Tuesday, May 28, 2013

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., et al, v.

Feliciano
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1965/mar1965/gr_l-24022_1965.html

Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric
tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President submitted said letter to his cabinet for
consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4,
1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized
to undertake the importation. Considering that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters
Association alleged that it is contrary to RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and
tat there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is
prohibited by RA 3452 which in Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to
private properties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from
doing so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or imminent
shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency and certified by
the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru any government agency he may designate -
is repealed by RA 3452.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national
emergency is repealed by RA 3452

Held:
No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.
Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This repealing clause is not
an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act/s that are intended to be
repealed. Rather, is is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied
repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre. The
failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law,
unless on irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws. Here there is no inconsistency.
While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are
different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being
applicable only to the government during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes importation during
normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of sucy gravity as to constitute a national
emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore not inconsistent and so implied
repeal does not ensue
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano Case
Digest
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano
G.R. No. L-24022 (March 3, 1965)

FACTS:

Private respondent Feliciano, the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice, thru a
government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National
Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964. It was approved. The President
designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the
importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and
set the bidding date. Petitioners contend that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the
government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same.

ISSUE:

W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452.

HELD:

The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong exclusively to private
parties, thereby prohibiting any government agency from doing so. RA 2207 provides that should there be
an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national
emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the President may authorize such
importation thru any government agency that he may designate. The two laws, although with a common
objective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. The two laws can therefore be
construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program.
In order to effect a repeal by implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant
to the prior existing law, hence there was no repeal.
CASE DIGEST: AGUJETAS V. CA
October 8, 2017

Case Title: Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, petitioner v. Court of

Appeals and the People of the Philippines, respondents

G.R. No. 106560, August 23, 1996

Facts: The petitioner assail the decision of the public respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mati,
Davao Oriental finding them guilty as charged for failure to proclaim a
winning elected candidate.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 7166 repeal section 231 of the Omnibus Election
Code saying that the winners should be proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers.

Held: No, since R.A. 7166 neither expressly or impliedly repealed section 231
of the Omnibus Election Code.
 SCHNECKENBURGER v. MORAN G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936 Jurisdiction
NOVEMBER 28, 2018

FACTS:

The petitioner, an honorary consul of Uruguay in the Philippines, was charged with the crime of
falsification of a private document before the CFI of Manila. He objected to the jurisdiction of
the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. He filed this petition for a writ
of prohibition with a view to preventing the CFI from taking cognizance of the criminal action
filed against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner.

RULING:

This case involves NO question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not
entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws
and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal
prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides.

In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the
Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall include
all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.” In deciding the instant case
this court cannot go beyond this constitutional provision.

It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the
Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is exclusive.

The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall include all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.”

It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the CFI.
Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and
made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, it follows
that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive.

Indeed, the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner. Hence, the petition for a writ of
prohibition must be denied.
Bayot vs. CA
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:
Rebecca Macapugay Bayot was an American citizen and born in Agoa, Guam, USA. She
married Vicente Bayot at Greenhills, Mandaluyong on April 20, 1979. On November 27,1982,
Rebecca gave birth to a daughter named Alix at San Francisco, California. However, as the
marriage turned sour, Rebecca initiated a divorce on 1996 in Dominican Republic. The latter
ordered the dissolution of marriage and remarriage after competing the legal requirements.
However, there must be a joint custody and guardianship to Alix, and the conjugal property,
particularly the real properties located only in Manila that they acquired during their marriage be
settled.

However, Rebecca stated under oath on May 28, 1996 that she is an American citizen and she is
carrying a child not of Vicente. Rebecca again filed another petition in Manila on March 2001
for absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of dissolution of partnership gain, monthly support
for their daughter and that Vicente is psychological incapacitated.

Vicente averred and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause and action and filed a case of
adultery and perjury against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the contrary, charged Vicente with bigamy
and concubinage.

On the other note, Rebecca became a recognized Filipino citizen on 2000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce is valid?

