5.

Ganzon vs Court of Appeals

200 SCRA 271

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS,

respondents.

G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.

MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON.

LUIS SANTOS, ET. AL

G.R. No. 93746. August 5, 1991.

Facts

The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245)
and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746),
respectively.

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative

complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime
in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression,
grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable
violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.

During the pendency of the charges, Respondent Secretary of

Department of Local Government issued a preventive suspension order for a
period of sixty (60) days. Later on, when a prima facie evidence was found to
exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent
ordered the petitioner’s second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988
for another sixty (60) days.

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an

action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government
(now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in
obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP
No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another

order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third
time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto
Malabor as acting mayor.

It is the petitioners’ argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer

allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the
power of suspension and/or removal over local officials.

The provision in question reads as follows:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general

supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component
cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to
component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units
are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

Issue

1. Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s

alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.
2. Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government acted with grave
abuse of discretion in the manner by which he suspended petitioner.

Ruling

1. Yes. It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the

change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to
divest the legislature of its right—or the President of her prerogative as
conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions
against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of “as may be
provided by law”) signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments ‘autonomy from congress and to break Congress’ “control”
over local governments affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend,
for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority
over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
2.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, “local autonomy” is not
instantly self- executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage
 of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution
legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to
realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of
autonomy, the Constitution places the local governments under the
general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the
Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code
provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may
exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has
done, delegate its exercise to the President.

3. Yes. Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive

imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the
trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption
of innocence unless and until found guilty Suspension finally is
temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be
imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, a longer suspension is
unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The

Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the
petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon,
may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the
remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior
to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all
such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera

Artieda, is AFFIRMED.