Sps Pascual v Sps Ballesteros

G.R. No. 186269 February 15, 2012

SPOUSES ROMAN A. PASCUAL and MERCEDITA R. PASCUAL, FRANCISCO A. PASCUAL, MARGARITA

CORAZON D. MARIANO, EDWIN D. MARIANO and DANNY R. MARIANO Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ANTONIO BALLESTEROS and LORENZA MELCHOR-BALLESTEROS, Respondents.

Facts:

The case involves a 1,539 square meter parcel of land (subject property) situated in Barangay Sta. Maria, Laoag City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-303753 of the Laoag City registry.

The subject property is owned by the following persons, with the extent of their respective shares over the same:
(1) the spouses Albino and Margarita Corazon Mariano, 330 square meters;
(2) Angela Melchor (Angela), 466.5 square meters; and
(3) the spouses Melecio and Victoria Melchor (Spouses Melchor), 796.5 square meters.

Upon the death of the Spouses Melchor, their share in the subject property was inherited by their daughter Lorenza
Melchor Ballesteros (Lorenza). Subsequently, Lorenza and her husband Antonio Ballesteros (respondents) acquired the
share of Angela in the subject property by virtue of an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale4 dated
October 1, 1986.

On August 11, 2000, Margarita, then already widowed, together with her children, sold their share in the subject property
to Spouses Pascual and Francisco.5 Subsequently, Spouses Pascual and Francisco caused the cancellation of TCT No.
30375 and, thus, TCT No. T-325226 was then issued in their names together with Angela and Spouses Melchor.

The respondents, claimed that they did not receive any written notice of the said sale in favor of Spouses Pascual and
Francisco, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City a Complaint7 for legal redemption against the
petitioners. The respondents claimed that they are entitled to redeem the portion of the subject property sold to Spouses
Pascual and Francisco being co-owners of the same.

The petitioners claimed that there was no co-ownership over the subject property considering that the shares of the
registered owners thereof had been particularized, specified and subdivided and, hence, the respondents has no right to
redeem the portion of the subject property that was sold to them. 8

On January 31, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for legal redemption filed by the
respondents.

Issue:
Whether the respondents herein and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co-owners of the subject property
who have the right of redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code; and

Whether that right was seasonably exercised by the respondents within the 30-day redemption period under Article 1623
of the Civil Code.

Held:

On the first issue, the RTC held that the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co-owners of
the subject property considering that the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing that the respective shares of
each of the registered owners thereof were indeed particularized, specified and subdivided.

On the second issue, the RTC ruled that the respondents failed to seasonably exercise their right of redemption within the
30-day period pursuant to Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding the lack of a written notice of the sale of a
portion of the subject property to Spouses Pascual and Francisco, the RTC asserted that the respondents had actual
notice of the said sale. Failing to exercise their right of redemption within 30 days from actual notice of the said sale, the
RTC opined that the respondents can no longer seek for the redemption of the property as against the petitioners.

Thereupon, the respondents appealed from the January 31, 2007 decision of the RTC of Laoag City with the CA. On July
29, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision10 the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the appealed January 31, 2007 Decision is, accordingly, REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered approving [respondents’] legal redemption of the portion in litigation. The
rest of their monetary claims are, however, DENIED for lack of factual and/or legal bases.

SO ORDERED.11

(extra beef)

The first issue raised by the petitioners is a factual question as it entails a determination of whether the subject property
was indeed co-owned by the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. Such determination would
inevitably necessitate a review of the probative value of the evidence adduced in the case below. In any case, it ought to
be stressed that both the RTC and the CA found that the subject property was indeed co-owned by the respondents and
the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. Thus, in the absence of any exceptional circumstances to warrant the
contrary, this Court must abide by the prevailing rule that findings of fact of the trial court, more so when affirmed by the
CA, are binding and conclusive upon it.

Anent the second issue asserted by the petitioners, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA in ruling that the 30-
day period given to the respondents within which to exercise their right of redemption has not commenced in view of the
absence of a written notice. Verily, despite the respondents’ actual knowledge of the sale to the respondents, a written
notice is still mandatory and indispensable for purposes of the commencement of the 30-day period within which to
exercise the right of redemption as it is based on Art. 1623 of the civil code. As it was explained in our jurisprudence, the
court ruled that "[P]etitioner-heirs have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale
by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run." The right of the petitioner-heirs to exercise their right of
legal redemption exists, and the running of the period for its exercise has not even been triggered because they have not
been notified in writing of the fact of sale.

Here, it is undisputed that the respondents did not receive a written notice of the sale in favor of the petitioners.
Accordingly, the 30-day period stated under Article 1623 of the Civil Code within which to exercise their right of
redemption has not begun to run. Consequently, the respondents may still redeem from the petitioners the portion of the
subject property that was sold to the latter.

In allowing the respondents to exercise their right of redemption, the CA held that the 30-day period within which to
exercise the said right had not yet lapsed considering the absence of a written notice of the said sale. Thus, the CA stated
that "[t]he mandatory nature of the ‘written notice requirement’ is such that, notwithstanding the actual knowledge of the
sale, written notice from the seller is still necessary in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, as well as its efficacy and status."12

The petitioners sought for a reconsideration of the said July 29, 2008 Decision, but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution13 dated January 30, 2009.

Undaunted, the petitioners instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari before this Court essentially asserting the
following arguments: (1) their predecessors-in-interest and the respondents are not co-owners of the subject property
since their respective shares therein had already been particularized, specified and subdivided; and (2) even if such co-
ownership exists, the respondents could no longer exercise their right of redemption having failed to exercise the same
within 30 days from actual knowledge of the said sale.

The petition is denied.

Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of
law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question
to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
Article 1623 of the Civil Code succinctly provides that:

Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice
in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (emphasis supplied)

Here, it is undisputed that the respondents did not receive a written notice of the sale in favor of the petitioners.
Accordingly, the 30-day period stated under Article 1623 of the Civil Code within which to exercise their right of
redemption has not begun to run. Consequently, the respondents may still redeem from the petitioners the portion of the
subject property that was sold to the latter.

(1) whether the respondents herein and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co-owners of the subject
property who have the right of redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code; and

(2) if so, whether that right was seasonably exercised by the respondents within the 30-day redemption period under
Article 1623 of the Civil Code.

The RTC held that the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co-owners of the subject
property considering that the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing that the respective shares of each of the
registered owners thereof were indeed particularized, specified and subdivided.

The RTC ruled that the respondents failed to seasonably exercise their right of redemption within the 30-day period
pursuant to Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding the lack of a written notice of the sale of a portion of the
subject property to Spouses Pascual and Francisco, the RTC asserted that the respondents had actual notice of the said
sale. Failing to exercise their right of redemption within 30 days from actual notice of the said sale, the RTC opined that
the respondents can no longer seek for the redemption of the property as against the petitioners.

Whether or not, RTC seriously committed grave abuse of discretion.

The petition was denied. The assailed ruling of RTC was Affirmed.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July
29, 2008 and Resolution dated January 30, 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89111 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
[G.R. No. 118712. July 5, 1996.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F.
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 118745. July 5, 1996.]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ET AL., Respondents.

FACTS: The nature of the case is the consolidation of two separate petitions for review filed by Department of Agrarian
Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, assailing the Court of Appeal’s decision, which granted private respondents'
petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, Agricultural Management and Development Corporation or AMADCOR
(private respondents) are land owners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes
to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of
the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, private respondents
filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6 (1992) and No. 9
(1990), and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine
the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively
"earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the
same. The Supreme Court referred the petition to CA for proper determination and disposition. The CA found the following
facts undisputed:
Respondents argued that Admin. Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting excess
in jurisdiction because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in
an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as
provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or"reserved"
the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property,
the compensation must be deposited in cash or inbonds. On the other hand, petitioner DAR contended that Admin Order
No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.
The issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of
RA 6657. Landbank averred that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits is in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A
and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words"reserved/deposited" were also used.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990) insofar as it provides for
the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate
and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for
just compensation.

RULING: 1. NO. Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides:

Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in
case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the
land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is explicit that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor
can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. There is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to
warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not
absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of
law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or
the spirit of a legislative enactment.
The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying
the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or
putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative
enactment, forsettled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.
And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former
that prevails.
YES. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as
compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation (P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap/ P
135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago/ P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR), and notwithstanding that they have already been
deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. It is unnecessary to
distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes
of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same; the
landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately
compensated. Wherefore, petition is denied for lack of merit. Appealed decision is affirmed.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F.
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 118745. July 5, 1996.]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ET AL., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, R., J.:

Consequent to the denial of their petitions for review on certiorari by this Court on October 6, 19951 , petitioners
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), filed their respective motions for
reconsideration contending mainly that, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, the opening of trust accounts in favor of the
rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of Republic Act 6657. Moreover, it is argued that there is no
legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting landowners pending the
determination of the final valuation of their properties.

Petitioner DAR, maintains that "the deposit contemplated by Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657, absent any specific
indication, may either be general or special, regular or irregular, voluntary or involuntary (necessary) or other forms known
in law, and any thereof should be, as it is the general rule, deemed complying." 2

We reject this contention. Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as
compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in "LBP bonds", to wit:
jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands —

x x x

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner,
upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance
with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds of issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." (Emphasis)

The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would include
the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit." Accordingly, we must adhere to the well-settled rule
that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application. 3 Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16(e)
of RA 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible. As we have previously declared, the
rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute. 4 Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. 5

The validity of constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate payment to
them is further premised on the latter’s refusal to accept the offered compensation thereby making it necessary that the
amount remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the landowners. 6
Additionally, it is argued that the release of the amount deposited in trust prior to the final determination of the just
compensation would be premature and expose the government to unnecessary risks and disadvantages, citing the possibility
that the government may subsequently decide to abandon or withdraw from the coverage of the CARP certain portions of the
properties that it has already acquired, through supervening administrative determination that the subject land falls under
the exempt category, or by subsequent legislation allowing additional exemptions from the coverage, or even the total
scrapping of the program itself. Force majeure is also contemplated in view of the devastation suffered by Central Luzon de
to lahar. Petitioner DAR maintains that under these conditions, the government will be forced to institute numerous actions
for the recovery of the amounts that it has already paid in advance to the rejecting landowners. 7

We are not persuaded. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP puts the
landowner, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has no recourse
but to allow it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the expropriated
property. As expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, but subject however to the limitation that he can only
be entitled to a "just compensation." Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is
merely exercising his right to seek just compensation. If we are to affirm the withholding of the release of the offered
compensation despite depriving the landowner of the possession and use of his property, we are in effect penalizing the
latter for simply exercising a right afforded to him by law.

