TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the
Atty. Mauricio Ulep damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause
E. Tort distinguished from breach of contract
JOSE CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD CO., (1918)
FACTS:
Jose Cangco, herein plaintiff, was a clerk in the Manila Railroad
Company. By virtue of a pass issued to him, he would come to
work daily through the company‘s trains free of charge. On
January 20, 1915, while he was returning home by rail, an
accident occurred. When the plaintiff alighted when the train was
barely moving, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack
of watermelons. As a result, he fell violently on the platform and
was drawn under the moving car. As the train moved possibly six
meters before it came to a full stop, his right arm was badly
crushed and lacerated. Considering that the accident occurred
between 7-8pm and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a
single light located some distance away, objects on the platform
where the accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to
a person emerging from a lighted car. His arm had to be
amputated in two operations. Thus, he eventually filed a complaint
in the CFI of the City of Manila to recover damages. The lower
court ruled that although negligence was attributable to the
defendant by reason of the fact that the sack of melons were so
placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars,
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from
recovering.
ISSUE:
WON defendant railroad company is liable
DECISION:
The decision of the lower court is reversed and judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
There are two kinds of culpa: 1) extra-contractual culpa,
substantive and independent, w/c of itself constitutes the source
of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any
legal tie (Art.1903) and 2) contractual culpa considered as ―an
accident in the performance of an obligation already existing. On
the first, the obligation to make good the damage arises at the
very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the
scope of his employment, causes the injury. The liability of the
master is personal and direct. There is a juris tantum presumption
which may be rebutted by proof that the master has not been
guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and supervision
of the servant. The proof of diligence and care in the selection and
control of the servant does not relieve the master from liability, in
fact, it prevents the birth of the said liability. This kind of culpa is
always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without
willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused
damage to another. This Court has ruled that in cases of extra-
contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that
there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant
personally. The liability in this case is imposed by reason of the
breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or
of it. On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for
the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents in
cases of contractual culpa is not based upon a mere presumption
of the master‘s negligence in their selection or control, and proof
of exercise of utmost diligence and care in this regard does not
relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Proof of the contract and of its non-performance is sufficient prima
facie to warrant a recovery.
The fundamental distinction between these two kinds of culpa,
rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is
the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the
vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations, the vinculum
exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed
by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, the liability is limited to
persons who are morally culpable and for reasons of public policy,
to extend the said liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute
or limited control over persons whose acts or omissions are
imputable.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by
implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe
means of entering and leaving its trains (Civil Code, Art.1258).
That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its
non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was
morally imputable to defendant‘s servants. As to the defendant‘s
defense of the plaintiff‘s contributory negligence, it has been
settled that the test to determine whether the passenger has been
guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway
train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. Thus, taking into
consideration, the age, sex and physical condition of Cangco, this
Court held that he has not been negligent for the following
reasons: first, the circumstances of the location of accident barred
him from clearly noticing the sacks of watermelon; second, he
was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it
was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet
moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person; third, the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it
was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station and
last, there are other passengers who were able to alight safely
from the train while it is slowly moving.
Japan Airlines vs Jesus Simangan (2008)
Facts:
In 1991, Jesus Simangan decided to donate a kidney to his
cousin, Loreto Simangan, after tests proved that their blood and
tissue types matched. Simangan needed to go to the United
States to complete his preliminary work-up and donation surgery.
Having obtained an emergency U.S. visa, Simangan purchased a
round trip plane ticket from JAL bound to Los Angeles via Narita,
Japan.
1