HELD:
1) No serious dispute that at the time of divorce to Vicente, Rebecca was an American citizen
and still remains to be one. Evidences: a) she was born in USA and jus soli is followed in
American territory in granting American citizenship; b) she was and may still be an American
passport holder; c) in marriage certificate, birth certificate of Alix and divorce decree in
Dominican Republic, it was declared that she is an American

2) VALID. Rebecca was bound by the national laws of USA where divorce was valid. Their
property relations were also properly adjudicated through their Agreement on 1996. Foreign
divorce can be recognized in the Philippines provided that the divorce decree is fact and valid
under the national law of the alien spouse. The reckoning point is the citizenship of parties at the
time the divorce was obtained and not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of marriage.
Urbano vs Chavez

FACTS

 there are 2 cases involved here: a criminal action for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (RA 3019) and an civil action for damages arising from a felony (defamation through a published
interview whereby Chavez imputed that Nemesio Co was a close associate (crony?) of Marcos), both
against Solicitor General Francisco Chavez (among others)
 in the criminal case (filed in the Office of the Ombudsman), the Office of the SolGen (OSG) entered its
appearance for Chavez and the other accused (DILG Sec and 2 sectoral reps) as far as the Prelim
Investigation is concerned. Urbano et. al. filed a special civil action for prohibition in the SC to enjoin
the SolGen and his associates from acting as counsel for Chavez in the PI. The contention is in the event
that an information is filed against the accused, the appearance of the OSG in the PI would be in conflict
with its role as the appellate counsel for the People of the Phils (counsel at the first instance is the
provincial/ state prosecutor).
 in the action for damages, the OSG likewise acted as counsel for Chavez, who was then the SolGen and
counsel for PCGG, the agency responsible for the investigation of graft and corrupt practices of the
Marcoses. The OSG filed for extension of time to file required pleading, and afterwards filed a motion
to dismiss on behalf of Chavez. Petitioner Co objected to appearance of OSG as counsel, contending
that he is suing Chavez in his personal capacity.
 OSG manifested that it is authorized to represent Chavez or any public official even if the said official
is sued in his personal capacity pursuant to the unconditional provisions of PD478 which defines the
functions of OSG, as well as EO300 which made OSG an independent agency under the Office of the
President
 RTC denied the petition, thus allowing the appearance of OSG as counsel. It also denied the MFR. Thus,
this petition for review

ISSUE/S

1. WON the OSG has authority to appear for (a) a certain gov’t official in the PI of their case before the Ombudsman
and (b) the SolGen in a suit for damages arising from a crime

HELD

1. NO

 The OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at ANY stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for
damages arising from a felony (applies to all public officials and employees in the executive, legislative and
judicial branches).
 PD47811 defines the duties and functions of OSG:
 SEC1. The OSG shall represent the Gov’t of the Phils, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. x x x
 the OSG submits that since there is no qualification, it can represent any public official without any
qualification or distinction in any litigation.
 Same argument seems to apply to a similar provision in the Rev Admin Code (Sec. 1661: As principal law
officer of the Gov’t, the SolGen shall have the authority to act for and represent the Gov’t , its officers and
agents in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer). In Anti-Graft
League v Ortega, SC interpreted Sec. 1661 to embrace PI. However, should an info be filed after, then OSG
can no longer act as counsel. The rationale given was that public officials are subjected to numerous suits,
 and threats of criminal prosecution could stay the hand of the public official. OSG provides assurance
against timidity in that they will be duly represented by counsel in the PI.
 However, the court declared this ruling abandoned in this case. The anomaly in this ruling becomes obvious
when, in the event of a judgment of conviction, the case is brought on appeal to the appellate courts. The
OSG, as the appellate counsel of the People, is expected to take a stand against the accused. More often
than not, it does. Accordingly, there is a clear conflict of interest here, and one which smacks of ethical
considerations, where the OSG, as counsel for the public official, defends the latter in the PI, and where the
same office, as appellate counsel of the People, represents the prosecution when the case is brought on
appeal. This anomalous situation could not have been contemplated and allowed by the law. It is a situation
which cannot be countenanced by the Court.
- another reason why the OSG can’t represent an accused in a crim case: the State can speak and
act only by law, whatever it says or does is lawful, and that which is unlawful is not the word or
deed of the state. As such, a public official who is sued criminally is actually sued in his personal
capacity inasmuch as his principal (the State) can never the author of a wrongful act. The same
applies to a suit for damages arising from a felony, where the public official is held accountable for
his act; the state is not liable.
 ** Re: Question of Law
 -both issues raise pure questions of law inasmuch as there are no evidentiary matters to be evaluated by
this Court. Moreover, if the only issue is whether or not the conclusions of the trial court are in consonance
with law and jurisprudence, then the issue is a pure question of law (Torres v Yu). Thus, the Court resolved
to consolidate both Petitions and to treat them as Petitions for certiorari on pure questions of law in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.
ERECTORS, INC V NLRC

11 FEB

GR 71177 | October 28, 1988 | Per Curiam

Facts:
Attys. Prescillano Adamos and Julian Barrameda filed in behalf of petitioner a petition for certiorari
in SC assailing the dismissal of NLRC of their MR of the POEA decision. They contended that the MR
or appeal was seasonably filed within 10 working days from receipt of decision, allegedly pursuant to
the 1984 POEA Rules Procedure, specifically Rule XXIV, Sec 1 and Rule XXV, Sec 2 thereof.