Obviously, this would render the right to seek a fair and just compensation illusory as it would discourage owners of private
lands from contesting the offered valuation of the DAR even if they find it unacceptable, for fear of the hardships that could
result from long delays in the resolution of their cases. This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the
payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made
to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 8

It is significant to note that despite petitioner’s objections to the immediate release of the rejected compensation, petitioner
LBP, taking into account the plight of the rejecting landowners, has nevertheless allowed partial withdrawal through LBP
Executive Order No. 003, 9 limited to fifty (50) per cent of the net cash proceeds. This is a clear confirmation that petitioners
themselves realize the overriding need of the landowners’ immediate access to the offered compensation despite rejecting its
valuation. But the effort, though laudable, still falls short because the release of the amount was unexplainably limited to
only fifty per cent instead of the total amount of the rejected offer, notwithstanding that the rejecting landowner’s property is
taken in its entirety. The apprehension against the total release of the rejected compensation is discounted since the
government’s interest is amply protected under the aforementioned payment scheme because among the conditions already
imposed is that the landowner must execute a Deed of Conditional Transfer for the subject property. 10

Anent the aforecited risks and disadvantages to which the government allegedly will be unnecessarily exposed if immediate
withdrawal of the rejected compensation is allowed, suffice it to say that in the absence of any substantial evidence to
support the same, the contemplated scenarios are at the moment nothing but speculations. To allow the taking of the
landowners’ properties, and in the meantime leave them empty handed by withholding payment of compensation while the
government speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse for government to subsequently decide to
abandon the property and return it to the landowner when it has already been rendered useless by force majeure, is
undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be sanctioned. Legislations in pursuit of the agrarian
reform program are not mere overnight creations but were the result of long exhaustive studies and even heated debates. In
implementation of the program, much is therefore expected from the government. Unduly burdening the property owners
from the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation is
plainly unfair and unacceptable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners’ motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 180462 February 9, 2011

SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR CORPORATION and SOUTH EAST ASIA SUGAR MILL CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, Respondents.

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the 6 November 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
100571, which set aside the 26 June 2007, 6 August 2007, and 31 August 2007 Orders 3 as well as the 6 September 2007
Writ of Execution and the 12 September 2007 Amended Writ of Execution of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 77) of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-02-46236.

Facts:

In 1999, the government projected a shortage of some 500,000 metric tons of sugar due to the effects of El Niño and La
Niña phenomena. To fill the expected shortage and to ensure stable sugar prices, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
issued Executive Order No. 87, Series of 1999 (EO 87),4 facilitating sugar importation by the private sector.

Section 2 of EO 87 created a Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction to determine procedures for sugar importation as
well as for collection and remittance of conversion fee.

Under Section 3 of EO 87, sugar conversion is by auction and is subject to conversion fee to be remitted by respondent
Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) to the Bureau of Treasury.

On 3 May 1999, the Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction issued the Bidding Rules providing guidelines for sugar
importation. Under the Bidding Rules, the importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within three working days from receipt
of notice of the bid award and the 75% balance upon arrival of the imported sugar.

The Bidding Rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the importation or if the imported sugar fails to arrive on
or before the set arrival date, 25% of the conversion fee is forfeited in favor of the Sugar Regulatory Administration.

The Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction caused the publication of the invitation to bid. Several sugar importers
submitted sealed bid tenders. Petitioners Southeast Asia Sugar Mill Corporation (Sugar Mill) and South Pacific Sugar
Corporation (Pacific Sugar) emerged as winning bidders for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd tranches.

Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill paid 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P14,340,000.00, while Pacific
Sugar paid 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P28,599,000.00.

As it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar (sugar corporations) delivered only 10% of their sugar import allocation, or a
total of only 3,000 metric tons of sugar. They requested the SRA to cancel the remaining 27,000 metric tons of sugar
import allocation blaming sharp decline in sugar prices. The sugar corporations sought immediate reimbursement of the
corresponding 25% of the conversion fee amounting to ₱38,637,000.00.

On 26 February 2002, the sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages in the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 77) of Quezon City.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized Atty. Raul Labay of the SRA’s legal department to assist the OSG in
this case. The RTC held that paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules contemplated delay in the arrival of imported sugar, not
cancellation of sugar importation. It concluded that the forfeiture provision did not apply to the sugar corporations which
merely cancelled the sugar importation. the deputized SRA counsel, Atty. Raul Labay, received his own copy of the
Decision and filed a notice of appeal. The sugar corporations moved to expunge the notice of appeal, which was
thereafter granted, on the ground that only the OSG, as the principal counsel, can decide whether an appeal should be
made.

The Court of Appeals held that the deputized SRA counsel had authority to file a notice of appeal.

Issue:

1) whether a deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal and

(2) whether the sugar corporations are entitled to reimbursement of ₱38,637,000.00 in conversion fee.

Held:
The petition lacks merit.

The sugar corporations contend that the deputized SRA counsel, Atty. Labay, was not authorized to file a notice of
appeal; that the OSG, as the principal counsel, had the sole authority to file a notice of appeal; that certiorari may not be
interposed as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal; and that the subject conversion fee amounting to ₱38,637,000.00
remained as private funds in view of its summary forfeiture and as such, it could not be deemed part of public funds.

The OSG counters that assuming Atty. Labay had no authority to file the notice of appeal, the defect was cured when the
OSG subsequently filed its opposition to the sugar corporations’ motion to expunge the notice of appeal. The OSG claims
that if the denial of the appeal is sustained, the SRA would no longer have a remedy to assail the RTC decision adjudging
it liable to reimburse the sugar corporations ₱38,637,000.00 in conversion fee despite the admitted failure of the sugar
corporations to comply with their contractual undertaking to import sugar.

First issue: The deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal.

Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the OSG to represent the SRA, a
government agency established pursuant to Executive Order No. 18, Series of 1986, in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers.

Assuming Atty. Labay had no authority to file a notice of appeal, such defect was cured when the OSG subsequently filed
its opposition to the motion to expunge the notice of appeal.

Assuming Atty. Labay had no authority to file a notice of appeal, such defect was cured when the OSG subsequently filed
its opposition to the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. As the OSG explained, its reservation 21 to "approve the
withdrawal of the case, the non-appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise the interest of the government" was
meant to protect the interest of the government in case the deputized SRA counsel acted in any manner prejudicial to
government. Obviously, what required the approval of the OSG was the non-appeal, not the appeal, of a decision adverse
to government.

We hold that the RTC should have given due course to the notice of appeal that Atty. Labay timely filed. Thus, the 19
December 2006 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-02-46236 cannot be deemed to have attained finality.

The next logical step is to remand the case to the RTC. However, a remand would only delay the resolution of this case
and frustrate the ends of justice. As a rule, remand is avoided in the following instances: (a) where the ends of justice
would not be served; (b) where public interest demands an early disposition of the case; or (c) where the trial court
already received all the evidence presented by both parties, and the Supreme Court is in a position, based upon said
evidence, to decide the case on its merits.22 All three conditions are present here.

Second issue:
The sugar corporations are not entitled to reimbursement of 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P38,637,000.00.

Section 2 of EO 87 granted the Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction power to promulgate rules governing sugar
importation by the private sector. It provides:

SEC. 2. Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction. – There is hereby created a Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction
which shall be headed by the DA, with the following as members: NEDA, DTI, DOF, SRA, and a representative each from
the sugar planters’ group and the sugar millers’ group. The Committee is hereby authorized to determine the
parameters and procedures on the importation of sugar by the private sector, and the collection and remittance of
the fee for the conversion of sugar from "C" (reserve sugar) to "B" (domestic sugar). (Emphasis supplied)

Paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules provides that if the importer fails to make the importation, 25% of the conversion fee
shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA. In joining the bid for sugar importation, the sugar corporations are deemed to have
assented to the Bidding Rules, including the forfeiture provision under paragraph G.1.

Petition is DENIED.
(additional beef)

Pursuant to this authority, the Committee issued the Bidding Rules subject of the controversy, paragraph G.1 of which
provides that if the importer fails to make the importation, 25% of the conversion fee shall be forfeited in favor of
the SRA, thus:

G. Forfeiture of Conversion Fee

G.1 In case of failure of the importer to make the importation or for the imported sugar to arrive in the Philippines on
or before the Arrival Date, the 25% of Conversion Fee Bid already paid shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA and the
imported sugar shall not be classified as "B" (domestic sugar) unless, upon application with the SRA and without objection
of the Committee, the SRA allows such conversion after payment by the importer of 100% of the Conversion Fee
applicable to the shipment.23 (Emphasis supplied)

In joining the bid for sugar importation, the sugar corporations are deemed to have assented to the Bidding Rules,
including the forfeiture provision under paragraph G.1. The Bidding Rules bind the sugar corporations. The latter cannot
rely on the lame excuse that they are not aware of the forfeiture provision.

The Bidding Rules passed through a consultative process actively participated by various government agencies and their
counterpart in the private sector: the Department of Agriculture, the National Economic Development Authority, the
Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Finance, the Sugar Regulatory Administration, and a representative
each from the sugar planters’ group and the sugar millers’ group.27

We find nothing in the forfeiture provision of the Bidding Rules that is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy. On the contrary, the forfeiture provision fully supports government efforts to aid the country’s ailing sugar
industry. Conversion fees, including those that are forfeited under paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules, are automatically
remitted to the Bureau of Treasury and go directly to the Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund.28

It is unrefuted that the sugar corporations failed in their contractual undertaking to import the remaining 27,000 metric tons
of sugar specified in their sugar import allocation. Applying paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules, such failure is subject to
forfeiture of the 25% of the conversion fee the sugar corporations paid as part of their contractual undertaking.1avvphi1

The RTC gravely erred in ordering the SRA to return the forfeited conversion fee to the sugar corporations. Its strained
interpretation that paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules contemplates cases of delay in the arrival of imported sugar but not
cases of cancellation of sugar importation defies logic and the express provision of paragraph G.1. If delay in the arrival of
imported sugar is subject to forfeiture of 25% of the conversion fee, with more reason is outright failure to import sugar, by
cancelling the sugar importation altogether, subject to forfeiture of the 25% of the conversion fee.

Plainly and expressly, paragraph G.1 identifies two situations which would bring about the forfeiture of 25% of the
conversion fee: (1) when the importer fails to make the importation or (2) when the imported sugar fails to arrive in the
Philippines on or before the set arrival date. It is wrong for the RTC to interpret the forfeiture provision in a way departing
from its plain and express language.

Where the language of a rule is clear, it is the duty of the court to enforce it according to the plain meaning of the word.
There is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.29

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 6 November 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100571, which set aside the 26 June 2007, 6 August 2007, and 31 August 2007 Orders as well as the 6 September
2007 Writ of Execution and the 12 September 2007 Amended Writ of Execution of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 77) of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-02-46236. Further, the 19 December 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
77) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-02-46236 is SET ASIDE.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 120363 September 5, 1997

CECILLEVILLE REALTY and SERVICE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land in Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
Private respondent Herminigildo Pascual occupies a portion thereof.

Despite repeated demands, private respondent refused to vacate and insisted that he is entitled to occupy the land since
he is helping his mother Ana Pascual, petitioner's tenant, to cultivate the land.

Petitioner instituted an ejectment suit against private respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.

Finding no tenancy relationship between petitioner and private respondent, the Municipal Trial Court on September 17,
1992, ordered private respondent to vacate the land and to pay "the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees" and "another
sum of P500.00 monthly from the filing of [the] complaint."1

On April 4, 1994, private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court to set aside the Municipal Trial Court's
decision and remanded the case to the DARAB for further adjudication.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but to no avail appealed to respondent Court of Appeals.

