CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW
1. GENERAL
 Persons exempt from the operation of
our criminal laws by virtue of the
principles of public international law:
a. Sovereigns and other chiefs of
state
b. Ambassadors, ministers
plenipotentiary, ministers
resident, and chages d’affaires
* A consul is not entitled to
the privileges and immunities
of an ambassador or
minister, but is subject to the
laws and regulations of the
country to which he is
accredited. (This is in the
absence of a treaty to the
contrary) --- International
Law
2. TERRITORIAL
 Criminal laws undertake to punish
crimes committed within Philippine
territory.
 The principle of territoriality means that
as a rule, penal laws of the Philippines
are enforceable only within its territory.
 Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code –
provisions of territoriality
1) Shall be enforced outside of the
jurisdiction of the PH against
those who:
1. Should commit an
offense while on a PH
ship or airship
2. Should forge or
counterfeit any coin or
currency note of the PH
or obligations and
securities issued by the
gov’t of the PH
3. Should be liable for acts
connected with the
introduction into the PH
of the obligations and
securities mentioned in
the preceding number
4. While being public
officers or employees,
should commit an offense
in the exercise of their
functions
5. Should commit any of the
crimes against national
security and the law of
nations, defined in Title
One of Book Two of the
Revised Penal Code
 Article 1 of the Philippine Constitution –
National Territory
3. PROSPECTIVE
– Article 366 of the RPC, crimes are
punished under the laws in force at the time
of their commission
 Exceptions:
1) Where the new law is expressly
made inapplicable to pending
actions or existing causes of
action
2) Where the offender is a habitual
criminal under Tule 5, Article 62,
RPC
 Different effects of repeal on penal law:
1) If the repeal makes the penalty
lighter in the new law, the new
law shall be applied, except when
the offender is a habitual
delinquent or when the new law
is made not applicable to
pending action or existing causes
of action.
2) If the new law imposes a heavier
penalty, the law in force at the
time of the commission of the
offense shall be applied.
3) If the new law totally repeals the
existing law so that the act which
was penalized under the old law
is no longer punishable, the
crime is obliterated (destroyed).
 When the repeal is absolute, the offense
ceases to be criminal.
 When the new law and the old law
penalize the same offense, the offender
can be tried under the old law.
 When the repealing law fails to penalize
the offense under the old law, the
accused cannot be convicted under the
new law.
GENERAL
ART 14 CIVIL CODE
Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the
principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.
ARTICLE 6
The Legislative Department
SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except
to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum
SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.
ARTICLE 11
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
RAPSING v ABLES
FACTS: Petitioners are the widows of civilians who
were allegedly killed in cold blood by the
respondents who are members of the Philippines
Army. Respondents were charged with multiple
murder. A warrant of arrest was issued by RTC
Masbate but before respondents could be arrested,
the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) of the
AFP filed an Omnibus Motion seeking for the cases
to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal. The entire records of the case were turned
over to the Commanding General of the 9th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army for appropriate action.
Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely abused
its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
when it transferred the criminal case filed against the
respondents to the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal, as jurisdiction over the same is conferred
upon the civil courts by RA 7055.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge gravely abused its
discretion in not taking cognizance of the case, which
actually falls within its jurisdiction.
RULING: Yes. Murder is a crime punishable under Art
248 of the RPC and is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC. Hence, irrespective of whether the killing was
actually justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime
charged against the respondents has been vested
upon the RTC by law.
In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the
military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over
respondents' case since the offense for which they
were charged is not included in the enumeration of
“service-connected offenses or crimes” as provided
for under Section 1 thereof. The said law is very clear
that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who
commit crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and
which are not service-connected, lies with the civil
courts. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it
must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the
court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate
is obeyed.
GONZALES vs. ABAYA
FACTS: Some armed members of the AFP had
abandoned their designated places of assignment
with an aim to destabilize the government.
Thereafter, they entered the premises of the
Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments in Makati City,
led by Navy Lt. Triplanes, disarmed the security
guards, and planted explosive devices around the
building.
