A Comprehensive Digest of the Majority Opinions

from:

Republic Vs. Sereno

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

Imbong Vs. Ochoa

G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

Legal Research

Submitted by: Yahweh Vincent Cesar R. Ybanez III

Submitted to: Atty. Gilbert Augustin Ganir

Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General
Jose C. Calida
vs.
Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, filed a
Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void
Respondent Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (SC) and to
oust and altogether exclude her therefrom.

When the position for Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced
the opening for applications and nominations, requiring applicants to submit all previous
SALNs up to 31 December 2011(instead of the usual last two years of public service)
and stating that, “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements
will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.”

Respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III on 25 August 2012. Five
years later, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon with the House
Committee of Justice. Included in the complaint was the allegation that Respondent
failed to make a truthful statement of her SALNs. Such complaint filed in the House
spawned a letter dated 21 February 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG requesting
the latter to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Respondent.

Issues:

Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition
for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom
an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives;

Ruling:
Yes. SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto. Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions
for quo warranto. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the
venue for an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when
commenced by the Solicitor General..While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct
invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this case is justified considering that the
qualification of a Member of the Court is in question, and the issue is of public concern.

The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental importance. The instant petition is one
of first impression and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that the
qualification, eligibility and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest
official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an action for quo warranto.

On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable officer such that a quo

warranto petition cannot prosper, the Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of
impeachment and quo warranto arematerially different. While both impeachment and
quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings
materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature;
while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the
courts.

Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or

invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office. Even the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the
Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. In fact, this would not be the
first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an
impeachable Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does
not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers: “[T]he Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office ...” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which, in
statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect. An option to remove by impeachment admits of
an alternative mode of effecting the removal.

The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is
not violative of thedoctrine of separation of powers. At the outset, an action for quo
warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a
writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude the House of
Representatives from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for
impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude the
Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment. In this
case, it is incidental that the non-filing of SALNs also formed part of the allegations in
the Articles of Impeachment, which in itself is a Constitutional requirement, the violation
of which constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution. But unlike other impeachable
officers, Respondent’s position also demands compliance with the qualifications of
having to be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence —
and the failure to submit SALNs goes into the very qualification of integrity.

The exercise of judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, is
thus misplaced. An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that
Respondent will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s
duty to settle an actual controversy squarely presented before it. There is also no
possibility of a constitutional crisis upon which an abdication of such duty is to be
premised because, as discussed, it is within the Court’s judicial power to settle
justiciable issues or actual controversies involving rights, which are legally demandable
and enforceable. It is not arrogating upon itself the power to impeach, which is a political
exercise.

Source Strength of Source Reason for Source

Strength
It is a strong source for
it provides that the
venue of an action
for quo warranto, when
Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules Strong commenced by the
of Court Solicitor General, is
either the Regional
Trial Court in the City of
Manila, in the Court of
Appeals, or in the
Supreme Court. It is a
procedural process
It is argued by the
petition that the source
cannot be served as a
precedent over the
case because it is
Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo Strong dismissed. However,
the court ruled that the
sourced case was
dismissed not because
the Court had no
jurisdiction over the quo
warranto petition but
 because Petitioner’s
challenge to the
respondent’s
presidency had no
merit. Therefore, the
source is strong
because it has been an
example of an earlier
case of quo warranto
that the Court took full
jurisdiction over.
It is a strong source
mainly because it is a
Section 5 Article III of the Constitutional Provision
Constitution Strong that states the
jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court on Quo
Warranto Cases
It is a strong source
because it is a
constitutional provision
Section 4 Article VII of the that states that the
Constitution Strong Court is designated as
the sole judge of the
qualifications the
President and Vice-
President, who are
impeachable officers.
A preceding case that
states that the writ of
Divinagracia v. Consolidated quo warranto simply
Broadcasting System, Inc. Strong complements the
“traditional separation
of powers that come to
bear in our analysis.”
The source states that
the impeachment court,
Paolo Celeridad, Evidence of the Senate, is tribunal
Character: The Burden of composed of politicians
Proving the Truth with respect who are indubitably
to the Political Nature of versed in pragmatic
Impeachment Trials by Means decision making and
of Substantial Evidence, 87 Weak cognizant of political
PHIL. L.J. 985 (2013). repercussions of acts
purported to have been
committed by
impeachable officials. It
is week because it
simply states the
composition of the
impeachment court.