Simangan was allowed to board the plane on July 29, 1992, but
while inside, the crew suspected that he was carrying falsified visa
and travel documents to work illegally in Japan. The stewardess
asked him to show his travel documents. Shortly after, the
stewardess ordered him out of the plane and it was only when the
plane left that he was informed that his papers were in order. JAL
refunded his ticket, but it was deducted $500, and his emergency
US visa was subsequently cancelled.
Displeased by the turn of events, Simangan filed an action for
damages against JAL with RTC in Valenzuela. He claimed he was
not able to donate his kidney to Loreto; and that he suffered
terrible embarrassment and mental anguish. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of respondent Simangan. JAL appealed to the
CA contending that it is not guilty of breach of contract of carriage,
hence, not liable for damages. CA affirmed the decision of RTC
with modification as to the amount of damages. Hence, this
petition.
Issues:
1) WON JAL is guilty of breach of contract of carriage?
2) WON respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages?
Decision:
JAL is guilty of breach of contract of carriage.
In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that is required
of plaintiff is to prove the existence of such contract and its non-
performance by the carrier through the latter's failure to carry the
passenger safely to his destination. Respondent has complied
with these requisites. Damage was made by JAL when
respondent was bumped off despite his protestations and valid
travel documents and notwithstanding his contract of carriage with
JAL.
Respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions
for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of
the items enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. As an
exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which
the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in
Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and
(2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith,
as provided in Article 2220.
The acts committed by JAL against respondent amounts to bad
faith. As found by the RTC, JAL breached its contract of carriage
with respondent in bad faith. JAL personnel summarily and
insolently ordered respondent to disembark while the latter was
already settled in his assigned seat. He was ordered out of the
plane under the alleged reason that the genuineness of his travel
documents should be verified.
JAL is also liable for exemplary damages as its above-mentioned
acts constitute wanton, oppressive and malevolent acts against
respondent. Exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of
example or correction for the public good, may be recovered in
contractual obligations, as in this case, if defendant acted in
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Radio Communications of the Philippines Inc. vs Court of
Appeals (1986)
Facts:
A telegram was sent through the Manila office of Radio
Communications of the Philippines (RCPI) to the offended party.
Loreto Dionela, reading as follows:
LORETO DIOMELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-
PER 115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN—WALA
KANG PADALA DITO—KAHIT BULBUL MO‖
Dionela alleges that the defamatory words sent to him not only
wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment
and affected his business. A carbon copy of the telegram is
readily available to the public as part of RCPI‘s files, making it
possible for third persons to read the message. Both the lower
courts and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Dionela.
RCPI as a defense, alleges the following; (1) the additional words
were a private joke between the sending and receiving operators.
It was never intended for Dionela; (2) RCPI as a petitioner-
employer should not be directly and primarily liable for the civil
liability arising from the criminal act of its employee; (3) there was
no sufficient publication of the telegram as to constitute libel and
(4) RCPI is not liable under art 19 and 20 of the NCC.
Issue: WON the petitioner is liable for breach of contract
Decision:
Petition DENIED. Decision of Court of Appeals affirmed.
Petitioner‘s contentions do not merit our consideration. The action
for damages was filed in the lower court directly against
respondent corporation not as an employer subsidiarily liable
under the provisions of Article 1161 of the New Civil Code. The
cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and
20 of the New Civil Code (supra). As well as on respondent‘s
breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees.
There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in
adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to
the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act
only through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in
receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner.
In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff
may recover, However, since negligence may be hard to
substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES
IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the
presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the
appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED.
2
SO ORDERED.
Juan J. Syquia, Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia and
Anthony C. Syquia vs The Honorable Court of Appeals, and
the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (1993)
Facts:
Juan Syquia, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, entered in a
contract of Deed of Sale and Interment Order with Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery Inc (MMPCI) . In the contract, there
contained a provision which stated that the coffin would be placed
in a sealed concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased
from the elements.
During the preparation for the transfer of Vicente‘s remains in the
newly bought lot in Manila Memorial, it was discovered that there
was a hole in the concrete vault which caused total flooding
inside, damaged the coffin as well as the body of the deceased
and covered the same with filth.
Syquia filed a complaint for recovery of damages arising from
breach of contract and/or quasi- delict against the MMPCI for
failure to deliver a defect-free concrete vault to protect the
remains of the deceased. In its defense, MMPCI claimed that the
boring of the hole was necessary in order to prevent the vault
from floating when water fills the grave. The trial court dismissed
the complaint holding that there was no quasi-delict because the
defendant is not guilty of any fault or negligence and because
there was a pre-existing contract between the parties. The CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: WON the private respondent is guilty of tort
Decision:
Denied. Decision of the CA affirmed.
We are more inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the
negative. There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to
justify a reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to
uphold the pleas of the petitioners. Although a pre -existing
contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the
existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the
respondent‘s Court finding that there was no negligence.
―Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x
x x.‖
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract
entitled ―Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care‖ on
August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the
parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence,
had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as
provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit: ―Those who in
the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.‖
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs The Honorable Court of
Appeals, Luis A. Luna and Clarita S. Luna (1995)
Facts:
Sometime in October 1986, private respondent Luis A. Luna
applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by
petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its
Pasig Branch. The bank also issued a supplemental card to
private respondent Clarita S. Luna.In August 1988, Clarita lost her
credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In order to replace the
lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this
nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would
appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the
principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master
file. Luis tendered lunch for a close friend, at Hotel
Intercontinental Manila, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD.
Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash
the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by
this incident. In a letter, Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded
from FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-
president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis. On
05 December 1988, filed a complaint for damages with the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
Trial Court‘s Ruling: On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given
the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision ordering
FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral
damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c)
P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
CA: The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
M.R.: Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition
for review.
Issue:
WON FEBTC can be held liable for moral damages?
Decision:
There is merit in this appeal. The appealed decision is MODIFIED
by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private
respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay private
respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by way of
nominal damages.
RATIO:
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the
defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the
breach of the contract. 2 The Civil Code provides:
3
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
(Emphasis supplied)
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple,
negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral
damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger
attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common
carrier.
Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to
personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in
the findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can
sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to
cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's
negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered
so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to
do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is
different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad
faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or ill will. 6
―Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.‖ Article 21 of
the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to
cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision
could properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be
warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual
obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of
misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most
importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle
in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the
specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the
grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the
breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately
becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of
transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or
deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of
moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered
included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art.
2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the
damages that are caused contractual breach, but because the
definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly
excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual
relations between the parties."
The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made by
the court a quo, affirmed by the appellate court, to be inordinate
and substantially devoid of legal basis.
Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve
as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory. In criminal
offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstance. In quasi-
delicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to
have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice.
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to
honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should
entitle him to recover a measure of nominal damages.
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right
of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court
deems such recovery to be just and equitable. We see no issue of
sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the
award thereof by the trial court.
Kristine Rea M. Regino vs Pangasinan Colleges of Science
and Technology, Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elisa Baladad
(2004)
Facts:
Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science
student at Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology
(PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly
through the financial support of her relatives. During the second
semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and
statistics under Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad,
respectively, as teachers. Sometime in February, PCST held a
fund raising campaign dubbed the ―Rave Part and Dance
Revolution,‖ the proceeds of which were to go to the construction
of the school‘s tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was
required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100.00 each. The
project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students
who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores;
those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the
final examinations. Financially strapped and prohibited by her
religion from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino
refused to pay for the tickets. On the scheduled dates of the final
examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers disallowed her
from taking the tests. Regino‘s pleas ostensibly went unheeded by
Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions
as compliance with PCST‘s policy.
As a result, Regino filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for
damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad (PCST et al.). In
4
her complaint, she prayed from P500,000 as nominal damages,
P500,000 as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary
damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of
litigation and attorney‘s fees. PCST et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
contending that the complaint should have been lodged with the
Commission of Higher Education (CHED). The RTC dismissed
the complaint for lack of cause of action. Aggrieved, Regino filed
the present Petition on pure questions of law.
Issue: Whether PCST et al. can be made liable for damages
Decision:
Court ruled in favor of Regino. PCST et al. can be made liable for
damages.
In her Complaint, Regino also charged that PCST et al.
―inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of their poverty,
religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon
[petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness‖; as a
result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any
of her subjects for the second semester of that school year and
had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of
respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental
agony and ―demoralization of unimaginable proportions‖ in
violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These
provisions of the law state thus:
―Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.‖
―Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.‖
―Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
Prying into the privacy of another‘s residence;
Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations ofnanother;
Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs,
lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.‖
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not
otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however,
may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with
its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a
tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA, from which we quote:
―x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that
obligations arising from quasidelicts or tort, also known as
extracontractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a
contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722; 18 SCRA
155), the private respondent was awarded damages for his
unwarranted expulsion from a firstclass seat aboard the petitioner
airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the
petitionerairline‘s liability as one arising from tort, not one arising
form a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the
view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for
the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view
was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court
was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38
Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: ‗x x x. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an
extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.‘
―Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code
on Human Relations, particularly Article 21 x x x.‖
F. Tort distinguished from civil liability arising from crime
The People of the Philippines vs Rogelio Ligon y Trias and
Fernando Gabat y Almera and Fernando Gabat y Almera
(1987)
Facts:
On October 23, 1983, the accused, Fernando Gabat (Gabat), was
riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio
Gabat, and driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon (Ligon).
The Kombi was coming from Espana Street going towards the
direction of Quiapo. Fernando Gabat was seated beside the
driver, in the front seat by the window on the right side of the
Kombi. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street
before turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue,
the Kombi had to stop as the traffic light was red. While waiting for
the traffic light to change, Fernando Gabat beckoned a cigarette
vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales), the victim, to buy some
cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed
Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was
occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven
by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. Rosales clung to the
window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on
the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the
Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple
physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on
October 30, 1983. In an autopsy, it was stated that the cause of
death of Rosales was "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary
to traumatic injuries of the head."
The prosecution claimed that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes
from Rosales and moved loose the latter's hand from the window
5
of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the
pavement. The defense, however, claims that as the vehicle sped
onward, the cigarette box which was squeezed between the right
arm of Gabat and the window frame fell inside the Kombi. Rosales
then ran beside the vehicle and clung to the windowsill of the
moving vehicle. Gabat testified that when he saw the cigarette
vendor clinging on the side of the front door, he told Ligon to veer
to the right in order that Rosales could get off at the sidewalk.
However, Gabat declared, that Ligon said that it could not be
done because of the moving vehicular traffic. Then, while the
vehicle slowed down and Ligon was maneuvering to the right in
an attempt to go toward the sidewalk, Rosales lost his grip on the
window frame and fell to the pavement of Quezon Boulevard.
Gabat allegedly shouted at Ligon to stop but Ligon replied that
they should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to the
parents of Gabat, and later they would come back to the scene of
the incident. However, while the Kombi was speeding along
Dewey Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of Prudencio Castillo
and a jeep driven by policemen. Gabat and Ligon were brought to
police headquarters, but neither of them executed any written
statement.
Issue: WON the accused who was acquitted from any criminal
liability is free from any civil liability.
Decision:
It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also
free from civil liability.
While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. The judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when
it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or
omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as
follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails
to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the
distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each
other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights.
One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the
other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved
party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other
that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus:
"There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a
crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty
shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for
the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by
the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of
the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged.
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence
exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of
Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the
testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses at the trial
and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we find
that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his
act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to
Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat's
wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of
a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of
events which led to the death of Rosales. Through fault and
negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving
forward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help
Rosales while the latter clung
precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his
order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the
driver's act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up
the injured victim. These proven facts taken together are firm
bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code for the
damage done to Rosales.
Rufo Mauricio Construction and/or Rufo Mauricio vs Hon.
Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the Philippines
(1987)
Facts:
On September 20, 1979, Illustre Cabiliza, driver of Izusu dump
truck owned by RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTIONS, was
charged before the RTC of Legazpi City with homicide and
damage to property through reckless imprudence. The dump truck
that he was driving sideswipe and hit a Colt Gallant driven and
owned by the late Judge Arsenio Solidum, thereby inflicting
injuries upon him which directly caused his untimely death and
further causing damage to the said vehicle and likewise causing
damage to the house owned by Pablo Navarro.
6
Cabiliza filed a Notice of Appeal but he died and did not live to
pursue his appeal. Hence, the lower court issued an Order
requiring the heirs of Cabiliza to appear and to substitute him with
respect to the civil aspect of the case. However, Cabiliza was
found insolvent evidenced by a certificate of insolvency. The
victim‘s widow Mrs. Aurora Solidum filed a motion for issuance of
a subsidiary writ of execution to be enforced against the
employer, Rufo Mauricio, which was granted.
Petitioner filed MR but it was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner
contends that --- The dismissal of the criminal case against the
accused-employee wipes out not only the employee‘s primary civil
liability, bu also the employer‘s subsidiary liability because:
The criminal case is based on Article 100 of RPC wherein criminal
liability and exemption of criminal liability implies exemption from
civil liability arising from crime.
The civil liability of the employer is based, if any, on quasi-delict,
since the accused was exempted from criminal liability.
Exemplary damages cannot be imposed upon employer who at
the time of the alleged incident was not present nor inside the
vehicle.
The petitioner-employer cannot be condemned to pay an
exorbitant amount of damages without giving him opportunity to
cross examine the witness and opportunity to adduce evidence to
resist the claim.
The IAC misapplied the facts contrary to the physical evidence
relied on conjectures that depicted a different picture of the
accident when the evidence shows that it was the victim who was
negligent at the time of the accident. (by invading the proper lane
of the dump truck)
Issue: WON Rufo Mauricio Construction is subsidiarily liable
Decision:
The first contention of petitioner that the death of the accused-
employee wipes out not only the employee's primary civil liability
but also his employer's subsidiary liability is without merit. The
death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before
the judgment of conviction (rendered against him by the lower
court) became final and executory extinguished his criminal
liability meaning his obligation to serve the imprisonment imposed
and his pecuniary
liability for fines, but not his civil liability should the liability
or
obligation arise (not from a crime, for here,
no crime was
committed, the accused not having been
convicted by final
judgment, and therefore still regarded as innocent) but from
a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177, Civil Code), as in this
case.
The liability of the employer here would not be
subsidiary
but solidary with his driver (unless said employer can
prove there was
no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove
due diligence in
the selection and supervision of his driver).
Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in
the criminal case, and to grant him his day in court for the purpose
of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on their testimonies
on the driver's alleged negligence and the amount of damages to
which the heirs of the victim are entitled, as well as to introduce
any evidence or witnesses he may care to present in his defense,
the hearing on the motion to quash the subsidiary writ of
execution must be reopened precisely for the purpose adverted to
hereinabove.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the appellate
court is hereby SET ASIDE, and this case is REMANDED to the
trial court for the hearing adverted to in the next preceding
paragraph.
Maria Benita A. Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of the
minor children Krizteen Elizabeth, Beverly Marie and
Napoleon II, all surnamed Dulay v. The Court of Appeals,
Former 8th Division, Hon. Teodoro P. Regino, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the RTC, NCR, QC, Br. 84, Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., and Safeguard Security
Corporation (1995)
Facts:
An altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon
Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security
guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay.
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased filed an action for
damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private
respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp.
("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. An
information was also filed by the petitioners charging Torzuela
with homicide.
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees. Private respondent
SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action, alleging that
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed
with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed
by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
7
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for
damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies
only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
While respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it
be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela
is not one of its employees.
RTC- Respondent Judge Regino ruled in favour of
SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion
for exclusion as defendant.
CA- Affirmed the lower court‘s ruling.
Issue: WON quasi-delicts cover acts that are intentional and
voluntary not just acts of negligence under Article 2176 of the
New Civil Code.
Decision:
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for
homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before
the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even
far better than a compliance with the requirement of express
reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA
357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in
this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil
action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not
on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence.
What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause
of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged
in the complaint as constituting the cause of action (Republic v.
Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit
and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the
party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by
the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De
Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]).
An examination of the complaint in the present case would show
that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to
recover damages against the private respondents for their
vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno
Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no
justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code
to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is
the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As
far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98
[1977]), this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. ...Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the
Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not
only acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to
the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis
supplied)
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil
Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to
the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However,
the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been
construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965);
Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes
not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]).
Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the
crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted
however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged
with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the
8
defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary
under the Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for
Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a
security guard. It having been established that the instant action is
not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela
and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence
of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either
in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over
him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing
of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v.
Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent
upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts
which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on
the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply
because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence
attributable to private respondents.
Francis Chua vs Hon. Court of Appeals and Lydia C. Hao (2004)
Facts:
Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a
complaint charging Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa Chua, of four
counts of falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 172
in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged
that Chua falsified the Minutes of the Annual Stockholders
meeting of the Board of Directors of the Siena Realty Corporation
by making or causing it to appear in said Minutes of the Annual
Stockholders Meeting that one LYDIA HAO CHUA was present in
said proceedings, when in truth and in fact, said person was never
present during the Annual Stockholders Meeting. During the trial,
Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel Bruno Rivera appeared as
private prosecutors. Chua moved to exclude complainant‘s
counsels as private prosecutors in the case on the ground that
Hao failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. The
court granted Chua‘s motion. Hao moved for reconsideration but it
was denied. Hence, Hao filed a petition for certiorari. The RTC
gave due course to the petition. Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari but was denied. He filed a
petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals and the lower court err in allowing
private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of Criminal
Case?
Decision:
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also
civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two
entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political
entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the
individual member of the society whose person, right, honor,
chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or
omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise
to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it
caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the
civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone
to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason
of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay
forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability
arising from the offense charged which includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability
is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that, ―[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.‖
a. Independent Civil Action, Rationale
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
Freedom of religion;
Freedom of speech;
Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
Freedom of suffrage;
The right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;
The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for
public use;
The right to the equal protection of the laws;
The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
The privacy of communication and correspondence;
9
The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances;
The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
The right of the accused against excessive bail;
The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in his behalf;
Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self,
or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a
promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except
when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a
statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional;
and
Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses
or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger
to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for
damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily
responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be
independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of
evidence shall suffice to support such action. (NCC)
QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) (NCC)
RULE 111
Prosecution of Civil Action
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action
shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint
or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in
the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be
paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall
be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed
by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which
could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action. (1a)
The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks
to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based
on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged
but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)
Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the
criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
10
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already
been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it
may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension
shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the
civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be
consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the
criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already
adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of
the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions
shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the
period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted
separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
tolled. (n)
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall
be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. (2a)
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. — In
the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. (3a)
Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the
delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under
section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued
against the estate or legal representative of the accused after
proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be.
The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party
may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment
rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability
is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for the same
act or omission subject of the civil action. (4a)
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A
petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may
be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed
in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
(5a) (Rules of Court)
Sps. Antonio C. Santos and Esperanza C. Santos, Nora
Barnalo, Belinda Lumactad, Marienela Dy, Nikka Santos and
Leonardo Ferrer vs Hon. Normandie B. Pizarro, as Presiding
Judge, RTC of QC, Branch 101, Dionision M. Sibayan and
Viron Transportation Company, Inc., represented by Virgilio
Q. Rondaris (2005)
Facts:
In April 1994, Viron Transit driver Dionisio Sibayan was charged
with reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and
multiple physical injuries in connection with a collision between a
bus driven by Sibayan and a lite ace van, for which Sibayan was
convicted on December 1998.
As there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no
pronouncement of civil liability was made by the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC).
In October 20, 2000, Santos filed a complaint for damages
against Sibayan, Viron Transit and Rondaris, president and
chairman of Viron Transit with the RTC of Quezon City, pursuant
to their reservation to file a separate civil action. They cited the
judgment convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint citing prescription
alleging that actions based on quasi delict prescribe in 4years
from the accrual of the cause of action.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint on the ground that the cause of
action had already prescribed.
CA: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari which was dismissed
for error in the choice or mode of appeal.
11
Issue: WON the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
when it insisted that the cause of action is based on quasi delict
and concluded that the action had prescribed
Decision:
Our RPC provides that every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution,
reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of
consequential damages.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a
separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by
Sibayan. The reason why MCTC did not make any
pronouncement as to the latter's civil liability.
The complaint reveals that the allegations are consistent with
petitioners claim that the action was brought to recover civil
liability arising from a crime. Even if there were allegations of
negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, it does not
mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on
quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed.
In cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice
between an action to enforce liability arising from crime under the
Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil
Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to 2
separate civili liabilities on the part of the offender :
1 . Civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC
2 . Independent civil liabilities
a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony,
( culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Art. 31 of
the Civil Code, intentional torts under Art. 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Art. 2176
b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal proceedings.
While the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed,
petitioners can still pursue the remaining avenue opened for them
by their reservation. The surviving cause of action ex delicto.
This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto
does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from crime especially as the latter action had been
expressly reserved.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana
is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the
employer.
Once there is a conviction for felony, final in character, the
employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the
crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees.
Article 103 of the RPC is the controlling force to obviate the
possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even
after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
L.G. Foods Corporation and Victorino Gabor, Vice President
and General Manager vs Hon. Philadelfa B. Pagapong-
Agraviador, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Br43,
Bacolod City and Sps Florentino and Theresa Vallejera (2006)
Facts:
On Feb. 26, 1996, Charles Vallejera, a 7-yr old son of the
spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, died as he
was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at
the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Ferrer. Eventually, an
information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was
filed against the driver before the MTCC Bacolod City. However,
as the accused driver committed suicide, the case was dismissed.
Claiming that the petitioners should be held civilly liable as they
failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee, the spouses Vallejera later on filed a complaint for
damages against them. For their part, the petitioners prayed, by
way of an Answer w/ Compulsory Counterclaim, for the dismissal
of the complaint. They argued that they had exercised the
required due diligence and maintained that for their liability to
attach their driver must first be convicted. Thus, since the driver
died during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non
condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled. Hence, they
argued that there is lack of cause of action on the part of the
Spouses. They also argued that since the Spouses Vallejera did
not make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages
when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is
thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action w/c was already
dismissed. The RTC and the CA both denied petitioner‘s motion
to dismiss. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the spouses Vallejeras‘ cause of action in the Civil
Case for Damages is founded on Art. 103 of the RPC, as
maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code, as decided by the lower courts.
Decision:
PETITION Denied.
From the allegations of their complaint, it is clear that quasi-delict
was the spouses‘ choice of remedy against the petitioners. An act
or omission causing damage to another may give rise to 2
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender: 1) civil liability
ex delicto and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those a) not
arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law, intentional torts and
culpa aquiliana) or where the injured party is granted a right to file
an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either
of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against
the offender. The victims of negligence or their heirs have a
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from
12
culpa criminal under Art. 100 of the RPC, and an action for quasi-
delict (culpa aquiliana) under Arts 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If,
as in this case, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff
may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee,
subject to the employer‘s defense of exercise of the diligence of a
good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen
is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily
liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.
According to Art. 2177, these are alternative remedies the plaintiff
may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of
arising indirectly from the crime or directly from tort. The choice is
with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his
initiatory pleading or complaint and not with the defendant who
can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff‘s case of action or lack
of it based on the defendant‘s perception that the plaintiff should
have opted to file a claim under Art. 103, RPC. Under Art. 2180 of
the CC, the liability of the employer is direct/immediate. It is not
considered upon prior recourse against the negligent employee
and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. Furthermore,
the circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil
action for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is
of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was
dismissed w/o any pronouncement having been made therein. In
reality, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first
place.
b. Prejudicial Question Doctrine Not Applicable
Consing, Jr. vs People of the Philippines (2013)
Facts:
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz various loans from Unicapital Inc. The
loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a
parcel of land in Cavite. In accordance with its option to purchase
the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of
the property. The other half of the property was purchased by
Plus Builders, Inc. Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could
develop the property, they learned that the title to the property
was really in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng.
And the title held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.
Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount that had been
paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter
ignored the demands.
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed a Civil Case in the Pasig City
RTC (Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to
enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for collection on the
ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother. On
August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati
City for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for estafa
through falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati City
(Makati criminal case). Consing moved to defer his arraignment in
the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a
prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati
civil cases. The RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings
in the Makati criminal case on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. The CA uphold the order of the RTC.
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders
commenced its own suit for damages against Consing in the RTC
in Manila (Manila civil case). On January 21, 2000, an information
for estafa through falsification of public document was filed
against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite
(Cavite Criminal Case). Consing filed a motion to defer the
arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases.
RTC denied Consing‘s motion. However, CA enjoined the RTC
from proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and
Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
The State assailed the decision of the CA in SC (G.R. No.
148193), praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA. SC
granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the decision of
the CA. SC held that there is no prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for the
reconsideration of the adverse decision of the CA, citing the ruling
in G.R. No. 148193. On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its
decision, reversing itself. Hence, this appeal by petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue: WON the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the
existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension
of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Decision:
Petition DENIED.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and
physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. This
was precisely the Court‘s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. In the instant case (Manila civil case), for
Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed
lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question
that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.
Principles
13
Abuse of Rights
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. (NCC)
1.1 Elements
Sea Commercial Company, Inc. vs The Honorable Court of
Appeals, Jamandre Industries, Inc. and Tirso Jamandre
(1999)
Facts:
SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of selling and
distributing agricultural machinery, products and equipment.
SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership agreement whereby
SEACOM appointed JII as its exclusive dealer in the City and
Province of Iloilo. The agreement was subsequently amended to
include Capiz in the territorial coverage and to make the
dealership agreement on a non-exclusive basis.
JII allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid
deliveries. SEACOM brought action to recover the amount. JII
filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposed a
counterclaim for damages representing unrealized profits. In the
counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted
to sell in 1977 twenty-four (24) units of Mitsubishi power tillers to a
group of farmers, which fact JII allegedly made known to
petitioner, but the latter taking advantage of said information and
in bad faith, went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and sold
twenty one (21) units of said tractors, thereby depriving JII of
unrealized profits. SEACOM alleges that the transaction with
FSDC was the result of a public bidding. It alleges that it did not
know FSDC‘s intent to buy machineries from JII. Moreover, the
dealership agreement is a non-exclusive, therefore, it can still
compete in the market against JII.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering JII to pay SEACOM
P18,843.85 representing its outstanding obligation. It also granted
the JII‘s counterclaim for unrealized profits and for moral and
exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court stating that while there exists no agency
relationship between SEACOM and JII, SEACOM is liable for
damages and unrealized profits to JII.
Issue: WON there was an abuse of right by SEACOM resulting to
bad faith when it competed with its own dealer, JII, as regards the
sale of farm machineries to FSDC
Decision:
Petition DENIED. Decision of Court of Appeals affirmed.
The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article (Art. 19
of NCC), departs from the classical theory that ―he who uses a
right injures no one.‖ The modern tendency is to depart from the
classical and traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for
damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights, even when
the act is not illicit. Article 19 was intended to expand the concept
of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
provide specifically in statutory law.
If mere fault or negligence in one‘s acts can make him liable for
damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should
abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith is
essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another,
even through the forms or technicalities of the law, together with
an absence of all information or belief of fact which would render
the transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means
good faith as understood by men of affairs.
While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of
principle,8 the ―cardinal law on human conduct‖ expressed in said
article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a person
exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs
his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and
good faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse
of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another.
Clearly, the bad faith of SEACOM was established. By appointing
JII as a dealer of its agricultural equipment, SEACOM recognized
the role and undertaking of JII to promote and sell said
equipment. Under the dealership agreement, JII was to act as a
middleman to sell SEACOM‘s products, in its area of operations,
i.e. Iloilo and Capiz provinces.
Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a
nonexclusive basis,19 SEACOM may not exercise its right
unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good
faith; otherwise it opens itself to liability under the abuse of right
rule embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code above-quoted.
1.2. Test when principle may be invoked
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp., and Herbert C. Hendry
vs The Honorable Court of Appeals and Restituto M. Tobias
(1989)
Facts:
Restituto Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay as purchasing
agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations
manager. In 1972, Globe Mackay discovered fictitious purchases
and other fraudulent transactions which caused significant loss to
the company. Tobias claimed that he was the one who discovered
the same which prompted him to report the incident to his
immediate superiors including the petitioner Herbert Hendry, the
general manager of Globe Mackay. Soon after making the report,
Tobias was considered as the primary suspect by Hendry and he
was instructed to take a forced leave, leave his office drawers
open and leave his office keys. Upon his return, he was called a
crook and a swindler by Hendry.
14
Two separate investigations by the police were conducted which
confirmed Tobias‘ non-participation in the incident. Despite the
said conclusions made by the police, the petitioners filed six (6)
complaints against Tobias for estafa which were subsequently
dismissed by the fiscal and affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
Tobias tried to protest the said filing but Hendry ordered him to
confess or else the company would file cases against him until he
landed in jail and that Filipinos are not trustworthy. During the
course of the filing of criminal charges, Tobias‘ employment was
terminated which prompted him to file a case for illegal dismissal
with the labor arbiter. The labor arbiter upheld the validity of the
dismissal but upon appeal to the NLRC, it was reversed. The
petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Labor which upheld the
decision of the labor arbiter. The respondent then raised the
matter to the Office of the President but during the pendency of
the proceedings, the parties entered into a compromise
agreement.
Tobias then applied for other employment but Hendry wrote a
letter to the prospective employer, without the latter‘s request, that
Tobias‘ employment was terminated due to dishonesty. As a
result, Tobias was never hired by the said employer which caused
him to file an action for damages for malicious prosecution and
abusive acts of the petitioners. The trial court ruled in favor of
Tobias which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, the present appeal.
Issue:
WON the petitioners are liable for damages
Decision:
Denied. Decision of the CA affirmed.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the
codification of ―some basic principles that are to be observed for
the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order.‖ Foremost among these principles is
that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one‘s rights but also in the
performance of one‘s duties. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for
the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an
action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of
law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not
violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising
their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not,
however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article
21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may
be invoked, there is NO RIGID TEST which can be applied. The
question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has
been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21
or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court,
after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that petitioners have indeed abused the right
that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for
which the latter must now be indemnified.
An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has
committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate
action such as ordering an investigation and directing the
employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover
the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the
high -handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was
certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners
was to continue when private respondent returned to work. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment
during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court
has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with the manner in which the
right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for
damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant
case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate
manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to
recover damages underArticle 19 in relation to Article 21 of the
Civil Code.
1.3 Requisites to be liable for Damages under the
Principle
Heirs of Purisima Nala vs. Artemio Cabansa (2008)
Facts:
15

