G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000
Respondent court held that no
ARTHUR TE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
*Art. 40; prejudicial question
F A C T S
 Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in civil
rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live
together after the marriage although they would
meet each other regularly. Not long after, Choa
gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, Te stopped
visiting her.3
 On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with Choa was
subsisting, Te contracted a second marriage with a
certain Julieta Santella (Santella).4
 Choa filed sometime in June 1990, when she learned
about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, charging
petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.
 Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, Te filed in the RTC
of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his
marriage to Choa on the ground that he was forced
to marry her. He alleged that Choa concealed her
pregnancy by another man at the time of their
marriage and that she was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.7
 On November 8, 1990, Choa filed with the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
administrative case against Te and Santella for
the revocation of their respective engineering
licenses on the ground that they committed acts of
immorality by living together and subsequently
marrying each other despite their knowledge that
at the time of their marriage, Te was already
married to Choa.
 With respect to Te, Choa added that he committed
an act of falsification by stating in his marriage
contract with Santella that he was still single.8
 petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave
of court (DENIED) and motion to inhibit the trial
court judge for showing antagonism and animosity
towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings
of said case (DENIED).
 Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari (DENIED), alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
judge, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity
towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the
requirements of due process by denying
petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and]
demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the
same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with
the appropriate guidelines for judges; and (4)
ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie
evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an
accused.
 Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil
Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the
administrative case for the revocation of his
engineering license was pending, a motion to
suspend the proceedings therein in view of the
pendency of the civil case for annulment of his
marriage to private respondent and criminal case
for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98 (DENIED on July
16, 1991), petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals another petition for certiorari,
contending that the Board gravely abused its
discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the
resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to
the outcome of the administrative case pending
before it; (2) not holding that the continuation
of proceedings in the administrative case could
render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-
incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy
against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping
interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice
of Professionals does not allow the suspension of
the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board
despite the pendency of criminal and/or
administrative proceedings against the same
respondent involving the same set of facts in other
courts or tribunals.
C A R U L I N G
 On 31 August 1994, CA upheld the RTC’s denial of
the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure
to show any concrete evidence that the trial court
judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the
case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s
motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question was in accord with law.15 The
Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial
of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner
for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to
support the same, considering that the prosecution
was able to adduce evidence showing the existence
of the elements of bigamy. Neither did the
appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s
motion to suspend proceedings in the
administrative case on the ground of prejudicial
question.
prejudicial question existed since the action
sought to be suspended is administrative in nature,
and the other action involved is a civil case.
 Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals (DENIED)
I S S U E
 A prejudicial question has been defined as one
based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.
 The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.
 The ruling in People vs. Mendoza24 and People vs.
Aragon25 cited by petitioner that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
a marriage which is void ab initio has been
overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article
40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect
at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent in September 1988. Said article states
that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage
unless there is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
 Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct
for continued failure to perform his obligations
as husband to private respondent and as father to
their child, and for cohabiting with Santella
without the benefit of marriage.30 The existence of
these other charges justified the continuation of
the proceedings before the PRC Board.
 Petitioner contends that CA erred in upholding the
trial court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence
in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the
prosecution failed to establish the existence of
both the first and second marriages beyond
reasonable doubt. He also claims that the original
 copy of marriage contract between him and private
respondent was not presented, the signatures
therein were not properly identified and there was
no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage
were complied with. He alleges further that the
original copy of the marriage contract between him
and Santella was not presented, that no proof that
he signed said contract was adduced, and that there
was no witness presented to show that a second
marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took
place.
 The Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court, which
based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds:
first, the prosecution established a prima
facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and
second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer
were insufficient to justify the grant of the same.
 Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to
inhibit Judge Peralejo should have been granted.
First, when petitioner manifested that he would
file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of
his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case,
the judge said such motion was dilatory and would
be denied even though the motion for
reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second,
when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had
just recovered from an accident and was not
physically fit for trial, the judge commented that
counsel was merely trying to delay the case and
required said counsel to produce a medical
certificate to support his statement. Third, when
petitioner manifested that he was going to file a
demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the
same as dilatory and declared that he would deny
the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s
hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as
shown in the foregoing instances justified the
grant of his motion to inhibit.
S C R U L I N G
 We agree with the appellate court that the grounds
raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did
not conclusively show that the latter was biased
and had prejudged the case.
 Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the decision to inhibit himself lay within the
sound discretion of Judge Peralejo.
o Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No
judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or
in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel,
or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record.
 This Court does not find any abuse of discretion
by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion
to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety
of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner
was deprived a fair and impartial trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
*Sec. 36; Art. 36; prejudicial question
F A C T S
 On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y
Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel
(petitioner)
 On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to
appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial
and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria
Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
 On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question (DENIED). Petitioner asserted
that since the relationship between the offender
and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a
bearing in the criminal case filed against him
before the RTC Quezon City.
R T C R U L I N G
 13 May 2005, the pendency of the case before the
RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case before
it. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion
to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the
Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of
merit, DENIED.
F A C T S
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In
its 22 August 2005 Order,5 the RTC Quezon City
denied.
 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the
Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22
August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
C A R U L I N G
 20 March 2006 Decision, CA dismissed the petition.
 in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the
issue is whether the offender commenced the
commission of the crime of parricide directly by
overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance.
 the issue in the civil action for annulment of
marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even
if the marriage between petitioner and respondent
would be declared void, it would be immaterial to
the criminal case because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime
of frustrated parricide had already been
committed.
 The CA ruled that all that is required for the
charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time
of the commission of the crime, the marriage is
still subsisting.
 Petitioner filed a petition for review before this
Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.