DOJ filed with RTC of Makati City an Information
for coup d’etat against those
soldiers while respondent General Abaya issued a
Letter Order creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel
tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the
military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles
of War
The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel recommended that,
following the "doctrine of absorption," those
charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not
be charged before the military tribunal for violation
of the Articles of War.
RTC then issued an Order stating that "all charges
before the court martial against the accused…are
hereby declared not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime
of coup d’etat."
In the meantime, the AFP approved the
recommendation that those involved be prosecuted
before a general court martial for violation of Article
96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman)
of the Articles of War. The AFP Judge Advocate
General then directed petitioners to submit their
answer to the charge but instead they filed with this
Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying
that respondents be ordered to desist from charging
them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of
War maintaining that since the RTC has made a
determination in its Order that the offense for
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not
service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime
of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel
them to submit to its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not those charged with coup d’etat
before RTC shall be charged before military tribunal
for violation of Articles of War. (YES)
HELD:
1) As to the jurisdiction of the court
GENERAL RULE: Members of the AFP and other
persons subject to military law who commit crimes
or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court.
EXCEPTION: Where the civil court, before
arraignment, has determined the offense to
be service-connected, then the offending soldier
shall be tried by a court martial.
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: Where
the President of the Philippines, in the interest of
justice, directs before arraignment that any such
crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
It bears stressing that the charge against the
petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their
solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution
and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation
allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the
military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing
of their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the "service-
connected" nature of the offense is the penalty
prescribed for the same (under Art. 96 of Articles of
War) – dismissal from the service –imposable only by
the military court.
The RTC, in making the declaration that Art 96 of
Articles of War as “not sevice-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furthenance of the crime of coup
d’etat”, practically amended the law which expressly
vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over
"service-connected crimes or offenses." It is only the
Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on
the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject
matter or nature of an action which can do so.
Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
2) As to the Doctrine of Absorption of Crimes
Moreover, the doctrine of ‘absorption of
crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally
applies to crimes punished by the same
statute, unlike here where different statutes are
involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the
trial court has jurisdiction over both offences. Here,
Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of
jurisdiction over service-connected offenses,
including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the
doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to
this case.
In criminal law, the absorption of a lesser included
offense into a more serious offense if a defendant is
charged with both. The purpose of merger in
criminal cases is the avoidance of double jeopardy.
WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF ABSORPTION?
> In cases of rebellion, other crimes committed
in the course of
crime are deemed absorbed in the crime of reb
ellion either as a means necessary for its
commission or as an unintended effect of
rebellion
> They cannot be charged as separate offenses in
themselves
> Exception: when the common crimes are
committed without any political motivation. In such
case, they will not be absorbed by rebellion.
Navales vs Gen. Abaya
Facts:
 Consolidated petitions for habeas corpus
and prohibition
 Oakwood Incident: On July 27, 2003, more
than three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of
the AFP – the Philippine Army’s Scout
Rangers and the Philippine Navy’s Special
Warfare Group (SWAG) – quietly entered
the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati
City. They disarmed the security guards and
took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments
(Oakwood). They planted explosives around
the building and in its vicinity. Between 4:00
to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue
a public statement through the ABS-CBN
News (ANC) network and claimed that they
went to Oakwood to air their grievances
against the administration of President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. (i.e.: the graft and
corruption in the military, the sale of arms
and ammunition to the “enemies” of the
State, etc.) They declared their withdrawal
of support from the chain of command and
demanded the resignation of key civilian and
military leaders of the Arroyo
administration. PGMA gave them until 5p.m.
to give up their positions and return to the
barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared
the existence of a “state of rebellion” and
issued an order to use reasonable force in
putting down the rebellion. An agreement
was forged between the two groups at 9:30
p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres. Arroyo
announced that the occupation of Oakwood
was over. The soldiers agreed to return to
barracks and were out of the Oakwood
premises by 11:00 p.m.
 August 1, 2003 - DOJ charged 321 of those
soldiers who took part in the “Oakwood
Incident” with violation of Article 134-A
(coup d’etat) of the Revised Penal Code
(filed w/ RTC)
 September 12, 2003 – 243 of accused filed
an Omnibus Motion praying that the RTC
assume jurisdiction over all charges filed
before the military tribunal in accord w/ RA
7055 and, order the prosecution to present
evidence to establish probable cause against
316 of 321 accused in which failure to do so
should cause dismissal of case.
