FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 8692. September 10, 1913.]

GODOFREDO B. HERRERA, as municipal president of Caloocan ,

petitioner, vs . ALBERTO BARRETTO, judge of first instance of Rizal,
and CONSTANCIO JOAQUIN , respondents.

Solicitor-General Harvey for petitioner.

R. Diokno, and Gibbs, McDonough & Blanco for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CERTIORARI. — A writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly

appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
2. ID. — If a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person,
decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause are decisions within its jurisdiction,
and however irregular or erroneous they may be they cannot be corrected by certiorari.
3. MANDAMUS; JURISDICTION OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE. — A Court of
First Instance has jurisdiction of an action of mandamus, and therefore has jurisdiction
to decide every question pertaining to that case; and the issuance of a mandatory
injunction, even though ex parte, requiring a municipal president to issue a cockpit
license, to stand during the pendency of the action, to one who had tendered the money
an bond required by law, is not an act in excess of jurisdiction, although it may be
irregular an erroneous.
4. ID.; ID. — In action for a writ of mandamus one of the principal questions to
be determined by the court is whether or not the o cer to whom the mandamus is to
be directed may use discretion and exercise his judgment in the performance of the act
which he is asked to perform, and the determination of that question by the court, even
though wrongly, is not in excess, nor does it deprive it, of jurisdiction.
5. ID.; ID. — The issuance by a Court of First Instance of a writ of mandamus
directed to a public o cer requiring him to perform an o cial act is not an act in
excess of jurisdiction, although an appellate court may nd that the writ should not
have been issued, as the public o cer under the law had a right and it was his duty to
use judgment and discretion in the performance of the act required by the writ to be
performed.
6. ID.; ID. — It may be stated as a general rule that the decision by a court of
on of the fundamental questions in the action before it does not, except, perhaps, in
cases involving a constitutional question, deprive it of jurisdiction whichever way it may
decide.
7. ID.; JURISDICTION DEFINED. — Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
determine a cause — the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and
determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or
upon the rightfulness of decision made.
8. ID.; JURISDICTION TO BE DISTINGUISH FROM EXERCISE OF
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 JURISDICTION. — Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction.
The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein is what
makes up jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, the decision of all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.
9. CERTIORARI; CERTAIN ERRORS NOW CORRECTED BY APPEAL INSTEAD
OF BY WRIT. — The writ of certiorari, in so far as it was a method by which the mere
errors of an inferior court could be corrected, no longer exists. Its place is now taken by
the appeal and so long as the inferior court retains jurisdiction, its errors can be
corrected only by that method.
10. ID.; PRESENT RESTRICTED USE OF THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI. — The
o ce of the writ of certiorari has been con ned in this country to the correction of
defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other purpose. It is truly
an extraordinary remedy and its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases.
11. MANDAMUS; RIGHTS OF PUBLIC AND OF THE COURT. — The people
have a right to go to the Court of First Instance to require a public o cer to perform his
duties; and they have the right to require that court pass upon the whole case and upon
every phase thereof and upon every question arising therein. This right is statutory and
must be respected by the courts as well as by others. As long as the court is deciding
questions pertaining to that cause, its rights and the rights of the litigant to continue it
to final determination undisturbed are inviolate.
12. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT
ALLEGED ERRORS OF JURISDICTION. — Where it is claimed that a Court of First
Instance has in the judgment of one of the parties issued an injunction erroneously or
performed any other act in the opinion of a party illegally or beyond or in excess of his
jurisdiction, the party should, before invoking the jurisdiction of a higher court, call the
attention of the inferior court to its supposed error and ask for its correction; and this
court discourages all attempts to come here upon questions which a court below is
entitled to decide without first invoking its judgment thereon.
13. ID. — Questions which Courts of First Instance are required by law to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and presented to this court without
rst giving them an opportunity of deliberately passing upon such questions
themselves; and where it is claimed that a mandatory injunction issued ex parte was
issued by the court in excess of its jurisdiction, a motion should be made to the court
for its dissolution before an application is made to the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari to review the proceeding.

DECISION

MORELAND , J : p

This is an application for a writ of certiorari to the court of First Instance of the
Province of Rizal.

It appears that on or about the 1st of March, 1913, Constancio Joaquin, believing
himself entitled to a license to open and exploit a cockpit in the municipality of
Caloocan, and the authorities thereof refusing to issue it to him, began an action
against Godofredo B. Herrera as municipal president of said municipality, the o cer
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 whose duty he claimed it was to issue cockpit licenses, to obtain a mandamus
compelling said official to issue such license.
On the presentation of the veri ed complaint and upon the facts stated therein
and the exhibits annexed thereto, the plaintiff asked that the court issue a mandatory
injunction directed to the defendant requiring him to issue a provisional license under
which the plaintiff might conduct his cockpit during the pendency of the action. The
court, in pursuance of such request and upon the facts stated in the complaint and
exhibits annexed thereto, issued such order ex parte without notice to the defendant.
Thereupon the defendant in that action began a proceeding in this court against
the judge of the Court of First Instance who had issued the mandatory injunction
relative to the provisional license referred to, Honorable Alberto Barretto, and
Constancio Joaquin, plaintiff therein, for a writ of certiorari, alleging that the court
below had acted without jurisdiction in the following particulars:
"1. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto exceed his jurisdiction in
issuing a mandatory injunction, because, according to paragraph (j), section 40,
of the Municipal Code and article 4 of municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan
(Exhibit 1 a), the issuance of cockpit licenses in Loma and Maypajo does not
pertain to the municipal president of Caloocan but to the municipal council
thereof.
"2. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto exceeded hid jurisdiction
in issuing the mandatory injunction ex parte without giving the municipal
president opportunity to show cause why such injunction should not be issued as
required by section 202 of Code of Civil Procedure.