I S S U E
 whether the resolution of the action for annulment
of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants
the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide against petitioner.
S C R U L I N G
 Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
 Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure
o Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. -
The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
 The rule is clear that the civil action must be
instituted first before the filing of the criminal
action. In this case, the Information7 for
Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It
was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004
as per the stamped date of receipt on the
Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case
No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14
February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
2005.8 Respondent’s petition9 in Civil Case No. 04- marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No.
7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the
November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for alleged crime that was committed at the time of
annulment was filed after the filing of the the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if
criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 annulled, petitioner could still be held
Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the criminally liable since at the time of the
civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of commission of the alleged crime, he was still
the criminal action. married to respondent.
 There is a prejudicial question when a civil action  the Court upholds the decision of the Court of
and a criminal action are both pending, and there Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415
exists in the civil action an issue which must be may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil
preemptively resolved before the criminal action Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt
may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
the civil action is resolved would be determinative  WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20
of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
criminal case. G.R. SP No. 91867.
o x x x one that arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that
it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue
or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined.
 The relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall
kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."
 Further, the relationship between the offender and CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents,
the victim is not determinative of the guilt or ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-
innocence of the accused. appellants,
 The issue in the civil case for annulment of vs.
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital *Art 21, 40, 742, 2219
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, F A C T S
the issue is whether he performed all the acts of
execution which would have killed respondent as a Appeal on dismissing a complaint for support and
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not damages, and another order denying amendment of the
produce it by reason of causes independent of same pleading.
petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents,
sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint
it was averred that the parties were neighbors in
Dapitan City, and had close and confidential
relations; that defendant Icao, although married,
succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff
several times by force and intimidation, and without
her consent; that as a result she became pregnant,
despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and
plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed
support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's
fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for
lack of cause of action since the complaint did not
allege that the child had been born; and after hearing
arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's
motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to
allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff
had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court,
sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no
amendment was allowable, since the original complaint
averred no cause of action.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be
untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn,
is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right
to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted
for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the
said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a
conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive
donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same
Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his
testament may result in preterition of a forced heir
that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir,
even if such child should be born after the death of
the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived
and unborn children may be accepted by
those persons who would legally
represent them if they were already
born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission
of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will (10) Acts and actions referred to in
or born after the death of the testator, Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid Thus, independently of the right to Support of the
insofar as they are not inofficious. child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause
of action for damages under the terms of the complaint
If the omitted compulsory heirs should
die before the testator, the institution
Costs against appellee Felix Icao
shall be effectual, without prejudice
to the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that
Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support
is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children
"does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides
imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text
of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing
that "the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the
foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not
a condition precedent to the right of the conceived
child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40
would become entirely useless and ineffective.
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from
is that for a married man to force a woman not his
wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original
complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines: ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes LAZO, respondents.
loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs
*Art. 40; juridical capacity
or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of procured her abortion, could recover damages from
physician who caused the same.
the same Code:
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered
in the following and analogous cases: Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of
Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a
physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered
lascivious acts: judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant
Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as
xxx xxx xxx damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the
suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special
division of five, sustained the award by a majority
vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a
separate dissenting opinion.
F A C T S
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio
Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt
Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her
present husband before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and
acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the
plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then
employed in the Commission on Elections and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less
than two years later, she again became pregnant. On
February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she
again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo
and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met
the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of
a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of
fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at
this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for
his election to the provincial board; he did not know
of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes
plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we
granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated
the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to
be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum
award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not
cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed
with personality—being incapable of having rights and
obligations.
It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality
of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur)
under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same
article expressly limits such provisional personality
by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive. In the present case, there is
no dispute that the child was dead when separated from
its mother's womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled
to coll ect any damages at all. But such damages must
be those inflicted directly upon them, as
distinguished from the injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical
integrity. In the case before us, both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for
an award of moral damages, evidently because the
appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of
his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration
of his parental hopes and affections. The appellee was
aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities
are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet
despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he
appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or
pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment
of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning
of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to
have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a
large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,
damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity"
claim that, under the circumstances of record, was
vs.
clearly exaggerated.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in
*Art. 43
provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and
morally reprehensible act, that can not be too Antonio Ramon
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or Navarro
Joaquin Sr. & Angela Navarro
Joaquin
that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify
an award of damage that have no factual or legal basis. Pilar Concepcion Natividad Joaquin Jr.
the summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro,
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the
Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin
complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased.
I S S U E
related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of
whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by
Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945.
F A C T S
The trial court found the deaths of this persons to
have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls,
named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin
Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th,
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred
with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela
Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the
latter was declared to have survived his mother.
The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin
de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice
versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the
rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present
petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of
Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased
spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the
liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their
three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and
their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife,
Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the
building known as the German Club, at the corner of
San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During
their stay, the building was packed with refugees,
shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on
fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at
the people inside the building, especially those who
were trying to escape. The three daughters were hit
and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the
premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not
convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and
son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro,
Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend
and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of
the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier
and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the
ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the
bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on
fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside,
presumably including Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and
Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby, the stayed there about three days, until
February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the
shelter be- cause the shelling tore it open. They flied
toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino
Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who
fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr.,
and his daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was
aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years
old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was
two or three years older than her brother; while the
other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y
Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."
testimony of Francisco Lopez, "as between the mother
Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the
evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and
insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be
applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its
conclusion is thus stated:
"It does not require argument to show that
survivorship cannot be established by proof of the
death of only one of the parties; but that there must
be adequate proof that one was alive when the other
had already died. there is not a scintilla of evidence,
direct or circumstantial, from which we may infer the
condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the
appreciable interval from the instant his son turned
his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he
died. All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela
Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape
from the German Club; but she could have died almost
immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might
have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters,
killed by falling beams from the burning edifice,
overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters
from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain.
