EVIDENCE brought to the station which he alleged in detail.
brought to the station which he alleged in detail. Then he was brought to the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio
IV.
RULE 130 SECTION 26 - Admissions of a Party
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAÑO, MANUEL "JUN" ABENOJA, JR., and FREDDIE "BOY"
CARTEL, accused.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
Facts:
At past 7:30 p.m. of 6 September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son,
Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family friend,
were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City,
from his driving the car. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came
out from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed
his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The
gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away.
Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza
store where she telephoned her mother and told her what had happened. Later, she and her mother brought her
father and Anthony to the hospital. Danny Ancheta went home and was then brought to the Notre Dame Hospital
for treatment. Anna Theresa Francisco was brought to the funeral parlor. The police later arrived at the crime
scene and conducted an investigation. they recovered some empty shells of an armalite rifle.
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiaño, an alleged former military agent or "asset" who had been
picked up in La Union by the police authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal
Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman in the fatal shooting of Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa
Francisco. He implicated Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr., allegedly a fellow military agent and the "bagman" who
engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Freddie "Boy" Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy."
During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, a representative of the
Integrated bar of the Philippines (IBP). Ms. Christie Napeñas, a stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
investigation. Thereafter, she transcribed the notes and the transcription became the sworn statement of Wilfredo
Quiaño which he signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia.
In the morning of 10 February 1987, "Jimmy," who turned out to be appellant Jaime Agustin, was picked up in Sto.
Tomas, Pangasinan, by military personnel (without a warrant) and brought to Baguio city. At 4:00 p.m. of that
date, he was taken to the office of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia where he was investigated in connection with the
crime. Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom assisted the appellant during the investigation. Ms. Christie Napeñas took down
stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation. The stenographic notes consisted of 22 pages
(Exhibit "B"), each of which was signed afterwards by the appellant and Atty. Cajucom. Ms. Napeñas subsequently
transcribed these notes which the prosecution marked as Exhibit "C." The appellant narrated therein his
knowledge of the shooting of Dr. Bayquen and revealed the identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a
confrontation two days later, he identified Quiaño as "Sony," the triggerman.
The appellant, who is a farmer and whose highest educational attainment was grad four, impugned the validity of
his extrajudicial statement which he finally did out of fear caused by the arresting officers prior to him being
City.
In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Baguio City, the
accused were charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with frustrated murder in Criminal
Case No. 4649-R, and with attempted murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R. The crimes were allegedly
committed on 6 September 1986 in Baguio City and resulted in the deaths of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna
Theresa Francisco and the wounding of Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny Ancheta.
The informations in the murder cases charged that the accused acted in conspiracy and the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and the ordinary aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
price.
Only the appellant and Wilfredo Quiaño were arrested. However, before Quiaño could be arraigned, he escaped
on 12 July 1987 while under the custody of the Philippine Constabulary/PNP Regional Command I at Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet.2 The cases, which were consolidated and jointly tried, proceeded only against the
appellant.
Trial court then concluded that "[t]here was conspiracy and the accused was a direct participant in the crime," and
that while he tried to minimize his culpability, his "extrajudicial confession" shows that "he was in on the plan,"
and even "expected to be paid, to be rewarded monetarily"; and that he "decided to give a statement only when
he was not given the money." Since the proof of corpus delicti required in Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
was established by the prosecution's evidence, it found his conviction for murder inevitable.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged extrajudicial confession is admissible as evidence against the accused-appellant,
"Jimmy".
Held:
No. After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R and a painstaking evaluation of
the evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with merit. Indeed, the extrajudicial admission — not
extrajudicial confession — of the appellant, which is the only evidence of the prosecution linking him to the
commission of the crime charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution. We also see in these cases a blatant disregard of the appellant's right under Section 2 of Article
III when he was unlawfully arrested.
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged,
while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in
connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a
conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in evidence under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph 3 thereof expressly refers to both confession and
admission.
Considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the Court has serious doubts about his ability to
understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his constitutional rights since Atty. Cajucom did so in English and
Tagalog. He also was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and independent counsel of his choice,
specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if
he could not, whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically
1
informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and
in the presence of his counsel.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
branch 3, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 4647-R and Criminal Case No. 4648-R, and ACQUITTING appellant JAIME
"JIMMY" AGUSTIN. His immediate release from confinement is hereby ORDERED unless for some other lawful
cause his continued detention is warranted.
G.R. No. 113779-80 February 23, 1995
ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe were charged with Robbery. The incident
happened when the house of Cipriana Torres was robbed and the only person inside her house is her maid Jovina
Madaraog Torres. Torres reported the robbery to the police authorities at Fairview, Quezon City and the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On July 25, 1988, Madaraog and Quintal described the physical features of the four
(4) robbers before the NBI cartographer. One of those drawn by the artist was a person with a large mole between
his eyebrows.9 On August 30, 1988, petitioner was arrested by the NBI agents. The next day, at the NBI
headquarters, he was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of
the crimes at bench.
He was arrested more than one (1) month after the robbery. Petitioner ALVIN TUASON, 12 on the other
hand, anchored his defense on alibi and insufficient identification by the prosecution. he has lived within the
neighborhood of the Torres family since 1978. He averred that on July 19, 1988, he was mixing dough and rushing
cake orders from 7:00 o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon at his sisters' TipTop bakeshop in
Antipolo Street, Tondo, Manila. It takes him two (2) hours to commute daily from Lagro, Novaliches to Tondo.
The prosecution presented Jovina and a certain Barbieto while Tuason maintained his alibi and corroborated
by the testimony of his sister Angeli Tuason.
The trial court convicted Tuason. He appelled to respondent CA which affirmed in toto the decision of lower
court. Thus, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred for ignoring or disregarding the glaring and fatal infirmities of the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, specially as identification, as well as to the palpable improbability of herein petitioner having been a
supposed participant in the offenses charged, the error being tantamount to gross misapprehension of the record.
RULING:
The SC reversed the decision.
The court ruled that evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness
but the same must be credible in itself. The trial court and respondent appellate court relied mainly on the
testimony of prosecution witness Madaraog that from her vantage position near the door of the bedroom she
clearly saw how petitioner allegedly participated in the robbery. After a careful review of the evidence, we find
that the identification of petitioner made by Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis
for conviction of petitioner.
it must be emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the maid Madaraog actually saw
petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at bench. Witnesses Quintal and Barbieto testified they only saw
petitioner at the vicinity of the crimes before they happened. There is, however, a serious doubt whether
Madaraog and Quintal have correctly identified petitioner. At the NBI headquarters, Madaraog described
petitioner as 5'3" tall and with a big mole between his eyebrows. While Quintal also described petitioner as 5'3"
and with a black mole between his eyebrows. On the basis of their description, the NBI cartographer made a
drawing of petitioner showing a dominant mole between his eyes. As it turned out, petitioner has no mole but
only a scar between his eyes. Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3" tall.
The records do not show any fact from which the trial court can logically deduce the conclusion that
petitioner covered up his scar with black coloring to make it appear as a mole. Such an illogical reasoning cannot
constitute evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This palpable error was perpetrated by respondent
appellate court when it relied on the theory that this "fact" should not be disturbed on appeal because the trial
court had a better opportunity to observe the behavior of the prosecution witnesses during the hearing. This is a
misapplication of the rule in calibrating the credibility of witnesses. The subject finding of the trial court was not
based on the demeanor of any witnesses which it had a better opportunity to observe. Rather, it was a mere
surmise, an illogical one at that. By no means can it be categorized as a fact properly established by evidence.
The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed this claim of petitioner as self-serving. Under our law of
evidence, self-serving evidence is one made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a party's
testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence that is the lack of
opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party and on the consideration that its admission would open
the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn and
affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination.3Clearly, petitioner's testimony in court on how he
was identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI headquarters is not self-serving.
G.R. No. 127553 November 28, 1997
EDDIE MANUEL, ROMEO BANA, ROGELIO PAGTAMA, JR. and JOEL REA, petitioners,
vs.
N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, JOHNNY LIM, ANITA SY and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND
DIVISION), respondents.
FACTS :
The security guards of respondent company caught Aurelio Guevara, and Jay Calso, taking out from the company
premises two rolls of electrical wire worth P500.00 without authority. Calso was brought to the Pasig Police station
for questioning. During the investigation, Calso named seven other employees who were allegedly involved in a
series of thefts at respondent company, among them petitioners Manuel, Bana, Pagtama, Jr. and Rea.Petitioners
received separate notices from respondent company informing them that they were positively identified by their
co-worker, Calso, They were thus invited to the Pasig police station for investigation regarding their alleged
involvement in the offense.
Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents' counsel conducted in their behalf an investigation regarding
petitioners' involvement in the theft. Petitioners initially denied the charge. However, after being positively
identified by Jay Calso, petitioners admitted their guilt and offered to resign in exchange for the withdrawal of any
2
 criminal charge against them.Petitioners Bana and Rea filed separate resignation letters while petitioners Manuel
and Pagtama, Jr. tendered their resignations orally. Petitioner Bana's resignation letter.
Reyes accepted the resignation letter however, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for
illegal dismissal. Petitioners alleged that they were not informed of the charge against them nor were they given
an opportunity to dispute the same. They also alleged that their admission made at the Pasig police station
regarding their involvement in the theft as well as their resignation were not voluntary but were obtained by
private respondents' lawyer by means of threat and intimidation.
The LA ruled in favor of petitioners and found their dismissal to be illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for a just cause. It held that petitioners failed
to adduce competent evidence to show a vitiation of their admission regarding their participation in the theft. It
further stated that such admission may be admitted in evidence because Section 12 Article III of the 1987
Constitution applies only to criminal proceedings but not to administrative proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the
admission of petitioners is admissible in evidence despite the fact that it was obtained in a hostile environment
and without the presence or assistance of counsel
RULING:
The SC affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
The SC reject petitioners' argument that said admission is inadmissible as evidence against them under Section 12
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a
suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who
had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start
of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (3) Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only
to admission made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the course of the investigation conducted by private
respondents' counsel to determine whether there is sufficient ground to terminate their employment. Petitioners
were not under custodial investigation as they were not yet accused by the police of committing a crime. The
investigation was merely an administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not a criminal investigation. The
questions were propounded by the employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the investigation was
conducted at the police station did not necessarily put petitioners under custodial investigation as the venue of the
investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the admissions made by petitioners during such investigation may be used
as evidence to justify their dismissal.
