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III.

CIVIL PERSONALITY

B. COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY

1. ROE V. WADE

FACTS:

 Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically
advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a
declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to
prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant
alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal
abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her
pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal
abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming
that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy,
protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
ISSUE:

Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy
embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its
penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?
RULING:

 The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
 The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving
from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law
abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero)
was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established
common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
 Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The
first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual
conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The
second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to
protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with
abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s
interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
 For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and may not be
criminalized by statute.
 For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate
abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s interest in
promoting the health of the mother.
 For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion,
except where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s
interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.
 Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and the right to
privacy is thus not inherently involved in this case.
 Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions except in the case
of a life saving procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to
privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription of abortion when the statute is
narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or the
viable fetus. The court declined to address the question of when life begins.

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2. GELUZ V. CA (1961)

FACTS:

 Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, against Antonio Geluz, a physician
 trial court--against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit
 Court of Appeals sustained the award
 Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948
 In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married.
 Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent-- had herself aborted by the defendant
 After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant-- employed in the Commission
on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient --she had herself aborted again by
the defendant in October 1953
 she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic
on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife.
Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of 50.00php
 The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the
provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion
 It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages.

ISSUE:

Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from
physician who caused the same.

RULING: NO

 The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of
P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
 This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the
death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with
personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de
persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera,
"Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
 Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
 In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that
lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).
 It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born
alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article".
 In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother's womb.
 But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury
or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity--be limited to
moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations

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(Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant
them (Art. 2230).
 But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis
for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
 The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that: “It seems to us that
the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife
has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than
mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was
purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and
with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or
both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but
also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
 It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be
too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse
it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
 The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

3. QUIMIGING V. ICAO (1970)

FACTS:

 Appeal -- dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order denying
amendment of the same pleading.
 Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below.
 In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close
and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that
as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff
had to stop studying.
 Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
 defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege
that the child had been born;
 the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
 Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse,
plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl;
 but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since
the original complaint averred no cause of action.
 Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to
allege fact of birth in complaint

RULING: YES

 We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable.


 A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for
all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
 The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as
yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being

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ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the
institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator Article 854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those
persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be
effectual, without prejudice to the right of 'representation.

 It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that
support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere
appears in the text of Article 291.
 It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother's womb).
 A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case)
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for
the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

 This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it
were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective
 The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts: xxx xxx xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

 Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a
cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for
failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
 the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao.

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4. DE JESUS V. SYQUIA (1933)

FACTS:

 CFI of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as
next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-named
plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of
30,000.00PHP as damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage
promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children begotten
by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred
pesos per month, together with costs.
 Upon hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring
the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at
the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects.
 From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied
part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision which
required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
 At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of
twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed
of a considerable property in his own right.
 His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the
defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention.
 In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was
taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and
amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a
baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
 The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her
pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to
the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows: “The baby due in
June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.--CESAR SYQUIA”
 The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a
trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia
showing a paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to
keep in good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be
strong, and promising to return to them soon.
 When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to
a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in
regular family style, all household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by
Syquia.
 In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show
signs of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another
woman.
 A point that should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the
defendant, who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.

ISSUE:

(1) whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with the letters written by the
defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning
of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.

(2) whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession
of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence,
the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of
article 135 of the Civil Code.

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RULING:

(1) YES

 the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient.


 It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of
legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights.
 It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings
before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This
contention is not, in our opinion, well founded.
 The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two
constructions.
 They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would
thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the
name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant
intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed by the
letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference
to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in
her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be
vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the
defendant urged her to take good care of herself and ofjunior also.
 It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of
acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of
the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made in more than one document,
of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father.
 Upon this point we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together
the admissions of more than one document, supplementing the admission made in one letter by
an admission or admissions made in another.
 In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the
other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de
Jesus.
 There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular
individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.