No evidence is available on the point. Hence the son
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have
survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was
admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69,
subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which
the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family met their
end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar,
Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela
Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days
later (of which there is no doubt), the father Joaquin
Navarro, Sr."
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of
whether section 334(37) of Act No. 129, now section 69
(ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed
article 33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43
of the New Civil Code. It is the contention of the
petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption
that there is total lack of evidence, as the Court of
Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro,
Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died at
the same time.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of
Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it
is not (1) shown who died first, and there are
no (2) particular circumstances from when it
can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed
from the probabilities resulting from the
strength and ages of the sexes, according to
the following rules:
x x x x x x x x x
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following
tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the
first to die to the two or more persons who
would inherent one from the other, the persons
who alleges the prior death of either must
prove the allegation; in the absence of proof
the presumption shall be that they died at the
same time, and no transmission of rights from
one to the other shall take place.
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of
Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that
the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct;
it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential.
Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which
a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption
does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls.
Francisco Lopez testimony, which was described by the
trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by
the Court of Appeals as "entitled to credence."
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony
contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of
the case. It is believed that in the light of the
conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable
inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the
inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein
provided be certain. It is the "particular
circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be
inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by
the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the
rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never
certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a
finding of fact."
Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence
by, which civil cases are decided, this inference
ought to prevail.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under
review, and hold that the distribution of the
decedents' estates should be made in accordance with
the decision of the trial court. This result precludes
the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva
troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical
theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that
of her son. Without costs.
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v.
SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (SET) AND MARY GRACE POE-
LLAMANZARES, Respondents.
*RA 9225; RA 9344; RA 8552; CA 63; grave abuse of
discretion
D E C I S I O N
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be
discovered despite a diligent search, but sufficient
evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable
inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required
to conclude that at least one or both of his or her
parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to
establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen.
When these inferences are made by the Senate Electoral
Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive
prerogative to decide the qualifications of the
members of the Senate, then there is no grave abuse of
discretion remediable by either Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court or Article VIII, Section I of the
Constitution.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed
by petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for
the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015
Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No.
001-15.2 The assailed November 17, 2015
Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto
filed by David, which sought to unseat private
respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for
allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to
hold such office under Article VI, Section 34 of the
1987 Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015
Resolution5 denied David's Motion for Reconsideration.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a
foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an
infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro,
Iloilo.6 Edgardo Militar found her outside the church
on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.7 He later
turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano
Militar.8 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on
September 6, 1968.9 She was given the name Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.10 Local Civil Registrar
issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling
Certificate.
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal
promulgated the Decision granting the Petition for
Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe
(more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa
Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces).12 The
Decision also ordered the change in Senator Poe's name
from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.13 October 27, 2005, Clerk
of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the
Decision had become final in a Certificate of
Finality.14
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-
Iloilo received the Decision of the San Juan Court
Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's foundling
certificate that she was adopted by Spouses Ronald
Allan and Jesusa Poe.
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila when she turned 18 years
old.17 The Commission on Elections issued her a Voter's
Identification Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila on December 13, 1986.18
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs
issued her a Philippine passport.19 Her passport was
renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13,
2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18, 2014.20Having
become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine
diplomatic passport on December 19, 2013.21
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University
of the Philippines, Manila, but eventually went to the
United States in 1988 to obtain her college
degree.22 In 1991, she earned a bachelor's degree in
Political Science from Boston College, Chestnut Hill,
Massachusetts.23
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael
Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino
national since birth.24 The marriage took place in
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila.25 On
July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United
States with her husband.26 For some time, she lived
with her husband and children in the United States.27
Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children:
Brian Daniel (Brian), Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and
Jesusa Anika (Anika).28 Brian was born in the United
States on April 16, 1992. Hanna was born on July 10,
1998, and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika
were born in the Philippines.29
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American
citizenship on October 18, 2001.30 She was subsequently
given a United States passport.31
Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran
for President of the Republic of the Philippines in
the 2004 National Elections.32 To support her father's
candidacy, Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna returned
to the Philippines on April 8, 2004.33 After the
Elections, she returned to the United States on July
8, 2004.34 It was during her stay in the Philippines
that she gave birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.35
Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11,
2004 and eventually "slipped into a coma."36Senator Poe
returned to the Philippines on December 13, 2004.37 On
December 14, 2004, her father died.38 She stayed in the
country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's
funeral and to attend to the settling of his estate.
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005 to support
the grieving Susan Roces.
Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue a Tax Identification Number
(TIN) on July 22, 2005.47
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of
Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines:48
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for
Retention and or Re-acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225.50 She also
"filed applications for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three children who were all below
eighteen (18) years of age at that time."
The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation on July 18, 2006.
A careful review of the documents submitted in support
of the instant petition indicate that Poe was a former
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born
to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a natural
born Philippine citizen; thereafter, became an
American citizen and is now a holder of an American
passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has taken her
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to have re-
acquired her Philippine Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in
the original)
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed
Citizens of the Philippines in accordance with Section
4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225."54 Until now, the Order
"has not been set aside by the Department of Justice
or any other agency of Government."55
On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
Identification Certificates in the name of Senator Poe
and her children.56 It stated that Senator Poe is a
"citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
. . . in relation to Administrative Order No. 91,
Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005
per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133.
Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay
Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31, 2006.58
She has formally renounced her American citizenship on
20 October 2010.
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino
III appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie
and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).62 On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship.
On October 21, 2010, she took her Oath of Office as
MTRCB Chairperson and assumed office on October 26,
2010.
On December 9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian executed
a Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Senator
Poe.71 The certificate was approved by the Overseas
Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3,
2012.72
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013
Elections.73 On September 27, 2012, she executed a
Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the
Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012.74 She won
and was declared as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial
Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal
a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015.76 He
contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to
"comply with the citizenship and residency
requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution."77
Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 15-01 requiring David "to correct the
formal defects of his petition."78 David filed his
amended Petition on August 17, 2015.79
On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by
the Senate Electoral Tribunal ordering the Secretary
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator Poe
to file an answer to the amended Petition.80
Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David
filed a Motion Subpoena the Record of Application of
Citizenship Re-acquisition and related documents from
the Bureau of Immigration on August 25, 2015.81The
documents requested included Senator Poe's record of
travels and NSO kept Birth Certificate.82 On August 26,
2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution
No. 15-04 granting the Motion.83 The same Resolution
directed the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue a
subpoena to the concerned officials of the Bureau of
Immigration and the National Statistics Office.84 The
subpoenas ordered the officials to appear on September
1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the
Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets of the
requested documents.85 The subpoenas were complied
with by both the Bureau of Immigration and the National
Statistics Office on September 1, 2015.86
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her
Verified Answer with (1) Prayer for Summary Dismissal;
(2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for
Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion
to Cite David for Direct Contempt of Court; and (4)
Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt of Court.87
On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
issued Resolution No. 15-05 requiring the parties to
file a preliminary conference brief on or before
September 9, 2015. During the Preliminary Conference,
the parties "agreed to drop the issue of residency on
the ground of prescription."
On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for
15 days the submission of DNA test results.93The Senate
Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on October 27,
2015. On November 5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a
Manifestation regarding the results of DNA
Testing,95 which stated that "none of the tests that
[Senator Poe] took provided results that would shed
light to the real identity of her biological parents."
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe
to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified
to hold office as Senator.
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen
under the 1935 Constitution and continue to be a
natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987
Constitution, as she is a citizen of the Philippines
from birth, without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship.
Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born
Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as
required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF
05-002 (the Revised Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225),
the foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the "final act" to
reacquire natural-born Philippine citizenship.
The petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED.
On November 23, 2015, David moved for
reconsideration.101 The Senate Electoral Tribunal
issued Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24, 2015,
giving Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on the
Motion for Reconsideration.
Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion
for Reconsideration on December 1, 2015.103David's
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Senate
Electoral Tribunal on December 3, 2015:104
the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated on 17
November 2015) of David Rizalito Y. David dated 23
November 2015.
The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution
No. 15-11 dated 24 November 2015 issued by the
Executive Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE the
Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on
01 December 2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to
appear and submit memorandum as amici curiae filed by
Dean Arturo de Castro
On December 9, 2015, David filed the pre Petition for
Certiorari before this Court.
On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and Senator Poe to comment on the
Petition "within a non-extendible period of fifteen
(15) days from notice."108 The Resolution also set oral
arguments on January 19, 2016.109 The Senate Electoral
Tribunal, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
submitted its Comment on December 30, 2015.110 Senator
Poe submitted her Comment on January 4, 2016.
Issue: whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition
for Quo Warranto based on its finding that private
respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen,
qualified to hold a seat as Senator under Article VI,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
I Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any
He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its
findings and conclusions on private respondent's
citizenship.
I. A
The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to
resolve such contests is exclusive to any other body.
The resolution of such contests is its only task; it
performs no other function.
The electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred. . . . The
exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission
under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
"intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature[.]"
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the
Constitution grants the [House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the [House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter
within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be
reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the
authority on the part of this Court that would in any
wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the
same."
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination
that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion. Our review is limited
to a determination of whether there has been an error
in jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.
I. B
The viability of such a petition is premised on an
allegation of "grave abuse of discretion."123
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been
generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious,
or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction:
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough: it must be grave.124
There is grave abuse of discretion when a
constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral
Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes
manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such
that critical pieces of evidence, which have been
nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or
admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation,
are ignored or not accounted for.125
Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a)
where the tribunal's approach to an issue is premised
on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on
a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the
evidence;127 (b) where a tribunal's assessment of a
case is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on
very personal and subjective assessment standards when
the law is replete with standards that can be
used";128 "(c) where the tribunal's action on the
appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the
limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable";129 and (d) where the tribunal invokes
erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an
issue.130
I. C
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate
Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in
keeping with a faithful and exhaustive reading of the
Constitution.
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by
petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
confronted with a novel legal question: the
citizenship status of children whose biological
parents are unknown, considering that the
Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly
makes reference to one's father or mother. It was
compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the
face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that
point, was without judicial precedent.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human
capacity. It did not insist on burdening private
respondent with conclusively proving, within the
course of the few short months, the one thing that she
has never been in a position to know throughout her
lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously appreciated the
implications of all other facts known about her
finding. Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a
manner in keeping with the degree of proof required in
proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute
certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or
preponderance of evidence, but "substantial evidence,
or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a V. A
conclusion."131
II
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells
out the requirement that "[n]o person shall be a
Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines."
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a
natural-born citizen and, therefore, not qualified to
sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2)
grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose
parents are unknown, private respondent fails to
satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she
failed to establish her Filipino "blood line,"
III
At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional
ambiguity.
Primarily, the actual words—text—and how they are
situated within the whole document—context—govern.
Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain
text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous
construction may settle what is more viable.