Respondent court dismissed petitioner's appeal. The entire ruling of respondent court in point states:

We find this petition devoid of merit.

There is a clear tenancy relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, such that the defendant cannot be
ejected from the premises like a common squatter.

The tenancy relationship dated back to 1976 when the defendant's father, Sotero Pascual, became the tenant of
Jose A. Resurreccion, the President of the Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation. This tenancy continued until
1991 when Sotero Pascual died and was succeeded by his wife Ann Pascual by operation of law. Ana Pascual is
entitled to the security of tenure was upheld by the DARAB in its Decision of November 8, 1993 which ordered the
plaintiff to respect and maintain the peaceful possession and cultivation of the property by the defendant Ana
Pascual and ordered the execution of a agricultural leasehold contract between the parties.

The defendant Herminigildo Pascual is occupying and working on the land holding to help his mother, a bona-fide
tenant. He is an immediate member of the family and is entitled to work on the land. As the lower court held.

Issue:

1. Whether or not private respondent is a tenant of the said land which entitles him to create an abode of his own.
2. WON the interpretation of Section 22, paragraph 3, of Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended by Rep. Act No. 2263 was
correct?

Held:

1. Under Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by RA 2263, entitled An Act to Govern the Relations Between
Landholders and Tenants of Agricultural Lands (Leasehold and Share Tenancy), Section 5(a) defines the
term tenant, to wit:

Sec. 5.

(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of
 production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder
a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.

Similarly, the term "immediate farm household" is defined in the same section as follows:

(o) Immediate farm household includes the members of the family of the tenant, and such other persons, whether related
to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him operate the farm enterprise.

The defendant, although not the tenant himself, is afforded the protection provided by law as his mother is already old and
infirm and is allowed to avail of the labor of her immediate household. He is entitled to the security of tenure accorded his
mother. His having a house of his own on the property is merely incidental to the tenancy.

It cannot be argued that the private respondent is entitled to help his mother in cultivating his land since he is an
immediate member of of Ana Pascual's family.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with costs against the petitioner.5 (Emphasis supplied.)

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari anchored on a lone assignment of error, to wit:

Petitioner respectfully contends that the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that while the private
respondent is entitled to work on the agricultural land of petitioner in his capacity as member of the family of
tenant Ana Pascual, nonetheless he cannot occupy a substantial portion thereof and utilize the same for
residential purposes.6

2. Sec. 22 (3) - The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an area of not
more than 3 per cent of the area of his landholding provided that it does not exceed one thousand square meters
and that it shall be located at a convenient and suitable place within the land of the landholder to be designated
by the latter where the tenant shall construct his dwelling and may raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and other
animals and engage in minor industries, the products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively.
The tenant's dwelling shall not be removed from the lot already assigned to him by the landholder, except as
provided in section twenty-six unless there is a severance of the tenancy relationship between them as provided
under section nine, or unless the tenant is ejected for cause, and only after the expiration of forty-five days
following such severance of relationship or dismissal for cause. (Emphasis supplied)

The law is unambiguous and clear. Consequently, it must be applied according to its plain and obvious meaning,
according to its express terms. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.

As clearly provided, only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a house
thereon. And here, private respondent does not dispute that he is not petitioner's tenant. In fact, he admits that he is a
mere member of Ana Pascual's immediate farm household.

Under the law, therefore, we find private respondent not entitled to a home lot. Neither is he entitled to construct a house
of his own or to continue maintaining the same within the very small landholding of petitioner. To rule otherwise is to make
a mockery of the purpose of the tenancy relations between a bona-fide tenant and the landholder as envisioned by the
very law, i.e., Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended, upon which private respondent relies, to wit:

Sec. 2. Purpose. — It is the purpose of this Act to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders
and tenants upon the principle of social justice; to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and
landholders; to insure the equitable division of the produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-
farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient agricultural production; to bolster their economic position and
to encourage their participation in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities.
(Emphasis supplied )

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The part of the decision appealed from which is inconsistent herewith is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Municipal Trial Court directing the private respondent Herminigildo
Pascual to vacate the portion of the landholding he occupies and to pay the petitioner attorney's fees in the amount of
P10,000.00 and another sum of P500.00 monthly from the filing of complaint is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

[RTJ-96-1347. June 14, 1996]
PROS. LEO C. TABAO, complainant vs. JUDGE PEDRO S. ESPINA, respondent

[RTJ-96-1348. June 14, 1996]

REGIONAL STATE PROS. FRANCISCO Q. AURILLO, JR., complainant, vs. JUDGE PEDRO S. ESPINA, respondent
DECISION

Facts:

In the 4th of July 1995, First Assistant City Prosecutor for Tacloban City, Leo C. Tabao, accused Judge Pedro S. Espina
then presiding judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City of:

Gross Irregularity,

Abuse of Authority,

Bias in favor of the accused, in handling and deciding Criminal Case No. 93-04-197 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Salvador Padernal" a case for violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Drug Pushing).

On July 21, 1995, a sworn complaint of Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr. manifested his desire to be a
co- complainant against Judge Espina for his handling of the above-mentioned criminal case.

On June 22, 1995, the prosecution received a notice of promulgation of judgment in the said criminal case which was set
on 27 June 1995.

On the same day, 22 June 1995, the prosecution filed an urgent manifestation seeking to postpone promulgation of
judgment since the defense had not submitted its documentary evidence, formal offer of exhibits and rested its case. The
prosecution also manifested its intention of adducing rebuttal evidence to the documentary exhibits to be submitted.

On June 23, 1995, Judge Espina nonetheless issued an order reiterating the notice setting the date of promulgation of
judgment on 27 June 1995.

On June 27, 1995, Judge Espina promulgated a judgment in the said Criminal Case No. 93-04-197 entitled "People v.
Salvador Padernal" acquitting the accused. The decision was dated 1 June 1995.

Prosecutor Aurillo, aside from reiterating the grounds relied upon by Prosecutor Tabao for holding Judge Espina
administratively liable, adds that he (Aurillo) had earlier assailed before the Court of Appeals an Order, dated 22 April
1993, issued by respondent judge granting bail to the accused in the same above-mentioned criminal case without giving
the prosecution a chance to present evidence to oppose the grant of bail. 4 The Court of Appeals in a decision dated 30
August 1994 annulled Judge Espina’s orders granting bail to the accused and denying the prosecution’s motion for
reconsideration of the order which granted bail. The dispositive part of the Court of Appeals decision which became final
and executory on 19 September 19945 reads:

“WHEREFORE, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and for lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, the
Orders dated April 22, 1993 and June 23, 1993 issued in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197, are declared null and void and set
aside. Consequently, the bail bond posted by accused-private respondent is ordered cancelled and respondent court is
ordered to issue a warrant of arrest for the accused.

We leave to the sound discretion of respondent Judge, the herein petitioner’s prayer for inhibition as he has not been
given the opportunity to rule on said motion.

On 22 September 1995, respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina filed comment on the first complaint, arguing that:
1. He proceeded to decide the case without the documentary evidence of the defense since such documents were not
submitted within the period allowed;
2. He is of the opinion that the documentary evidence, consisting of business licenses and permits, even if offered to show
that accused is gainfully employed, is immaterial to the innocence or guilt of the accused;
3. Respondent judge invokes Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 128 on the admissibility only of evidence relevant to the issue;
4. Finally, respondent judge invokes Section 3(m) of Rule 131 (not Sec. 5(m) of Rule 128 as erroneously referred to in the
comment) that presumes that official duty was regularly performed unless the contrary is shown.
On 19 December 1995, respondent Judge Espina filed a pleading entitled “Consolidated Comments” alleging:
1. He granted bail to the accused (Padernal) after the prosecuting fiscal in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197 agreed to
submit the issue of bail for resolution after the prosecution filed an opposition to the petition for bail;
2. He granted bail in the amount of P200,000.00 a day after the prosecution filed said opposition;
3. He denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail on the ground that the order had
become final;
4. The enactment into law of Republic Act No. 7659 on 31 December 1993 and the ruling of the Supreme Court
in People v. Simon (G.R. No. 93028,29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555), giving the law (R.A. 7659) retroactive effect insofar as
it is beneficial to the accused, now entitles the accused in the subject criminal case to bail as a matter of right;
5. It is an undue interference with the prerogative of the trial court to argue that the decision in the subject criminal
case should not have been rendered (the way and form it was rendered);
6. It is the sole prerogative of the trial court, in the exercise of its authority to appreciate the evidence, to decide the
relevance or irrelevance of evidence.

On 6 February 1996, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted to the Court a recommendation to absolve
respondent Judge Espina from any administrative liability, based on the opinion that respondent’s acts constitute an
exercise of judicial prerogative.

We are not persuaded by the recommendation.

The Court has repeatedly stressed the ruling in People v. Dcicudao7 that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a
judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong on the issue of whether or not to grant
bail to an accused charged with a heinous crime where the imposable penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Hence, a denial of the prosecution’s request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a
right to which it is entitled equally as the defense. A hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the
existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Sec. 6, Rules of Court in granting or rejecting a plea for bail. The
hearing for bail though summary in nature is necessary to afford both the prosecution and the defense an opportunity to
prove their respective contentions on the matter of bail for the accused.

The Court has never hesitated to impose sanctions on judges who had granted bail to an accused charged with a heinous
crime punishable with death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without the required hearing. In Santos v.
Ofilada8 the Court expressing almost exasperation over repeated violations by judges hi this regard stated that, “It is
indeed lamentable that despite the series of its pronouncements on the same administrative offense, this Court still has to
contend with the same problem all over again and to impose once more the same sanction.”

In the present case, respondent Judge Espina’s failure to comment on this aspect of the complaint against him
aggravates his situation. It will be recalled, in this connection, that respondent Judge Espina was also required in another
administrative case to comment on the grant of bail to the accused without hearing the evidence of the prosecution.9 In
that case, as in the present case, respondent judge did not comment on the averment that he had granted bail to the
accused without hearing the prosecution’s evidence. The reason for respondent judge’s failure to comment on
accusations reflecting on his competence and integrity can only be surmised, but it is apparent that respondent either
ignored this Court’s resolution ordering him to comment on all the charges in the complaints or respondent judge does not
realize the gravity of the accusation that he had granted bail without the required hearing. In the former case, it is gross
misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court, for respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolution requiring
him to comment on the accusations in the complaints thoroughly and substantially, while in the latter case, not realizing
the importance and indispensability of a bail hearing is, to be sure, gross ignorance of the law. In either case, respondent
judge should be sanctioned accordingly.

Respondent cannot rely on the ruling in People v. Simon10 since the issue in the present complaints is his having granted
bail to an accused charged with an offense then punishable with life imprisonment, without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to show that evidence of guilt is strong and that as a consequence, the accused is not entitled to bail. Under
the Rules of Court, a hearing for bail is mandatory to afford the State its right to oppose the grant of bail. The ruling
in Simon did not alter much less set aside the State’s right to a hearing to oppose bail. Neither did the ruling in Simon cure
the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case.