Whether the petition is out rightly dismissible on the ground of prescription;

Ruling:
The one-year limitation is not applicable when the Petitioner is not a mere private
individual pursuing a private interest, but the government itself seeking relief for a public
wrong and suing for public interest. In the three instances enumerated by Rules of
Court, the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to commence the necessary
quo warranto petition, as seen in the use of the word “must.” In Agcaoili v. Suguitan, “As
a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal,
have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right.” In
effect, when the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to
assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or prescription.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of
an action for quo warranto, which is to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority
unlawfully asserted. The Republic, then, cannot be faulted for questioning Respondent’s
qualification for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster.

Respondent cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she should not be
required to submit the said documents as she was considered to be coming from private
practice; that it was not feasible to retrieve most of her records in the academe
considering that the same are more than fifteen years old; and that U.P. already cleared
her of “all academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities
and from administrative charges”. She has never been clear on whether she had filed
the required SALNs or not. Given the foregoing, there can be no acquiescence or
inaction, in this case, on the part of the Republic as would amount to an abandonment
of its right to seek redress against a public wrong and vindicate public interest.

Lastly, the Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of the novel issues
imbued with public interest presented before Us than to dismiss the case outright
merely on technicality

Source Stngth of Source Reason for Source

Section 2, Rule 66 of the
Rules of court
Agcaoili v. Suguitan
Strength
This source gives the
Solicitor General the
Strong obligation to commence any
necessary quo warranto
petitions.
The ruling states that
whenever the Government
is a party of interest, they
can be no defense on the
ground of laches and
Strong prescription. Therefore,
being the Chief Justice, a
public office, the
Government certainly is a
party of interest,
prescription is not an issue.

Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:

Ruling:
No.

Whether the determination of candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the
character of political question outside the Court's supervisory and review
powers;

Ruling:
No. The Court’s supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the
JBC complies with its own rules. In interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the
power of the JBC, it is consistently held that the Court’s supervisory power consists of
seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures.
 Source
Judge Villanueva v.
Judicial and Bar Council,
757 Phil. 534 (2015)
Source Strength Reason for Source
Strength
A preceding case which
ruled that “ As when the
policies of the JBC are
being attacked, the Court,
Strong through its supervisory
authority over the me, has
the duty to inquire about the
matter and ensure that the
JBC is compliant with its
own rules”

Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and
required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether
the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of respondent as
Chief Justice;

Ruling:
Yes. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of
SALN intimately relates to a person’s integrity. Contrary to Respondent’s postulation
that the filing of SALN bears no relation to the requirement of integrity, the filing of
SALN itself is a Constitutional and statutory requirement, under Section 17,
Article XI of the Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Faithful compliance with the requirement
of the filing of SALN is rendered even more exacting when the public
official concerned is a member of the Judiciary.

Source Strength of Source Reason for Source

Strength
A constitutional provision
Section 17 Article XI of the Strong stating the requirement
Constitution of the SALN to hold
public office
A statutory provision that
enumerates the possible
grounds for ouster, quo
warranto, or
Republic Act No. 3019 Strong impeachment which
clearly states that the
non- submission of
SALN is a ground
thereof.
A statutory law that
exhibits the allowable
The Code of Conduct and and prohibited acts of a
Ethical Standards of Public Strong person holding public
Officials and Employees office. Where section 8
thereof, states that
government official
should have full
disclosure of their Net
Assets.

Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required

by the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the
nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;

Ruling:
 Yes. The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those
applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not
to have been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. The established
and undisputed fact is Respondent failed to submit the required number of SALNs in
violation of the rules set by the JBC itself during the process of nomination. The JBC
determined that she did not submit her SALNs from 1986 to 2006 and that, as remarked
by Senator Escudero, the filing thereof during those years was already required. There
was no indication that the JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the years 2009, 2010 and
2011) submitted by Respondent for her 20 years as a professor in the U.P. College of
Law and two years as Justice, as substantial compliance. Respondent was specifically
singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of
SALN for her years of service in the U.P. College of Law. For these reasons, the JBC
should no longer have considered Respondent for interview as it already required the
submission of, at least, the SALNs corresponding to the immediately preceding 10
years up to December 31, 2011.

Source Source Strength Reason for Source

Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge
Usman
Section 17, Article XI of
the Constitution
Strength
The source case states that
“While every office in the
government service is
public trust, no position
exacts greater demand on
moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual
than seat in the Judiciary.
Judges are strictly
Strong mandated to abide with the
law, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and with existing
administrative policies in
order to maintain the faith
of our people in the
administration of justice.”
Therefor filing of SALN is a
must to prove ones integrity
in holding an office in the
judiciary, if not done so, the
appointment will be void.
It is a constitutional
provision that “public officer
or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as
Strong often thereafter as may be
required by law, submit
declaration under oath of
his assets, liabilities, and
net worth.”

In case of finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief

Justice, whether or not the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the
appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.

Ruling:
No. Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice. As the qualification of proven
integrity goes into the barest standards set forth under the Constitution to qualify as a
Member of the Court, the subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will
not qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In other words, the inclusion of
Respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President cannot override the
minimum Constitutional qualifications.
Source Source Strength Reason for Source
Strength
It is stated in the source
Luego v. Civil Service Strong that “Appointment is an
Commission essentially discretionary
power and must be
performed by the officer in
which it is vested according
to his best lights, the only
condition being that the
appointee should possess
the qualifications required
by law.”

Whether respondent is de jure or de facto officer.

Ruling:

De Facto. The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible

therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers
on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification,
Respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, Respondent has never attained the status of an
impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is
justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper
to oust Respondent from the appointive position of Chief Justice.

Source Source Strength Reason for Source

Tayko v. Capistrano
Strength
Defining a “De Facto
Judge”, the source states
that “de facto judge is one
who exercises the duties of
judicial office under color of
an appointment or election
thereto. He differs, on the
one hand, from mere
usurper who undertakes to
act officially without any
Strong color of right, and on the
others hand, from judge de
jure who is in all respects
legally appointed and
qualified and whose term of
office has not expired” For
being a de facto officer, it
was ruled that “As such,
respondent has never
attained the status of an
impeachable official and
her removal from the office,
other than by impeachment,
is justified.”
 Imbong Vs. Ochoa
Facts:

The enactment by the Congress on December 21, 2012 of the RA No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law)
was pushed through by Congress despite calls to withdraw support there to.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the juris
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and two petitions- in-intervention. A
perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law

Issues:

Whether or not RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the right to life:

Ruling:
No. The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent
abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent
and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section
4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also
those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the
State has a bounded duty to protect it.

Source Source Strength Reason for Source

Strength
It supports the legal
meaning of the stated
provision of Article II,
Chavez vs. JBC Section 12 of 1987
G.R. No. 202242, July 17, Strong Constitution. The case
201 2, 676 SCRA 579 states that in statutory
construction that the words
of the Constitution should
be interpreted in their plain
and ordinary meaning.

Whether or not RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional

for violating the right to health

Ruling:

NO. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the
prescription of a duly-licensed physician.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in
place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of
the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives
it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done
following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De
Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or
loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered

“mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and
approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal,
non-abortificient and effective”.

Source Source Strength Reason for Source

Strength
Justice Leonardo- De
Separate Opinion (Justice Castro reiterates that,
Leonardo-De Castro) p. 54. Strong protecting the people is the
responsibility and burden of
the government.

