should be called to account in a criminal action for
perjury upon the complaint of the person against whom such false
charges are made.
Article 319 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Any person who shall give false testimony in favor of a defendant
in a criminal case shall suffer a penalty ranging from arresto
mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its
medium degree and a fine of not less than three hundred and
seventy-five and not more than three thousand seven hundred
and fifty pesetas, if the case were for a felony, and the penalty of
arresto mayor if it were for a misdemeanor.
We conclude that the judgment of conviction entered in the court below
should be affirmed but that the sentence imposed therein should be
reversed, and that giving the accused the benefit of the provisions of Act
No. 2142, a penalty of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor and a fine of
P75 with subsidiary imprisonment as prescribed by law should be
imposed upon him in lieu of that imposed by the trial judge, with the
costs of this instance de officio. So ordered.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., dissenting:
I agree that the provisions of the Penal Code relative to false swearing
were revived by the repeal of Act No. 1697 by the Administrative Code.
I cannot believe, however, that the Penal Code intended to include a
defendant in a criminal action among those who are to be punished for
false swearing.
The defendant in the case at bar is charged with having sworn falsely
when testifying in his own behalf while on trial charged with estafa, in
that, on that trial, he testified that a certain written confession of his
guilt alleged to have been made by him and put in evidence against him
was false in its statement of the facts and had been obtained from him by
threats, intimidation and violence.
On the trial for estafa the court accepted as a true enough of the
testimony of the accused as to the manner in which the confession had
been obtained to raise in his mind a reasonable doubt as to the voluntary
character of the confession; and, there not being other evidence
sufficient to sustain a conviction, the accused was acquitted.
I cannot bring myself to believe, as I have already stated, that the
provisions of the Penal Code defining false swearing include the false
testimony of a defendant in a criminal action given in his own behalf.
In the first place, the wording of the law does not include him. Article
319 provides:
Any person who shall give false testimony in favor of a defendant
in a criminal case shall suffer a penalty ranging from arresto
mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its
medium degree and a fine of not less than three hundred and
seventy-five and not more than three thousand seven hundred
and fifty pesetas, if the case were for a felony, and the penalty of
arresto mayor if it were for a misdemeanor.
89

The language itself plainly shows that the "person who shall give false
testimony" is not the defendant in the action but a different person — a
witness and not a party, an outsider and not one whose life or liberty
depends on the result of the action.
In the second place, the defendant in a criminal action could not be a
witness when the Penal Code was adopted and, accordingly, the framers
of the Penal Code could not have contemplated him as the "person who
shall give false testimony." (U. S. vs. Gutierrez, 12 Phil. Rep., 529.)
Thirdly, there is a reason given by Viada why the Spanish law did not
punish a party for false swearing even in those proceedings in which
false swearing was punishable and in which he was allowed to testify. In
volume 2 of his commentaries on the Penal Code, at page 465 and 466,
he puts this question "Will a party who testifies falsely in his answers to
interrogatories prepared in a civil case be guilty of false swearing?" And
answers it as follows:
It is worth while to consider this question here was we have
recently seen a judge in this city order prepared a copy of the
testimony given by a defendant in answer to interrogatories
prepared in a civil suit as a basis for a criminal action against him
because the judge believed that he had testified falsely in
answering said interrogatories. A party who testifies falsely in
reply to interrogatories cannot be prosecuted for false swearing
for the simple reason that he is not a witness, for, as the Digest
says, nullus indoneus testis in re sua intelligitur; and, besides, if
the legislator had wished to punish the perjury of a party he
would have done so by including in the Penal Code a special
provision to that effect, as was done in the French Penal Code by
art. 366. The Spanish law took into consideration the frailty of
human nature; it believed that a false oath given by a party was
sufficiently punished by his conscience, especially in view of the
fact that, as a learned author has said, for a man to testify against
himself for mere love of or respect for the truth is certainly
heroic, and by reason of the very fact that it is heroic no one
should be condemned criminally for not doing it.
If it is true that it was not the intention of the framers of the Penal Code
to make a defendant in a criminal action who should testify falsely in his
own behalf guilty of perjury, the mere fact of making him a competent
Persons and Family Relations Cases
witness in the case is not sufficient to include him within the provisions
relating to false swearing, when, but for the fact of being a competent
witness, he would not be included. If there is any doubt that a given class
of person is included in a penal provision it should be excluded.
For the reason stated, I have grave doubts of the intention of the Spanish
lawmakers to include a defendant in a criminal action as one of the
"witnesses" who could commit the crime of false swearing; and it is the
Spanish law of crimes we are applying and not the American law of the
competency of witnesses. The intention of the law being to exclude a
party from its operation, that intention cannot logically be held to have
been changed by giving the party an additional attribute. Although he
may be made a witness he still remains a party; and Viada says that the
Spanish law never intended to hold a defendant who testified falsely to
save his neck from the gallows to the same responsibility as a mere
witness who has absolutely nothing to lose by his testimony.
Groizard makes a suggestion which approaches the question in hand
very closely and shows the trend of judicial as well as legislative thought
on the subject under discussion. Speaking of the person who, under the
Penal Code, may be punished for false swearing, he says "There is one
exception which we could have wished our code to make in connection
with the matter we are discussing, and that is that its provisions shall
not apply to those witnesses whose honor would be sullied by the truth
or who, if they testified truthfully, would be exposed to the risk of a
criminal prosecution. Nor should he be held to answer to a charge of
false swearing who testifies falsely to save his parents, his brothers or
sisters, or his relations within the fourth degree. The law should not so
far forget the power and influence of personal interest and family ties as
to require as a legal duty something which not all regard even as a moral
duty. Blood has its law. . . ."
Spanish law and Spanish legal thought are against the position of the
court in this case. American law does not expressly, or even clearly,
undertake to change it. Making a person a witness does not deprive him
of his character as a party; and it is precisely in his character as a party
that the Spanish law protects him.
The case of United States vs. Gutierrez, already cited, is not conclusive of
the case before us. There the false testimony was given in a civil action.
Here it was given in a criminal action.
90

