G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988 and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition.
and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. On July 5, 1985, the
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
YAP, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated October 16, 1985, petitioner seeks to annul and
set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated August 9, 1985,
August 12,1985 and September 17, 1985, and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the trial
or any other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, an entitled "People of the Philippines
versus Francisco S. Tatad."
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los
Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information
(DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report
with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was
then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Apparently, no action was taken on said report.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had
submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on
December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP
Case No. 8005-16-07) against the petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices
in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public Information. The complaint repeated
the charges embodied in the previous report filed by complainant before the Legal Panel,
Presidential Security Command (PSC).
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand
E. Marcos. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los
Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On June
16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC,
submitted his Investigation Report, with the following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered
indicates that former Min. TATAD have violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019,
respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also liable under Sec. 5 of
RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from prosecution
by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and his motion for
reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982. On October 25, 1982, all affidavits
Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April 1, 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor
Marina Buzon, recommending that the following informations be filed against petitioner
before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
l. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a
private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions through
manifest partiality and evident bad faith;
2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of RA. 3019 for receiving a check
of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity
Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of
P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973;
3. Violation of Section 7 of RA. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to
file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973,
1976 and 1978.
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were flied with the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S.
Tatad with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry)
of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully demand
and receive a check for Pl25,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration
for the payment to said Corporation of the sum of P588,000.00, for printing
services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum of
January, 1973, wherein the accused in his official capacity had to intervene
under the law in the release of the funds for said project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
Office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10500
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO
S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true
detailed and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December
31, 1973, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income,
the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1973), as required
of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was flied with the
Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10501
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO
S. TATAD with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:
That on or about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then
the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did
then and there, wilfully and unlawfully give Marketing Communication
Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private corporation of which his brother-in-law,
Antonio L. Cantero, is the President, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official functions, through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, by allowing the transfer of D' GROUP of the
funds, assets and ownership of South East Asia Research Corporation
(SEARCH), allegedly a private corporation registered with the Securities
and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but whose organization and
operating expenses came from the confidential funds of the Department of
Public Information as it was organized to undertake research, projects for
the government, without requiring an accounting of the funds advanced by
the Department of Public Information and reimbursement thereof by D'
GROUP, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
Office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10502
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO
S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true
and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1976,
including a statement of the amounts of his personal and family expenses
and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year
(1976), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1988.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10503
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO
S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a
 true, detailed and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of
December 31, 1978, including a statement of the amounts and sources of
his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1978),
as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash
the informations on the follow grounds:
1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of
the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting
to loss of jurisdiction to file the informations;
2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500
and 10501;
3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an
offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10500, 10502 and 10503;
5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case
No. 10199 for Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case
No. 10501 (for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.
On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated motion
to quash, stating therein in particular that there were only two grounds in said motion that
needed refutation, namely:
1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,10500 and 10501,
have already prescribed and criminal liability is extinguished; and
2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 — For
failure to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not
constitute an offense.
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,
122 SCRA 538, contended that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in the fiscal's office
interrupts the period of prescription. Since the above-numbered cases were filed with the
Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged offenses were committed on July 16,
1973, January 31, 1974 and in May 1975, respectively, although the charges were actually
filed in Court only on July 9, 1985, the Tanodbayan has still the right to prosecute the
same, it appearing that the ten (10) year prescriptive period has not yet lapsed. Moreover,
Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, extending the
period of limitation with respect to criminal prosecution, unless the right to acquittal has
been acquired, is constitutional.
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of Assets and
Liabilities in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required pursuant to the provisions
of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the former requires "any natural or juridical
person having gross assets of P50,000.00 or more..." to submit a statement of assets and
liabilities "... regardless of the networth," the mandate in the latter law is for ALL
government employees and officials to submit a statement of assets and liabilities. Hence,
the prosecution under these two laws are separate and distinct from each other.
Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation does not
impair the validity of the informations filed and that neither will it render said informations
defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the law which governs preliminary
investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a period of ten (10) days from its
termination to resolve the preliminary investigation.