 October 20, 2003 - While the said motion
was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the
Resolution finding probable cause for coup
d’etat against only 31 of the original 321
accused and dismissing the charges against
the other 290 for insufficiency of evidence.
 November 14, 2003 – RTC admitted
Amended Information, charging only 31 of
original accused with coup d’etat. It
expressly stated that the case against the
other 290 accused, including petitioners 1Lt.
Navales, et al. and those who are subject of
the petition for habeas corpus, Capt. Reaso,
et al., was dismissed
  Meanwhile, Capt. Reaso, et al. and 1Lt.
Navales, et al. were charged before the
General Court-Martial with violations of the
Articles of War 63, 64, 67, 96, 97. The 31
charged in the Amended Information were
not included in the charge sheets.
 February 11, 2004 – acting on the earlier
Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the
original accused under the Information
dated August 1, 2003, the RTC (Branch 148)
issued an Order rendering contents of OM
moot and academic and all charges before
court martial against the accused and
former accused declared not service-
connected but rather absorbed and in
furtherance to alleged crime of coup d’etat.
 March 1, 2004 - General Court-Martial set
on March 16, 2004 the arraignment/trial of
petitioners for violations of the Articles of
War
Issue: whether or not the petitioners are entitled to
the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
Held: NOOOOO.
 The sweeping declaration made by the RTC
(Branch 148), that all charges before the
court-martial against the accused were not
service-connected, but absorbed and in
furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, was
made without or in excess of jurisdiction and
thus cannot be given effect. (null and void)
o The Order dated February 11, 2004
was issued purportedly to resolve
the Omnibus Motion, which prayed
for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over all the charges filed
before the military courts in
accordance with Rep. Act No. 7055.
o The said Omnibus Motion was filed
on September 12, 2003 by 243 of the
original accused under the
Information dated August 1,2003.
However, this information was
subsequently superseded by the
Amended Information dated October
20, 2003 under which only 31 were
charged with the crime of coup
d'etat.
o In the November 14, 2003 Order of
the RTC (Branch 61), the Amended
Information was admitted and the
case against the 290 accused,
including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and
Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed.
The said Order became final and
executory since no motion for
reconsideration thereof had been
filed by any of the parties.
o Therefore, when the RTC (Branch
148) eventually resolved the
Omnibus Motion on February 11,
2004, the said motion had already
been rendered moot by the
November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC
(Branch 61) admitting the Amended
Information under which only31 of
the accused were charged and
dismissing the case as against the
other 290.
 It had become moot with
respect to those whose
charge against them was
dismissed because they were
no longer parties to the case.
 In view of this the case
against aforesaid accused,
the Court, therefore, can no
longer assume jurisdiction
over all charges filed before
the military courts and this
Court cannot undo nor
reverse the Order of
November 14, 2003 of Judge
Barza, there being no motion
filed by the prosecution to
reconsider the order or by
any of the accused.
 Such declaration was made by the RTC
(Branch 148) in violation of Section 1, RA
7055
 o RA 7055 did not divest the military
courts of jurisdiction to try cases
involving violations of Articles 54 to
70, Articles 72 to 92and Articles 95
to 97 of the Articles of War as these
are considered "service-connected
crimes or offenses." In fact, it
mandates that these shall be tried by
the court-martial.
o In view of the clear mandate of Rep.
Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148)
cannot divest the General Court-
Martial of its jurisdiction over those
charged with violations of Articles 63
(Disrespect Toward the President
etc.), 64 (Disrespect TowardSuperior
Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
a Gentleman) and 97 (General
Article) ofthe Articles of War, as
these are specifically included as
"service-connected offenses or
crimes" under Section 1 thereof.
Military courts have jurisdiction.
 Jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. Once vested by law
on a particular court or body, the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action cannot be dislodged by
any body other than by the legislature
through the enactment of a law.
 Writ of Habeas Corpus will not issue where
the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court (includes
General Court-Martial) which has
jurisdiction to do so. It should not be
allowed after the party sought to be
released has been charged before any court
or quasi-judicial body. This rule applies to
Capt. Raso, et al., as they are under
detention pursuant to Commitment Order
issued by Chief of Staff of the AFP pursuant
to Article 70 of Articles of War.
