(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TUE 6-9 PM (ATTY. J. FAMADOR) Discussion on Arrest |
August 28, 2019
RULE 113
Arrest
Section 1. Definition of arrest. — Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)
Section 2. Arrest; how made. — An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person
arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his
detention. (2a)
Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. — It shall be the duty of the officer executing
the warrant to arrest the accused and to deliver him to the nearest police station
or jail without unnecessary delay. (3a)
Section 4. Execution of warrant. — The head of the office to whom the warrant
of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed
within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of
the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report
to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant,
he shall state the reasons therefor. (4a)
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall
be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)
Section 6. Time of making arrest. — An arrest may be made on any day and at
any time of the day or night. (6)
Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. — When making an
arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of
the cause of the arrest and of the fact that a warrant has been issued for his
arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity
to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.
The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest
but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be
shown to him as soon as practicable. (7a)
Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. — When making an
arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his
authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the
commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has
escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform
him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (8a)
Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. — When making an arrest, a
private person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest
him and cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission
of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees,
or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so
inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (9a)
Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. — An officer making a lawful arrest
may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to assist him in
effecting the
arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting the
arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself. (10a)
resolution of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman
or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, for appropriate action. The resolution shall
state the findings of facts and the law supporting his action, together with the
record of the case which shall include: (a) the warrant, if the arrest is by virtue of
a warrant; (b) the affidavits, counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence of
the parties; (c) the undertaking or bail of the accused and the order for his
release; (d) the transcripts of the proceedings during the preliminary
investigation; and (e)

Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. — An officer, in
order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as
provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person
to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance
thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose. (11a)
Section 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure. — Whenever an officer
has entered the building or enclosure in accordance with the preceding section,
he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself. (12a)
Section 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. — If a person lawfully arrested escapes
or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a
warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines. (13)
the order of cancellation of his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of
the complaint.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the records, the provincial or city
prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be, shall review
the resolution of the investigating judge on the existence of probable cause.
Their ruling shall expressly and clearly state the facts and the law on which it is
based and the parties shall be furnished with copies thereof. They shall order the
release of an accused who is detained if no probable cause is found against him.
(5a)

Section 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. — Any member
of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another
acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such person
in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to
reasonable regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also exercise the
same right. (14a)

