SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,  In a resolution, the NLRC declared that Joy was illegally dismissed.
the NLRC declared that Joy was illegally dismissed. It reiterated the
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
FACTS:
 Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and
placement agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles,
submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan.
 Joy’s application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a oneyear employment
contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer Overseas
Agency required her to pay a placement fee of P70,000.00 when she signed the
employment contract.
 Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26,
1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality
control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
 Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr.
Huwang from Wacoal informedJoy, without prior notice, that she was terminated
and that "she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and
passport." She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."
 Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a
total of NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane
ticket to Manila.
 Subsequently, Joy filed a complaint with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal.
She claimed that she was illegally dismissed. She asked for the return of her
placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary
for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. She identified Wacoal as
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign principal.
 Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due
to her inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with the
work requirements [of] her foreign [employer]." The agency also claimed that it did
not ask for a placement fee of P70,000.00. As evidence, it showed an official
receipt bearing the amount of P20,360.00. Petitioner added that Wacoal's
accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower
& Management Services, Inc. (Pacific). Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already
substituted by Pacific Manpower.
 Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it. It
alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship between
them. Therefore, the claims against it were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter. Pacific Manpower argued that the employment contract should first be
presented so that the employer’s contractual obligations might be identified. It
further denied that it assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal acts.
 Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint.
 Joy appealed to the NLRC.
1
doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or
valid cause belongs to the employer. It found that Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for termination. There was no
sufficient proof to show that respondent was inefficient in her work and that she
failed to comply with company requirements. Furthermore, procedural due process
was not observed in terminating respondent.
 The Commission denied the agency’s motion for reconsideration
 Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a
petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the NLRC’s resolutions.
 The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC with respect to the finding of illegal
dismissal.
 Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition.
ISSUE:
WON, the CA erred when it affirmed the ruling of the NLRC finding respondent illegally
dismissed.
RULING:
No. CA has validly affirmed the ruling of the NLRC.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s
dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at
work.58 They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with
these standards.59 Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. 60 Certainly,
employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is guilty of acts
that are inimical to the interest of the employer. 61 While the law acknowledges the plight
and vulnerability of workers, it does not "authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the
employer." Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence. This
prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the employee’s right to
security of tenure."63Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before
termination. They may not be removed from employment without a validor just cause as
determined by law and without going through the proper procedure. Security of tenure for
labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different
jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of
lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) which governs in this
jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected
here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations,
and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the
courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.
Herein the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to
wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living
wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law. By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs)
may only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and after compliance with procedural
due process requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer.
Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of
the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders
of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her
duties69 may, therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only
if petitioner was able to prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. "The
employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a
2
justifiable cause." Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1)
the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee
will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated
tothe employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the
employee’s performance assessment. This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on
probationary employees, which allow termination ofthe employee only when there is "just
cause or when [the probationary employee] fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the
time of his [or her] engagement."72
However, we do not see why the application of that ruling should be limited to probationary
employment. That rule is basic to the idea of security of tenure and due process, which are
guaranteed to all employees, whether their employment is probationary or regular. The pre-
determined standards that the employer sets are the bases for determining the probationary
employee’s fitness, propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular employee. Due
process requires that the probationary employee be informed of such standards at the time
of his or her engagement so he or she can adjust this or her character or workmanship
accordingly. Proper adjustment to fit the standards upon which the employee’s qualifications
will be evaluated will increase one’s chances of being positively assessed for regularization by
his or her employer.
Assessing an employee’s work performance does not stop after regularization. The employer,
on a regular basis, determines if an employee is still qualified and efficient, based on work
standards. Based on that determination, and after complying with the due process
requirements of notice and hearing, the employer may exercise its management prerogative
of terminating the employee found unqualified.