Artemio Cabansag filed Civil Case for damages in October 1991.
According to respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property
from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Felisa Duyan Gomez on
July 23, 1990. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot
registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991,
he received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado in
behalf
of Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from
1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is
owned
by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will be filed against
him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because
of such demands, respondent suffered damages and was
constrained to file the case against Nala and Atty. Del Prado
Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good
faith and that he was merely acting in behalf of his
client, Nala. Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-
square meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio
Duyan, which was subsequently divided into two parts. The 400-
square meter property was conveyed to spouses Gomez in a
fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement that it will be merely
held by them in trust for the Duyan's children. Said property is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 281115 in the name of
spouses Gomez. Nala also claimed that respondent is only
renting the property which he occupies.
RTC RULING: In favor of respondent. P150,000.00 by way of
moral damages; P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
P20,000.00 as and for reasonable attorney's fees and other
litigation expenses; and to pay the costs.
CA RULING: Decision dated December 19, 2002 affirmed the
RTC Decision with modification. P30,000.00 by way of moral
damages; exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and
P10,000.00, attorney's fees.
Issue: WON respondent Cabansag is entitled to damages?
Decision:
―Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.‖ The foregoing provision
sets the standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one‘s rights but also in the performance of one‘s
duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise
of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith,
but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse
of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or
injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance
with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure
another.
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights
principle, the following requisites must concur:
(a) the existence of a legal right or duty; which is exercised in bad
faith; and
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of
Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed, and he who
alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the
other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple
negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and
conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to
some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response
to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove
that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or
malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first
place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that
the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that
respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no
knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on
them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property
to respondent. It was only after respondent filed the case for
damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. The bare
fact that respondent claims ownership over the property does not
give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the demand letters
by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent any evidence presented by
respondent, bad faith or malice could not be attributed to
petitioner since Nala was only trying to protect their interests over
the property.
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del
Prado's acts were done with the sole intention of prejudicing and
injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered mental
anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received
the demand letters; however, there is a material distinction
between damages and injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal
right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the
injury. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy
for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes
Facts:
Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the
decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC
16
of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto
Reyes aka ―Amang Bisaya‖, an entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while
having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr.
Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes,
Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for
the hotel‘s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff
agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket
of fruits, the latter‘s gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon
as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel‘s Executive Secretary, asked
him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people
around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati
policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time,
Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party
but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim
approached several people including Dr. Filart‘s sister, Ms.
Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told
Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart‘s group. She wasn‘t
able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking
over the phone and doesn‘t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr.
Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the
party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the
list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food
then leave the party.
During the plaintiff‘s cross-examination, he was asked how close
was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr.
Reyes answered ―very close because we nearly kissed each
other‖. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim‘s intention
to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who
made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.
Issues:
1. WoN Ruby Lim violated the said provisions entitling Reyes to
damages.
2. Won Nikko Hotel is solidarily liable with her as her employer.
Held:
1. No. Ruby Lim did not violate the provisions. Since the lower
court and and appellate court were in disagreement as to the
facts, the Supreme Court deemed it necessary to determine which
version is credible. It sided with the lower court‘s version and
concluded that Lim was not liable because of the following
findings:
a. Reyes himself admitted that when he was asked to leave, Ruby
Lim was so close to him to a point that they ―almost kissed,‖
suggesting that Lim observed proper decorum as to avoid being
heard by other people to the embarrassment of Reyes. The claim
of Reyes that he was escorted by the police is not because of
Lim‘s orders to get him out of the party but because of how he
reacted when discreetly told to do so. Hence,not violating Article
19 on Abuse of Power.
b. Reyes failed to show that Lim was driven by animosity when
she asked him to leave, For the record that incident was the first
time when they actually met. Also, the contestation of Reyes that
Lim is an old maid who has "very strong bias and prejudice
against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her
work at the hotel with foreign businessmen‖ leading to such
animosity is so lame an argument which cannot merit any
consideration. Hence, not violating Article 21.
2. No. Nikko Hotel is not liable upon the finding that Lim is not
guilty.
Doctrines:
1. Article 19 (Abuse of Power) is not a panacea for all human
hurts and social grievances. when "a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible."The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one‘s rights but also in the performance of one‘s duties. These
standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is
any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised
in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is
proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20
pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not
obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave. Hence, Reyes invoked Article 21. (Refer below).
2. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the
following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. Under Articles 19
and 21 the nature of the act to be able to claim damages must be
intentional. It has been proven in the case, however, the Lim‘s
acts were otherwise.
3. Doctrine of Violenti Non Fit Injuria (―to which a person assents
is not esteemed in law as injury‖) pertains to the self-inflicted
injury which will not entitle a person for damages because of the
very fact that it in the first place it was his fault on why he was
injured. This doctrine was invoked by Nikko Hotel in the petition,
claiming that Reyes exposed himself to the injury of being thrown
out of the party as a gate crasher. The Court, however, said that
this is not applicable in this case because despite Reyes‘
improper behaviour of gate-crashing, Nikko Hotel and Lim should
still observe proper treatment towards him under Articles 19 and
21 as to not expose him to humiliation and shame.
36. Juanito Ang, for and in behalf of Sunrise Marketing (Bacolod),
Inc. v. Sps. Roberto and Rachel Ang
GR NO. 201675 | June 19, 2013| Carpio, J.
Derivative Suit
DOCTRINE:
17
A derivative suit is an action brought by a stockholder on behalf of
the corporation to enforce corporate rights against the
corporation‘s directors, officers or other insiders.
FACTS:
Sunrise Marketing is a duly registered corporation owned by the 5
members of the Ang family. President – Roberto; Vice President –
Juanito; Secretary – Rachel and Treasurer – Anecita (collectively,
directors)
In 1995, Nancy (Juanito and Roberto‘s sister) and her husband
Theodore loaned P1M to the Ang family to settle the obligations of
Sunrise Marketing and the family‘s other corporations. There was
no written loan agreement in view of the close relationship
between the parties. In 2005, Sunrise Marketing increased its
authorized capital stock to P10M. The Certificate of Increase of
Capital Stock was signed by the directors. Juanito claimed
however that the increase contravened the Corporation Code,
ultimately allowing Sps. Ang to take over active management of
Sunrise Marketing at 50/50 stock shares.
Juanito claimed that payments to Sps. Nancy and Theodore
ceased after 2006, prompting Nancy to send a demand letter to
Sps. Juanito and Anecita, and Sps. Roberto and Rachel. The
latter replied that they are not complying with the demand letter
because they did not personally contract the loan from Nancy.
Sps. Juanito and Anecita executed a Settlement Agreement and
an Extrajudicial REM, admitting that they obtained a loan from
Sps. Nancy and Theodore and that it shall be secured by their
shares in real property they owned.
A certain Kenneth C. Locsin (Locsin) signed on behalf of Nancy
and Theodore, under a SPA which was not attached as part of the
Settlement Agreement or the Mortgage, nor included in the
records of this case. Juanito then filed a Stockholder Derivative
Suit with prayer for an ex parte writ of attachment/receivership
before the RTC, alleging that the malicious refusal of Sps.
Roberto and Rachel to settle their 50% share in the loan will affect
the financial viability of Sunrise Marketing. He also claimed that
he was illegally excluded from the management and participation
in Sunrise‘ business through force and intimidation. RTC granted
the writ of attachment, break open order, and appointment of a
receiver.
In her Answer, Rachel prayed that the complaint be dismissed as
it was not a bona fide derivative suit, but a collection suit since the
real party in interest is not Sunrise Marketing but Nancy and
Theodore as creditors. Juanito then moved for Rachel, her
daughter Em, and their counsel Atty. Tan to be held in contempt
for allegedly attempting to thwart the implementation of the
attachment order (office was padlocked and all corporate
documents and records were missing). Juanito then filed a
complaint against Atty. Tan.
RTC held that the action was a derivative suit, finding that the
issuance of the checks to settle the purported obligations to
Rachel‘s relatives, as well as the removal of Nancy as a
stockholder in SMBI‘s records as filed with the SEC, shows that
Rachel and Roberto committed fraud. Rachel filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA which reversed the Order of the RTC. The
Complaint should not have been dismissed because it is a
harassment suit and not a derivative suit. The CA-Cebu also
found that Juanito failed to exhaust intra-corporate remedies and
that the loan extended by Nancy and Theodore was not SMBI‘s
corporate obligation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed because of its
nature as a nuisance or harassment suit
HELD:
YES. The CA-Cebu correctly ruled that the Complaint should be
dismissed since it is a nuisance or harassment suit under Section
1(b) of the Interim Rules. Section 1(b) thereof provides:
b) Prohibition against nuisance and harassment suits. - Nuisance
and harassment suits are prohibited. In determining whether a suit
is a nuisance or harassment suit, the court shall consider, among
others, the following:
(1) The extent of the shareholding or interest of the initiating
stockholder or member;
(2) Subject matter of the suit;
(3) Legal and factual basis of the complaint;
(4) Availability of appraisal rights for the act or acts complained of;
and
(5) Prejudice or damage to the corporation, partnership, or
association in relation to the relief sought.
In case of nuisance or harassment suits, the court may, motu
proprio or upon motion, forthwith dismiss the case.
Records show that Juanito, apart from being Vice President, owns
the highest number of shares, equal to those owned by Roberto.
Also, as explained earlier, there appears to be no damage to
SMBI if the loan extended by Nancy and Theodore remains
unpaid. The CA-Cebu correctly concluded that "a plain reading of
the allegations in the Complaint would readily show that the case
x x x was mainly filed to collect a debt allegedly extended by the
spouses Theodore and Nancy Ang to [SMBI]. Thus, the aggrieved
party is not SMBI x x x but the spouses Theodore and Nancy Ang,
who are not even x x x stockholders."
1.5 Other illustrative cases
Jose Roque, Jr., substituted by his wife Norma Roque,
petitioner vs Jaime T. Torres, substituted by his son James
Kenley M. Torres and the Honorable Court of Appeals
Facts:
Jose Roque, Jr. (Roque) was the administrator of certain parcels
of land in Antipolo, Rizal, registered in the name of his son Rafael
Roque. Sometime before the incident, Jaime T. Torres (Torres),
claiming to be the owner of said property, hired security guards
from Anchor Security and Detective Agency, who allegedly barred
Roque from entering the property and threatened him with
physical harm should he attempt to tend the said land. Roque,
then, filed a case for grave threats against said security guards
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Rizal. Prior to the
18
incident, Torres instituted an Action for cancellation of Certificate
of Titles in the name of Roque‘s son Rafael Roque before the
RTC of Antipolo which was dismissed by the trial court. According
to the court a quo, Torres‘ action was premature for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies in the Bureau of Lands.
Respondent appealed the dismissal before the Court of Appeals,
which later affirmed the decision of the lower court. Respondent‘s
appeal to this Court was also dismissed.
Roque visited the said property and was surprised to see seven
security guards guarding the property upon orders of
respondent. Three security guards approached Roque and
exchange of words happened. When Roque refused to leave the
premises, Cabos, one of the guards threatened Roque that should
he stay inside, Cabos would shoot him, so Roque immediately left
the place. However, Cabos still fired at him but missed. Roque ran
fast to his makeshift hut where Cabos followed him and shot
again hitting petitioner on the back.
After a while, the other security guards, namely Sulla, Betasulo,
and Romy Mendoza, came, and together with Cabos mauledand
kicked petitioner all over his body until he lost consciousness. As
a result of the incident, petitioner was hospitalized and placed
under continuous treatment and medication. Due to the multiple
gunshot wounds, hematoma, and contusions sustained by
petitioner, his left eye became 90 to 95% blind and his body was
paralyzed from the bustline down. Consequently, petitioner filed a
criminal case for frustrated murder before the RTC of Antipolo
against the security guards. Eventually, after suffering for more
than nine years, petitioner died.
Torres admits the existence of the titles in the name of Rafael
Roque but denies the latter‘s ownership over the property. He
further admits the dismissal of his case for cancellation of Roque‘s
titles based on a technical ground. Torres likewise admits to the
posting of the security guards on the property to guard the same
from any intruder but denies that they were his personal security
guards, and moreover claimed that they were security guards of
the Antipolo Landowners and Farmers Association, Inc. (ALFAI),
of which he was president. Respondent further asserts that being
the President of ALFAI, his instruction to the security guards was
to prevent squatters or intruders from entering the property and to
make use of reasonable force to repel aggression in the event of
any untoward incident.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of Roque.
On appeal, CA reversed the RTC judgment and rendered a
Decision, stating that Art. 2180 does not apply as there is no
question that the security guards involved in the shooting incident
were employed of Anchor Security Detective Agency and not by
Torres.
Issue: WON Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code is applicable to the case at bar
Decision:
We agree with the Court of Appeals‘ finding that respondent
cannot be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the
damages suffered by petitioner because respondent is not the
employer of the security guards who inflicted the injuries upon the
person of the petitioner. As reiterated in the recent case of
Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao:
In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, we held that where the security agency
recruits, hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or security
guards to a client, the employer of such guards or watchmen is
such agency, and not the client, since the latter has no hand in
selecting the security guards. Thus, the duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family cannot be demanded from
the said client:
x x x [I]t is settled in our jurisdiction that where the security
agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its
watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such
guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed
by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not
to the clients or customers of such agency. As a general rule, a
client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting
who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by
the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards
cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the
client whose premises or property are protected by the security
guards.
x x x [T]he fact that a client company may give instructions or
directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself,
render the client responsible as an employer of the security
guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions.
This conclusion, however, does not necessarily preclude this
Court from holding respondent liable under the law for damages
resulting from the injuries inflicted on petitioner by the unlawful
acts of the security guards.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code states that ―whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.‖ In the case at
bar, Torres cannot feign ignorance of the fact that at the time of
the shooting incident, the titles to the disputed property were
already registered in the name of Roque‘s son, the cancellation
for title case filed by Torres having been dismissed. In fact, during
trial, the offer for stipulation of Roque‘s counsel that at the time of
the shooting incident, there is a valid and existing title in the name
of Roque‘s son which was never cancelled by the court, was
accepted by Torres. Therefore, by hiring the security guards to
prevent entry, possibly even by the registered owner, to the
subject property, titles to which he fully knew he did not possess,
Torres blatantly acted in bad faith. Torres‘ unwarranted act of
posting security guards within the property, which he clearly knew
is registered in the name of another, unduly placed petitioner at
harm and deprived him of his right to fully exercise his privileges
and duties as administrator of said property. Respondent, by his
grossly faulty acts, paved the way to the infliction of injuries by the
security guards on petitioner.
19
Furthermore, respondent‘s palpable display of bad faith in
claiming a superior right to the property over petitioner‘s son
entitles petitioner to damages resulting therefrom. In order that a
plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries which he
sustained, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff – a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it. In other words, in order that the law will give
redress for an act causing damage, the act must be not only
hurtful, but wrongful.
In the case at bar, it is clear that respondent violated the principle
embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code which mandates that
―every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.‖ When a right is exercised in
a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be
held accountable. As we have stated in a previous case, if mere
fault or negligence in one‘s acts can make him liable for damages
for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad
faith make him liable.[
University of the East vs Jader (2000)
Facts:
Romeo Jader was a law student enrolled at UE from 1984-1988.
During the first semester as fourth year law student, he failed to
take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he
was given an incomplete grade. As he enrolled for the second
semester he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete
grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega which was approved by Dean
Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took
the examination on March 8 and on March 30 Prof Ortega gave
him grade of 5.
The Dean and Faculty Members met to deliberate on whom
among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate
and the plaintiff‘s name appeared in the Tentative List of
Candidates for graduation. Likewise his name appeared in the
invitation for Investiture & Commencement Ceremonies. Having
learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not
able to take the bar examination. Consequently, respondent sued
petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation etc. arising from
the latter‘s negligence. Petitioner denied liability arguing mainly
that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the
requirements when his name was included in the tentative list of
graduating student. Furthermore, it argued that the proximate and
immediate cause of the alleged damages arose out of
respondent‘s own negligence in not verifying from the professor
concerned the result of his removal exam. Lower Court ruled in
favor of respondent. CA affirmed with modification. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: May an educational institution be held liable for damages
for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied
all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case?
Decision:
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning
institution, a contract of education is entered into between said
institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors
hired by the school are considered merely as agents and
administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under
the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and the
student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's
agents, such as the professors with respect to the status or result
of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or
students from sharing with each other such information. The Court
takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in educational
institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her
students their grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school
to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to
each and every student as to whether he or she had already
complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree
or whether they would be included among those who will
graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a formal
ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such
ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the
whole world that the students included in the list of those who will
be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have
satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent
to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform
the student of any problem involving the latter's grades and
performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for
remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the
removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already
commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have
acted in good faith.
It is the school that has access to those information and it is only
the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with
its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation
and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise
control, much less influence, over the way an educational
institution should run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its
professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the
school's rules and orders. The negligent act of a professor who
fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not
promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable to the
professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable
to respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold that
respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. As a
senior law student, respondent should have been responsible
enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining
to his academic achievement, are in order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
20
University of Santo Tomas v. Sanchez
Facts:
A Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez
(respondent) against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its
Board of Directors, the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST
College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for their alleged
unjustified refusal to release the respondents Transcript of
Records (ToR).
In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he graduated from UST
on April 2, 2002 with a Bachelors Degree of Science in Nursing.
He was included in the list of candidates for graduation and
attended graduation ceremonies. Respondent sought to secure a
copy of his ToR with the UST Registrars Office, paid the required
fees, but was only given a Certificate of Graduation by the
Registrar. Despite repeated attempts by the respondent to secure
a copy of his ToR, and submission of his class cards as proof of
his enrolment, UST refused to release his records, making it
impossible for him to take the nursing board examinations, and
depriving him of the opportunity to make a living. The respondent
prayed that the RTC order UST to release his ToR and hold UST
liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
and the costs of suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they
refused to release respondents ToR because he was not a
registered student, since he had not been enrolled in the
university for the last three semesters. They claimed that the
respondents graduation, attendance in classes, and
taking/passing of examinations were immaterial because he
ceased to be a student when he failed to enroll during the second
semester of school year 2000-2001.
Petitioners then filed a Supplement to their Motion to Dismiss,
alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before
the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-
complaint. Petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary
jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Complaint failed to state a cause of action,
since respondent admitted that he was not enrolled in UST in the
last three semesters prior to graduation.
Ruling:
Under Rule 16, Section 1(g) of the Rules of Court, a motion to
dismiss may be made on the ground that the pleading asserting
the claim states no cause of action. To clarify the essential test
required to sustain dismissal on this ground, we have explained
that the test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition, to
constitute a cause of action, is whether admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer of the petition. Stated otherwise, a
complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting
what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be
entitled to the relief prayed for.
The Complaint makes the following essential allegations: that
petitioners unjustifiably refused to release respondents ToR
despite his having obtained a degree from UST; that petitioners
claim that respondent was not officially enrolled is untrue; that as
a result of petitioners unlawful actions, respondent has not been
able to take the nursing board exams since 2002; that petitioners
actions violated Articles 19-21 of the Civil Code; and that
petitioners should be ordered to release respondents ToR and
held liable for P400,000.00 as moral damages,P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of
suit, and P15,000.00 as actual damages. Clearly, assuming that
the facts alleged in the Complaint are true, the RTC would be able
to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
Complaint.
Petitioners argue that paragraph 10 of the Complaint contains an
admission that respondent was not officially enrolled at UST. Said
paragraph reads:
10. On several occasions, [respondent] went to see the
[petitioners] to get his ToR, but all of these were futile for he was
not even entertained at the Office of the Dean. Worst, he was
treated like a criminal forcing him to admit the fact that he did not
enroll for the last three (3) semesters of his schooling. [Petitioner]
Dean tried to persuade the [respondent] to give the original copies
of the Class Cards which he has in his possession. These are the
only [bits of] evidence on hand to prove that he was in fact
officially enrolled. [Respondent] did not give the said class cards
and instead gave photo copies to the [Petitioner] Dean. The Office
of the Dean of Nursing of [petitioner] UST became very strict in
receiving documents from the [respondent]. [They have] to be
scrutinized first before the same are received. Receiving, as
[respondent] believes, is merely a ministerial function [of] the
[petitioners] and the documents presented for receiving need not
be scrutinized especially so when x x x they are not illegal. Copies
of the class cards are hereto attached as F hereof.
This statement certainly does not support petitioners claim that
respondent admitted that he was not enrolled. On the contrary,
any allegation concerning the use of force or intimidation by
petitioners, if substantiated, can only serve to strengthen
respondents complaint for damages.
We fully agree with the RTCs finding that a resolution of the case
requires the presentation of evidence during trial. Based on the
parties allegations, the issues in this case are far from settled.
Was respondent enrolled or not? Was his degree obtained
fraudulently? If so, why was he permitted by the petitioners to
graduate? Was there fault or negligence on the part of any of the
parties? Clearly, these are factual matters which can be best
ventilated in a full-blown proceeding before the trial court.
Titus B. Villanueva vs Emma M. Rosqueta (2010)
Facts:
This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse
of right committed by a superior public officer in preventing a
subordinate from doing her assigned task and being officially
recognized for it.
21

Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy
Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of
the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy
resignation but later on withdrew withdrew the same. Meanwhile
Gil Valera was appointed by President Arroyo. Rosqueta
challenged the same by filing a petition for prohibition, quo
warranto and injunction against Villanueva, then Commissioner of
Customs, the Secretary of Finance and Valera with the RTC of
Manila. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO),
enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretary3 from
implementing Valera‘s appointment which later on was
superseded by a writ of preliminary injunction.4
Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance
challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its
own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTC‘s injunction
order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually
dismissed the petition before it.
During the Bureau‘s celebration of its centennial anniversary
its special Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs
deputy commissioners, except respondent Rosqueta. The
commemorative billboard also displayed at the Bureau‘s main
gate included Valera‘s picture but not Rosqueta‘s. Rosqueta filed
a complaint for damages before the RTC of Quezon City against
petitioner Villanueva alleging that the latter maliciously excluded
her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she
claimed that he prevented her from performing her duties as
Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act
on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award her
P1,000,000.00 in moral damages, P500,000.00 in exemplary
damages, and P300,000.00 in attorney‘s fees and costs of suit.
RTC- Dismissed6 respondent Rosqueta‘s complaint, stating that
petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no
omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that
Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy
Commissioner seven months before the Bureau‘s centennial
anniversary.
CA- Reversed the RTC‘s decision, holding instead that petitioner
Villanueva‘s refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order
issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to
recover moral damages from him. Citing the abuse of right
principle, the RTC said that Villanueva acted maliciously when he
prevented Rosqueta from performing her duties, deprived her of
salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as Deputy
Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial anniversary
memorabilia.
Issue: WON Villanueva is liable for damages to respondent
Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order.
Decision:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil
Code a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act
in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith,
with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are
Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter
indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right
or duty.
Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) when he allowed Valera to
assume the office as Deputy Commissioner since respondent
Rosqueta held the position merely in a temporary capacity and
since she lacked the Career Executive Service eligibility required
for the job.
But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice
that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his rank
must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of
law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera‘s
right to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly
resolved.
That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith
and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law
the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the
centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by
any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her
from assuming the duties of the position. As the Court said in
Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez, a party‘s refusal to abide by a
court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful,
constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.1avvphi1
That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed Deputy
Commissioner for another division of the Bureau is immaterial.
While such appointment, when accepted, rendered the quo
warranto case moot and academic, it did not have the effect of
wiping out the injuries she suffered on account of petitioner
Villanueva‘s treatment of her. The damage suit is an independent
action.
The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent
Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded when the defendant‘s
transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiff‘s anguish in
the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Here, respondent Rosqueta‘s colleagues and friends testified that
she suffered severe anxiety on account of the speculation over
her employment status.17 She had to endure being referred to as
a "squatter" in her workplace. She had to face inquiries from
family and friends about her exclusion from the Bureau‘s
centennial anniversary memorabilia. She did not have to endure
all these affronts and the angst and depression they produced
had Villanueva abided in good faith by the court‘s order in her
favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages.
The Court, however, finds the award of P500,000.00 excessive.
As it held in Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Alejandro,18 moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given
to ease the defendant‘s grief and suffering. Moral damages
should reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the
gravity of the wrong done. Here, that would be P200,000.00.
22

The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of
example or correction for the public good but, in line with the
same reasoning, reduces it to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court
affirms the award of attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses but
reduces it to P50,000.00.
MWSS vs Act Theatre Inc.
Facts:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act
Theater, Inc., namely, Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel
Concha and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by members of
the Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water
meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876.
The respondent‘s employees were subsequently criminally
charged. On account of the incident, the respondent‘s water
service connection was cut off. Consequently, the respondent
filed a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner
MWSS.
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in that the petitioner
acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the
respondent‘s water service connection without prior notice. Due to
lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only of the
respondent‘s patrons but in the surrounding premises as well,
were adversely affected.
After due trial, the court acquitted the four employees of Act
Theater, Inc. in the criminal case. In the civil case, the court
ordered MWSS to pay Act Theater, Inc. actual damage in the
amount of P25,000 and to return the sum of P200,000.00
deposited by the plaintiff for the restoration of its water services
after its disconnection on September 23, 1988.
The petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the decision to the CA.
The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. According to
the CA, the petitioner‘s act of cutting off the respondent‘s water
service connection without prior notice was arbitrary, injurious and
prejudicial to the latter justifying the award of damages under
Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Issue: WON the Honorable Court of Appeal[s] correctly applied
the provision of Article 19 of the new Civil Code without
considering the applicable provision of Article 429 of the same
code
Decision:
The petition is devoid of merit. Article 429 of the Civil Code, relied
upon by the petitioner in justifying its act of disconnecting the
water supply of the respondent without prior notice, reads:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For
this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonable to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a
constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of
long usage, 6 constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one
person against the other.
Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing
water supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had
the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations.
Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which
such right is to be exercised. Article 19 of the Civil Code sets the
norms for the exercise of one‘s rights:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these
norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed
for which actor can be held accountable. In this case, the
petitioner failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is
due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the
respondent‘s water service connection.
While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to
plaintiff-appellee prior to the disconnection of the latter‘s water
services, this was done only a few hours before the actual
disconnection. Clearly, the plaintiff-appellee was denied due
process when it was deprived of the water services. As a
consequence thereof, Act had to contract another source to
provide water for a number of days. Plaintiff-appellee was also
compelled to deposit with MWSS the sum of P200,000.00 for the
restoration of their water services.
ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, et. al., Petitioners, vs. ISMAEL
VELOSO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171365 Oct. 6, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro
FACTS:
This case is an off-shoot of an unlawful detainer case filed by
herein petitioners against herein respondent. In said complaint for
unlawful detainer, it was alleged that they are the lessors of a
residential house in Quezon City which was leased to respondent
at a monthly rental of P17,000.00. The action was instituted on
the ground of respondent's failure to pay rentals from May 23,
1997 to December 22, 1998 despite repeated demands.
Respondent denied the non-payment of rentals and alleged that
he made an advance payment of P825,000.00 when he paid for
the repairs done on the leased property.
After trial, the MeTC decided in favor of petitioners by ordering
respondent to (a) vacate the premises; (b) pay the sum of
P306,000.00 corresponding to the rentals due from May 23, 1997
to November 22, 1998, and the sum of P17,000.00 a month
thereafter until respondent vacates the premises; and (c) pay
petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Whilst respondent's appeal of the MeTC judgment was pending
before the RTC-Branch 88, respondent filed before the RTC-
23
Branch 227 a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages
against the petitioners. The said complaint alleged two causes of
action. The first cause of action was for damages because the
respondent supposedly suffered embarrassment and humiliation
when petitioners distributed copies of the MeTC decision to the
homeowners of Horseshoe Village while appeal was still pending
before RTC-Branch 88. The second cause of action was for
breach of contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to make
continuing repairs on the subject property to preserve and keep it
tenantable. Thus, respondent sought the following from the court
a quo:
a) P1,500,000.00 as moral damages and consequential damages;
b) P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) P425,000.00 representing the difference of the expenses of the
improvements of P825,000.00 andP400,000.00 pursuant to Art.
1678 of the Civil Code;
d) P594,000.00 representing interest for three (3) years from 1998
to 2000 on the P825,000.00 advanced by the respondent at the
rate of 24% per annum;
e) P250,000.00 as compensation for the respondent's labor and
efforts in overseeing and attending the needs of contractors the
repair/renovation of the leased premises;
f) P250,000.00, plus 20% of all recoveries from petitioners and
P2,500.00 per hearing as attorney's fees;
g) Cost of suit.
Petitioners argued that respondent had no cause of action against
them because the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case
was a matter of public record and its disclosure to the public
violated no law or any legal right of the respondent. Moreover,
petitioners averred that the respondent's present Complaint for
Breach of Contract and Damages was barred by prior judgment
since it was a mere replication of respondent's Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim in the unlawful detainer case before the
MeTC. The said unlawful detainer case was already judicially
decided with finality.
The RTC-Branch 227 dismissed respondent's complaint for
violating the rule against splitting of cause of action, lack of
jurisdiction, and failure to disclose the pendency of a related case.
The CA, on appeal, fully agreed with the RTC-Branch 227 in
dismissing respondent's second cause of action (i.e., breach of
contract). It, however, held that RTC-Branch 227 should have
proceeded with the trial on the merits of the first cause of action
(i.e., damages), because although respondent may have stated
the same factual antecedents that transpired in the unlawful
detainer case, such allegations were necessary to give an
overview of the facts leading to the institution of another case
between the parties before the RTC acting in its original
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals then went on to find that
petitioners were indeed liable to respondent for damages: an
award of P30,000.00 moral damages circumstances and
P10,000.00 exemplary damages.
Issue:
May disclosure of a court decision, which is part of public record,
cause any leal and compensable injury to respondent?
Held:
Yes. Petitioners are obliged to respect respondent's good name
even though they are opposing parties in the unlawful detainer
case. As Article 19 of the Civil Code requires, "every person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith." A violation of such principle constitutes an abuse of
rights, a tortuous conduct.
While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of
principle, the "cardinal law on human conduct" expressed in said
article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a person
exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs
his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and
good faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse
of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another.
Petitioners are also expected to respect respondent's "dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind" under Article 26 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
Thus, Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of
moral damages for acts and actions referred to in Article 26,
among other provisions, of the Civil Code.
It is already settled that the public has a right to see and copy
judicial records and documents. However, this is not a case of the
public seeking and being denied access to judicial records and
documents. The controversy is rooted in the dissemination by
petitioners of the MeTC judgment against respondent to
Horseshoe Village homeowners, who were not involved at all in
the unlawful detainer case, thus, purportedly affecting negatively
respondent's good name and reputation among said
homeowners. The unlawful detainer case was a private dispute
between petitioners and respondent, and the MeTC decision
against respondent was then still pending appeal before the RTC-
Branch 88, rendering suspect petitioners' intentions for distributing
copies of said MeTC decision to non-parties in the case. While
petitioners were free to copy and distribute such copies of the
MeTC judgment to the public, the question is whether they did so
with the intent of humiliating respondent and destroying the
latter's good name and reputation in the community.
Nevertheless, the CA erred in already awarding moral and
exemplary damages in respondent's favor when the parties have
not yet had the chance to present any evidence before the RTC-
Branch 227. In civil cases, he who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. It is incumbent upon
the party claiming affirmative relief from the court to convincingly
prove its claim. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are
not equivalent to proof under our Rules. In short, mere allegations
are not evidence.
At this point, the finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and
malice on the part of petitioners has no factual basis. Good faith is
presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the
same.
The award of moral and exemplary damages made by the Court
of Appeals in favor of respondent Ismael Veloso III is DELETED.
The complaint of respondent Ismael Veloso III is hereby
24
REINSTATED before Branch 227 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City only in so far as the first cause of action is
concerned.
2. Unjust Enrichment (Solutio Indebiti)
2.1 Requisites
H . L Carlos Construction v. Marina Properties Corp.
Facts:
Marina Properties Corporation (MPC) is engaged in the business
of real estate development.
It entered into a contract with H.L Carlos Construction, inc (HLC)
to construct Phase III of a condominium complex ( Marina
Bayhomes Condominium Project) consisting of townhouses and
villas for a total consideration of P38, 580, 609 within a period of
365days from receipt of " notice to proceed ".
The original completion date of the project was May 16, 1989, but
it was extended to October 31, 1989 with a grace period until
November 30, 1989.
The contract was signed by Jovencio F. Cinco, president of MPC,
and Honorio L. Carlos, president of HLC.
On December 15, 1989, HLC instituted this case for sum of
money against not only MPC but also against the latter's alleged
president, (Respondent) Jesus K. Typoco, Sr. (Typoco) and
(Respondent) Tan Yu (Tan), seeking the payment of various sums
with an aggregate amount of P14 million pesos
RTC: Judgment in favor of (Petitioner) H.L Carlos Construction
inc. and as against Respondent Marina Properties Corporation,
Tan Yu and Typoco
CA: Respondents were not liable for escalations in the cost of
labor and construction materials since petitioner failed to show
any basis for the award sought. They were also absolved from
paying for change orders and extra work since there was no
supplemental agreement covering them as required in the main
construction contract.
Issues:
1 ) WON petitioner is entitled to price escalation for labor, cost of
change order and extra work
2 ) Whether Typoco and Tan are solidarily liable with MPC
3 ) WON H.L Construction is liable for actual and liquidated
damages
Decision:
1 ) MPC argues that to allow the claim for labor cost escalation
would be to reward petitioner for incurring delay, thereby
breaching a contractual obligation. This contention is untenable.
To allow MPC to acquire the partially accomplished project
without paying for labor cost escalation validly incurred would
constitute UNJUST ENRICHMENT at the expense of the
petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code when
(1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived
at the expense of or with damages to another.
Since petitioner had rendered services that were accepted by
MPC, then the former should be compensated for them. Labor
cost escalation, has already been earned by petitioner.
Evidence on record reveals that MPC approved some change
order jobs despite the absence of any supplementary agreement.
Under the principle of quantum meruit, a contractor is allowed to
recover the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered
despite the lack of written contract, in order to avoid unjust
enrichment.
2 ) Typoco and Tan are not liable. The records are bereft of any
evidence that they acted in bad faith with gross or inexcusable
negligence, or that they acted outside the scope of his authority.
3 ) Yes, petitioner did not fulfill its contractual obligations. It could
not totally pass the blame to MPC for hiring a second contractor,
because the latter was allowed to terminate the services of the
contractor.
Either party shall have the right to terminate this contract for
reason of violation or non-compliance by the other party of the
terms and condition herein agreed upon.
As of November 1989, petitioner accomplished only
approximately 80 percent of the project. In other words, it was
already in delay at the time.
Engr. Miranda testified that it would lose money even if it finished
the project; respondents already suspected that it had no intention
of finishing the project at all.
Petitioner was in delay and in breach of contract. Clearly, the
obligor is liable for damages that are the natural and probable
consequences of its breach of obligation.
In order to finish the project, the latter had to contract the services
of a second construction firm for P11, 750,000. Hence, MPC
suffered actual damages in the amount of P4,604,579 for the
complaint of the project.
Petitioner is also liable for liquidated damages as provided in the
Contract.
Liquidated damages are those that the parties agree to be paid in
case of a breach. As worded, the amount agreed upon answers
for damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the
completion of the project. Under Philippine laws, these damages
take the nature of penalties.
25

A penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume greater
liability in case of breach. It is attached to an obligation in order to
ensure performance.
2.2 Manifestation of Unjust Enrichment
Vicente S. Almario vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (2007)
Facts:
Almario, then about 39 years of age and a Boeing 737 (B-737)
First Officer at PAL, successfully bid for the higher position of
Airbus 300 (A-300) First Officer. Since said higher position
required additional training, he underwent, at PAL‘s expense,
more than five months of training consisting of ground schooling
in Manila and flight simulation in Melbourne, Australia. After
completing the training course, Almario served as A300 First
Officer of PAL, but after eight months of service as such, he
tendered his resignation, for ―personal reasons‖. Almario pushed
through with his resignation.
PAL filed a Complaint against Almario for reimbursement of
training costs. PAL invoked the existence of an innominate
contract of do ut facias (I give that you may do) with Almario in
that by spending for his training, he would render service to it until
the costs of training were recovered in at least three (3) years.
Almario denied the existence of any agreement with PAL that he
would have to render service to it for three years after his training
failing which he would reimburse the training costs.
Issue: WON Article 22 of the Civil Code can be applied to recover
training costs.
Decision:
Article 22 of the Civil Code applies. This provision on unjust
enrichment recognizes the principle that one may not enrich
himself at the expense of another. The enrichment of the
defendant must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or
injury to the plaintiff. This prejudice may consist, not only of the
loss of property or the deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of
non-payment of compensation for a prestation or rendered to the
defendant without intent to donate on the part of the plaintiff, or
the failure to acquire something which the latter would have
obtained.
It bears noting that when Almario took the training course, he was
about 39 years old, 21 years away from the retirement age of 60.
Hence, with the maturity, expertise, and experience he gained
from the training course, he was expected to serve PAL for at
least three years to offset ―the prohibitive costs‖ thereof.
PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a
higher level of skill, proficiency, or technical competence so that
he could efficiently discharge the position of A-300 First Officer.
Given that, PAL expected to recover the training costs by availing
of Almario‘s services for at least three years. The expectation of
PAL was not fully realized, however, due to Almario‘s resignation
after only eight months of service following the completion of his
training course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the
costs of training without violating the principle of unjust
enrichment.
2.3 Where is there no unjust enrichment
Benguet Corporation vs. DENR
FACTS
Benguet Corporation (―Benguet‖) and J.G. Realty and Mining
(―J.G. Realty‖) entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to
Purchase (―RAWOP‖), wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as
the owner of four mining claims covered by Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (―MPSA‖) Application No. APSA-V-0009
jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claimowner and Benguet as
operator. The RAWOP, among others, provide that ―any disputes
x x x between Benguet and [J.G. Realty] with reference to
anything whatsoever pertaining to [the RAWOP] x x x shall not be
cause of any action x x x in any court or administrative agency but
shall x x x be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three
(3) members, one to be selected by Benguet, another to be
selected by [J.G. Realty] and the third to be selected by the
aforementioned two arbitrators so appointed.‖
J.G. Realty subsequently informed Benguet that it was terminating
the RAWOP by reason of Benguet‘s failure to comply with its
obligations thereunder. J.G. Realty sought the cancellation of the
RAWOP, filing a petition for this purpose with the Panel of
Arbitrators (―POA‖) having territorial jurisdiction over the mining
area involved. In its Decision, the POA declared the RAWOP
cancelled. Benguet then filed a notice of appeal with the MAB.
The decision was affirmed on appeal to the Mines Adjudication
Board (―MAB‖).
Benguet contended that the issue raised by the J.G. Realty
should have been raised first with the arbitration before POA took
cognizance of the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is unjust enrichment in the case at hand
RULING:
Based on the foregoing discussion, the cancellation of the
RAWOP was based on valid grounds and is, therefore, justified.
The necessary implication of the cancellation is the cessation of
Benguets right to prosecute MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009
and to further develop such mining claims.
In Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and Development
Corporation, we defined unjust enrichment, as follows:
We have held that [t]here is unjust enrichment when a person
unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Article 22 of the
Civil Code provides that [e]very person who through an act of
26
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The principle of
unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two conditions: (1)
that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and
(2) that such benefit is derived at anothers expense or damage.
There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit
has a valid claim to such benefit.
Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the
cancellation of the RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal
right to participate in further developing the mining claims, was
brought about by its violation of the RAWOP. Hence, Benguet has
no one to blame but itself for its predicament.
2.4 Laws and Cases
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him. (NCC)
Title XVII. - EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
CHAPTER 1
QUASI-CONTRACTS
Art. 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to
the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall
be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. (n)
Art. 2143. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do
not exclude other quasi-contracts which may come within the
purview of the preceding article. (n)
SECTION 1. - Negotiorum Gestio
Art. 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or
management of the business or property of another, without any
power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the
termination of the affair and its incidents, or to require the person
concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so.
This juridical relation does not arise in either of these instances:
When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned;
If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner. In
the first case, the provisions of Articles 1317, 1403, No. 1, and
1404 regarding unauthorized contracts shall govern.
In the second case, the rules on agency in Title X of this Book
shall be applicable. (1888a)
Art. 2145. The officious manager shall perform his duties with all
the diligence of a good father of a family, and pay the damages
which through his fault or negligence may be suffered by the
owner of the property or business under management.
The courts may, however, increase or moderate the indemnity
according to the circumstances of each case. (1889a)
Art. 2146. If the officious manager delegates to another person all
or some of his duties, he shall be liable for the acts of the
delegate, without prejudice to the direct obligation of the latter
toward the owner of the business.
The responsibility of two or more officious managers shall be
solidary, unless the management was assumed to save the thing
or business from imminent danger. (1890a)
Art. 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous
event:
1. If he undertakes risky operations which the owner was
not accustomed to embark upon;
2. If he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner;
3. If he fails to return the property or business after
demand by the owner;
4. If he assumed the management in bad faith. (1891a)
Art. 2148. Except when the management was assumed to save
property or business from imminent danger, the officious manager
shall be liable for fortuitous events:
1. If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the
management;
2. If by his intervention he prevented a more
competent person from taking up the
management. (n)
Art. 2149. The ratification of the management by the owner of the
business produces the effects of an express agency, even if the
business may not have been successful. (1892a)
Art. 2150. Although the officious management may not have been
expressly ratified, the owner of the property or business who
enjoys the advantages of the same shall be liable for obligations
incurred in his interest, and shall reimburse the officious manager
for the necessary and useful expenses and for the damages
which the latter may have suffered in the performance of his
duties.
The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when the
management had for its purpose the prevention of an imminent
and manifest loss, although no benefit may have been derived.
(1893)
Art. 2151. Even though the owner did not derive any benefit and
there has been no imminent and manifest danger to the property
or business, the owner is liable as under the first paragraph of the
preceding article, provided:
1. The officious manager has acted in good faith, and
2. The property or business is intact, ready to be returned
to the owner. (n)
27
Art. 2152. The officious manager is personally liable for contracts
which he has entered into with third persons, even though he
acted in the name of the owner, and there shall be no right of
action between the owner and third persons. These provisions
shall not apply:
1. If the owner has expressly or tacitly ratified the
management, or
2. When the contract refers to things pertaining to the
owner of the business. (n)
Art. 2153. The management is extinguished:
1. When the owner repudiates it or puts an end thereto;
2. When the officious manager withdraws from the
management, subject to the provisions of Article 2144;
3. By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of
the owner or the officious manager. (n)
SECTION 2. - Solutio Indebiti
Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no right to
demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the
obligation to return it arises. (1895)
Art. 2155. Payment by reason of a mistake in the construction or
application of a doubtful or difficult question of law may come
within the scope of the preceding article. (n)
Art. 2156. If the payer was in doubt whether the debt was due, he
may recover if he proves that it was not due. (n)
Art. 2157. The responsibility of two or more payees, when there
has been payment of what is not due, is solidary. (n)
Art. 2158. When the property delivered or money paid belongs to
a third person, the payee shall comply with the provisions of
article 1984. (n)
Art. 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment, shall
pay legal interest if a sum of money is involved, or shall be liable
for fruits received or which should have been received if the thing
produces fruits.
He shall furthermore be answerable for any loss or impairment of
the thing from any cause, and for damages to the person who
delivered the thing, until it is recovered. (1896a)
Art. 2160. He who in good faith accepts an undue payment of a
thing certain and determinate shall only be responsible for the
impairment or loss of the same or its accessories and accessions
insofar as he has thereby been benefited. If he has alienated it,
he shall return the price or assign the action to collect the sum.
(1897)
Art. 2161. As regards the reimbursement for improvements and
expenses incurred by him who unduly received the thing, the
provisions of Title V of Book II shall govern. (1898)
Art. 2162. He shall be exempt from the obligation to restore who,
believing in good faith that the payment was being made of a
legitimate and subsisting claim, destroyed the document, or
allowed the action to prescribe, or gave up the pledges, or
cancelled the guaranties for his right. He who paid unduly may
proceed only against the true debtor or the guarantors with regard
to whom the action is still effective. (1899)
Art. 2163. It is presumed that there was a mistake in the payment
if something which had never been due or had already been paid
was delivered; but he from whom the return is claimed may prove
that the delivery was made out of liberality or for any other just
cause. (1901)
SECTION 3. - Other Quasi-Contracts
Art. 2164. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to
give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right
to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave
it out of piety and without intention of being repaid. (1894a)
Art. 2165. When funeral expenses are borne by a third person,
without the knowledge of those relatives who were obliged to give
support to the deceased, said relatives shall reimburse the third
person, should the latter claim reimbursement. (1894a)
Art. 2166. When the person obliged to support an orphan, or an
insane or other indigent person unjustly refuses to give support to
the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy
individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to
give support. The provisions of this article apply when the father
or mother of a child under eighteen years of age unjustly refuses
to support him.
Art. 2167. When through an accident or other cause a person is
injured or becomes seriously ill, and he is treated or helped while
he is not in a condition to give consent to a contract, he shall be
liable to pay for the services of the physician or other person
aiding him, unless the service has been rendered out of pure
generosity.
Art. 2168. When during a fire, flood, storm, or other calamity,
property is saved from destruction by another person without the
knowledge of the owner, the latter is bound to pay the former just
compensation.
Art. 2169. When the government, upon the failure of any person
to comply with health or safety regulations concerning property,
undertakes to do the necessary work, even over his objection, he
shall be liable to pay the expenses.
Art. 2170. When by accident or other fortuitous event, movables
separately pertaining to two or more persons are commingled or
confused, the rules on co-ownership shall be applicable.
Art. 2171. The rights and obligations of the finder of lost personal
property shall be governed by Articles 719 and 720.
Art. 2172. The right of every possessor in good faith to
reimbursement for necessary and useful expenses is governed by
Article 546.
28