G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NILO SOLAYAO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
SPO3 Niño and his team were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to
verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran when they met the
group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became suspicious when they observed that
the latter were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.
Accused-appellant's companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.
Police Officer Niño told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after which he
seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade
firearm locally know as "latong." When he asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said firearm
or whether he was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no
permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the
custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession
of firearm.
Solayao claimed that he was not aware that there was a shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves
since they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed that this was the third torch handed to him
after the others had been used up.
The trial court convicted the accused.Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.
RULING:
The SC ruled that accused-appellant's arguments are hardy tenable
Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in evidence as it was the
product of an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained that the search made on his person violated his
constitutional right to be secure in his person and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Not only was
the search made without a warrant but it did not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides, inter alia:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et al. 12 where this Court
declared: ". . . emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incident to a lawful
arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then
an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be
unlawful, for being contrary to law."
In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified himself as
a government agents. The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense
of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming in the barangays
surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They
could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
3
 Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.
G.R. No. 128046 March 7, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAMON CHUA UY, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Evidence on record shows that SPO1 Nepomuceno acted as a poseur buyer and transacted a sale of shabu with
Chua Uy. Thereupon, SPO1 Nepomuceno introduced himself and informed the accused of his constitutional rights
before placing him under arrest.The team brought accused Chua Uy to their office where he was referred to SPO2
Vicente Mandac for proper investigation. In the course thereof, it was learned that there were still undetermined
quantity of shabu left at the residence of the accused. Forthwith, SPO4 Regalado applied on the following day for a
search warrant before this Court to lawfully search the said premises of the accused for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. However, accused Chua Uy claimed his innocence by insisting that the quantity of the illicit drug
allegedly seized from him were merely "planted" by the police officers.
The trial court convicted the accused with two charges in relation to RA 6425. Unsatisfied, he appealed from
decision of trial court. RAMON submits that the trial court erred (1) in giving credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the evidence for the defense; and (2) in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of drug pushing and drug possession.He assails the credibility of the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses on the buy-bust operation, thus, the female confidential agent/police informer should
have testified in court to prove her claims against him.RAMON submits that without the testimony of NBI Forensic
Chemist, the prosecution's case "falls to pieces." Bravo's testimony cannot be waived since only he could say
whether the substance allegedly seized is indeed shabu, and also determine its actual weight upon which depends
the penalty to be imposed. Thus, whatever he said in his report is hearsay and hearsay evidence, whether objected
to or not, has no probative value. He insists that at the pretrial he did not waive the testimony of the chemist but
only "stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's evidence.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution and discredited the evidence of
defense.
(2) WON the testimony of NBI Forensic is considered as hearsay.
RULING: The SC find no merit.
(1) The failure to present the informer did not diminish the integrity of the testimony of the witnesses for
the prosecution. Informers are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve
their invaluable service to the police.Their testimony or identity may be dispensed with since his or her
narration would be merely corroborative, as in this case, when the poseur- buyer himself testified on
the sale of the illegal drug.
As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that they caught RAMON in a buy-bust
operation, supported by other evidence such as the packets of shabu sold by and seized from him, RAMON's
negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony,
especially when it comes from the mouth of credible witness. The failure to present the informer did not diminish
the integrity of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. Informers are almost always never presented
in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be
dispensed with since his or her narration would be merely corroborative, as in this case, when the poseur- buyer
himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug.
Since RAMON was caught in flagrante selling shabu, the trial court correctly ruled that his warrantless arrest
and the seizure of his attache case containing more shabu was also valid and lawful. Besides, Ramon never raised,
on constitutional grounds, the issue of inadmissibility of the evidence thus obtained.
(2) RAMON's premise is that at the pre-trial he did not waive the Forensic Chemist's testimony but only
"stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's evidence.” The record disclosed that during pre-trial
conducted immediately after the arraignment, duly represented by counsel de parte Atty. Gerardo
Alberto, and the prosecution stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's exhibits, and agreed to
dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo.
RAMON nor his counsel made express admission that the contents of the plastic bags to "be marked" as
Exhibits "D," "D-1," "D-2," "D-3," "D-4," and "E" contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. That RAMON agreed to
dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Bravo may not be considered an admission of the findings of
Bravo on the contents of the plastic bag.To bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him but
his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the accused against
improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel may have entered into without his
knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial conference; eliminate any doubt on the
conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon.
In addition to the foregoing admission by RAMON of the prosecution's exhibits, he likewise never raised
in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of Forensic Chemist Bravo. RAMON cannot now raise it for the
first time on appeal. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot
raise the question for the first time on appeal.The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the inadmissibility of
certain documents upon the ground of hearsay if not urged before the court below cannot, for the first time, be
raised on appeal.In U.S. v. Choa Tong where the defense counsel did not object to the form or substance of a
laboratory report that the specimen submitted was opium, the Court ruled that "[t]he objection should have been
made at the time the said analysis was presented.
As to the reports of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it must be stressed that as an NBI Forensic Chemist, Bravo is
a public officer, and his report carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function and duty.
Besides, by virtue of Section 44, Rule 130, entries in official records made in the performance of office duty, as in
the case of the reports of Bravo, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. We are also aware that "the
test conducted for the presence of 'shabu' (infrared test) is a relatively simple test which can be performed by an
average or regular chemistry graduate" and where "there is no evidenceto show that the positive results for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride ('shabu') are erroneouscoupled with the undisputed presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed, said results" may "adequately establish" that the specimens
submitted were indeed shabu.
G.R. No. 124832 February 1, 2000
4
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANTE CEPEDA y SAPOTALO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Conchita claims that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 2, 1994, Dante Cepeda went to her house at
Buhang, Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, and asked her to [go to] his house to massage (hilot) his wife who was
suffering from stomach ache. Regina Carba, her neighbor, was in her house and she asked her to go with her.
Cepeda was at his kitchen door when they reached his house. He told Gina to leave as his wife, who was Muslim,
would get angry if there were many people in their home. He insisted on this many times so that Gina had to
leave. Cepeda led the complainant to his bedroom. At the door, Conchita peeped inside and saw a figure covered
by a blanket whom she presumed was Cepeda's wife. At that instance, accused immediately placed his left arm
around her shoulders and pointed a knife at the pit of her stomach saying: "Just keep quiet, do not make any
noise, otherwise I will kill you."
She elbowed him, stooped and shouted "Help!" three times but Cepeda covered her mouth then carried her
to the room by her armpits. Shaking herself, free from, his grasp, she hit her left shin at the edge of the floor of the
bedroom. Inside the room, he threatened her with a knife and ordered her to remove her panty and lie on the
bed. Afraid she did as ordered and the accused also removed his pants and brief. He placed himself on top of her,
spread her legs with his legs, inserted his penis inside her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her at the same
time embracing and kissing her. After he was through, she ran towards the kitchen with Cepeda chasing her.
This charge is refuted by the accused claiming that he and Conchita are lovers. Conchita asked him to leave
his wife to elope with her as she would also leave her husband.He rejected this proposal because he loved his wife
and Conchita had three daughters. Conchita, according to him, was displeased because he would not elope with
her. On April 2, 1994, Conchita again came to his house and while they were petting, somebody outside his house
said: "You there, what are you doing?" At this Conchita left his house and went home.
The trial convicted the accused with the crime of rape.
ISSUE:
WON the testimony of Conchita is credible.
RULING:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant's allegation of an illicit amorous relationship is too shopworn to deserve serious
consideration and is totally unworthy of credence. A circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the "illicit
love affair" angle appears as a fabrication by accused-appellant. As an affirmative defense, the alleged "love affair"
need convincing proof.Having admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the complainant several times,accused-
appellant bears the burden of proving his defense by substantial evidence.The record shows that other than his
elf-serving assertions, there is no evidence to support the claim that accused-appellant and private complainant
were in love.
Other than accused-appellant's self-serving testimony, no other evidence like love letters, mementos or
pictures were presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship with private complainant. Neither was there
any corroborative testimony supporting this pretended illicit affair. If accused-appellant were really the paramour
of private complainant, she would not have gone to the extent of bringing this criminal action which inevitably
exposed her to humiliation of recounting in public the violation of her womanhood. Moreover, she would not have
implicated a person, who is allegedly her lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable crime and thereby lay open
their illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule not to mention the ire of a cuckolded husband and the
withering contempt of her children were it not the truth.
Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source but must also be credible in itself
such as one that the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, women by
custom and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so that their
reputation remains untainted.Such circumspection must have prompted the victim to request Regina Carba to
accompany her on the errand of mercy to accused-appellant's house. Unfortunately, Carba was shooed away by
accused-appellant on the pretext that his wife who was a Muslim was averse to having too many people in their
house.
In scrutinizing the credibility of witnesses, case law has established the following doctrinal
guidelines: first, the appellate tribunal will not disturb the findings of the lower court unless there is a showing that
it had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would
have affected the result of the case; second, the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great respect and even finality since it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor as they
testified on the witness stand; and third, a witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
The find the private complainant's prompt report of her defilement to her husband as well as the
authorities as convincing indications that she has been truly wronged. A complainant's act in immediately
reporting the commission of rape has been considered by this Court as a factor strengthening her credibility.
RULE 130 SECTION 27 - Offer of Compromise Not Amissible
G.R. No. 97957 March 5, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO LASE, alias "BERT", accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant appeals from the decision of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate in Criminal
Case No. 55571 convicting him of the crime of murder for the death of Dante Huelva on 18 May 1987 in Barangay
Pia-ong, Dimasalang, Masbate, and sentencing him:
. . . to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in the absence of any mitigating circumstance
and to indemnify the parent of the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.2
The decision was promulgated on 18 February 1991.
The prosecution presented Dr. Ernesto Tamayo, the Municipal Health Officer of Dimasalang, Masbate who
identified the post-mortem examination report (Exhibit "A") and the death certificate of Dante Huelva (Exhibit
"B"), DominicoPangantihon, Godofreda Huelva and Cpl. Carlos Mitra as witnesses for its evidence in chief.
5
On the other hand, accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi; he relied on the testimony of his principal
witnesses to support his version that he was somewhere else and not at the scene of the crime at the time of the
killing.
In his surrebuttal testimony, accused-appellant vaguely denied this offer of compromise. He, however, insinuated
that he could offer a higher amount.
The defense also sought to discredit the testimony of DominicoPangantihon because it was months after the
incident, and only after Ramon Sayson failed to testify, that he decided to come out and testify as an alleged
eyewitness to the killing.
