FIRST DIVISION

[GR No. L-163. April 27, 1946.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , complainant-

appealed , against MAXIMO APLEGIDO, RAYMUNDO
CARRERA and FELIX PENASO, accused.RAYMUNDO
CARRERA , appellant .

Mr. Mariano A. Albert on behalf of the appellant.

Assistant Attorney General Kapunan, jr. and the Baptist Attorney on

behalf of the Government.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE; LACK OF IDENTITY OR COMMUNITY

OF PURPOSE BETWEEN THE AGGRESSORS; INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY; CASE OF CARS. - There is no evidence that lost three
defendants, including the appellant, in the acts of successive aggression that
they executed against the CP, had previously arranged to assault and kill him,
or if they were agreed to that end in the course of the fray. What, on the
contrary, appears clear in the case file is that each aggressor carried out the
attack independently of the other, as it occurred to him instantaneously,
without doing that joint work ( team work) that will denote a conspiracy and a
solidarity tactic of aggression. It is also clear from the record that the fatal
injuries were those inflicted by the MA and FP defendants. In cases of this
nature, it is firmly established jurisprudence that each aggressor responds
responds individually to their actions, to the extent and extent of their personal
participation. "Simultaneity and conjunction in the agrider is not enough;
identity or community of purpose among aggressors is necessary."
 2. ID .; ID .; CONSPIRACY TEST - The conspiracy, concert or common
criminal purpose must be established by positive and conclusive evidence.
3 ID .; ID .; DEFINITION OF "COMPLICE." - According to article 17 of
the Revised Criminal Code, the perpetrators of the crime (1) are those who
take a direct part in the execution of the act; (2) those who directly force or
induce others to be executed; (3) those who cooperate in the execution of the
act by an act without which it had not been carried out. Complices are those
that do not, being included in article 17, cooperate in the execution of the act
by previous or simultaneous acts. VIada gives this comprehensive definition:
"It is an accomplice of a crime that cooperates in its execution for previous or
simultaneous acts, provided that it has not taken a direct part in said
execution, nor has it directly forced or induced others to execute it, even if it
has cooperated. to its execution for an indisputable act, because if it were one
or the other of these circumstances, it would no longer be an accomplice but
an author . " From the aforementioned it is inferred that complicity implies a
certain participation in the will or purpose that generates the crime,
since cooperating means wanting or wanting something in common. But that
will or common purpose does not necessarily mean prior intelligence , as the
defense attorney asserts, since it can be explained or extracted from the
circumstances of each case.

