prosecution to present Atty.
Daquiz to testify on the validity of the confession substantiates the
III. POLICE INVESTIGATION
G.R. No. 130189. June 25, 1999.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO R. MULETA,
accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Custodial Investigation; Extrajudicial Confessions; Confessions extracted
without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law.—The appellant claims
that “it is not true that [he] had executed an extrajudicial confession.” As correctly pointed out by
the solicitor general, however, the appellant actually admits to the execution of the said
confession, albeit without the assistance of counsel. But unlike the solicitor general, we are not
ready to declare that such “ambivalence only indicates the unreliability of [appellant’s] claim.”
Indeed, confessions extracted without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court
of law.
Same; Same; Same; A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is
obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial investigation.—To be
acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession
is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the following
rights of persons under custodial investigation: to remain silent, to
have independent and competent counsel preferably of their own choice, to be provided with
counsel if they are unable to secure one, to be assisted by such counsel during the investigation,
to have such counsel present when they decide to waive these rights, and to be informed of all
these rights and of the fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court.
Same; Same; Same; The right to be informed of one’s constitutional rights during
custodial investigation refers to an effective communication between the investigating officer and
the suspected individual, with the purpose of making the latter understand these rights.—The
right to be informed of one’s constitutional rights during custodial investigation refers to
an effective communication between the investigating officer and the suspected individual, with
the purpose of making the latter understand these rights. Understanding would mean that the
information transmitted was effectively received and comprehended. Hence, the Constitution
does not merely require the investigating officers to “inform” the person under investigation;
rather, it requires that the latter be “informed.”
Same; Same; Same; Terse and perfunctory statements imply a superficial reading of the
rights of the accused.—The questions propounded to the appellant did not satisfy the strict
requirements mandated by the Constitution. Such “terse and perfunctory statements” implied a
superficial reading of the rights of the accused, without the slightest consideration of whether he
understood what was read to him. This Court will not subscribe to such manner of “informing”
the accused of his constitutional rights. We have stated this then, and we reiterate it now: “[The]
stereotyped ‘advice’ appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of ‘legal form’ or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the court ‘Opo’ as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or
even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.”
Same; Same; Same; We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our
hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a
suspect.—As observed by this Court in People v. Lucero, “[w]e have constitutionalized the right
to counsel because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in
extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them
inadmissible.” This Court has consistently held, without equivocation, that no custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it is done in the presence of counsel. The failure of the
conclusion that the sworn statement is constitutionally suspect and invalid. In relation to this, we
stress that the right to counsel refers to competent and independent lawyers preferably chosen
by the accused persons themselves. This Court, as well as the court a quo, did not have the
opportunity to determine the competence and the independence of the NBI-procured lawyer
because, despite the denial of the accused that he was assisted by counsel, the prosecution
failed to present Atty. Daquiz.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 7438 includes as an integral part of custodial
investigation the practice of issuing “invitations” to persons being investigated in connection with
an offense they are suspected to have committed.—Based on the prosecution’s own evidence,
the accused was already singled out as the perpetrator of the crime. The supposed “invitation”
by NBI Agent Ely Tolentino was in reality a custodial investigation targeting the accused for the
purpose of procuring a confession. Republic Act 7438 includes as an integral part of custodial
investigation the practice of issuing “invitations” to persons being investigated in connection with
an offense they are suspected to have committed. Under the present factual milieu, Domingo
Muleta should have been accorded the right to counsel (and all the constitutional rights of the
accused), from the time that he was brought to the NBI office in Manila.
Same; Same; Same; The suspect’s waiver of his rights, in order to be valid, should be in
a language that clearly manifest his desire to do so.—Even if we were to assume that the
appellant was assisted by counsel when he waived his rights, the waiver itself was lamentably
insufficient. After Atty. Daquiz was allegedly called to assist the appellant, she posited this
question: “Gusto mo bang talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating
Konstitusyon?” To this, the appellant replied: “Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang
ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay CHARITO DELGADO na pamangkin ko.” To the Court, this was
not the waiver that the Constitution clearly and strictly required. Such waiver failed to show his
understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights, and the implications of his waiver. The
waiver, in order to be valid, should have been in a language that clearly manifested his desire to
do so. The part of the sworn statement in which the accused “waived” his rights referred to them
as “mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon” and “iyon”—words that were
utterly vague and insufficient to satisfy the Constitutional requirements. As presented, the
prosecution would have us refer to the first part of the sworn statement for guidance, as if it were
a footnote saying “Please see first part.” Such stratagem is woefully insufficient to constitute a
waiver of rights cherished and enshrined in our basic law.
Same; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites for Conviction.—The rule is that “x x x in the
absence of direct proof, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, but to warrant
such conviction, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”
Same; Witnesses; Affidavits; An affidavit is hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court
and subjected to cross-examination.—Despite the efforts of the fiscal during cross-examination,
the appellant consistently denied that he worked in the place where the victim’s body was found.
Also, the prosecution failed to prove that he was at work around 9:30 p.m. on April 29, 1993 and
that he went home on April 30, 1993. All it could present was the testimony of NBI Agent Ely
Tolentino, who merely testified on what appellant’s co-workers related to him: that appellant left
work earlier. This is clearly hearsay. The affidavits of these co-workers do not help the
prosecution’s case, since they themselves were not presented during the trial. An affidavit is
hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court and subjected to cross-examination. Besides, the
appellant’s wife, Emelinda Muleta, stated categorically that her husband was with her at home
on April 29 and 30, 1993. The appellant himself steadfastly affirmed this during his cross-
examination.
Same; Presumption of Innocence; Suspicion or accusation is not synonymous with
guilt.—The appellant’s rather strange behavior during the wake was, according to his testimony,
due to his perceived failure to take care of his niece. This was corroborated by the testimony of
Danilo Delgado. Moreover, the defense claims that the words he said during the wake were
ambiguous. “Patawarin mo ako Charito” could have meant that the appellant was blaming
himself for being unable to protect the victim. “Ikaw kasi lumaban pa” could have connoted
frustration with what he imagined could have saved the life of his niece. “Nakakahiya ako,
mabuting mamatay na” also shows the appellant blaming himself for being inutile, indicating his
desire to take his own worthless life. If these words merit anything, it is this: it places the
appellant under suspicion. But suspicion or accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
Same; Same; The prosecution must convict the accused based on the strength of its own
case, not on the weakness of the defense.—We have always considered alibi inherently weak,
because it can be either easily fabricated or difficult to disprove. However, we have consistently
held that the prosecution must convict the accused based on the strength of its own case, not on
the weakness of the defense: “True, alibi is a weak defense. But then, so also is the
prosecution’s evidence in this case. x x x Indeed, it is when the evidence is purely circumstantial
that the prosecution is much more obligated to rely on the strength of its own case and not on
the weakness of the defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty.”
Same; Same; In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt—the freedom of
the accused is forfeited only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence.—This principle is well-articulated in People v. Mejia. “In our jurisdiction accusation is
not synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit[ed] only if the requisite quantum
of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the most careful
scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and documentary, independent of whatever
defense is offered by the accused. Every circumstance favoring the accused’s innocence must
be duly taken into account. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason.
Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied
that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged. If the prosecution
fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused’s right to be freed; it is, even more,
the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.”
Same; Rule of Law; The Court is saddened that law enforcement agents transgress the
law which they have sworn to defend and uphold—a mockery of the law must not be allowed to
sully the country’s quest for peace and order.—In acquitting appellant, the Court is not saying
that he did not commit the offense charged. We are only saying that the prosecution failed to
present credible and admissible evidence of appellant’s guilt. The strongest evidence of the
prosecution is the extrajudicial confession of appellant. But the Constitution is clear—a
confession obtained in violation of the rights of an accused cannot be used as evidence. Without
Muleta’s confession, the other pieces of circumstantial evidence lose their significance. Had the
National Bureau of Investigation followed the law in extracting appellant’s admission of guilt,
perhaps—just perhaps—the result of this case would have been different. The Court is
saddened that law enforcement agents transgress the law which they have sworn to defend and
uphold. A mockery of the law—which was manifestly perpetrated in this case—must not be
allowed to sully the country’s quest for peace and order.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An extra-judicial confession extracted in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights is
inadmissible in evidence. During custodial investigation, suspects have the rights,
among others, (1) to remain silent, (2) to have an independent and competent
counsel, (3) to be provided with such counsel, if unable to secure one, (4) to be
assisted by one in case of waiver, which should be in writing, of the foregoing; and (5)
to be informed of all such rights and of the fact that anything he says can and will be
used against him. Where the remaining pieces of evidence are insufficient to
determine guilt with moral certainty, the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. A
conviction must rest on the strength of the admissible evidence of the prosecution,
not on the weakness or insufficiency of the defense.
The Case
Domingo R. Muleta appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. 3264-M-93, finding him guilty of the
complex crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
The Information, dated October 1, 1993 and signed by Prosecution Attorney
Emmanuel Y. Velasco, charged appellant as follows:
“That on April 30, 1993, between the hours of 12:05 past midnight to 2:00 in the
morning, at a house in Malolos, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused DOMINGO MULETA y ROCERO willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously had carnal knowledge of a woman in the person of Charito M.
Delgado without her consent, by using force and intimidation and while the latter
was unconscious; and thereafter accused Domingo Muleta y Rocero by reason or
on occasion of the said rape incident, taking advantage of his superior strength,
stab[bed] Charito M. Delgado in the neck and at the back causing the
instantaneous death of the latter.”
Upon arraignment on December 10, 1993, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
After trial, the lower court rendered its assailed August 15, 1997 Judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused Domingo R. Muleta
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of [r]ape with [h]omicide and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
“The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim
Charito Delgado death indemnity of P50,000.00, actual damages of P44,000.00,
exemplary damages of P20,000.00 and moral damages of P20,000.00.
“No pronouncement as to costs.”
Hence, this appeal.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as viewed by the prosecution, are summarized in the Appellee’s Brief thus:
“On April 15, 1993, nineteen-year-old Charito Delgado, a native of Oriental
Mindoro, went to Manila to find work. Once in Manila, Charito proceeded to 1347
Banaba Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila, where her uncle, Ruben Delgado lived.
There, she stayed with her sister Marissa. Shortly thereafter, Charito landed a job
as a saleslady at the Ali Mall, in Cubao, Quezon City.
“In the afternoon of April 29, 1993, Charito left Tondo, Manila and moved to
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, bringing with her some of her sister’s baggage. She,
however, returned to Tondo, Manila to pick up their remaining baggage. It was the
last time she was seen alive by her relatives.
“On April 30, 1993, Charito’s lifeless body was found naked in Mojon, Malolos,
Bulacan, tied to a post with the use of a pair of pants and both her hands were tied
with a bra. Charito’s body bore five (5) stab wounds, three (3) in the left side of her
neck and two (2) at her back.
“The initial investigation on Charito’s death was conducted by the police in
Malolos, Bulacan but the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila, later took