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying
petitioner's motion to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the
accused's "Consolidated Motion to Quash" should be as it is hereby,
denied for lack of merit. Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the defect in the information in Criminal Case
No. 10500 being one which could be cured by amendment,
the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to amend said information to change
the date of the alleged commission of the offense therein charged
from January 31, 1974 to September 30, 1974 within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8, 1985,
the Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500, changing the
date of the commission of the offense to September 30, 1974.
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the Sandiganbayan September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on
October 16, 1985 assailing the denial of his motion to quash. On October 22, 1985, the
Court, without giving due course the petition, resolved to require the respondents to
comment thereon and issued a temporary restraining order effective immediately and
continuing until further orders of the Court, enjoining the respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial and other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos.
10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In compliance with said resolution, the
respondents, through ,Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their comment on
January 6, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises considering the
supervening events, including the change of administration that had transpired, and the
provisions of Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, insofar far as the Public respondents
were concerned, which requires the successor official to state whether or not he maintains
the action or position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the new
Tanodbayan manifested that since "the charges are not political offenses and they have
no political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative but to pursue the cases against the
petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the petition; that in any event, petitioner is not
precluded from pursuing any other legal remedies under the law, such as the filing of a
motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor General filed
a manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in which he concurred with the position taken by the
new Tanodbayan.
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a motion
for re-evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, praying that the
cases in question be re-evaluated and the informations be quashed. The Court is not
aware of what action, if any, has been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan. However, be
that as it may, the filing of the aforesaid motion for re-evaluation with the Tanodbayan has
no material bearing insofar as the duty of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the
instant petition is concerned.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:
1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the
Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional light to due
process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the
Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty
raised by the petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non- existence
of prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of the cases at bar justifies the
quashal of the questioned informations.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due
process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the
preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than
a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss
of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan
dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by
him to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to grant the
"radical relief" prayed for by petitioner at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere
allegations of "undue delay" do not suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any
showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural right granted or
allowed to the respondent accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of
"indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed by the Tanodbayan in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts and circumstances as would
establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other constitutionally guaranteed
rights could be presented and more fully threshed out at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:
That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination
of the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and
its resolution on April 17, 1985 could have been due to certain factors
which do not appear on record and which both parties did not bother to
explain or elaborate upon in detail. It could even be logically inferred that
the delay may be due to a painstaking an gruelling scrutiny by
the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official. In this respect, We are the considered opinion that the
provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as amended, regarding the resolution
of a complaint by the Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from termination of
the preliminary investigation is merely "directory" in nature, in view of the
nature and extent of the proceedings in said office.
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth
in concise language in Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure and no other grounds for quashal may be entertained by the
 Court prior to arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the
performance of its official functions and subject to the charge that it has
gravely abused its discretion. Such facts and circumstances which could
otherwise justify the dismissal of the case, such as failure on the part of the
prosecution to comply with due process or any other constitutionally-
guaranteed rights may presented during the trial wherein evidence for and
against the issue involved may be fully threshed out and considered.
Regrettably, the accused herein attempts to have the Court grant such a
radical relief during this stage of the proceedings which precludes a pre-
cocious or summary evaluation of insufficient evidence in support thereof.
This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional
right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as
guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its head in the sand, as it
were, at the initial stage of the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only after the
trial?
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief"
and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial
where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally
guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine
enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely
undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a
report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974,
containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of
Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of
the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister)
Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On
December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint
filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan
acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner
Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos — by referring the complaint to the CIS,
Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS
report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and
corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25,
1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by
the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by
the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the corresponding criminal informations
against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations
played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly,
the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits
by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the
complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing
attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial process,
lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot
emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the
impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for
political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental
objective of serving the interest of justice even handedly, without fear or favor to any and
all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict
adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of the of the
prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be
justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day
period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its
termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is
merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely,
with absolute impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that the law has included a
provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead
letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to
due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct
of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee
of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's
constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in
the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling
scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the first
place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were G.R. No. 192432 June 23, 2014
for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by
Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost vs.