There is strong doubt in my mind also with respect to the correct
resolution of another question presented in this case which has been
decided by this court adversely to the defendant. As I have already
stated, the defendant in this case is on trial for perjury for having
testified falsely in a criminal action in which he was a defendant charged
with the crime of estafa. The testimony which he gave and which is
alleged in the present action to have been false related, as already stated,
to the voluntary and spontaneous character of a written confession
which he is alleged to have made with regard to the commission of the
crime with which he was charged. He contended, as a witness for himself
on his trial for estafa, that the confession was false in its statement of
facts and had been obtained from him by threats, intimidation and
violence. He was acquitted in that case upon the ground that his
testimony in that regard was true, or was of such a character as to
produce in the mind of the court doubt sufficient to require an acquittal.
The judge who presided at the trial of the accused for estafa presided
also at the trial of the accused for perjury. In his opinion acquitting the
defendant of the charge of estafa the court said, speaking of the alleged
confession and of the testimony relating to it given in that case:
This is not a new occurrence in this court. It is frequently
resorted to in important cases, where confessions have been
secured by the secret service. We are fully convinced that every
precaution is taken by the chief of the Secret Service Bureau with
a view to avoiding the maltreatment of persons who have been
apprehended by that Bureau, and who are under suspicion of
crime, and in the majority of cases we pay no heed to the
testimony of criminals who have come to look upon this
allegation of maltreatment as a stock defense. But in this case
there were some circumstances in connection with the testimony
of the defendants which raised a grave doubt at least as to the
voluntary character and spontaneity of these confessions, and in
view therefore, of this grave doubt, and of the unsatisfactory
character of the evidence generally, the defendants are acquitted
and the costs are taxed de officio.
In the present case the same judge says with regard to the same matter:
In the case in which the defendant was charged with estafa and
in which he is accused of having testified falsely, the case turned
largely upon the truth of the confessions of the defendant and his
Persons and Family Relations Cases
codefendants, which were alleged to have been made while they
were under detention in secret service headquarters. If it were
true that such confessions were extracted under threats and
torture, it is unnecessary to state that it would be a very serious
matter. Indeed the court considered it so serious at the time the
accused in question was tried with his codefendants, that it
preferred to enter an acquittal rather than to risk a conviction on
confessions which appear to be tainted with this suspicion."
I am inclined to believe that the finding of the trial court in the case of
estafa with regard to the testimony of the defendant in relation to the
confession is a bar to a subsequent trial of the same defendant for
perjury for giving the testimony to which the finding of the court relates.
In the case of Cooper vs. Commonwealth (106 Ky., 909) it appeared that
the appellant in that case and one Libbie Purvis were jointly indicted in
the Rowan Circuit Court for the offense of adultery. The trial under that
indictment resulted in a verdict of acquittal for appellant. The grand jury
of Rowan County thereupon reported an indictment against him in
which it was charged that, upon the trial of appellant and Libbie Purvis
upon the charge of adultery, "he did knowingly, willfully, and corruptly
swear that he had not had carnal sexual intercourse with Libbie Purvis,
when same was false and untrue, and was known by him to be false and
untrue." The trial under this indictment resulted in a verdict of guilty,
and judgment sentencing appellant to confinement in the penitentiary
was entered and the case came to the Supreme Court of the State of
Kentucky upon an appeal from that judgment. In its opinion for a
reversal the court said:
The principal question to be considered is the effect which is to
be given to the indictment, trial, verdict and judgment of
acquittal of appellant under the indictment for adultery, as it is
manifest that appellant can not be guilty in this case if he was
innocent of the charge contained in the indictment.
His guilt or innocence of the offense of having had carnal sexual
intercourse with Libbie Purvis was the exact question which was
tried in the first proceeding, and as a result of that trial the
defendant was found not guilty. In order to convict him in this
case, it was necessary for the jury to believe that he was guilty of
the identical offense for which he had been tried and acquitted
under the other indictment, as it is evident that, if he was
91

innocent of having had carnal sexual intercourse with Libbie
Parvis, he was not guilty of false swearing when he stated that he
had not had such intercourse with her. We therefore have, as a
result of the trial of appellant under these two indictments, a
verdict and judgment finding him not guilty of the offense of
having had carnal sexual intercourse with Libbie Purvis, and in
the second case a verdict and judgment finding him guilty of false
swearing when he testified that he had not had such intercourse
with her; in other words, the first jury found him innocent of the
misdemeanor with which he was charged, and the second jury
found him guilty of the felony because he testified that he was
not guilty of such misdemeanor. It certainly was never intended
that the enginery of the law should be used to accomplish such
inconsistent results. It appears to us from the conflicting
character of the testimony in the case upon the question of
defendant's guilt or innocence that a verdict of the jury might
have been upheld in the first case whether it found one way or
the other, but certainly the finding of the jury must be conclusive
of the fact considered as against the Commonwealth, and
preclude any further prosecution which involves the
ascertainment of such fact.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant in this case had already been tried and acquitted of the
offense of having had carnal sexual intercourse with Libbie
Purvis, and the judgment in that case is res judicata against the
Commonwealth, and he can not again be put on trial where the
truth or falsity of the charge in that indictment is the gist of the
question under investigation. It therefore follows that appellant
was entitled to a peremptory instruction to the jury to find him
not guilty.
In the case of United States vs. Butler (38 Fed. Rep., 498) a defendant,
who had been acquitted upon an indictment for selling liquors without
payment of the special tax required by law, was subsequently put upon
trial for perjury for having sworn upon his preliminary examination
before a commissioner that he did not sell. It was held that his acquittal
for selling liquor was a conclusive adjudication in his favor upon the
subsequent trial for perjury, and that the Government could not show
that his oath was false. In that case the court said:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
But I am clearly of the opinion that upon the trial of this case the
defendant would be entitled to show that he had been acquitted
of the offense concerning which he is charged to have committed
perjury, and that such acquittal would be conclusive. Whenever
the same fact has been put in issue between the same parties, the
verdict of the jury upon such issue is a complete estoppel. This
case contains all the elements of a plea of res judicata; the parties
as the same; the point issue, viz, whether he did in fact sell liquor,
is the same, and the quantum of proof requisite in both cases is
also the same. Had he sworn before the commissioner that he
had paid his tax and had been acquitted by the jury upon the
ground that he did not sell liquor, the issue would have been
different, and perhaps such difference might have been shown by
parol, but in this case the two issues were identically the same.
In Commonwealth vs. Ellis (160 Mass., 165), it was held that the record
of the conviction and sentence of a father upon a complaint, under the
statute of 1885, c. 176, for unreasonably neglecting to support his minor
child, was conclusive evidence that the paternity of the child was
determined, and the father was estopped to set up the illegitimacy of the
child as a defense to a subsequent complaint under the same statute for
a similar offense. In arriving at this conclusion the court said:
The question of the paternity of the child was necessarily
involved in the prior conviction of the defendant. That fact
having been determined, it cannot again be litigated between the
same parties unless a different rule applies to criminal
proceedings from that which obtains in civil proceedings. See Sly
vs. Hunt, 159 Mass., 15, and cases cited. It is well settled that the
rule is the same in both classes of cases. Thus, in Commonwealth
vs. Evans, 101 Mass., 25, it was held, on the trial of an indictment
for manslaughter, that the record of a conviction of the defendant
for the assault which caused the death was conclusive evidence
that the assault was unjustifiable. So in Commonwealth vs.
Feldman, 131 Mass., 588, where the defendant was indicted for
an assault upon a public officer, committed while the defendant
was under arrest for drunkenness; it was held that a record of
his conviction and sentence for drunkenness at the time of his
arrest was conclusive evidence of that fact.
92