The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she
meets all the standards for employment. This time, however, the standards to be met are set
for the purpose of retaining employment or promotion. The employee cannot be expected to
meet any standard of character or workmanship if such standards were not communicated
to him or her. Courts should remain vigilant on allegations of the employer’s failure to
communicatework standards that would govern one’s employment "if [these are] to
discharge in good faith [their] duty to adjudicate." In this case, petitioner merely alleged that
respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer’s work requirements and was
inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to support such allegations. Petitioner did
not even bother to specify what requirements were not met, what efficiency standards were
violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards
against which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as to
the position held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not
clear. The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just
cause for termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.
Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day
show not only failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the requirement of the
existence of just cause for termination. They patently show that the employers did not
comply with the due process requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of
dismissal.75 The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written
notices before termination. One of the written notices must inform the employee of the
particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal. The other notice must "[inform] the
employee of the employer’s decision."78 Aside from the notice requirement, the employee
must also be given "an opportunity to be heard." Petitioner failed to comply with the twin
notices and hearing requirements. Respondent started working on June 26, 1997. She was
told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and barely a month
from her first workday. She was also repatriated on the same day that she was informed of
her termination. The abruptness of the termination negated any finding that she was
properly notified and given the opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due
process of law was violated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with modification.
Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles
the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her employment contract at
an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to
reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorney's fees
of NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. Vs FERTIPHIL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2008
FACTS:
-Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations
incorporated under Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and
distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
-On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative
powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital
recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the
Philippines. The LOI provides:
“3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include
in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution component of
not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected
until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital
3
contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of
fertilizers in the Philippines.”
-Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the
domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the
amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI.
Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986. After the 1986 Edsa
Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465,
but PPI refused to accede to the demand.
-Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages8 against FPA and PPI with
the RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust,
unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of
due process of law.9 Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned
corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
-In its Answer,10 FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of
LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of
the fertilizer industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage
from the LOI because the burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the
seller.
- On November 20, 1991, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Fertiphil
- On November 28, 2003, the CA handed down its decision affirming that of the RTC
ISSUE:
WON the law constitutes a valid legislation pursuant to the exercise of taxation and police
power for public purposes.
HELD:
The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is an exercise of the power of taxation. Taxes are
exacted only for a public purpose. The P10 levy is unconstitutional because it was not for a
public purpose. The levy was imposed to give undue benefit to PPI.
An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes are
exacted only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the
exclusive benefit of private persons.46 The reason for this is simple. The power to tax exists
for the general welfare; hence, implicit in its power is the limitation that it should be used
only for a public purpose. It would be a robbery for the State to tax its citizens and use the
funds generated for a private purpose. As an old United States case bluntly put it: "To lay
with one hand, the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the
other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private
fortunes, is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called
taxation."
 Here, We do not find anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the amounts - Same voting power in four other nationally organized / controlled stock corporations
paid by Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465. It unduly benefited from the levy. It was proven during
the trial that the levies paid were remitted and deposited to its bank account. Quite the - The petitioners were elected directors of the NCC by a vote of the gov’t-owned shares cast
reverse, it would be inequitable and unjust not to order a refund. To do so would unjustly by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House
enrich PPI at the expense of Fertiphil. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
"every person who, through an act of performance by another comes into possession of - The Governor General challenged the validity of the legislated amendments and did not
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground shall return the same to
participate in the election
him." We cannot allow PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate
that PPI must refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil.
ISSUE

- Whether or not the amendments introduced by the legislated acts are unconstitutional
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 28,
2003 is AFFIRMED. HELD
SO ORDERED.
- Yes. The court sustained the contention of the Government that “the election of the
directors and managing agents by a vote of the government-owned stock was an executive
Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands function entrusted by the Organic Act to the Gov. Gen, and that the acts of the Legislature,
divesting him of the that power and vesting it, the majority of which in each instance
Argued April 10, 1928 consisted of officers and members of the Legislature, were invalid as being in conflict with
the Organic Act.”