III. A
It is a well-established rule in constitutional
construction that no one provision of the Constitution
is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which
enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines, may be
compared with counterpart provisions, not only in
earlier Constitutions but even in organic laws142and in
similar mechanisms143 introduced by colonial rulers
whose precepts nevertheless still resonate today.
Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic
appreciation of legal interpretation must grapple with
the truth that meaning is not always singular and
uniform.
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to
pedantic rigor that foments absurdity.
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a
universal plain language is erroneous. In reality,
universality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A
contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is
static.
The more appropriate and more effective approach is,
thus, holistic rather than parochial: to consider
context and the interplay of the historical, the
contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial
interpretation entails the convergence of social
realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to
be effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is
the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the
Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that
describes the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates
this imperative of constitutional primacy.
III. C
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than
in the framer's understanding thereof.149 (Emphasis
supplied)
IV
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is
a Philippine citizen without the need for an express
statement in the Constitution making her so.
Article IV, Section 2, of "natural-born citizens."
This definition must be harmonized with Section 1's
enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that
foundlings are natural-born unless there is
substantial evidence to the contrary. This includes
its mandate of defending the well-being of children,
guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access
to opportunities for public service, and respecting
human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring
natural-born status for select public offices.
V
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. By
definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently
naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status
upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No.
9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as
Senator of the Republic.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.150
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born
citizens:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section
1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides
a definition of the term "natural-born citizens." This
is distinct from Section 1's enumeration of who are
citizens. As against Section 1's generic listing,
Section 2 specifically articulates those who may count
themselves as natural-born.
V. B
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political
affiliation. It is the "right to have rights."151 It is
one's personal and . . . permanent membership in a
political community. . . The core of citizenship is
the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the
right to participate in government principally through
the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,]
and the right to petition the government for redress
of grievance.152
Citizenship also entails obligations to the political
community of which one is part.153 Citizenship,
therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that
loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits
and protection provided by it.
Spanish colonial rule: native inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands were identified not as citizens but
as "Spanish subjects.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, It was only on
December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this
jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there
existed a categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens,159 thus:
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even
if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization
papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have
become domiciled inhabitants of any town of
the Monarchy.160
United States of America under the Treaty of Paris
left the determination of the native inhabitants'
status to the Congress of the United States:
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing
in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in
such territory or may remove therefrom. . . . In case
they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a
declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall
be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they may reside.
Thus -
The civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by Congress.
The native inhabitants who had ceased to be Spanish
subjects were "issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection
of the United States."163
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first
appeared in legislation in the Philippine Organic Act,
otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902:164
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended
Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made
to include a proviso for the enactment by the
legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This
proviso read:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who
are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein.166
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known
as the Jones Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill
of 1902. It restated the citizenship provision of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended:167
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain, signed
at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight, and except such others as have since become
citizens of some other country: Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born
inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was deemed to be
a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if
he or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11,
1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date,
and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country."168
Article III, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
provided:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of
Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of
foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of
Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this
jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution's provision
stipulating the qualifications for President and Vice-
President of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3
read:
SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of
President or Vice-President, unless he be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter,
forty years of age or over, and has been a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding the election.
Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read
with the then civil law provisions that stipulated the
automatic loss of Filipino citizens lip by women who
marry alien husbands—was discriminatory towards
women.170
The 1973 Constitution rectified this problematic
situation:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines.
the
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and naturalized.
of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV,
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines
law. "from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By
necessary implication, a naturalized citizen are
SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who
"former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid
marries an alien shall retain her Philippine
procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is
evidence to prove that they possessed all the
deemed, under the law, to have renounced her
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
citizenship.171
the provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens."
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to
actually define the term "natural-born citizen." V. D
Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution
provided:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a
citizen of the Philippines from birth without having Did Poe underwent the naturalization process to become
to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine a Filipino?
citizenship.172
She did not.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now
reads: V. E
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines: Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being
a human thoroughbred.
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section
the time of the adoption of this Constitution; 1(2) stipulates that to be a citizen, either one's
father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical
of the Philippines;
features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are not
determinative of citizenship.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; natural-born Filipino citizens.
and
Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with degree: parentage. There is no need, as petitioner
law.174 insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity.
Constitution's previous definition of natural-born
citizens, as follows: V. F
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who Private respondent has done this. The evidence she
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without adduced in these proceedings attests to how at least
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their one—if not both—of her biological parents were
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine Filipino citizens.
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section
1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Proving private respondent's biological parentage is
(Emphasis supplied) now practically impossible. To begin with, she was
V. C abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned
almost half a century ago. By now, there are only a
handful of those who, in 1968, were able-minded adults
who can still lucidly render testimonies on the
circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the
identification of individuals against whom DNA
evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer
economic cost, prohibitive.
In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through
circumstantial evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v.
People:185
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in
dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the
proof of fact or facts from which, taken either singly
or collectively, the existence of a particular fact in
dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable
consequence.
People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial
evidence:
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a
series of facts other than the fact in issue, which by
experience have been found so associated with such
fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead
us to a satisfactory conclusion.188 (Citation omitted)
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
for instance, stipulates when circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal
proceedings:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.
— Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial
evidence.190
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant
outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September
3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all—
Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino
population.192 Private respondent is described as
having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge,
straight black hair and an oval-shaped face."193 She
stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.194 Further, in 1968,
there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.
These circumstances are substantial evidence
justifying an inference that her biological parents
were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is
more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in
1968, lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic
environment, would have behaved. The absence of an
international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the
possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a
foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming
in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave
her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is
unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest
to it.