In the case of Coffey vs. United States (116 U. S. 436) the principal
question presented for determination was stated by the court as follows:
The principal question is as to the effect of the indictment, trial,
verdict and judgment of acquittal set up in the fourth paragraph
of the answer. The information is founded on sections 3257,
3450, and 3453; and there is no question, on the averments in
the answer, that the fraudulent acts and attempts and intents to
defraud, alleged in the prior criminal information and covered by
the verdict and judgment of acquittal, embraced all of the acts,
attempts and intents averred in the information in this suit.
The question, therefore, is distinctly presented, whether such
judgment of acquittal is a bar to this suit. We are of opinion that
it is.
It is true that section 3257, after denouncing the single act of a
distiller defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States of
the tax on the spirits distilled by him, declares the consequences
of the commission of the act to be: (1) That certain specific
property shall be forfeited, and (2) that the offender shall be
fined and imprisoned. It is also true that the proceeding to
enforce the forfeiture against the res named must be a
proceeding in rem and a civil action; while that to enforce the
fine and imprisonment must be a criminal proceeding, as was
held by this court in The Palmyra (12 Wheat., 1, 14 [25 U. S., bk.
6, L. ed. 531, 535]). Yet, where an issue raised as to the existence
of the act or fact denounced has been tried in a criminal
proceeding, instituted by the United States, and a judgment of
acquittal has been rendered in favor of a particular person, that
judgment is conclusive in favor of such person, on the
subsequent trial of a suit in rem by the United States, where, as
against him, the existence of the same act or fact is the matter in
issue, as a cause for the forfeiture of the property prosecuted in
such suit in rem. It is urged as a reason for not allowing such
effect to the judgment, that the acquittal in the criminal case may
have taken place because of the rule requiring guilt to be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that, on the same evidence, on
the question of preponderance of proof, there might be a verdict
for the United States, in the suit in rem. Nevertheless, the fact or
act has been put in issue and determined against the United
Persons and Family Relations Cases
States; and all that is imposed by the statute, as a consequence of
guilt, is a punishment therefor. There could be no new trial of the
criminal prosecution after the acquittal in it; and a subsequent
trial of the civil suit amounts substantially to the same thing,
with a difference only in the consequences following a judgment
adverse to the claimant.
When an acquittal in a criminal prosecution in behalf of the
Government is pleaded or offered in evidence, by the same
defendant, in an action against him by an individual, the rule
does not apply, for the reason that the parties are not the same;
and often for the additional reason that a certain intent must be
proved to support the indictment, which need not be proved to
support the civil action. But upon this record, as we have already
seen, the parties and the matter in issue are the same.
Whether a conviction on an indictment under section 3257 could
be availed of as conclusive evidence, in law, for a condemnation,
in a subsequent suit in rem under that section, and whether a
judgment of forfeiture in a suit in rem under it would be
conclusive evidence, in law, for a conviction on a subsequent
indictment under it, are questions not now presented.
The conclusion we have reached is in consonance with the
principles laid down by this court in Gelston vs. Hoyt (3 Wheat.,
246 [16 U. S., bk. 4, L. ed., 381]). In that case Hoyt sued Gelston
the collector, and Schenck the surveyor, of the Port of New York,
in trespass, for taking and carrying away a vessel. The
defendants pleaded that they had seized the vessel, by authority
of the President, as forfeited for a violation of the statute against
fitting out a vessel to commit hostilities against a friendly foreign
power, and that she had been so fitted out and was forfeited. At
the trial it was shown that after seizure, the vessel was
proceeded against by the United States, by libel, in the United
States District Court, for the alleged offense, and Hoyt had
claimed her and she was acquitted and ordered to be restored,
and a certificate of reasonable cause of seizure was denied. The
defendants offered to prove facts showing the forfeiture. The
trial court excluded the evidence. In this court, the question was
presented whether the sentence of the district court was or was
not conclusive on the defendants, on the question of forfeiture.
93

This court held that the sentence of acquittal, with a denial of a
certificate of reasonable cause of seizure, was conclusive
evidence that no forfeiture was incurred, and that the seizure
was tortious; and that these questions could not again be
litigated in any forum.
This doctrine is peculiarly applicable to a case like the present,
where, in both proceedings, criminal and civil, the United States
is the party on one side and this claimant the party on the other.
The judgment of acquittal in the criminal proceeding ascertained
that the facts which were the basis of that proceeding, and are
the basis of this one, and which are made by the statute the
foundation of any punishment, personal or pecuniary, did not
exist. This was ascertained once for all, between the United
States and the claimant, in the criminal proceeding, so that the
facts can not again be litigated between them, as the basis of any
statutory punishment denounced as a consequence of the
existence of the facts. This is a necessary result of the rules laid
down in the unanimous opinion of the judges in the case of Rex
vs. Duchess of Kingston (20 Howell, St. Tr., 355, 538), and which
were formulated thus: the judgment of a court of concurrent
jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea a bar, or as
evidence conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same
matter directly in question in another court; and the judgment of
a court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, in like
manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the same
parties, coming incidentally in question in another court for a
different purpose. In the present case, the court is the same court
and had jurisdiction; and the judgment was directly on the point
now involved and between the same parties.
In a case before Mr. Justice Miller and Judge Dillon (U. S. vs.
McKee, 4 Dill., 128), the defendant had been convicted and
punished under a section of the Revised Statutes, for conspiring
with certain distillers to defraud the United States, by unlawfully
removing distilled spirits without payment of the taxes thereon.
He was afterwards sued in a civil action by the United States,
under another section, to recover a penalty of double the amount
of the taxes lost by the conspiracy and fraud. The two alleged
transactions were but one; and it was held that the suit for the
penalty was barred by the judgment in the criminal case. The
Persons and Family Relations Cases
decision was put on the ground that the defendant could not be
twice punished for the same crime, and that the former
conviction and judgment were a bar to the suit for the penalty.
I am rather inclined to believe that these decisions cover the case at bar.
It is true that the fact determined by the court on the trial for estafa was
not a fact necessary to be alleged in the information charging the crime
as an essential element thereof; and that consequently it was not one of
the facts necessary to be established in order to convict. Reasoning from
these facts it might be claimed that, whether the confession offered in
evidence in the estafa case was voluntary or was obtained by threat,
intimidation and violence, was not the fact in issue on that trial, and that,
therefore, the judgment in the estafa case determining that question was
not a bar to the presentation of the same question in the present action
for perjury. I am of the opinion, however, that the principles enunciated
in the cases cited, and especially the Coffey case, are sufficiently broad to
cover the case at bar. It is well settled that a right, question or fact
definitely put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be discussed in a
subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and that even
if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question, or
fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or their
privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in
the first suit remains unmodified. This is substantially the rule stated in
the case of Southern Pacific Railroad vs. United States (168 U. S., 1).
It is clear from the decision of the trial court in the estafa case that the
question most strongly fought by the parties in that action was whether
or not the confession was voluntary or had been obtained by threats,
intimidation and violence. The evidence which the Government was able
to produce was, apart from the confession, insufficient to convict; and, as
a necessary consequence, whether or not the defendant was convicted in
that case depended, in the main, upon the character of the confession. In
all respects an issue was joined by the parties with reference thereto
(Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. Rep., 504). It was accepted by
both parties and a large part of the evidence in the estafa case, so far as
we can judge from the opinion of the trial court in that case, related to
that issue. The question of fact involved was decided adversely to the
Government and, as we have seen from the opinion of the trial court in
that and the present case, the acquittal was based wholly upon the
defeat of the Government on that issue.
94
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

It would seem to me, therefore, that the character of the confession was
as thoroughly litigated and decided by the trial court as if it had been a
fact necessary to have been alleged in the information to describe the
crime sought to be charged. If that is so then the Government in the
present case cannot be allowed to put that question again in issue and
can not be heard to charge that the testimony given by the defendant in
relation thereto was false.

For these reason I am of the opinion that the conviction can not stand
and that the accused should be acquitted.

95
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Republic of the Philippines REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in
representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN
ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB
M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and
BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER
FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of
the President Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary
of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196305
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission
on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management, PAQUITO OCHOA, JR.,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his
capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his
capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197221
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary,
and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197280
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-
LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO
BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and
HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer of the
Philippines, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197282
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197392
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x-----------------------x

96

G.R. No. 197454
JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-
Intervenor.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu
Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No.
197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R.
No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners
Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido
Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the
manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al.
in G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory
resolution that the temporary restraining order (TRO) is still existing
and effective.
These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we
upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to
the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed
the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of
August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the
President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily
assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected
officials.
The Motions for Reconsideration
Persons and Family Relations Cases
The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in
support of their motion:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
ARMM ELECTIONS ARE LOCAL ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT
THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS AND
IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS.
II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT.
III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC ACT
(R.A. 9054) ARE NOT IRREPEALABLE LAWS.
IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE
SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE CONSTITUTION.
V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.]1
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that:
I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
OFFICIALS OF ARMM CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS OR
EQUATED WITH THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs)
BECAUSE (A) THERE IS NO EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION ON SUCH PARITY; AND (B) THE ARMM IS MORE
SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE, POWERS AND
AUTONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS OWN
APART FROM TRADITIONAL LGUs.
II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL
MANDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN
ARMM INDUBITABLY PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY THE
PRESIDENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE (OICs), ALBEIT
MOMENTARY OR TEMPORARY, FOR THE POSITIONS OF ARMM
GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR AND MEMBERS OF THE
REGIONAL ASSEMBLY.
97