DECISION

BRIONES , M : p

It is the appeal filed by Raymundo Carrera against the judgment of the

Court of First Instance of Iloilo in which he is convicted of murder, as co-
author, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years, and one (1) day
of major prison to fourteen (14) years, seven (7) months and one (1) day of
temporary seclusion, jointly and severally in the sum of P2,000, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay the costs of the trial. Its co-defendants
Maximino Aplegido and Felix Penaso are just sorry, but the latter two have not
appealed the sentence by opting to break into it.
The following facts have been established beyond any doubt, when the
appellant's own ex officio lawyer says:
At about 5 p.m. on July 30, 1944, Maximino Aplegido, who sold manga
fruits and goodies on the outskirts of a biscuit, had a quarrel with Silverio
Esgana, because he, despite not having his way in the bargain of the price of
the sleeves, kicked the basket that contained them, scattering them on the
floor. Indignant at this behavior, Maximino gave Silverio a penknife on the left
side of his chest. While unarmed, Silverio ran, but having run into a man
carrying a sickle he seized it and returned to where Maximino was hurting him
with the sickle in the face and escaping immediately. Maximino, more furious,
pursued Silverio, whom he managed to reach by inflicting a stab in the back.
At this juncture Canuto Prudente, father-in-law of Silverio, arrived on
the scene and participated in the fight to help his son-in-law. Then without
more Felix Penaso, Maximino's nephew and like this seller of sleeves and
peddler, I take Canuto Prudente on his own by hitting him on the back of his
head with a blackjack commonly called a caborrata . It was at this precise
moment when the appellant, Raymundo Carrera, also a peddler, presumably
entered the scene to help his fellow buhoenria, attacking Canuto with a knife
for cockfighting, causing a wound of a little or so near his right elbow an inch
in length Then Felix Penaso hit Canuto Prudente with the blackjack again on
the right cheek and on the forehead, whose results Canuto fell to the
ground. In this, Maximino finished the attack by stabbing Canuto in the
stomach, who died moments later that same afternoon.
The district nurse who examined the corpse found a large wound on the
right forehead an inch or so in diameter; another large wound on the right
cheek half an inch in diameter a little or so; and another large wound on the
right side of the head, also an inch or so in diameter. These three wounds
were inflicted by the defendant Felix Penaso through a blunt instrument. The
nurse also found two other wounds caused by a sharp weapon: a large one
under the left nipple, about three inches in length, caused by the accused
Maximino Aplegido, and another on the outer side of the right arm, near the
elbow, an inch or so in length, caused by the appellant.
The appellant's defense in the first instance was that of an alibi, but his
ex officio lawyer on appeal has abandoned said defense and admits the
presence and participation of the appellant in the brawl that culminated in the
murder of cars. But to what degree was that participation and what is the
responsibility resulting from it? Is the sentence of the lower court condemned
to the appellant as co-author correct? Both the accusation and the defense
agree that SS the sentencing judge erred in assessing the facts and the law
applicable to them. It is evident from the evidence that the fight in which the
death of the deceased occurred unexpectedly, without prior concert or formed
at the moment between the actors to commit the accused homicide. It also
results from the evidence that the sole intervention of the appellant was
reduced to a razor blade (fighting cock razor) that caused a wound that could
not be of serious consequences on the right arm of the deceased, near the
elbow. There is no evidence that the three defendants, including the
appellant, in the acts of successive aggregation they executed against Canuto
Prudente, had previously arranged to assault and kill him, or even that they
would be arranged for that purpose in the course of the fray. What, on the
contrary, is clear in the case file is that each aggressor carried out the attack
independently of the other, as it occurred to him instantaneously, without
doing that joint work ( team work ) that would denote a conspiracy and a
solidary tactic of aggression. It is also clear from the records that the fatal
injuries were inflicted by the accused Maximino Aplegido and Felix Penaso. In
cases of this nature, it is firmly established jurisprudence that each aggressor
responds individually to their actions, to the extent and extent of their personal
participation. "Simultaneity or community of purpose among aggressors is not
enough" (Pueblo v. Caballero, 53 Jr. Fil., 623, 634, in which several decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain are cited; Pueblo v. Tamayo, 44 Jr. Fil., 40;
United States vs. Solis, 4 Jur. Fil., 180). And the conspiracy, concert or
common criminal purpose must be established by positive and conclusive
evidence (Pueblo v. Ancheta, 66 Phil., 638; Lawyers Journal of March 15,
1939).
Established that the appellant is not a co-author of the homicide, the
defense and the accusation disagree, however, in appreciating his criminal
responsibility, considering that he is merely injured, minor or less serious,
while the accusation is considered as an accomplice. In these cases the
border that divides the criminal responsibility of the participants in the
aggression is so tenuous, so subtle that it is very difficult sometimes to
highlight it. It is not possible to establish a priori , fixed and
inflexible rules . The safest is to examine the circumstances of each case well
and delineate with them the contours of each responsibility.
According to article 17 of our Revised Criminal Code, the perpetrators
(1) are those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; (2) those who
force or directly induce others to execute it; (3) those who cooperate in the
execution of the act by an act without which it would not have been
effected. Complices are those that do not, being included in article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous acts. Viada
gives this comprehensive definition: "It is anaccomplice of a crime that
cooperates in its execution for previous or simultaneous acts, provided it has
not taken a direct part in said execution, nor has it directly forced or induced
others to execute it, nor has it cooperated to its execution by an indispensable
act, because if there were one or the other of these circumstances, they will
no longer be an accomplice but an author . "
From the aforementioned it is inferred that complicity implies a certain
participation in the will or purpose generating the crime,
because cooperating meanswanting or wanting something in common. But
that will or common purpose does not necessarily mean prior intelligence , as
the defense lawyer asserts, because it can be explained or extracted from the
circumstances of each case. Let us apply, verbigracia, reciocinio to the case
at hand. Undoubtedly, the appellant had no prior agreement with his co-
defendants to attack and kill Canuto Prudente. It is evident that the bloody
quarrel was a sequel to a sudden and momentary altercation, resulting from
the haggling over the price of the sleeves and caused by the kick that Silverio
Esgana gave to the basket in which they were placed scattering them on the
ground.But it is also unquestionable that the Appeal participated to some
extent in the common homicidal will as it can be dedurced of the following
circumstances: (1) the appellant was also a peddler and merchant in sleeves
like his co-defendants, so he would have felt dragged into the fight by
something like spirit of body or class; (2) the appellant was present from the
beginning of the fight; he saw or had occasion to see that his co-defendants
were provided with effective weapons to kill, the one with a blackjack
( caborrata ), and the other with a dagger; saw or had occasion to see when
the accused Penaso hit Prudente with the blackjack on the back of his head
leaving him stunned and wobbly; so when at this time of the fight the appellant
intervened with the razor that mention has been made, he knew very well the
turn of the fight was to death, that his co-defendants threw to kill (perhaps he
also threw to kill), and that , given all that the circumstances, the violent death
of the adversary could be the eventual result of the quarrel; (3) It is true that
the injury caused by the appellant was not fatal — and therefore, his
responsibility is only that of complicity — with all such injury he was able to
weaken the Western defenses and thus contribute to the dire result, that is,
his death . Here, then, is a case in which there was no prior agreement
or intelligence to commit murder, but participation in the common homicidal
purpose was interwoven by the same circumstances of the case.
The appellant's lawyer cites, in support of his thesis, some cases of our
criminal jurisprudence, among which the most typical and the most similar to
the one he occupies is undoubtedly the cause of the United
States against Magcomot (13 Jur. Fil., 392 ), under the presentation of the
distinguished Magistrate Mr. Map.However, from a simple reading of the
paper it is clear that the facts in this case are substantially different from those
that make up the one that concerns us. In that case the defendants were one
Epiphany Magcomot and his sons Clemente and Isidro. According to the
evidence of the accusation, these last two quarreled in a game of "mount"
with one called Bonifacio Gabales, and while they held him he came suddenly
and unexpectedly Epifanio, who came from quite a distance, and with a
flamenco knife he attacked and hurt Bonifacio, whose results this
death. Clemente and Isidro did not inflict any injury to the west. SS the Judge
sentinciador found the three defendants convicted of murder as perpetrators,
but this Court married the sentence absolving the children exclusively
imputing responsibility to the father. The enlightened rapporteur, reasoning
the ruling, makes several considerations:
"The arrival of this place was completely casual and unexpected
and he started so unexpectedly, so immediately according to testimony
of the witnesses of the accusation, that they probably would not have
been able to avoid it even if their coprocessors had wanted it, and it was
possible that they would not even they would have noticed the
aggression until after it had been consummated, given the unexpected
and sudden of it and the darkness of the night, busy as they were in
holding the deceased at that time. All circumstances of the case being
taken into account, we are convinced that this aggression was executed
without the will, which is the primary basis of all criminal responsibility,
there are no skillful terms to make those responsible for such aggression
and its consequences, without obsessing that the acts of violence
executed by the victims have been simultaneous themselves and the
Epiphany on the person of the deceased, because simultaneity does not
necessarily prove alone the concert d and wills, or the unity of action and
purpose that generate collective responsibility, and without which it is of
rigorous justice, in good principles of law, that each one responds
individually only to what he himself executed. (United States v.
Magcomot, 13 Jur. Fil., Pags, 392, 395.).