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and disregarded the defense of alibi in view of the
positive identification of the accused-appellant and the possibility of his being at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission. Thus, in a Decision promulgated on 18 February1991, 17 the trial court held him liable for the
killing of Dante Huelva which, in view of the attendance of treachery, was qualified to murder.
The accused-appellant now comes to the Court to question his conviction based on the lack of credibility of the
witnesses presented against him. He alleges that DominicoPangantihonbelatedly came out in the open as a
witness to the incident, and Police Corporal Carlos Mitra’s testimony "incurred various glaring material
inconsistencies which render his testimony doubtful and unreliable."Additionally, accused-appellant suggests that
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Dr. Tamayo and Godofreda Huelva are likewise unreliable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the witnesses presented against the accused-appellant were reliable and credible.
HELD:
Yes. The challenged Decision of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate in Criminal Case No. 5557 finding
the accused-appellant ALBERTO LASE, alias "BERT" guilty of the crime charged, is hereby AFFIRMED.
REASONING:
At the bottom of the first and second assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of witnesses, a matter
appropriately addressed to the trial court 24 because it is in a better position to decide the matter, having heard
the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 25 Thus, the said court's
findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal absent any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case. 26
The failure of prosecution witness DominicoPangantihon to immediately report the incident certainly did not
detract from his credibility. While it was his duty as a barangay official to have assumed the responsibility of
reporting the incident, come to the succor of the victim or even run after and arrest the assailant, it is a sad reality
that not all in our society, including many of our public officials, are imbued with the highest sense of civic duty
which is necessarily expected of leaders in the community. Such indifference or apathy should not, however, cast
any shadow of doubt on or impair the credibility of a person who fails to report a crime or immediately come
forward to testify. The initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case
or their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is common. 27 Delay in itself is,
therefore, not enough. It would, of course, be entirely different if it clearly appears to the trial court that the
witness himself is not credible for the rule is settled that evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from a
credible witness but must also be credible in itself. 28 Respect should not likewise be accorded to such testimony if
there is proof that the said witness is influenced by improper or ulterior motives in so volunteering to testify for
the victim sometime after the occurrence of the incident.
The trial court, after observing the demeanor and deportment of said witness, together with the variations in his
expressions while on the witness stand — which are badges of truthfulness 29 — concluded that both he and his
testimony are credible. Accused-appellant presents no factual bases or strong arguments to convince Us that the
trial court erred in that regard. Nor has he shown any improper motive which could have impelled Dominico to
testify against him or implicate him in the commission of the crime. The absence of evidence as to an improper
motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit. 30For indeed, if an accused had nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the natural order of events
and of human nature and against the presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness to falsely testify against
the accused. 31
The alleged contradictions or inconsistencies in the testimony of Cpl. Mitra relate to minor, if not inconsequential,
matters. The rule is settled that minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses; 32 on the contrary,
they may even heighten their credibility. 33
Then too, accused-appellant offered to compromise the case for the sum of P10,000.00. The second paragraph of
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that:
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by
law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt. 34
Murder is not among those criminal cases which may be compromised.
G.R. No. 109172 August 19, 1994
TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
The COURT OF APPEALS and ASSOCIATED BANK, respondents.
Sometime in 1979, petitioner applied for and was granted several financial accommodations amounting to
P1,300,000.00 by respondent Associated Bank. The loans were evidenced and secured by four (4) promissory
notes, a real estate mortgage covering three parcels of land and a chattel mortgage over petitioner's stock and
inventories.
The mortgaged parcels of land were substituted by another mortgage covering two other parcels of land and a
chattel mortgage on petitioner's stock inventory. The released parcels of land were then sold and the proceeds
amounting to P1,386,614.20, according to petitioner, were turned over to the bank and applied to Trans-Pacific's
restructured loan. Subsequently, respondent bank returned the duplicate original copies of the three promissory
notes to Trans-Pacific with the word "PAID" stamped thereon.
6
Despite the return of the notes, or on December 12, 1985, Associated Bank demanded from Trans-Pacific payment
of the amount of P492,100.00 representing accrued interest on PN No. TL-9077-82. According to the bank, the
promissory notes were erroneously released.
Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay the amount demanded by respondent bank. Later, it had a
change of heart and instead initiated an action before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 146, for specific
performance and damages. There it prayed that the mortgage over the two parcels of land be released and its
stock inventory be lifted and that its obligation to the bank be declared as having been fully paid.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Trans-Pacific, declaring plaintiff's obligations to
defendant to have been already fully paid and ordering defendant to execute and deliver to plaintiffs a release on
the mortgage over the parcels of land and chattel mortgage.
Respondent bank elevated the case to the appellate court which, as aforesaid, reversed the decision of the trial
court, on the ground that the petitioner’s offer to compromise proved that the debt was not fully paid.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the appellate court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Trans-Pacific’s obligation to Asia Bank is fully paid.
HELD:
No. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
REASONING:
Applying the legal presumption provided by Art. 1271 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that petitioner has
fully discharged its obligation by virtue of its possession of the documents (stamped "PAID") evidencing its
indebtedness. Respondent court disagreed and held, among others, that the documents found in possession of
Trans-Pacific are mere duplicates and cannot be the basis of petitioner's claim that its obligation has been fully
paid. Accordingly, since the promissory notes submitted by petitioner were duplicates and not the originals, the
delivery thereof by respondent bank to the petitioner does not merit the application of Article 1271 (1st par.) of
the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit, made voluntarily by the creditor
to the debtor, implies the renunciation of the action which the former had against the latter.
Respondent court is of the view that the above provision must be construed to mean the original copy of the
document evidencing the credit and not its duplicate, thus:
. . . [W]hen the law speaks of the delivery of the private document evidencing a credit, it must be
construed as referring to the original. In this case, appellees (Trans-Pacific) presented, not the
originals but the duplicates of the three promissory notes." (Rollo, p. 42)
The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly groundless. It is undisputed that the documents
presented were duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as evidence. Further, it must be noted that
respondent bank itself did not bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by petitioner.
In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]), we said:
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing
of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby,
produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same
stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are
regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without
accounting for the nonproduction of the others.
A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in evidence when the original is in the possession of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice (Sec. 2[b], Rule
130), as in the case of respondent bank.
The presumption created by the Art. 1271 of the Civil Code is not conclusive but merely prima facie. If there be no
evidence to the contrary, the presumption stands. Conversely, the presumption loses its legal efficacy in the face
of proof or evidence to the contrary. In the case before us, we find sufficient justification to overthrow the
presumption of payment generated by the delivery of the documents evidencing petitioners indebtedness.
It may not be amiss to add that Article 1271 of the Civil Code raises a presumption, not of payment, but of the
renunciation of the credit where more convincing evidence would be required than what normally would be called
for to prove payment. The rationale for allowing the presumption of renunciation in the delivery of a private
instrument is that, unlike that of a public instrument, there could be just one copy of the evidence of credit. Where
several originals are made out of a private document, the intendment of the law would thus be to refer to the
delivery only of the original original rather than to the original duplicate of which the debtor would normally retain
a copy. It would thus be absurd if Article 1271 were to be applied differently.
While it has been consistently held that findings of facts are not reviewable by this Court, this rule does not find
application where both the trial and the appellate courts differ thereon (Asia Brewery, Inc. v. CA, 224 SCRA 437
[1993]).
As for the records, there is actually none submitted by petitioner to prove that the contested amount, i.e., the
interest, has been paid in full. In civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it (Imperial
Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC 200 SCRA 178 [1991]). Petitioner could have easily adduced the receipts
corresponding to the amounts paid inclusive of the interest to prove that it has fully discharged its obligation but it
did not.
There is likewise nothing on the records relied upon by the trial court to support its claim, by empirical evidence,
that the amount corresponding to the interest has indeed been paid. The trial court totally relied on a disputable
presumption that the obligation of petitioner as regards interest has been fully liquidated by the respondent's act
of delivering the instrument evidencing the principal obligation. Rebuttable as they are, the court a quo chose to
ignore an earlier testimony of Mr. Mesina anent the outstanding balance pertaining to interest.
That petitioner has not fully liquidated its financial obligation to the Associated Bank finds more than ample
confirmation and self-defeating posture in its letter dated December 16, 1985, addressed to respondent bank, viz.:
7
 . . . that because of the prevailing unhealthy economic conditions, the business is unable to
generate sufficient resources for debt servicing.
Fundamentally on account of this, we propose that you permit us to fully liquidate the remaining
obligations to you of P492,100 through a payment in kind (dacion en pago) arrangement by way of
the equipments (sic) and spare parts under chattel mortgage to you to the extent of their latest
appraised values." (Rollo, pp. 153-154; Emphasis supplied)
Followed by its August 20, 1986 letter which reads:
We have had a series of communications with your bank regarding our proposal for the eventual
settlement of our remaining obligations . . .
As you may be able to glean from these letters and from your credit files, we have always been
conscious of our obligation to you which had not been faithfully serviced on account of
unfortunate business reverses. Notwithstanding these however, total payments thus far remitted
to you already exceede (sic) the original principal amount of our obligation. But because of interest
and other charges, we find ourselves still obligated to you by P492,100.00. . . .
. . . We continue to find ourselves in a very fluid (sic) situation in as much as the overall outlook of
the industry has not substantially improved. Principally for this reason, we had proposed to settle
our remaining obligations to you by way of dacion en pago of the equipments (sic) and spare parts
mortgaged to you to (the) extent of their applicable loan values. (Rollo, p. 155; Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the above offer of settlement or compromise is not an admission that anything is due and is
inadmissible against the party making the offer (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court). Unfortunately, this is not an
iron-clad rule.
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and
the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but
offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is
inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence of an indebtedness
combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such
indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII,
p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L.ed. 1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an
effective admission of a borrower's loan balance (L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186
SCRA 640 [1990]). Exactly, this is what petitioner did in the case before us for review.