Decided May 14, 1928
- The court entered judgments of ouster against the petitioners
(scope and limit of legislative power, appointing power of the executive)
NOTES
FACTS
- Sec. 8 of the Organic Act
- The National Coal Company (NCC) was created by Act 2705 (approved March 10, 1917) and
subsequently amended by Act 2882 (March 5, 1919) “That general legislative power, except as otherwise herein provided, is hereby granted to
the Philippine Legislature, authorized by this Act’”
- Act 2882
- Sec. 21
“The voting power of all such stocks owned by the Gov’t of the Philippines shall be vested
exclusively in a committee, consisting of the Gov. Gen, the Pres. of the Senate, and the “That the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive officer… ‘The Governor
Speaker of the House of Representatives.” General of the Phil. Islands’.”

- The National Bank was created by Act 2612 (approved February 4, 1916) and subsequently “…general supervision and control of all of the departments and bureaus of the
amended by Act 2747 (February 20, 1918) and Act 1983 (January 30, 1921) government…

- Original act: voting power vested exclusively on the Gov. Gen. - Not having the power of appointment, unless expressly granted or incidental to its powers,
the legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would to
- Amended acts: voting power vested in a board (Board of Control) composed of the Gov. usurp the power of appointment by indirection
Gen., Senate President, and Speaker of the House of Representatives

4
Tobias vs Abalos Gr No. L-114783. December 8, 1994
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, “An Act Converting the municipality
of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”.
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the Munnicipalities of Mandaluyong
and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent
congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually
became RA 7675, President Ramis signed it into law.
Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved the conversion. The turnout at the
plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes”
whereas 7, 911 voted “no”. By virtue of these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified in effect.
Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46 thereof, is
unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the “one subject – one bill” rule. They also
alleged that the subject law embraced two principal subjects, namely: 1. the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and 2. the division of the congressional district of
San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the composition of
the House of Representative beyond that provided in the Constitution. Furthermore,
petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
Issue:
1. Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of Representative may
increase.
3. Whether or not the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering.
Ruling:
1. No.
5
The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less
than 250, 000 indubitably ordains compliance with the “one city – one representative” as
provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution.
The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural ang
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. It should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions are germane to that
general subject. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand
that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public,
of the nature, scope and consequence of the proposed law and its operation.
2. Yes.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The present composition of the
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
3. No.
Gerrymandering is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate
or party. It should be noted that Rep. Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the
incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently
won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s constituency has in
fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
Petition dismissed.
Dimaporo v. Mitra
FACTS:
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of
Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections.
Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM.
Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of
Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the
election wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected
member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress.
 Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX
Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to
the members of Congress.
Grounds may be termed to be shortened:
1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof.
2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior
3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an
election contest
4. Voluntary renunciation of office
ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has
filed for another government position
HELD: No.
In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In
the 1935 Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers
should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity.
If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6
years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that
he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and
therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned.
The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or
relinquishing his mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek
another position which he feels he could be of better service.
Case Digest #2-2 | GR No. 189698 | Quinto and Tolentino vs COMELEC
FACTS:
The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of
RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679
that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
6
BACKGROUND:
Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA
9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
unconstitutional.
Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution.
HELD:
The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.
RULING:
These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privelege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and
conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable ground exists
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials.
Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.
PUNDAODAYA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 179313 September 17, 2009 Residence, Domicile,
Dwelling
NOVEMBER 23, 2017
FACTS:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which declared private respondent Arsenio Densing Noble
qualified to run for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections. Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya is married to
Judith Pundaodaya, who ran against Noble for the position of municipal mayor of Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.
Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks the
residency qualification prescribed by existing laws for elective local officials; that he never
resided nor had any physical presence at a fixed place in Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza,
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and that he does not appear to have the intention of residing
therein permanently. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is in fact a resident of Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City, where he also maintains a business called OBERT Construction Supply.
ISSUE;
Should “residence” and “domicile” be construed as referring to “dwelling”? Did Noble
effectively change his domicile?
RULING:
No to both. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the term “residence” is to
be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but
rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
7
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).” In Domino v.
Commission on Elections, the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one
intends to return.