On the issue regarding the manner of promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197, it is evident that
respondent judge digressed from the regular course and procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after
both the prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases. In the subject criminal case, the defense had yet
to rest its case when respondent judge rendered the judgment of acquittal. It is not difficult to imagine the grave injustice
which would have resulted had respondent judge convicted the accused before the defense had rested its case. Of
course, respondent judge acquitted the accused. But the questions now are: why the deliberate haste to acquit the
accused, the same accused to whom bail had been granted by respondent judge without hearing the prosecution’s
evidence? And why was the prosecution denied the right to present rebuttal evidence when it had manifested its intention
to present rebuttal evidence when informed of the promulgation of judgment?

Judges should be reminded that each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to
present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence.

Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration the rights of all, the parties to
the case, whether in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold
the law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by one who has an unsound and
distorted sense of justice and fairness. Respondent judge’s conduct in the disposition of the criminal case subject of the
present complaints leaves much to be desired. He miserably failed to exhibit the objectivity required of members of the
bench which is necessary, even indispensable, to maintain the public’s trust and confidence in the courts.
In sum, respondent judge should be penalized for gross ignorance of the law in granting bail to the accused in Criminal
Case No: 93-04-197, where the then imposable penalty was life imprisonment, without hearing. He should also be
accordingly sanctioned for having promulgated the decision in the same criminal case before the defense had rested and
without according the prosecution an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.

For these two (2) acts constituting grave misconduct, ignorance of the law and gross incompetence, respondent Judge
Pedro S. Espina, now Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all trial courts in the country with a warning that further violations of the
requirement of hearing prior to the grant of bail in cases where the imposable penalty is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, will merit the same sanctions imposed in this case. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima,
Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., no part in deliberation.

Issue:
Whether the deliberate haste of Judge Espina to acquit the accused, the same accused to whom bail had been granted
by respondent judge without hearing the prosecution's evidence and;

Having denied the prosecution`s right to present rebuttal evidence when it had manifested its intention to present rebuttal
evidence when informed of the promulgation of judgment legal.
Ruling:
Accordingly, regular course of trial should always take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case and he
miserably failed to exhibit the objectivity required of members of the bench which is necessary, even indispensable, to
maintain the public's trust and confidence in the courts.
In conclusion, respondent judge should be penalized for gross ignorance of the law in granting bail to the accused in
Criminal Case No. 93-04-197, where the then imposable penalty was life imprisonment, without hearing. He should also
be accordingly sanctioned for having promulgated the decision in the same criminal case before the defense had rested
and without according the prosecution an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.
For these two (2) acts constituting grave misconduct, ignorance of the law and gross incompetence, respondent Judge
Pedro S. Espina, now Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan is hereby
dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
G.R. No. 187919 February 20, 2013

RAFAEL H. GALVEZ, and KATHERINE L. GUY, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ASIA UNITED BANK, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

Facts:
We resolve the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner-movants, Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy in G.R. No.
187919,[1] and, Gilbert G. Guy, Philip Leung and Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr. in G.R. No. 188030 [2] addressed to our
consolidated Decision dated 25 April 2012[3] finding probable cause to charge petitioners of the crime of SYNDICATED
ESTAFA under Article 315 (2)(a) in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689.

Our consolidated decision read:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 June 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97160 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy and
Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr. be charged for SYNDICATED ESTAFA under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689.[4]

The Motion for Reconsideration

In the main, petitioners submit the following arguments in support of their motion for reconsideration:

First, the petitioners cannot be charged for estafa whether simple or syndicated for the element of deceit was absent in
the transactions that transpired between the petitioners and respondent. This is a case of collection of sum of money,
hence, civil in nature.

Second, the petitioners cannot be charged for syndicated estafa defined in Presidential Decree No. 1689 because they
did not solicit funds from the general public, an indispensable element for syndicated estafa to prosper.[5]

In our 25 April 2012 Decision, we have more than amply discussed the petitioners' arguments, specifically, as to the first
issue whether deceit was present in the transaction as to warrant prosecution for the crime of estafa. If only to
emphatically write finis to this aspect of the case, we examine again the petitioners' arguments vis-à-vis this Court's ruling.

The facts

In 1999, Radio Marine Network Inc. (RMSI) claiming to do business under the name Smartnet Philippines [6] and/or
Smartnet Philippines, Inc. (SPI),[7] applied for an Omnibus Credit Line for various credit facilities with Asia United Bank
(AUB). To induce AUB to extend the Omnibus Credit Line, RMSI, through its directors and officers, presented its Articles
of Incorporation with its 400-peso million capitalization and its congressional telecom franchise. RMSI was represented
by the following officers and directors occupying the following positions:

Gilbert Guy - Exec. V-Pres./Director

Philip Leung - Managing Director
Katherine Guy - Treasurer
Rafael Galvez - Executive Officer
Eugenio Galvez, Jr. - Chief Financial Officer/Comptroller

Satisfied with the credit worthiness of RMSI, AUB granted it a P250 Million Omnibus Credit Line, under the name of
Smartnet Philippines, RMSI's Division.

On 1 February 2000, the credit line was increased to P452 Million pesos after a third-party real estate mortgage by
Goodland Company, Inc., an affiliate of Guy Group of Companies, in favor of Smartnet Philippines, was offered to the
bank. Simultaneous to the increase of the Omnibus Credit Line, RMSI submitted a proof of authority to open the Omnibus
Credit Line and peso and dollar accounts in the name of Smartnet Philippines, Inc., which Gilbert Guy, et al., represented
as a division of RMSI, as evidenced by the letterhead used in its formal correspondences with the bank and the financial
audit made by SGV & Co., an independent accounting firm. Attached to this authority was the Amended Articles of
Incorporation of RMSI, doing business under the name of Smartnet Philippines, and the Secretary's Certificate of SPI
authorizing its directors, Gilbert Guy and Philip Leung to transact with AUB. [8] Prior to this major transaction, however,
and, unknown to AUB, while RMSI was doing business under the name of Smartnet Philippines, and that there was a
division under the name Smartnet Philippines, Gilbert Guy, et al. formed a subsidiary corporation, the SPI with a paid-up
capital of only P62,500.00.

Believing that SPI is the same as Smartnet Philippines - the division of RMSI - AUB granted to it, among others,
Irrevocable Letter of Credit No. 990361 in the total sum of $29,300.00 in favor of Rohde & Schwarz Support Centre Asia
Ptd. Ltd., which is the subject of these consolidated petitions. To cover the liability of this Irrevocable Letter of Credit,
Gilbert Guy executed Promissory Note No. 010445 in behalf of SPI in favor of AUB. This promissory note was renewed
twice, once, in the name of SPI (Promissory Note No. 011686), and last, in the name of Smartnet Philippines under
Promissory Note No. 136131, bolstering AUB's belief that RMSI's directors and officers consistently treated this letter of
credit, among others, as obligations of RMSI.

When RMSI's obligations remained unpaid, AUB sent letters demanding payments. RMSI denied liability contending that
the transaction was incurred solely by SPI, a corporation which belongs to the Guy Group of Companies, but which has a
separate and distinct personality from RMSI. RMSI further claimed that while Smartnet Philippines is an RMSI division,
SPI, is a subsidiary of RMSI, and hence, is a separate entity.

Aggrieved, AUB filed a case of syndicated estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section
1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689 against the interlocking directors of RMSI and SPI, namely, Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael H.
Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy, and Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr., before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City.

AUB alleged that the directors of RMSI deceived it into believing that SPI was a division of RMSI, only to insist on its
separate juridical personality later on to escape from its liabilities with AUB. AUB contended that had it not been for the
fraudulent scheme employed by Gilbert Guy, et al., AUB would not have parted with its money, which, including the
controversy subject of this petition, amounted to hundreds of millions of pesos.

Our Ruling

We already emphasized in the 25 April 2012 Decision that "this controversy could have been just a simple case for
collection of sum of money had it not been for the sophisticated fraudulent scheme which Gilbert Guy, et al., employed in
inducing AUB to part with its money."[9] Our Decision meticulously discussed how we found probable cause, a finding
affirming that of the prosecutor and the Court of Appeals, to indict petitioners for the crime of estafa under Article 315
(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.[10] We noted there and we now reiterate that it was neither the petitioners' act of
borrowing money and not paying it, nor their denial thereof, but their very act of deceiving AUB in order for the latter to
part with its money that is sought to be penalized. Thus:

x x x As early as the Penal Code of Spain, which was enforced in the Philippines as early as 1887 until it was replaced by
the Revised Penal Code in 1932, the act of fraud through false pretenses or similar deceit was already being punished.
Article 335 of the Penal code of Spain punished a person who defrauded another 'by falsely pretending to possess any
power, influence, qualification, property, credit, agency or business, or by means of similar deceit.' [11]

Under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by,
among others, false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud, i.e., by
using a fictitious name, falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

Underscoring the aforesaid discussion, we found that:

First, Gilbert Guy, Philip Leung, Katherine Guy, Rafael Galvez and Eugene Galvez, Jr., interlocking directors of RMSI and
SPI, represented to AUB in their transactions that Smartnet Philippines and SPI were one and the same entity. While
Eugene Galvez, Jr. was not a director of SPI, he actively dealt with AUB in his capacity as RMSI's Chief Financial
Officer/Comptroller by falsely representing that SPI and RMSI were the same entity. Gilbert Guy, Philip Leung, Katherine
Guy, Rafael Galvez, and Eugene Galvez, Jr. used the business names Smartnet Philippines, RMSI, and SPI
interchangeably and without any distinction. They successfully did this by using the confusing similarity of RMSI's
business name, i.e., Smartnet Philippines its division, and, Smartnet Philippines, Inc. the subsidiary corporation. Further,
they were able to hide the identity of SPI, by having almost the same directors as that of RMSI. In order to let it appear
that SPI is the same as that of Smartnet Philippines, they submitted in their application documents of RMSI, including its
Amended Articles of Incorporation, third-party real estate mortgage of Goodland Company in favor of Smartnet
Philippines, and audited annual financial statement of SGV & Co. Gilbert Guy, et al. also used RMSI letterhead in their
official communications with the bank and the contents of these official communications conclusively pointed to RMSI as
the one which transacted with the bank.

These circumstances are all indicia of deceit. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives
or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.

Second, the intent to deceive AUB was manifest from the start. Gilbert Guy et al.[,] laid down first all the necessary
materials they need for this deception before defrauding the bank by first establishing Smartnet Philippines as a division of
Radio Marine under which Radio Marine Network Inc. operated its business. Then it organized a subsidiary corporation,
the SPI, with a capital of only P62,000.00. Later, it changed the corporate name of Radio Marine Network Inc. into RMSI.