 Writ of Prohibition is to prevent inferior
courts, corporations, boards or persons
from usurping/exercising a
jurisdiction/power with which they have not
been vested by law. The General Court-
Martial has jurisdiction has jurisdiction over
the charges filed against 1Lt. Navales, et al.
under RA 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot
be issued to prevent it from exercising its
jurisdiction.
THE UNITED STATES, vs. PHILIP K. SWEET
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review
Facts: A complaint was filed against Sweet, an
employee of the US Military, for having committed
an offense against a prisoner of war. In his defense,
he contended that being a soldier or a military
employee, that he was “acting in the line of duty” at
the time the offense was committed, it exempts
him from the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
Issue: Does the civil court have jurisdiction to try the
case of the accused?
Ruling: The order of the court below is affirmed
with costs to the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi: Yes. In this case, the general
principle applies—that the jurisdiction of civil courts
is unaffected by the military or other special
character of the person brought before it. The
contention also that the act was performed under
the order of his military superior cannot affect the
right of the court to take jurisdiction of the case.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that there is
no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions; the
military tribunal not asserting any claim.
LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow
ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral
defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s
bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from
legal process under section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the
country. Based on the said protocol communication
that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge
without notice to the prosecution dismissed the
criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA.
When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC
of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and
ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated
the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing
that he is covered by immunity under the
Agreement and that no preliminary investigation
was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered
with immunity from legal process with regard to
Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary
investigation was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the
immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is
covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section
45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to
the exception that the acts must be done in “official
capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of
right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this
case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary
investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is
clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER vs. MANUEL vs.
MORAN
Facts: This petition is for a writ of prohibition
overruled with a view to preventing the Court of
First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of
the criminal action filed against him. The petitioner
was an accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at
Manila. He was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Manila of falsification of a private
document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the
court on the ground that both under the
Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the Philippines the court below had
no jurisdiction to try him. His objection was
overruled hence this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of
Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner.
Held: The counsel for the petitioner contend that
the CIF of Manila has no jurisdiction according to
Aticle III Sec. 2 of the United States Constitution
which stipulated that the Supreme Court of the
United States has original jurisdiction in all cases
affecting ambassadors, public ministers, and
consuls, and such jurisdiction which excludes the
courts of the Philippines and that that such
jurisdiction is conferred exclusively upon the
Supreme Court of the Philippines. Although section
17 of Act No. 136 vests in the Supreme Court the
original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto, such jurisdictiona was also
conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code
of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222,
226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction
possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands was not exclusive of, but
concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance.
Hence, the Court of Instance has jurisdiction over
the petitioner.
TERRITORIAL
Miquibas vs. Commanding General
NATURE: Original Action in the Supreme Court.
Habeas corpus.
FACTS: Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian
employee of the US army in the Philippines who had
been charged of disposing in the Port of Manila
Area of things belonging to the US army in violation
of the 94th article of War of the US. He was
arrested and a General Court-Martial was
appointed. He was found guilty. As a rule, the
Philippines being a sovereign nation has jurisdiction
over all offenses committed within its territory but
it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the
US shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses
committed within said portions of territory.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the offense has been committed
within a US base thus giving the US jurisdiction over
the case.
No. The Port of Manila Area where the offense was
committed is not within a US base for it is not
names in Annex A or B of Article XXVI of the Military
Base Agreement (MBA) and is merely part of the
temporary quarters located within presented limits
of the city of Manila. Moreover,
extended installations and temporary quarters are
not considered to have the same jurisdictional
capacity as permanent bases and are governed by
Article XIII paragraphs 2 and 4. The offence at bar,
therefore is in the beyond the jurisdiction of
military courts.
2. WON the offender is a member of the US armed
forces
No. Under the MBA, a civilian employee is not
considered as a member of the US armed forces.
Even under the articles of war, the mere fact that a
civilian employee is in the service of the US Army
does not make him a member of the armed forces.