(2) NO

 The facts already stated are sufficient to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this point,
and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant
had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in connection with the
facts found by the court upon the second point.
 It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the
mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a
year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's
head of abandoning her.
 The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status
of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince the father's resolution
to concede the status.
 The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started
is unimportant.
 The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the
concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues.
 With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in
refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to
marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or

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property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the
features necessary to maintain such an action.
 Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant
to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
 Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the
maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely
point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify
the order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
 The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

5. LIMJOCO V. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PIO FRAGRANTE (1948)

FACTS:

 Pedro Fragrante, a Filipino citizen, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and
maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. Fragrantedies while his application was still pending.
 At the time of his death, his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed
service.
 The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the intestate estate
of the deceased through authorizing the said intestate estate with its special or judicial
administrator, appointed by the Court, to maintain and operate the plant.
 Limjoco (petitioner) argues that the intestate estate of Fragrante cannot be substituted as the
applicant for the deceased and is a contravention of the law.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the intestate estate of Fragrante is a juridical person?

RULING:

 Yes. The issuance of the certificate of public convenience to the intestate estate of the deceased
is valid.
 Fragrante was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such until his death. His estate was able to
financially maintain and operate. His right to prosecute the application to its final conclusion
was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death.
 There would be a grave injustice for failure to recognize the said estate as a person for the
quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results
to his investment .

6. DUMLAO V. QUALITY PLASTICS (1976)

FACTS:

 On February 28, 1962 the CFI of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. T-662 rendered a judgment
ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and
Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal
rate of interest from November, 1958.
 The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its
decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the
bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond
the four sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for the obligations of the principal,
Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their
undertaking).
 Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become
final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of
the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as
security under the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at

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public auction on September 24, 1962. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of
November 20, 1962.
 It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was
filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives
of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-
212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
 The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal
in the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original summons in
his own behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.
 On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the
Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land.
(Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate).
 The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil
Case No. T- 873). It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil
Case No. T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case
No. T-662, was filed.
 Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against
Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's
jurisdiction over Oria.
 After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other
defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that
Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically
ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid
as to him. From that decision the plaintiffs appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the other
world, was never served with summons, is valid.

RULING: NO

 Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang
Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte,
68 Phil. 4).
 As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is
void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly
served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
 The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria,
there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as
contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not
have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
 But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to
annul the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's
fees against that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that
the appellee acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
 the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against
Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by
OCT No. 28732 is also void.

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7. EUGENIO, SR. V. VELEZ (1990)

FACTS:

 On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for restraining order and/or injunction (G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin
respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC,
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the
writ --said writ and orders as null and void.
 In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required comment from the respondents
on the petition but denied the application for a temporary restraining order.
 Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters,
herein private respondents (Vargases) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas
corpusbefore the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that
Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein
petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
 Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the
petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with
petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
 The respondent court issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied.
 Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings;
besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the
Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the …, a registered religious sect, of
which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
 Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his
residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of
her body.
 Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent court,
directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its
autopsy.
 Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss
the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under
sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. A special proceeding
for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.
 Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted
leave to amend their petition. Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28
September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents
(Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was
wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the
Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana.
 In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the
respondent court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial
Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and
examined by a duly authorized government pathologist.
 Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, dated 17
November 1988, that:

It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the
second amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana
Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as
the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said
deceased. The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already
dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on September 29, 1988 by
respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of this
case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body of the petition

Page 9 of 14
on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late
Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the reason that under the
provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx

it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this
case. The authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the
lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the
allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and
6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

 Thereafter, the court a quo , rendered a decision on 17 January 1989, resolving the main issue of
whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an action for
custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such
relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.
 Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981), Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court Articles 305 and 308 in relation to
Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision
stated:

. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the
original petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has
been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the
custody and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but
elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds
that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an action for
custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the petition controls and is
binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it
is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. . . . . 10

 Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful
custody over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give
support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse,
ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who was
merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another woman.
 On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were
pure questions of law, basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140);
hence, the consolidation of both cases.
 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to
maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February
1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to
the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The
petitions were then submitted for decision without further pleadings.

Page 10 of 14
ISSUE:

(1) whether the habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover custody of
the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood brothers
and sisters and a common law husband is proper;

(2) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as
one for custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.