RULE 112

Preliminary Investigation

Section 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. — Within ten (10)
days after the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit the
People vs Aruta G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998
FACTS:
On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that
a certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large
volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the
Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from
Baguio, when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the
team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM
agents. When Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the contents of her
bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried
marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to
evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the
items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just
come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie “Balweg”.
While about to cross the road, an old woman asked her for help in
carrying a shoulder bag when she was later arrested by the police.
She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the
woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was
presented.
The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous
drugs of 1972.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs
from the accused.
RULING:
No, the police didn’t correctly searched and seized the drugs from
the accused.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence
of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the facts. The
following have been established: (1) In the morning of December
13, 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from
an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be
leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in
the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of
marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988,
accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a
travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law
enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers approached
her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked
by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the
same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found dried
marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the
NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police
received information two days before the arrival of Aminnudin that
the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9.
His name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of
arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the
police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of
securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin.
When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held
to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be
used against him.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not
armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search
and seizure of accused-appellants bag, accused-appellant must
have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which
provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx.
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime.
Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a
crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was
not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground
for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The
NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant
were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as
clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason
whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was
committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant.
This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any
compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and
warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to
effect a warrantless search of accused-appellants bag, there being
no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently
illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly
illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce
operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized
could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these
are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected,
pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the
search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself
may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that
a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest
effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such
search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to
law. cräläwvirtualibräry
18
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal
warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of accused-appellants
bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in plain view
under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not
immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM
agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to
ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be
justified as a search of a moving vehicle. There was no moving
vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was
apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner
bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street and not
while inside the vehicle.
While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise
illegal search, we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript
quoted above -- did not voluntarily consent to Bolonias search of
his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if
there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and
is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering tha a t the
search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we
cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of
regularity of the performance of duty.
Respondent is acquitted.
Pp vs Malmstedt
Facts:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the
third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in
1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival
thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed
in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the
Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City.
From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City,
then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13
May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus.
in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at
Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint, for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to
establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of
NARCOM, that same morning,that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay
Police Station, set up a checkpoint in the morning and inspected all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region.
In the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of
the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2)
NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the
rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was
seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist.
The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened
the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of
the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a
derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before
he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from
the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A
teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer
noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam
stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused
finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation
room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also
contain hashish.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were
hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an
information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
Issue: Is the search leading to an arrest valid?
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the Constitution guarantees the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a
lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest
without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under
the following circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was
caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which
allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search
warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused,
however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing
a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause
that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any
fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the
accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM
officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something
illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause
which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects
of the accused.
People v Montilla
FACTS:
 Appellant was apprehended by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1
Armando Clarin.
 The appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28
marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which
marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
 These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an
informer in the arrest of appellant.
 That informer had informed them the day before that a drug courier,
whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving with an
undetermined amount of marijuana.
 It was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the
appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney.
 Appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed
that he traveled with only some pocket money and without any luggage.
 He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house he was
never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed
of the P500.00 which he had with him.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto.
2. Whether or not the civilian informer should have been presented in court.
3. Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure is valid
4. Whether or not the evidence acquired is admissible in evidence.
5. Whether or not there was probable cause to consider appellant in flagrante
delicto.
6.Whether or not there was a violation of the Miranda rights.
HELD:
1. Yes. The Court discerns no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial
court. The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of
Article II thereof, as amended, is as follows:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
 Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if
the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved
in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of
a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
2. No. The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian
informer should have been produced in court considering that his testimony was
"vital" and his presence in court was essential in order to give effect to or
recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed
by the State against him.
For one the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely
corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the
trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in
which they had personally taken part. Besides, informants are generally not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their
invaluable services to the police.Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to
present in court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that course.
3. Yes. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that those law enforcers had