III. THE PRESIDENT’S APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED TO
APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND DOES NOT EXTEND TO ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS EVEN AS THE PRESIDENT IS ONLY VESTED WITH
SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER THE ARMM, THEREBY NEGATING
THE AWESOME POWER TO APPOINT AND REMOVE OICs
OCCUPYING ELECTIVE POSITIONS.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE HOLDOVER
OF ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS PENDING THE ELECTION AND
QUALIFICATION OF THEIR SUCCESSORS.
V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO ARMM
ELECTED OFFICIALS WHOSE TERMS OF OFFICE ARE NOT
PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION BUT PRESCRIBED BY
THE ORGANIC ACTS.
VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF ¾ VOTES IN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE FOR THE
VALIDITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF
THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT IMPOSE AN IRREPEALABLE
LAW.
VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE
EFFECTIVITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION
OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT UNDULY EXPAND THE
PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.
VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION WITH THE
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IS NOT MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD AND
CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMM, AND THE
ENACTMENT OF AN IMPROVIDENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTE IS AN ANALOGOUS CAUSE WARRANTING COMELEC’S
HOLDING OF SPECIAL ELECTIONS.2 (italics supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET A
STATUTE, IT IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON THAT THERE BE
DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE.
THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY REFER TO THE 1992 ELECTIONS AND
TURN-OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.
IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED "INTENT" OF THE
FRAMERS, AND APPLYING THE SAME TO ELECTIONS 20 YEARS
AFTER, THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE
VIOLATED THE FOREMOST RULE IN STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION.
xxxx
II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT
RA 9054, AN ORGANIC ACT, WAS COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE,
RA 10153 SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ENACTED
PRECISELY TO AMEND RA 9054.
xxxx
III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A
SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE 2/3 VOTING
REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN RA 9054 AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxx
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A
SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A PLEBISCITE IS NOT
NECESSARY IN AMENDING THE ORGANIC ACT.
xxxx
V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN
DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER OF ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
98

xxxx
VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN
UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.3
(italics and underscoring supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that:
A.
ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE APPOINTMENT
OF OICs FOR THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMM IS
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN WITH, SUCH
APPOINTMENT OF OIC REGIONAL OFFICIALS WILL CREATE A
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH THAT R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD
HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A PLEBISCITE IN THE ARMM FOR
APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE, WHICH PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT
CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING THE
PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON APPOINTMENT OF OICs AS
AN "INTERIM MEASURE".
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OICs FOR THE ARMM
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
C.
THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054 DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION, AND BEFORE THEIR
SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN EITHER AN ELECTION TO BE
HELD AT THE SOONEST POSSIBLE TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE
SAID INCUMBENT ARMM REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY VALIDLY
CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS SUCH IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII OF R.A. NO.
9054.
D.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM
ELECTIONS, SPECIAL ELECTIONS MUST IMMEDIATELY BE HELD
FOR THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF THE ARMM WHO
SHALL SERVE UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN THE
MAY 2013 SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS.4
Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that:
a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not apply
to the ARMM elections;
b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican
democracy which, by constitutional mandate, guides the
governance of the Republic;
c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and,
thus, has to comply with the 2/3 vote from the House of
Representatives and the Senate, voting separately, and be
ratified in a plebiscite;
d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to hold
their offices even after their terms are over and non-elective
individuals getting into the vacant elective positions by
appointment as OICs, the holdover option is the better choice;
e) the President only has the power of supervision over
autonomous regions, which does not include the power to
appoint OICs to take the place of ARMM elective officials; and
f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately from
the national and local elections as this will make it easier for the
authorities to implement election laws.
In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions:
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM
regional elections with national and local elections?
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No.
10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements?
99

(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special
elections in ARMM?
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs
violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional
legislative and executive offices?
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed
the President’s supervisory powers over autonomous regions?
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the motions for lack of merit.
Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution
does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and
local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following
provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which state:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the
President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members
of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or
municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and
the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the
remaining twelve for three years.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
xxxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we
refer to the discussions of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a
section which we will temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads: "THE
SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR
FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF JUNE 1992."
This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that
Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is
recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only
state that in view of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2
earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: "THE
SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL
SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992."
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on
Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President and
Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by
the Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local officials is
three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next election for said
officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could
never attain, subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once
every three years.
100
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual until 1995. From then on, we shall have an election every three
synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should not have a local years.
election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them
to be able to complete their term of three years each. And if we also So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if
stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in we have to synchronize our elections every three years which was
1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators already approved by the body.
in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their
term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So, consequently we Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
will have elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will
be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to the local officials and the xxxx
Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never
have an election once every three years, therefore defeating the very MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of
purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the incumbent President and Vice-President in 1992.
the President and another six years for the Senators with the possibility
of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three years insofar MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only
way to effect the first synchronized election which would mean,
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the
necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the Lower
election of the Senators and local officials with the election of the
House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.
President?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here
is on the assumption that the provision of the Transitory Provisions on
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer. the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would really
end in 1992.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is
recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992
for all, from the President up to the municipal officials.5 (emphases
During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of and underscoring ours)
elections, I was the one who proposed that in order to synchronize the
elections every three years, which the body approved — the first
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective
national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office more clearly – there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective
for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing.
officials – from the President down to the municipal officials.
That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the
Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or
President will be for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective,
1992, we will again have national, local and presidential elections. This highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.
time, in 1992, the President shall have a term until 1998 and the
first 12 Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve
We came to the same conclusion in Osmeña v. Commission on
until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve
Elections,6 where we unequivocally stated that "the Constitution has

101

mandated synchronized national and local elections."7 Despite the
length and verbosity of their motions, the petitioners have failed to
convince us to deviate from this established ruling.
Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the
ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically
mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be
interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization. We have to consider that the
ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized at the
time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in
mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the
exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long
as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a
constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a
continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the
unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles
embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of
its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process
intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not
static.8
To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled "Local Government,"
clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous
regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section 1
of this Article, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political
subdivisions of the State under the heading "Local Government"
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous
regions as one of the forms of local governments.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the
"local governments," and does not make a distinction between the "local
government" and the "regional government," is particularly revealing,
betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of government,
but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes
than other local government units, still remain under the category of
local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local
governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are
also considered as local elections.
The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution
mandates the synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not
covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and not local
elections.
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis,
"that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed."9 Applying this principle to determine the scope of "local
elections," we refer to the meaning of the word "local," as understood in
its ordinary sense. As defined in Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary Unabridged, "local" refers to something "that primarily serves
the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor
political subdivision." Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held
within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall
within this definition.
To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other
provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to treat the
ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish.10
RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054
The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in
postponing the ARMM elections, amend RA No. 9054.
We cannot agree with their position.
102