As petitioner would rather vehemently deny, undisputed is the fact of its admission regarding the unpaid balance
of P492,100.00 representing interests. It cannot also be denied that petitioner opted to sue for specific
performance and damages after consultation with a lawyer (Rollo, p. 99) who advised that not even the claim for
interests could be recovered; hence, petitioner's attempt to seek refuge under Art. 1271 (CC). As previously
discussed, the presumption generated by Art. 1271 is not conclusive and was successfully rebutted by private
respondent. Under the circumstances, i.e., outright and honest letters of admission vis-a-vis counsel-induced
recalcitrance, there could hardly be honest belief. In this regard, we quote with approval respondent court's
observation:
The countervailing evidence against the claim of full payment emanated from Transpacific itself. It
cannot profess ignorance of the existence of the two letters, Exhs. 3 & 4, or of the import of what
they contain. Notwithstanding the letters, Transpacific opted to file suit and insist(ed) that its
liabilities had already been paid. There was thus an
ill-advised attempt on the part of Transpacific to capitalize on the delivery of the duplicates of the
promissory notes, in complete disregard of what its own records show. In the circumstances, Art.
2208 (4) and (11) justify the award of attorney's fees. The sum of P15,000.00 is fair and equitable.
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
G.R. Nos. 114011-22 December 16, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VEVINA BUEMIO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
VevinaBuemio, a field officer of a travel agency, appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court which
convicted her of the crime of illegal recruitment, punishable under Art. 39 of the Labor Code.
She allegedly received payments from the complainants, without license, so she could help them get jobs in Japan.
Such payments were evidenced by receipts issued by Buemio. Unable to fulfill her promises, the complainants
demanded the return of their payments. Then said complainants lodged their complaints before the NBI.
The POEA accordingly issued a certification dated June 11, 1992 stating that "VEVINA BUEMIO, in her personal
capacity" was "neither licensed nor authorized . . . to recruit workers for overseas employment from Jan., 1991 to
the present."
Buemio was convicted by the trial court. Hence, this appeal questioning the trial court's giving weight and
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, and alleging denial of due process to the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the weight and credence of the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses established the accused-
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Yes. The Decision of the trial court finding appellant VevinaBuemio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale under Arts. 38 and 39 of the Labor Code and imposing on her the penalty of life
imprisonment and the payment of a fine of P100,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED.
REASONING:
On the merits of the appeal, appellant contends in the main that the testimonies of Principe, Villanueva and
Gutierrez are contrary to ordinary human experience. Thus, they could not have been enticed to work in factories
in Japan as there was no mention of any contacts of appellant in that country who could provide them
employment, nor were their specific work and workplaces as well as the peso equivalent of their supposed salary
ever pointed out by the appellant. Neither was it proven that appellant enticed them with convincing benefits in
8
working in Japan which would be enough for them to part with their money just so they could be "TNTs" 29 in
Japan.
Appellant's contentions boil down to the issue of credibility. As a rule, appellate courts will not disturb the findings
of the trial court on said issue unless certain facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This is because the trial
court heard the testimony of the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. 30 No negative circumstances attend this case as to warrant departure from the general rule.
In fact, a review of the transcript of stenographic notes in this case shows that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are credible. Taken as a whole and even under the crucible test of examination by the defense, said
testimonies are not only consistent on all material respects but also replete with minutiae of the questioned
transactions with the appellant.31 Inasmuch as the trial court found the positive declarations of the complainants
more credible than the sole testimony of the appellant denying said transactions, there must be a well-founded
reason in order to deny great weight to the trial court's evaluation of the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies. 32 The defense has failed to provide that reason as it has failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of
the complainant-witnesses in so imputing to appellant such a serious crime as illegal recruitment.
G.R. No. 110129 August 12, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDELCIANO AMACA @ "EDDIE" and "JOHN DOE" @ "OGANG," accused,
EDELCIANO AMACA @ "EDDIE," accused-appellant.
The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to identify the assailant in the case at hand. However, the
accused cannot be convicted of murder attended by treachery, because the Information charged him with murder
qualified only by evident premeditation. This legal lapse of the prosecution — for that matter, any prosecution
lapse — should benefit the appellant, because in a criminal case, the accused may be held accountable only for the
crime charged (or for the crime necessarily included therein), and every doubt must be resolved in his favor. Thus,
we hold him guilty only of homicide. Furthermore, since the heirs of the victim waived their claim through an
affidavit of desistance, no award for civil indemnity should be included in this Decision finding the accused guilty of
the homicide.
FACTS:
Appeal from the Decision 1 dated November 19, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Baisconvicting Accused
Edelciano Amaca of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Bernardo Mangubat, member of the Philippine National Police of Canlaon City, testified that as a police
investigator one of his companions in the force fetched him from his residence at about 7:00 in the evening of
October 1, 1990, and informed him of a shooting incident, where the victim was at the clinic of Dr. Cardenas,
which was near his residence. Upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw the victim already on board a Ford
Fiera pick up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former
answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not know
the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim said that he was about to die. (TSN,
p. 22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked, the victim identified himself as Nelson (sic) Vergara. He was able to
reduce into writing the declaration of victim Vergara, and have the latter affixed (sic) his thumbmark with the use
of his own blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor. (Exh. "C")
Interposing the defense of alibi, the accused corroborated (by) his witnesses, namely, Felix Ponting, and Alfredo
Gabucero, portrayed the following scenario: Felix Ponting and Alfredo Gabucero were members of the CAFGU
(Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit) and accused as member of the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO)
with station at Barangay Lumapao, Canlaon City. On October 1, 1990, the accused together with his companion
Felix Ponting were on duty at the said station from 6:00 o'clock in the evening to 8:00 o'clock that same evening.
After their duty at 8:00 o'clock, they went to sleep at the detachment, and were relieved by Alfredo Gabutero,
whose duty covered from 8:00 to 9:00 that same evening. 10
Prosecution Witnesses Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose Lapera both desisted
from further prosecution of the case; the former because of the "financial help" extended by the accused to her
family, and the latter because Segundina had already "consented to the amicable settlement of the case." This
notwithstanding, the Department of Justice found the existence of a prima facie case based on the victim's ante
mortem statement.
The trial court deemed the victim's statement to Police Officer Mangubat, positively identifying Appellant
Amaca, a dying declaration sufficient to overcome the latter's defense of alibi. However, due to the voluntary
desistance of the victim's mother from further prosecuting the case, the court a quo declined to make a finding on
the civil liability of the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding accused Edelciano Amaca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder on the sole basis of the alleged dying declaration of the victim to Police Officer Bernardo
Mangubat.
HELD:
The appeal is partially granted. The appellant is guilty only of homicide, not murder, and civil indemnity shall not
be awarded to the heirs of the deceased.
REASONING:
Dying Declaration, Sufficient to Identify Assailant
A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware of his impending
death to accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when
a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most
powerful consideration to speak the
truth." 13 This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased made the declaration conscious of his impending
death; (2) the declarant would have been a competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case
where the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declaration is complete in itself. 14 All these
concur in the present case.
Declarant a Competent Witness
The appellant contends that had he survived, the declarant would not have been a competent witness to
identify his assailant. He emphasizes that
the victim was shot twice at the back at nighttime and that ". . . the witness/victim based on the foregoing
circumstance was not able to see the alleged assailants . . . 15 We are not persuaded. True, the victim, Wilson
Vergara, was hit at the back by two bullets. But as the prosecution clearly showed by other evidence, Wilson did
not lose consciousness upon being shot. In fact, his ante mortem statement clearly indicates that he was able to
9
see and recognize who shot him. In this light, appellant is assailing the credibility, not the competency, of the
victim. Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum ability to observe, record, recollect and recount as
well as an understanding of the duty to tell the truth. 16 Appellant does not dispute that the victim was capable of
observing and recounting the occurrences around him; appellant merely questions whether the victim, under the
circumstances of this case, could have seen his assailant. In effect, appellant challenges merely the credibility of
the victim's ante mortem statement. We hold that the serious nature of the victim's injuries did not affect his
credibility as a witness since said injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause the immediate loss of his ability
to perceive and to identify his shooter. The Court had occasion in the past to rule on a similar issue as follows:
. . . (') The question as to whether a certain act could have been done after receiving a given wound,(') according
to Wharton and Stilles (Vol. III, Medical Jurisprudence, p. 212), "is always one that must be decided upon the
merits of a particular case." They cited a case from Vibert's Precis de Med. Leg., 4th ed., p. 286, where a man after
being shot in the chest threw a lamp at his adversary. The lamp started a fire; and to extinguish the fire, the
wounded man fetched a pail of water from the courtyard. When the fire was extinguished, the man lay down in
bed and died. Vibert performed the autopsy, and found that the left ventricle of the heart had been perforated by
the revolver's bullet. It is evident from the foregoing that Dr. Acosta's assertion that the victim of a gunshot wound
would immediately lose consciousness, after infliction of the wound, may not be true in all cases. . . . 17
Appellant also argues that the declarant could not have seen who shot him because "the actual shooting
occurred at 7:00 o'clock in the evening." 18 This statement is bereft of factual basis. The record shows that Police
Officer Mangubat was fetched from his house at 7:00 p.m. to investigate the shooting. He was informed that the
victim had already been brought to the clinic of Dr. Cardenas. 19 It may thus be inferred that the shooting
occurred sometime before the victim was found, brought to the clinic, and before Mangubat was fetched from his
house. Thus, a considerable period of time must have elapsed from the time of the actual shooting until the
policeman was fetched from his house around 7:00 p.m. That he was shot way before 7:00 p.m. does not lead to
the inference that it was pitch-black at the time of the shooting. Indeed, from the foregoing, it is reasonable to
assume that the crime was committed before nightfall and that there was sufficient daylight to enable the victim
to identify his assailant. At any rate, there are no indicia in the record that lighting conditions made it impossible
for declarant to identify his assailant. Ineluctably, the positive assertion of the declarant that he did recognize his
shooter has greater persuasive value than the baseless negative speculation of the defense that he did not.
Genuineness of the Dying Declaration
The defense attempts to cast doubt on the genuineness of the dying declaration by suggesting that since "the
relationship between CAFGU and the PNP is marred by jealousy, suspicion and general dislike for one another," 20
Police Officer Mangubat had enough motive to falsely implicate appellant who was a CAFGU member. The defense
also asks: "Why was the alleged dying declaration of the victim merely thumbmark (sic) when in fact he was still
coherent, conscious and very capable of writing his name at that time?" 21 Additionally, the defense questions
why Wagner Cardenas who signed the ante mortem statement as witness was not presented as such by the
prosecution. 22
The foregoing ulterior-motive theory is thoroughly unconvincing. Clearly, it does not destroy the genuineness of
the ante mortem statement. Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under the law to have regularly performed his
duty. There is nothing in the circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows any semblance
of irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to frame Appellant Amaca. As aptly noted by the trial court, even
appellant testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with Police Officer Mangubat and knew no reason
why the latter would falsely testify against him. 23 This dismal failure of the defense to show any ill motive on the
part of said police officer adds credence to Mangubat's testimony. 24
Moreover, that the declarant attested to his ante mortem statement through his thumbmark in his own blood is
sufficient to sustain the genuineness and veracity thereof. This manner of authentication is understandable in view
of the necessity and urgency required by the attendant extreme circumstances. It cannot be indicative of any
ulterior motive on the part of Police Officer Mangubat. We have clearly ruled that an ante mortem statement may
be authenticated through the declarant's thumbmark imprinted which his own blood, and serve as evidence in the
form of a dying declaration in a criminal case involving his death. 25 Verily, such declaration need not even be in
writing and may be proven by testimony of witnesses who heard it.