the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should
therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the marijuana, as well as the
arrest of appellant on the following dawn. Once again, the Court is not
persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search
and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant,
absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision.
Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an
absolute and rigid proscription. Thus:customs searches; searches of moving
vehicles; seizure of evidence in plain view;
consented searches; searches incidental to a lawful arrest; and "stop and frisk"
measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian
informant to the law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana.
The informant did not know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which
particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this
asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of
transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed
and whether the same were arriving together with, or were begin brought by
someone separately from, the courier. On such bare information, the police
authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant.
4. Yes. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on
appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his
belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result
thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Under the provision, a peace officers or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. A legitimate
warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender: dangerous
weapons, and those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
5. Yes. On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence
with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a). These instances
have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto.
The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the
determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is
understood as having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead
a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the
commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney
the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by
pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer
told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and
carton box which appellant was carrying at the time.
The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a
seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they
approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him
to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant
voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag
yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box,
they brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarter for questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag
and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of
any crime since that is normal. But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things
that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and
concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely
on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed
them, that the drugs were in appellant's luggage. Here, there were sufficient
facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search,
were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could
properly create in the minds of the officers a well grounded and reasonable
belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded
affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then
actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs.
6. No. Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities,
claiming that he was not allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was
not duly informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. The police authorities here
could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 7438 which defines
certain rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, as
well as the duties of the arresting, detaining, and investigating officers, and
providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof. Assuming the existence
of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court will not
necessarily be struck down.
Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his custodial
investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or
involuntary confession or admission was elicited from him which would
otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and more importantly,
the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other evidence adduced by the
prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together with
the documentary and object evidence which were formally offered and admitted
in evidence in the court below.
People v Amminudin
FACTS: Idel Aminnudin was arrested after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9
in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked like marijuana leaves, took him to
their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated and tested by the NBI laboratory. They were verified to be 3 kilos
worth of marijuana leaves. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act was filed against him. Accused-appellant was eventually convicted.
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one
of their informers naming accused-appellant and adding that he was on board
said vessel, and was carrying marijuana. The PC waited for him and approached
him as he descended after the informer had pointed to him.
Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana.He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit. He insisted
he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.He also argued that the marijuana he
was alleged to have been carrying was not properly identified and could have
been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters.
The trial court was unconvinced. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE Whether or not the arrest was legal, and the evidence admissible.
RULING: No and no.
It is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had
no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying.
Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and
regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by
boat with marijuana.
There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. The accused-
appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or
had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113
of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the
obtention of the warrant. The present case presented no urgency to apply the
ruling that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures
for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at
least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. From the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing.
No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be
so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong
enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the
case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted. The
marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree. The search was
not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of
Court.Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible. With the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as
evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that
he is innocent. The decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-
appellant is ACQUITTED.
David v Arroyo
People v. Claudio
G.R. No. 72564,April 15, 198
FACTS: RTC of Olongapo City convicted the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang for
violating Sec. 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Prosecution’s witness Danel
Obiña, a policeman, testified that while on board the Victory Liner heading back
to his home in Olongapo, Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in
front of him after placing a woven buri bag made of plastic containing some
vegetables she was carrying at the back of Obiña’s seat. With the feeling that
there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag so
when they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, he inserted one of his fingers in a
plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. He
could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at
the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered
that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached
Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus. Obina intercepted her and
showed her his ID Identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search
her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag.
Claudio replied, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the
witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and with
her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the police
headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched
in the presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco, Obiña, Claudio and Sgt. Leoncio
Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing
marijuana weighing about one kilo.
ISSUE:WON Claudio’s warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were
unlawful?
RULING: NO, the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were lawful.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides for the in flagrante delicto
arrest, that is, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Meanwhile, its Rule
126, Sec. 12 provides for a warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest to be
lawful. In other words, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.
Here, Claudio was caught in flagrante delicto transporting prohibited
drugs. Thus, Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio. The
warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful (Nolasco
v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1
kilos of marijuana. The warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were
lawful.
People v Burgos
FACTS: RTC of Davao convicted Ruben Burgos the crime of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of subversion.
One Casar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
stating that he was recruited by Ruben Burgos to join the NPA, threatening him
with the firearm if he refused.
Upon receipt of the information, the authorities dispatched to arrest Ruben
Burgos through the help of his brother Pedro Burgos, in which the former was
found plowing in the field. In the house of Ruben Burgos, he denied possession of
the firearm but when his wife was questioned by one of the authorities, his wife
pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. After
the firearm was discovered, Ruben Burgos pointed out the subversive documents
which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of cogon grass.
Ruben Burgos was tortured during the investigation in order to obtain an
admission of possession of the firearms
ISSUE: WON The trial court erred in holding that the arrest of accused-appellant
without valid warrant to be lawful.
RULING: YES, Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who
has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual
possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing
any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field
at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body
and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The
statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest
is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when
securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by
the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or
extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so
would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated
and so deserving of full protection.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not
enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal
report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed
a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The
subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the
lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without
warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened
or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is
necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the
arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to
first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime.
There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on
the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts
of the accused were unknown
People v Saycon
Facts: Alvaro Saycon (D) was charged with violating the Dangerous Drugs Act
when he was found with "shabu".
At about 6:00am, a Coastguard personnel received information from a NARCOM
agent that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon (D) was on
board the MV Doña Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete
City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer ordered a
combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel to
intercept the suspect.
The vessel docked at 6:00am that same morning at Dumaguete City. Saycon (D)
alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint
manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by a police officer
of the NARCOM. Saycon (D) was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at
the Pier area and he willingly went with them. At the headquarters, Saycon (D)
was asked to open his bag and he willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings
and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a cigarette pack
containing the suspected "shabu". When asked whether the cigarette pack
containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon (D) merely bowed his head.
Then, Saycon (D), his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the
NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM
agents did not have a warrant of arrest.
Issues: Is the warrantless search valid? Is the warrantless arrest valid?
Ruling: Yes. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to
the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. "There are certain
exceptions recognized in our law," the Court noted in People vs. Barros. The
exception which appears most pertinent in respect of the case at bar is that
relating to the search of moving vehicles. In People vs. Barros, the Court said:
Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles
without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a
judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant may be sought. (People vs. Bagista, supra; People vs. Lo
Ho Wing, supra) In Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 (1989),
the Court stated:
"Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case."
 When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents
or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the
subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
The Court considers that a valid warrantless search had been conducted. It
follows that the warrantless arrest of Saycon (D) which ensued forthwith, was
also valid and lawful.
Posadas vs. CA (August 2, 1990/GR 89139)
FACTS:
On October 16, 1986, Officers Ungab and Umpar were
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. At
that time, they spotted Posadas (the petitioner) who was carrying a
“buri” bag and they noticed that the latter was acting suspiciously.
The officers approached the petitioner and the former identified
themselves as member of the Integrated National Police (INP). The
petitioner, thereafter, attempted to flee from the officers,
prompting the latter to give chase. They caught the petitioner and
subsequently conducted a search on the “buri” bag where they
found firearms, ammunitions, and a smoke grenade. After
investigation it was found that the petitioner had no license to
possess the aforementioned firearms, a case was then filed against
the petitioner.
During trial, the petitioner argued that the articles
confiscated should be held inadmissible as evidence since the
arrest was illegal, there being no warrant of arrest, and the
resulting search and seizure should also be held illegal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the search and seizure, which was preceded by a
warrantless arrest, was valid.
2. Whether or not the act of fleeing from an investigating officer
would constitute probable cause.
RULING:
Yes, the S&S was valid. The court justified the validity as
follows:
1. “There are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost
of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at
military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of
which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa.”
2. “As between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military
or police checkpoints and the search in the case at bar, there is no
question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering
that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable
cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search
the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall
have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise
may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.”
The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a
"stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the
identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information. This is illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio.
People v Tangliben
PRINCIPLE/DOCTRINE:
1. Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
2. Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
NOTE: Accused guilty of possession of marijuana under Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6425.
FACTS: Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and companion were conducting surveillance
mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas,
San Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance was aimed not only against
persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons
who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information
supplied by informers; that it was around 9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen
noticed a person caring a traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they
confronted him; that the person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and
Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede
later on when the patrolmen identified themselves; that found inside the bag
were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more
or less.
Trial Court:
Found the Accused guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Respondent alleged the following:
1. The marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful
search without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence;
2. Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves
supposedly seized from him was never authenticated and therefore should not
have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana
package brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for
examination did not contain a tag bearing the name of the accused; and
3. Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted
was insufficient and doubtful and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt as
the informer should have been presented before the lower court.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the evidence allegedly seized from the defendant-appellant was a
product of an unlawful search without
warrant
2. W/N the evidence is admissible as it was never authenticated
3. W/N the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search were (sic) acquired by them in the official performance of their duties and then,
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on (sic) being no showing that they are prejudiced against the accused, their
Criminal Procedure provides: “Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A testimonies deserve full credit.
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search People v Bagista
warrant.” Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides: A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit September 18, 1992
an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of
Facts:
his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless
search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. Although the
On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning, the Narcotics
trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes
reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the Arix Building,
carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers Bokawkan Road, Baguio City, received information from one of its regular
had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly
hair, and with a height of 5’2″ or 5’3″, would be transporting marijuana
SECOND ISSUE:
The marijuana package examined by the forensic checklist was satisfactorily from up north. Acting upon this piece of information, they established a
identified as the one seized from accused. Patrolman Quevedo testified that he checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both private and public, coming
gave the marijuana package together with a letter-request for examination, and from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana
the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified that she received the
leaves on board.
marijuana together with the letter-request and said letter-request bore the name
of the accused, then the requirements of proper authentication of evidence were
After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco
sufficiently complied with.
THIRD ISSUE: bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which came from
This Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer, Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon
where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to Sgt. Parajas announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents
the prosecution's case. As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule
that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their
and that they were going to search their baggages. At the back, Sgt.
testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side (as one is
by the appellate court. The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with
Silverio Quevedo and Romeo Punzalan are positive and sufficiently clean to show black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and
the commission by the accused of the offense herein chatted. These prosecution
witnesses have no motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious discovered three (3) bundles of
offense against the accused. The knowledge on what these witnesses testified to
marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the contents
thereof were confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought
to the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked and
investigated.

Issue:

WON probable cause is present in the conduct of the warrantless search?

WON the warrantless search is valid?

Held:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures

admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful
arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle,
15 and the seizure of evidence in plain view. This in no way, however,
gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause.

In the case at bar, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and
search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in
view of the confidential information they received from their regular
informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-
appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have
probable cause to search accused-appellant’s belongings since she fits the
description given by the NARCOM informant.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is

hereby AFFIRMED in toto.