over and the case was assigned to NBI Agent Ely Tolentino on May 19, 1993.
 “Based on Tolentino’s investigation, appellant is Charito’s uncle, [appellant]
being the brother of Charito’s mother, Milagros Delgado; that on April 29 and 30,
1993, appellant was working at the Loadstar Shipping Lines located at Pier 16,
North Harbor, Tondo, Manila; that on April 29, 1993, appellant left his work at 9:30
in the evening; that appellant reported for work on April 30, 1993 at 8:00 in the
evening; that according to appellant’s wife, he left for work on April 29, 1993 but
returned only in the morning of April 30, 1993.
“On September 19, 1993, Tolentino went to appellant’s house in Oriental
Mindoro and requested appellant to go with him to the NBI, Manila for investigation.
Appellant readily obliged. Danilo Delgado, Charito’s paternal uncle, accompanied
Tolentino and appellant to Manila.
“During his custodial investigation on September 19, 1993, appellant was
assisted by counsel, Atty. Deborah [D]aquis, with address at Room 401, D & D
Building, Pedro Gil and San Marcelino Street, Manila. There, he admitted having
raped and later killed Charito Delgado.
“Another prosecution witness, Danilo Delgado, testified that during the wake
of Charito Delgado on May 13, 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, appellant
became hysterical, crying, shaking his head and muttering: ‘Patawarin mo ako
Charito, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya, mabuti pang mamatay na.’
“Delgado saw appellant drink a bottle of ‘chlorux,’ after which he fell to the
ground. Appellant was brought to the Fatima Hospital.” (citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
The appellant, on the other hand, submits the following as the facts of the case:
“x x x [T]he defense presented the accused himself [Domingo Muleta] who testified
that he was not the one who committed the crime [he was] being charged [with];
that he was just unscrupulously picked up by the NBI and forced to admit the crime
in question; that on April 30, 1993, he was in their rented house at Camias St.,
Magsaysay, Tondo, Manila; that on that day, he left the house at 5:30 in the
afternoon and went to the house where Charito Delgado was then residing; that
he learned from his sister Milagros Delgado that the latter’s daughter Charito
transferred to another house and she was then missing; that he reported the matter
to the police authorities; first, to the PNP Headquarters in Tondo; second, to the
PNP Headquarters at U.N. Avenue; and third, to the PNP Headquarters situated
at Caloocan; that on May 8, 1993, he found the body of Charito Delgado already
lying in state at Valenzuela, Metro, Manila; that he learned from his sister Milagros
that her body was found somewhere in Malolos; that he was working in the Load
Star Shipping as a welder on a contractual basis; that from April to May, 1993, he
was applying to another company because Load Star Shipping closed shop; that
on September 19, 1993, he was picked up by the NBI at Banos Gloria, Oriental
Mindoro; that he was brought at Taft Avenue; that he was tortured; that aside from
boxing and kicking him, [they] brought [him] to a secluded place; that he was
blindfolded; that he was told to lie down on his back, his feet were tied and water
was poured on his nose; that he was forced to sign a document which he was not
able to read, that he was forced to sign the document because he [could] no longer
bear the torture; that he did not have a lawyer at that time; that the NBI agent’s
name is Ely Tolentino who testified earlier in this case; that he knows that the
reason why he was accused of raping his niece is that he gave an information
about a woman he saw in the room of his brother-in-law Rolando Delgado.
“x x x [T]hat the last time he [accused] visited his niece in her residence in
Moriones was April 26, 1993; that Marissa was present when he visited Charito
Delgado; that he used to work at Lawang Bato, Bagbaguin, Valenzuela, Bulacan;
that he did not work in Malolos; that when he saw the cadaver of Charito, he was
so sad about her condition, that he [could] no longer recall what he did because of
his anger.
“x x x Emelinda Muleta testified that her husband, the accused-appellant,
never left the house in Tondo, Manila in the evening of April 29, 1993.”
Ruling of the Trial Court
Despite the absence of an eyewitness, the trial court held that the circumstantial
evidence in this case was enough to establish the guilt of the appellant. In so holding,
it referred to the following as sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict:
“First, the accused is familiar with the place VOP Compound, Bo. Mojon, Malolos,
Bulacan, where the crime was committed and where the body of the victim was
found;
“Second, the accused left his place of work at around 9:30 in the evening of
April 29, 1993;
“Third, the accused did not go home in the evening of April 29, 1993 but went
home only in the morning of April 30, 1993;
“Fourth, that during the wake of Charito, the accused went wild and hysterical
and uttered these words: ‘Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi lumaban pa,
nakakahiya ako, mabuti pang mamatay na.’;
“Fifth, the accused admitted in his sworn statement, that he uttered these
words;
“Sixth, the accused admitted that he drank chlorox and was brought to the
Fatima Hospital for treatment; and
“Seventh, the sworn statement executed by the accused contains details of
the manner in which the crime was committed which only he could have known.”
In upholding the validity of the extrajudicial confession, the lower court further ruled:
“The contention of the accused that his extrajudicial confession [was] inadmissible
because it was obtained through force and without the assistance of counsel is
untenable. Well-settled is the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntary
until the contrary is proved. In th[is] case, the presumption has not been overcome.
The narration contained in the sworn statement bespeaks spontan[ei]ty and truth.
Not only is the [confession of the accused] replete with details only he could have
supplied, but the circumstances surrounding its execution belie his claim.
Indubitably established is the fact that accused was assisted by Atty. Deborah
Daquis who even signed the statement; that before accused made his extrajudicial
confession he was first asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Daquis
to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, while accused recited a litany of
alleged acts of maltreatment, no medical certificate had been shown to prove that
he did suffer inhuman treatment. Nor was there any proof that he even initiated the
filing of an administrative or criminal complaint against his alleged tormentors.
Neither did accused present any eyewitness to the alleged torture. In short, his
allegation, obviously self-serving, hardly deserves consideration. Noteworthy too,
is the fact that he did not repudiate said confession at the earliest opportunity and
did so only during trial, thus indicating that his repudiation [was] only a lastditch
effort to avoid the consequences of the crime.
“The court upholds the admissibility of accused’s extrajudicial confession
which, by itself, is sufficient basis for his conviction.
“The rule is, a confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is
supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his
conscience.
“Finally, accused’s defense of denial and alibi cannot negate his culpability
because these are not supported by any credible evidence other than his bare
assertion. Additionally, there was no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the
part of the prosecution witnesses that might have led them to give fabricated
testimony against the accused.” (citations omitted)
Assignment of Error
Appellant presents this lone assignment of error:
 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION AND IN THE PROCESS DISREGARDING Flagrantly violated in the present case were the appellant’s right to be informed of his
THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.” rights under custodial investigation, his right to counsel, as well as his right to have
said counsel present during the waiver of his rights under custodial investigation.
A reading of the Appellant’s Brief, however, yields the following issues to be resolved:
(1) the validity and admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of the appellant, (2) the The Right to Be Apprised of Constitutional Rights
sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
The right to be informed of one’s constitutional rights during custodial investigation
doubt, and (3) alibi as a defense.
refers to an effective communication between the investigating officer and the
suspected individual, with the purpose of making the latter understand these rights.
This Court’s Ruling
Understanding would mean that the information transmitted was effectively received
The appeal is meritorious. The extrajudicial confession of appellant is inadmissible,
and comprehended. Hence, the Constitution does not merely require the investigating
and the remaining circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sorely
officers to “inform” the person under investigation; rather, it requires that the latter be
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. “informed.”
First Issue: Validity of Extrajudicial Confession
The prosecution’s purported compliance with this requisite appears in the
following portion of the extrajudicial confession:
The appellant claims that “it is not true that [he] had executed an extrajudicial “SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI DOMINGO MULETA y ROCERO NA IBINIGAY
confession.” As correctly pointed out by the solicitor general, however, the appellant KAY NBI AGENT ELY T. TOLENTINO DITO SA TANGGAPAN NG NBI, ANTI-
actually admits to the execution of the said confession, albeit without the assistance ORGANIZED CRIME DIVISION NGAYONG IKA-19 NG SETYEMBRE, 1993 SA
of counsel. But unlike the solicitor general, we are not ready to declare that such HARAP NG ILANG SAKSI.
“ambivalence only indicates the unreliability of [appellant’s] claim.” Indeed, x------------------------------------------------------------------------x
confessions extracted without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a 01. TANONG: Bago kita tanungin hinggil sa pagkamatay ni CHARITO
court of law. DELGADO y MULETA ay nais ipabatid sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan na
itinatadhana ng ating saligang batas, at ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
01.Ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik at huwag sumagot sa mga katanungan sa
To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional iyo sa imbestigasyong ito[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)
requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is 02.Ikaw ay may karapatan na kumuha ng abogado na sarili mong pili, pero kung
obtained in violation of any of the following rights of persons under custodial wala kang ikakaya ay bibigyan ka namin ng abogado para matulungan ka sa
investigation: to remain silent, to have independent and competent counsel preferably imbestigasyong ito[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ang karapatan mong ito? (Sgd. Domingo
of their own choice, to be provided with counsel if they are unable to secure one, to Muleta)
be assisted by such counsel during the investigation, to have such counsel present 03.Ang lahat ng bagay na sasabihin mo sa imbestigasyong ito ay maaaring gamitin
when they decide to waive these rights, and to be informed of all these rights and of laban sa iyo sa alinmang hukuman[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ito? (Sgd. Domingo
Muleta)
the fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court. In People
Matapos na malaman mo ang iyong mga karapatan ikaw ay nakahanda pa
v. Santos, we held: ring magbigay ng pahayag?
“A confession is not admissible unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows that it SAGOT: Nakahanda po akong sabihin lahat ng totoo.
was obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article 02. T: Ikaw ba ay may abogado na
III thereof, provides: matatawagan ngayon na sarili mong
‘(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall pili?
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have S: Wala po.
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the 03. T: Nais mo bang bigyan ka namin ng
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with abogado?
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence S: Opo.
of counsel. 04. T: Gusto naming ipakilala sa iyo si Atty.
xxx xxx xxx Deborah Z. Daquiz isang abogada
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section na pribado na handang asistihan at
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.’ tulungan ka sa imbestigasyong ito.
“If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is Gusto mo bang tawagin natin siya
subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely—without coercion, bago natin ituloy ang pagbibigay mo
intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent ng pahayag?
with the normal experience of mankind. S: Opo. (At this juncture, Atty. Daquiz
“A confession that meets all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a was called first and the statement
high order because no person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately taking was temporarily stopped until
confess to be the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. after her arrival).
Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with the cold objectivity of the 05. T: Ngayong naririto na si Atty.
exclusionary rule.” (citations omitted) DEBORAH DAQUIZ, ikaw ba ay nais
 pa ring magbigay ng salaysay na
bukal sa iyong kalooban?
S: Opo.
06. T: Atty. Daquiz: Gusto mo bang talikdan
ang iyong mga karapatan na
ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating
Konstitusyon?
S: Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil
gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang
pangyayari kay CHARITO
DELGADO na pamangkin ko. (Sgd.
Domingo Muleta)
xxx xxx xxx
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of September, 1993
at the Office of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Divsion, NBI Building, Taft Avenue,
Manila and I hereby certify that I have personally examined the herein Affiant and
found him to have fully read and understood the contents of his statement
containing three (3) pages and that he executed the same out of his own volition.
(Sgd.) Atty. ARTEMIO M. SACAGUING
Chief AOCD
(By Authority of Rep. Act 157)
x x x x x x x x x” (emphasis ours)
However, the testimony of Tolentino, the investigating NBI agent, clearly contradicts
the claim of the prosecution. The agent testified:
“x x x x x x x x x
Q Did you inform her [Atty. Deborah Daquiz] x x x
thr[ough] the phone x x x why you were soliciting her
assistance?
A Yes[,] sir. We told her that we have a subject to
confess what he [did,] will you kindly assist him in
this investigation[?]
Q What was the response of Atty. Daquis?
A She [asked] me [if it] could x x x be made the
following day.
Q What was you[r] answer?
A It is up to you, I said.
Q If the request of Atty. Daquis was the following day[,]
meaning September 20, are you saying that the
statement of Muleta was given the following day[,] on
September 20?
A September 19, I started taking the statement. I think I
just finished the question the following day I
continued. [sic]
x x x x x x x x x” [Emphasis ours]

