ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner , vs.HON.

COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,

REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents.G.R. No. 162571
June 15, 2005 CORONA,FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued
Martin’s allegedbiological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite
before theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.The baby’s birth certificate
waspurportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expensesbut
later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financialcapacity and
even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied havingfathered the child. In
his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affairand intimacy with Fe had
allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. Arnel alsoclaimed that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in theacknowledgment of Martin’s birth certificate
were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected hismarital status as single when he was actually married
and that his birth year was 1965 when itshould have been 1964. In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17,
2002, Arnel vehemently deniedhaving sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal
to settle the case. OnJuly 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties tosubmit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.
Arnelopposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He
alsomoved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on thebirth
certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled tosupport if not
recognized by the putative father. Petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized bythis Court as a
conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testingviolates his right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987Constitution. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the partiesto submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court ofAppeals affirmed the trial court.ISSUE:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support withoutviolating
petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.HELD: Petitioner posits
that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means ofproving paternity. He also contends
that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and rightagainst self-incrimination as guaranteed
under the 1987 Constitution. The petition is withoutmerit. Given that this is the very first time that the
admissibility of DNA testing as a means fordetermining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a
controversy, a brief historical sketchof our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called
for.In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee where the appellant was convicted of murder on
thetestimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an orbiter dictum that “while
eyewitnessidentification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms
ofidentification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result (emphasis supplied).”Our faith in
DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Limv. Court of Appeals,
promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because “DNA,being a relatively new
science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts.Paternity (would) still have
to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevantincriminating acts, verbal and
written, by the putative father.In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous
relations with the petitioner,as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer,
petitioner admittedthat he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered Martin, claiming
that he hadended the relationship long before the child’s conception and birth. It is undisputed and
evenadmitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The
onlyremaining question is whether such sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did,
asrespondents have alleged, then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitionerand
Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has noobligation
to give support