The documentary evidence of Noble, however, failed to convince the Court that he
successfully effected a change of domicile. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal
presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires
not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it
one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. In this case, Noble’s marriage to Bernadith Go
does not establish his actual physical presence in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does
it prove an intention to make it his permanent place of residence.
Limbona vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 186006. Oct. 16, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Norlanie Mitmug Limbona, her husband, and respondent Malik “Bobby” T. Alingan
were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte. After filing their Certificate of
Candidacy, Respondent filed a petition to disqualify the husband of petitioner for non-
compliance with the one-year residence requirement. Subsequently, respondent also filed
the same petition, this time against the petitioner. Petitioner filed for withdrawal of her
candidacy which the COMELEC granted. The COMELEC granted the disqualification of
petitioner’s husband. Petitioner filed a new Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate
for her husband which was approved by the COMELEC. Respondent yet again sought
Petitioner’s disqualification.
Petitioner claimed that she has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for
more than 20 months in Lower Kalangaan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner satisfied the one-year residency requirement
HELD:
Petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. In order to acquire a domicile
by choice, there must be residence or bodily presence in the new locality, an intention to
remain there, and an intention to abandon the old domicile. A person’s domicile once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established.
The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified
with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community.
Petitioner’s claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar for
almost 20 months prior to the elections, is self-serving and unsubstantiated. Furthermore,
the court finds no other act that would indicate petitioner’s intention to stay in Pantar for an
indefinite period of time. The filing of certificate of candidacy in Pantar is not sufficient to
hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new residence. In SPA No. 07-611, the commission
has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said municipality warranting her
disqualification as a candidate.
The court noted the findings of the COMELEC that petitioner’s domicile of origin is Maguing ,
Lanao del norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile, by operation of law by
virtue of marriage, is Rapasun, Marawi City. The COMELEC Found that Petitioner’s Husband
effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11,
2006. Since it is presumed that the Husband and wife live together in one legal residence,
then it follows that Petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11,
2006.
Hence, failure to comply with the residency requirement, Petitioner is disqualified to run for
the office of mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
Mitra v. Comelec
Certificate of candidacy; residency requirement.
- The Omnibus Election Code provides that a certificate of candidacy may be
denied due course or cancelled if there is any false representation of a material fact.
8
- The critical material facts are those that refer to a candidate’s qualifications for
elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence.
- The false representation must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
- Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to
deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office.
- Thus, the misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and
cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no
deception on the electorate results.
- The foregoing are the legal standards by which the COMELEC must act on a petition
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
- Thus, in considering the residency of a candidate as stated in the certificate of
candidacy, the COMELEC must determine whether or not the candidate deliberately
attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact about his or her residency that would
otherwise render him or her ineligible for the position sought.
- The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this case when, in considering the
residency issue, it based its decision solely on very personal and subjective assessment
standards, such as the nature or design and furnishings of the dwelling place in relation to
the stature of the candidate. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010.
Nature: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) canceled the certificate of
candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he is
a resident of the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he ran for the position
of Governor. Mitra came to this Court to seek the reversal of the cancellation.
Facts:
- When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled,
Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan.
- This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and
Puerto Princesa City.
- He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and
represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of
2010.
- On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as Representative),
Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a
component city of the Province of Palawan.
- The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto
Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.
- On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor,
Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720
of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of
Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of
Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
- Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the
respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC.
Issue: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.
Held: YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme
Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency
requirement as mandated by the Constitution.
RATIO:
- The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010
elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3.
- The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome
Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his
representation on this point in his COC.
- Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude
that Mitra’s statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."
9
- Mitra’s domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as
Governor – in light of the relatively recent change of status of Puerto Princesa City from a
component city to a highly urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for provincial
officials – he had to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a new one within the local
government unit where he intended to run; this would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a
domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the
following:
(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
- Mitra, presented sworn statements of various persons (including the seller of the
land he purchased, the lessor of the Maligaya Feedmill, and the Punong Barangay of the site
of his residence) attesting to his physical residence in Aborlan; photographs of the residential
portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he resides, and of his experimental pineapple plantation,
farm, farmhouse and cock farm; the lease contract over the Maligaya Feedmill; and the deed
of sale of the lot where he has started constructing his house. He clarified, too, that he does
not claim residence in Aborlan at the house then under construction; his actual residence is
the mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill building.
- Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest and has therefore the
mandate of the electorate to serve
NOTES:
- The minimum requirement under our Constitution and election laws for the
candidates’ residency in the political unit they seek to represent has never been intended to
be an empty formalistic condition; it carries with it a very specific purpose: to prevent
"stranger[s] or newcomer[s] unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community"
from seeking elective offices in that community.
- The purpose of the residency requirement is "best met by individuals who have
either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the
same area either by origin or by choice."
- Read and understood in this manner, residency can readily be appreciated as a
requirement that goes into the heart of our democratic system; it directly supports the
purpose of representation – electing those who can best serve the community because of
their knowledge and sensitivity to its needs. It likewise adds meaning and substance to the
voters’ freedom of choice in the electoral exercise that characterizes every democracy.
- To acquire a new domicile – a domicile by choice – the following must concur: (1)
residence or bodily presence in a new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must be an animus non
revertendi with respect to the old domicile, and an animus manendi at the domicile of
choice. The intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period
of time and the acts of the person must be consistent with this intent.
Article VI: The Legislative Department, Section 5: Composition of the House of
Representatives; Apportionment and Representation: Following the return of every census,
Congress shall make a reapportionment)
Bagabuyo vs COMELEC
Date of Promulgation: December 8, 2008
Ponente: Brion
Motion: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with a prayer for issuance of TRO and writ
of preliminary injunction
Facts
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and
sponsored House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone
Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro or RA No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de
Oro’s legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, CDO’s voters would
be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of
residence. On March 13, 2007, COMELEC promulgated a resolution implementing the said
act. Bagabuyo filed a petition at the Supreme Court asking for the nullification of RA 9371
and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds. Petitioner argued that COMELEC cannot
implement a law without the commencement of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the
division and conversion of a local govt. unit.
Issue:
Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city, involve
the division and conversion of a local government unit, necessitating a plebiscite
10
Ruling: Petition is DISMISSED.
The Court upheld respondent’s arguments saying that such law only increased the
representation of CDO in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10
requires the commencement of a plebiscite, while legislative apportionment or
reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. There was also no change in CDO’s territory,
population, income and classfication.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination of the
number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a
legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the
population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power
among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation. RA 9371 does not have the effect of
dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and
territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect
is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say,
both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
The City, for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in
the halls of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country has not
increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead of
one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and proportional improvement in the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.
Aquino vs COMELEC GR No 120265 18 September 1995
Facts: Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2nd district of Makati
stating that he has been residing there for ten months. When his candidacy was opposed he
filed another certificate of candidacy stating that he has been residing in Makati for more
than a year by virtue of a contract of lease. COMELEC dismissed petition for Aquino’s
disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995 election. Mateo Bedon filed for
suspension of his proclamation. COMELEC decided in favour of Bedon hence the petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement?
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC decision affirmed. In order for Aquino to qualify he
must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Clearly, the
place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home” where he
eventually intends to return and remain – his domicile – is what the Constitution speaks of
residence for purposes of election law. Property ownership is not an indicia of the right to
vote or to be voted upon.
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo
vs COMELEC
Facts:
RA 9716 was signed into law by PGMA on October 2009. This law created an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing 1st and 2nd
districts of CamSur.
Aquino and Robredo contend that the reapportionment runs foul of the constitutional
standard that requires minimum population of 250k for a creation of legislative district (the
new 1st and 2nd district in RA 9716 has population less than 250k).
Respondents, represented by Office of Solicitor General seek to dismiss the petition based
on: On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2)
fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between
cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain
and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application
with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000
minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
11
Ruling:
1. Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that
we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed.
2. Absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused
when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive
Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be
settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed.
3. We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption
of constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there
must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or
transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor
any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will
prevail and the law must be upheld.