Out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines
in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners.
This translates to roughly 99.8% probability that
private respondent was born a Filipino citizen.
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright
impossibility, of identifying her parents after half
a century, a range of substantive proof is available
to sustain a reasonable conclusion as to private
respondent's parentage.
VI
Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted
to private respondent upon a mere showing that she is
a foundling is a serious error.
Petitioner invites this Court to establish a
jurisprudential presumption that all newborns who have
been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines are
not Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's
supposed burden to prove the circumstances of her
birth places upon her an impossible condition. To
require proof from private respondent borders on the
absurd when there is no dispute that the crux of the
controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is
simply not known.
"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law." Burden of proof lies on the party making the
allegations;198 that is, the party who "alleges the
affirmative of the issue"199 Burden of proof never
shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the
burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party
makes a prima facie case in his or her favor.200 The
other party then bears the "burden of going
forward"201 with the evidence considering that which
has ostensibly been established against him or her.
VII
Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born
Filipino citizen consistent with a reading that
harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of
natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to
parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption
that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born
to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino
mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is
substantial proof otherwise.
VII. A
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV,
Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2),
constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be
taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the
constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of
children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and
equal access to opportunities for public service, and
to respect human rights. They must also be read in
conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for
requiring natural-born status for select public
offices. Further, this presumption is validated by
contemporaneous construction that considers related
legislative enactments, executive and administrative
actions, and international instruments.
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of
the 1987 Constitution require the state to enhance
children's well-being and to project them from
conditions prejudicial to or that may undermine their
development. Fulfilling this mandate includes
preventing discriminatory conditions and, especially,
dismantling mechanisms for discrimination that hide
behind the veneer of the legal apparatus:
ARTICLE II
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
ARTICLE XV
The Family
SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
(2) The right of children to assistance, including
proper care and nutrition, and special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their
development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to
natural-born citizens of the Philippines. The 1987
Constitution makes the following offices exclusive to
natural-born citizens:
(1) President;212
laws and equal access to opportunities for public
service: Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise
that foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth.
ARTICLE II
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile
State Policies Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides:

(2) Vice-President;213 SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following
opportunities for public service, and prohibit State policies shall be observed at all times:
(3) Senator;214 political dynasties as may be defined by law.
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the
(4) Member of the House of Representatives;215 ARTICLE III child through measures that will ensure the observance
Bill of Rights of international standards of child protection,
especially those to which the Philippines is a
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, party. Proceedings before any authority shall be
collegiate court;216
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor conducted in the best interest of the child and in a
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the manner which allows the child to participate and to
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil express himself/herself freely. The participation of
Service Commission;217 laws.
children in the program and policy formulation and
implementation related to juvenile justice and welfare
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the ARTICLE XIII
shall be ensured by the concerned government agency.
Commission on Elections;218 Social Justice and Human Rights
(Emphasis supplied)

(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit;219
(9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;220
(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas;221 and
(11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on
Human Rights.222
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to
natural-born citizens include, among others, city
fiscals,223 assistant city fiscals,224 Presiding Judges
and Associate Judges of the Sandiganbayan, and other
public offices.225 Certain professions are also limited
to natural-born citizens,226 as are other legally
established benefits and incentives.227
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently
discriminating against our foundling citizens. They
can then never be of service to the country in the
highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to
excluding them from certain means such as professions
and state scholarships, which will enable the
actualization of their aspirations. Concluding that
foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an
inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that
inferiority through no fault of their own.
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.
(Emphasis supplied)
They [foundlings or not] are both entitled to the full
extent of the state's protection from the moment of
their birth. Foundlings' misfortune in failing to
identify the parents who abandoned them—an inability
arising from no fault of their own—cannot be the
foundation of a rule that reduces them to
statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class
citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and
protection from the state as those who know their
parents. Sustaining this classification is not only
inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns those
who, from the very beginning of their lives, were
abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation.
ARTICLE II
State Policies
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
(Emphasis supplied)
VII. C
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the
"best interest of the child" as the "totality of the
circumstances and conditions which are most congenial
to the survival, protection and feelings of security
of the child and most encouraging to the child's
physical, psychological and emotional development."
Consistent with this statute is our ratification230 of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. This specifically requires the states-parties'
protection of: first, children's rights to immediate
registration and nationality after birth; second,
against statelessness; and third, against
discrimination on account of their birth status.231
The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
As with the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
this treaty requires that children be allowed
immediate registration after birth and to acquire a
nationality. It similarly defends them against
discrimination
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law.

By the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot
be the object of discrimination. They are vested with
the rights to be registered and granted nationality
upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of
citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly
burden them, discriminate them, and undermine their
development.
Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, is formally
entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on
Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other
Purposes. It was enacted as a mechanism to "provide
alternative protection and assistance through foster
care or adoption of every child who is neglected,
orphaned, or abandoned."236
private respondent's natural-born status has been
affirmed and reaffirmed through various official
public acts.
First, private respondent was issued a foundling
certificate and benefitted from the domestic adoption
process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted an
order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of
Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the President
of the Philippines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson—
an office that requires natural-born citizenship.239
VIII. A
"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in
the manner provided by law."240 Commonwealth Act No. 63
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized
elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office
must comply with all of the following requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution,251 Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and
other existing laws. This is to facilitate the
exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow
for voting in elections.252
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
VIII. C
Private respondent has complied with all of these
requirements.
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully
reacquired natural-born citizenship; she has also
complied with all of the other requirements for
eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated
in Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII. D
To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of
Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225
reacquire natural-born citizenship. The prefix "re"
signifies reference to the preceding state of affairs.