"3. That said Alberto Barretto exceeded hi jurisdiction in issuing such
mandatory injunction for the reason that the cockpit license which the president
of Caloocan had erroneously issued in favor of Constancio Joaquin, on the _____
day of _____, 1913, has been annulled and canceled by virtue of ordinance No.
_____ of the municipal council of Caloocan, which ordinance has been duly
approved by the provincial board of Rizal.
"4. That there being another action pending between the same parties,
founded upon the same facts and reasons, the Court of First Instance of Rizal has
no jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction of the 1st of March, 1913
(Exhibit 4), for the reason that such injunction tends to render ine cacious and
null the nal decision which this honorable court will render in civil cause No.
8673."
The action referred to in this paragraph is one begun by Antonio Bertol and
Tranquilina T., widow of Angeles, against Godofredo B. Herrera and others relating to
validity of a certain ordinance.
"5. That there being pending civil cause No. 986 mentioned in the
previous paragraphs, the Court of First Instance of Rizal lacked jurisdiction to
issue the mandatory injunction which he issued on the 1st of March, 1913, for the
reason that it tends to render ine cacious and null the decision which the
Honorable Richard Campbell will render in civil No. 986."
The objection is based upon an action previously begun by Antonio Bertol and
Tranquilina T., widow of Angeles, against the municipality or the o cials thereof for the
purpose of having declared null and void municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan, which
is the same ordinance upon which was based the complaint of Constancio Joaquin and
in which the mandatory injunction was issued.
"6. That the said Constancio Joaquin at the present time does not
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 posses a license to maintain and run the said cockpits of Loma and Maypajo, nor
does he have the right to exploit the same."
It has been repeatedly held by this court that a writ of certiorari will not be issued
unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction. It will not be issued to cure errors in the proceedings or to
correct erroneous conclusions of law or of fact. If the court has jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the person, decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause
are decisions within its jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous they may be
cannot be corrected by certiorari. The Code of Civil Procedure giving Courts of First
Instance general jurisdiction in actions for mandamus, it goes without saying that the
Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in the present case to resolve every question
arising in such an action and to decide every question presented to it which pertained
to the cause. It has already been held by this court that, while it is a power to be
exercised only in extreme cases, a Court of First Instance has power to issue a
mandatory injunction to stand until the nal determination of the action in which it is
issued. While the issuance of the mandatory injunction in this particular case may have
been irregular and erroneous, a question concerning which we express no opinion,
nevertheless its issuance was within the jurisdiction of the court and its action is not
reviewable on certiorari. It is not su cient to say that it was issued wrongfully and
without su cient grounds and in the absence of the other party. The question is, did
the court act with jurisdiction?
It has been urged that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in requiring the
municipal president to issue the license, for the reason that he was not the proper
person to issue it and that, if he was the proper person, he had the right to exercise a
discretion as to whom the license should be issued. We do not believe that either of
these questions goes to the jurisdiction of the court to act. One of the fundamental
questions in a mandamus against a public o cer is whether or not that o cer has the
right to exercise discretion in the performance of the act which the plaintiff asks him to
perform. It is one of the essential determinations of the cause. To claim that the
resolution of that question may deprive the court of jurisdiction is to assert a novel
proposition. It is equivalent to the contention that a court has jurisdiction if he decides
right but no jurisdiction if he decides wrong. It may be stated generally that it is never
necessary to decide the fundamental questions of a cause to determine whether the
court has jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction is preliminary and never touches the
merits of the case. The determination of the fundamental questions of a cause are
merely the exercise of a jurisdiction already conceded. In the case at bar no one denies
the power, authority, or jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to take cognizance of
an action for mandamus and to decide every question which arises in that cause and
pertains thereto. The contention that the decision of one of those questions, if wrong,
destroys jurisdiction involves an evident contradiction.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause — the right to act in a
case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the
regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made.
Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The
authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes
up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, as we have
said before, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
that jurisdiction.
In the case of Chase vs. Christianson (41 Cal., 253), the court said: "Here, then,
was jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, and, these conditions
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 conceded, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but the exercise of
that jurisdiction, and an erroneous decision of any of these other questions could not
impair the validity and binding force of the judgment when brought in question
collaterally.
"It is not the particular decision given which makes up jurisdiction, but it is
the authority to decide the question at all. Otherwise all distinction between
erroneous exercise of jurisdiction upon the one hand, and a total want of it upon
other, must be obliterated."
In the case of Freeman vs. Thompson (53 Mo., 183), the following is quoted with
approval from Paine vs. Mooreland (15 Ohio, 435): "The court once having, by its
process, acquired the power to adjudicate upon a person or thing, it has what is called
jurisdiction. . . . The distinction is between a lack of power or want of jurisdiction in the
court, and a wrongful or defective execution of the power. In the rst instance, all acts
of a court, not having jurisdiction or power, are void; in the latter, voidable only. A court,
then, may act, rst, without power or jurisdiction or power of jurisdiction; second,
having power or jurisdiction, may exercise it wrongfully; or third, irregularly. In the rst
instance the act or judgment of the court is wholly void, and is as though it had not been
done; the second is wrong and must be reversed upon error." the third is irregular and
must be corrected by motion."
In Hardin vs. Lee (51 Mo., 241), the court said: "The judgment though grossly
erroneous was not void, the court having acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter. . . .
In other word, error and nullity are not legal equivalents or synonyms."
In Hagerman vs. Sutton (91 Mo., 519), the court said: "The power to decide
correctly and to enforce a decision when correctly made necessarily implies the same
power to decide incorrectly and to enforce a decision when incorrectly made. (Devis vs.
Packard, 10 Wend., 71.)"