The questions propounded to the appellant did not satisfy the strict requirements Atty. Quintana amplified this point on cross-examination:
mandated by the Constitution. Such “terse and perfunctory statements” implied a “x x x xxx xxx
superficial reading of the rights of the accused, without the slightest consideration of Q In the direct examination, you claimed that the accused
whether he understood what was read to him. This Court will not subscribe to such Domingo Muleta gave his statement and made a
manner of “informing” the accused of his constitutional rights. We have stated this confession?
then, and we reiterate it now: A Yes, madam.
“[The] stereotyped ‘advice’ appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions Q You also claimed that you started taking the statement of
which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of ‘legal form’ or model. Police Domingo Muleta, the accused, without the presence of
investigators either automatically type it together with the curt ‘Opo’ as the answer counsel?
or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, A No, madam. I took his statement in the presence of Atty.
punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of Daquis.
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a Q In the direct examination on May 27, 1994, page 81, last
spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.” (emphasis paragraph and I quote: ‘A. September 19, I started taking
supplied) the statement. I think I just finished the question the
following day I continued.’ Now, do you want to change
now your answer that you took the accused’ [sic]
The Right to Counsel statement with the presence of counsel?
The prosecution contends that this constitutional requirement was satisfied because A No, madam. Although I started to take his statement on
appellant executed the confession with the assistance and in the presence of Atty. the night of September 19, I continued it when Atty.
Deborah Daquiz. The participation of the counsel was described in the confession in Daquiz arrived x x x the following morning wherein the
this manner: accused conferred with the accused, madam. [sic]
“x x x xxx xxx Q But, [is it] not true that on the night of September 19,
04. T: Gusto naming ipakilala sa iyo si Atty. 1993 you started taking the statement of the accused
Deborah Z. Daquiz, isang abogada na without the presence of Atty. Daquiz and only continued
pribado na handang asisti han at tulungan the same on the early morning of September 20, 1993
ka sa imbestigasyong ito. Gusto mo bang when Atty. Daquiz arrived?
tawagin natin siya bago natin ituloy ang A Yes, madam.
pagbibigay mo ng pahayag? Q Don’t you know that as a police officer NBI a[t] that, that
S: Opo. (At this juncture, Atty. Daquiz was before a suspected person can give his statement, a
called first and the statement taking was counsel must be present at all times?
temporarily stopped until after her arrival). A Yes, madam.
x x x x x x x x x” x x x x x x x x x” (emphasis ours)
Despite Agent Tolentino’s claim that the confession of the accused started to be
taken on September 19, 1993 and continued the next day, the sworn statement itself
clearly showed that what began on the 19th of September ended on the same day.
According to the jurat, the extrajudicial confession was subscribed and sworn to on
September 19, 1993. The importance of the jurat must be stressed. In People v.
Relucio, we observed:
“At this point, it must be noted that Exhibit 2-A, the statement which Padrones
claimed above to have been admittedly taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 but,
supposedly signed by him later and not on the same day before Judge Vicencio
as he had previously stated, bears the following heading:
‘SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI MIGUEL PADRONES y ESPEJO SA
PAGTATANONG NI P/CPL J. S. VILORIA DITO SA HIMPILAN NG PULISYA NG
KABANATUAN NGAYONG IKA-19 NG OKTUBRE 1972 SA GANAP NA IKA 5:15
NG HAPON . . .’
and ends with the following jurat:
‘NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa aking harap ngayong ika 20 ng Oktubre
1972, dito sa Lunsod ng Kabanatuan.’
With the dates October 19 and 20 thus appearing in this statements, how
could there be any proximity to the truth in the assertion of Padrones that his
statement was first taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 and that it was signed by
him before Fiscal del Rosario on October 9, 1972 and that it was the very statement
he had been referring to earlier as having been signed by him before Judge
Vicencio?” (emphasis in the original)
We note that the heading of the sworn statement refers to the same date: September
19, 1993. It is thus daylight clear that the purported sworn statement of the appellant
was prepared prior to the arrival of his NBI-procured counsel. In other words, the
sworn statement was executed and completed on September 19, 1993, while Atty.
Daquiz arrived only the following day, September 20, 1993. Thus, when the appellant
executed and completed his purported extrajudicial confession on September 19,
1993, he was not assisted by counsel.
As observed by this Court in People v. Lucero, “[w]e have constitutionalized the right
to counsel because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue
influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish
confessions and render them inadmissible.” This Court has consistently held, without
equivocation, that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it is done in
the presence of counsel. The failure of the prosecution to present Atty. Daquiz to
testify on the validity of the confession substantiates the conclusion that the sworn
statement is constitutionally suspect and invalid. In relation to this, we stress that the
right to counsel refers to competent and independent lawyers preferably chosen by
the accused persons themselves. This Court, as well as the court a quo, did not have
the opportunity to determine the competence and the independence of the NBI-
procured lawyer because, despite the denial of the accused that he was assisted by
counsel, the prosecution failed to present Atty. Daquiz.
Based on the prosecution’s own evidence, the accused was already singled out
as the perpetrator of the crime. The supposed “invitation” by NBI Agent Ely Tolentino
was in reality a custodial investigation targeting the accused for the purpose of
procuring a confession. Republic Act 7438 includes as an integral part of custodial
investigation the practice of issuing “invitations” to persons being investigated in
connection with an offense they are suspected to have committed. Under the present
factual milieu, Domingo Muleta should have been accorded the right to counsel (and
all the constitutional rights of the accused), from the time that he was brought to the
NBI office in Manila.
No Valid Waiver
The illegality of the alleged confession is further demonstrated by the fact that
appellant exercised no satisfactory waiver of his rights. As stated in our earlier
discussions, since he was not assisted by a lawyer when the waiver was made, there
was no valid waiver to speak of.
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the appellant was assisted by
counsel when he waived his rights, the waiver itself was lamentably insufficient. After
Atty. Daquiz was allegedly called to assist the appellant, she posited this question:
“Gusto mo bang talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating
Konstitusyon?” To this, the appellant replied: “Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto
ko nang ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay CHARITO DELGADO na pamangkin ko.”
To the Court, this was not the waiver that the Constitution clearly and strictly
required. Such waiver failed to show his understanding of his rights, his waiver of
those rights, and the implications of his waiver. The waiver, in order to be valid,
should have been in a language that clearly manifested his desire to do so. The part
of the sworn statement in which the accused “waived” his rights referred to them as
“mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon” and “iyon”—words that
were utterly vague and insufficient to satisfy the Constitutional requirements. As
presented, the prosecution would have us refer to the first part of the sworn statement
for guidance, as if it were a footnote saying “Please see first part.” Such stratagem is
woefully insufficient to constitute a waiver of rights cherished and enshrined in our
basic law.
Moreover, Atty. Daquiz raised only one question: whether appellant would like to
waive his rights. This was odd, because she had been called to assist appellant in
making his confession, not his waiver. Atty. Daquiz made no effort to determine
whether the accused was treated well, or if he understood his rights. Such
perfunctory, even cavalier, attempt falls short of constitutional requirements.
Second Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence for the Prosecution
Having ruled the alleged confession as unconstitutional and inadmissible, we now
determine whether the other pieces of evidence—all circumstantial in nature—would
be sufficient to overturn yet another constitutional right: to be presumed innocent
unless otherwise proven.
The rule is that “x x x in the absence of direct proof, conviction may be based on
circumstantial evidence, but to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”
Here, the solicitor general, as well as the trial court, posits that the conviction of the
appellant was sufficiently warranted by the aggregate of the following circumstantial
evidence:
1.The appellant was familiar with the place where the crime was perpetrated.
 2.The appellant left work around 9:30 on the evening of April 29, 1993 and did not
return home until the morning of April 30, 1993.
3.The appellant, during the victim’s wake, became hysterical and allegedly
uttered: “Patawarin mo ako Chato, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya ako, mabuti
pang mamatay na,” after which he drank “chlorox.”
We do not agree. At the outset, we stress that a careful review of the records of this
case reveals that these pieces of circumstantial evidence were controverted by the
defense and, even more important, they were not sufficiently established.
Despite the efforts of the fiscal during cross-examination, the appellant
consistently denied that he worked in the place where the victim’s body was found.
Also, the prosecution failed to prove that he was at work around 9:30 p.m. on April 29,
1993 and that he went home on April 30, 1993. All it could present was the testimony
of NBI Agent Ely Tolentino, who merely testified on what appellant’s co-workers
related to him: that appellant left work earlier. This is clearly hearsay. The affidavits of
these co-workers do not help the prosecution’s case, since they themselves were not
presented during the trial. An affidavit is hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court
and subjected to cross-examination. Besides, the appellant’s wife, Emelinda Muleta,
stated categorically that her husband was with her at home on April 29 and 30, 1993.
The appellant himself steadfastly affirmed this during his cross-examination.
The appellant’s rather strange behavior during the wake was, according to his
testimony, due to his perceived failure to take care of his niece. This was corroborated
by the testimony of Danilo Delgado. Moreover, the defense claims that the words he
said during the wake were ambiguous. “Patawarin mo ako Charito” could have meant
that the appellant was blaming himself for being unable to protect the victim. “Ikaw
kasi lumaban pa” could have connoted frustration with what he imagined could have
saved the life of his niece. “Nakakahiya ako, mabuting mamatay na” also shows the
appellant blaming himself for being inutile, indicating his desire to take his own
worthless life. If these words merit anything, it is this: it places the appellant under
suspicion. But suspicion or accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
Most importantly, even if we were to assume that all the foregoing were proven,
they are still not enough to establish an unbroken chain leading inexorably to the guilt
of the appellant. That the appellant could have been familiar with the place where the
body was found did not legally prove anything. That he left work at 9:30 p.m. on April
29 1993 did not necessarily mean he was at the scene of the crime. So many other
possible conclusions could be made regarding this circumstance. As for his
statements during the wake, they are ambiguous.
We have said that “[i]n the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be
established by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, however, must still pass the
test of moral certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence
cannot sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the state’s evidence does not
constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the
accused, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.” Thus, in People v. Bato, the pieces of circumstantial evidence
presented there—those showing that the accused brothers invited the victim (and his
son) for a drink, suddenly tied his hands and took him away; after which his body was
recovered from the river the next day—were ruled to be inadequate to sustain a
conviction based on guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented acquires significance only
when taken together with the appellant’s confession. The pattern of the tapestry,
which the prosecution would want us to see, is bound by only a single thread—the
confession of the appellant. Due to constitutional infirmity, that one strand has been
cut, and thus the pattern disintegrates. The tapestry becomes an unreadable puzzle.
Third Issue: Alibi as a Defense
True, we have always considered alibi inherently weak, because it can be either
easily fabricated or difficult to disprove. However, we have consistently held that the
prosecution must convict the accused based on the strength of its own case, not on
the weakness of the defense:
“True, alibi is a weak defense. But then, so also is the prosecution’s evidence in
this case. x x x Indeed, it is when the evidence is purely circumstantial that the
prosecution is much more obligated to rely on the strength of its own case and not
on the weakness of the defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than
moral certainty.” (emphasis supplied)
Presumption of Innocence
“Where the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the
constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of the
weakness or even the absence of his defense, for any conviction must rest on the
strength of the prosecution’s case and not on the weakness of the defense.” Here,
without the confession of the appellant, the presumption of innocence prevails.
This principle is well-articulated in People v. Mejia. “In our jurisdiction accusation
is not synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit[ed] only if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course,
requires the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and
documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every
circumstance favoring the accused’s innocence must be duly taken into account. The
proof against the accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged. If the prosecution
fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused’s right to be freed; it is,
even more, the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.”
One final note. In acquitting appellant, the Court is not saying that he did not
commit the offense charged. We are only saying that the prosecution failed to present
credible and admissible evidence of appellant’s guilt. The strongest evidence of the
prosecution is the extrajudicial confession of appellant. But the Constitution is clear—
a confession obtained in violation of the rights of an accused cannot be used as
evidence. Without Muleta’s confession, the other pieces of circumstantial evidence
lose their significance. Had the National Bureau of Investigation followed the law in
extracting appellant’s admission of guilt, perhaps—just perhaps—the result of this
case would have been different. The Court is saddened that law enforcement agents
transgress the law which they have sworn to defend and uphold. A mockery of the
law—which was manifestly perpetrated in this case—must not be allowed to sully the
country’s quest for peace and order.
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is hereby
REVERSED and VACATED. Appellant Domingo R. Muleta is hereby ACQUITTED
for insufficiency of evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby
directed to cause the release of appellant forthwith, unless the latter is being lawfully
held for another cause; and to inform the Court of his release, or the reasons for his
continued confinement, within ten days from notice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Note.—A signed admission (“pagpapatunay”) by the accused which was