A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for
only the first ARMM elections;11 it does not provide the date for the
succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the
regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not
amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any
provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections
subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely
filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
We reiterate our previous observations:
This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of
the date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion – finds
support in ARMM’s recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the
ARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not
fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific
date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another
legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No.
8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix
the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or
modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments
to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any
plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on
March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the
second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No.
9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second
Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional
elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions
ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter,
Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to
treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as
separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without
Persons and Family Relations Cases
requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in
Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.12 (emphases
supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is no
lacuna in RA No. 9054 as regards the date of the subsequent ARMM
elections. In his estimation, it can be implied from the provisions of RA
No. 9054 that the succeeding elections are to be held three years after
the date of the first ARMM regional elections.
We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the
court may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a
statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion.13 Courts are not authorized to insert into the
law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the
legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to the
omission.14 Providing for lapses within the law falls within the exclusive
domain of the legislature, and courts, no matter how well-meaning, have
no authority to intrude into this clearly delineated space.
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No.
9054, there is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment
requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we
have already established that the supermajority vote requirement set
forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 905415 is unconstitutional for
violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend
and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to
limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike
down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As
we explained in Duarte v. Dade:16
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects,
whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial
103

jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless
prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or
limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by
enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative
body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors.
This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the
original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and
before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in
advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours]
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to
approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum.17 In
requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher
voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress,
which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which we
sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is
not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.18
We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio
in his dissenting opinion, where he stated: "Section 1, Article XVII of RA
9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of Congress to
surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the
reach of Congress’ amendatory powers. One Congress cannot limit or
reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by
requiring a higher vote threshold than what the Constitution requires to
enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing such a higher
vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation,
to amend the Constitution."19
Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad
Similarly, we struck down the petitioners’ contention that the plebiscite
requirement20 applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an
unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the
Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
Persons and Family Relations Cases
purpose[.]" We interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of
autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the
Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act21 –
require ratification through a plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.
The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to
comply with the plebiscite requirement is to recognize that sovereignty
resides primarily in the people.
While we agree with the petitioners’ underlying premise that
sovereignty ultimately resides with the people, we disagree that this
legal reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite requirement for
all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by the petitioners’
interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all
amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite
requirement before becoming effective, this would lead to impractical
and illogical results – hampering the ARMM’s progress by impeding
Congress from enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise
in the region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government with the
costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite.
Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153,
in giving the President the power to appoint OICs to take the place of the
elective officials of the ARMM, creates a fundamental change in the basic
structure of the government, and thus requires compliance with the
plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No. 9054.
Again, we disagree.
The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153,
which reads:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall
appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices
until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.
104

We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic
structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this
provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional
government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional
government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these
offices to "perform the functions pertaining to the said offices."
Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision
The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1),
Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to remain
in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially
argue that the ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in
their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no
specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective
officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X which
provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
[emphases ours]
On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of
Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period of
three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September
next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same
date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the
autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are
elected and qualified.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a
limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can
occupy their offices. We have already established that elective ARMM
officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year
Persons and Family Relations Cases
term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective
officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the
Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term
limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of
three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by
the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover
provisions in various laws. One significant difference between the
present case and these past cases22 is that while these past cases all
refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose
terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the
present case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor, the
ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly - whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there
had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No.
9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where
no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.23
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option,
has made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed
in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the
holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the wisdom
of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not
this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional
government which arise from the legislature complying with the
constitutional mandate of synchronization.
COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) is sufficiently empowered to set the date of special
elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely
empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and
105

regulations relative to the conduct of an election.24 Although the
legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang
[BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to
another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls
within the narrow confines of the following provisions:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or
upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and
hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to
be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should
be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or
after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect. [emphases and
underscoring ours]
As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section 5
and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have already
been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended
Persons and Family Relations Cases
because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as
violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances.
In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance
of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local
elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.
More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next
ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different
election date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special
elections, and this Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is still
the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected officials
in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013 national
and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the COMELEC has
the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an amendment of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the term of local
officials to three years.
President’s authority to appoint OICs
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the President’s power to
appoint pertains only to appointive positions and cannot extend to
positions held by elective officials.
The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in
nature.25 Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad
strokes the extent of this power, thus:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
106

in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted
above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel,
of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments. [emphasis ours]
The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and
its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction;
while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President
can make are enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution
enumerates the various appointments the President is empowered to
make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style
is significant; in providing for this change, the framers of the 1987
Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the first group
of presidential appointments and the second group of presidential
appointments, as made evident in the following exchange:
MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after
"captain" and x x x delete "and all" and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO
APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed
amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned
therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.26
The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, pertains to
Persons and Family Relations Cases
the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
The second group of officials the President can appoint are "all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint."27 The second sentence acts as the "catch-all provision" for the
President’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power
to appoint is essentially executive in nature.28 The wide latitude given
to the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of
the President’s power to appoint officials whose appointments are not
even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices
which have to be filled, but the law does not provide the process for
filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill
the office by appointment.
Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s
appointment power should be strictly construed and must be clearly
stated in order to be recognized.29 Given that the President derives his
power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it
falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the
second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the
President’s appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.
The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the
President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates
Section 16, Article X of the Constitution,30 which merely grants the
President the power of supervision over autonomous regions.
This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s
appointment power. There is no incompatibility between the President’s
power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions,
and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of
RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer
to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with
law."31 This is distinguished from the power of control or "the power of
an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for the latter."32
107

The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power
of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President’s
appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will.
In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be
beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President
and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’
supposition. The provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall
appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices
until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the
OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office
until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013
elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the
power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the
petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not
in a vacuum, but within the context it was enacted in. In the first place,
Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the constitutional
mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional elections with the national
and local elections. To do this, Congress had to postpone the scheduled
ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the problem of how to
provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period,
between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and
the assumption to office – twenty-one (21) months away – of those who
will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible
solutions open to Congress to address the problem created by
synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office
Persons and Family Relations Cases
after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for
special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected
so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c)
recognize that the President, in the exercise of his appointment powers
and in line with his power of supervision over the ARMM, can appoint
interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM regional
government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already
established the unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to
consider the last available option.
In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to
respond to the adjustment that synchronization requires. Given the
context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of
reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
In other words, "given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a
holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for
lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is
the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed and
specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution – an unconstitutional or
unreasonable choice for Congress to make?"33
We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election
process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s
choice of leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the adoption of
this measure is a matter of necessity in order to comply with a mandate
that the Constitution itself has set out for us. Moreover, the
implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
is comparable to the interim measures traditionally practiced when, for
instance, the President appoints officials holding elective offices upon
the creation of new local government units.
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel
nor innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to
appoint members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to
the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the
President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative
Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook).34
108

Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and Motion
dated December 21, 2011, question the propriety of the appointment by
the President of Mujiv Hataman as acting Governor and Bainon Karon as
acting Vice Governor of the ARMM. They argue that since our previous
decision was based on a close vote of 8-7, and given the numerous
motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, the President, in
recognition of the principle of judicial courtesy, should have refrained
from implementing our decision until we have ruled with finality on this
case.
We find the petitioners’ reasoning specious.
Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of
courts and applies only to lower courts in instances where, even if there
is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it
would be proper for a lower court to suspend its proceedings for
practical and ethical considerations.35 In other words, the principle of
"judicial courtesy" applies where there is a strong probability that the
issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as
a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or
court of origin.36 Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the
President, who represents a co-equal branch of government. To suggest
otherwise would be to disregard the principle of separation of powers,
on which our whole system of government is founded upon.
Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of
8-7 does not, and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any less
effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as
there is concurrence of the majority of the members of the en banc who
actually took part in the deliberations of the case,37 a decision garnering
only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme Court
en banc and must be respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore,
not in any position to speculate that, based on the voting, "the
probability exists that their motion for reconsideration may be
granted."38
Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to
Issue Clarificatory Resolution, argues that since motions for
reconsideration were filed by the aggrieved parties challenging our
Persons and Family Relations Cases
October 18, 2011 decision in the present case, the TRO we initially
issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and effective. He
further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our
October 18, 2011 decision pending resolution of the motions for
reconsideration "borders on disrespect if not outright insolence"39 to
this Court.
In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v. COMELEC,40
where the Court held that while it had already issued a decision lifting
the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet final and executory, and can also
be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner also cites
the minute resolution issued by the Court in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance,41 where the Court reproached the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue for manifesting its intention to implement the
decision of the Court, noting that the Court had not yet lifted the TRO
previously issued.42
We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included as
a subject of a motion for reconsideration filed to assail our decision. It
does not follow, however, that the TRO remains effective until after we
have issued a final and executory decision, especially considering the
clear wording of the dispositive portion of our October 18, 2011
decision, which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and
UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the
temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September
13, 2011. No costs.43 (emphases ours)
In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino and
the present case. While it may be true that Tolentino and the present
case are similar in that, in both cases, the petitions assailing the
challenged laws were dismissed by the Court, an examination of the
dispositive portion of the decision in Tolentino reveals that the Court did
not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the present case, we
expressly lifted the TRO issued on September 13, 2011.1âwphi1 There is,
therefore, no legal impediment to prevent the President from exercising
his authority to appoint an acting ARMM Governor and Vice Governor as
specifically provided for in RA No. 10153.
109
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Conclusion RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner
in G.R. No. 197282 presents in his motion, that our Decision has virtually
I reiterate my Dissenting Opinion I reiterate my Dissenting Opinion
given the President the power and authority to appoint 672,416 OICs in ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
the event that the elections of barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Associate Justice Associate Justice
officials are postponed or cancelled.
I maintain my vote joining the
We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering. dissent of Justice Velasco
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
Associate Justice
This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and CASTRO
legal circumstances which led to the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA No. Associate Justice
10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM (On Official Leave)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to grant the MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice
President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of the fact Associate Justice
that: (a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM elective officials is legally
impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special elections and I maintain my dissent
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
shorten the terms of elective local officials for less than three years. ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit
for barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there is no legal I join the Dissent of J. Carpio
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
proscription which prevents these specific government officials from JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
continuing in a holdover capacity should some exigency require the Associate Justice
postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan elections. Clearly,
these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand on. (On Leave)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. BIENVENIDO L. REYES
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners’ motions for SERENO** Associate Justice
reconsideration. Associate Justice