Whether or not RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the freedom of religion and right to free speech

Ruling:
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint;
or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the
authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.

Source Source Strength Reason for Source

. religious freedom question
Estrada v. Escritor, 455
Phil. 4 11 , 560 (2003).
Strength
The case sees that the
involving only one person
or majority of persons does
not alter the paramount
Strong importance of the question
for the "constitution
commands the positive
protection by government of
religious freedom -not only
for a minority, however
small- not only for a
majority, however large- but
for each of us."

Whether or not the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it
mandates the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene
the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners

Ruling:
No. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict
other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment
Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program
through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

Source Strength of Source Reason for Source

Strength
The source is a
Strong constitutional provision that
states that “No law shall be
Article III, Section 5 of the made respecting an
Constitution establishment of religion”.
Therefore, allowing religion
to bar the state in pursuing
its legitimate secular
activities will be against the
constitution

Whether or not the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by

compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers,
under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their
conscientious objections

Ruling:

Yes. Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical

practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the
law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections
based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of
the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.

Source Strength of Source Reason for Source

Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution
Strength
The source states that “ the
free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and
worship, without
discrimination or
preference, shall forever be
Strong allowed” Hence, by
compelling medical
practitioners or hospital
personnel to accommodate
Reproductive Health
Services although it is
against their religious
beliefs will clearly violate the
Constitution.

Whether or not the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by

requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage
license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and
infant nutrition.

Ruling:
NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police
power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning
methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept
or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of
family life without the intervention of the State.

(No Source)

Whether or not RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

Ruling:
YES. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with
only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal
content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law
cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of
marriage and the family.

Source Strength of Source Reason for Source

Strength
It was ruled in this case that
“the right to privacy as such
Morje v. Mutuc 130 Phil. is accorded recognition
415 (1968) Strong independently of its
identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection."

Whether or not RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the freedom of expression and academic freedom

Ruling:
NO. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH
Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an
actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education

has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in
the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents
in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.

Source Strength of Source Reason for Source

Strength
Records, 1986 The source emphasize the
Constitutional Convention, Strong role of the parents in the
Volume IV, pp. 401-402 .) family and to the state.
Whether or not RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the due process clause.

Ruling:
No. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as
the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague. The
definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section
4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health
care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health
care service provider. The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to
include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals
operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern
family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from
giving RH information and procedures. The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”.
Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly”
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the
nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

Source Strength of Source Reason for Source

Philippine International
Trading Corporation v.
COA, G.R. No. 1835 17,
June 22, 2010, 621 SC RA
461, 469.
Strength
It was ruled in the source
that “statute must be
interpreted with reference to
the context, that is, every
part of it must be construed
Strong together with the other parts
and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole
enactment.” Hence, the
petitioners claim for
vagueness is not tenable.

Whether or not RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the equal protection clause

Ruling:
No. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section
11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs
of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to
the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education

program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom
of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to
consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

(No Source)

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the prohibition against involuntary servitude
Ruling:
No. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the
practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH
service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of
this digest.)

Source Strength of Source Reason for Source

Strength
Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo A jurisprudence that defines
(G. R. No. 205478), p. 8 Strong the meaning of Involuntary
servitude

Whether or not the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential
Drugs List is valid

Ruling:
NO. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether
or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the
FDA not only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover
health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act
of 2009).

(No Source)

Whether or not the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local
Governments and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

Ruling:
No. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments.
Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local government
unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over
a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of

these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.

Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely
delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These
provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation
that would benefit the general welfare.

Source Strength of Source Reason for Source Strength

A case where the
Kida v. Senate of the discussion is centered on
Philippines, G.R. No. RA 6734 also known as “An
196271, October 18, 2011, Strong Act providing for an Organic
659 SCRA 270, 306. Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim
Mindanao.”