RULING:

 interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code) which
states: Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to
give it, shall be made in the following order: (1) From the spouse; x x x x x x x x x
 Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ
of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court).
 It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the complaint or
petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and even without the
prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts
alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13
 When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain
whether Vitaliana was dead or alive.
 While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance,
and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his
judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ.
 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance,
the writ should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments
make a prima facie case for relief.
 However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in
looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's
power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct
any errors or defects in the petition. 15
 In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas
corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:

All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been
dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition,
it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous relation
between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all
principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference
for remaining with said respondent, because the minor may not chose to continue an
illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.

xxx xxx xxx

The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not
allow the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in
the way of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the
court had power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other
suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is
that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. 17

 After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to
avoid multiplicity of suits.

Page 11 of 14
 Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance
of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in
order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless
there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise
or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18
 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and
academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody
remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
 Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term
spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such
qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters
contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man
and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions
but not in the Philippines. 19
 While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present
in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed
by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that
the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. 21
 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of
Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of
Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted
however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-
law spouses)."
 There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code
article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a
sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot
even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her;
in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
 Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and
sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the
body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof,
shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left
any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the
deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession
of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.

 the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.

Page 12 of 14
8. JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO (1953)

FACTS:

During the battle of liberation of Manila on February 6, 1945, the following sought refuge on the ground
floor of German Club building: Joaquin Navarro Sr (70); Angela Joaquin (67); daughter Pilar (32-33);
daughter Concepcion (23-25); son Joaquin Natividad Jr (30); and wife of Jr Adela Conde (--). The building
was set on fire and Japanese started shooting the daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave the building.
His wife didn’t want to leave so he left with his son, Jr., and Jr.’s wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez. As
they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground and rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German
Club collapsed trapping many people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela, and Francisco
sought refuge in an air aid shelter where they hid for 3 days. On February 10, 1945, on their way to St.
Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols. Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. The trial court ruled that
Angela Joaquin outlived her son while CA ruled that son outlived his mother.

ISSUE:

W/N the son/mother died first before the other.

[If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession. If mother died first, respondent
Antonio, son of Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit]

RULING:

Based on the story of Francisco Lopez, Jr. died before his mother did. This presumption was based on
speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence on which civil cases
are to be decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be direct, indirect,
circumstantial or inferential.

9. SMITH BELL V. NATIVIDAD (1919)

FACTS:

Smith, Bell and Co, is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines Islands. A majority of its
stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the PI in
1916, of more than 15 tons gross. The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of
transporting plaintiff’s merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the
home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collectoe
refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smit, Bell and co were
not citizens either of the US or the PI. The instant action is the result.

Counsel argues that Act. 2761 denies to Smith bell and co the equal protection of the laws because it, in
effect, prohibits corporations from owning vessels, and because classification of corporations based on
the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No 2761 deprives the
corporation of its property without due process of law because by the passage of the law company was
automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked
title to a boat it could not use.

ISSUE:

Won the government of the PI, through its legislature, can deny the registry of vessel in its coastwise
trade to corporations having alien stockholders.

Page 13 of 14
RULING:

YES

Act no 2761 provides:

Investigation into character of vessel- no application for a certificate of Philippine register shall be
approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or
destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such opwnership is
defined in section 1172 of this code.

Certificate of Philippine register- upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than
15 tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic
ownership and of 15 tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be
optional with the owner.

While Smith bell and co, a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded
by the due process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights,
nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as smith, the
right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwide trade, does not belong to that vicious species of
class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably,
within the purview of the police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision.

10. BARLIN V. RAMIREZ (1906)

FACTS:

F: The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by the pltff parish priest, took possession of the church on
7/5/01. He administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until 11/14/02. His successor having
been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church,
convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the church.
The def., by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of
Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the Pope at
Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Mla.
In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def., alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman
Catholic Church was the owner of the church bldg, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other
prop. belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the def.
render an account of the prop. w/c he had received and w/c was retained by him, and for other relief.
The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the pltff.

ISSUE:

RULING:

It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine
Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand
years any other personality in Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in
Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious
consideration.

Page 14 of 14

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