obtained in violation of his rights under custodial investigation is not admissible in
evidence. (People vs. Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 [1995])

——o0o——
 G.R. No. 174471. January 12, 2016 test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
PRECIOSA GOMEZ y CAMPOS, respondents.
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Applying the totality-of-circumstances test,
we find Edward’s out-of-court identification to be reliable and thus admissible. To recall, when
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Illegal Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; The
the three individuals entered Edward’s office, they initially pretended to be customers, and even
illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
asked about the products that were for sale. The three had told Edward that they were going to
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.—It is settled that [a]ny objection to the
pay, but Pepino “pulled out a gun” instead. After Pepino’s companion had taken the money from
procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of
the cashier’s box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward and forced him to go down to the parked
the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
car. From this sequence of events, there was thus ample opportunity for Edward — before and
deemed waived. As we held in People v. Samson, 244 SCRA 146 (1995): [A]ppellant is now
after the gun had been pointed at him — to view the faces of the three persons who entered his
estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the
office. In addition, Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him “[a]t least once a day” during the
quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his
four days that he was detained.
arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of “not guilty” and by participating in the trial. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime
complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot
was committed.—Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is
deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their
to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was
culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
committed. As the Court held in People v. Esoy, 617 SCRA 552 (2010): It is known that the most
information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had
natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator
been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
and to observe the manner in which the offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the
assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily
Criminal Law; Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; Elements of.—The elements of
erased from a witness’s memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of
amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any
reliability the identity of criminals at any given time. While this pronouncement should be applied
other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be
with great caution, there is no compelling circumstance in this case that would warrant its non-
illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
application.
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
Same; Criminal Procedure; Custodial Investigations; Police Lineups; Right to Counsel;
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a
a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a
suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule, a police lineup is not part
minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally
of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is also of no moment
yet be invoked at this stage.—The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to
and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances
preclude the slightest coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right
mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present.
to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused.
Same; Kidnapping; For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a
from going home.—It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of
suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule, a police lineup is not part
placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any
of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.
yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial
Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the
investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police lineup.
intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Out-of-Court Identification; Totality of
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by
Circumstances Test; In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.—
following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by
of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence
the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and after the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. Proof of the agreement does
identification procedure.—In People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995), the Court
not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement may be inferred from the conduct of the
explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the admissibility
parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
of such identifications in this manner: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in
offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and
various ways. It is done thru show ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the
entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by
witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness
which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a
Same; Penalties; Death Penalty; With the passage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346,
group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on
entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines” (signed into law on
out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
June 24, 2006), the death penalty may no longer be imposed. The Supreme Court (SC)
sentenced Gomez to the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to
A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.—Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the
imposition of the death penalty when the kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Ransom, as employed in the law, is so
used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price,
or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a
payment that releases one from captivity. In the present case, the malefactors not only
demanded but received ransom for Edward’s release. The CA thus correctly affirmed the RTC’s
imposition of the death penalty on Pepino and Gomez. With the passage of Republic Act No.
9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines” (signed into
law on June 24, 2006), the death penalty may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence Gomez
to the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-
SC. The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is more
favorable to him.
Same; Kidnapping for Ransom; Civil Indemnity; Moral Damages; Exemplary Damages; In
the case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also for kidnapping for ransom), the
Supreme Court (SC) set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the
imposition of the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, as
follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim
is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages to set an example for the public good.—In the case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA
508 (2013), (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages
where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by R.A.
No. 9346, as follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages
which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts shall earn interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Court’s Resolution until
fully paid.
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by Jerry Pepino (Pepino) and Preciosa Gomez (Gomez)
assailing the June 16, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02026.
Antecedents
The prosecution evidence showed that at 1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, two men
and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat,
Parañaque City, and pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to receive
them, one of the men, eventually identified as Pepino, pulled out a gun. Thinking that
it was a holdup, Edward told Pepino that the money was inside the cashier’s box.
Pepino and the other man looted the cashier’s box, handcuffed Edward, and forced
him to go with them. From the hallway, Jocelyn Tan (mentioned as “Joselyn” in some
parts of the record), Edward’s wife, saw Pepino take her husband. She went to the
adjoining room upon Edward’s instructions.
Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla where three other men
were waiting inside. The woman (later identified as Gomez) sat on the front
passenger seat. The abductors then placed surgical tape over Edward’s eyes and
made him wear sunglasses. After travelling for two and a half hours, they arrived at
an apartment in Quezon City. The abductors removed the tape from Edward’s eyes,
placed him in a room, and then chained his legs. Pepino approached Edward and
asked for the phone number of his father so that he could ask for ransom for his
(Edward’s) liberty. Edward told Pepino to negotiate with his wife, but the latter insisted
on talking to his father.
At around 5:00 p.m. of the same day, the kidnappers called Edward’s father and
demanded a P40 million ransom for his release. Edward’s father told the kidnappers
that he did not have that amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn who
eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom. The kidnappers told Jocelyn to pack the
money into two packages and to drop these at a convenience store in front of
McDonald’s at Mindanao Avenue. They further demanded that Edward’s vehicle be
used to bring the money.
After four days, or on July 1, 1997, Antonio Gepiga (the family driver) brought the
agreed amount to the 7-Eleven convenience store at Mindanao Avenue as instructed.
That evening, three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made him board a car, and
drove around for 30 minutes. Upon stopping, they told Edward that he could remove
his blindfold after five minutes. When Edward removed his blindfold, he found himself
inside his own car parked at the UP Diliman Campus. He drove home and reported
his kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a known anti-crime crusader.
After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) informed Edward
that they had apprehended some suspects, and invited him to identify them from a
lineup consisting of seven persons: five males and two females. Edward positively
identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo. Jocelyn likewise identified Pepino.
Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead
presented Zeny Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, NBI Special Investigator Marcelo Jadloc
and P/Sr. Insp. Narciso Quano (mentioned as “Qano” in some parts of the record).
Zeny testified that she and her husband, Jerry Pepino, were inside their house in
Cebu City on December 7, 1997, when about 20 heavily armed men entered their
house looking for Jerry. When Jerry asked them if they had a warrant of arrest, one of
the men pointed a gun at him and handcuffed him; the armed men then hit him with
the butt of an armalite and punched him. The men also took Pepino’s wristwatch and
wallet, as well as Zeny’s bag and watch. Some of the armed men searched the
second floor of the house, and found a .45 caliber gun. The armed men brought Zeny
and Pepino outside their house where Zeny saw Renato Pepino and Larex Pepino
already handcuffed. The armed men brought them to the Cebu City Police
Headquarters before bringing them to the NBI Headquarters in Manila. The following
day, Jerry, Renato, and Larex were brought to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Zeny, on the other hand, was released after being detained at the NBI for three (3)
days.
Reynaldo’s testimony was summarized by the CA as follows:
x x x On December 6, 1997, he accompanied accused-appellant Gomez to
his brother’s sister-in-law who happens to work in a recruitment agency. While they
were inside the latter’s house at Lot 2, Block 15, Marikina Heights, Marikina City,
they heard a noise at the gate. When he peeped through the window, he saw two
(2) motorcycles and two (2) Vannette vans. Shortly thereafter, someone kicked the
back door and several armed men emerged therefrom and announced their
 arrest. When he asked them if they had any warrant, they replied: “Walang
warrant, warrant. Walang search, search.” They were then hogtied and made to
lie face down. Five (5) of them then went upstairs and seized his personal
belongings together with his briefcase which contained P45,000.00, documents of
accused-appellant Gomez, and his .45 caliber pistol as well as his license and
permit to carry the same. No receipts were issued for their personal effects which
were confiscated. They were subsequently brought to Camp Crame and subjected
to torture. The following day, they were brought to the Department of Justice and
a case for kidnapping was filed against him. Upon reinvestigation, however, he
was discharged from the Information and the court dismissed the case against him.
SI Jadloc and Police Senior Inspector Quano, Jr. were presented as hostile
witnesses.
Jadloc declared on the witness stand that NBI Assistant Director Edmundo
Arugay dispatched a team to Cebu City to investigate a kidnap-for-ransom case. The
team immediately conducted surveillance operations when they arrived at Calle Rojo,
Lahug, Cebu City. One of the team members saw Renato and Larex Pepino with
guns tucked in their waists. When the team approached them, the two men ran inside
their house. The team went after them and on entering the house, they saw Jerry in
possession of a .45 caliber gun. The team arrested Jerry, Renato and Larex, and then
brought them to the NBI Headquarters in Manila.
Quano testified that he was designated as the leader of a team tasked to arrest
members of a kidnap-for-ransom group at their safe house in Lot 2, Block 50,
Marikina Heights, Marikina City. When they arrived there, they introduced themselves
as police officers. The police forcibly opened the door after the occupants of the
house refused to open the ground floor door. During their search at the second floor,
the operatives found an armalite and a .45 caliber gun. The members of the team
handcuffed Gomez and Reynaldo, and then brought them to Camp Crame.
The prosecution charged Preciosa Gomez, Jerry Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino,
Jessie Pepino, George Curvera, Boy Lanyujan, Luisito “Tata” Adulfo, Henriso Batijon
(a.k.a. Dodoy Batijon), Nerio Alameda, and an alias Wilan Tan with kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
259, Parañaque City. Reynaldo was subsequently discharged after reinvestigation.
Only Pepino, Gomez, and Batijon were arraigned; their other co-accused remained at
large.
In its May 15, 2000 decision, the RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (as
amended) and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. The RTC also ordered
them to pay Edward P700,000.00 representing the amount extorted from him;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000 as exemplary damages. The trial court
acquitted Batijon for insufficiency of evidence.
The RTC held that Edward positively identified Pepino and Gomez as two of
the persons who forcibly abducted him at gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and who
consequently detained him somewhere in Quezon City for four (4) days until he was
released inside the UP Diliman Campus after the payment of ransom. The RTC
added that Jocelyn corroborated Edward’s testimony on material points. It also
pointed out that Edward identified both Pepino and Gomez at the lineup conducted
inside the NBI compound, although Jocelyn only recognized Gomez.
The RTC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from questioning
the validity of their arrest after they entered their respective pleas.
The case was automatically elevated to this Court in view of the death penalty
that the RTC imposed. We referred the case to the CA for intermediate review
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.
In its decision dated June 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision with the modification that the amounts of moral and exemplary damages
were increased from P300,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively.
The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any objection
to the illegality of their arrests when they did not move to quash the information before
entering their plea, and when they participated at the trial.
The CA further ruled that Pepino and Gomez conspired with each other to attain a
common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward in exchange for ransom.
While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino filed an urgent
motion to withdraw his appeal, which the Court granted. Only Gomez’s appeal is now
pending before us.
In her brief and supplemental brief, Gomez maintained that it was impossible for
Edward to have seen her in the front seat of the getaway car because he (Edward)
was blindfolded. She also alleged that the prosecution failed to prove that she had
conspired with the other accused.
Gomez further claimed that Edward’s identification of her during trial “may have
been preconditioned x x x by suggestive identification” made at the police lineup. She
further argued that the death penalty imposed on her is no longer proper due to the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.
The Court’s Ruling
We affirm Gomez’s conviction, but we modify the penalty imposed and the
awarded indemnities.
Illegality of the Arrest
We point out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the
legality of her warrantless arrest or the acquisition of RTC’s jurisdiction over her
person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless
arrest.
It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the
acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. As we held in People v. Samson:
[A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his
arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court.
Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he
 voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea
of “not guilty” and by participating in the trial.
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside
a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right
to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is
much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced
and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against
her.
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
a. Elements of kidnapping proved
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3)
the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the
offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority;
or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a
minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped
and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is also of no moment and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by
death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267
is present.
All these elements have been established by the prosecution. Edward positively
identified Gomez and Pepino — both private individuals — as among the three