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and UPHOLD the Associate Justice
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
CERTIFICATION
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
ARTURO D. BRION conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
Associate Justice before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
110

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 166562 : March 31, 2009]
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, v. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside the
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
and its December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The
appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the
January 9, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23,
Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.4
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting
(Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu
City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamin's family home in Maguikay, Mandaue
City.6 When their second child was born, the couple decided to move to
Carmen's family home in Cebu City.7 In September 1975, Benjamin
passed the medical board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to
take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to
anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the
preceptorship program for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began working
for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen's family, as member of its active
staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospital's Treasurer.11
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9,
1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April
Persons and Family Relations Cases
5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on
July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old,
Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological
incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which,
however, only became manifest thereafter.13
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was
already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with
his friends.14 But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink
regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee
hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult
respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him.
There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate
of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin's job as
anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to
answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other
anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his
services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent
tried to talk to her husband about the latter's drinking problem, but
Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give
financial support to their family and would even get angry at her
whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing
support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling
and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely
stayed home18 and even neglected his obligation to his children.19
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.20 He
would gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his
friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no money.
Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife's own jewelry to finance his
gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell
their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his
father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only
stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for
111

having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so
that he would be banned from the gambling establishments.23
In sum, Carmen's allegations of Benjamin's psychological incapacity
consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamin's alcoholism, which adversely affected his family
relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamin's violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular
drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it
necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from
his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money
to pay the same; andcralawlibrary
4. Benjamin's irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure
and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.24
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He
maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm.
He said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and
would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also
denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to support his family
financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would
collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still
serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin
also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his means
whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly
spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also
pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their
children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.28
During the trial, Carmen's testimony regarding Benjamin's drinking and
gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana
Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses' children from 1987 to
1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when
Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.30
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a
psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr.
Oñate's evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamin's deposition because the
latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in
South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr.
Oñate concluded that Benjamin's compulsive drinking, compulsive
gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that
petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.32
To refute Dr. Oñate's opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a
psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra
evaluated Benjamin's psychological behavior based on the transcript of
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared
by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South
Africa, and his (Dr. Obra's) interview with Benjamin's brothers.34
Contrary to Dr. Oñate's findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing
wrong with petitioner's personality, considering the latter's good
relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as
anesthesiologist.35
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC
gave credence to Dr. Oñate's findings and the admissions made by
Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive
drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-
curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies,
which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even
before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
xxx
SO ORDERED.37
112

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA
rendered a Decision38 reversing the trial court's ruling. It faulted the trial
court's finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the
conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time
he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate's conclusion was based only on
theories and not on established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set
forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals and Molina.41
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina
decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five
years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the
Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run
counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the
motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed
period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining
compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise
denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari 43 with this Court. In a Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this
Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen's
motion for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA decided to reconsider its
previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended
Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court's
decision.47
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the
same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to
follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized;
andcralawlibrary
Persons and Family Relations Cases
III. Whether the CA's decision declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based
on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.49
Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,50
necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.51
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by
the English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate
Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno's discussion on the historical
development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino
v. Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the
thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English
Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it
is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same
points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its
application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were
"plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed
conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the
"actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words
or reasoning used to reach the decision."
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the
framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and
precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts."
Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into
the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof.
Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the
countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to
abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal
113

conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the
flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that
the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof.
Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own life in
the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal
scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of
lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases
involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis
requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy
correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an
obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy,
imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of
the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare
decisis - constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.
Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in
refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional
litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated:
"Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of
stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed
from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is
again called upon to consider a question once decided." In the same vein,
the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of
constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial
interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains:
"after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a
consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it
acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had
been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect for
Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
Persons and Family Relations Cases
courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it
cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it
leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands
of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future
courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with
them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the
stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most
famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked
Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public
transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that
"separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the
shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored
Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this
Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule
in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain
provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary
of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion
for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will
show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered
before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance,
intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition,
courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the
voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare
decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether
the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance
that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling
and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no
114

more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out
whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.53
To be forthright, respondent's argument that the doctrinal guidelines
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for
being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The
same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,54
and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of
this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who
have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina
doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we
declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court
to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases
of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all
cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it,
which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as
well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be
considered as on "all fours" with another.57
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is
logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of
parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in
Persons and Family Relations Cases
granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts
must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.59 The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the
expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te
that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated
distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the
stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation
given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root
cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified
written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved
to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice
o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these
experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to
relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need
for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.60
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause,
gravity and incurability of a party's alleged psychological incapacity,
then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be
weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity
of marriage.
115
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

III. On petitioner's psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced
by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically
unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the
date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court's and the appellate court's rulings declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article
36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have
afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. 62
ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner's "defects" were
present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited
that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would
occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by
itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the
part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such
"defects" to be incurable.
as well as his (Dr. Obra's) personal interview with Benjamin's brothers.64
Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra's findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner's drinking
and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There
is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember
that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter
owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondent's
testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by the
respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit
pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case,
the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce,
prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the
December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive
evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the
parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the
opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent's
allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided
diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified
that petitioner's behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with
petitioner's personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in
Dr. Obra's opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of
Benjamin's deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took
into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by
another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin,