three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to LARRY MENDOZA y ESTRADA, Accused-Appellant.
alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting
more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of DECISION
three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
BERSAMIN, J.:
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation
The law enforcement agents who conduct buy-bust operations against persons suspected
does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the absence of a preliminary
of drug trafficking in violation of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA No. 9165), otherwise known
investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, should comply with the statutory
delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man
requirements for preserving the chain of custody of the seized evidence. Failing this, they
has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
are required to render sufficient reasons for their non-compliance during the trial;
otherwise, the presumption that they have regularly performed their official duties cannot
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to obtain, and the persons they charge should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable
hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the doubt.
information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly,
The Case
the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should
be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues
raised by petitioner. This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on April 26, 2010
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03901 entitled People of the Philippines v. Larry Mendoza y
Estrada,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on February
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the same.
24, 2009 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 67, in Binangonan, Rizal finding
The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, entitled
accused Larry Mendoza y Estrada guilty of a violation of Section 5 and a violation of
"People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary
Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165.2
restraining order issued on October 22, 1985 is made permanent.
Antecedents
SO ORDERED.
The accusatory portion of the information charging the violation of Section 5 of RA No.
9165 reads:

That on or about the 28th day of August 2007, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province
of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to a poseur buyer (PO1 Arnel D. Diocena), 0.03
gram and 0.01 gram or a total weight of 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance contained
in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, which substance was found positive to
the test for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride alsoknown as "shabu", a dangerous drug,
in consideration of the amountof Php 500.00, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The accusatory portion of the information charging the violation of Section 11 of RA No.
9165 alleges:
That, on or about the 28th day of August 2007, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province
of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and have in his custody and control 0.01 gram
of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet,
which substance was found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride also
known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
After the accused pleaded not guiltyto both informations,5 the State presented Sr. Insp.
Vivian C. Sumobay, PO1 Arnel D. Diocena and Insp. Alfredo DG Lim as its witnesses,
while the witnesses for the Defense were the accused himself, Lolita Flores and Analiza
Acapin.
The CA summarized the respective versions of the parties in the decision under review as
follows:
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses:
"x x x Policemen Arnel Diocenaand Alfredo DG Limtestified that, on September 29, 2007,
they received reports that an alias ‘Larry’ was selling shabuat St. Claire Street, Barangay
Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal. They organized a buy-bust operationwhere Diocena acted
as the poseur buyer while Lim servedas back-up. They proceeded to the target area with
their asset at around 10:45 p.m. There Diocena and the asset waited in the corner on their
motorcycle while Lim and the other cops positioned themselves in the perimeter. The asset
texted Larry and they waited for him to arrive. Later,Larry arrived and told them, ‘Pasensya
na at ngayon lang dumating ang mga items.’ Larry then asked them how much they were
buying and Diocena told ₱500.00 worth. Larry took out two plastic sachets of shabuand
gave it to Diocena who gave him a marked ₱500 bill (exhibit ‘D’). Diocenalit the left signal
light of his motorcycle to signal Lim and the other cops that the deal was done. They then
arrested Larry who turned out to be the accused. After frisking him, they recovered another
sachet of shabufrom him. Diocena marked the first two ‘LEM-1’and ‘LEM-2’while the one
taken after the frisk he marked ‘LEM-3’(TSN dated April 23 and July 17, 2008, exhibits ‘D’,
‘E’ and ‘F’). These were sent to the police crime lab for forensic testing where they tested
positive for 0.03 (‘LEM-1’), 0.01 (‘LEM-2’) and 0.01 (‘LEM-3’) grams for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu respectively (TSN dated December 5, 2007,
exhibits ‘A’,‘B’ and ‘C’). ‘LEM-1’ and ‘LEM-2’ were made the basis of the pushing charge
while ‘LEM-3’ the one for possession."