Undoubtedly, deceit here was conceived in relation to Gilbert Guy, et al.'s transaction with AUB. There was a plan,
documented in corporation's papers, that led to the defraudation of the bank. The circumstances of the directors' and
officers' acts in inserting in Radio Marine the name of Smartnet; the creation of its division Smartnet Philippines; and its
registration as business name as Smartnet Philippines with the Department of Trade and Industry, together with the
incorporation of its subsidiary, the SPI, are indicia of a pre-conceived scheme to create this elaborate fraud, victimizing a
banking institution, which perhaps, is the first of a kind in Philippine business.

xxxx

Third, AUB would not have granted the Irrevocable Letter of Credit No. 990361, among others, had it known that SPI
which had only P62,500.00 paid-up capital and no assets, is a separate entity and not the division or business name of
RMSI. x x x.

xxxx

It is true that ordinarily, in a letter of credit transaction, the bank merely substitutes its own promise to pay for the promise
to pay of one of its customers, who in turn promises to pay the bank the amount of funds mentioned in the letters of credit
plus credit or commitments fees mutually agreed upon. Once the issuing bank shall have paid the beneficiary after the
latter's compliance with the terms of the letter of credit, the issuing bank is entitled to reimbursement for the amount it paid
under the letter of credit. [Citation omitted]

In the present case, however, no reimbursement was made outright, precisely because the letter of credit was secured by
a promissory note executed by SPI. The bank would have not agreed to this transaction had it not been deceived by
Gilbert Guy, et al. into believing the RMSI and SPI were one and the same entity. Guy and his cohorts' acts in (1) securing
the letter of credit guaranteed by a promissory note in behalf of SPI; and, (2) their act of representing SPI as RMSI's
Division, were indicia of fraudulent acts because they fully well know, even before transacting with the bank, that: (a) SPI
was a separate entity from Smartnet Philippines, the RMSI's Division, which has the Omnibus Credit Line; and (b) despite
this knowledge, they misrepresented to the bank that SPI is RMSI's division. Had it not [been] for this false representation,
AUB would [not] have granted SPI's letter of credit to be secured with a promissory note because SPI as a corporation
has no credit line with AUB and SPI by its own, has no credit standing.

Fourth, it is not in dispute that the bank suffered damage, which, including this controversy, amounted to hundreds of
millions of pesos.[12] (Emphasis supplied)

We revisit, however, our ruling as to the second issue, i.e., whether or not the petitioners may be charged and tried for
syndicated estafa under Presidential Decree No. 1689.

While this case is all about finding probable cause to hold the petitioners for trial for syndicated estafa, and, while, without
doubt, a commercial bank is covered by Presidential Decree No. 1689, as deduced from our pronouncements in People v.
Balasa,[13] People v. Romero,[14] and People v. Menil, Jr.,[15] cases where the accused used the legitimacy of the
entities/corporations to perpetrate their unlawful and illegal acts, a careful re-evaluation of the issues indicate that while
we had ample reason to look into whether funds from commercial bank may be subject of syndicated estafa, the issue of
who may commit the crime should likewise be considered.

Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689 provides:

Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is
committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal
act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited
by corporations/associations from the general public.

When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.

Thus, the elements of syndicated estafa are:

(a) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code is committed;
(b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and
(c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.

On review of the cases applying the law, we note that the swindling syndicate used the association that they manage to
defraud the general public of funds contributed to the association. Indeed, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689
speaks of a syndicate formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful scheme for the misappropriation of the money
contributed by the members of the association. In other words, only those who formed and manage associations that
receive contributions from the general public who misappropriated the contributions can commit syndicated estafa.

Gilbert Guy, et al., however, are not in any way related either by employment or ownership to AUB. They are outsiders
who, by their cunning moves were able to defraud an association, which is the AUB. Theirs would have been a different
story, had they been managers or owners of AUB who used the bank to defraud the public depositors.

This brings to fore the difference between the case of Gilbert Guy et al., and that of People v. Balasa, People
v. Romero, and People v. Menil, Jr.

In People v. Balasa, the accused formed the Panata Foundation of the Philippines, Inc., a non-stock/non-profit corporation
and the accused managed its affairs, solicited deposits from the public and misappropriated the same funds.

We clarified in Balasa that although, the entity involved, the Panata Foundation, was not a rural bank,
cooperative, samahang nayon or farmers' association, it being a corporation, does not take the case out of the coverage
of Presidential Decree No. 1689. Presidential Decree No. 1689's third "whereas clause" states that it also applies to other
"corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public." It is this pronouncement about the
coverage of "corporations/associations" that led us to the ruling in our 25 April 2012 Decision that a commercial bank falls
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1689. We have to note though, as we do now, that the Balasa case,
differs from the present petition because while in Balasa, the offenders were insiders, i.e., owners and employees who
used their position to defraud the public, in the present petition, the offenders were not at all related to the bank. In other
words, while in Balasa the offenders used the corporation as the means to defraud the public, in the present case, the
corporation or the bank is the very victim of the offenders.

Balasa has been reiterated in People v. Romero, where the accused Martin Romero and Ernesto Rodriguez were the
General Manager and Operation Manager, respectively, of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation, a
corporation engaged in marketing which later engaged in soliciting funds and investments from the public.

A similar reiteration was by People v. Menil, Jr., where the accused Vicente Menil, Jr. and his wife were proprietors of a
business operating under the name ABM Appliance and Upholstery. Through ushers and sales executives, the accused
solicited investments from the general public and thereafter, misappropriated the same.

The rulings in Romero and Menil, Jr. further guide us in the present case. Notably, Romero and Menil, Jr. applied the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689 because the number of the accused was below five, the
minimum needed to form the syndicate.

The second paragraph, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689 states:

When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua if the amount of fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.

Effectively, Romero and Menil, Jr. read as written the phrase "when not committed by a syndicate as above defined," such
that, for the second paragraph of Section 1 to apply the definition of swindling in the first paragraph must be satisfied: the
offenders should have used the association they formed, own or manage to misappropriate the funds solicited from the
public.

In sum and substance and by precedential guidelines, we hold that, first, Presidential Decree No. 1689 also covers
commercial banks; second, to be within the ambit of the Decree, the swindling must be committed through the
association, the bank in this case, which operate on funds solicited from the general public; third, when the number of the
accused are five or more, the crime is syndicated estafa under paragraph 1 of the Decree; fourth, if the number of
accused is less than five but the defining element of the crime under the Decree is present, the second paragraph of the
Decree applies (People v. Romero, People v. Balasa); fifth, the Decree does not apply regardless of the number of the
accused, when, (a) the entity soliciting funds from the general public is the victim and not the means through which
the estafa is committed, or (b) the offenders are not owners or employees who used the association to perpetrate the
crime, in which case, Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code applies.

The present petition involves an estafa case filed by a commercial bank as the offended party against the accused who,
as clients, defrauded the bank.

WHEREFORE, we MODIFY our 25 April 2012 Decision and RULE that Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung,
Katherine L. Guy and Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr., be charged for SIMPLE ESTAFA under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Brion, (Acting Chairperson), Del Castillo,* and Reyes, JJ., concur.
People V. Purisima
GR No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978

FACTS OF THE CASE:

There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are
consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon"
in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above
issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or
dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the
offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession
of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?

There are two elements to the offense:

first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
implement for a livelihood;

and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o
regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.

HELD:

COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT
JUDGES.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the
intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences
were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence
People v Purisima
Facts:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and
joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of
law.

The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar

Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal
Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed
motions to quash the said informations after which the respondent-courts passed their own orders
quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations did not allege facts constituting
ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the crime, which is, that the
carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on
the occasion of, connected with, or related to to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder.

The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to
maintain law and order in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless
violence. The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other
legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned
that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon was intended for the
purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners
said that the purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically
a malum prohibitum or is an action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal
also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is
voluntary is enough.

Issue:
Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of
“Illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?

Held:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state
the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare
his defense accordingly.

3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to
penalize the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive
acts, and the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and spirit of the
decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.
The petition is DISMISSED

[G.R. No. 8848. November 21, 1913. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM C. HART, C.J. MILLER, and SERVILLANO
NATIVIDAD, Defendants-Appellants.

Pedro Abad Santos for appellants Hart and Natividad.

W.H. Booram for appellant Miller.

Solicitor-General Harvey for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. VAGRANCY; LOITERING ABOUT SALOONS, DRAM SHOPS, OR GAMBLING HOUSES; VISIBLE MEANS OF SUPPORT. — A
person is not guilty of vagrancy under the second paragraph of section 1 of the Vagrancy Act for frequenting saloons, dram
shops, or gambling houses, unless it be shown that he is without visible means of support.

2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PUNCTUATION EMPLOYED. — If the punctuation of a statute gives it a meaning which is
reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal
meaning of the words of a statute as thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and
the courts will not hesitate change the punctuation when necessary, to give to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature,
disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.

Intrinsic Aid - PUNCTUATION EMPLOYED

FACTS:
Hart, Miller, and Natividad were found guilty in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on a charge of
vagrancy. All appealed.

Evidence of the prosecution as to the defendant Hart shows that he pleaded guilty and was convicted on a
gambling charge about 2-3 weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge.

Hart had been conducting two gambling games, one in his saloon and in another house.

Each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or business.

Sec. 1 of Act No. 519 – divided into 7 clauses, separated by semicolons. Each clause enumerates a certain calls
of person who, within the meaning of this statute, are to be considered as vagrants.

“Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who had the physical ability to work, and who neglects
to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling housed, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support; … … …”

ISSUE:
Whether or not “without visible means of support" apply to “every person found loitering about saloons or dram
shops”

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the
true legislative intention, and adopt that the construction of the statute which will give it effect.
The construction finally adopted should be based upon something more substantial than the mere punctuation
found in the printed Act.
If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with the
legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the
statute as thus punctuated.

But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the
punctuation when necessary, to give the Act the effect intended by the Legislature, disregarding superfluous or
incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.

HELD:
 A most important step in this reasoning, necessary to make it sound, is to ascertain the consequences
flowing from such a construction of the law.
o What is loitering? It is idling or wasting one’s time.
o The time spent in saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is seldom anything but that.
o If “visible means of support” does not apply to “every person found loitering about saloons or
dram shops or gambling houses”, practically all who frequent such places commit a crime of
vagrancy.
 Vagrancy as defined in Act No. 519 is the Anglo-Saxon method of dealing with the habitually idle and
harmful parasites of the society.
o That the visible means of support or a lawful calling is necessary under these statutes to a
conviction for loitering around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is not even negatived
by the punctuation employed.
 For these reasons, the defendants are acquitted.
 DECISION

TRENT, J. :

The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were arraigned in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on a charge of
vagrancy under the provision of Act No. 519, found guilty, and were each sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Hart and
Miller were further sentenced to a fine of P200, and Natividad to a fine of P100. All appealed.

The evidence of the prosecution as to the defendant Hart shows that he pleaded guilty and was convicted on a gambling
charge about two or three weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge; that he had been conducting two gambling
games, one in his saloon and the other in another house, for a considerable length of time, the games running every night.
The defense showed that Hart and one Dunn operated a hotel and saloon at Angeles which did a business, according to the
bookkeeper, of P96,000 during the nineteen months preceding the trial; that Hart was also the sole proprietor of a saloon in
the barrio of Tacondo; that he raised imparted hogs which he sold to the Army garrison at Camp Stotsenberg, which business
netted him during the preceding year about P4,000; that he was authorized to sell several hundred hectares of land owned
by one Carrillo in Tacondo; that he administered, under power of attorney, the same property; and that he furnished a
building for and paid the teacher of the first public school in Tacondo, said school being under Government supervision. The
evidence of the prosecution as to Miller was that he had the reputation of being a gambler; that he pleaded guilty and was
fined for participating in a gambling game about two weeks before his arrest on the present charge of vagrancy; and that he
was seen in houses of prostitution and in a public dance hall in Tacondo on various occasions. The defense showed without
contradiction that Miller had been discharged from the Army about the year previously; that during his term of enlistment he
had been made sergeant; that he received rating as "excellent" on being discharged; that since his discharge he had been
engaged in tailoring business near Camp Stotsenberg under articles of partnership with one Buckerd, Miller having
contributed P1,000 to the partnership; that the business netted each partner about P300 per month; that Miller attended to
business in an efficient manner every day; and that his work was first class.