116

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163586 January 27, 2009
SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 65, Guimaras; the COA-Region VI, represented by its
Director; and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court filed by Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 22, 2003
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed CA-G.R. SP No.
69350; and the March 26, 2004 CA Resolution2 which denied the motion
for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of
Public Funds, under an Information which reads, as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior
thereto, in the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Guimaras,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court,
abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the Revenue Officer I of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such, was in
the custody and possession of public funds in the amount of
P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing the value of her
collections and other accountabilities, for which she is accountable by
reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her public position, with
deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully,
Persons and Family Relations Cases
unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle
and convert to her own personal use and benefit said amount of
P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands made upon her account
for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001.
On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
the preliminary investigation and file the Information. Petitioner argued
that the Information failed to allege her salary grade -- a material fact
upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v.
Sandiganbayan,4 petitioner further argued that as she was a public
employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable
by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public
prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was
limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.5
The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order6 dated September 7,
2001. It held that the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not
depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty imposable
upon the latter for the offense charged.7 Moreover, it sustained the
prosecutorial authority of the Ombudsman in the case, pointing out that
in Uy, upon motion for clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court
set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision and issued a March 20, 2001
Resolution expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory
authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.
The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1,
Rule 117, for it was filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty under the
Information.8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which the RTC denied in
its December 18, 2001 Order.10
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari11 with the CA, but the latter
dismissed the petition in the Decision under review.
117

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration12 was also denied.
Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the
Information for Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted
against the Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in light
of this Supreme Court’s ruling in the First "Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the prosecutorial
powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the
Supreme Court dated February 22, 2001 in the Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the Petitioner-
Accused, without violating the constitutional provision on ex-
post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process.13
Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on August 9,
1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of issuance on
March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court in the same case, the
prevailing jurisprudence was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial
powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As the investigation and
prosecution against petitioner was conducted by the Ombudsman
beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was
applicable, notwithstanding that the said decision was set aside in the
March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said case. Hence, the
Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that time
the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the
case.
The petition lacks merit.
The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc,14 wherein
accused Ruben Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9, 1999 Decision of the
Court in Uy15 in a motion to dismiss the 11 counts of malversation that
were filed against them by the Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC
granted the motion but upon petition filed by the Ombudsman, the Court
reversed the RTC and held:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same
resolution promulgated on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan
reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman
extended only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the
Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the
regular courts. It held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any
illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and
Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining
the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary
jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the
exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and
employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman
of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees.
Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to
the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance,
118

misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and
employees during their tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be
equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under
Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its
power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited
to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly,
the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The
Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers
and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative,
civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To
carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his
office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist
in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated
or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The
law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute
cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance with
Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate
and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) against
respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao Del Sur even as this
authority is not exclusive and is shared by him with the regular
prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court, branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case
Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to try and decide the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva,16 in
which, citing the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy, the RTC dismissed a
criminal complaint that was filed before it by the Ombudsman. The Court
reversed the RTC, for, "given the Court’s Uy ruling under its March 20,
2001 Resolution, the trial court’s assailed Orders x x x are, in hindsight,
without legal support and must, therefore, be set aside."
Persons and Family Relations Cases
It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that the
Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC,
extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the time when
its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.
Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in
Uy cannot have retroactive effect, for otherwise it would amount to "an
ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally proscribed."17
Petitioner is grasping at straws.
A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act,
constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original passage. Such
interpretation does not create a new law but construes a pre-existing
one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent of
that law.18 Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in Uy
interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of the date
of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.
Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or
abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing
that acts may have been performed under the impression of the
constitutionality of the law or the validity of its interpretation, has
consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation;
thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application.19 But
where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial
interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment
of its legislation.20
In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no
declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine
long held by the Court and relied upon by the public. Rather, it set aside
an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as
expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect has
therefore been held by the Court to reach back to validate investigatory
and prosecutorial processes conducted by the Ombudsman, such as the
filing of the Information against petitioner.
With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and
academic.
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 Persons and Family Relations Cases

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Acting Chief Justice
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ*

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

DANTE O. TINGA*
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO**

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

120

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187451 August 29, 2012
JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent.
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,*
VILLARAMA, JR.,**
PEREZ,***
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and
set aside the February 25, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
in CA-G.R. CV No. 72613, reversing and setting aside the February 19,
2001 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Isabela, Basi Ian
(RTC), in Civil Case No. 685-627, an action for "Recovery of Possession
and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction."
The Facts
Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed Homestead Application No.
V-33203 (E-V-49150) for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land situated
in Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan in 1949. His application was approved on
January 23, 1952.3 In 1955, however, the land was subdivided into three
(3) lots – Lot Nos. 138,139 and 140, Pls-19 - as a consequence of a public
land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio),
who filed Homestead Application No. 18-4493 (E-18-2958). Lot 140 was
allocated to petitioner Jesus Virtucio (Virtucio), who filed Homestead
Application No. 18-4421 (E-18-2924).4
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and
Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the whole area,
including Lot Nos. 139 and 140.5
On October 30, 1961, the Director of Lands rendered a decision denying
Alegarbes' protest and amending the latter's application to exclude Lots
139 and 140. Only Lot 138 was given due course. The applications of
Custodio and Virtucio for Lots 139 and 140, respectively, were likewise
given due course.6
Alegarbes then appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, who dismissed his appeal on July 28, 1967. He then sought
relief from the Office of the President (OP), which, however, affirmed the
dismissal order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in
a decision, dated October 25, 1974. Alegarbes moved for a
reconsideration, but the motion was subsequently denied.7
On May 11, 1989, an order of execution8 was issued by the Lands
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to enforce the decision of the OP. It ordered Alegarbes and all
those acting in his behalf to vacate the subject lot, but he refused.
On September 26, 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint9 for "Recovery of
Possession and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction" before the RTC.
In his Answer,10 Alegarbes claimed that the decision of the Bureau of
Lands was void ab initio considering that the Acting Director of Lands
acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the provisions of the Public
Land Act. Alegarbes argued that the said decision conferred no rights
and imposed no duties and left the parties in the same position as they
were before its issuance. He further alleged that the patent issued in
favor of Virtucio was procured through fraud and deceit, thus, void ab
initio.
Alegarbes further argued, by way of special and/or affirmative defenses,
that the approval of his homestead application on January 23, 1952 by
the Bureau of Lands had already attained finality and could not be
reversed, modified or set aside. His possession of Lot Nos. 138, 139 and
140 had been open, continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years and had acquired such lots
by acquisitive prescription.
121

In his Amended and Supplemental Answer,11 Alegarbes also averred
that his now deceased brother, Alejandro Alegarbes, and the latter's
family helped him develop Lot 140 in 1955. Alejandro and his family, as
well as Alegarbes' wife and children, had been permanently occupying
the said lot and, introducing permanent improvements thereon since
1960.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC rendered its decision on February 19, 2001, favoring Virtucio.
The decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the merit of this case, this court finds for the plaintiff
and against the defendant by:
1. Ordering the defendant and all those acting in his behalf to vacate Lot
No. 140, Pls-19, located at Lower Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan and
surrender the possession and ownership thereof to plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (₱ 15,000.00) as attorney's fees and another Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱ 10,000.00) as expenses for litigation; and
3. To pay the cost of the suit in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos
(₱500.00).
SO ORDERED.12
Not in conformity, Alegarbes appealed his case before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On February 25, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision declaring
Alegarbes as the owner of Lot No. 140, Pls-19, thereby reversing and
setting aside the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that Alegarbes
became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 and, therefore, entitled to retain
possession of it.
Consequently, the awards of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs of suit were deleted.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
In so ruling, the CA explained that even if the decision to approve
Virtucio's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final,
Alegarbes could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription. The
decisions on the issues of the approval of Virtucio's homestead
application and its validity were impertinent as Alegarbes had earlier
put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot 140 which he claimed by
virtue of adverse possession.
The CA also found reversible error on the part of the RTC in disregarding
the evidence before it and relying entirely upon the decisions of the
administrative bodies, none of which touched upon the issue of
Alegarbes' open, continuous and exclusive possession of over thirty (30)
years of an alienable land. The CA held that the Director of Lands, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the OP did not
determine whether Alegarbes' possession of the subject property had
ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the mass of public land and, thus, was
beyond their jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition.
ISSUES
Virtucio assigned the following errors in seeking the reversal of the
assailed decision of the CA, to wit:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the judgment of the
trial court, which awarded the lot in question to the respondent by
virtue of acquisitive prescription and ordered herein petitioner to
surrender the ownership and possession of the same to them.13
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the decision
in CA-G.R. CV-26286 for Recovery of Possession and Ownership,
Custodio vs. Alegarbes which contains same factual circumstances
as in this case and ruled against JOSE ALEGARBES.14
3. The Court of Appeals erred in deleting the award of attorney's
fees to the petitioner.15
The lone issue in this case is whether or not Alegarbes acquired
ownership over the subject property by acquisitive prescription.
122