Finally, the non-presentation of Wagner Cardenas as witness during the trial is not fatal, as his testimony would
have been merely corroborative of Mangubat's. In addition, the presumption that evidence omitted by a party
would be adverse if presented does not obtain in this case, since Wagner Cardenas is also available and could have
been called to the witness stand by accused-appellant. Besides, it is the prosecutor's prerogative to choose his
own witnesses to prove the People's cause. 26
Ante Mortem Statement as Res Gestae
The ante mortem statement may also be admitted in evidence when considered as part of the res gestae,
another recognized exception to the hearsay rule provided specifically under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of
Court. The requisites for the admissibility of statements as part of the res gestae are: (a) the statement is
spontaneous; (b) it is made immediately before, during or after a startling occurrence; and (c) it relates to the
circumstances of such occurrence. 27 These requirements are obviously fulfilled in the present case where the
statement, subject of this discussion, was made immediately after the shooting incident and, more important, the
victim had no time to fabricate.
An ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.
This dual admissibility is not redundant and has the advantage of ensuring the statement's appreciation by courts,
particularly where the absence of one or more elements in one of the said exceptions may be raised in issue. In
this manner, the identification of the culprit is assured. 28
Alibi Debunked
The defense also contests the trial court's finding that the"alibi interposed by the accused miserably fall short of
exculpation. (Decision, p. 7)" 29 Appellant insists that, since the dying declaration was unreliable and since there
was no positive identification aside from this declaration, the defense of alibi gained strength. 30 There is no basis
for this contention for, as previously discussed, the ante mortem statement met all requirements for its
admissibility either as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae or both. 31 It must be remembered that alibi
is inherently weak and the facts in the case at hand show that it was not at all impossible, considering the
circumstances of time and place, for the accused-appellant to have been present at the crime scene at the time of
its commission. 32 The military detachment at Barangay Lumapao, where appellant allegedly slept, is a mere seven
kilometers away from Barangay Mabigo, Purok Liberty Hills where the crime was committed. In other words, the
able-bodied appellant was only an hour's walk and a short fifteen-minute tricycle ride from the locus criminis. 33
As correctly argued by the trial court, "(i)t would not have been impossible for the accused to be at Purok Liberty
Hills, and shoot the victim, and come back to his detachment in a matter of thirty (30) minutes, the time testified
by the defense witness Gabutero as to going to and coming back from these two places. (TSN, p. 17, July 15,
1992)" 34 The alibi of appellant cannot overcome, therefore, the very persuasive declaration of the victim. 35
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court's conscience rests easy with the moral certainty that indeed
accused-appellant committed the crime charged. His pretense at innocence is futile in view of the overwhelming
evidence presented against him. Even his flight — eluding the police for almost six months after the issue of the
warrant for his arrest — clearly bespeaks hisguilt. 36
Non-Award of Indemnity
The trial court did not make a finding on the civil liability of accused-appellant, reasoning that it was prevented
from doing so by the "unwillingness" of the victim's mother, Segundina Vergara, to further prosecute the case
against the accused. 40 The trial court cited the resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) denying the motion
10
for reinvestigation. The DOJ held that the ante mortem statement of the victim testified to by Pfc. Mangubat
accorded prima facie validity to the case against the accused, but it noted and confirmed the desistance of the
victim's mother and her son-in-law from further prosecuting the case.
The Solicitor General finds nothing wrong with the trial court's reasoning and recommends that its decision be
affirmed. 42 We agree. The facts of this case show that the victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case in
consideration of the "financial help" extended to her family by the accused-appellant. Such "financial help" when
viewed as an offer of compromise may also be deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellant's
criminalliability. 43 Parenthetically, her claim that the cause of her son's death was an accident attributable to the
latter, has no basis. It is inconceivable that the victim's two gunshot wounds at the back were self-inflicted. Well-
settled it is that the desistance of the victim's complaining mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the
criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving
her right to institute an action to enforce the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be
awarded any civil indemnity arising from the criminal prosecution. 44 This waiver is bolstered by the fact that
neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court's refusal to include a finding of
civilliability. 45
The records, however, do not show whether the deceased had other compulsory heirs. Such heirs, if there are
any, may file an independent civil action to recover damages for the death of Wilson Vergara.
RULE 130 SECTION 30 - Admissions by Conspirator
G.R. No. L-48185 August 18, 1941
FELICIANO B. GARDINER vs. HONORABLE PEDRO MAGSALIN,
OZAETA, J.:
FACTS:
This is an original petition for writ of Mandamus to compel respondent judge to admit the testimony of
Catalino Fernandez, one of the accused in a case to prove the alleged conspiracy between him and his co-accused.
Herein petitioner, as acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed an information against Catalino and his five
co-accused charging them with having conspired together to kill, and did kill one GaudencioVivar with evident
premeditation.
Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and his co-accused not guilty. At the trial of the five co-
accused,Catalino Fernandez was called by the fiscal as his first witness, to testify on the alleged conspiracy. Upon
objection of counsel for the defense, the respondent judge did not permit Fernandez to testify against his co-
accused on the ground that as a conspirator, his act or declaration is not admissible against his co-conspirators
until the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration, under Sec.12 rule 123 of the Rules of
Court. A motive for reconsideration was filed but to no avail. Hence, petition for Mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 12 of Rule 123 was correctly interpreted in this case.
RULING:
The court ruled that respondents completely missed the real meaning of Sec. 12 of Rule 123. This rule is one
of the exceptions to the “res inter alios” rule, which refers to an extrajudicial declaration of a co-conspirator, not
to his testimony by way of direct evidence.
The evidence adduced in court by the co-conspirator as a witness is not declarations of conspirator but
direct testimony to the fats which they testify. Aside from the discredit which to them as accomplices, their
evidence is entirely competent to establish the facts to which they testify. The rule for which counsel contends is
applicable only when it sought to introduce extrajudicial declarations and statements of co-conspirators.
There is no rule requiring the prosecution to establish conspiracy in order to permit a witness to testify what
one or all of the several accused persons did; and evidence adduced by the co-conspirators as witnesses, which is
direct evidence of the facts to which they testify is not within the rule requiring a conspiracy to be shown as
prerequisite to its admissibility.
The petition for writ of Mandamus was granted.
G.R. No. L-22426 May 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PELAGIO CONDEMENA, CASAMERO PATINO, SIMPLICIO
ANIEL, RICARIDO CAUSING @ GARIDO, defendants,
SIMPLICIO ANIEL, Defendant-Appellant.
ANGELES, J.:
FACTS:
PelagioCondenema, CasameroPatino, Ricardo Causing and SimplicioAniel were charged with the crime of
robbery in band with homicide, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity, abuse of superior strength and dwelling.
After trial, the court found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of robbery in band with
homicide without making a finding on the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information.
Pending their appeal, PelagioCondenema, CasameroPatino and Ricardo Causing withdraw their appeal which
was granted by the court. Hence, only SimplicioAniel remained as the appellant.
The evidence of the prosecution has established, through the testimonies of BarcelisaLamoste, wife of the
victim and her daughter Esmeralda who was then 14 years old as eyewitnesses to the crime. BarcelisaLamoste
testified that she recognized PelagioCondenema as one of the accused. She does not know the names of the other
accused but she recognized their faces and she pointed to SimplicioAniel as the one who pointed the gun , about
one foot long on her face. CasameroPatino and Ricardo Causing held the hands of the victim and when it was
impossible already for the victim to resist, PelagioCondenema stabbed the victim on his right breast,
Her testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Esmeralda who was then at the door of the house.
The defense of accused-appellant was alibi.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant SimplicioAniel has been sufficiently identified as one of the four men who
participated in the commission of the crime charged.
RULING:
The court ruled that the defense of alibi was weak where the prosecution witnesses positively identified the
accused. To prosper such a defense, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The degree of the
evidence must be such as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
The positive identification of appellant Aniel was further bolstered when PelagioCondenema and
CasameroPatino, in their sworn statements, named him as one of them in the group who killed FerminLamoste
and robbed the house.
11
 Extrajudicial confession, independently made without collusion, which are identical with each other in their
essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on record, as admissible as circumstantial evidence
against the person implicated to show the probability of the Latter’s actual participation in the commission of the
crime.
The commission of the crime was attended by treachery. The act of the accused in suddenly rushing toward
the victim, then two of them, each holding the hands of the victim, and the third stabbed the victim is
characterized by treachery insuring the accomplishment of their purpose without risk to themselves from any
defense or retaliation the victim might offer.
The conspiracy among the accused is evident and equally proven. Appellant Aniel is liable as principal
because the evidence does not show that he attempted to prevent the assault and the killing. The aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity cannot be appreciated without any evidence that the peculiar advantage of night time
was purposely and deliberately sought by the accused.
G.R. No. L-28347 January 20, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.PAN PROVO, ET AL., defendants, JOSE MESINA,
defendant-appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:
Appellant Mesina was found guilty of the crime of murder while his two co-accused were acquitted. The
penalty was imposed in its medium period, instead of the maximum because the aggravating circumstance of night
time and use of superior strength alleged in the information have already been absorbed in the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
The main evidence for the prosecution against Mesina consisted of the testimonies of the BenetaMayuyu
who positively identified the appellant corroborated by the testimonies of other witnesses. Appellant denied
having performed any of the acts imputed to him by the prosecution and interposed the defense of alibi.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the court erred in relying upon the testimony of Benita Mayuyu
2.) Whether or not the court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Anastacio Serrano, Apolonio
Gilbert and KudiaruLaxamana
3.) Whether or not the court erred in admitting Exhibits C and E as evidence
4.) Whether or not the court erred in not believing the evidence of defense.