The evidence of the prosecution as to Natividad was that he had gambled nearly every night for a considerable time prior to
his arrest on the charge of vagrancy, in the saloon of one Raymundo, as well as in Hart’s saloon; that Natividad sometimes
acted as banker; and that he had pleaded guilty to a charge of gambling and had been sentenced to pay a fine therefor
about two weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge. The defense showed that Natividad was a tailor, married, and had
a house of his own; that he made good clothes, and earned from P80 to P100 per month, which was sufficient to support his
family.

From his evidence it will be noted that each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or business, quite
sufficient to support himself in comfort, and that the evidence which the prosecution must rely upon for a conviction consists
of their having spent their evenings in regularly licensed saloons, participating in gambling games which are expressly made
unlawful by the Gambling Act, No. 1757, and that Miller frequented a dance hall and houses of prostitution.

Section 1 of Act No. 519 is divided into seven clauses, separated by semicolons. Each clause enumerates a certain calls of
person who, within the meaning of this statute, are to be considered as vagrants. For the purpose of this discussion, we
quote this section below, and number each of these seven clauses.

"(1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who had the physical ability to work, and who neglects to apply
himself or herself to some lawful calling; (2) every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling housed,
or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support; (3) every person known to be a pickpocket,
thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his own confession or by his having been convicted of either said offenses, and having no
visible or lawful means of support when found loitering about any gambling house, cockpit, or in any outlying barrio of a
pueblo; (4) every idle or dissolute person of associate of known thieves or ladrones who wanders about the country at
unusual hours of the night; (5) every idle person who lodges in any barn, shed, outhouse, vessel, or place other than such as
is kept for lodging purposed, without the permission of the owner or a person entitled to the possession thereof; (6) every
lewd or dissolute person who lives in and about houses of ill fame; every common prostitute and common drunkard, is a
vagrant."cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

It is insisted by the Attorney-General that as visible means of support would not be a bar to a conviction under any one of
the last four clauses of this act, it was not the intention of the Legislature to limit the crime of vagrancy to those having no
visible means of support. Relying upon the second clause to sustain the guilt of the defendant, the Attorney-General then
proceeds to argue that "visible means of support" as used in that clause does not apply to "every person found loitering
about saloons or dram shops on gambling houses," but is confined entirely to "or tramping or straying through the country."
It is insisted that had it been intended for "without visible means of support" to qualify the first part of the clause, either the
comma after gambling house would have been omitted, or else a comma after country would have been inserted.

When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true
legislative intention, and adopt that the construction of the statute of the statute which will give it effect. The construction
finally adopted should be based upon something more substantial than the mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the
punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be
used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as thus punctuated. But an
argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to a change the punctuation when
necessary, to give to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks,
and inserting others where necessary.

The Attorney-General has based his argument upon the proposition that neither visible means of support not a lawful calling
is a sufficient defense under the last four paragraphs of the section; hence, not being universally a defense to a charge of
vagrancy, they should not be allowed except where the Legislature has so provided. He then proceeds to show, by a "mere
grammatical criticism: of the second paragraph, that the Legislature did not intend to allow visible means of support or a
lawful calling to block a prosecution for vagrancy founded on the charge that the defendant was found loitering around
saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses.

A most important step in this reasoning, necessary to make it sound, is to ascertain the consequences flowing from such a
construction of the law. What is loitering? The dictionaries say it is idling or wasting one’s time. The time spent in saloons,
dram shops, and gambling houses is seldom anything but that. So that under the proposed construction, practically all who
frequent such places commit a crime in so doing, for which they are liable to punishment under the Vagrancy Law. We
cannot believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to penalize what, in the case of saloons and dram shops, is under
the law’s protection. If it be urged that what is true of saloons and dram shops is not true of gambling houses in this respect,
we encounter the wording of the law, which makes no distinction whatever between loitering around saloon and dram shops,
and loitering around gambling houses.

The offense of vagrancy and defined in Act No. 519 is the Anglo-Saxon method of dealing with the habitually idle and harmful
parasites society. While the statutes of the various States of the American Union differ greatly as to the classification of such
persons, their scope is substantially the same. Of those statutes we have had an opportunity to examine, but two or three
contain a provision similar to the second paragraph of Act No. 519. (Mo. Ann. Stat., sec. 2228; sec 1314.) That the absence
of visible means of support or a lawful calling is necessary under these statutes to a conviction for loitering around saloons,
dram shops, and gambling houses is not even negatived by the punctuation employed. In the State of Tennessee, however,
we find an exact counterpart for paragraph 2 of section 1 of our own Act (Code of Tenn., sec 3023), with the same
punctuation: jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

". . . or for any person to be found loitering about saloons or dram shops, gambling houses, or houses of ill fame, or
tramping or strolling through the country without any visible means of support." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

A further thought suggests itself on connection with the punctuation of the paragraph in question. The section, as stated
above, is divided into seven clauses, separated by semicolons. To say that two classes of vagrants are defined in paragraph
2, as to one of which visible means of support or a lawful calling is not a good defense, and as to the other which such a
defense is sufficient, would imply a lack of logical classification on the part of the legislature of the various classes of
vagrants. this we are not inclined to do.

In the case at bar, all three of the defendants were earning a living by legitimate methods in a degree of comfort higher than
the average. Their sole offense was gambling, which the legislature deemed advisable to make the subject of a penal law.
the games in which they participated were apparently played openly, in a licenses public saloon, where the officers of the law
could have entered as easily as did the patrons. It is believed that Act No. 1757 is adequate, if enforced, to suppress the
gambling proclivities of any person making a good living ar a lawful trade of business.

For these reasons, the defendants are acquitted, with the costs de oficio.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Carson, JJ., concur.

Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur the result.

G.R. No. 93666 April 22, 1991
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and EARL TIMOTHY CONE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, HON. BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment, and BASKETBALL COACHES
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Sobrevinas, Diaz, Hayudini & Bodegon Law Office for petitioners.

Rodrigo, Cuevas & De Borja for respondent BCAP.
RESOLUTION

FACTS:

On 1 May 1989, the National Capital Region of the Department of Labor and Employment issued Alien Employment
Permit No. M-0689-3-535 in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a United States citizen, as sports consultant and
assistant coach for petitioner General Milling Corporation ("GMC").

On 27 December 1989, petitioners GMC and Cone entered into a contract of employment whereby the latter undertook to
coach GMC's basketball team.

On 15 January 1990, the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation approved petitioner
Cone's application for a change of admission status from temporary visitor to pre-arranged employee.

On 9 February 1990, petitioner GMC requested renewal of petitioner Cone's alien employment permit. GMC also
requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach. The DOLE Regional Director, Luna Piezas, granted the
request on 15 February 1990.

On 18 February 1990, Alien Employment Permit No. M-02903-881, valid until 25 December 1990, was issued.

Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the issuance of said alien
employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who, on 23 April 1990, issued a decision ordering
cancellation of petitioner Cone's employment permit on the ground that there was no showing that there is no
person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing to perform the services required nor that the hiring of
petitioner Cone would redound to the national interest.

Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental Motions for Reconsideration but said
Motions were denied by Acting Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma in an Order dated 8 June 1990.

Petitioners are now before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari, dated 14 June 1990.

Issue:

1. WON the respondent Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he revoked petitioner Cone's alien
employment permit; and

2. WON Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code is null and void as it is
in violation of the enabling law as the Labor Code does not empower respondent Secretary to determine if the
employment of an alien would redound to national interest. Or (2) labor code does not empower
secretary to determine if the employment of an alien would redound to national
interest.
HELD:

1. The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment Permit.
GMC’s claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer’s prerogative has no legal basis. Under Section 40 of the
Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the
Department of labor. GMC’s right to choose whom to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an
employment permit.

The Labor Code empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the
services of a “person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of the
application to perform the services for which an alien is desired.”

In short, the Department of Labor is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of availability of local
workers. The constitutional validity of legal provisions granting such jurisdiction and authority and requiring proof of non-
availability of local nationals able to carry out the duties of the position involved, cannot be seriously questioned.

2. Petitioners apparently also question the validity of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, specifically Section 6
(c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, as imposing a condition not found in the Labor Code itself.
Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, provides as follows:

Section 6. Issuance of Employment Permit –– the Secretary of Labor may issue an employment permit to the
applicant based on:

a) Compliance by the applicant and his employer with the requirements of Section 2 hereof;

b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-availability of any person in the Philippines who is
competent and willing to do the job for which the services of the applicant are desired.

(c) His assessment as to whether or not the employment of the applicant will redound to the national interest;

(d) Admissibility of the alien as certified by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation;

(e) The recommendation of the Board of Investments or other appropriate government agencies if the applicant
will be employed in preferred areas of investments or in accordance with the imperative of economic
development;

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Article 40 of the Labor Code reads as follows:

Art. 40. Employment per unit of non-resident aliens. –– Any alien seeking admission to the Philippines for
employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to engage an alien for employment in
the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor.

The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after a determination
of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to
perform the services for which the alien is desired.

For an enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said employment permit may be issued upon
recommendation of the government agency charged with the supervision of said registered enterprise. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized to take into account the question of whether or
not employment of an alien applicant would "redound to the national interest" because Article 40 does not explicitly refer
to such assessment. This argument (which seems impliedly to concede that the relationship of basketball coaching and
the national interest is tenuous and unreal) is not persuasive. In the first place, the second paragraph of Article 40 says:
"[t]he employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after a determination of the
non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the
services for which the alien is desired." The permissive language employed in the Labor Code indicates that the authority
granted involves the exercise of discretion on the part of the issuing authority. In the second place, Article 12 of the Labor
Code sets forth a statement of objectives that the Secretary of Labor should, and indeed must, take into account in
exercising his authority and jurisdiction granted by the Labor Code,

Art. 12. Statement of Objectives. –– It is the policy of the State:

a) To promote and maintain a state of full employment through improved manpower training, allocation and
utilization;

xxx xxx xxx

c) To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking work in conformity with the national
interest;

d) To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with the national interest;

e) To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a registration and/or work permit system;

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, we find petitioners' arguments on the above points of constitutional law too insubstantial to require further
consideration.1avvphi1

Petitioners have very recently manifested to this Court that public respondent Secretary of Labor has reversed his earlier
decision and has issued an Employment Permit to petitioner Cone. Petitioners seek to withdraw their Petition
for Certiorari on the ground that it has become moot and academic.