Ruling of the Court
The petition must fail.
Indeed, it is fundamental that questions of fact are not reviewable in
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Only questions of law distinctly set forth shall be raised in the
petition.16
Here, the main issue is the alleged acquisition of ownership by Alegarbes
through acquisitive prescription and the character and length of
possession of a party over a parcel of land subject of controversy is a
factual issue.17 The Court, however, is not precluded from reviewing
facts when the case falls within the recognized exceptions, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
Persons and Family Relations Cases
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.18 [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bench, the findings and conclusions of the CA are
apparently contrary to those of the RTC, hence, the need to review the
facts in order to arrive at the proper conclusion.
On Acquisitive Prescription
Virtucio insists that the period of acquisitive prescription was
interrupted on October 30, 1961 (or in 1954 when Alegarbes filed the
protest) when the Director of Lands rendered a decision giving due
course to his homestead application and that of Ulpiano Custodio.
Virtucio further claims that since 1954, several extrajudicial demands
were also made upon Alegarbes demanding that he vacate said lot.
Those demands constitute the "extrajudicial demand" contemplated in
Article 1155, thus, tolling the period of acquisitive prescription.19
Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article 712, provides
that prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through the lapse of
time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. Under
the same law, it states that acquisitive prescription may either be
ordinary or extraordinary.20 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten
years,21 while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires
uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years, without need of title or
of good faith.22
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is
acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as
expounded in par. 1, Article 1106. Other names for acquisitive
prescription are adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is
extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse
of time as defined in Article 1106 and par. 2, Article 1139. Another name
for extinctive prescription is litigation of action.23 These two kinds of
prescription should not be interchanged.
123

Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of
prescription of actions. Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on the
other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code. Thus,
Virtucio’s reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period of
acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that
effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil
interruption.24
Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the
possessor.25 When no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a
judicial summons against the respondents. The period of acquisitive
prescription continues to run.
In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his
homestead application interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of
acquisitive prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence, however,
dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll the said period.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon,26 the Court
ruled that a mere Notice of Adverse Claim did not constitute an effective
interruption of possession. In the case of Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli
Tanyag v. Gabriel,27 which also cited the Rañon Case, the Court stated
that the acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes and
obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in one's name cannot defeat
another's right of ownership acquired through acquisitive
prescription.28
In the same vein, a protest filed before an administrative agency and
even the decision resulting from it cannot effectively toll the running of
the period of acquisitive prescription. In such an instance, no civil
interruption can take place. Only in cases filed before the courts may
judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession. Records
show that it was only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case before the RTC.
The CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that Alegarbesbecame ipso jure
owner of Lot 140 entitling him to retain possession of it because he was
in open, continuous and exclusive possession for over thirty (30) years
of alienable public land.Virtucio emphasizes that the CA erred in
disregarding the decisions of the administrative agencies which
amended Alegarbes' homestead application excluding Lot 140 and gave
due course to his own application for the said lot, which decisions were
affirmed by the RTC.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are
entitled to great weight and respect on appeal and, in fact, are accorded
finality when supported by substantial evidence on the record.29 It
appears, however, that the conclusion made by the RTC was not
substantially supported. Even the RTC itself noted in its decision:
The approval of a Homestead Application merely authorizes the
applicant to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the
requirements prescribed by law before a final patent could be issued in
his favor – what divests the government of title to the land is the
issuance of a patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of
Deeds.30
A perusal of the records would reveal that there was no issuance of any
patent in favor of either parties. This simply means that the land subject
of the controversy remains to be in the name of the State. Hence, neither
Virtucio nor Alegarbes can claim ownership. There was, therefore, no
substantial and legal basis for the RTC to declare that Virtucio was
entitled to possession and ownership of Lot 140.
It can be argued that the lower court had the decisions of the
administrative agencies, which ultimately attained finality, as legal bases
in ruling that Virtucio had the right of possession and ownership. In fact,
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) even
issued the Order of Execution31 on May 11, 1989 ordering Alegarbes to
vacate Lot 140 and place Virtucio in peaceful possession of it. The CA,
however, was correct in finding that:
But appellant had earlier put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot 140
which he claims by virtue of adverse possession. On this issue, the cited
decisions are impertinent. Even if the decision to approve appellee's
homestead application over Lot 140 had become final, appellant could
still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription.32
In the case of Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando,33 the Court ruled that
the mere application for a patent, coupled with the fact of exclusive,
open, continuous and notorious possession for the required period, is
sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant applied for.34 It likewise
cited the cases of Susi v. Razon35 and Pineda v. CA,36 where the Court
ruled that the possession of a parcel of agricultural land of the public
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 Persons and Family Relations Cases

domain for the prescribed period of 30 years ipso jure converts the lot case was effectively interrupted by Custodio's filing of a complaint,
into private property.37 which is wanting in this case.

In this case, Alegarbes had applied for homestead patent as early as
1949. He had been in exclusive, open, continuous and notorious
possession of Lot 140 for at least 30 years. By the time the DENR issued
its order of execution in 1989, Alegarbes had Lot 140 in his possession
for more than 30 years. Even more so when Virtucio filed the complaint
before the RTC in 1997, Alegarbes was already in possession of the
subject property for forty-eight (48) years.
The CA correctly observed that the RTC erred in disregarding the
evidence before it and relying entirely upon the decisions of the Director
of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the OP,
which never touched the issue of whether Alegarbes’ open, continuous
and exclusive possession of over thirty (30) years of alienable land had
ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the mass of public land and beyond
the jurisdiction of these agencies.38
When the CA ruled that the RTC was correct in relying on the
abovementioned decisions, it merely recognized the primary jurisdiction
of these administrative agencies. It was of the view that the RTC was not
correct in the other aspects of the case. Thus, it declared Alegarbes as
owner ipso jure of Lot 140 and entitled to retain possession of it. There
is no reason for the Court to disturb these findings of the CA as they
were supported by substantial evidence, hence, are conclusive and
binding upon this Court.39
On the CA Decision involving a similar case
Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial
precedent.40 "The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower
courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions.
It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. "41
The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's
insistence that it was erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier
decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls upon this Court to
adhere to that decision by invoking the stare decisis principle, which is
not legally possible because only final decisions of this Court are
considered precedents.42
In view of the foregoing, the Court need not dwell on the complaint of
Virtucio with regard to the deletion of the award of attorney's fees in his
favor. It is ludicrous for the CA to order Alegarbes to pay attorney's fees,
as a measure of damages, and costs, after finding him to have acquired
ownership over the property by acquisitive prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision in WE CONCUR:
Custodio v. Alegarbes, CA-G.R. CV 26286, for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, which involved the same factual circumstances and ruled DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
against Alegarbes. Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
It must be noted that the subject property in the said case was Lot 139
allocated to Custodio and that Virtucio was not a party to that case. The
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
latter cannot enjoy whatever benefits said favorable judgment may have
Associate Justice Associate Justice
had just because it involved similar factual circumstances. The Court also
found from the records that the period of acquisitive prescription in that

125
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

126