Evidence for the Defense
The defense witnesses’ version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision,
is as follows:
"x x x On that day, he was minding his own business, eating with his wife when his friend
Rolly Lopez knocked on the door. Rolly was wanted by the cops (‘may atraso’) and asked
Mendoza for help to get them off his back.Rolly texted somebody and after there was
another knock. It was the police led by one Dennis Gorospewho asked Mendoza for his
identity. When he said yes, Gorospe cuffed him after showing him sachets of shabuwith
his initials. Gorospe was then taken to the police station where he was interrogated and
asked how much protection money he can cough up. When he refused, he was arrested
and drug tested. He claims that he was supposed to be a regaloto the new police chief.
(TSN dated August 27, October 9, November 26, 2008 and February 18, 2009)6
Ruling of the RTC
On February 24, 2009, the RTC convicted the accused of the crimes charged,7 disposing:
We thus find accused Larry Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 and sentence him to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and
topay a fine of ₱500,000.00. We also find him GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 and illegally possessing a total of 0.01 grams of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabuand accordingly sentence him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day as minimum to 13 years as maximum and to
pay a fine of ₱300,000.00
Let the drug samples in this case be forwarded to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) for proper disposition. Furnish PDEA with a copy of this Decision per OCA Circular
No. 70-2007.
SO ORDERED.8
Judgment of the CA
The accused appealed, contendingthat the identity of the corpus delictiand the fact of
illegal sale had notbeen established beyond reasonable doubt; that PO1 Diocena’s
testimony on the sale of the illegal drugs and on the buy-bust operation had not been
corroborated; that the Prosecution had patently failed to show compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA No. 9165; and that such failure to show compliance had
negated the presumption of regularity accorded to the apprehending police officers, and
should warrant his acquittal.9
On April 26, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of the accused,10 holding and ruling
thusly:
x x x [I]t is worthy of mention that prosecution of cases for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act arising from buy-bust operations largely depend on the credibility of the police officers
who conducted them. Unless clear and convincing evidence is proffered showing that the
members of the buy-bust team were driven by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.
Here, accused-appellant failed to present any plausible reason or ill-motive on the part of
the police officers to falsely impute to him such a serious and unfounded charge. We thus
are obliged to accord great respect to and treat with finality the findings of the trial court on
the prosecution witnesses’ credibility. After all, it is settled doctrine that the trial court’s
evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for the trial court
has the distinct opportunity of directly observing the demeanor of a witness and, thus, to
determine whether he is telling the truth.
Accused-appellant’s argument that the procedural requirements of Section 21, paragraph
1 of ArticleII of Republic Act No. 9165 with respect to the custody and disposition of
confiscated drugs were not complied with is equally bereft of merit.
xxxx
Verily, failure of the police officers to strictly comply with the subject procedure isnot fatal
[to] the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items having been
properly preservedby the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an
accused’s arrest illegal or items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. For, what is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
xxxx
It thus behooves Us to believe that all the links in the chain– from the moment it was seized
from the accused-appellant, marked in evidence and submitted to the crime laboratory, up
to the time it was offered in evidence – were sufficiently establishedin this case.
We are thus constrained to uphold accused-appellant’s conviction.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated February
24, 2009 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
Issue
In this appeal, the accused presentsthe lone issue of whether the CA erred in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violations of Section 5 and Section 11 of RA No.
9165.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
1.
The State did not satisfactorilyexplain substantial lapses
committed by the buy-bust team in the chain of custody;
hence, the guilt of the accused for the crime charged
was not established beyond reasonable doubt
The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not
indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As such, the
identityof the dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing thatthe
dangerous drugs offered in court were the same substances boughtduring the buy-bust
operation. This rigorous requirement, known under RA No. 9165 as the chain of custody,
performs the function of ensuring thatunnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.12 As the Court has expounded in People v. Catalan,13 the
dangerous drugs are themselves the corpus delicti; hence:
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti.That proof is vital to a judgment
of conviction. On the other hand, the Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable
requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the
dangerous drugs are missing but also when there are substantial gaps in the chain of
custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the
evidence presented in court.14
As the means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of RA
No. 9165 specifies that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The following guideline in the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165
complements Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165, to wit:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
inthe presence of the accused or the person/s from whom suchitems were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative orcounsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid suchseizures of and custody
over said items;
Based on the foregoing statutory rules, the manner and timing of the marking of the seized
drugs or related items are crucial in proving the chain of custody. Certainly, the marking
after seizure by the arresting officer, being the starting point in the custodial link, should
be made immediately upon the seizure, or, if that is not possible, as close to the time and
place of the seizure as practicable under the obtaining circumstances. This stricture is
essential because the succeeding handlers of the contraband would use the markings as
their reference to the seizure. The marking further serves to separate the marked seized
drugs fromall other evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until the drugs are
disposed of upon the termination of the criminal proceedings. The deliberate taking of
these identifying steps is statutorily aimed at obviating switching, "planting" or
contamination of the evidence.15 Indeed, the preservation of the chain of custody vis-à-vis
the contraband ensures the integrity of the evidence incriminating the accused, and relates
to the element of relevancy as one of the requisites for the admissibility of the evidence.