While ordinarily this Court would dismiss a petition that clearly appears to have become moot and academic, the
circumstances of this case and the nature of the questions raised by petitioners are such that we do not feel justified in
leaving those questions unanswered.4

Moreover, assuming that an alien employment permit has in fact been issued to petitioner Cone, the basis of the reversal
by the Secretary of Labor of his earlier decision does not appear in the record. If such reversal is based on some view of
constitutional law or labor law different from those here set out, then such employment permit, if one has been issued,
would appear open to serious legal objections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

Fernan, C.J., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.
G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

Facts:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular
barangay election in 1994.

A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay.

Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition,
scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,1995.

At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The
COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition.

On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the
holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction,
docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order.

After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required
petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay
recall election was without COMELEC approval.2

On January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence,
the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction.

On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor
General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's
manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the
required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.3

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that
the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set
by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter.

In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court
considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local
election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall
election. We do not agree.

Issue:

WON the prohibition on Sec. 74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections, where the recall election is for Barangay post?
Facts:

Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular barangay election. A petition for his recall
as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the Barangay.At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed
the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for recall, COMELEC resolved to
approve the petition and set recall election date.

To prevent the holding of recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for INJUCTION which was later dismiss.
Petitioner fied for centiorari with urgent prayer for injuction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang
Kabataan election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government which states that “ no recall shall take place within one (1)
year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election.

Issue:

WON the prohibition on Sec. 74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections, where the recall election is for Barangay post?

Held:

No, but petition is dismissed for having become moot and academic

Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional
expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official
concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in
office than a successor elected through a recall election.

It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local
election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code
considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the
same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of
suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of
suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one
requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the
Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).

Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991).
Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18.
In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local).
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines

Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:
These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the
several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No.
6657.

G.R. No. 79777

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation. G.R. No. 79310

G.R. No. 79310

This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be
simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such
payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall
be taken without due process or just compensation.

G.R. No. 78742

Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department
of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.

Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically
preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police
power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the
extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-
beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989
Ponente: CRUZ, J.

FACTS
 Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions. They will be subject to one
common discussion and resolution.
G.R. No. 79777:
 The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and
Augustin Hermano, Jr. who owns a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. They question the constitutionality
of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 & 229, and R.A. No. 6657 since their tenants were declared full owners of the
mentioned lands.
G.R. No. 79310
 Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental and Planters’ Committee
Inc., with 1400 planter-members, submitted a petition seeking to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229.
 Aug. 27, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters, which claim
20 000 members). It was granted by the court.
 Sept. 10, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and
riceland owners. It was granted by the court.
G.R. No. 79744
 Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land
Transfer accusing the then Secretary of DAR of violation of due process and the requirement for just
compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer were issued to the private respondents who then refused to pay
lease rentals. The petitioner is asking for the recall and cancellation of these certificates.
 Dec. 24, 1986 – Petitioner claims his petition was denied without hearing.
 Feb. 17, 1987 – A motion for reconsideration was filed which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229
were issued which rendered his motion moot.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the President had the power to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229
2. Whether or not the President had the legislative power for issuing the measures
3. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the
Constitution
4. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention
limits required by Article 13, Section 4 of the Constitution
5. Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates constitutional requirement that a bill should only have one subject, to be
expressed in its title
6. Whether or not the writ of mandamus can issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a
specific department of the government.
7. Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the power of eminent domain
8. Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power
9. Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated
10. Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is not violative of
the Constitution
11. Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain by divesting the landowner
of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation

RULING
 1. YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella. President
Aquino is authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229.
2. YES. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when the Congress was formally convened and took
over legislative power.
3. NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that is not its principal purpose and therefore is not
required to conform to the requirements.
4. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law.
5. NO. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters
embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.
6. NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the
discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
7. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is payment of just compensation unlike in the
exercise of police power wherein confiscation of property is not compensable.
8. YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and
the lawful method. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself,
we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the
method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
9. NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
10. NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of payment, other modes of payment shall be
permitted as compensation. The court accepts the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always
required to be made fully in money, they find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of
value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not
unduly oppressive upon the landowner. The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his
option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue.
The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after
the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware
that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes
even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless
countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.)
11. NO. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP
bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.

DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional
objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their
respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights
granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 79416 September 5, 1989

ROSALINA BONIFACIO, surviving wife; and children GABRIEL, PONCIANO, TIBURCIO, BEATRIZ,
GENEROSA, SILVERIA, LEONARDO, FELOMENA, ENCARNACION and LEONILA, all surnamed
BONIFACIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Branch XIII, Malolos,
Bulacan and PASTORA SAN MIGUEL, respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTION; EJECTMENT CASE SURVIVES DEATH OF A PARTY. — The general rule
is that an ejectment case survives the death of a party. The supervening death of a party did not extinguish his
civil personality.

2. AGRARIAN RELATION; AGRICULTURAL LEASE; EJECTMENT GROUNDED ON PERSONAL CULTIVATION;

PERSONAL CULTIVATION, CONSTRUED. — Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by
which the ground for ejectment under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term gave the
impression that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was allowed only if and when the landowner-lessor and no
other opted to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving rise to a bigger misconception that the right of cultivation
pertained exclusively to the landowner-lessor, and therefore his personal right alone. Thus, whether used in
reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a restricted
connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to
either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate family
members.

3. RIGHT TO CULTIVATE TRANSMITTED TO IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE DECEASED

LANDOWNER-LESSOR. — Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate
family members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR
Case No. 2160-B '68 not being a purely personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was
transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the
judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B 68.

FACTS:
The favorable judgment adverted to by petitioners traces its origin to the complaint filed on July 1, 1968 by Olimpio Bonifacio
before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Baliwag, Bulacan, seeking the ejectment of private respondent Pastora San
Miguel from Bonifacio's two-hectare agricultural land situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-27298. The ground relied upon therefor was personal cultivation under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844,
otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code (CAR Case No. 2160-B '68).

On September 18, 1970, judgement was rendered on the merits by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio granting authority to plaintiff
OLIMPIO BONIFACIO to eject defendant PASTORA SAN MIGUEL from the landholding in question situated at Patubig,
Marilao, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares, more or less, and consequently, ordering said defendant to vacate the
same landholding and deliver possession thereof to said plaintiff for the latter's personal cultivation, subject
to the provisions of Section 25 of R.A 3844 and dismissing all other claims and counterclaims of the parties. Respondent
Pastora San Miguel appealed and the Court of Appeals modified said judgment with respect to her counterclaim by ordering
Olimpio Bonifacio to pay her the amount of P1,376.00. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects.

Private respondent Pastora San Miguel was still dissatisfied, sought relief from this Court claiming that during the pendency
of her petition, on August 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio died and no notice of such death was given to the Court, no order for
the substitution of his heirs was made.

On July 31, 1985, the Court En Banc resolved to deny private respondent's petition for lack of merit and to affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio, as surviving wife, and all the children and heirs of
Olimpio Bonifacio, moved for the execution of the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 before the respondent Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan. A writ of execution was issued on February 20, 1986 and on March 6, 1986, the Deputy Sheriff
submitted his Report (Partial Delivery of Possession), stating in part that except for a portion thereof occupied by the house
of Pastora San Miguel which the latter refused to vacate, he had delivered the land subject matter of the action to Rosalina
Bonifacio as surviving wife of Olimpio Bonifacio. Private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of
execution. This was opposed by petitioners who in turn sought the issuance of a writ of demolition and an order
declaring Pastora San Miguel in contempt of court for allegedly re-entering the subject land.
After hearing, respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon issued a resolution on July 15, 1986, stating that the writ of execution
of the Decision dated September 18, 1970 made by the Sheriff of this Court is declared null and void and the "Motion for
Demolition" filed by plaintiff is denied and the "Petition for Contempt" is likewise denied. Petitioners assail this resolution in
the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals, which as stated earlier, was certified to us pursuant to Section 9
(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in relation to Section 5 (2) [e], Art. X of the 1973 Constitution and Rule 50, Sec. 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 can no longer be executed as said
action is purely personal in character and therefore cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacio's death, be inherited by his heirs. They
assert that CAR Case No. 2160-B '68, being an ejectment case and not one of those specifically provided by law to be
purely personal, survives the death of a party. Furthermore, as under Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the Rules of Court,
a judgment is binding not only upon the parties but also on their successors-in-interest, petitioners are entitled to enforce
the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68.

Private respondent places stress on the fact that the action under consideration is not an ordinary ejectment case but an
agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. She theorizes that the right being asserted in the action is personal
to Olimpio Bonifacio, which necessarily died with him. She further contends that the non-substitution of Olimpio Bonifacio
by his heirs rendered the proceedings taken after his death null and void. She also points to certain supervening events
which allegedly prohibit execution of the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68, the amendment of Section 36 (1), R.A.
3844 by R.A. No. 6389 and 2) the promulgation of P.D. No. 27.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT, THE FAVORABLE JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY THE DECEDENT IS INHERITED BY THE
COMPULSORY HEIRS, THEREBY VESTING TO THE LATTER, ALL THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THE
JUDGMENT TO THE DECEDENT.

HELD:
YES, the favorable judgement obtained by the decedent is inherited by the compulsory heirs.

Private respondent is correct in characterizing CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 as more than an ordinary ejectment case. It is,
indeed, an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee, which in the light of the public policy involved, is more
closely and strictly regulated by the State. But this does not operate to bar the application to the instant case of the
general rule that an ejectment case survives the death of a party.

Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by which the ground for ejectment under Section 36 (1) of R.A.
3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term gave the impression that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was
allowed only if and when the landowner-lessor and no other opted to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving rise to a
bigger misconception that the right of cultivation pertained exclusively to the landowner-lessor, and therefore his personal
right alone. Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 however readily demonstrates the fallacy of this interpretation which provides:

Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due
hearing it is shown that: (1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family will personally cultivate
the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site
or other useful non- agricultural purposes.

Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to
cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so desired. This provides that the law
clearly did not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of
such right to the members of his immediate family. Clearly, the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a
right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of
cultivation likewise conferred upon the landowner's immediate family members.

The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate family members evidently to place the landowner-
lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm
household. In this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his
immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in "personal cultivation”.

Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a
restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to
the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate family members.
In this case, petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate family
members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR Case No.
2160-B '68 not being a purely personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was transmitted to petitioners as
heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68.

DECISION

FERNAN, C.J.:

The issue raised in the instant petition for certiorari certified to us by the Court of Appeals in its resolution 1 dated November
28, 1986 in CA-G.R. SP No. 10033 as involving a pure question of law is phrased by petitioners, thus: jgc:cha nrob les.com. ph

"WHETHER OR NOT, THE FAVORABLE JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY THE DECEDENT IS INHERITED BY THE COMPULSORY HEIRS,
THEREBY VESTING TO THE LATTER, ALL THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THE JUDGMENT TO (sic) THE DECEDENT." 2

The favorable judgment adverted to by petitioners traces its origin to the complaint filed on July 1, 1968 by Olimpio Bonifacio
before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District, Branch I-A of Baliwag, Bulacan, seeking the ejectment of
private respondent Pastora San Miguel from Bonifacio’s two-hectare agricultural land situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27298. The ground relied upon therefor was personal cultivation under
Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code (CAR Case No. 2160-B ‘68).