As seen above, the evidence in the present case demonstrates that

when the appellant was well placed in it. Suddenly, Maximino Aplegido had
already hit with the blackjack to the deceased in the back of the head making
the same tambalease. It was at this precise moment that the appellant gave a
razor to the deceased in the right arm, near the elbow, and then Applegious
stabbed him to this one under the left tetilla. From these facts it is evident not
only that there was some correlation in the acts of aggression of the accused,
but above all that the appellant was or had to be aware of the attitude of his
co-defendants, a circumstance that was missing in the aforementioned cause
of Magcomot.
We have examined the precedents cited in his allegation by the
Attorney General and we consider the most relevant and applicable case of
Pueblo v. Cortes (55 Jur. Fil., 152). We adhere to what has been declared
and resolved in that case, and in addition to the judgments of the Spanish
Supreme Court cited therein, we believe that the following may also be cited
in support of the doctrine that is reaffirmed here.
"As a result of a dispute between the interfected and the
defendants, they undertake it with cheeks with acquel, and taking one of
them a knife from the puncture in the belly, which causes death within a
few hours: they should be qualified as Complicates of this homicide are
those defendants who only beat and mistreated the interfect, but without
a herile? —The Supreme Court has resolved the affirmative, based on
the fact that the facts presented, practiced by said defendants, can only
be regarded as complices of the murderer, because they were
simultaneous to it and contributed to take away the victim's strength and
means of defense, making the principal aggressor possible and even
easy what otherwise might not have been possible. (Judgment of May
24, 1879, Gazettes of 9 and August 10)

"The one who, having taken part in a dispute or question that a

partner had with the interfect, when meeting him, knocks him to the
ground, in whose situation his partner kicks him in the head that causes
death, will be responsible as complice of the executed homicide? —The
Supreme Court has resolved the affirmative: 'Considering that no
mistake has been made regarding the involvement of the accomplice
that is attributed by the court room to the defendant Manuel Callejo,
 because appearing and taking part in the issues they had with the
interfect and his companions on that night, and lately throwing him to the
ground, in whose situation Victoriano Vela gave him a kick in the head,
whose results he died, there is no doubt that I cooperate to take place
the homicide for previous acts and simultaneously , and, consequently,
not being included in the cases of article 13 of the Criminal Code to
consider the author, the provisions of 15, etc., are applicable '(Judgment
of July 6, 1881, Gazette of 15th September.) "(2 Viada, 5 Edition,
to

pp. 430, 431.)

We conclude, then, that the appellant is responsible as an accomplice,

and by applying article 52 in relation to article 249 of the Revised Criminal
Code, as well as the provisions of the law on an indeterminate sentence, we
condemn him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than six (6)
months and one (1) correctional prison day, or more than eight (8) years and
one (1) major prison day. The appellant is also sentenced to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500. This modification confirms the
sentence appealed in everything else. That's how it is ordered.
Moran, Pres. Paras, Jaranilla, Feria, and Pablo, MM., Are satisfied.
(The People of the Philippines v. Aplegido, GR No. L-163, [April 27, 1946], 76
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PHIL 571-580)