An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust team did not observe the statutory
procedures on preserving the chain of custody.
To start with, the State did not show the presence during the seizure and confiscation of
the contraband, aswell as during the physical inventory and photographing of the
contraband, ofthe representatives from the media or the Department of Justice, or of any
elected public official. Such presence was precisely necessary to insulatethe apprehension
and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity.16
It is notable that PO1 Diocena, although specifically recalling having marked the
confiscated sachets of shabuwith the initials of the accused immediately after the seizure,
did not state, as the following excerpts from his testimony indicate, if he had madehis
marking in the presence of the accused himself or of his representative, and in the
presence of a representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected
public official, to wit:
Q - What did you do with the plasticsachets you bought or the plastic sachets handed to
you and the other plastic sachet Insp. Lim recovered from him?
A - I put markings, Ma’am.
Q - What markings did you place on the plastic sachets?
A - LEM-1, LEM-2 and LEM-3.
Q - And after marking those specimen, what did you do with them?
A - We brought them to the police station.
Q - What did the police station do with the plastic sachets?
A - Our investigator took pictures and brought them to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
xxxx
Q - You said that you put markings on the specimen at the target area?
A - Yes, Ma’am.
Q - You prepared the listing of all the specimen and marked money you recovered from
the accused?
A - No, Ma’am.
Q - When you returned to the police station that was the only time that you took pictures
of the marked money?
A - Yes, Ma’am.
Q - To whom did you turn it over?
A - To our investigator, Ma’am.
Q - What is the name of your investigator?
A - PO1 Dennis Gorospe, Ma’am. 17
Similarly, P/Insp. Lim did not mention in his testimony, the relevant portions of which are
quoted hereunder, that a representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or
any elected public official was present during the seizure and marking of the sachets of
shabu, as follows:
Q - What did you do with the subject sale and the one you recovered from the accused?
A - I told PO1 Diocena to mark it, the three heat-sealed plastic sachets.
Q - Do you know the markings placed on the plastic sachets?
A - LEM-1, LEM-2 and LEM-3.
Q - And aside from marking the specimen, what did you do with them?
A - I apprised the suspect of his rights, then right after that we went to the headquarters.
Q - And after you brought the accused and the specimen to the headquarters, what did
you do next with the specimen?
A - We submitted them to the Crime Laboratory for verification.
Q - Who personally brought them to the Crime Laboratory?
A - If I am not mistaken it was also PO1 Diocena and the other men.
xxxx
Q - Where was Officer Diocena when heput markings on the three plastic sachets you
recovered?
A - When I arrested the subject, he alighted from the motorcycle and he helped me in
arresting the accused, it was just then beneath the Meralco post.
Q - And the markings represent the initials of the accused?
A - I don’t know, Ma’am, LEM, maybe, Ma’am.
Q - But it was Officer Diocena who put the markings?
A - Yes, Ma’am.
Q - Was there an inventory or list of the things you recovered from the accused?
A - Yes, Ma’am.
Q - Did you ask the accused to sign that inventory?
A - I was not able, Ma’am.18
The consequences of the failure ofthe arresting lawmen to comply with the requirements
of Section 21(1), supra, were dire as far as the Prosecution was concerned. Without the
insulating presence of the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or
any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils
of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared
their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of
the sachets of shabu that were evidence herein of thecorpus delicti, and thus adversely
affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.