It is to this status quo ante that one returns. "Re"-
acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way things
were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the
investiture of an entirely new status, it should not
have used a word such as "reacquire." Republic Act No.
9225, therefore, does not operate to make new citizens
whose citizenship commences only from the moment of
compliance with its requirements.
He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine
citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may
have consequences de facto.
IX
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a
natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to hold
office as Senator of the Republic.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY
LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
ROBERTO REYES ‘ Story
While he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel
Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years,
Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him.6 Mrs.
Filart invited him to join her in a party at the
hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of
the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes
then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the
basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for
the celebrant. When the buffet dinner was ready, Mr.
Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great
shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by
petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for
Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a loud
voice and within the presence and hearing of the other
guests who were making a queue at the buffet table,
Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang
kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr.
Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr.
Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance,
however, completely ignored him thus adding to his
shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was
still recovering from the traumatic experience, a
Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out
of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted
out of the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages,
Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages,
One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17
Ruby Lim’s Story
Admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but
not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the
latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s
Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20)
years.18 One of her functions included organizing the
birthday party of the hotel’s former General Manager,
Mr. Tsuruoka. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim
generated an exclusive guest list and extended
invitations accordingly.20 The guest list was limited
to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest
friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes
was not one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim
first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a
drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the
party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the
"captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr.
Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he
saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr.
Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest
and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired
instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida
Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr.
Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.26 Mr.
Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire
from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want
to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr.
Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later
approached.28 Believing that Captain Batung and Mr.
Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the
same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to
tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim
spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to
speak to him herself as there were no other guests in
the immediate vicinity.30However, as Mr. Reyes was
already helping himself to the food, she decided to
wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to
eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo,
hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho
kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos
kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then turned
around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough
decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began
screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened
to dump food on her.
Dr. Violeta Filart’s Story
She never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According
to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the
basket of fruits intended for the celebrant.35 When
they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to
go down as he was not properly dressed and was not
invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes
already left the place, but she later saw him at the
bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a
commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38 She ignored
Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the
celebrant to think that she invited him.40
RTC dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to
the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in
asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court
likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk
of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited
Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko
Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault.
CA reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found
more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes
that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice
within hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation,
telling him that he should not finish his food and to
leave the place within the hearing distance of other
guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good
customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate
the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as
a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code).
Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation, appellant
could not have suffered such humiliation. For that,
appellee Filart is equally liable.
. . .
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel
Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary
obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
(2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s fees in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant
to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they
cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was
a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a
person assents is not esteemed in law as injury"47 )
refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to
injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages by one
who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to
danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.50 As
formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does
not find application to the case at bar because even
if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to
leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21
of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to
treat him fairly in order not to expose him to
unnecessary ridicule and shame.
ISSUE: whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in
asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave
the party where he was not invited by the celebrant
thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim
were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her
employer, is solidarily liable with her.
Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly
sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked
to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to
kiss.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of
Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to
ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she
would shout at him from a very close distance.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to
plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the
party was made such that they nearly kissed each other,
the request was meant to be heard by him only and there
could have been no intention on her part to cause
embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to
the request that must have made the other guests aware
of what transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested,
there was no need for the police to take him out.
Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he
who alleges proves. All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas,
Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that
it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes
to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot
be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employee.58
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has
the following elements: (1) There is an act which is
legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is
done with intent to injure.66
The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave
was likewise acceptable and humane under the
circumstances.
G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL
PANLILIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE,
VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-
SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present Petition for Review on Certiorari
partially assails the Court of Appeals Decision1 of
March 26, 2004 holding herein petitioners Silahis
International Hotel, Inc. and Jose Marcel Panlilio,
along with Floro Maniego and Steve Villanueva, civilly
liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code,
for violation of respondents’ constitutional right
against unreasonable search of their office.
Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) was the
Vice President for Finance of his co-petitioner
Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (hotel), while
respondents Rogelio Soluta (Soluta), Joselito Santos,
Edna Bernate (Edna), Vicenta Delola (Vicenta), and
Florentino Matilla (Matilla) were employees of the
hotel and officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis Union
Chapter, the hotel employees union (the union).
Petitioners’ version of the antecedents of the case
are as follows:
In late 1987, as Coronel Floro Maniego (Maniego),
General Manager of the Rapier Enforcement Professional
Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (REPISA) which
the hotel contracted to provide its security force,
had been receiving reports that sale and/or use of
marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution were
going on in the union office at the hotel and that
there existed a theft syndicate, he conducted a
surveillance, with the approval of Panlilio, of
suspected members and officers of the union.2
In the morning of January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his
personal secretary Andy Dizon, Maniego, Bulletin
reporter Nonoy Rosales, and REPISA security guard
Steve Villanueva (Villanueva) entered the union office
located at the hotel basement, with the permission of
union officer Henry Babay (Babay) who was apprised
about the suspected illegal activities, and searched
the premises in the course of which Villanueva found
a plastic bag under a table. When opened, the plastic
bag yielded dry leaves of marijuana.3 Panlilio
thereupon ordered Maniego to investigate and report
the matter to the authorities.
On the other hand, respondents’ version follows:
On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera (Loida), a
laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the
female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At
dawn of January 11, 1988, she heard pounding sounds
outside, prompting her to open the door of the locker
room upon which she saw five men in barong tagalog
whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not
employees of the hotel,4 forcibly opening the door of
the union office.5 She even saw one of the men hid
something behind his back. She then closed the door
and went back to bed. Soon after she heard the door
of the union office opened.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer
Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union
office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed
at dawn.
Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint before the
Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith, Efren
Guevarra, who tried to assist him, Edna, Arnold
Ilustrisimo and Ed Bautista open the door. At that
instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs
arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions,
drawing them to run to the female locker room, and to
thereafter proceed to the Engineering Office where
they called for police assistance.6
While awaiting the arrival of the police, Babay and
Panlilio, on the latter’s request, met. At the
meeting, Panlilio told Babay that they proceed to the
union office where they would settle the mauling
incident, to which Babay replied that the door of the
office could not be opened. Panlilio thereupon
instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the
latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions
began searching the office, over the objection of
Babay who even asked them if they had a search
warrant.7 A plastic bag was found containing marijuana
flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of
marijuana in the union office and after the police
conducted an investigation of the incident, a
complaint against the 13 union officers,8 namely:
Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr., Soluta, Teodoro Gimpayan,
Vicenta, Edna, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde,
Joselito Santos, Renato Lina, Avelino Meneses,
Matilla, and Norman Agtani9 was filed before the
Fiscal’s Office of Manila, for violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa
Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act).
After trial, Branch 5 of the RTC acquitted the accused.
The trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, with the specimen and/or the marijuana
flowering tops allegedly found inside the Union Office
occupied by the accused not admissible in evidence,
coupled by the suspicious circumstance of
confiscation, for lack of sufficient evidence, accused
Henry Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr., Rogelio Soluta,
Teodoro F. Gimpayan, Vicente Delola, Edna Bernate,
Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos,
Avelino Meneses, Florentino Matilla and Norman Agtani,
are ACQUITTED of the charge. The bonds they put up for
their provisional liberty are cancelled.
Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with
the union, thereafter filed before the Manila RTC a
Complaint12against petitioners et al. including
prosecuting Fiscal Jose Bautista and Atty. Eduardo
Tutaan who assisted in the prosecution of the case
against them, for malicious prosecution and violation
of their constitutional right against illegal search.
RTC held the hotel, Panlilio, Maniego and Villanueva
jointly and severally liable for damages as a result
of malicious prosecution and illegal search of the
union office.
1. Plaintiffs Union, Rogelio S. Soluta,
Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta
Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay, jointly, the
sum of P70,900.00 as actual damages, and the
further sum of P1,000.00 each for the same
plaintiffs, except the Union, in the same
concept and nature.
2. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos,
Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna
Bernate-Dacanay the sum of
P100,000.00 each for moral damages.
3. Plaintiffs Joselito Santos, Florentino
Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna-Bernate-
Dacanay the sum of
P30,000.00 each as exemplary damages.
4. To all the plaintiffs, jointly and
severally, the sum of P30,000.00 for and
as attorney’s fees.
All the counterclaims of the defendants are likewise
dismissed for lack of factual and legal basis.
On appeal, CA affirmed with modification the trial
court’s decision. It found herein petitioners et al.
civilly liable for damages for violation of individual
respondents’ constitutional right against illegal
search, not for malicious prosecution, set aside the
award of actual damages to respondent union, and
reduced the award of actual damages to individual
respondents to ₱50,000.
Petition of Panlilio:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION
THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE
32 OF THE CIVIL CODE IN THAT:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ APPLICATION OF PEOPLE
V. ARUTA (288 SCRA 626[1998]) AND SECTION 13,
RULE 126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN
THE INSTANT CASE IS LEGALLY FLAWED.
2. PETITIONERS’ SEARCH OF THE UNION OFFICE IN
THE INSTANT CASE WAS ENTIRELY REASONABLE UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.16
Petitioners argue that being private persons, they are
not covered by the standards set forth in Aruta
case as the constitutional protection against illegal
searches and seizures is not meant to be invoked
against private individuals.20
Petitioners further argue that the search of the union
office was reasonable under the circumstances,21 given
that the hotel owns the room where the union holds
office; the search was not without probable cause as
it was conducted precisely due to reports received by
petitioners that the union office was being used as a
venue for illegal activities, particularly the sale
and/or use of prohibited drugs;22 and the search was
conducted with the consent and in the presence of union
officer Babay.23
The petition fails.
Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties
of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
x x x x
(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
x x x x
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold
not only public officers but also private individuals
civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in
Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not
even necessary that the defendant under this Article
should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise,
it would defeat its main purpose, which is the
effective protection of individual rights.25 It
suffices that there is a violation of the
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Under the circumstances, this court upheld the grant
of damages by the trial court to the therein private
respondents for violation of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Neither does petitioners’ claim that they were allowed
by union officer Babay to enter the union office lie.
Babay’s account of why petitioners and company went to
the union office – to consider Panlilio’s suggestion
to settle the mauling incident is more credible, as is
his claim that he protested the search, and even asked
if they were armed with a search warrant.
While it is doctrinal that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver
by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear
and convincing evidence of an actual intention to
relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof.28 There
must be proof of the following: (a) that the right
exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the
waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently made. The evidence shows otherwise,
however.
That a violation of one’s constitutional right against
illegal search and seizure can be the basis for the
recovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to
Article 2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code, there
is no doubt.

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the

following and analogous cases:

(6) Illegal search;

(10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26,

27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35. (Emphasis supplied)

ISSUE: whether "an act of a private individual,

allegedly in violation of [one’s] constitutional
rights, [may] be invoked against the State." In other
words, the issue in that case was whether the evidence
obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity without the participation of the State, is
admissible.

The issue in the present civil case, however, is

whether respondent individual can recover damages for
violation of constitutional rights. As reflected
above, Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and
(10) of the Civil Code, allows so.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing ratiocinations,

the petition is DENIED.