US vs Bull
Facts:
On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged
in the transport of animals named Stanford
commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of
Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel
from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle
without providing appropriate shelter and proper
suitable means for securing the animals which
resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and
others to have died while in transit.
This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts
No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It
is however contended that cases cannot be filed
because neither was it said that the court sitting
where the animals were disembarked would take
jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed
under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an
offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the
headlines which embrace the entrance of Manila
Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus,
the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime
committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel
sailing to the Philippines is within the jurisdiction of
the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions
existed during the time the ship was within the
territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the
same conditions existed when the ship settled from
the foreign port and while it was on the high seas,
In light of the above restriction, the defendant was
found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two US VS AH SING
hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary
Facts:
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a
costs.
foreign vessel which arrived in the port of Cebu
US VS LOOK CHOW from Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon,
brought them on board and had them in his
Facts:
possession during the said trip. The 8 cans of opium
Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909,
were found in the ashes below the boiler of the
the Port of Cebu and internal revenue agent of
steamer's engine by authorities who made a search
Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship
upon anchoring on the port of Cebu. The defendant
Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found two
confessed that he was the owner of the opium and
sacks containing opium. The defendant stated freely
that he had purchased it in Saigon. He dis not
and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of
confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the
opium in Hong Kong with the intention of selling
opium. He did not say that it was his intention to
them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and
import the prohibited drug.
that as his hold had already been searched several
times for opium he ordered two other chinamen to
keep the sack. All the evidence found properly Issue:
constitutes corpus delicti. Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of
opium into the Philippine Islands is criminally liable
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of in the Philippines.
English nationality, that it came from Hong Kong,
and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports
Held:
in Manila and Cebu.
Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold
that any person who unlawfully imports or brings
Issue: any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands,
when the prohibited drug is found under this
Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its
person's control on a vessel which has come direct
jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in its port.
from a foreign country and is within the jurisdiction
limits of the Philippines, is guilty of the crime of
Held: illegal importation of opium, unless contrary
Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the circumstances exist or the defense proves
matter. The mere possession of a thing of otherwise.
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign People vs Wong Cheng
vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
Facts:
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts
The appellant, in representation of the Attorney
of this country, on account of such vessel being
General, filed an appeal that urges the revocation of
considered as an extension of its own nationality.
a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance
However, the same rule does not apply when the
of Manila presented by the defendant. The
article, whose use is prohibited within the
defendant, accused of having illegally smoked
Philippines, in the present case, a can of opium, is
opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil,
English nationality while the said vessel was
thus committing an open violation of the penal law
anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from
in force at the place of the commission of the crime.
the shores of the city. In the said demurrer, the
Only the court established in the said place itself
defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the
has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an
lower court of the said crime, which resulted to the
agreement under an international treaty.
dismissal of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional
waters.
Held:
Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in
our internal waters thus the Philippine courts have
a right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The
Court said that having the opium smoked within our
territorial waters even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship is a breach of the public order
because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious
effects within our territory. Therefore, the
demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered further
proceedings.
People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw,
FACTS:
Two Dutch boats sailed for Peta in the Dutch East
Indies (present day Indonesia). The second boat,
which carried several passengers, arrived between
the islands of Buang and Bukid. Six vintas with 24
armed men surrounded the vessel. The armed men
initially asked for food. However, once they were on
the Dutch boat, the armed men attacked the
passengers, raped two women, and stole all the
cargo. They drilled holes into the boat to make it
sink. They also took the two women and repeatedly
raped them. The two women escaped at Maruro,
where the armed men landed. Left with no
provision, the passengers were rescued after 11
days.
Lol-lo and Saraw, two of the armed men, later went
back to their home in Sulu. Subsequently, they were
arrested and charged with piracy. After trial, both
were found guilty of the crime.
On appeal, defendants argued that Philippine courts
do not have jurisdiction over their case since the
crime was committed in the high seas.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether the accused committed the crime of
piracy – YES
2. Whether Philippine courts have jurisdiction over
the case – YES
3. Whether the Spanish Penal Code provisions on
piracy are still in force – YES
RATIO:
1. The accused are guilty of priracy.
Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high
seas, without lawful authority and done animo
furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility. All of the elements of the crime of piracy
are present.
2. Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a
crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be
punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime
was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit
of a foreign state, “for those limits, though neutral
to war, are not neutral to crimes.
3. The Spanish Penal Code provisions on piracy are
still in force.
The provisions of the Spanish Penal Code on piracy
are still in force in the Philippines even when there
is a change in the sovereign power from Spain to
the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris
(1898). While political laws are necessarily changed
with the change in the sovereign, municipal laws
remain in force as long as they are consistent with
the U.S. Constitution, the laws of the U.S., or the
characteristics and institutions of the government.
As such, laws of municipal character designed to
secure order and peace in the community subsisting
during the time of the transfer of sovereignty
remain in force until altered or repealed by the new
government through direct action. The Penal Code
provisions on piracy are held not to be inconsistent
with the laws of the U.S., since the Penal Code
provisions on piracy have similarities to statutory
provisions elsewhere and to concepts of public law,
while the laws of the U.S. on piracy rest on the
universal conception of piracy under the law of his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.
nations. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as it is unfavorable
to the accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.
Using this construction, the word “Spain” in the
Penal Code should be substituted by the words
2. Whether or not RTC erred in convicting appellant
“United States” and the word “Spaniards” should be
for simple illegal possession of firearms and
substituted by the expression “citizens of the
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence
United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands.”
of 17 to 20 years.

Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is

PROSPECTIVE
Prospectivity in criminal law means that
penal laws can only punish an act committed after
its effectivity. It cannot penalize an act that was not
punishable at the time of its commission.
People vs. Ringor
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
there can be no separate conviction for the crime of
illegal possession of firearms under PD No. 1866. t is
simply considered as an aggravating circumstance,
no longer as a separate offence.
According to the article 22 of RPC, retroactivity of
the law must be applied if it is favourable to the
accused.

FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June

3. Whether or not trial court erred in convicting
23, 1994 was seen entering People’s Restaurant. A
accused of murder
witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a
table where the victim was sitting, pulled his hair,
No. For self-defence to prosper, unlawful
and poked a knife at the latter’s throat. After,
aggression, proportionality of methods to fend said
leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a
aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation from
gun, entered the kitchen of the restaurant,
defender must be proven. In this case, defendant
stealthily approached the victim from behind and
failed to prove unlawful aggression. The statement
shot him six times successively. The defendant was
that the victim approached him with a bolo was
later apprehended and caught in his possession was
inconsistent to the witness’ statement of the victim
an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp
being in a prone position in the table. This does not
Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not a licensed
constitute the requisite quantum of proof for
firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed.
unlawful aggression. With the first requirement
Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove
missing, the last two requisites have no basis.
Florida’s unlawful aggression. He was found guilty
of murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced
4. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to
to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge
death for muder which was not proven and that the
of possession of an unlicensed firearm with a
alleged murder committed by the appellant, the
sentence of 17 to 20 years.
appropriate penalty for the offense is reclusion
perpetua due to to the absence of an aggravating
ISSUES:
circumstance.
1. Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294
(which took effect in 1997: crime occurred in 1994)
Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating
is applicable
circumstances to a crime of murder as described by
art 248 of RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion
No. At the time of the commission of the crime the
perpetua has to be imposed in according to article
use of an unlicensed firearm was still not an
63(2) of RPC
aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To
apply it to Ringor would increase
 Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons
Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court.
Habeas corpus.
FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was
sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for
the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with
Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the
first two petitioners was rendered on March 8,
1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last
petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion
perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners
have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by
virtue of their convictions.
They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v.
Hernandez which negated such complex crime, a
ruling which was not handed down until after their
convictions have become final. In
People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the
information against the accused for rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not
warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling was not
handed down until after their convictions have
become final. Since Hernandez served more than
the maximum penalty that could
have been served against him, he is entitled to
freedom, and thus, his continued detention is
illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which
gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is
applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions
favourable to the accused/convicted for the same
crime can be applied retroactively)
RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the
accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners
relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favour the accused who is not a habitual criminal.
The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part
of our legal
system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional
right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et
al., has been convicted for the same offense as they
have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas
corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused
by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.