In Paine vs. Mooreland (15 Ohio, 435), the court said: "The distinction is between
a lack of power or want of jurisdiction in the court, and a wrongful or defective
execution of the power. In the rst instance all acts of the court, not having jurisdiction
or power, are void; in the latter voidable only."
In the case of Colton vs. Beardsly (38 Barb., 51), the court said: "The test of
jurisdiction is, whether the court has power to enter on the inquiry, and not whether it
decision is right or wrong."
In Wertheimer vs. Boonville (29 Mo., 254), the court said: It is hard to conceive
how the question of jurisdiction can be made to depend on the fact whether the
judgment was right or wrong. The mayor unquestionably has authority to decide
whether the ordinance had been violated, and after he has determined it, how can it be
said he had no jurisdiction?"
In O'Reilly vs. Nicholas (45 Mo., 160), the court said: "A judgment, though
informal, even to the extent of granting a relief not contemplated in the petition,
when the parties are before the court and the relief is within its jurisdiction, is not
a void proceeding. The doctrine laid down in Fithian vs. Monks (43 Mo., 502), 'in
that it fails to make the readily observable distinction between jurisdiction to act
in a given cause, and erroneous exercise of such jurisdiction, . . . should no longer
be followed. . . . Jurisdiction being acquired error could not oust it, although that
error consisted in granting relief not warranted by law.'"
In the case of Gray vs. Bowles (74 No., 419), the court; "When a court has
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action and the parties to it, a judgment
rendered by it, although it may be an erroneous, irregular, or wrong judgment, cannot be
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 said to be void, but remains valid and binding until reversed or set aside on the ground
of such error or irregularity.'
In State vs. Second Judicial District (24 Mont., 238), the court said: "A judgment
was rendered against Baker, who appealed but could not furnish the necessary bonds
or security on appeal. The purpose of this application is to set aside the judgment,
relator asserting that the district court was without jurisdiction. The right to hear and
determine necessarily carries with it the power to decide wrong as well as right. It did
not exceed its jurisdiction although the court may have erred, yet it regularly pursued its
authority. Certiorari may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction
of the court."
In Central Pac. vs. Board (43 Cal., 365), the court said: "Mere irregularity
intervening in the exercise of an admitted jurisdiction — mere mistakes of law
committed in conducting the proceedings in an inquiry which the Board had authority to
entertain, . . . are not to be considered here upon certiorari, other that writ would be
turned into a writ of error. . . . Jurisdiction over a question presented being conceded,
carries with it necessarily the authority — the mere power —to decide the question
either way."
In Lewis vs. Larson (45 Wis., 353), the court said: "The judgment of a justice of
the peace will not be reversed on a common-law certiorari, if the justice had jurisdiction
to render it, no matter how irregular or erroneous it may be."
In the case of Utah Association vs. Budge (16 Idaho, 751), the court said: "If the
court had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, then it is clear that whatever
mistake has been made has been only an error committed on the part of the trial court
exercising his judgment and applying the law to the case, rather than an excess of
jurisdiction in acting in a matter wherein he had not acquired jurisdiction to act or
wherein his court has no jurisdiction of the subject in litigation. . . . The court had the
jurisdiction, power, and authority to hear and determine that question. It accordingly did
so. If the court committed an error in deciding the question thus presented, we answer
that the court had jurisdiction to commit the error."
Although certiorari may be considered a direct attack upon a judgment as
distinguished from a collateral attack, nevertheless, under the laws of these Islands the
only ground for the issuance of certiorari being the failure of jurisdiction of the inferior
tribunal, the basis of the direct attack upon the judgment becomes in this jurisdiction
the same as for collateral attack, inasmuch as, generally speaking, a collateral attack
against a judgment is sustainable only when the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction
in the court to pronounce it. Therefore the authorities relative to the ground necessary
for a successful collateral attack upon a judgment are authorities in a large sense,
pertinent to a discussion as to when a court may be held to have acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction.
In the case of Cooper vs. Reynolds (10 Wall., 308, the court said: "It is no avail,
there, to show that there are errors in the record, unless they be such as prove that the
court had no jurisdiction of the case, or that the judgment rendered was beyond its
power. This principle has been often held by this court and by all courts, and it takes
rank as an axiom of the law."
In case of Cornett vs. Williams (20 Wall., 226), it was declared that "the settled
rule of law is, that jurisdiction having attached in the original case, everything done
within the power of that jurisdiction, when collaterally questioned, is to be held
conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless impeached for fraud."
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 These two cases were cited and approved in the case of Manson vs. Duncanson
(166 U.S., 533), wherein the court said: "When a court has jurisdiction it has a right to
decide every question that may arise in the cause; and whether its decisions be correct
or not its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court. These
principles apply in all respects and with special force in this case. It was for the court
whose decree is attempted to be impeached, not only to decide on the facts before it,
but upon the construction and legal effect of all deeds and muniments of titled upon
which the proceeding was based. The court having general jurisdiction over the subject
matter of decreeing the sale of real estate of a deceased debtor for the payment of
debts, it had the right and was required to determine the question as to the liability of a
property for the debts, and whether the case was within its jurisdiction; and though its
decision may have been erroneous, it could only be reversed upon a direct appeal."
See Shepard vs. Adams, 168 U.S., 618; Gunn vs. Plant, 94 U.S., 664; Parker vs.
Kane, 22 Howard, 1; Huff vs. Hutchinson, 14 Howard, 586; Thompson vs. Tolmie, 2 Pet.,
157; Hatcher vs. Hendrie, 68 C.C.A., 19.
See, also, the long list of authorities cited as sustaining this doctrine in 23 Cyc.,
1090, where the rule is stated as follows: "Where a court has jurisdiction of the parties
and the subject matter, its judgment, although irregular in form, or erroneous or mistake
in law, is conclusive, as long as it remains unreversed and in force, and cannot be
impeached collaterally."