Art. 2173. When a third person, without the knowledge of the
debtor, pays the debt, the rights of the former are governed by
Articles 1236 and 1237.
Art. 2174. When in a small community a nationality of the
inhabitants of age decide upon a measure for protection against
lawlessness, fire, flood, storm or other calamity, anyone who
objects to the plan and refuses to contribute to the expenses but
is benefited by the project as executed shall be liable to pay his
share of said expenses.
Art. 2175. Any person who is constrained to pay the taxes of
another shall be entitled to reimbursement from the latter.
Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation vs.
New World Properties and Ventures, Inc. (2006)
Facts:
New World conducted a bidding for the construction of 69 bored
piles which would form the foundation of the 36-storey World
Trade Exchange Building it planned to erect. New World notified
AFCSC of the acceptance of its bid to construct the 69 bored
piles.
After the issuance of the Notice to Proceed, but before the signing
of the contract, AFCSC, proposed an amendment to the contract
conditions, to wit:
1.6 Excluded in the contractor scope of work shall be as follows:
1.6.2. Removal of Underground Obstruction
xxx
New World did not respond to said proposal but instead directed
AFCSC to proceed with the construction. Both parties signed the
contract for the construction of the 69 bored piles. AFCSC‘s
proposal, however, was not incorporated in said contract.
Included in the billing is the cost of the removal of underground
obstructions in the project site as well as the installation of sonic
pipes to be used to conduct load tests on the bored piling works.
AFCSC claimed that these works were not part of the original
contract and should be treated as extra work. New World refused
to pay its outstanding obligations to AFCSC.
Issue: WON the removal of underground obstructions, installation
of sonic pipes, build up of pile test cap, soil investigation, and
crane rental constitute additional works which will entitle AFCSC
to its claim of additional pay.
Decision:
The removal of the underground obstructions was not covered by
the scope of work in the contract. It is not disputed though that the
same was a major work entailing additional expenses and extra
working time. Neither was it denied that such major work was
indeed necessary for the successful completion of the project.
Indeed, to deny AFCSC relief for the expenses it incurred in
removing said obstructions would result in allowing New World to
unjustly enrich itself at the expense of AFCSC. Equity necessarily
dictates that New World be held liable for the expenses incurred
for the extra work conducted for its sole benefit.
Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim, Nemo ex
alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made
rich out of another‘s injury) states: Art. 22. Every person who
through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code
on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as
―basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of the social order, x x
x designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain
of good conscience, x x x guides human conduct [that] should run
as golden threads through society to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of
justice.
Hence, to allow New World to acquire the finished project at a
price far below its actual construction cost would undoubtedly
constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of
AFCSC. Such unjust enrichment, as previously discussed, is not
allowed by law.
THE TORTFEASOR
A. The Tortfeasor
1. Natural Persons
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-
mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on
capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from
certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from
property relations, such as easements. (32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or
limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a
deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage,
absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these
circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules
of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on
account of religious belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for
all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law. (n)
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it,
29
provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article. (29a)
(NCC)
2. Juridical Persons
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
The State and its political subdivisions;
Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or
purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they
have been constituted according to law;
Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate
and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
(35a)
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the
preceding article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing
them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application
on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are
governed by the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships.
(36 and 37a)
Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all
kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal
actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their
organization. (38a)
Philippine National Bank vs CA (1978)
Facts:
The basic action is the complaint filed by Philamgen (Philippine
American General Insurance Co., Inc.) as surety against Rita
Gueco Tapnio and Cecilio Gueco, for the recovery of the sum of
P2,379.71 paid by Philamgen to the Philippine National Bank on
behalf of respondents Tapnio and Gueco, pursuant to an
indemnity agreement. Petitioner Bank was made third-party
defendant by Tapnio and Gueco on the theory that their failure to
pay the debt was due to the fault or negligence of petitioner.
Philamgen executed its Bond, with defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio
in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch at San Fernando,
Pampanga, to guarantee the payment of defendant Rita Gueco
Tapnio's account. In turn, to guarantee the payment of whatever
amount the bonding company would pay to the Philippine National
Bank, both defendants executed the indemnity agreement.
Defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio was indebted to the bank which
she failed to pay despite demands. The Bank wrote a letter of
demand to plaintiff. Plaintiff paid the bank for the defendant Rita
Gueco's obligation. Plaintiff made several demands upon
defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio. Tapnio told the Plaintiff that she did
not consider herself to be indebted to the Bank at all because she
had an agreement with one Jacobo-Nazon whereby she had
leased to the latter her unused export sugar quota. Tapnio filed
her third-party complaint against the Bank. She agreed to allow
Mr. Jacobo C. Tuazon to use said quota for the consideration of
P2,500.00. This agreement was called a contract of lease of
sugar allotment. Her indebtedness was known as a crop loan and
was secured by a mortgage on her standing crop including her
sugar quota allocation. Her sugar cannot be exported without
sugar quota allotment. A planter harvest less sugar than her
quota, so her excess quota is utilized by another who pays her for
its use. This is the arrangement entered into between Mrs. Tapnio
and Mr. Tuazon . Since the quota was mortgaged to the P.N.B.,
the contract of lease had to be approved by said Bank.
The bank required the parties to raise the consideration of P2.80
per picul or a total of P2,800.00. When the branch manager of the
Philippine National Bank at San Fernando recommended the
approval of the contract of lease at the price of P2.80 per picul,
the board of directors required that the amount be raised to 3.00
per picul. The parties were notified of the refusal on the part of the
board of directors.
The refusal on the part of the bank to approve the lease at the
rate of P2.80 per picul would have enabled Rita Gueco Tapnio to
realize the amount of P2,800.00 which was more than sufficient to
pay off her indebtedness to the Bank
Petitioner argued that as an assignee of the sugar quota of
Tapnio, it has the right to fix the rental price per picul of the sugar
quota subject of the lease between private respondents and
Jacobo C. Tuazon.
Tuazon informed the Branch Manager of the Bank that the
minimum lease rental of P2.80 per picul was acceptable to him
and that he even offered to use the loan secured by him from
petitioner to pay in full the sum of P2,800.00 which was the total
consideration of the lease. This arrangement was not only
satisfactory to the Branch Manager but it was also approves by
Vice-President J. V. Buenaventura of the PNB. Under that
arrangement, Rita Gueco Tapnio could have realized the amount
of P2,800.00, which was more than enough to pay the balance of
her indebtedness to the Bank which was secured by the bond of
Philamgen.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable for the damage caused. Yes
Decision:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
ordering petitioner, as third-party defendant, to pay respondent
Rita Gueco Tapnio.
The difference between the amount of P2.80 per picul offered by
Tuazon and the P3.00 per picul demanded by the Board
amounted only to a total sum of P200.00. Considering that all the
accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the Bank were secured by
chattel mortgage and surety, there was no reasonable basis for
30
the Board of Directors of petitioner to have rejected the lease
agreement because of a measly sum of P200.00.
The law makes it imperative that every person "must in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. This petitioner failed to do.
The bank knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that
by its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be
unable to utilize the sugar quota in question. In failing to observe
the reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the
surrounding circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner bank is
consequently liable for the damages caused on private
respondents. Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
3. Corporate Tort
Guillermo v. Uson
Facts:
Respondent Uson was an accounting supervisor in Royal Class
Venture Phils., Inc. (RCVPI) until Dec. 20, 2000 when he was
allegedly dismissed by petitioner Guillermo, the company‘s
president/general manager, for having exposed the latter‘s
practice of dictating and undervaluing the shares of stocks of the
corporation. Thereafter he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the corporation, RCVPI.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Uson, ordering
respondent to reinstate him to his former position and pay his
backwages, 13th month pay as well as moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney‘s fees. RCVPI did not file an
appeal but repeated issuances of Writs of Execution against the
same remained unsatisfied.
Uson filed another Motion for Alias Writ of Execution and to Hold
Directors and Officers of Respondent Liable for the Decision and
quoted from the sheriff‘s return: a) that at RCVPI‘s address (to
which the writs are being served) there is a new establishment
named ― Joel and Sons Corporation‖ which was a family
corporation owned by the Guillermos, in which Jose Emmanuel
Guillermo, the President and General Manager of RCVPI, is one
of the stockholders; b) that Jose received the writ using the
nickname ―Joey‖ concealing his real identity and pretended to be
the brother of Jose; c) that RCVPI has already been dissolved.
Labor Arbiter granted the motion filed by respondent and held
herein petitioner Jose Emmanuel Guillermo, in his personal
capacity jointly and severally liable with the corporation stating
that the officers of the corporation are jointly and severally liable
for the obligations of the corporation (―piercing the veil of
corporate fiction‖) to the employees even if the said officers were
not parties to the case.
Guillermo filed a Motion for Reconsideration/To Set Aside the
Order of the labor arbiter. His contentions were a) officers cannot
be included as judgement obligor in a labor case for the first time
only after the decision of the Labor Arbiter had become final and
executory b) in piercing the veil of RCVPI, he was allegedly
discriminated against when he alone was belatedly impleaded
despite the existence of other officers of RCVPI; c)that the labor
arbiter has no jurisdiction because the case is one of an intra-
corporate controversy, with the complainant Uson also claiming to
be a stockholder and director of the corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether the twin doctrines of ―piercing the veil of corporate
fiction‖ and personal liability of company officers in labor cases
apply.
RULING:
It also bears emphasis that in cases where personal liability
attaches, not even all officers are made accountable. Rather, only
the "responsible officer," i.e., the person directly responsible for
and who "acted in bad faith" in committing the illegal dismissal or
any act violative of the Labor Code, is held solidarily liable, in
cases wherein the corporate veil is pierced.58 In other instances,
such as cases of so-called corporate tort of a close corporation, it
is the person "actively engaged" in the management of the
corporation who is held liable.59 In the absence of a clearly
identifiable officer(s) directly responsible for the legal infraction,
the Court considers the president of the corporation as such
officer.60
The common thread running among the aforementioned cases,
however, is that the veil of corporate fiction can be pierced, and
responsible corporate directors and officers or even a separate
but related corporation, may be impleaded and held answerable
solidarily in a labor case, even after final judgment and on
execution, so long as it is established that such persons have
deliberately used the corporate vehicle to unjustly evade the
judgment obligation, or have resorted to fraud, bad faith or malice
in doing so. When the shield of a separate corporate identity is
used to commit wrongdoing and opprobriously elude
responsibility, the courts and the legal authorities in a labor case
have not hesitated to step in and shatter the said shield and deny
the usual protections to the offending party, even after final
judgment. The key element is the presence of fraud, malice or
bad faith. Bad faith, in this instance, does not connote bad
judgment or negligence but imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of
a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes
of the nature of fraud.
A "corporate tort" is described as a violation of a right given or the
omission of a duty imposed by law; a breach of a legal duty. Such
legal duty include that spelled out in Art. 238 of the Labor Code
which mandates the employer to grant separation pay to
employees in case of closure or cessation of operations not due
to serious business losses or financial reverses.
B. Persons Made Responsible For Others
31
In General
a. Quasi-delicts under Art. 2180, how interpreted
Felina Rodriguez-Luna vs The Honorable Intermediate
Appellate Court (1985)
Facts:
The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in
a vehicular collision.Those involved were the go-kart driven by the
deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis
dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.
Trial court ruled On the amount of the award of P1,650,000.00. It
was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the deceased Roberto
R. Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his
annual net income was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00
annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.
According to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at age
33 the life expectancy of Roberto Luna was 33.4 years. Dr.
Vicente Campa testified that based on Roberto Luna‘s condition,
he could reasonably expect to have a life expectancy of 30 years.
Court of First Instance of Manila rendered sentencing the
defendants Luis dela Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to pay, jointly and
severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned
net earnings of Roberto Luna, compensatory damages plus
attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00.
The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals. The
court affirmed in toto that of the trial court. However, upon a
motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants-appellants, the
Court of Appeals ordered the defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly
and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P450,000.00) as unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna.
The Court of appeal takes notice that the wrongful death occurred
as early as January 18, 1970 and that until now the process of
litigation is not yet over. In the interest of justice, the private
respondents are hereby ordered to pay to the petitioners within
thirty
days from notice the following amounts adjudged against them:
P450,000.00 for unearned net earnings of the deceased.
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the
Court of Appeals took into account the fact that the deceased
Roberto R. Luna had been engaged in car racing and manner of
life should be one of the factors affecting the value of mortality
table in actions for damages. The court concluded that Luna could
not have lived beyond 43 years. The result was that the 30-year
life expectancy of Luna was reduced to 10 years only.
Court of Appeals ruled in respect of Luna's annual personal
expenses, the escalating price of automobile gas which is a key
expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing, it should
increase that amount to P30,000.00.The Court of Appeals then
determined the amount of the award thus: P75,000.00 annual
gross income less P30,000.00 annual personal expenses leaves
P45,000.00 multiplied by 10 years of life expectancy and the
product is P450,000.00.
The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when by
its resolution of June 19, 1981, it reduced Luna's life expectancy
from 30 to 10 Years and increased his annual personal expenses
from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Their petition contains the following prayer: That after notice and
hearing, judgment be rendered, setting aside or modifying the
RESOLUTION of respondent Court of Appeal only insofar as it
reduced the unearned net earnings to P450,000.00, so as to
affirm the trial court's finding as to the unearned net earnings of
the deceased in the amount of P1,650,000.00
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when
required to explain they said that they had no cash money.
Matters still to be resolved shall be the following; whether the
award for unearned net earnings shall be increased to
P1,650,000.00; and whether the award for attorney's fees shall
also be with interest at the legal rate.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original
decision. YES
Decision:
Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.
Supreme Court sustain the petitioners. Luna was engaged in go-
kart racing which cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for
go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only
slightly larger than foot-pedalled four wheeled conveyances. It
was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual
income of the deceased by increasing his annual personal
expenses but without at the same time increasing his annual
gross income.
The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's fees be with
interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the
complaint. There is merit in this prayer. The attorney's fees were
awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and
under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be
adjudicated at the discretion of the court.
The courts are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this
case because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela
Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
Moreover, he does not have any property either in the Philippines
or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support his
family.
b. Indirect liability for intentional acts
Linday Paleyan, for her own and behalf of her Minor children
vs Carlos Bangkili and Victoria Bangkili (1971)
32
Facts:
Plaintiffs are the widow and children of Balos Paleyan, who was
killed by defendant Carlos Bangkili. He was then accused of the
crime of Homicide with less serious physical injuries. At the time
of the commission of the offense Carlos Bangkili was a minor.
Upon his plea of guilty, he was sentenced accordingly, but the
decision made no pronouncement as to the civil indemnity. The
plaintiffs filed the an action for damages against Carlos Bangkili
and his mother, Victoria Bangkili.
The Court orders the dismissal of the complaint against the
defendant Victoria Bangkili and renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant Carlos Bangkili. In dismissing
the complaint against Victoria Bangkili the court held that under
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code Victoria Bangkili could not
be held civilly liable for the criminal act of her minor son, who was
already 19 years of age at the time he committed the offense; and
that Article 2180 of the New Civil Code was not applicable for it
covers only obligations arising from quasi-delicts and not to those
arising from crimes.
Issue: WON the latter, as the mother of Carlos who had him in her
custody at the time he committed the offense, should be adjudged
liable with him for the amount which he was sentenced to pay,
considering that he was then a minor of 19 years.
Decision:
VICTORIA BANGKILI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH HER CO-
DEFENDANT.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180: "The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the
instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from
quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where
mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.
Where the allegations in the complaint show that herein appellee
was sued directly under the said provision, in that she "failed and
neglected to exercise the proper care and vigilance over her ward
and minor child and as a consequence of such failure and
neglect, the said Carlos Bangkili committed the wrongful act
herein complained of.
The appellee here agrees that Article 2180 is applicable in this
case, but submits that its application should be relaxed,
considering that her son, although living with her, was already 19
years of age and hence mature enough to have a mind of his
own. This fact is not a legal defense, however, and does not
exempt the appellant from her responsibility as parent and natural
guardian. Article 2180 does not provide for any exemption except
proof that the defendant parent "observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage." There is no such
proof in this case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed with
respect to defendant-appellee Victoria Bangkili, and she is hereby
adjudged liable solidarily with her co-defendant for the amounts
awarded in said judgment, with costs.
c. Nature of Solidarity
Feliz Lanuzo vs Sy Bon Ping and Salvador Mendoza (1980)
Facts:
A Complaint for damages was instituted by Felix Lanuzo against
Sy Bon Ping, the owner and operator of a truck and his driver,
Salvador Mendoza. It was alleged that while Mendoza was driving
the truck and because of his reckless negligence, he rammed into
the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house
and store were completely razed to the ground causing damage
to plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. The defendants
moved to dismiss on the ground that a criminal case for Damage
to Property through Reckless Imprudence, was pending in the
Municipal Court of Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same
parties for the same cause. Plaintiff opposed the dismissal
stressing that he had made an express reservation in the criminal
case to institute a civil action for damages separate and distinct
from the criminal suit.
The Court rendered a judgment in plaintiff's favor ordering the
defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P13,000.00
as damages.
They urged that the civil action was prematurely instituted in view
of Rule 111, section 3, providing in part that "after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."
Additionally, they contended that even assuming their liability, the
lower Court nevertheless committed an error in holding them
jointly and severally liable.
Issues:
1. WON THE CIVIL ACTION WAS PREMATURELY
INSTITUTED IN VIEW OF RULE 111, SEC.3.
2. WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING SY
BONG PING JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR
THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENT ACT
OF HIS EMPLOYEE
Decision:
1.) The terms of plaintiff's reservation of his right to institute a
separate civil action clearly and unmistakably make out a case for
quasi-delict. This is also evident from the recitals in plaintiff's
Complaint averring the employer-employee relationship between
the appellants, alleging that damages to the house and store were
caused by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck
"recklessly, with gross negligence and imprudence, without
33
observance of traffic rules and regulations and without regard to
the safety of persons and property".
As it is apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim for
damages on quasi-delict, he is not barred from proceeding with
this independent civil suit. The institution of a criminal action
cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on
quasi-delict. And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may
proceed independently and regardless of the result of the criminal
case, except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or commission of the defendant.
2.) As to the subject of liability of the appellants herein, For his
own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and
operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is
primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other
hand, the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary
and direct under Article 2180 of the same Code, which explicitly
provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
For failure of the Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his
negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, he is
likewise responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act
of his employee (driver), and his liability is primary and solidary.
But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for
damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his
employee for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the
offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.
Prima Malipol, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of
her minor children, Lydia Malijan, Josefina Malijan, Teodoro
Malijan and Sebastian Malijan vs Lily Lim Tan and Ernesto
Labsan (1974)
Facts:
In the evening of February 6, 1965, Pantaleon Malijan, who was
walking on a road in Barrio San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was
hit by a gasoline tanker and was thrown to the ground. While he
was sprawling on the ground Malijan was run over by the tanker's
right wheel that got detached from its axle. He died due to the
accident. The cause of death is "possible traumatic cerebral
hemorrhage due to vehicular accident."
The gasoline tanker was driven at the time of the accident by
herein appellant Ernesto Labsan which was being used in
connection with the gasoline business of the owner, the herein
appellant Lily Lim Tan.
Representations and demands for payment of damage having
been ignored by appellants, appellees filed on May 18, 1966 a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying that
appellants be condemned to pay, jointly and severally, the
damages as specified in said complaint. The appellees are the
mother and the minor brothers and sisters of the deceased
Pantaleon Malijan.
Appellants were duly served but they failed to file their answer
within the reglementary period. Upon appellees' motion, the trial
court declared the appellants in default and appellees were
permitted to present their evidence in the absence of the
appellants.
CFI- Ernesto Labsan is liable to pay damages to the plaintiffs and
should Ernesto Labsan not be able to pay the damages, they
shall be paid for by defendant Lily Lim Tan, who by law, being the
owner and operator of the gasoline tanker that featured in the
accident, is subsidiarily liable.
Appellants subsequently filed a verified motion to lift the order of
default and for a new trial which was denied by the trial court.
Issue: WON the liability of Lily Lim Tan in the case, who by law,
being the owner and operator of the gasoline tanker is subsidiary.
Decision:
No. Lily Lim Tan‘s liability is direct and primary.
We must point out a flaw in the decision of the lower court. It is
stated in the decision appealed from that the driver, Ernesto
Labsan, was primarily liable for the payment of damages
adjudged therein, and the appellant Lily Lim Tan, being the owner
and operator of the gasoline tanker that figured in the accident, is
subsidiarily liable, that is, liable only in case Ernesto Labsan was
not able to pay. This is not correct. The action in the instant case
was brought not to demand civil liability arising from a crime. The
complaint makes no mention of a crime having been committed,
much less of the driver Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of
a crime. But there is an allegation in the complaint that Ernesto
Labsan was the authorized driver of the truck that figured in the
accident, which truck was operated by appellant Lily Lim Tan in
connection with her gasoline business. The prayer in the
complaint, furthermore, sought to hold appellants jointly and
solidarily liable for damages. The instant action, therefore, was
based, as the complaint shows, on quasi delict. Under Article 218
of the Civil Code, which treats of quasi delicts, the liability of the
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise for
damages caused by their employees is primary and direct, not
subsidiary. 9 The employer, however, can demand from his
employee reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his
liability. The employer, appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held
primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded
in the decision of the lower court. This is, of course, without
prejudice to the right of appellant Lily Lim Tan to demand from her
co-appellant Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the damages that
she would have to pay to appellees.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, dated July 1, 1966, as modified in accordance with the
observations we made in the preceding paragraph, and the order,
dated October 10, 1966, denying appellants' motion for the lifting
34
of the order of default and for new trial, in Civil Case No. 1732,
are affirmed. Costs against defendants-appellees.
Gregorio Anuran, Maria Maligaya, Lapaz Laro, et al vs Pepito
Buno, Pedro Gahol, Luisa Alcantara, Guillermo Razon,
Anselmo Maligaya and Cerefina Aro (1966)
Facts:
Petitioners- Representatives of the dead and the injured
Respondents- Driver and owners of motor truck and driver and
owners of jeepney
At noon of January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney was parked on
the road to Taal, Batangas. A motor truck speeding along,
negligently bumped it from behind, with such violence that three of
its passengers died, even as two others (passengers too) suffered
injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital
for many days.
So, in February 1958 these suits were instituted by the
representatives of the dead and of the injured, to recover
consequently damages against the driver and the owners of the
truck and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.
Court of First Instance- rendered judgment absolving the driver of
the jeepney and its owners but it required the truck driver and the
owners thereof to make compensation.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that the
driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable
for damages.
Court of Appeals- it affirmed the exoneration of the jeepney driver
and of its owners. It explained that although the driver of the ill-
starred jeepney was not free from fault, for he was guilty of an
antecedent negligence in parking his vehicle improperly with a
portion thereof occupying the asphalted road and because it was
overloaded, it considered the truck driver guilty of greater
negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision; and
applying the doctrine of the "last clear chance", the said Court
ordered the owners of the truck to pay, solidarily with its driver,
damages.
The plaintiffs brought the matter to this Supreme Court insisting
that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made
liable.
Issue: WON the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also
be made liable.
Decision: Yes.
Upon further and more extended consideration of the matter, we
have become convinced that error of law was committed in
releasing the jeepney from liability. It must be remembered that
the obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely is
such that the New Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from the
carriers (Art. 1755) who are "presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have observed
extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal
presumption of negligence is confirmed by the Court of Appeals'
finding that the driver of the jeepney in question was at fault in
parking the vehicle improperly. It must follow that the driver — and
the owners — of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its
passengers.
The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for
application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
WHEREFORE, affirming the decision under review, we hereby
modify it in the sense prayed for by plaintiffs-petitioners. The three
defendants ( Driver and owners of the jeepney) are required to
pay solidarily with the other defendants-respondents the amounts
fixed by the appealed decision. Costs of both appeals against said
three defendants. So ordered.
The last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts that is
employed in contributory negligence jurisdictions. Under this
doctrine, a negligent plaintiff can nonetheless recover if he is able
to show that the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the
accident. Where the plaintiff's previous negligence has placed him
or her in a position from which the person is powerless to extricate
himself or herselfby the exercise of any ordinary care, and the
defendant detects the danger while time remains to avoid it but
fails to act, the courts have held that the plaintiff can
recover.There must be proof that the defendant discovered the
situation, had the time to take action that would have saved the
plaintiff, but failed to do what a reasonable person would have
done. In the absence of any one of these elements, the courts
deny recovery on the part of the plaintiff.
John Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. vs Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc. (2005)
Facts:
Petitioner John Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. (Chan), owner of a
gasoline station bounded on the south by a chapel of the
respondent Iglesia ni Kristo, Inc. (INC), supposedly needed
additional sewage and septic tanks for his gasoline station. To this
end Chan contracted the services of Dioscoro Yoro (Yoro) in
which the latter was to dig the parcel of land. Their Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) provided among others, that any damage
within or outside Chan‘s property incurred during the digging shall
be borne by Yoro. Digging commenced, and after some time
Chan was informed that the digging traversed and penetrated a
portion of the land belonging to INC. The foundation of the chapel
was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage
and prejudice of the respondent.
A complaint was filed by INC with the RTC against Chan and his
engineer Oller, who filed an answer and third-party complaint
35
against Yoro. The RTC ruled that the diggings were not intended
for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made
to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure, and that Chan and
Yoro are solidarily liable to INC and absolving Oller from any
liability.
Chan and Yoro separately appealed to the CA, which disallowed
the latter‘s appeal for failure to pay the docket and other fees. The
CA denied Chan‘s appeal.
Issue: Whether Aruego is the real party in interest and may be
sued as defendant
Decision:
Petition DENIED.
The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb this particular
conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals. The issue, therefore,
must be ruled in the negative.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are
the following:
1. there must be an act or omission;
2. such act or omission causes damage to another;
3. such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence;
and
4. there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties.
All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act
was the excavation which caused damage to INC because it was
done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected
the foundation of the chapel. The excavation INC‘s premises was
caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual
relation between Chanand Yoro on the one hand, and INC on the
other.
For the damage caused to INC, Chan and Yoro are jointly liable
as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
The heavy reliance of Chan in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited
earlier cannot steer him clear of any liability.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve
of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.
Indubitably, Chan and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort.
They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would
divide the treasure if any is found within or outside Chan‘s
property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner
from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared
as liable.
Besides, Chan cannot claim that he did not know that the
excavation traversed INC‘s property. In fact, he had two (2) of his
employees actually observe the diggings, his security guard and
his engineer Teofilo Oller.
2. In Particular
a. Parents
Republic Act No. 6809 December 13, 1989
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-
ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family
Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority.
Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of
eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby
repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended
to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the
person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established
by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age
of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty
or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards
below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third
paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests,
donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments
containing references and provisions favorable to minors will not
retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its
publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
36
Approved: December 13, 1989
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall
be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
(n)
Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of
the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall
have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards
the following rights and duties:
1. To keep them in their company, to support, educate and
instruct them by right precept and good example, and to
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
2. To give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding;
3. To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance,
inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-
reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the
duties of citizenship;
4. To furnish them with good and wholesome educational
materials, supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others, protect them from bad company,
and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to
their health, studies and morals;
5. To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
6. To demand from them respect and obedience;
7. To impose discipline on them as may be required under
the circumstances; and
8. To perform such other duties as are imposed by law
upon parents and guardians. (316a)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the
acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a ) (NCC)
Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased vs Reginald Hill,
minor, and Marvin Hill, as father and natural guardian of said
minor (1977)
Facts:
Appellee Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom
he was living and getting subsistence, was charged by appellants
Pedro and Patricia Elcano for the killing by Reginald of their son
named Agapito Elcano. The CFI acquitted the Hills on the ground
that Marvin‘s act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake." The CFI also dismissed the Elcano‘s
complaint for recovery of damages against the Hills for the same
charge. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil
Code may be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of,
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from
his father, was already legally married
Decision:
Petition DENIED.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill,
his father, it is also the Court‘s considered opinion that the
conclusion of the Hills that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176
is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
37
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason
behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any
act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol.
II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites
judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which
cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in the Court‘s considered view, Article 2180 applies
to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now
of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
Narciso Gutierrez vs. Bonifacio Gutierrez (1931)
Facts:
A passenger truck and a private automobile collided while
attempting to pass each other on Talon Bridge in Las Piñas. The
passenger truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco,
and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. On the other hand, the
private automobile was driven by Bonifacio Gutierrez (18 years
old) and owned by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At
the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the
mother, together with several other members of the Gutierrez
family was accommodated therein. The collision between the bus
and the automobile resulted in the injuries of Narciso Gutierrez, a
passenger in another autobus.
It was conceded that the young Bonifacio Gutierrez was
incompetent and that he was driving in an excessive rate. At the
time of the collision, he lost his control thus he contributed his
negligence to the accident.
Issue: Whether Mr. Manuel Gutierrez, the father of Bonifacio, is
liable for the negligence of his son?
Decision: Yes.
The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted
a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible
for the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and
not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages
caused by the minor.
At the same time, we believe that, as has been done in other
cases, we can take cognizance of the common law rule on the
same subject. In the United States, it is uniformly held that the
head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for
the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by
one of his children, whom he designates or permits to run it,
where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury
for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the
child driving it. The theory of the law is that the running of the
machine by a child to carry other members of the f amily is within
the scope of the owner's business, so that he is liable for the
negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and
servant.
Sabina Exconde vs. Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno (1957)
Facts:
Dante Capuno, a 15-year old member of the Boy Scout
Organization and a student of Balintawak Elementary School
attended a parade in honor of Jose Rizal in the City of San Pablo.
Upon the instruction of the city school‘s supervisor, Dante and
with other students boarded a jeep to go to the parade. Dante
took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left
side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two
of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a
consequence.
Dante was convicted of double homicide through reckless
imprudence. Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro
Caperiña, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for
damages against the accused. Sabina filed an action for damages
against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante.
Delfin Capuno‘s defense primarily states that at the time of the
accident, the Dante was not under the control, supervision 'and
custody of Delfin. On the other hand, Sabina Exconde contends
that Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages with his son Dante
because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which
resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then
living with his father.
Issue: Whether Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable with his
son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro
Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
Decision: Yes.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to
correct and punish them in moderation". The only way by which
they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage.
38
Here Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he
attended the parade in honor of Dr. José Rizal upon instruction of
the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that
parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and
while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is
clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's
supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante
because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and
trades as provided for by law.
Agapito Fuellas vs Elpidio Cadano (1961)
Facts:
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, were both 13 years old. They
were classmates at St. Mary‘s High School.
One afternoon, while Pepito was studying in their classroom, Rico
took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and secretly placed it
inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return
the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which
angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the
floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told
them to go home.
When Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met
by Rico. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands.
Pepito extended his hand to Rico. However Rico held Pepito by
the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and
pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his
right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side.
While Rico was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out ―My
arm is broken.‖ Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was
helped by others to go home.
That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General
Hospital for treatment.
Rico was convicted for serious physical injuires.
Elpidio Cadano, father of Pepito, filed a civil case for damages
against Agapito Fuellas, father of Rico.
Agapito Fuellas‘ defense is based primarily on the fact that the act
of the minor must be one wherein ―fault or negligence‖ is present;
and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of his son,
but deliberate intent, the articles of par. 2 of Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code are not
applicable, for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission
of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its.
Issue: Whether Agapito Fuellas is laible for the acts of his minor
son, Rico?
Decision: Yes.
The fact that the civil law liability under Article 2180 is not
respondeat superior but the relationship of pater familias which
bases the liability of the father ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his minor son and that if an injury is caused by
the fault or negligence of his minor son, the law presumes that
there was negligence on the part of his father.
To hold that Article 2180 does not apply to the instant case
because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts
and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would
result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for
the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if
the damage is caused with criminal intent.
Ma. Teresa Cuadra, minor represented by her father Ulises
Cuadra et al. vs. Alfonso Monfort (1970)
Facts:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were
classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in
Bacolod City. Their teacher assigned them, together with three
other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While
thus engaged Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she
said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to
frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise
moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object
hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured
part and treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye
became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to
her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment.
She underwent surgical operation twice, and stayed in the
hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the
parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts,
Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor
daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father,
the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages;
P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees,
plus the costs of the suit.
Issue: Whether or not the parent of Monfort is liable for the act
commited by the latter, which caused damage to another child
namely, Cuadra
Held: No.
The relevant provisions of the civil Code provides that:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
39
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another
is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article
2180, such as that of the father or the mother under the
circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although
primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is
presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or
omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may be
rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn
from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.".
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred
that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such
damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was
at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was,
as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and
supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the
injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual
among children at play and which no parent, however careful,
would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably
on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to
her parents.
Complaint dismissed.
Cresencio Libi and Amelia Libi vs. Hon. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Felipe Gotiong and Shirley Gotiong (1992)
Facts:
Respondent spouses Gotiong are the legitimate parents of Julie
Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which
took place and from which she died was an 18-year old first year
commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City;
while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor
between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents,
and who also died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978
when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she
supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the
first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering
Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted
in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against
her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her
best friend, Malou Alfonso.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a
single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and
Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi,
which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the
circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their
parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their
respective theories drawn from their interpretation of
circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and
evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, submitted that Wendell caused her death by
shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the
gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners,
contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have
displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics
informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must
have caused Wendell‘s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate
any witness and thereby avoid identification.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed a case
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from
the latter‘s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
After trial, the court rendered" WHEREFORE, judgment
dismissing plaintiffs‘ complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.
On appeal, said judgment was set aside and another judgment
was rendered against spouses Libi.
Issue: Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly
interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for
vicarious liability.
Decision:Yes.
Petitioners‘ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a
good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for
the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the
evidence on record.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety
deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these
petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita‘s key
is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell.
They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun.
She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no
longer in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly, cannot but
entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been
exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely
locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold
thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was
40
negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of
his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a
parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the
instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely
remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the
activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so
much so that it was only at the time of Wendell‘s death that they
allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that
Cresencio‘s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both
parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in
monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who, for all
they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being
drug informers, or even drug users..
Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which provides:
‗The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who
live in their company.‘
The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil
liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor
children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their
company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages.
That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101
of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto
caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but
under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with
regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who
acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of
age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code. 3
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be
effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in
case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability
may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of
the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil
liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental
authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising from
quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so
modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann
Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by
Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners
liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding
modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the
bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its
findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite
diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
Petition is DENIED.
Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo and Aurelia Tamargo, vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals, The Hon. Ariston L. Rubio, Victor
Bundoc; and Clara Bundoc (1992)
Facts:
Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her
death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with
the by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent,
and petitioner spouses Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents
against respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents
with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In
addition to this case for damages, a criminal information for
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against
Adelberto. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from
criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without
discernment.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to
adopt the minor Adelberto. This petition for adoption was granted
on after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption,
claimed that not them, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since
parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the
moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend
that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to
the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child,
Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the
following issues:
Issue: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental
authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to
make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the
latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological
parents.
Held: No.
41