persons who entered his office and pretended to be Kilton Motors’ customers. He
further declared that Pepino pointed a gun at him, and forcibly took him against his
will. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. WILLIAM CHUA:
Q: Can you tell us if anything unusual happened to you on June 28, 1997?
EDWARD TAN:
A: I was kidnapped.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell this Court how the kidnapping was initiated?
A: At around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, there were three persons who entered
the office of Kilton Motors and pretended to be customers.
Q: What was the gender of these three persons that you are referring to?
A: Two men and a woman.
Q: After they pretended to be customers, tell us what happened?
A: They told me they were going to pay but instead of pulling out money, they pulled
out a gun.
Q: How many people pulled out guns as you said?
A: Only one, sir.
Q: Will you look around this courtroom now and tell us if the person who pulled out
a gun is in court?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A PERSON AT THE RIGHT SECTION, SECOND
ROW WHO, WHEN ASKED HIS NAME, ANSWERED JERRY PEPINO)
Q: Now, you said that there were two men and a woman who went up the Kilton
Motors Office and you pointed to one of the men as Jerry Pepino, can you
look around the courtroom and tell us if any of the two others are in court?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A WOMAN INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO,
WHEN ASKED HER NAME, ANSWERED AS PRECIOSA GOMEZ)
xxxx
Q: You said Mr. Pepino pulled out his gun, what happened after he pulled out his
gun?
A: He told me just to be quiet and go with him.
Q: What was your reaction when he pointed a gun to you and he stated
those words?
A: I thought it was only a holdup and so I told him there was money with the cashier
and told him to get it.
Q: What happened after you told him the money was in the cashier’s box?
A: His companion took the money and told me to still go with them.
Q: When they told you to go with them, what happened next?
A: I told them why should I still go with them and then, I was handcuffed and was
forced to go down.
xxxx
Q: As they were bringing you down, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: When we went down nearing his car, I was boarded on [in] his car.
xxxx
Q: When they boarded you inside that car, what did they do to you, Mr. Witness?
A: They put surgical tape on my eyes and also sunglasses.
xxxx
Q: Who was at the passenger’s front seat of the car?
A: It was Preciosa Gomez.
xxxx
Edward further declared on the witness stand that Pepino, Gomez, and their other
co-accused brought him to a safe house in Quezon City; detained him there for four
(4) days; and demanded ransom from his (Edward’s) family.
It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any
manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from
going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
Notably, Jocelyn corroborated Edward’s testimony on the following points: Pepino
poked a handgun at Edward while they were on the second floor of Kilton; Pepino and
his companion brought him downstairs and out of the building, and made him board a
car; and the kidnappers demanded ransom in exchange for Edward’s release.
Both the RTC and the CA found the respective testimonies of Edward and
Jocelyn credible and convincing. We affirm the credibility accorded by the trial court
(and affirmed by the CA) to these prosecution witnesses, in the absence of any
showing that this factual finding had been arbitrarily arrived at. There is nothing in the
records that would put the testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn under suspicion. We
recall that Edward had close contacts with Pepino at Kilton Motors and at the safe
house. He also saw Gomez (a) seated at the front seat of the getaway Toyota Corolla
vehicle; (b) at the safe house in Quezon City; and (c) inside the car before the
kidnappers released him.
 Jocelyn, for her part, stated that she was very near Pepino while he was taking
away her husband.
In People v. Pavillare, the Court found the testimonies of the private complainant
Sukhjinder Singh and his cousin, Lakhvir Singh, to be credible and convincing, and
reasoned out as follows:
Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to
remember their faces. The complainant had close contact with the kidnappers
when he was abducted and beaten up, and later when the kidnappers haggled on
the amount of the ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare face to face and actually
dealt with him when he paid the ransom money. The two-hour period that the
complainant was in close contact with his abductors was sufficient for him to have
a recollection of their physical appearance. Complainant admitted in court that he
would recognize his abductors if he sees them again and upon seeing Pavillare he
immediately recognized him as one of the malefactors as he remembers him as
the one who blocked his way, beat him up, haggled with the complainant’s cousin
and received the ransom money. x x x It bears repeating that the finding of the trial
court as to the credibility of witnesses is given utmost respect and as a rule will not
be disturbed on appeal because it had the opportunity to closely observe the
demeanor of the witness in court.
b. Admissibility of Identification
We find no merit in Gomez’s claim that Edward’s identification of her during
trial might have been preconditioned by the “suggestive identification” made during
the police lineup.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr., the Court explained the procedure for out-of-court
identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identifications in this
manner:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done
thru show ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness
for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time
of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of
any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward’s out-of-court
identification to be reliable and thus admissible. To recall, when the three individuals
entered Edward’s office, they initially pretended to be customers, and even asked
about the products that were for sale. The three had told Edward that they were going
to pay, but Pepino “pulled out a gun” instead. After Pepino’s companion had taken the
money from the cashier’s box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward and forced him to
go down to the parked car. From this sequence of events, there was thus ample
opportunity for Edward — before and after the gun had been pointed at him — to view
the faces of the three persons who entered his office. In addition, Edward stated that
Pepino had talked to him “[a]t least once a day” during the four days that he was
detained.
Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green
Toyota Corolla vehicle. In addition, the abductors removed the tape from Edward’s
eyes when they arrived at the apartment, and among those whom he saw there was
Gomez. According to Edward, he was able to take a good look at the occupants of
the car when he was about to be released.
On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of Pepino
as the person who pointed a gun at her husband while going down the stairs, and
who brought him outside the premises of Kilton Motors. She maintained that she was
very near when Pepino was taking away her husband; and that she could not forget
Pepino’s face. For accuracy, we quote from the records:
ATTY. CORONEL:
Q: You stated that you were able to see one of the persons who kidnapped your
husband, if you see this person again, would you be able to identify him?
JOCELYN SY TAN:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you look around the courtroom and see if the person you are referring to is
here today?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you point to him?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A MALE PERSON INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO
WHEN ASKED HIS NAME ANSWERED AS JERRY PEPINO)
Q: Ms. Witness, what role did this person whom you identified and gave his name
as Jerry Pepino, what role did he play in the kidnapping of your husband?
A: Siya po bale ‘yong nakayakap sa husband ko tapos nakatutok ng baril.
xxxx
ATTY. ESTRUCO:
Q: When Jerry Pepino was at Kilton Motors, he embraced your husband?
JOCELYN SY TAN:
A: Yes, sir. And pointed a gun at my husband.
Q: And he was not blindfolded at that time?
A: No, he was not blindfolded, he was only wearing a cap.
Q: You are very sure that he is Jerry Pepino?
A: Yes, I am very, very sure. I could not forget his face.
Q: You are very sure?
A: Yes, sir. Kahit sa nightmare ko, kasama siya.
xxxx
We add that no competing event took place to draw Edward’s and Jocelyn’s
attention from the incident. Nothing in the records shows the presence of any
distraction that could have disrupted the witnesses’ attention at the time of the
incident.
Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to
strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime
was committed. As the Court held in People v. Esoy:
It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to strive to
look at the appearance of the perpetrator and to observe the manner in which the
offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements
thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness’s
memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of
violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a
high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time.
 While this pronouncement should be applied with great caution, there is no
compelling circumstance in this case that would warrant its non-application.
Contrary to what Gomez claimed, the police lineup conducted at the NBI was not
suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup; Edward was not
compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it might
have been ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup instead of only
two, or if there had been a separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone
that there were five males and two females in the lineup did not render the procedure
irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to
Edward that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators.
The following exchanges at the trial during Edward’s cross- examination prove
this point:
ATTY. ESTURCO:
Q: When they were lined up at the NBI, where were they placed, in a certain room?
EDWARD TAN:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: With a glass window? One way?
A: No, sir.
Q: You mean to say you were face to face with the alleged kidnappers?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the persons who allegedly kidnapped
you, you conferred with the NBI agents?
A: The NBI agents told me not to be afraid.
Q: No, my question is, you conferred with the NBI agents?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is the name of the NBI agent?
A: I cannot remember, sir.
Q: And how many were lined up?
A: Seven, sir.
Q: And the NBI agent gave the names of each of the seven?
A: No, sir.
We also note that Jocelyn’s and Edward’s out-of-court identifications were made
on the same day. While Jocelyn only identified Pepino, the circumstances
surrounding this out-of-court identification showed that the whole identification
process at the NBI was not suggestive. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. ESTURCO:
Q: How about the alleged kidnappers, where were they placed during that time?
JOCELYN TAN:
A: They were in front of us.
Q: Without any cover?
A: None, sir.
Q: Without any glass cover?
A: See-through glass window.
Q: One-way mirror?
A: Not one way, see-through.
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the alleged kidnappers, you were
already instructed by the NBI what to do and was told who are the
persons to be lined up?
A: No, sir.
xxxx
Q: And between the alleged length of time, you were still very positive that it
was Gerry (sic) Pepino inside the NBI cell?
A: At first, I did not know that he was Jerry Pepino but we know his face.
Q: At first, you did not know that it was Jerry Pepino?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: It was the NBI officer who told you that the person is Jerry Pepino, am I
correct?
A: They identified that the person we identified was Jerry Pepino. We first
pinpointed na heto ang mukha at saka sinabi na ‘yan si Jerry Pepino.
xxxx
These exchanges show that the lineup had not been attended by any
suggestiveness on the part of the police or the NBI agents; there was no evidence
that they had supplied or even suggested to either Edward or Jocelyn that the
appellants were the kidnappers.
We are not unaware that the Court, in several instances, has acquitted an
accused when the out-of-court identification is fatally flawed. In these cases, however,
it had been clearly shown that the identification procedure was suggestive.
In People v. Pineda,42 the Court acquitted Rolando Pineda because the police
suggested the identity of the accused by showing only the photographs of Pineda and
his co-accused Celso Sison to witnesses Canilo Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos. According
to the Court, “there was impermissible suggestion because the photographs were
only of appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two accused.”
Similarly, the Court in People v. Rodrigo acquitted appellant Lee Rodrigo since
only a lone photograph was shown to the witness at the police station. We thus held
that the appellant’s in-court identification proceeded from, and was influenced by,
impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic identification.
The lack of a prior description of the kidnappers in the present case should not
lead to a conclusion that witnesses’ identification was erroneous. The lack of a prior
description of the kidnappers was due to the fact that Jocelyn (together with other
members of Edward’s family), for reasons not made known in the records, opted to
negotiate with the kidnappers, instead of immediately seeking police assistance. If
members of Edward’s family had refused to cooperate with the police, their refusal
could have been due to their desire not to compromise Edward’s safety. In the same
manner, Edward, after he was freed, chose to report the matter to Teresita Ang See,
and not to the police.
Given these circumstances, the lack of prior description of the malefactors in this
case should not in any way taint the identification that Edward and Jocelyn made.
c. The Right to Counsel
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to
counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
accused.
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule,
a police lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be
assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be
claimed by the accused during identification in a police lineup.
Our ruling on this point in People v. Lara is instructive:
x x x The guarantees of Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police lineup
is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were
among those already presented to the media as kidnapping suspects by the DOJ
a day before the police lineup was made. In this sense, the appellants were already
the focus of the police and were thus deemed to be already under custodial
investigation when the out-of-court identification was conducted.
Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for
having been tainted by an irregular out-of-court identification in a police lineup.
They focused, instead, on the legality of the appellants’ arrests.
Whether Edward and Jocelyn could have seen Pepino and Gomez in various
media fora that reported the presentation of the kidnapping suspects to the media is
not for the Court to speculate on. The records merely show that when defense
counsel, Atty. Caesar Esturco, asked Jocelyn during cross-examination whether she
was aware that there were several kidnap-for-ransom incidents in Metro Manila, the
latter answered that she “can read in the newspapers.”50 At no time did Jocelyn or
Edward ever mention that they saw the appellants from the news reports in print or on
television.
At any rate, the appellants’ respective convictions in this case were based on
an independent in-court identification made by Edward and Jocelyn, and not on
the out-of-court identification during the police lineup. We reiterate that the RTC
and the CA found the court testimonies of these witnesses to be positive and credible,
and that there was no showing that their factual findings had been arrived at
arbitrarily. The in-court identification thus cured whatever irregularity might have
attended the police lineup.
As the Court ruled in People v. Algarme:
Even assuming arguendo the appellants’ out-of-court identification was
defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
initially attended it. We emphasize that the “inadmissibility of a police lineup
identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification.” We also stress that all the accused-appellants
were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial.
It is also significant to note that despite the overwhelming evidence adduced by
the prosecution, Pepino and Gomez did not even testify for their respective defenses.
d. The Presence of Conspiracy
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged
conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a
common design or purpose.
Proof of the agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the
agreement may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily,
it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an
explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by
which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
In the present case, the records establish the following facts: Pepino, Gomez, and
another man entered Edward’s office, and initially pretended to be customers; the
three told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino pulled out a gun. After
Pepino’s companion took the money from the cashier’s box, the malefactors
handcuffed him and forced him to go down to the parked car; Gomez sat at the front
passenger seat of the car which brought Edward to a safe house in Quezon City; the
abductors removed the tape from Edward’s eyes, placed him in a room, and then
chained his legs upon arrival at the safe house; the abductors negotiated with
Edward’s family who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom to be delivered by
the family driver using Edward’s own car; and after four days, three men and Gomez
blindfolded Edward, made him board a car, drove around for 30 minutes, and left him
inside his own car at the UP Diliman campus.
The collective, concerted, and synchronized acts of the accused before, during,
and after the kidnapping constitute undoubted proof that Gomez and her co-accused
conspired with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward and
detain him illegally in order to demand ransom for his release.
The Proper Penalty
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition of
the death penalty when the kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Ransom, as employed in the
law, is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other
thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases one from captivity.
In the present case, the malefactors not only demanded but received ransom for
Edward’s release. The CA thus correctly affirmed the RTC’s imposition of the death
penalty on Pepino and Gomez.
With the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines” (signed into law on June 24, 2006), the
death penalty may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence Gomez to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.
The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino,
since it is more favorable to him.
The Awarded Indemnities