In the case of Miller vs. Rowan (251 Ill., 344), the court said: "A judgment or
decree is not binding upon anyone unless the court rendering the same had jurisdiction
of the parties and the subject matter of the cause. The court did have jurisdiction of the
parties, and the appellant, who is disputing the binding effect of the decree, was one of
the complaints. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to adjudge concerning
the general question involved, and if a bill states a case belonging to a general class
over which the authority of the court extends, the jurisdiction attaches and no error
committed by the court can render the judgment void. It the court has jurisdiction, it is
altogether immaterial, when the judgment is collaterally called in question, how grossly
irregular or manifestly erroneous its proceedings may have been. The judgment cannot
be regarded as a nullity, and cannot, therefore, be collaterally impeached. Such a
judgment is binding on the parties and on every other court unless reversed or annulled
in a direct proceeding and is not open to collateral attack. If there is a total want of
jurisdiction in a court its proceedings are an absolute nullity and confer no right and
afford no protection but will be pronounced void when collaterally drawn in question.
(Buckmaster vs. Carling, 3 Scam., 104; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 id., 364; People vs. Seelye,
146 Ill., 189; Clark vs. People, 146 id., 348; O'Brien vs. People, 216 id., 354; People vs.
Talmadge, 194 id., 67.)"
Trombly vs. Klersy (146 Mich., 648); Chapman vs. Taliaferro (1 Ga. App., 235);
Smith vs. Schlink (44 Colo., 200), where the court said: "That the court had jurisdiction
of the parties and the subject matter cannot be questioned. This being true, and it not
appearing that the judgment was not within the issues presented by the pleadings,
however erroneous it may be, the judgment cannot be held to be void, so as to bring
this case within the rule that disobedience of avoid decree does not constitute
contempt of court."
Baldwin vs. Foster (157 Cal., 643), where the court said: "Throughout this
consideration the fact is to be borne in mind that we are not reviewing judgment under
attack made on direct appeal where errors prejudicial to those appealing would call for
a reversal, but we are considering it upon collateral attack, where every intendment is in
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 favor of the judgment and where mere errors and irregularities will not be considered.
Upon collateral attack the judgment will be set aside, generally speaking, for but one of
three reasons: Lack of jurisdiction of the person, lack of jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action, or an absolute lack of jurisdiction to render such a judgment as the
one given. (Moore vs. Martin, 38 Cal., 428; Mayo vs. Foley, 40 Cal., 281; In re James, 99
Cal., 374; 37 Am. St. Rep., 60; 33 Pac., 1122; Wood vs. Jordan, 125 Cal., 261; 57 Pac.,
997.)"
Goodman vs. City (164 Fed., 970); Sawyer vs. Kelly (148 Iowa, 644); Lucy vs.
Deas (59 Fla., 552).
The certiorari will lie only in case of failure of jurisdiction has been consistently
held by this court. The following are substantially all of the cases decided by this court
referring to certiorari or prohibition. We include those referring to prohibition for the
reason that the ground of its issuance is the same as that in certiorari, viz, lack or
excess of jurisdiction:
In the case of In re Prautch (1 Phil. Rep., 132), the court said: "Under the
provisions of the code in certiorari proceedings, it is necessary that it should appear
both that the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction and that there is no appeal
from such court."
In his concurring opinion Judge Willard says: "Considering the existence of facts
which may confer jurisdiction, the question of whether those facts are presented in
such a manner in the a davit as to invoke the exercise of this jurisdiction is one which
the court has the same right to determine as it would have in the decision of any other
questions which might arise in a matter within its recognizance. In the exercise of this
power it may issue an erroneous order, but such an order is not absolutely void; unless
it is remedied during the same action by means of an appeal or otherwise, it will have
the effect of a valid order. The Court of First Instance should not give a judgment upon
a complaint on a promissory note which does not state a cause of action, but if it does
so its judgment is valid unless it is reversed by means of appeal. We cannot defer to
any decision of the supreme court of California which sustains a contrary doctrine.
Article 528, already cited, establishes the law of these Islands, and we must submit to
that. To accept the other rule would be to convert the writ habeas corpus into a writ of
error, a thing which is in no wise permissible. It would make it possible for any
defendant by means of such writ to interpose an appeal to this court in all those cases
in which an order of arrest should be issued and would oblige us to review the errors of
law which are alleged to have been committed by the court in investigating the
su ciency of the a davit, and this is, in our opinion, the very practice which article 528
seeks to avoid.'
In the case of Reyes vs. Roxas (1 Phil. Rep., 625), the court held that the refusal to
hear witness offered by the defense in a criminal action might constitute error, but was
not an excess of jurisdiction to be remedied by certiorari, the court saying: "The
complaint in this case does not allege that the court which convicted the petitioner had
no jurisdiction to try the case. Neither does it allege that in the prosecution of the case
there has been any a rmative action by the judge outside of his jurisdiction. It simply
alleges that he has failed to take action; that he has refused to hear the witnesses for
the defendant. This, if true, would constitute error, but it would be error committed by
the judge in the exercise of a jurisdiction which he possessed. The remedy by certiorari
does not apply to this case."
