LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ASSO.

OF LDB EMPLOYEES and GARCIA

G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995

DOCTRINE: Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original
jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over
(1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and
(2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction over
other labor disputes.
On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has jurisdiction over the
following enumerated cases:
. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of
the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes,
the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving
wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the
legality of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity
benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons
in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

FACTS: From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: Whether or
not the company has violated the CBA provision and the MOA on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers. Atty.
Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position Paper ; LDB, on the
other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator
reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.
Without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the CBA provision nor
the MOA on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

ISSUE: WON a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the CA and not the SC
HELD: The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such
arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the
appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter. The “(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the
Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission …” Hence, while
there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is
silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not,
elevated to the SC itself on a petition for certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator
with the NLRC or the CA. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary
burden upon it.

NOTES:
1. In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person
for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties who have
bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding. Arbitration may be
classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.
Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the
government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their
dispute through arbitration by a third party. 1 The essence of arbitration remains since a
resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final
and binding on the parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally
appointed by the government.

Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the parties is made,
pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial third
person for a final and binding resolution. 2 Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be
complied with by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an
arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they
are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular
dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and
decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator’s decision.

89. G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU,

FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, vs. THE INSULAR
LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

DOCTRINE: The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike
following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next
day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an
unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through
dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining
representatives.
FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance
Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees
Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation
of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate CBAs with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; tried to dissuade
the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National
Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.

Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of
the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as
assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department. Enaje was hired as
personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel
for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.

Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on the
Union’s proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result
of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for “deadlock on collective
bargaining.” The issue was dropped subsequently (in short, nagkasundo). But, the parties
negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter
of salary increases.

Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in

responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to
strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.

On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, sent to each of the
strikers a letter. Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who
were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter. Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and
with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against the
strikers with the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila.xxx

Another letter was sent by the company to the individual strikers: If you are still interested in
continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges pending
against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this
date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement. Before, the
decisions was yours to make. So it is now.

Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions,
except 3, were dismissed by the fiscal’s office and by the courts. These three cases involved
“slight physical injuries” against one striker and “light coercion” against two others.
* However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia.

CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic
Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the
members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out
individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise
of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning
them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and
(2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the
strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent company is guilty of ULP

HELD: YES. The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike
following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next
day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an
unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through
dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining
representatives.

Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union
as the employees’ bargaining representative.

Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his
representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair
labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to
undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free
from the employer’s molestation.

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to “bribe” the strikers with
“comfortable cots,” “free coffee and occasional movies,” “overtime” pay for “work performed in
excess of eight hours,” and “arrangements” for their families, so they would abandon the strike
and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently,
of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer
reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the
employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of
returning to work would be.

ULP also: (super short cut na to) Hiring of Enage and Garcia with attractive compensations;
respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in
responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions; respondents,
thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-
strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the
three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide
and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life
Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers;
respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not
dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the
respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining the
strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies’
gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out
and in, of the Companies’ buildings.

90. G.R. Nos. L-20667 and 20669 October 29, 1965

PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., vs. PHILIPPINE OFFICERS GUILD, ET
AL.,

DOCTRINE: The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the company of its employees to
a series of questionings regarding their membership in the union or their union activities, in such
a way as to hamper the exercise of free choice on their part, constitutes unfair labor practice. The
respondent court has found that PHILSTEAM's interrogation of its employees had in fact
interfered with, restrained and coerced the employees in the exercise of their rights to self
organization.

FACTS: PHILSTEAM is engaged in inter-island shipping, PMOG is a labor-union affiliated

with Federation of Free Workers (FFW) representing and which represented some of
PHILSTEAM’s officers. The Cebu Seamen’s Association (CSA) is another labor union that
represents some of PHILSTEAM’s officers. PMOG sent PHILSTEAM a set of demands with a
request for collective bargaining but PHILSTEAM required PMOG to first prove its
representation of a majority of PHILSTEAM’s employees before its demands will be considered.
PHILSTEAM started interrogating and investigating its captains, deck officers, and engineers, to
find out directly from them if they had joined PMOG or authorized PMOG to represent them.
PMOG filed a notice of intention to strike stating PHILSTEAM’s alleged refusal to bargain and
unspecified ULP. The CSA also transmitted its own set of demands to PHILSTEAM where the
latter considered its demands. PHILSTEAM and CSA signed a CBA. On that same day, PMOG
declared a strike against PHILSTEAM

Issue: Whether or not PHILSTEAM committed ULP.

Held: The acts found by respondent court constituting the foregoing unfair labor practice are: (1)
the interrogation and investigation by PHILSTEAM's supervisory officials of its captains, deck
officers and engineers, to determine whether they had authorized PMOG to act as their
bargaining agent; (2) the subjection of PMOG to vilification; and (3) the participation of
PHILSTEAM's pier superintendent in soliciting membership for a competing union.
PHILSTEAM admits that it initiated and carried out an investigation of its officers as to their
membership in PMOG and whether they had given PMOG authority to represent them in
collective bargaining. The reason for this, PHILSTEAM was merely to ascertain for itself the
existence of a duty to bargain collectively with PMOG, a step allegedly justified by PMOG's
refusal to furnish proof of majority representation. The asserted reason for the investigation
cannot be sustained. The record discloses that such investigation was started by PHILSTEAM
even before it received PMOG's reply stating a refusal to submit proof of majority
representation. Specifically, the investigation was put under way on June 29, 1954 the same day
PHILSTEAM sent its request that PMOG submit proof of majority representation whereas,
PHILSTEAM knew of PMOG's refusal to furnish said proof only on July 6, 1954, when it
received PMOG's reply letter. PMOG's refusal to submit evidence showing it represented a
majority had nothing to do with PHILSTEAM's decision to carry out the investigation. An
employer is not denied the privilege of interrogating its employees as to their union affiliation,
provided the same is for a legitimate purpose and assurance is given by the employer that no
reprisals would be taken against unionists. Nonetheless, any employer who engages in
interrogation does so with notice that he risks a finding of unfair labor practice if the
circumstances are such that his interrogation restrains or interferes with employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization. The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the
company of its employees to a series of questionings regarding their membership in the union or
their union activities, in such a way as to hamper the exercise of free choice on their part,
constitutes unfair labor practice. The respondent court has found that PHILSTEAM's
interrogation of its employees had in fact interfered with, restrained and coerced the employees
in the exercise of their rights to self organization.