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative." The use by the subject
provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion
than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
G.R. No. L-26969 December 19, 1984
CARPIO PHUA, TAN SIN TEE, PUA CHING TOO and PUA SHING SHING, the last two
represented by CARPIO PHUA, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS of the Bureau of Immigration, respondent-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
This cage is about the exclusion from this country of Tan Sin Tee and her two minor children,
Pua Ching Too and Pua Shing Shing, on the ground that they were not properly documented.
The three arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong on November 7, 1961 documented as
Filipino citizens and holders of certificates of registration and Identity issued on November 2,
1961 by the Philippine Consulate. It should be noted that the signature of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs on the cablegram authorizing their documentation as Filipino citizens was
a forgery.
Upon their arrival, their admission was referred to a board of special inquiry of the Bureau of
Immigration After due investigation, the board rendered a decision admitting Tan Sin Tee
and her children, as Filipino citizens. Tan Sin Tee was alleged to be the wife of Carpio Phua, a
supposed Filipino, with the two minors as their legitimate children. The minors were born on
May 2, 1955 and January 24, 1956 or within an interval of less than nine months.
The decision of the board of special inquiry was referred individually to the Board of
Immigration Commissioners. Commissioner Emilio Galang wrote the word "Exclude" above
his signature while Commissioners Francisco de la Rosa and Felix Talabis wrote the word
"Noted" on the face of the decision which means affirmance of the decision of the board of
special inquiry. The Commissioners did not meet as a body and did not deliberate on the said
decision. As a result, Tan Sin Tee and her children were issued on December 13, 1961
Identification certificates as Filipino citizens.
On January 24, 1962 the Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum Order No. 9, directing the
Board of Commissioners to review all decisions of the board of special inquiry admitting
entry of aliens into this country particularly those where entry had been permitted on the
ground that the entrant is a Filipino citizen.
Immigration Commissioners Martiniano P. Vivo, Virgilio N. Gaston and Marcial Rañola motu
proprio rendered a decision dated November 14, 1962, excluding Tan Sin Tee and her
children. The Commission said:
12
There is doubt as to the alleged Philippine citizenship of Carpio Phua and his relationship
therein to the applicants. Carpio's birth certificate was not presented. There is only a
certification by the Director of the Archives Division that there is no record of his birth
without giving any reason for such lack of record. No effort was made to secure his birth
certificate from Lauan, Samar, his birthplace.
It has also been noted that the births of the two applicant children occurred within nine (9)
months, aphysical impossibility for which no explanation was offered. There was blood test
of the applicants but such blood test is not conclusive proof of filiation.
Even assuming the validity of the marriage between Carpio and Tan Sin Tee although
performed only according to old Chinese customs, there appears no evidence of their legal
capacity to marry.
In view of the foregoing applicants failed to establish their claim that they are the wife and
children, respectively, of a Philippine citizen.
The Commissioners ordered that Tan Sin Tee and her alleged minor children be ordered
excluded pursuant to section 29 (a) (17) of the Immigration Law. Before the warrant of
exclusion could be carried out, Carpio Phua and his alleged wife and children filed an action
for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
The Court of First Instance of Manila in 1966 declared as void the decision of the Immigration
Commissioners, set aside the warrant of exclusion and made permanent the preliminary
injunction against the execution of said warrant. The Commissioners appealed. The appellees
did not file any brief.
We hold that the trial court erred in holding that the petitioners were denied due process of
law. The Immigration Law does not require notice and hearing for the review by the Board of
Commissioners of the decision of the board of special inquiry. The petitioners were already
heard before the board of special inquiry. That hearing was a sufficient compliance with the
requirements of due process. (Caoile vs. Vivo, L-27602, October 15, 1983, 125 SCRA 85, 98;
Arocha vs. Vivo, 128 Phil. 566. See Go Yu Tak Wai vs. Vivo, L-22257, May 25, 1977, 77 SCRA
55.)
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. The petition is dismissed.
The preliminary injunction is dissolved. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
13