Secondly, the records nowhere indicated, contrary to the claim of P/Insp. Lim, that the buy-
bust team, orany member thereof, had conducted the physical inventory of the confiscated
items. We know this because the State’s formal offer of evidence did not include such
inventory, to wit:
PROSECUTOR ARAGONES:
Your Honor, we formally offer Exhibit "A", the Chemistry Report No. D-221-07; Exhibit "B",
the request for laboratory examination from the Binangonan Police Station; and Exhibit
"C", the subject specimen. This is to prove that after request made by the Binangonan
Police Station, examined by the forensic chemical officer, and after examination proved
positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride. These exhibits are offered as part
of the testimony of the forensic chemist. Exhibit "D", the buy bust money, the ₱500.00 bill
used during the operation; Exhibit "D-1" is the marking placed by Police Officer Diocena.
This is to prove that this is the xerox copy of the original buy bust money used during the
buy bust operation conducted against the accused. Exhibit "E" is the sworn statement of
Police Officer Diocena. This is to prove all the facts alleged in the information and as part
of the testimony of the said police officer. Exhibit "F" is the sworn statement of P/Insp.
Alfredo Lim to prove all the facts alleged in the information and as part of the testimony of
said witness. That would be all for our formal offer of evidence.19 Without the inventory
having beenmade by the seizing lawmen, it became doubtful whether any shabu had been
seized from the accused at all.
And, thirdly, although PO1 Diocena asserted that photographs of the confiscated items
and the marked money were taken at the police station,20 it still behooved him to justify why
the photographs of the seized shabuwas not taken immediately upon the seizure,and at
the place of seizure. The State did not explain this lapse. The pictorial evidence of the
latter kind would have more firmly established the identity of the seizedshabufor purposes
of preserving the chain of custody.
The last paragraph of Section 21(1) of the IRR of RA No. 9165 expressly provides a saving
mechanism tothe effect that not every case of non-compliance with the statutory
requirements for the physical inventory and photograph of the dangerous drugs being
made "in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof" would prejudice
the State’s case against the accused. But in order for that saving mechanism to apply, and
thus save the day for the State’s cause, the Prosecution must have to recognize first the
lapse or lapses, and then credibly explain them.21
It appears that the application ofthe saving mechanism in this case was not warranted.
The Prosecution did notconcede that the lawmen had not complied with the requirement
for "the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof." Also, the Prosecution did
not tender any justification why no representatives from the media or the Department of
Justice, or any elected public official had been present during the seizure and confiscation
of the shabu. The omissions, particularly the failure to justify on the part of the lawmen,
were strange and improbable, particularly because the records indicated that the lawmen
had sufficient time and the opportunity to prepare for the proper conductof the buy-bust
operation against the accused due to such operation having come in the aftermath of a
successful test buy.
Anent the test buy, PO1 Diocena mentioned the same in his sinumpaang salaysay, thusly:x
x x Na itong sinasabi ng aming asset na alyas "Larry" ay matagal na naming
minamanmanan at sa katunayan ay nagsagawa na kami ng Test Buy noong Hulyo 10,
2007 at kami ay nakabili sa kanya ng isang pirasong maliit na plastic na may lamang shabu
at amin itong ipinasuri sa RIZAL PNP Crime Laboratory Office na nagbigay ng positibong
resulta sa pinagbabawal na droga at siya ay di namin kaagad nahuli sapagkat siya ay
huminto pansamantala sa pagbebenta ng iligal na droga. x x x22
Similarly, P/Insp. Lim adverted to the test buy in his own sinumpaang salaysayas follows:
x x x Sapagkat ako ay bago lamang dito sa himpilan ng Binangonan, napagalaman ko
mula saaking mga kasamahan na itong sinasabi ng aming asset na alyas "Larry" ay
matagal na nilang minamanmanan at sa katunayan aynagsagawa ng Test Buy noong
Hulyo 10, 2007 laban dito kay alyas "Larry" at ang nabiling pinaghihinalaang shabu ay
ipinasuri sa RIZAL PNP Crime Laboratory Office na nagbigay ng positibong resulta sa
pinagbabawal na droga na kaya lamang hindi nahuhuli itong si alyas "Larry" sa dahilang
siya at huminto pansamantala sa pagbebenta ng iligal na droga.23
P/Insp. Lim reiterated his story on direct examination, viz:
Q - And what report, if any, was madeby that asset aside from there was an ongoing sale
of drugs in Calumpang?