RULING:
On the first issue, the Defense assails the credibility of Benita Mayuyu’s testimony upon the ground that she
had given conflicting versions.
The Court was not dissuaded considering that Benita was a member of an non-Christian tribe known as the
Baluga. She grew up and lived in a primitive condition and devoid of education, illiterate and cannot read, not even
a time piece. She explained that the time she was referring to was just an estimate.
Her failure to forthwith reveal the participation of Mesina in the commission of the crime can be explained
by an intense lamentation and expression of grief for a misfortune, which when unchecked may result in a
condition of numbness, under which the mind becomes somewhat dull. Well settled is the rule that inconsistency
and contradictions incurred by an illiterate witness in the course of a lengthy examination will not affect the
credibility of the testimony. It was Benita who positively identified accused Mesina.
On the second issue, the court found no sufficient grounds to doubt the veracity of the witnesses for the
prosecution. The argument of Mesina that his act of dissuading the posse headed by KudiaruLaxamana from
following the set of footprints going to the right of the coconut plantation instead of going to the left was too
insignificant to implicate him was found by the court to be devoid of merit, aside from being immaterial to the
issue of credibility of Laxamana’s testimony. The court found no possible motive from witnesses Serrano,
Laxamana and Benita Mayuyu to falsely incriminate appellant Mesina.
On the third issue, the court ruled that extrajudicial confessions are in general admissible only against those
who made the same; this rule is subject to exception. Extrajudicial confessions independently made without
collusion, which are identical with each other in the essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on
record, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show probability of actual
participation in the commission of the crime. Hence, Exhibits C and E were properly admitted as circumstantial
evidence tending to show the probability of the participation of appellant in the commission of said offense as
testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution.
On the fourth issue, the court ruled that the alibi set up by the appellant is one of the weakest
defense available in criminal cases, it cannot offset the testimony of Benita Mayuyu, who positively identified him
as one of those who seized Matignas Serrano at Pisok, corroborated by the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution and by the aforementioned Exhibits C and E. The testimony of Lazaro David to corroborate the
testimony of Mesina could not explain why the allegedly remembered the presence of Mesina at the religious
service in the Iglesiani Cristo, but could not remember other events of similar nature at about that period of time.
The court found no reason to disturb the decision of the Trial Court.
G.R. No. L-27909 December 5, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARCADIO PUESCA alias "Big Boy", WALTER, APA,
FILOMENO MACALINAO, JR. alias "White", MAGNO MONTANO alias "Edol", JOSE GUSTILO alias "Peping" and
RICARDO DAIRO alias 'Carding" defendants-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
ArcadioPuesca, alias “Big Boy”, Jose Gustilo alias "Peping", MagnoMontaño alias "Edol", FilomenoMacalinao,
Jr. alias "White", Walter Apa and Ricardo Dairo alias "Carding" were charged with the crime of Robbery in Band
with Homicide allegedly for killing Candido Macias and taking the amount of P20,000.00 from the victim.
While Candido Macias and his wife Marcela Macias were taking their supper, strangers with firearms
suddenly entered their house. Three of them went upstairs and one of them from the sala ordered the occupants
of the house to lie down on the floor. CAndido Macias went to the sala and two gunshots were fired upon him and
caused his death.
After trial, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged attended by
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity and penalty of death was imposed upon them.
Hence, the automatic review of said judgment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court a quo erred in giving credence to declarations of the relatives of the
deceased.
2. Whether or not the court erred in admitting and believing the confessions of the appellants.
12
 3. Whether or not the court erred in denying appellant’s motion for new trial.
RULING:
On the first issue, the court finds that the evidence clearly shows that the appellants were positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as participants of the crime. AnacletoDelfino declared that ArcardioPuesca
and MagnoMontaño were the persons he saw under the house of the victim because he raised the lamp higher to
see who they were, and that Puesca was the one who fired at him.
Marietta Macias-Olarte and Francisco Urbano testified that Walter Apa and Ricardo Dairo were the ones
who escorted Francisco Macias passing through the backyard. They testified that they recognized Walter Apa as
tall, stoop-shouldered person holding a gun and that the shorter fellow armed with a carbine was Ricardo Dairo.
The arguments of the appellant that it was improbable for Delfino to have recognized Jose Gustilo and
FilomenoMacalinao, Jr. since he saw them for the first time under the light of a kerosene lamp and he was gripped
by fear and lying on the floor face down was not believed by the court. Accordingly, fear does not necessarily
detract from a person’s ability to observe. A person will easily remember one who does him harm, because
consciously and unconsciously he turns his attention to the offender.
The court was not persuaded that the prosecution eyewitnesses should be disbelieved because they are
related to the victim. Relationship to the victim, standing by itself, does not prove that they are prejudiced or
biased, considering that their testimonies were clear and convincing and corroborated by other facts and
circumstances.
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellants were engaged in conspiracy to effect
the object of their criminal purpose.
As to the second issue, the confessions of ArcadioPuesca, MagnoMontaño and Jose Gustilo are admissible
against them. It could be considered as corroborative evidence of the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses
pointing to them as participants in the commission of the crime.
It is true that extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the person who made it, but it is also settled
that such confession is admissible as corroborative evidence of the other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his
co-defendants.
The claim of the defense that the confessions of appellants Puesca, Gustilo, and Montaño were extracted
through force and violence was not supported by evidence.
On the third issue, it was ruled that the appellants can no longer raise in issue the denial of their motion for
new trial because they have previously challenged before the court by certiorari the correctness of the order of
the trial court denying their motion for new trial.
The court found the petition devoid of merit, hence it was dismissed. The decision appealed from was
affirmed.
G.R. No. 101117 June 15, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARCELINO CEDON, defendant-appellant.
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
Felimon Gerona was illegally kidnapped by TeodoroZaldo alias "PiloBulan", Eli Lomuardo, SimoCedon, Ruben
Molito, Mepen Doe, Lando Doe, Davis Doe and Jaime Doe, who are still at large and whose identities are still
unknown. He recognized, as among the group, TeofiloBulan and Ruben Bolito, who belonged to a gang of robbers
called "Sabarra." He also noticed the appellant standing on the concrete pavement near the beach.
He was carried away from his house to Aripuyok Island. In the island, Gerona’s captors tried to force him to admit
that he was an intelligence agent but he stuck to his denial of the charge. Bulan finally told him that he needed
funds to buy certain equipment for the use of his band. After Gerona agreed to give P5,000.00, he was taken back
to Barangay Bulo-an, with his left hand tied to the mast of the motorboat.
Gerona did not immediately report the incident to the police authorities. It was only after the townspeople
organized the "alsamasa" as a counter — insurgency movement, did he inform the authorities of the extortion. He
also enlisted with the CAFGU as a means to retaliate against the extortionists. In 1990, Gerona together with some
members of the CAFGU, arrested appellant (MarcelinoCedon) and another suspect, Danny Alvarez.
Appellant claimed that he was apprehended by Gerona because the latter wanted him to testify against PiloBulan.
When appellant refused to do so, Gerona demanded P2,500.00 from him. Since appellant failed to give the said
amount, Gerona arrested him.
Consequently, an information for kidnapping for ransom was filed charging the accused, together with
TeodoroZaldo alias “PiloBulan”, Eli Lomuardo, Ruben Molito and some unknown persons.
After trial, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged against him.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. The court erred when it gave weight and credence to the improbable and contradictory
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; and
2. The court failed to acquit the accused-appellant on the ground of insufficient evidence and
reasonable doubt to warrant his conviction.
RULING:
On the first issue, the court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove any overt act on the part of the
appellant, showing that he joined Bulan’s gang to perpetrate the criminal act. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation
in the commission of the crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Time and again
the Court has held that conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
On the second issue, the court ruled that the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution to support a
conviction has not been satisfied with regard to appellant’s participation in the kidnapping for ransom of Gerona,
Sr. The conviction of the accused must rest on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution.
The decision of the court a quo was reversed and set aside and accused-appellant was acquitted.
G.R. No. 140405 March 4, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
13
MAJOR EMILIO COMILING, GIL SALAGUBANG (acquitted), MARIO CLOTARIO (acquitted), GERALDO GALINGAN,
EDDIE CALDERON (at large), BALOT CABOTAJE (at large) and RICKY MENDOZA (at large),accused.
MAJOR EMILIO COMILING and GERALDO GALINGAN, appellants.
CORONA, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision1 dated September 1, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Tayug,
Pangasinan, convicting Maj. Emilio Comiling, Geraldo Galingan alias "Bong" and Ricky Mendoza alias "Leo" of the
crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing them to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
Facts:
On September 2, 1995, Ysiong Chua, the owner of Masterline Grocery and his helper Mario were about
to close the store when someone knocked on the door to buy some cigarettes. As soon as Mario opened the door,
three masked, armed men suddenly barged into the store and announced a hold-up.
SPO1 Rolando Torio, PO3 Erwil Pastor and SPO4 Emilio Nagui of the Tayug Police Station rushed to the
crime scene. SPO1 Torio was standing outside the store's door, he heard three gunshots coming from inside the
store, all directed towards Bonifacio Street. PO3 Pastor was then on the street while Nagui was some 50 meters
away. PO3 Pastor ran and hid behind a concrete marker, then moved westward as if to return to the police
headquarters. Unfortunately, in his attempt to flee, PO3 Pastor was shot in the face.
Meanwhile, Ysiong discovered that he lost three gold necklaces worth P26,000 and cash amounting to
P81,000.
On September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience, prosecution witness NatyPanimbaan decided to
reveal to police authorities what she knew about the case. During the trial, she testified that she was present in all
the four meetings in which the plan to rob the Masterline Grocery was hatched.
On the other hand, all the accused denied culpability for the felony. Each of them claimed to be
somewhere else at the time the crime happened on September 2, 1995. The witnesses for the defense also tried
to impugn the credibility of the lead witness for the prosecution, NatyPanimbaan.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in considering NatyPanimbaan as a credible witness for the prosecution.
2. Whether or not Naty's testimony was inadmissible to prove conspiracy because of the res inter alios
acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
Ruling:
1.