It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on
quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code
provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with
them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor
children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the
parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents.
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living
with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were
negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely
to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental
liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority
coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the
duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of
course, only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an
air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect
may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted
child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of
the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had
been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have
foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they
were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody
over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.
Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious
liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the
conclusion reached above.
Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally
granted unless and until the
adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial
custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment
and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of
trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally
vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody,
i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the
child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody
period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at
the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of
Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting
parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit
for damages brought by petitioners. Petition for Review is
GRANTED.
Bartolome vs Social Security System
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
Facts:
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as
electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the
vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was
enrolled under the government‘s Employees‘ Compensation
Program (ECP). Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following day. John was, at the
time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, John‘s biological mother and, allegedly,
sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under
PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando
42
City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter
dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim
on the ground that due to the Adoption of John by Cornelio Colcol,
petitioner Bartolome is no longer entitled to be the beneficiary as
the parent of John.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the pension of the
deceased biological child despite adoption.
Held:
Yes. When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2)
years old, petitioner‘s parental authority over John was severed.
However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed,
aside from Cornelio‘s death, was that when the adoptive parent
died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was
still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John‘s minority at the time of his adopter‘s death is a significant
factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental
authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the
biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent
ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are
no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to
care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in
favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20
of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of
adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee‘s
biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one
of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise
known as the ―Social Security Law.‖ While RA 8282 does not
cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and
expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not
related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John‘s
deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least
evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio‘s
death during John‘s minority, the restoration of petitioner‘s
parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address,
and John‘s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary
– effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit
claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent
parent.
People of the Philippines v. Noel Darilay (2004)
FACTS:
On April 19, 1997 at about 9:00 am in Camarines Sur, Marilyn and
Ailyn Arganda were asked by their parents to buy tinapa (dried
fish) from a store. After buying the fried fish they walked back
home. Momentarily they saw 15 year-old Noel Darilay, the
accused, emerge from a catmon tree. He stuck Ailyn twice with a
piece of wood and boxed her on the left side of her face. She fell
unconscious. The appellant then struck Marilyn twice on the back
with a piece of wood. He then carried Ailyn to a grassy area and
left her there. When Ailyn regained her bearings, she looked for
Marilyn but the appellant and her sister were nowhere to be
found.
Ailyn then rushed back home and told her mother what happened
to her and Marilyn. Their neighbour Allan Candelaria then rushed
to the farm where Pascal worked and informed him of what
happened to his daughters. He hurried home and looked for
Marilyn to no avail. Earlier that day, Andres Arganda, the victim‘s
uncle reported the incident to the police station. The three police
officers rushed to the scene. With the help of the tanods, they
searched for Marilyn in the place where the appellant attacked the
girls. About 15 meters away, they found a yellow and white
colored dress, white panites and slipper bearing the name
Marilyn. The dress was torn. While the policemen were
conducting their investigation, the appellant arrived accompanied
by PO3 Antonio Pacardo. The appellant finally told them where
Marilyn was and volunteered to accompany them to the place.
They proceeded to the place and found Marilyn‘s body in a grassy
area near bushes and trees along the Palinao River. She was
lying face down, her legs spread apart and was naked. There was
blood on her nose, her mouth and her vagina. The policemen
arrested the appellant and had him detained in jail.
After the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting the
appellant of rape with homicide in Criminal case No. 97-201 and
attempted murder in Criminal Case No. RTC 97-202. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Noel Darilay should be held
liable for the damages sustained by the heirs of the victims.
HELD:
Considering that at the time of the commission of the crime, the
appellant was a minor under the parental authority of his parents,
the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are primarily and directly
liable for the damages sustained by the heirs of the victims
Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda.Consequently, the Spouses Manuel
and Julieta Darilay are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, in
Criminal Case No. RTC‘97-201, to pay to the heirs of the victim
Marilyn Arganda, the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P28,000.00 as exemplary -
damages. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence in support of
actual damages; hence, the heirs of the victim are not entitled
thereto. They are, however, entitled to temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00. In Criminal Case No. RTC‘97-202, the
Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are hereby ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, to Ailyn Arganda, the amount of P25,000.00
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
b. Guardian
43
New Family Code
Art. 216. The family is a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects.
Art. 218. The law governs family relations. No custom, practice or
agreement which is destructive of the family shall be recognized
or given any effect.
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of
the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.
RULE 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
Sec. 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident.
- Any relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor
or incompetent who has no parent or lawful guardian, or the minor
himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court
having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for
the person or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent. An
officer of the Federal Administration of the United States in the
Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and
the Director of Health, in favor of an insane person who should be
hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for the appointment of a
general guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment
necessary or convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the
minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him in their care;
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of
guardianship are prayed.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or
verification shall render void the issuance of letters of
guardianship.
Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing; Notice thereof. - When a
petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the
court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the
minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and
may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given.
Sec. 3. Guardian to settle accounts, collect debts, and appear in
actions for ward. - A guardian must settle all accounts of his ward,
and demand, sue for, and receive all debts due him, or may, with
the approval of the court, compound for the same and give
discharges to the debtor, on receiving a fair and just dividend of
the estate and effects; and he shall appear for and represent his
ward in all actions and special proceedings, unless another
person be appointed for that purpose.
Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to
maintenance of ward. - A guardian must manage the estate of his
ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits
thereon, so far as may be necessary, to the comfortable and
suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any;
and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the
guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being
authorized by order so to do, and apply so much of the proceeds
as may be necessary to such maintenance.
Sec. 5. Guardian may be authorized to join in partition
proceedings after hearing. - The court may authorize the guardian
to join in an assent to a partition of real or personal estate held by
the ward jointly or in common with others, but such authority shall
only be granted after hearing, upon such notice to relatives of the
ward as the court may direct, and a careful investigation as to the
necessity and propriety of the proposed action.
Sec. 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or
concealing property of ward. - Upon complaint of the guardian or
ward, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the
estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise, that anyone is
suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed away
any money, goods, or interest, or a written instrument, belonging
to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person
to appear for examination touching such money, goods, interest,
or instrument, and make such orders as will secure the estate
against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.
Sec. 7. Inventories and accounts of guardians, and appraisement
of estates. - A guardian must render to the court an inventory of
the estate of his ward within three (3) months after his
appointment, and annually after such appointment an inventory
and account, the rendition of any of which may be compelled
upon the application of an interested person. Such inventories
and accounts shall be sworn to by the guardian. All the estate of
the ward described in the first inventory shall be appraised. In the
appraisement the court may request the assistance of one or
more of the inheritance tax appraisers. And whenever any
property of the ward not included in an inventory already rendered
is discovered, or succeeded to, or acquired by the ward, like
proceedings shall be had for securing an inventory and
appraisement thereof within three (3) months after such
discovery, succession, or acquisition.
Sec. 8. When guardian's accounts presented for settlement. -
Expenses and compensation allowed. Upon the expiration of a
year from the time of his appointment, and as often thereafter as
may be required, a guardian must present his account to the court
for settlement and allowance. In the settlement of the account, the
guardian, other than a parent, shall be allowed the amount of his
reasonable expenses incurred in the execution of his trust and
also such compensation for his services as the court deems just,
not exceeding fifteen per centum of the net income of the ward.
44