A - That there was an ongoing sale byalias Larry na matagal na nilang minamatyagan, in
fact they havealready testbuy noong mga nakaraang taon, eh, wala pa ho ako noon.24
In all, the buy-bust team had about 48 days – the period intervening between July 10,
2007, when the test buy was conducted, and August 28, 2007, when the crimes charged
were committed – within which to have the media and the Department of Justice be
represented during the buy-bust operation, as well as to invite an elected public official of
the place of operation to witness the operation. It puzzles the Court, therefore, that the
buy-bust team did not prudently follow the procedures outlined in Section 21(1), supra,
despite their being experienced policemen who knew the significance of the procedures in
the preservation of the chain of custody.
With the chain of custody being demonstrably broken, the accused deserved to be
acquitted of the seriouscharges. Even if we rejected the frame-up defense of the accused,
the unexplained failures and lapses committed by the buy-bust team could not be fairly
ignored. At the very least, they raised a reasonable doubt on his guilt. "A reasonable doubt
of guilt," according toUnited States v. Youthsey:25
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious
doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the
defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a fellowman. If, having
weighed the evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty,
to that degree of certainty as would lead you toact on the faith of it in the most important
and crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt is notproof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of
mistake. Thus, the accused was entitled to beacquitted and freed, for, as we pointed out
in People v. Belocura:26
x x x in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty
is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a
finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The
Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the
offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence,
and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden
of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused that no less thanthe Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his
innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set
free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In
other words, the weakness of the defense put up bythe accused is inconsequential in the
proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in
establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the
malefactor responsible for it.
2. The CA and the RTC erred in relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance
of duty of the arresting officers
Even if the foregoing conclusion already renders any further discussion of the applicability
of the presumption of regularity in favor of the members of the buy-bust team superfluous,
we need to dwell a bit on the matter if only to remind the lower courtsnot to give too much
primacy to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty at the expense
of the higher and stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused in a
prosecution for violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
We have usually presumed the regularity of performance of their official duties in favor of
the members of buy-bust teams enforcing our laws against the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. Such presumption is based on three fundamental reasons, namely: first, innocence,
and not wrong-doing, is to be presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated; and,
third, a republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon
controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental department
or agent by every other such department or agent, at least to the extent of such
presumption.27 But the presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
of any failure to perform a duty.28 Judicial reliance on the presumption despite any hint of
irregularity in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law will thus be
fundamentally unsound because such hint is itself affirmative proof of irregularity.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason
exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty.
And even in that instance the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will
defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. Trial courts are
instructed to apply this differentiation, and to always bear in mind the following reminder
issued in People v. Catalan:29
x x x We remind the lower courts that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty could not prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence favoring the accused.
Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent would be
held sut ordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of evidence. Where, like
here, the proof adduced against the accused has not even overcome the presumption of
innocence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not be a factor
to adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.
Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly presumed
in favor of the policemen because the records were replete with indicia of their serious
lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a police officer
must be inferred only from an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say
it differently, it is the established basic fact that triggers the presumed fact of regular
performance. Where there is any hint of irregularity committed by the police officers in
arresting the accused and thereafter, several of which we have earlier noted, there can be
no presumption of regularity of performance in their favor.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on April
26, 2010 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03901 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Larry Mendoza y Estrada; ACQUITS LARRY MENDOZA y ESTRADA on
the ground of reasonable doubt; and ORDERS his immediate release from detention at
the National Penitentiary, unless there are other lawful causes warranting his continued
detention.
The Director of Bureau of Corrections is directed to forthwith implement this decision and
to report to this Court his action hereon within ten (10) days from receipt.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.