No. In the case at bar, there is nothing to suggest that the trial court was whimsical or capricious in the
performance of its tasks. Thus, the court have no recourse but to uphold its findings on the credibility of
NatyPanimbaan and of the other prosecution witnesses. In any event, as correctly stated by the Solicitor General,
NatyPanimbaan was examined three times not only under the close scrutiny of two defense counsels but also, in
some instances, under the abrasive tirades of the trial judge who called her a "whore." Yet, despite the trial court's
apparent misgivings about her character, it still gave full credence to her testimony. Naty's tenacious insistence on
the minute details of what happened suggested nothing else except that she was telling the truth. The court does
not doubt her credibility.The time-tested rule is that, between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and
the mere denials of the accused, the former undisputedly deserve more credence and are entitled to greater
evidentiary value.
2.
No. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. prescribes that any declaration made by a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy is admissible against him alone but not against his co-conspirators unless the conspiracy
is first shown by other independent evidence. The res inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial declarations
or admissions and not to testimony given on the witness stand where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.8 In the present case, Naty's admission implicating appellant Comiling
was made in open court and therefore may be taken in evidence against him.
RULE 130 SECTION 32 - Admissions by Silence
G.R. No. L-9341 August 14, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SERVANDO BAY, defendant-appellant.
Buencamino and Lontok for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The information in this case charges the appellant, Servando Bay, with the crime of rape, committed as follows:
On the night of June 7 of the present year, 1913, in the barrio of San Teodoro of the township of Calapan,
Mindoro, in the jurisdiction of this Court of First Instance, the above- named accused accidentally met
Florentina Alcones walking along the beach, and, on finding that she was alone, did maliciously and
criminally drag her toward a place covered with underbrush, and there by means of force and intimidation
did lie with her against her will.
Facts:
About 7 o'clock in the evening of June 7, 1913, when turning from her rice field Florentina was joined by
the accused, and that a short distance from the mouth of Subaan River, he caught hold of her, picked her up, and
carried her to the edge of some thickets, where he threw her on the ground and attempted to have carnal
intercourse with her. Angered by her resistance he drew his dagger, and force her under threat of her life to
accede to his desires.
14
 A party who was passing near the place where the crime was committed heard the victim’s cries and
thereafter stepped ashore. Upon seeing the accused get up from the place where the woman claims the crime was
committed, asked "What's this?" The accused made no explanation of his conduct or his presence there, and left
the place forthwith.
Immediately thereafter, the woman, accompanied by some of the party from the boat, went to the
councilman of the barrio and filed a complaint. The accused, having been brought before the councilman and
asked had he committed the crime of which he was charged, admitted that he had. Consequently, the accused
was sent to the justice of the peace, who held him for trial.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in accepting as true the testimony of the complaining witness and of the
witnesses called by the prosecution.
2. Whether the accused, when the complaint was made to the councilman of the barrio, did or did not admit
his guilt.
Held:
1.
No. It is true that there are some apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of some of
the ignorant witnesses called for the prosecution, and that it is somewhat difficult to understand how the accused, a
young married man, could have been so lost to all sense of right and decency as to assault a woman so much older
than himself, a neighbor, and an old friend of his family. But Florentina’s evidence, supported by that of other
witnesses for the prosecution, is so convincing and conclusive that we are forced to believe that he did it in fact
commit the atrocious crime with which he is charged.
2.
The evidence leaves no room for doubt that neither at the moment when the party in the boat came upon him in
company with his victim nor when he appeared before the councilman upon her complaint did he claim, as he does
now, that her charge that he had assaulted her was a pure fabrication, invented for the purpose of wreaking
vengeance upon him.
There can be no possible doubt that he was present when the party on board the boat were attracted to the
place where the victim raised her outcry charging him with the assault, and that he was present later or when he
presented her complaint to the councilman of the barrio.
Under such circumstances, the court is convinced that an innocent man would instantly and indignantly repudiate
such a charge, and attempt there and then to establish his innocence, explaining how he came to be there present
with the woman, and the conditions under which she had made the false charge.
G.R. No. L-59551 August 19, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL NAVOA y MARTINEZ and BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ alias "Jack Robertson," alias "Lim Ming Tak," alias
"Christopher Kelly," defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Dakila F. Castro for defendant-appellant M. Navoa.
Divina S. Cuejillo for defendant-appellant B. Lim.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Sixth Judicial District,
Branch XXX convicting defendants-appellants Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim of the crime of Arson. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused Manuel Navoa y Martinez and Bernardo Lim y Ramirez,
also known as Jack Robertson, Lim Ming Tak and Christopher Kelly, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of arson, as charged in the information and hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of death,
to indemnify, jointly and severally, the building and theater owners, N. de la Merced & Sons, Inc.
and Universal Management Corporation, in the total amount of P774,550.29, and to pay the costs.
Facts:
On July 9, 1978, at about 2:30 and 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the Manila Cinema Building housing the
Manila Cinema 1 and 2 theaters located at the corner of ß M. Recto Avenue and Nicanor Reyes, Sr., Streets, Manila
was burned, causing damage and destruction to the said building. In addition, fourteen (14) persons died in the
fire, eleven of whom were Identified. All died because of asphyxia due to suffocation.
On June 29, 1979, defendant-appellant Bernardo Lim alias "Jack Robertson," alias Christopher Kelly," alias
"Lim Ming Tak," acting as an alleged informer of Police Corporal Vicente Palmon and his fellow arson operatives,
informed the latter that it was Manuel Navoa who was responsible for the fire that destroyed Manila Cinema 1
and 2.
Relying solely on the credibility of Bernardo Lim and without first securing a warrant of arrest, Corporals
Palmon and Harrison Tolosa arrested appellant Manuel Navoa. At the police headquarters, appellant Navoa
allegedly executed statements waiving his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel and giving an extra-
judicial confession. Both waiver and extra-judicial confession were subscribed and sworn to before Inquest Fiscal
Zeus Abrogas.
Earlier, on that same day, appellant Bernardo Lim likewise executed a waiver of his constitutional rights
to silence and to counsel and also gave an extra-judicial confession.
Both defendants-appellants pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. They further testified during trial that
they were tortured to sign the waiver of their constitutional rights and intimidated into signing the extrajudicial
confessions.
15
 Solely on the basis of the extra-judicial confessions of both defendants- the trial court rendered the
appealed judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting both defendants based on their extrajudicial confessions
Ruling:
Yes. The main thrust of the defendants-appellants' arguments on appeal is that they were not afforded the
opportunity to avail of their rights under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution; that there was no
intelligent waiver of their rights, and as such, their extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible against them.
This Court had already ruled that to be valid, a confession must be shown to have proceeded from the free
will of the person confessing. Thus, in People v. Bagasala (39 SCRA 236), we stated that where the confession is
involuntary, being due to maltreatment, or induced by fear or intimidation, there is a violation of this
constitutional provision. Any form of coercion, whether physical, mental or emotional thus stamps it with
inadmissibility. What is essential for its validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the person confessing."
A defendant may waive effectuation of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel at a custodial
police interrogation provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. In the case at bar, there
was no such voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Evidence presenyted " is so pat and aptly worded, so
contrived as to be exactly suited to meet legal objections that it could have been prepared only by a veteran police
investigator and not by an ordinary layman like appellant Manuel Navoa.”
Furthermore, the trial court stated that no results of medical examinations indicating torture were
presented in evidence by the accused. No eyewitness who saw defendants at the vicinity of the scene of the crime
was ever presented. The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. L-69971 July 3, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO LUVENDINO y COTAS, accused/appellant.
Facts:
On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap left her home at Deva Village, Tambak,
Taguig, Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of Manila where she was a sophomore commerce student.
She would usually be home by 7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings, 1 but on that tragic day, she would not reach home
alive. On that particular evening, her father Panfilo Capcap arriving home from work at around 7:30 p.m., noted her
absence and was told by his wife and other children that Rowena was not yet home from school. Later, a younger
brother of Rowena, sent on an errand, arrived home carrying Rowena's bag which he had found dropped in the middle
of a street in the village.
Panfilo Capcap lost no time in seeking the help of their barangay captain and the police officers. He returned
home and, with the help of some neighbors, launched a search party for the missing Rowena. The search ended in a
grassy vacant lot within the Deva Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80 meters from the Capcap residence, where
lay the apparently lifeless body of Rowena, her pants pulled down to her knees and her blouse rolled up to her
breasts. Her underwear was blood-stained and there were bloody fingerprint marks on her neck. Rowena, her body
still warm, was rushed to a hospital in Taguig, where on arrival she was pronounced dead.
By 5 March 1984, an information had been filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C. Luvendino, Cesar Borca
alias "Cesar Putol" and Ricardo de Guzman alias "Ric" with the crime of rape with murder. Warrants of arrest were
issued against all the above accused but only accused-appellant Ernesto Luvendino was actually apprehended; the
other two (2) have remained at large.
It appears that Luvendino re-enacted the events that transpired in the evening of January 17 at the crime
scene, where pictures were taken by a photographer brought by the police officers. In the course of the
demonstration, Luvendino allegedly remarked: “Inaamin ko po nakasama ko si Cesar Borcasapagre-rape kay Rowena.”
At the arraignment, Luvendino pleaded not guilty. On 12 December 1984, the trial court rendered a decision
finding Luvendino guilty, sentencing him to death, requiring him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Rowena in the
amount of P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as a result of her death.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not holding that his "demonstration" or re-enactment of the crime as well as
his subsequent written admission of guilt as inadmissible for having been made without the benefit of counsel
Ruling:
Yes.The trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on what had occurred during the
re-enactment of the crime by Luvendino. We note that the re-enactment was apparently staged promptly upon
apprehension of Luvendino and even prior to his formal investigation at the police station. The decision of the trial
court found that the accused was informed of his constitutional rights "before he was investigated by Sgt.
Galang in the police headquarters" and cited the "Salaysay" of appellant Luvendino. The decision itself, however,
states that the re-enactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the police station. Thus, it is not clear
from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of his
constitutional rights including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived such right before
proceeding with the demonstration. Under these circumstances, we must decline to uphold the admissibility of
evidence relating to that re-enactment.
RULE 130 SECTION 33 - Confession
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAÑO, MANUEL "JUN" ABENOJA, JR., and FREDDIE "BOY"
CARTEL, accused. JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
16
Facts:
At past 7:30 p.m. of 6 September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his
son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family
friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street,
Baguio City, from his driving the car. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church,
a man came out from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the
Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a
fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away.All those in the car were hit and
Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot.
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiaño, an alleged former military agent or "asset",
confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal ErdolfoBalajadia in his office that he was the
triggerman in the fatal shooting. He implicated Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr., allegedly a fellow military agent and the
"bagman" who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Freddie "Boy" Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a
certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic
notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiaño was
assigned, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom.