OPHELIA HERNAN v. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal
Clerk at DOTC-CAR in Baguio City. By virtue of his
position, she was designated as cashier,
disbursement and collection officer.
As such, petitioner received cash and other
collections from customers and clients for the
payment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and
special message fees. The collections she received
were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City
Branch.
On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of
accounts handled by Hernan was conducted. It was
found out that the deposit slips dated September
19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the
amounts of P11,300.00 and P81,348.20,
respectively, did not bear a stamp receipt by LBP
nor was it machine validated. Petitioner was then
informed that the two aforesaid remittances were
not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then
found that petitioner duly accounted for the
P81,348.20 remittance but not for the P11,300.00.
Accused-petitioner was charged with malversation
of public funds with the amount of P11,300.00. RTC
found the accused guilty. Petitioner appealed to CA
which affirmed her conviction but modified the
penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA
set aside its decision on the finding that it has no
appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbayan
which affirmed RTC’s decision but modified the
penalty imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution
dated August 31, 2010. On June 26, 2013, the
Resolution denying petitioner’s MR became final
and executory.
On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to
Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with
Prayer to Stay the Execution. Sandiganbayan denied
the same and directed the execution of the
judgment of conviction.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of
Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of
Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which
was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of
malversation of public funds.
2. Whether or not the case may be reopened
for further reception of evidence.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES.
The Court affirmed the finding of guilt of
accused for the crime of malversation of public
funds.
The elements of malversation of public funds under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1)
that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had
the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those
funds or property were public funds or property for
which he was accountable; and (4) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented
or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them. This article
establishes a presumption that when a public
officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public
funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, it shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds to
personal uses.
As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s defense that she,
together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went
to the LBP and handed the subject
P11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and,
thereafter, had no idea as to where the money
went failed to overcome the presumption of law.
For one, Paraiso was never presented to
corroborate her version. For another, when
questioned about the subject deposit, not only did
petitioner fail to make the same readily available,
she also could not satisfactorily explain its
whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of malversation,
all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof
that the accountable officer had received public
funds, that she did not have them in her possession
when demand therefor was made, and that she
could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do
so. Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody
else who misappropriated the said amount,
petitioner may still be held liable for malversation.
SECOND ISSUE: NO, but the instant case was
nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify the penalty
imposed in view of the enactment of an
amendatory law favorable to the accused.
The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling that
the absence of the first requisite that the reopening
must be before the finality of a judgment of
conviction already cripples the Motion to Reopen
the Case. The records of the case clearly reveal that
the August 31, 2010 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration had already become final and
executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the
Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013.
Requirements for reopening of the case (Section 24,
Rule 119 of Rules of Court)
1. The reopening must be before the finality of
a judgment of conviction;
2. The order is issued by the judge on his own
initiative or upon motion;
3. The order is issued only after a hearing is
conducted;
4. The order intends to prevent a miscarriage
of justice; and
5. The presentation of additional and/or
further evidence should be terminated
within thirty days from the issuance of the
order
However, the Court held that it is still necessary to
reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of
Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the maximum periods, which has a prison term of two
Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6)
evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in years.
order to modify the penalty imposed by said court.

The general rule is that a judgment that has

acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it
will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land. When, however,
circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable, the Court may sit en banc and give due
regard to such exceptional circumstancewarranting
the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability.

To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act

(R.A.) No. 10951 which accordingly reduced the
penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an
example of such exceptional circumstance.

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore,

we have here a novel situation wherein the
judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein,
has already become final and executory and yet the
penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by
virtue of the passage of said law. Because of this,
not only must petitioner’s sentence be modified
respecting the settled rule on the retroactive
effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to
the accused, she may even apply for probation, as
long as she does not possess any ground for
disqualification, in view of recent legislation on
probation, or R.A. No. 10707.

Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that

petitioner may suffer as well as a possible
multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court
deems it proper to reopen the instant case and
recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of
the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the penalty of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as
maximum. Instead, since the amount involved
herein is P11,300.00, which does not exceed
P40,000.00, the new penalty that should be
imposed is prision correccional in its medium and