In the case of Dy Chuan Leng vs. Ambler (1 Phil. Rep., 535), the court said: "We
cannot grant an injunction under this section unless there is a compliance with articles
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 164 and 166. It must appear from the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
in the action. If the complaint states no cause of action no preliminary injunction can be
issued. The complaint led in this court is defective in this respect. It shows upon its
face that the petitioners are not entitled to an order of prohibition against the court
below. The court had jurisdiction of the action to dissolve the partnership. In that action
it had the power to grant a preliminary injunction (art. 164), and to appoint a receiver
(art. 174). Having those powers, if in the exercise of them any errors were committed,
they could be corrected only on appeal from the nal judgment. The facts as alleged,
that the complaint was ambiguous; that the judge believed that plaintiff below was a
partner when the defendants denied it; that he xed the bond at $1,000 instead of
$30,000, as requested by the defendants; that no mention of the bond was made in the
writ of injunction; that he refused to hear the defendants' witnesses; that he refused to
dissolve the injunction upon a bond which the defendants offered to give, all of these
do not show that the court was acting outside of its jurisdiction. They simply show, if
they are true, that the court has committed certain errors in exercising its jurisdiction,
errors which must be corrected by appeal."
In the case of Ivancich vs. Odlin ( 1 Phil. Rep., 284), the court said at page 287:
"The ground upon which the second prohibition is sought is that the attachment
ordered by the court is not such an attachment as is authorized by articles 424 et seq.
of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, but on the contrary is an
attachment under a procedure not in force here, although it is in force in the United
States of America in maritime cases, and that the attachment, moreover, was levied
without a davit, bond, or any of the securities established by law whereby the owners
of the steamer can obtain reparation for any damages which may be occasioned them
by the lawful detention of the said steamer; and that the procedure of the court below
is devoid of all the formal requisites established by law for the levying of such
attachments.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The judge did not, therefor, act without jurisdiction when directing the
attachment of the vessel in question, and has not exceeded his jurisdiction. If the
excess of jurisdiction upon which the argument was based consists in his having
levied the attachment without the fulfillment of the necessary conditions and
without following the form prescribed by some law of procedure applicable to the
case, it is our opinion that this error is not such an excess of jurisdiction as can be
secured by prohibition, and the petitioner has other means whereby this error of
procedure may be corrected or remedied. Upon these grounds we decide that the
petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied, with the costs to petitioner, and it
is so ordered."
In the case of Araneta vs. The heirs of Tranquilino Gustilo (2 Phil. Rep., 600, this
court said: "This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the action of the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Negros in requiring a supersedeas bond under section 144
of the Code of Civil procedure. It does not appear from the petition what the amount
involved in the litigation is, nor in what sum the bond was xed by the court, but it is
alleged that the bond is excessive. The court below had jurisdiction to require the bond
as a condition of a stay of execution, and to x its amount. Assuming that the bond was
excessive, yet nothing is alleged in the petition which shows that the court exceeded its
jurisdiction in the premises or committed any irregularity in its proceedings in exercise
thereof. The writ must therefore be denied."
In the case of Springer vs. Odlin (3 Phil. Rep., 344), the court said: "The court, on
30th of May, after hearing both parties, made an order by which it was adjudged that
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 the claim of Co-Banco had a preference over the claim of springer and ordered the
money in the custody of the clerk to be delivered to Co-Banco, but requiring him to
execute a bond for the sum of P400 with sureties for the protection of Springer in case
he appealed to the Supreme Court to annul the order.
"The plaintiff, Springer, alleges in his application for certiorari that the
Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction in making this order of the 30th
day of May, 1903; that not being a party in the cause of the United States vs.
Catalino Mortes, he has no right to appeal nor has he any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy from the order; and further alleging that Co-Banco had no lien
upon the P259.50 in dispute, either by attachment or by execution; nor did the
said Co-Banco on the date of the making of the order in his favor have any right
of any other character upon said money.
"If the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to render the judgment of the
13th day of May, 1903, in favor of Co-Banco in the case of the United States vs.
Catalino Mortes, and in the proceeding in which Springer intervened resulting in
the order of May 30, or if the plaintiff, Springer, had any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy by a bill of exceptions, appeal, or otherwise from the order of
the 30th day of May, 1903, by which the money in question was directed to be
paid to Co-Banco, then the proceeding in certiorari will to lie."
In the case of Felizardo vs. Justice of the Peace of Imus (3 Phil Rep., 635), the
court said: "Attorneys Pineda and Escueta, on behalf of Flaviano Felizardo an Francisca
Felizardo, upon the facts stated by their complaint, dated April 4, 1904, and upon the
ground that there was no other speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, pray for an order dissolving the attachment levied upon the property of the
petitioners, and that a writ issue to the justice of the peace of Imus, requiring him to
absolutely refrain from all further proceedings until a nal decision is rendered upon the
complaint.
"By intervening in the suit in which the attachment was levied, the parties
may avail themselves of all the legal remedies provided for the defense of their
lawful rights, but cannot avail themselves of the writ of prohibition for the
purpose of obtaining a discharge of attachment complained of. The case is one
which pertains exclusively to the jurisdiction of the judge who is trying, and there
is no authority of law for interference with the proceedings."
In the case of Rubert & Guamis vs. Sweeney (4 Phil. Rep., 473), the court said:
"The court below had jurisdiction of the subject matter of that suit and of the parties
thereto. It had power by law to grant an injunction in the case and power to dissolve it
or modify it. There can be no doubt of the correctness of these propositions, but it is
claimed by the plaintiff in this suit that the stipulation made between the parties to the
suit below to the effect that the sheriff should hold the money until the nal judgment in
that case, deprived the court of jurisdiction to make the order modifying the injunction
and requiring the sheriff to pay the money to the defendant Lo Shui upon his furnishing
a proper bond.