In the case of People v. Gambao (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court set
the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the
death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim
is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the
Court’s Resolution until fully paid.

We thus reduce the moral damages imposed by the CA from P300,000.00 to

P100,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping cases. This
reduced penalty shall apply to Pepino for being more favorable to him. However, the
additional monetary award (i.e., P100,000.00 civil indemnity) imposed on Gomez
shall not be applied to Pepino.

We affirm the P700,000.00 imposed by the courts below as restitution of the

amount of ransom demanded and received by the kidnappers. We also affirm the
CA’s award of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages based on Gambao.

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, we AFFIRMthe challenged June

16, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02026 with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty imposed on Gomez and Pepino shall be reduced from death
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2) they are jointly and severally ordered to pay the reduced amount of P100,000.00
as moral damages;
(3) Gomez is further ordered to pay the victim P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
(4) the awarded amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of the Court’s Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—There is no law or police regulation requiring a police lineup for proper

identification in every case. Even if there was no police lineup, there could still be proper and
reliable identification as long as such identification was not suggested or instigated to the
witness by the police. (People vs. Macapanas, 620 SCRA 54 [2010])

It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in
an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty — for there
to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. (People vs.
Anticamara, 651 SCRA 489 [2011])

——o0o——

G.R. No. 205412. September 9, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADRIAN GUTING y TOMAS,
accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; To justify a conviction upon
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no
reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused.—To justify a conviction
upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no
reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. Rule 133, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court enumerates the conditions when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction, thus: SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient.—Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law; Parricide; Elements of.—Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed;
(2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in Parricide — other than the fact of killing —
is the relationship of the offender to the victim. All the elements are present in this case. Jose,
the victim, was killed by accused-appellant, his own son. Accused-appellant’s birth certificate,
which was presented before the RTC, establishes that accused-appellant was the legitimate son
of Jose and Flora.
Same; Same; Penalties; The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties
of reclusion perpetua to death.—The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties
of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender,
and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on
accused-appellant was proper.
Same; Damages; Death Occurs Due to a Crime; When death occurs due to a crime, the
following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages.—We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages
may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.
Same; Same; Loss of Earning Capacity; To be able to claim damages for loss of earning
capacity despite the nonavailability of documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony.—To
be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the nonavailability of documentary
evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the fact that in the
victim’s line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (b) the victim was employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 23, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04596, which affirmed the Decision dated
June 24, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in
Criminal Case No. 06-93, finding accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas guilty of
the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
In an Information dated August 1, 2006, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-93,
accused-appellant was charged before the RTC with Parricide, allegedly committed
as follows:
That on or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel
St., Poblacion B, Camiling, Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and
deliberated to kill his own father Jose Guting y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while
inside their residential house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and
unexpectedly stabbed several times the victim, employing means, manner and
form in the execution thereof which tender directly and specially to insure its
commission without danger to the person of said accused, the result of which
attack was that said victim received multiple stab wounds on his body which
directly caused his instantaneous death.
When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. Thereafter, pretrial and trial on the merits ensued.
Below is a summary of the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies.
Police Officer (PO)1 Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the rainy afternoon of July
30, 2005, at around 5:00 o’clock, he and PO1 Alexis Macusi (Macusi) were standing
in front of the Camiling Police Station when accused-appellant, all wet from the rain
and with a bladed weapon in his hand, suddenly approached them and told them that
he had stabbed his father. Hearing accused-appellant’s statement, PO1 Torre
immediately got the bladed weapon from accused-appellant and turned it over to PO1
Macusi for proper disposition.
PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre’s testimony. PO1 Macusi narrated that
accused-appellant suddenly appeared before them at the Police Station, all wet and
holding a knife. Accused-appellant proclaimed that his father was already dead.
Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who killed accused-appellant’s father. Accused-
appellant answered, “Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!” PO1 Torre
then got the knife from accused-appellant and gave it to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi
placed the knife in the custodian cabinet in the Police Station. Thereafter, PO1
Macusi, Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Eliseo Hermosado (Hermosado), and SPO2
Noli Felipe (Felipe) went to the residence of Jose Guting (Jose), accusedappellant’s
father, to verify the reported crime, while other police officers informed Flora Guting
(Flora), Jose’s wife (also accused-appellant’s mother), who was still in the market with
Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and Flora’s other son (accused-appellant’s brother),
who was then driving a tricycle for hire. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito, PO1
Macusi, SPO2 Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody
had witnessed the crime, but no one did. When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they
entered the house and saw Jose’s lifeless body with blood still oozing from his
wounds. Immediately, Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to the hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. Subsequently, Flora and Emerlito executed their
respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed a case for Parricide against accused-
appellant.
 On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given to him
by PO1 Torre for safekeeping, he did not ask accused-appellant if it was the knife he
used to kill his father. Neither did accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi that it
was the knife he used in stabbing Jose. All that accused-appellant said was,
“Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!” PO1 Macusi also admitted that he
did not request for the examination of the knife because it was clean; any trace or
stain of blood on it would have been washed away by the rains at that time. PO1
Macusi was further questioned as to why he did not put into writing accused-
appellant’s admission that he killed his father, and PO1 Macusi explained that it
escaped his mind as he was still new at the job then and he was carried away by the
fast flow of events.
Flora conceded that she was not present when Jose, her husband, was killed by
accused-appellant, their son. Flora only learned of the stabbing incident and accused-
appellant’s surrender from the police officers of the Camiling Police Station. Flora
declared that she spent for the wake and burial of Jose and that Jose, who was a
tricycle driver, had been earning around P200.00 a day at the time of his death.
Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the autopsy of
Jose’s body. Dr. Lomibao reported that Jose suffered around 39 stab wounds on the
head, neck, thorax, abdomen, and extremities. Jose’s internal organs were heavily
damaged by the stab wounds, resulting in his instantaneous death. Dr. Lomibao also
showed several pictures of Jose’s body which were taken before he conducted the
autopsy.
Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his defense.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding accused-appellant
guilty of Parricide based on his verbal admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even
assuming that accused-appellant’s admission was inadmissible in evidence, the RTC
adjudged that the prosecution was still able to establish sufficient circumstantial
evidence which, taken collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of
the brutal killing of his father. The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Adrian Guting y Tomas is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Parricide punishable under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended and hereby sentences him to a penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and still another amount of P30,000.00 as temperate damages.
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals, docketed
as C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04596. The appellate court promulgated its Decision on
May 23, 2012, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68 convicting herein accused-
appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas for the crime of Parricide under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED.
Hence, accused-appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same
assignment of errors he raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I no idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF HIS EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.
We find no merit in accused-appellant’s appeal.
Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi,
without the assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made
in blatant violation of his constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution.
Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution
mandate that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The “investigation” in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
pertains to “custodial investigation.” Custodial investigation commences when a
person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a
crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect’s participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. As we
expounded in People v. Marra:
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to
be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule
begins to operate. (Citation omitted)
Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial
investigation when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1
Macusi that he stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant’s verbal confession
was so spontaneously and voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning
by the police authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-appellant
who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so in response to accused-appellant’s
initial declaration that his father was already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had
the suspect in his father’s killing. Accused-appellant was also merely standing before
PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and was not yet in
police custody.
Accused-appellant cites in support of his argument People v. Cabintoy, where we
held that an uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in
evidence. The situation of accused-appellants in Cabintoy is not similar to that of
accused-appellant herein. The accused-appellants in Cabintoy, when they executed
their extrajudicial confessions without assistance of counsel, were already suspects
under custodial investigation by the San Mateo Police for robbery with homicide
committed against a taxi driver. Accused-appellant in the instant case, on his own
volition, approached unsuspecting police officers standing in front of the police station
with a knife in his hand and readily confessed to stabbing his father to death.
Accused-appellant was arrested and subjected to custodial investigation by the police
officers only after his confession. Hence, herein accused-appellant’s confession,
even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of his constitutional
right under Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The present
case is more akin to People v. Andan17 wherein we allowed into evidence the
uncounselled confession of therein accused-appellant given under the following
circumstances:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant’s
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has
“operational supervision and control” over the local police and may arguably be
deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3)
of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant’s confession to the mayor was
not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not
question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor.
It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to
confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and
not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate
his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures
on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars
is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under
Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state
as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant’s confession to the
mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Moreover, accused-appellant’s verbal confession that he stabbed his father to
death made to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, established through the testimonies of
said police officers, falls under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that “[t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.” This rule is based upon the notion that no man would
make any declaration against himself, unless it is true. Accused-appellant’s
declaration is admissible for being part of the res gestae. A declaration is deemed
part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when these three requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.19 All the requisites are present in this case.
Accused-appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, that
is, his father’s death. Accused-appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1
Macusi only a few minutes after and while he was still under the influence of said
startling occurrence, before he had the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In
fact, accused-appellant seemed to still be in shock when he walked to the Police
Station completely unmindful of the rain and the knife in his hand, and headed directly
to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, who were standing in front of the Police Station, to
confess to stabbing his father to death. The police officers who immediately went to
the house of Jose, accused-appellant’s father, found Jose’s lifeless body with blood
still oozing from his stab wounds. As res gestae, accused-appellant’s spontaneous
statement is admissible in evidence against him.
Accused-appellant’s confession was further corroborated by the circumstantial
evidence.
To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the
criminal liability of the accused. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates
the conditions when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, thus:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient.—Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the aforequoted requisites
have been satisfied in this case given the following circumstantial evidence:
1. On or about 4:50 o’clock in the afternoon of July 30, 2006, the victim was
stabbed to death.
2. Thirty minutes later, [accused-appellant] personally went to Camiling
Police Station and surrendered himself and the bladed weapon he used in killing
his father to the police authorities of the said police station.
3. When his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant] did
nothing to appease his responding mother. “It has always been said that criminal
case are primarily about human nature.” Here is a case of a son doing nothing to
explain the death of his father to his grieving mother. Such inaction is contrary to
human nature.
4. When he was detained after police investigation, [accused-appellant] did
not object to his continued detention.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person. The incriminating collage of facts against accused-appellant was
created by circumstantial evidence anchored on the credible and unbiased testimony
of the prosecution’s witnesses. We will not disturb but shall accord the highest
respect to the findings of the RTC on the issue of credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies, it having had the opportunity to observe their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide.—Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his
spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by
the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused. The key element in Parricide — other than the fact of killing
— is the relationship of the offender to the victim. All the elements are present in this
case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-appellant, his own son. Accused-
appellant’s birth certificate, which was presented before the RTC, establishes that
accused-appellant was the legitimate son of Jose and Flora.
The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion
perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender,
and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua on accused-appellant was proper.
We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be
awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages.
Prevailing jurisprudence pegs the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages
awarded to the heirs of the victim of Parricide at P75,000.00 each. 25 The temperate
damages awarded by the RTC in the amount of P30,000.00 should be decreased to
P25,000.00 to also conform with the latest jurisprudence. It is fitting to additionally
award exemplary damages in the sum of P30,000.00 considering the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of relationship.
Damages for the loss of earning capacity of Jose should be awarded as well
given the testimony of his wife, Flora, on this particular fact. We refer to our
pronouncements in People v. Verde that:
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased Francisco Gealon. The fact that the prosecution did not present
documentary evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity
of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said damages. The testimony of
the victim’s wife, Delia Gealon, as to the earning capacity of her husband Francisco
Gealon sufficiently establishes the basis for making such an award. It was
established that Francisco Gealon was 48 years old at the time of his death in
1991. His average income was P200.00 a day. Hence, in accordance with the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted in several cases decided by this
Court, the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated as follows:
To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the nonavailability
of documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-
employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial
notice was taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work, no documentary evidence
is available; or (b) the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws.
In the case at bar, Jose was 67 years old at the time of his death and was earning
a daily wage of P200.00 as a tricycle driver, which was below the P252.00 to P263.50
minimum wage rate for non-agriculture under Wage Order No. 11 dated June 16,
2005 for Region III. We take judicial notice that there is no documentary evidence
available to establish the daily earning capacity of a tricycle driver. We thus compute
the award of damages for the loss of Jose’s earning capacity as follows:
Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all monetary
awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
04596, finding accused-appellant, Adrian Guting y Tomas, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS.Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages,
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P316,455.00 as compensation for loss of
earning capacity. All monetary awards for damages shall be subject to interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until they are fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. (People vs. Paycana, Jr., 551
SCRA 657 [2008])
Jurisprudence, however, has established the following formula for computing compensation
for loss of earning capacity: net earning capacity = [2/3 x (80-age at time of death) x (gross
annual income – reasonable and necessary living expenses], and pegged reasonable and
necessary reasonable expenses at 50% of earnings in the absence of contrary evidence.
(People vs. Tambis, 560 SCRA343 [2008])
——o0o——
 G.R. No. 208404. February 24, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE LUGNASIN and
DEVINCIO GUERRERO, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Kidnapping for Ransom; Elements of.—In prosecuting a case involving the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (i) the
accused was a private person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another
of his or her liberty; (iii) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was
kidnapped or detained for ransom. A painstaking review of the present case clearly shows that
all the aforestated elements were proven in the criminal case on review. The testimony of
Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the crime and both the accused-appellants’
culpability. He positively identified in and out of court accused-appellants Vicente and Devincio
as two of his abductors. As the kidnap victim, a private individual, Cordero’s positive
identification of both accused-appellants — as two of several men who abducted him from the
gate of his house, who brought him to a hut somewhere in the south, who chained him to a bed,
who essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful cause for four days, and, which deprivation
of his liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom from his family — collectively establish the
crime of kidnapping for ransom as the actions of both the accused-appellants were certain and
clear, and their intent was explicit and made known to Cordero himself.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the
findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings
are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.—This Court cannot sustain both accused-
appellants’ arguments casting doubt on Cordero’s positive identification of their participation in
the commission of the crime. As oft-explained, when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the
findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings
are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This holds truer if such findings are affirmed
by the appellate court. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance,
the rule should not be disturbed.
Same; Same; Out-of-Court Identification; Out-of-court identification is conducted by the
police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face
with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose.—The trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly found the out-of-court identification made by Cordero to have satisfied the totality of
circumstances test. People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995), is instructive on the rules
and test for a valid out-of-court identification: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the
police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face
with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have
fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of
constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Illegal Arrests; An accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of
the information against him on this ground before arraignment.—Accused-appellant Devincio
insists that his warrantless arrest was illegal for not falling under the permissible warrantless
arrests enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. This being the case, accused-
appellant Devincio says, the RTC had no jurisdiction to render judgment over his person. He
also claims that there was no showing that he was informed of his Constitutional rights at the
time of his arrest and his rights under Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7438 during
investigation. As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out, that accused-appellant Devincio
raised none of these issues anytime during the course of his trial. These issues were raised for
the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals
and quote below Miclat, Jr. v. People, 656 SCRA 539 (2011), on this Court’s treatment of an
accused’s belated allegation of the illegality of his warrantless arrest: At the outset, it is apparent
that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that
petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any
defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails
to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before
arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In the present case, at the time of petitioner’s
arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he
actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have
waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It
will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. (Citations omitted) The
foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente who failed to raise
their allegations before their arraignment. They actively participated in the trial and posited their
defenses without mentioning the alleged illegality of their warrantless arrests. They are deemed
to have waived their right to question their arrests.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For review is the January 23, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02971, which affirmed with modification the March 24, 2003 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-
87600, entitled “People of the Philippines v. Vicente Lugnasin, Tito Lugnasin, Excelso
Lugnasin, Elmer Madrid, Rogelio Baldaba and Devincio Guerrero,” wherein accused-
appellants Vicente Lugnasin (Vicente) and Devincio Guerrero (Devincio) were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
On October 15, 1999, the Department of Justice filed an Information against
Vicente, Devincio and four other individuals, namely, Tito E. Lugnasin (Tito), Excelso
B. Lugnasin (Excelso), Elmer A. Madrid (Elmer), Rogelio D. Baldaba (Rogelio), and
five other unidentified individuals: John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe, George Doe,
and James Doe, for the crime of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about April 20, 1999 in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court accused VICENTE LUGNASIN, TITO LUGNASIN,
EXCELSO LUGNASIN, ELMER MADRID, ROGELIO BALDABA, DEVINCIO
GUERRERO, and other persons whose identities ha[ve] not yet been ascertained,
while conspiring, conniving and confederating with one another, did then and there
with criminal and malicious intent, with the use of force, threat and intimidation,
with firearms, take and carry away the person of Nicassius Cordero, to the
Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, detaining him thereat, depriving
 Nicassius Cordero of his liberty, against his free will and consent, for the purpose
of extorting ransom money for his safe release from detention said demand for the
payment of ransom money was made on the relatives of Nicassius Cordero, and
the same was release[d] in the evening of April 24, 1999 along the South Luzon
Expressway.
When arraigned on November 5, 2001, accused-appellant Vicente pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Accused-appellant Devincio likewise pleaded not guilty
when he was arraigned on March 6, 2002. Both accused-appellants made no
stipulation during their respective pretrial conferences except for their identities and
the jurisdiction of the court.
The nine other accused remain at large.
The facts succinctly synthesized by the RTC are as follows:
The prosecution’s lone witness, Nicassius Cordero narrated in court how he
was abducted while opening the garage door of his residence in Mindanao Avenue
in the late evening of April 20, 1999 by three armed men. He identified Devincio
Guerrero as the man with a 38 cal. revolver who came from his left side and pushed
him inside the car. The man who came from his right side and identified later as
Tito Lugnasin drove the car with Elmer Madrid riding at the back. After divesting
him of his P5,000.00 cash and asking some questions, he realized he was being
kidnapped for ransom. Repeatedly, he declared that he was not a rich man. Along
Libis, another cohort, Celso Lugnasin, rode with them until they reached the South
Superhi[gh]way and after paying the toll fee, they drove on for about fifteen minutes
and stopped just behind an owner-type jeepney before they switched places. The
jeepney driver introduced himself as Commander and drove the car. [Cordero] saw
Commander’s face. He was later identified as Vicente Lugnasin. After driving for
some minutes more, they alighted, [Cordero’s] abductors placed the car’s sunvisor
around his face and ordered him to walk barefooted towards a small house.
[Cordero] was kept there for four days, while they negotiated with Saleena, his
sister-in-law for the ransom money. On the fourth day, Commander was already
angry and threatened to finish him off. He was eventually released, without ransom
money being paid.
Vicente Lugnasin, a resident of Luzviminda I, Dasmariñas, Quezon City
denied the accusation, saying he only saw Cordero for the first time at the
Department of Justice and Cordero could not even identify him. He recounted that
on May 14, 1999[,] while preparing for the town fiesta celebration, policemen came
to his residence and arrested him and his brother Tito [and] cousin Excelsio for
alleged involvement in a robbery case. They were tortured, then put on display for
media men to feast on and for alleged victims to identify. After posting bail, he was
later arrested for illegal possession of firearms. He was also charged with two other
cases, a bank robbery and the Mercury Bank robbery, both pending before
the sala of Judge Jose Mendoza.
Devincio Guerrero, a fish vendor at the Pasig Market, likewise denies any
involvement in the kidnap[ping] of Cordero. He swears he saw him for the first time
only in the courtroom. He recalled that nearing Holy Week in 2002[,] five uniformed
policemen arrested him without a warrant in Lucena City, where he used to buy
smoked fish to sell. He was transferred to Camp Karingal before being detained at
the QC Jail, where he is detained up to the present. On May 14, 1999[,] he was a
sponsor at a baptism of the child of his kumpadre in Bgy. Luzviminda, Dasmariñas,
Cavite. On his way home, he was accosted by police officers while urinating along
the roadside. He was detained first at the Cavite City Jail then at the Trece Martires
jail. He saw Vicente Lugnasin only at the Quezon City Jail.
The Court of Appeals also made a finding that accused-appellant Vicente made
known their intentions when he asked Cordero about his work, family, and a contact
person, and told him that they would be demanding 30 Million Pesos as ransom for
his release.
Ruling of the RTC
On March 24, 2003, the RTC, resolving the lone issue of “whether [or not]
Cordero’s identification of Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero as among his
kidnappers is reliable,”6promulgated its Decision, finding both accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom described
and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 in conspiracy with each other and other Does, the Court
hereby sentences them to each suffer the penalty of Death and to indemnify jointly
and severally the private complainant Nicassius Cordero the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The warrants of arrest issued against the other accused remain.
In convicting the accused-appellants, the RTC found Cordero to be a careful,
truthful, and candid witness, whose story was supported by the evidence submitted. It
added that this was in contrast to the accused-appellants’ bare denial of their
participation in the kidnapping. The RTC also pointed out that Cordero was able to
identify both accused-appellants as he saw their faces before he was blindfolded.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 23, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the accused-appellants’
conviction with modification as to the penalty. The falloof the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Decision dated March 24, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76,
Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-87600, is MODIFIED in that the penalty
of death imposed upon appellants is AMENDED to Reclusion Perpetua, without
the possibility of parole.
The Court of Appeals held that the elements of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom were established by the prosecution through its lone witness, Cordero, whose
credible testimony should be accorded great weight. It also ruled that Cordero’s
identification of his abductors conformed to the stringent guidelines of out-of-court
identification, contrary to accused-appellant Devincio’s assertion that it was marked
with suggestiveness.
As regards accused-appellant Devincio’s argument that his warrantless arrest
was illegal since it did not fall under Section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure, as
amended, the Court of Appeals held that accused-appellant Devincio’s right to
question his arrest and subsequent inquest/preliminary investigation is deemed
waived due to his failure to raise such argument before his arraignment.
Addressing accused-appellant Devincio’s claim that his rights under Republic Act
No. 7438, entitled “An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or
Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and
Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof” were violated,
the Court of Appeals pointed out that he neither offered any evidence nor executed
an extrajudicial confession or admission for such allegation.
Finally, in light of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the Court of Appeals modified the penalty from Death to reclusion
perpetua without the possibility of parole.
Both accused-appellants are now before this Court praying for a reversal of their
conviction on the same arguments upon which their appeal to the Court of Appeals
were anchored.
Issues
Accused-appellant Devincio assigned the following errors in his Appellant’s Brief:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE PROSECUTION WITNESS.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [DEVINCIO] GUILTY
NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRESENCE OF SUGGESTIVENESS IN [THE]
IDENTIFICATION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT OF THE APPELLANT AS
ONE OF HIS ABDUCTORS.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING [DEVINCIO]’S
WARRANTLESS ARREST AS ILLEGAL.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
[DEVINCIO]’S RIGHTS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING
CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSONS ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING,
DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE VIOLATED.
Accused-appellant Vicente, for his part, posed a lone error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [VICENTE]
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the assailed judgment of
conviction.
Elements of Kidnapping for Ransom established.
The accused-appellants were charged and convicted under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, viz.:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.—Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission of
the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.
From the aforequoted provision, in prosecuting a case involving the crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (i)
the accused was a private person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner
deprived another of his or her liberty; (iii) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and
(iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.
A painstaking review of the present case clearly shows that all the aforestated
elements were proven in the criminal case on review.
The testimony of Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the crime and
both the accused-appellants’ culpability. He positively identified in and out of court
accused-appellants Vicente and Devincio as two of his abductors. As the kidnap
victim, a private individual, Cordero’s positive identification of both accused-
appellants — as two of several men who abducted him from the gate of his house,
who brought him to a hut somewhere in the south, who chained him to a bed, who
essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful cause for four days, and, which
deprivation of his liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom from his family —
collectively establish the crime of kidnapping for ransom as the actions of both the
accused-appellants were certain and clear, and their intent was explicit and made
known to Cordero himself.
Identification of the Accused-Appellants.
This Court cannot sustain both accused-appellants’ arguments casting doubt on
Cordero’s positive identification of their participation in the commission of the crime.
As oft-explained, when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This holds truer if such findings are
affirmed by the appellate court. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the
appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.
Herein, there is nothing far-fetched or incredible in Cordero’s testimony. Both
accused-appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for Cordero to
recognize them, as in fact, Cordero had the unhindered view of his captors’ faces
before he was even blindfolded. Therefore, Cordero’s eyewitness account deserves
full faith and credit.
But accused-appellant Devincio avers that the length of time, which has elapsed
from the time Cordero was released, up to the time he identified his abductors would
have already affected his memory, such that the possibility of error in his identification
of the abductors could not be discounted. He also insists that Cordero’s “subsequent
identification of [him] in open court should be disregarded since the initial
identification was seriously flawed, i.e., it was characterized by suggestiveness.”
On the other hand, accused-appellant Vicente argues that although denial is an
inherently weak defense, it assumes importance and acquires commensurate
strength when the prosecution’s evidence, particularly as to the identity of the
accused as the author of the crime, is feeble, doubtful, inconclusive, or unreliable. He
says that Cordero’s identification of his abductors was questionable due to the
circumstances during his abduction and detention, i.e., it was dark when he was
abducted, he was instructed to go down on the floor of the vehicle and not to look at
his kidnappers, he was blindfolded, and his eyeglasses were removed.
With the foregoing, both accused-appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying
on Cordero’s identification of them as two of his abductors as it was doubtful and
unreliable.
This Court disagrees.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the out-of-court
identification made by Cordero to have satisfied the totality of circumstances test.
People v. Teehankee, Jr. is instructive on the rules and test for a valid out-of-court
identification:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done
thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure
its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure. (Citation omitted)
Cordero was able to see the faces of the men who abducted him from his house
due to the light emanating from the pedestrian gate. He was also able to describe
how these men approached him, the kind of firearms they were carrying, how the
men acted where they passed, where he was taken, and even the sounds he heard.
Cordero’s testimonies were replete with detailed descriptions of how he was abducted
and who abducted him. To top it all, he was confident that he could identify his
abductors, as he did at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Camp
Pantaleon Garcia, Imus, Cavite,22and in open court.
This Court notes with approval the observation of the RTC, viz.:
Cordero gave a detailed narration of his abduction that fateful night of April 20,
1999. We observed his demeanor, his reactions to questions asked of him. He was
a careful witness, truthful and candid. At times, we noted that he was in tears at
the painful recollection of the horror he went through. His story was supported by
the evidence submitted.
And as the Court of Appeals said, “Cordero was endeavoring to remember faces
and incidents and etch these in his memory.” In People v. Martinez, we held:
Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances
take place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the important details. This
Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to
strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in
which the crime is committed. x x x. All too often, the face of the assailant and his
body movements create a lasting impression on the victim’s mind and cannot thus
be easily erased from his memory.
Cordero positively identified both accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente as two
of his kidnappers. He saw both accused-appellants’ faces before he was blindfolded.
Thus, it cannot be said that the length of time between the crime and the identification
of the accused-appellants, which was only 26 days, had any effect on Cordero’s
memory, to render his positive identification flawed.
Accused-appellant Devincio’s contention that Cordero’s out-of-court identification
was marked by suggestiveness must similarly fail for his failure to support it by solid
evidence. The only reason he gave for such argument was Cordero’s knowledge that
the persons who were being investigated in connection with a robbery case were
included in the police or photographic lineup. However, that is not enough to strike
down Cordero’s identification for being tainted. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was on point when it quoted this Court’s ruling in People v. Villena as follows:
Eyewitness identification is often decisive of the conviction or acquittal of an
accused. Identification of an accused through mug shots is one of the established
procedures in pinning down criminals. However, to avoid charges of
impermissible suggestion, there should be nothing in the photograph that
would focus attention on a single person. x x x. (Citation omitted)
As the OSG averred, the photographs shown to Cordero contained nothing to
suggest whom he should pick and identify as his abductors. Cordero testified as
follows:
Cordero They asked me to see a lineup
and I said I was still very afraid of them so they
showed me different photographs and asked if
I co[u]ld identify who my abductors were and
from a series of photos, I was able to identify
Vicente Lugnasin, Celso Lugna sin, Elmer
Madrid, Guerrero and I could not yet identify de
Chaves but I saw him there walking around.
But assuming for the sake of argument that Cordero’s out-of-court identification
was improper, it will have no bearing on the conviction of the accused-appellants. We
have ruled as follows:
[I]t is settled that an out-of-court identification does not necessarily foreclose
the admissibility of an independent in-court identification and that, even assuming
that an out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, the subsequent
identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it. x x x. (Citation
omitted)
 Cordero’s in-court identification was made with certainty when he pointed to both
accused-appellants in court when he was asked to identify them from among the
people inside the courtroom.
It is apparent in the case at bar that Cordero was able to categorically, candidly,
and positively identify both accused-appellants as two of his abductors both outside
and inside the court. Thus, his identification of the accused is worthy of credence and
weight. This Court, in People v. Cenahonon said:
An affirmative testimony merits greater weight than a negative one, especially
when the former comes from a credible witness. Categorical and positive
identification of an accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
witness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative
and self-serving evidence undeserving of real weight in law unless substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence. (Citation omitted)
As to the Alleged Illegality of Accused-appellant Devincio Guerrero’s
Warrantless Arrest and the Violation of His Rights Under Republic Act No. 7438.
Accused-appellant Devincio insists that his warrantless
arrest was illegal for not falling under the permissible warrantless arrests enumerated
in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.31This being the case, accused-appellant
Devincio says, the RTC had no jurisdiction to render judgment over his person. He
also claims that there was no showing that he was informed of his Constitutional
rights at the time of his arrest and his rights under Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act
No. 7438 during investigation.32
As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out, that accused-appellant Devincio
raised none of these issues anytime during the course of his trial. These issues were
raised for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals. We affirm the ruling of
the Court of Appeals and quote below Miclat, Jr. v. People33 on this Court’s treatment
of an accused’s belated allegation of the illegality of his warrantless arrest:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity
of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in
the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to
raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.
In the present case, at the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no
objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to
have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity
of the conviction of the accused. (Citations omitted)
The foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente
who failed to raise their allegations before their arraignment. They actively
participated in the trial and posited their defenses without mentioning the alleged
illegality of their warrantless arrests. They are deemed to have waived their right to
question their arrests.
As regards accused-appellant Devincio’s argument that his rights under Republic
Act No. 7438 were violated, we likewise uphold the following ruling of the Court of
Appeals:
With respect to appellant Devincio’s argument that his rights under RA 7438
were violated while he was under custodial investigation, aside from his barefaced
claim, he has offered no evidence to sustain such claim; and appellant Devincio
(or appellant Vicente, for that matter) has not executed an extrajudicial confession
or admission for, as stated in People v. Buluran and Valenzuela:
There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during
custodial investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial
confession or admission. In fact, the records show that appellant Cielito
Buluran opted to remain silent during custodial investigation. Any allegation
of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material
only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted
from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. (Citation omitted)
Damages Awarded
The RTC awarded Cordero Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages. However, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to
modify such award as follows:
1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
“The award of exemplary damages is justified, the lowering of the penalty
to reclusion perpetua in view of the prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty
notwithstanding, it not being dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty
but on the fact that a qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of the death
penalty attended the kidnapping.”
The accused-appellants shall be jointly and severally liable for these amounts
awarded in favor of Cordero. In addition, these amounts shall accrue interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to earn from the date of the finality of this Court’s
Decision until fully paid.37
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2013 in
C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02971 finding accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and
Devincio Guerrero GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility of parole is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero are ordered to pay Nicassius
Cordero the following:
1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The foregoing amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum, to earn from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
 Notes.—Even assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification was defective, the
defect was cured by the subsequent positive identification in court for the ‘inadmissibility of a
police lineup identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent
in-court identification.’ (People vs. Manigo, 714 SCRA 551 [2014])

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-
ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done
thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also
done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose. (People vs. Dandanon, 771 SCRA 483 [2015])

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