SC required the counsels to furnish the source of the POEA rules in its resolutions and thereafter
discovered the rule’s non-existence. It required counsels to explain why they should not be
“disciplinary dealt with for fabricating rules for the purpose of trifling with court processes.” The
counsels persisted in their claim and submitted not a certified but a xerox copy of the alleged rules.
SC issued a warning in its decision, but they again cited the non-existent rules in their MR.

They were directed to show cause why they should not be held in contempt and in their
“Compliance”, the counsels stated that they were “motivated by counsels’ desire to fully defend their
client’s interest or cause with their utmost/best efforts…”

Issue:
W/N the counsels may be held liable for their misconduct

Held:
Yes. The counsels committed a serious violation of the attorney’s solemn oath to do no falsehood
due to its deliberate effort to mislead the Court.
For a lawyer’s duty to his client does not mean freedom to set up false or fraudulent claims especially
with respect to provisions of law or administrative rules and that while lawyers are bound to exert
utmost legal skill in prosecuting their client’s cause or defending it, their duty, first and foremost, is
to the administration of justice. The office of attorney does not permit, much less demand, to support
a client’s case, violation of law or otherwise, fraud or chicanery. A lawyer must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client.

Attys. Adamos and Barrameda are suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six months.
 BONA vs. BRIONES
G.R. No. L-10806
July 6, 1918

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills

FACTS:
Counsel for Monica Bona, the widow by the second marriage of the deceased Francisco Briones who died
on August 14, 1913, applied for the probate of the will which the said deceased husband on September 16,
1911. The petition was granted on January 20, 1915.
The counsel of the legitimate children by the first marriage of the testator, opposed the probate of the will
alleging that the said will was executed before two witnesses only and under unlawful and undue pressure
or influence exercised upon the person of the testator who thus signed through fraud and deceit; and prayed
that for that reason the said will be declared null and of no value.
On March 27, 1915, the judge rendered judgment, denied probate to the will. dated March 27, 1915, denying
probate to the will. Counsel for Monica Bona appealed On March 31, 1915, the judge admitted the appeal,
ordered the original records to be brought up, and reiterated his order of December 28, 1913, declaring Bona
as a pauper, for the purposes of the appeal interposed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the execution of the will in question the solemnities prescribed by section 618 of Act No.
190 have been observed.

HELD:
Yes. It is indispensable to note that the will in question was executed by Francisco Briones on September
16, 1911, the order denying probate was rendered on March 27, 1915, both dated being prior to that of Act
No. 2645 amending said section 618 and promulgated on February 24, 1916, which took effect only from
July first of the last named year: so that, in order to explain whether or not the above-mentioned will was
executed in accordance with the law then in force, the last named law cannot be applied and the will in
question should be examined in accordance with, and under the rules of, the law in force at the time of its
execution.
The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor
charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render
the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
A mere reading of the last four paragraphs or parts of the will shows in a clear manner that the said will in its
form and contents expresses without shadow of doubt the will of the testator; and that in its execution the
solemnities prescribed by the above-mentioned section 618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.
Moreso, it is not proper to just invalidate the will of Francisco Briones merely because of some small defect
in form which are not essential or of great importance, such as the failure to state therein that Domingo de la
Fuente was also a witness to the said will when he signed it twice. As a matter of act, he understood the
contents of the will better than the two other attesting witnesses, for he really was a witness and he attested
the execution of the will during its making until it was terminated and signed by the testator, by the witnesses,
and by himself, even though he did it in the capacity of a notary.
The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which amended the oft-repeated section 618 cannot be required
in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as this document was executed in September, 1911, five years
before said amendatory law began to take effect (July 1, 1916), while the testator died on August 14, 1913,
two years and some months before the enforcement of the said law; and so, the only law applicable to the
present case is the provision contained in section 618 of Act No. 190, and in accordance with the provisions
of this section, the said will should be probated; for it has been presented to the court many months before
the amendatory act went into effect.
It is well-known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive effect only governs the rights
arising from acts done under the rule of the former law; but if the right be declared for the first time by a
subsequent law it shall take effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts subject to the former
laws, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the same origin.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and it should be declared that the will has been executed
in due form by Francisco Briones on September 16, 1911, and that the said will contains and expresses the
last will and testamentary wishes of the deceased testator. Without any special ruling as to costs.So ordered.