"When section 516 of the code of Civil Procedure speaks of a tribunal
exercising functions which are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, it covers
those cases only in which such tribunal acts without or in excess of the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law. It has no reference to cases where it is
claimed that such tribunal acts in excess of jurisdiction which the parties may
have attempted by stipulation to confer upon it, or in excess of a jurisdiction to
which the parties may by stipulation have attempted to limit the court. The fact
that the judge may have committed an error in disregarding the stipulation of the
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 parties has nothing to do with the question of the jurisdiction which by law the
judge was authorized to exercise. If there was such error in the action of the court
below, it was an error that must be corrected by appeal. An action of prohibition
cannot be maintained in such cases. (Citing cases.) There is nothing in the case
of Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404), relied upon by the plaintiff, in con ict
with this rule. As was stated in the case of Dy Chuan Leng vs. Amber above cited,
the writ of prohibition was t here granted upon the ground that in no case where
the fact of marriage was denied did the Court of First Instance have any
jurisdiction to grant temporary alimony."
In the case of Cantaño vs. Lobinger (7 Phil. Rep., 91), the court said: "The
concrete questions raised by the parties to these proceedings are (1) whether or not
the judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte had power to issue an injunction
against the justice of the peace of Manila in an action pending in his court, and (2)
whether the judge of the said Court of First Instance of Leyte could entertain a petition
for a writ of certiorari against the said justice of the peace of the city of Manila.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte had no jurisdiction over
justice of the peace of the city of Manila, and were judge of the Court of First
Instance permitted to grant such extraordinary remedies against a justice of the
peace in a district or province other than his own, it would be a serious
interference with the proper administration of justice, and a procedure relating to
appeals from and other remedies against the judgments of inferior courts would
be subverted. It should be borne in mind that the enforcement of the laws of
procedure, and more particularly those relating to the jurisdiction of the various
courts, concerns the interests of the community at large.
"The judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte had no power to take
cognizance, on appeal, of a case originally tried in the justice court of the city of
Manila, nor has he the power to take cognizance of cases that should ordinarily
be tried in the Court of First Instance of Manila, unless by virtue of a special
commission. Nor has he the power to issue writs of injunction in connection with
other special and extraordinary remedies sought from the decision of said justice
of the peace."
In the case of Herman vs. Cross eld (7 Phil. Rep., 259). the court said: "After the
term at which judgment was rendered, a Court of First Instance made an order opening
the case for the introduction of additional evidence, the motion therefor having been
made and argued during said term. Held, That such order was not avoid because made
after the close of said term and that it could not be reviewed on certiorari."
The court at page 261 said: "Whether the order made on the 14th of April was
right or wrong is not before us for decision. The court had jurisdiction to decide the
motion, even if it were a motion for a new trial, a point which we do not determine. If it
decide it incorrectly, the plaintiff who was the defendant in that case, had the right to
except to the order and, although he could not bring the case here at once for decision
because that order was not a nal judgment, yet he could do so after nal judgment
had been entered and could then have the order in question reviewed."
In the case Somes vs. Cross eld (8 Phil. Rep., 284), the action was one of
certiorari. The court said: " The plaintiff, in an action brought by himself in the Court of
First Instance of manila, made a motion for a preliminary injunction restraining the
defendants from selling certain property upon the motion, the court, after saying that
the plaintiff was not entitled to the preliminary injunction, made the following order:
"'Accordingly, the petition for a preliminary writ of prohibition is denied, and
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 it is hereby further ordered that the proceeds of the sales under the executions
already issued, and pending, either in this court or in the hands of the sheriff of
the Province of Albay, be deposited in this court, subject to further orders thereof,
upon a bond of P10,000 being led by the plaintiff to answer for any loss
resulting from the failure to apply said proceeds as ordered in the executions
issued.'
"The plaintiff thereupon commenced this original action of certiorari in this
court, claiming that the court below, in making the order in question, exceeded its
jurisdiction. The defendants have demurred to the complaint, and the case is now
before us for decision upon such demurrer.
xxx xxx xxx
"That the court below did not exceed its jurisdiction in making that order is
free from doubt. (Rubert & Guamis vs. Sweeney, 4 Phil. Rep., 473)"
In the case of Artacho vs. Jenkins (11 Phil. Rep., 47), the court said at page 48: "it
is alleged in the complaint that, in ordering the issue of a second execution, the
defendant judge exceeded his jurisdiction and that such order was absolutely void. This
contention cannot be sustained. The court of Pangasinan had jurisdiction of the case of
Tan Chu Chay against the plaintiff Artacho, jurisdiction both of the parties and of the
subject matter, and the mere fact that some creditor of Tan Chu Chay had attached the
debt due from Artacho to the former did not oust that court from its jurisdiction to
proceed with the case. (See among other cases decided by this court: Rubert & Guamis
vs. Sweeney, 4 Phil. Rep., 473; Somes vs. Cross eld, 8 Phil. Rep., 284; an Yambert vs.
McMicking, 10 Phil. Rep., 95.)"
In the case of Lagahit vs. Nengasca and Wislizensus (12 Phil. Rep., 423), the
action was one of certiorari. The action in the court below was one over a contested
election. The court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Arellano, said: "Whether or not
the court below acted rightly in considering the other candidate as the 'adverse party'
and the party defeated in the proceedings is not a matter on which action may be taken
by this court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It is evident that it was a matter
within the jurisdiction of the court below to tax the adverse party' with the costs. The
remedy of certiorari is, therefore, not available, as the purpose thereof is to prevent and
remedy extra limitations of jurisdiction and authority, not to correct errors in decisions
or mistakes of law, which are proper subjects for appeal and cassation.

"The rst nding is perfectly in accordance with the provision of the law.
The court below in deciding upon the protest against the contested election for
president of Aloguisan said: 'The court believes that the majority of the electors at
the past election voted in favor of the petitioner, Simeon Nengasca.' Whether or
not this opinion of the court below is proper cannot be the subject of review by
this court. It is a decision which is within the jurisdiction of the lower curt as
conferred by law.