c. Owners and Managers of Establishments and Enterprises
Orlando D. Garcia, Jr., doing business under the name and
style Community Diagnostic Center and Bu Castro vs. Ranida
D. Salvador and Ramon Salvador
Facts:
Ranida Salvador worked as a trainee in the accounting
department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal. As a prerequisite for
regular employment, she underwent a medical exam at the
Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia, a medical
technologist conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen)
test and issued the test result indicating that Ranida was ―HBs Ag:
Reactive.‖ The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as
examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Bu Castro as
pathologist. When Ranida submitted the result to company
physician Dr. Sto.Domingo, the latter told her that she is suffering
from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Based on medical report, the
company terminated Ranida‘s employment for failing the physical
exam. When she informed her father Ramon, he suffered a heart
attack and was confined at Bataan Doctors Hospital. During her
father‘s confinement, she had another HBs Ag test at the same
hospital. The result indicated that she is non-reactive. She
informed Sto. Domingo but was told that the test by the CDC was
more reliable because it used the Mirco-Elisa Method. She went
back to CDC for confirmatory testing and the Anti-HBs test
conducted on her had a Negative result. She also had another
test at the hospital using the Micro-Elisa Method and the result
indicated that she was non-reactive. She submitted both results to
the Executive Officer of the company who requested her to
undergo another similar test before her re-employment would be
considered. The CDC conducted another test which indicated a
Negative result. The Med-Tech OIC of CDC issued a certification
correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining med
tech Garcia interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or
negative. The company rehired Ranida. She then filed a complaint
for damages against Garcia and an unknown pathologist of CDC.
She claimed that because of the erroneous interpretation of the
results of the examination, she lost her job and suffered serious
mental anxiety, trauma, sleepless nights, while Ramon was
hospitalized and lost business opportunities. In an amended
complaint, she named Castro as the pathologist. Garcia denied
the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and
reiterated the scientific explanation for the ―false positive‖ result of
the first HBs Ag tests in a letter to the respondents. Castro
claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when
a case was referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida; and
that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp signature. RTC
dismissed the complaint because the respondent failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. CA
reversed the RTC‘s ruling and found Garcia liable for damages for
negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result. The appellate
court exonerated Castro for lack of participation.
ISSUE: Whether Castro has been negligent in issuing the test
result and thus liable for damages
HELD:
YES. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the
interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of
the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either
fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done;
and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then
he is guilty of negligence.
Thus, the elements of actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach,
3) injury, and 4) proximate causation. All the elements are present
in the case at bar. Owners and operators of clinical laboratories
have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and
regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the
health of the people by preventing the operation of substandard,
improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical
laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of
clinical laboratory examinations. Their business is impressed with
public interest, as such, high standards of performance are
expected from them. In fine, violation of a statutory duty is
negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do
something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable
to whoever may be injured thereby. From provisions RA 4688,
otherwise known as the The ClinicalLaboratory Law, it is clear that
a clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and
supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Sec. of
Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of
laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under
the supervision of the pathologist or licensed physician; and that
the results of any examination may be released only to the
requesting physician or his authorized representative upon the
direction of the laboratory pathologist. These rules are intended
for the protection of the public by preventing performance of
substandard clinical examinations by laboratories whose
personnel are not properly supervised. The public demands no
less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical
laboratory examinations through compliance with the quality
standards set by laws and regulations.
Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis vs. Jerome Jovanne
Morales (2010)
FACTS:
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student
who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and
Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the
gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and
Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while
owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun
owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for
repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be
going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It
45
appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and
placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the
young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return
the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It
went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag,
however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the
exempting circumstance of ―accident‖ under the RPC.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal
case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted
by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners,
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of
Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial,
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages,
moral damages and attorney‘s fees. Respondent appealed to the
CA, which reversed the trial court‘s Decision and absolved
respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
MR denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial
court‘s Decision reinstated.
YES
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of
petitioners‘ son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners
may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability
arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may
opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil
Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in
the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file
an independent civil action for damages against respondent
whom they alleged was Matibag‘s employer. Petitioners based
their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code.
**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of
the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that
matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct,
based on a person‘s own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a
gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the ―Policy on
Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,‖ a person who is in
the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and
ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements
of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will
be suspended or cancelled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has
in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely
dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or
substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous
instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to
prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs
of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing
with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree
of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be
knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known
never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable
risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to
ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms
should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when
the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With
more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be
loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an
accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for
repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it
was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have
been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for
repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded
to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should
never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or
action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is
completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not
loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not
shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair
which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its
original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and
diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the
degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous
weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.
d. Employers, Meaning of
Art. 2180, New Civil Code
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
46
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan vs.
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Archimedes J. Balingit And
Fernando Pineda (1975)
Facts: On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight
truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the
national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped
the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan
suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used
for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings
amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer
was that Balingit was not Pineda‘s employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the
ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of
action against him. As already stated, the lower court dismissed
the action as to Balingit. The bus company and its driver
appealed.
The Civil Code provides:
"ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one‘s own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x action below for damages against Arbatin, his employer;
"The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions.
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
x x x
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Issue: Whether the terms "employers" and "owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in article 2180
of the Civil Code, embrace the manager of a corporation owning a
truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the
vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
Decision: We are of the opinion that those terms do not include
the manager of a corporation.
It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term
"manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense
of "employer." Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no
tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the
vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be
regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc.
WHEREFORE, the lower court‘s order of dismissal is affirmed.
Jose E. Genson vs. Sps. Eduardo Adarle And Sherlita Mari-
On, And Intermediate Appellate Court(1987)
Facts: Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the sale at
public auction of junk and other unserviceable government
property located at the compound of the Highway District
Engineer's Office of Roxas City. Private respondent Eduardo
Adarle was hired as a laborer by Arbatin to gather and take away
scrap iron from the said compound with a daily wage of P12.00 or
about 312.00 a month.
On September 8, 1979, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, on a
Saturday and a non-working day, while the private respondent
was tying a cable to a pile of scrap iron to be loaded on a truck
inside the premises of the compound, and while the bucket of the
payloader driven by Ramon Buensalido was being raised, the
bucket suddenly fell and hit Adarle on the right back portion of his
head just below the nape of his neck. Adarle was rushed to the St.
Anthony Hospital, Roxas City.
While still in the hospital, the private respondent instituted the
Buensalido, the payloader operator; Candelario Marcelino, the
civil engineer; and petitioner, the Highway District Engineer.
During the trial on the merits, the petitioner put up the defense
that he had no knowledge of or participation in the accident and
that, when it happened, he was not present in the government
47
compound. Apart from the fact that it was a Saturday and a non-
working day, he was in Iloilo. The trial court found that, with the
exception of the petitioner, all of the defendants were present at
the Highway's compound when the accident occurred. However, it
still adjudged the petitioner liable for damages because the
petitioner was supposed to know what his men do with their
government equipment within an area under his supervision.
Thus, on January 19, 1982, the trial court rendered a decision
finding all the defendants liable for damages under Articles 1172
and 2176 of the New Civil Code. The petitioner appealed to the
Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the
trial court and further ordered the defendants to pay P5,000.00
exemplary damages. Defendant Candelario Marcelino was,
however, absolved from liability.
In this present petition, the petitioner contends that the appellate
court committed a palpable error when it ruled that the petitioner
was present when the accident happened and that he had given
permission to the other defendants to work on a Saturday, a non-
working day. The petitioner argues that considering these were
the facts relied upon by the said court in holding that he was
negligent and thus liable for damages, such a conclusion, is
without basis.
Issue: Whether IAC committed a palpable error when it rules that
Genson was present when the accident happened and that he
had given permission to the other defendants to work on a
Saturday, a non-working day thereby making Genson liable for
damages
Decision: With regard to the main contention of the petitioner that
the appellate court based its conclusions on an erroneous finding
of fact, we agree with him that the appellate court's finding that he
was present within the premises when the accident happened is
not supported by evidence indisputably showing that he was
indeed there.
Since the evidence fails to establish petitioner Genson's presence
when the payloader's bucket fell on the head of Mr. Adarle, any
liability on his part would be based only on his alleged failure to
exercise proper supervision over his subordinates. There is
likewise no sufficient basis for the "master-servant" doctrine in tort
law to apply. Buensalido was not working overtime as a
government employee. It is doubtful if the district engineer can be
considered an "employer" for purposes of tort liability who may be
liable even if he was not there. No evidence was presented to
show that an application for overtime work or a claim for overtime
pay from the district engineer's office was ever filed. It is more
logical to presume that Buensalido, the operator of the payloader,
was trying to earn a little money on the side from the junk buyer
and that his presence in the compound on that Saturday was a
purely private arrangement. From the records of this case, we are
not disposed to rule that a supervisor who tolerates his
subordinates to moonlight on a non-working day in their office
premises can be held liable for everything that happens on that
day. It would have been preferable if Mr. Arbatin brought his own
payloader operator and perhaps, his own equipment but we are
not dealing with sound office practice in this case. The issue
before us is subsidiary liability for tort comitted by a government
employee who is moonlighting on a non-working day.
There is no showing from the records that Genson received
anything which could be called "inordinate gain." It is possible that
he permitted work on a Saturday to accomodate an acquaintance
but it is more plausible that he simply wanted to clear his
compound of junk and the best time for the winning bidder to do it
was on a non-working day.
At any rate, we see no malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on
the part of Genson to hold him liable for the acts of Buensalido
and Arbatin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against
Jesus Genson is DISMISSED.
Ernesto Martin vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals And Manila Electric
Company(1992)
Facts: Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing
license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2 o'clock in the morning of
May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into
a Meralco electric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal.
The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco
subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the
demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for damages in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging inter alia that he was liable
to it in the sum of P17,352.00 plus attorney's fees and litigation
costs as the employer of Nestor Martin. The petitioner's main
defense was that Nestor Martin was not his employee.
The Regional Trial Court held in favor of the plaintiff, awarding
him the amount claimed, with 12% interest, and P4,000.00
attorney's fees, plus costs. The decision was seasonably elevated
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed it in toto on February 22,
1988, 2 prompting this petition for review.
Issue: Whether Ernesto Martin is the employer of Nestor Martin
thereby liable for damages
Decision: The petition has merit.
It is important to stress that the complaint for damages was filed
by the private respondent against only Ernesto Martin as alleged
employer of Nestor Martin, the driver of the car at the time of the
accident. Nestor Martin was not impleaded. The action was based
on tort under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer
under Article 2180 is liable for the torts committed by his
employees within the scope of their assigned task. But it is
necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once
this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable,
that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then
that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to
interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and
48
supervision of the employee as allowed in that article. In the case
at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to
show that the defendant was the employer of Nestor Martin at the
time of the accident. The trial court merely presumed the
existence of the employer-employee relationship.

The facts proved, or not denied, viz., the ownership of the car and
the circumstances of the accident, are not enough bases for the
inference that the petitioner is the employer of Nestor Martin.

In the modern urban society, most male persons know how to

drive and do not have to employ others to drive for them unless
this is needed for business reasons. Many cannot afford this
luxury, and even if they could, may consider it an unnecessary
expense and inconvenience. In the present case, the more
plausible assumption is that Nestor Martin is a close relative of
Ernesto Martin and on the date in question borrowed the car for
some private purpose. Nestor would probably not have been
accommodated if he were a mere employee for employees do not
usually enjoy the use of their employer's car at two o'clock in the
morning.

As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and

Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was necessary for the
plaintiff to establish it by evidence. Meralco had the burden of
proof, or the duty "to present evidence on the fact in issue
necessary to establish his claim" as required by Rule 131, Section
1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its
action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the

respondent court is REVERSED.

49