The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the privileges like that
of Quiaño. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement in the said crime. He further
declared that although he was given a lawyer, Atty. Cajucom, he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver
Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him for only two minutes in English and Tagalog, but not in Ilocano, the
dialect he understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quiaño
escaped. However, the RTC convicted him since conspiracy was established.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial admissions are admissible as evidence to warrant conviction
Held:
No. The rule provides that any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 of
Article III of the Constitution shall be inadmissible in evidence. The extrajudicial admission of the appellant,
contained in twenty-two pages appear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the
records, the transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court
cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes, it cannot be expected that appellant, who is a farmer and
who reached only the fourth grade, to read and decipher its contents.
Despite asking for his uncle to represent him, he was provided with an impartial counsel who is an
associate of the private prosecutor. It also appears that some of the transcripts of the notes of the proceeding that
show the extrajudicial statement made by the accused were not signed by him. By making his statements, the
accused voluntarily waived his right to remain silent but that was not put in writing either.
People vs Salazar
Facts: On August 23, 1988, the accused Nena Salazar was caught selling 5 sticks of marijuana to a poseur buyer and
possession of 6 more sticks and 5 grams. On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In her
own defense, the accused stated that the NARCOM agents brought her to their headquarters to force her into
divulging the identity of other drugs pushers in the area and that the case against her was only a "trumped-up
charge". The Trial court found her guilty of selling a prohibited drug without being authorized by law.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting her of the crime charged despite the unreasonable and
unlawful search and seizure conducted by the NARCOM agents and there has been a violation of Appellant's Right
to Counsel
Held: (a) No. The Trial Court was correct in convicting the accused of the crime charged. Indispensable in every
prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the submission of proof that the sale of the illicit
drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, coupled with the presentation of the
corpusdelicti as evidence in court. The element of sale must be unequivocally established in order to sustain a
conviction.
Because the drug pusher had been caught in flagrante delicto, the arresting officers were duty-bound to
apprehend the culprit immediately and to search her for anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the crime. The search, being an incident of a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity.
(b) The Court finds appellant's claim that she was not informed of her right to counsel during custodial
investigation to be correct. Moreover, the NARCOM agent's admission that they made her sign and thumbmark
the bond paper which they used to wrap the marijuana found in her possession was violative of her constitutional
right to counsel.
While the bond paper does not appear to have been considered as a pivotal piece of evidence against appellant,
such act of the NARCOM agents is worth noting if only to provide guidance to law enforcement operatives. In
People vs. Simon:
. . . Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the
crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel. Although
appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not
made in writing and in the presence of counsel, hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be
extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. Besides, the arrest report is self-
serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
People vs Tiozon
Facts: On February 24, 1989, Rosalina and Leonardo Bolima were awakened by the loud knocks on their door;
Leonardo opened the door and they saw that the person who was knocking was their EutropioTiozon. Leonardo
invited the accused inside their home. After a few minutes the accused and Leonardo had left the house and five
minutes later and/or after Rosalina had heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their door
and at the same time informing her that he accidentally shot her husband. Rosalina told the court about what
happened and the admission of the accused of shooting Leonardo.
The Trial Court found the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal possession of Firearms with Murder.
Appellant contends that the trial court had erred in convicting the appellant of the crime, stating further that the
testimony of the wife of the victim that after hearing two successive gunshots accused, the appellant went back to
her house and informed her that he accidentally shot her husband, should not have been considered by the trial
court as part of the res gestae.
Issue: a. Whether or not Rosalina’s testimony is hearsay;
17
b. Whether or not the court had erred in the conviction of the accused for Illegal possession of Firearms with
Murder
Held: a. The questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is not hearsay. She testified on what the accused-
appellant told her, not what any other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The accused-appellant's
statement was an "oral confession", not a part of res gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true, which he
did in this case.
In the similar case of People vs. Tulagan, the Court declared that a statement allegedly made by one of the accused
to Natalia Macaraeg that "we killed him" (referring to himself and his co-accused) and which Natalia repeated in
her testimony in open court was merely an "oral confession" and not part of the res gestae.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the alleged statement of the accused-
appellant is hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning its admission due to his failure to object thereto at the
time the testimony was given.
b. It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal
possession of a firearm.However, it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative fact that the
accused had no license but to prove it.There being no proof that accused-appellant had no license to possess the
firearm in question, he could not be convicted for illegal possession of a firearm. The trial court then committed an
error in holding the accused-appellant guilty thereof.
In order for murder to be established, there must be treachery on the part of the accused. In the instant case, no
witness who could have seen how the deceased was shot was presented. Absent the quantum of evidence
required to prove it, treachery cannot be considered against the accused-appellant.
People vs Tujon
Facts: On November 3, 1977, taxiRolando Abellana was found dead at Doña Faustina Village, Quezon City by stab
wounds. On November 23, 1977, accused JovitoTujon and Ernesto Parola were arrested by the police. The
extrajudicial confession shows that they mugged and killed Abellana. During the pendency of this case, Parola
escaped from the Quezon City Jail; consequently the defense presented only accused Tujon as its lone witness,
denying the accusation against him. The Trial Court found Tujon guilty with Robbery with Homicide. Appellant
contends that the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged by relying heavily on
their respective extra-judicial confessions.
Issue: Whether or not the court can rely solely on extrajudicial evidence.
Held: The Court agrees with counsel for appellant that the evidence presented is not sufficient to sustain
conviction.He correctly observed that it was not even shown by the evidence how appellant came to be suspected
of the robbery and killing and subsequently arrested. The evidence against the accused consists solely of their
extra-judicial confessions. There is no eyewitness and not even a single circumstantial evidence pointing to the
accused as the perpetrators of the crime.
People vs Macam, Cawilan Jr., Cedro, Roque, Roque
Facts: On August 18, 1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque
went to the house of Benito Macam, the victim, in Quezon City. The maid, SalvacionEnrera, testified that only
Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. and Danilo Roque entered the house and that Ernesto Roque remained in the
tricycle.
The accused then announced a hold-up, and started ransacking the place and looking for valuables. Tying up the
members of Benito's household, namely, Leticia Macam, NiloAlcantara, SalvacionEnrera, and the children of
Benito Macam, the accused brought them to a room upstairs. After a while, Leticia was killed and Benito, Nilo, and
Salvacion were stabbed.
Accused Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benito’s house for a fee of PHP
50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be paid the following
day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to have lunch. Thereafter Danilo washed the dishes
and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather
some things and which he abided out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito, he heard the
accused saying “kailanganpatayinangmgataongyandahilkilalaako ng mgayan”. Upon hearing such phrase he
escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from
the province and in no way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his brother, they
went to the factory of the Zesto Juice for him to get his payment PHP 50.00. He and his brother was suddenly
apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit
certain things.
After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on their faces caused by blows
inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital before each surviving victims
and made to line-up for identification. The Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Issue: (a). Whether or not the identification of the uncounseled used is inadmissible.
(b). That the appellants guilt were not proved beyond reasonable doubt
Held: (a). The identification is valid. The general rule is that after the start of the custodial investigation, any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the
case at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims before the confrontation was held. The
circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a
mistaken identification.
However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at the police line-up.
Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled
accused cannot be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identification made by the
prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the identification of appellants at the police line-up
at the hospital, again identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-court identification as
being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such objection, the prosecution need not show that said
identifications were of independent origin.
(b). The presence of conspiracy between appellants and the other accused can be shown through their conduct
before, during and after the commission of the crime. It is undeniable that appellant Danilo Roque was the only a
tricycle driver, who brought the 4 to the house of Benito.
Upon arriving at the residence of Benito Macam, appellant Danilo Roque, together with his co-accused, went
inside the house to eat. He even admitted that after eating, he washed the dishes, swept the floor and sat on the
sofa in the sala instead of going out of the house. This conduct is not in keeping with his being merely the tricycle
driver hired by the accused to transport them to their destination.
While the appellant Roque claimed that he was merely intimidated by the accused to gather the stolen articles, his
subsequent conduct belied this claim. According to him, he escaped after hearing accused Eduardo Macam tell his
co-accused to kill all the possible witnesses who may be asked to identify them. Yet he continued to ply his route
as if nothing unusual happened. He did not report the incident to the police.
Appellant Danilo Roque's denial of his participation in the commission of the crime is not sufficient to overcome
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, who positively identified the former as one of the persons who
entered the Macam's residence, robbed and stabbed the occupants therein.
People vs Olivares
18
Facts: PurisimoMacaoili testified that he found the dead body of Mr. Sy (Tiu Hui) in the morning of December 26,
1981 inside Cardinal Plastic Industries. Appellant Danilo Arellano failed to report for work since the commission of
the crime. Appellant Olivares accompanied the police officers to Broadway, Barangay Kristong Hari, Quezon City,
where they found appellant Arellano. After being ask about the incident that took place at the Cardinal Plastic
Industries, appellant Arellano admitted to the police authorities his participation in the commission of the crime.
Upon investigation, appellant Olivares told the truth about the incident.
The trial court charged and convicted the appellants with the complex crime of Robbery with Double Homicide. On
direct appeal to the Court, appellants, who are imprisoned, seek their acquittal on the ground that their guilt was
not proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the court had erred in convicting the appellants by reason of extrajudicial confession of
Olivares
Held: Yes, the trial court had erred in convicting the appellants. The prosecution's principal evidence against them
is based solely on the testimony of the police officers who arrested, investigated and subsequently took their
confession. Such evidence when put together with appellants' constitutional rights concerning arrests and the
taking of confessions leads to a conclusion that they cannot he held liable for the offense charged despite the
inherent weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not because they are not guilty but because the evidence
adduced against them are inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.
Under the present laws, a confession to be admissible must be:
1.) express and categorical;
2.) given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused realizes the legal significance of his act;
3.) with assistance of competent and independent counsel;
4.) in writing; and in the language known to and understood by the confessant; and
5 signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write thumbmarked by him.
The extrajudicial confession of appellant Olivares, Jr. on which the prosecution relies, is likewise inadmissible in
evidence. Under the Constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right, among other to have a counsel, which right can be validly waived. In this case, the said confession was
obtained during custodial investigation but the confessant was not assisted by counsel.
RULE 130 SECTION 34 - Similar Acts of Evidence

RULE 130 SECTION 48 - Opinion Rule

RULE 130 SECTION 49 - Opinion of Expert Witness

RULE 130 SECTION 51 - Character Evidence

19