"As a result of this opinion of the court below, and in compliance with the
provision of the law, the judgment should have been: 'Let a writ of mandamus be
issued against the board of canvassers requiring the board to correct its canvass
in accordance with the facts as found.'
"For the reasons above set forth we decide that the order of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu recognizing Nengasca a president-elect at the elections in
the municipality of Alonguisan, in aid province, should be, and is hereby annulled
for the reason that it is not within the jurisdiction of the said court to recognize or
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 proclaim a president in a contested election."
The action of Ocampo vs. Jenkins 914 Phil. Rep., 681), was one of prohibition. it
was held there: "The fact that an appeal is pending in the Supreme Court in a criminal
case for libel, under Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, does not prevent the
prosecution of a civil action for damages under the same Act, which clearly recognizes
two distinct actions upon the theory that there are two separate and distinct injuries
received from the crime, one by the State and the other by the individual damaged by
the libel. In such a case, therefore, a petition for a writ of prohibition enjoining the
prosecution of the civil suit while the criminal appeal is pending will be denied."
There are certain cases like Lagahit vs. Nengasca an Wilizenus above cited
wherein the court has held that certiorari would lie. In the case of Encarnacion vs.
Ambler (3 Phil. Rep., 623), the court said at page 624: "In the case of Eugenio Bonaplata
vs. Byron S. Ambler et al. (2 Phil. Rep., 392), which involved the validity of the
appointment of Antonio Torres as receiver of the state of Tan-Tonco in the said cause
of Sergia Reyes vs. Fulgencio Tan-Toco, it was held by this court that section 174 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, under which the appointment of the receiver was made, did not
authorize the appointment; that no property belonging to Fulgencio Tan-Toco was the
subject of litigation in the case of Sergia Reyes vs. Tan-Toco; nor did the case fall within
either of the other subdivisions of section 174; that the placing of the property of the
defendant in said cause in the hands of the receiver for the purpose, after paying fees
and expense of distributing the property among the creditors, was practically a
bankruptcy proceeding; that there are no bankruptcy laws in force in these Islands: that
bankruptcy proceedings have been expressly forbidden by section 524 of the Code of
Civil Procedure in Civil Actions until a law shall be enacted; and that consequently the
Court of First Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction appointing Torres receiver in
said action.
"We adhere to the view expressed in the decision of this court in the said
case of Eugenio Bonaplata vs. Byron S. Ambler et al."
In the case of United States vs. Siationg (5 Phil. Rep., 463), the court said:
"Without its being our purpose to decide if the remedy of certiorari invoked by the
provincial scal is proper in this case or not, we cannot admit his petition on account of
its not being made in due form. The remedy of certiorari should be petitioned for by
formal complaint having all of the requirements prescribed by the Code of Procedure in
Civil Actions, and the petition formulated by the scal in the form of a brief in a criminal
cause does not come up to these requirements, for which reason it is set aside in
accordance with law."
"In the case of Rocha & Co. vs. Cross eld (6 Phil. Rep., 355), the court, on page
358, after quoting the section of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to cases in which
a receiver may be appointed, said: "The case at bar does not fall within any of the
provisions of this section. There is no allegation in the complaint, as has been before
stated, that the plaintiff is the owner of any of the property of Roca & Co., nor is there
any allegation that he has any lien thereon, nor are there any facts alleged in the
complaint from which it could be inferred that he was the owner of such property or
had any lien thereon. On the contrary, from the facts that are alleged in the complaint it
would seem that his separation from the partnership of Carman & Co., left that
partnership as a going concern and did not dissolve it. The effect of the provisions of
the articles of partnership which are referred to in the complaint is that after the
withdrawal of any partner the remaining partners became the owners of all the assets
of the partnership and he became a general creditor of the partnership.
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 "xxx xxx xxx
"That case not being one in which a receiver could be appointed, the order
making such appointment was void and was beyond the jurisdiction of the court,
though that court had jurisdiction of the main action has been settled adversely to
the defendants in this suit by the case of Bonaplata vs. Ambler (2 Phil. Rep., 392;
see also Encarnacion vs. Ambler, 3 Phil. Rep., 623; Findly & Co. vs. Ambler, 3 Phil.
Rep., 690).
"That certiorari is the proper remedy in such a case was decided in the case
of Blanco vs. Ambler (3 Phil. Rep, 358, 735).
"In the argument in this court it was claimed that his extraordinary remedy
would not lie because the plaintiff, Rocha & Co., had a right to appeal from the
order appointing a receiver, although that appeal could not be taken until a nal
judgment had been entered in the case. That argument is answered by what is
said in the case of Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404)."
In the case of Bañes vs. Cordero (13 Phil. Rep., 466), the court said: "And, if the
jurisdiction has not been exceeded, there is not nor could there be any legal ground of
the issuance of the writ of certiorari, because these proceedings can only exclusively be
granted to remedy abuses committed in the exercise of a power of jurisdiction.
Sections 217 and 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing for such relief
unequivocally and speci cally refer to the act of exceeding or going beyond the
jurisdiction; and this court has repeatedly held that, in order that certiorari may issue, it
is absolutely held that, in order that certiorari may issue, it is absolutely necessary to
show that the respondent has exceeded his power or jurisdiction. (In re Prautch, 1 Phil.
Rep., 132; De los Reyes vs. Roxas, 1 Phil. Rep., 625; Spinger vs. Odlin, 3 Phil. Rep., 344.)"
In the case of Arzadon vs. Chanco (14 Phil. Rep., 710); the court decided as
follows: "Certiorari is the proper remedy whenever an inferior tribunal, board or o cer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its or his jurisdiction, and no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to correct such excess or extra limitation.
(Secs. 217 and 514, Code of Civil Procedure ). The jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance to hear and decide election contests is exclusive and nal ( 27 of the Election
Law); consequently, decisions rendered by them in the exercise of said jurisdiction
cannot be reviewed by means of an appeal. As they are not appealable and as against
them no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists, it is evident that they
constitute a proper subject for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Therefore, if the
court below has exceeded his jurisdiction in rendering the above-cited decision it is
proper to annul the same by virtue of said proceedings.'
In that case the Court of First Instance made the following order : "By the
foregoing, Silvestre Arzadon appears to have violated the provisions of the Election law
which prohibit every action, in uence, and promise of any kind, for the purpose of
obtaining votes. These should indicate the free will of the voters, and for such
infractions his election for the o ce of municipal president of the town of Badoc must
be considered illegal.
"Therefore, it is decreed by the court that the election of Silvestre Arzadon
for the o ce of president, held on the 5th day of November last in the
municipality of Badoc, Ilocos Norte, was not legal, and another special election for
the said o ce must be held at the expense of the said Arzadon who shall not
then be eligible, and any vote entered in his favor shall not count; the costs and
expenses of these proceedings shall also be charged to him."
In respect to that order the Supreme Court said: "It is our opinion that he has so
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 exceeded his jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance to hear election
protests in conferred upon them by the aforesaid section 27 of the Election Law, and
neither the said section 27 of the Election Law, and neither the said section, nor any
other legal provision, authorizes the court, in deciding such protests , to declare
ineligible in future elections the person against whom the protest was presented, nor to
sentence him to pay the expenses of the new election to be held. Hence, the court
below had no power to enter such rulings in the case as gave rise to these proceedings,
and in consequence thereof said rulings must be entirely annulled."
See also Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. Rep., 238).
The case of Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404) was one relating to the
allowance of alimony pending the trial of an active divorce. The court below allowed
alimony although the answer denied the marriage. Prohibition was brought in this court
and, after hearing, the lower court was enjoined from levying and collecting alimony.
The court said at page 414: "The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit, but
he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right to claim alimony had not
accrued in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. This Code only grants the
right to alimony to a wife. This status not appearing by a nal judgment, the court is
without jurisdiction to make any order in the matter."
See also U.S. vs. Cross eld (24 Phil. Rep., 321); Young Wampo vs. Collector of
Customs (id., 431).
The reasons given in these cases last cited for the allowance of the writ of
prohibition are applicable only to the class of cases with which the decisions deal and
do not in any way militate against the general proposition herein asserted. Those which
relate to election contests are based upon principle that those proceedings are special
in their nature and must be strictly followed, a material departure from the statute
resulting in a loss, or in an excess, of jurisdiction. The cases relating to receivers are
based, in a measure, upon the same principle, the appointment of a receiver being
governed by the statute; and in part upon the theory that the appointment of a receiver
in an improper case is in substance a bankruptcy proceeding, the taking of which is
expressly prohibited by law. The case relative to the allowance of alimony pendente lite
when the answer denies the marriage is more di cult to distinguish. The reasons in
support of the doctrine laid down in that case are given in the opinion in full and they
seem to place the particular case to which they refer in a class by itself.
It is not a light thing that the lawmakers have abolished writs of error and with
them certiorari and prohibition, in so far as they were methods by which the mere errors
of an inferior court could be corrected. As instruments to that end they no longer exist.
Their place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court retains jurisdiction
its errors can be corrected only by that method. The o ce of the writ of certiorari has
been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be
used for any other purpose. It is truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction,
its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases — cases in which the action of the
inferior court is wholly void; where any further steps in the case would result in a waste
of time and money and would produce no result whatever; where the parties, or their
privies, would be utterly deceived; where a nal judgment or decree would be nought
but a snare and a delusion, deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a
recorded falsehood, a standing menace. it is only to avoid such results as these that a
writ of certiorari is issuable; and even here an appeal will lie if the aggrieved party
prefers to prosecute it.
A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court touching
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 the question of certiorari and prohibition fully supports the proposition already stated
that, where a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
person, its decision of any question pertaining to the cause, however erroneous, cannot
be reviewed by certiorari, but must be corrected by appeal.
It must be remembered that the people of the Philippine Islands may go to the
Court of First Instance to require a public o cer to perform his duties; and they have
the right to have that court pass upon the whole case and upon every phase thereof and
upon every question arising therein. This right is conferred by statute. It must be
respected by the courts as well as by others. it would be manifestly illegal, as it would
be agrantly unjust, so long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, to withdraw from
the Court of First Instance the consideration of that case under color of any proceeding
whatever. As long as the court is considering that case, its rights and the rights of the
litigants to continue to final determination are inviolate.
The fact that another action may have been pending involving the same subject
matter and even between the same parties, which was not the fact in this case, does
not touch the jurisdiction of the court to act.
We cannot leave the case without suggesting that the applicant herein, before
coming to this court, should, as the better practice, have made the proper application to
the Court of First Instance for a dissolution or modi cation of the mandatory injunction,
and thereby given that court an opportunity, after full argument of counsel and citation
of authorities, to pass upon the question of his power and jurisdiction and, even, the
correctness and propriety of his action, should power and jurisdiction be found by the
court to exist. Questions which Courts of First Instance are required by law to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and presented to this court without rst
giving them an opportunity of deliberately passing on such questions themselves. The
most natural and proper thing to do, when such court, in the judgment of one of the
parties, has issued an injunction erroneously, is immediately to call the attention of that
court to its supposed error and ask for its correction. The strongest reasons of policy
and courtesy, if not actual legal right itself, require such procedure; an we discourage all
attempts to come to this court upon questions which a court below is entitled to
decide without rst invoking its judgment thereon. There are special reasons for
following this course in cases where the court has acted ex parte.
The writ is denied and the proceeding is dismissed. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Trent, J., concurs in the result.

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