After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered therein on September 18, 1970 by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio: jgc:chanro bles. com .ph

"1. Granting authority to plaintiff OLIMPIO BONIFACIO to eject defendant PASTORA SAN MIGUEL from the landholding in
question situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares, more or less, and consequently, ordering
said defendant to vacate the same landholding and deliver possession thereof to said plaintiff for the latter’s personal
cultivation, subject to the provisions of Section 25 of R.A 3844; and

"2. Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims of the parties." 3

On appeal by private respondent Pastora San Miguel, the Court of Appeals 4 modified said judgment with respect to her
counterclaim by ordering Olimpio Bonifacio to pay her the amount of P1,376.00. The judgment was affirmed in all other
respects. 5

Still dissatisfied, private respondent Pastora San Miguel sought relief from this Court. During the pendency of her petition, on
August 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio died. As no notice of such death was given to the Court, no order for the substitution of his
heirs was made. On July 31, 1985, the Court En Banc resolved to deny private respondent’s petition for lack of merit and to
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 6

Subsequently, petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio, as surviving wife, and Gabriel, Ponciano, Tiburcio, Beatriz, Generosa, Silveria,
Leonardo, Felomena, Encarnacion and Leonila all surnamed Bonifacio, as children and heirs of Olimpio Bonifacio, moved for
the execution of the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B ‘68 before the respondent Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. A writ of
execution was issued on February 20, 1986 and on March 6, 1986, the Deputy Sheriff submitted his Report (Partial Delivery
of Possession), stating in part that except for a portion thereof occupied by the house of Pastora San Miguel which the latter
refused to vacate, he had delivered the land subject matter of the action to Rosalina Bonifacio as surviving wife of Olimpio
Bonifacio.

Thereafter, private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of execution. This was opposed by petitioners
who in turn sought the issuance of a writ of demolition and an order declaring Pastora San Miguel in contempt of court for
allegedly re-entering the subject land.

After hearing, respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon issued a resolution on July 15, 1986, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chan robles v irt ualawli bra ry cha nrob les.com: chan roble s.com.p h

"WHEREFORE, the implementation of the writ of execution of the Decision dated September 18, 1970 made by the Sheriff of
this Court, per directive contained in our Order of February 18, 1986, is hereby declared null and void; the "Motion for
Demolition" filed by plaintiff is hereby denied; and, the "Petition for Contempt" likewise denied.

"SO ORDERED." 7

Petitioners assail this resolution in the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals, which as stated earlier, was
certified to us pursuant to Section 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in relation to Section 5 (2) [e], Art. X of the 1973
Constitution and Rule 50, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners contend that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in ruling
that the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B ‘68 can no longer be executed as said action is purely personal in character and
therefore cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacio’s death, be inherited by his heirs. They assert that CAR Case No. 2160-B ‘68, being
an ejectment case and not one of those specifically provided by law to be purely personal, survives the death of a party.
Furthermore, as under Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the Rules of Court, a judgment is binding not only upon the parties but also
on their successors-in-interest, petitioners are entitled to enforce the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B ‘68.

Private respondent, on the other hand, places stress on the fact that the action under consideration is not an ordinary
ejectment case but an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. She theorizes that the right being asserted in
the action is personal to Olimpio Bonifacio, which necessarily died with him. She further contends that the non-substitution of
Olimpio Bonifacio by his heirs rendered the proceedings taken after his death null and void. She also points to certain
supervening events which allegedly prohibit execution of the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B ‘68, to wit: the amendment
of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 by R.A. No. 6389 and 2) the promulgation of P.D. No. 27.

Private respondent is correct in characterizing CAR Case No. 2160-B ‘68 as more than an ordinary ejectment case. It is,
indeed, an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee, which in the light of the public policy involved, is more
closely and strictly regulated by the State. This factor, however, does not operate to bar the application to the instant case of
the general rule that an ejectment case survives the death of a party. 8

Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by which the ground for ejectment under Section 36 (1) of R.A.
3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term gave the impression that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was allowed
only if and when the landowner-lessor and no other opted to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving rise to a bigger
misconception that the right of cultivation pertained exclusively to the landowner-lessor, and therefore his personal right
alone. A reading of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 however readily demonstrates the fallacy of this interpretation. Said section
provides: c han robles v irt ualawli bra ry chan rob les.com: chan robles .com.p h

"Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of
the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown
that:jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

"(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will
convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural
purposes . . ." cralaw virtua1aw l ib rary

Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to
cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so desired. In so providing, the law clearly did not
intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of such right to the
members of his immediate family. Clearly then, the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive
and personal to the landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation likewise conferred
upon the landowner’s immediate family members.

The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner’s immediate family members evidently to place the landowner-lessor
in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. In
this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his immediate farm
household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in "personal cultivation." cralaw virt ua1aw l ibra ry

Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a
restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to
the members of the lessor’s or lessee’s immediate family members.

Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate family members of the deceased landowner-
lessor as well. The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B ‘68 not being a purely personal right of
the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners are
entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B ‘68.

Rules of procedure make it the duty of the attorney to inform the court promptly of his client’s death, incapacity or
incompetency during the pendency of the action and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian
or other legal representative. 9 In case of a party’s death, the court, if the action survives, shall then order upon proper
notice the legal representatives of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased within a period of 30 days
or within such time as may be granted. 10

In the case at bar, Olimpio Bonifacio’s death during the pendency of private respondent’s petition was not communicated to
the Court. As ruled by this Court in the case of Florendo, Jr. v. Coloma, supra, involving substantially the same facts and
issue: jgc:cha nrob les.com .ph

". . . The petitioners challenge the proceeding in the Court of Appeals after the death of the plaintiff-appellant Adela
Salindon. They are of the opinion that since there was no legal representative substituted for Salindon after her death, the
appellate court lost its jurisdiction over the case and consequently, the proceedings in the said court are null and void. This
argument is without merit.

"There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party. The supervening death of plaintiff-appellant
Salindon did not extinguish her civil personality (Republic v. Bagtas, 6 SCRA 242; Vda. de Haberes v. Court of Appeals, 104
SCRA 534) . . .

x x x

"In the case at bar, Salindon’s counsel after her death on December 11, 1976 failed to inform the court of Salindon’s death.
The appellate court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of Salindon without the proper
manifestation from Salindon’s counsel. In such a case and considering that the supervening death of appellant did not
extinguish her civil personality, the appellate court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. There is
no showing that the appellate court’s proceedings in the case were tainted with irregularities." cralaw vi rt ua1aw lib rary

Private respondent’s challenge against the proceedings held after Olimpio Bonifacio’s death cannot therefore be heeded. cra lawnad

Neither can private respondent derive comfort from the amendment of Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 by Section 7 of R.A. No.
6389 11 and the promulgation of P.D. No. 27. 12 In Nilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34586, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA
519, we categorically ruled that both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied retroactively under the general rule
that statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein.

There being no cogent reason to nullify the implementation of the writ of execution in CAR Case No. 2160-B ‘68, respondent
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in having done so. The writ prayed for should issue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution dated July 15, 1986 is hereby set aside. The immediate
execution of the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B ‘68 is ordered. This decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-11959 October 31, 1959

ARTURO B. PASCUAL, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondent-appellee.

Amado G. Salazar, Felicisimo S. Ocampo, Arturo S. Tomas, Feliciano Bautista and Severo Ongsiapco for appellant.
Mariano D. Capuyoc for appellee.

October 31, 1959 | Gutierrez David, J. | Appeal | Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

SUMMARY: 3 admin cases were filed against San Jose Mayor Pascual before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija. He filed
an MD for the 3rd charge alleging that the wrongful acts were committed during his previous term and cannot be a ground
for disciplining him during his 2nd term. When his MD was denied, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition since petitioner did not first appeal to the Executive Secretary, in
compliance with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. SC held that the said principle admits certain
exceptions, as in this case, where the only question to be settled is purely legal.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio 2.

Facts:

Petitioner-appellant Arturo B. Pascual had been elected mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in November 1951 and
reelected in 1955. In October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor of that province filed with the Provincial Board three
administrative charges against the said appellant. Charge III was for "Maladministrative, Abuse of Authority, and
Usurpation of Judicial Functions,"

After the presentation of evidence regarding the first two charges, petitioner-appellant filed with the respondent-appellee,
the Provincial Board, a motion to dismiss the third charge on the ground that the wrongful acts therein alleged had been
committed during his previous term of office and could not constitute a ground for disciplining him during his second term.
Upon opposition filed by a special counsel for the respondent-appellee, the motion to dismiss was denied by resolution of
the Board.

After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the appellant filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction (G. R. No. L-11730), to enjoin the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija from taking cognizance of the third charge,
but the petition was denied by minute resolution of December 21, 1956 "without prejudice to action, if any, in the Court of
First Instance."

Accordingly, the petitioner-appellant filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction seeking to inhibit the said Provincial Board from proceeding with the hearing of Charge No. III, for
lack of jurisdiction.

The Provincial Board moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it states no cause of action because petitioner had
not complied with the cardinal principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies before he could appeal to the courts.
CFI dismissed the petition “for being premature” since petitioner had not first appealed to the Executive Secretary.

From that order, the case was brought before us on appeal. Upon urgent petition, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued restraining the respondent-appellee from investigating petitioner-appellant on the charge above-mentioned.

ISSUE/S:
WON it was legally proper for petitioner-appellant to have come to court without first bringing his case to the Executive
Secretary for review.

HELD:

Order appealed from REVOKED. Writ of prohibition GRANTED and preliminary injunction made permanent.

The settled rule is that where the law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy could be
effected, the same should be followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated (Ang Tuan Kai vs. Import Control
Commission, 91 Phil., 143; Coloso vs. Board, 92 Phil., 938; Miguel vs. Reyes, 93 Phil., 542, and several other cases), but
we believe that this rule is not without exceptions.
The rule is inapplicable where administrative remedy is provided. Likewise, the rule will be relaxed where there is grave
doubt as to availability of the administrative remedy; where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done; where although there are steps to be taken, they are, under the admitted
facts, merely matters of from, and the administrative process, as a process of judgment, is really over; or where the
administrative remedy is not exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a judicial remedy. A litigant need not
proceed with optional administrative process before seeking juducial relief. (73 C. J. S. p. 354)

In this case, the only question to be settled is a purely legal one: WoN the municipal mayor may be subjected to an
administrative investigation of a charge based on misconduct allegedly committed by him during his prior term.

As to the legality of disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately
preceding term of office, the Court resorted to American authorities due to an absence of any precedent. While there were
conflicting cases on the matter, the weight of authority seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from
office because of a misconduct during a prior term, to which the Court fully subscribes. The underlying theory is that each
term is separate from the other terms, and that reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be
to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically
overrule the will of the people.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby revoked; the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted
and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued made permanent. Without special pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-61388 April 20, 1983

IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO
PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN
PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA
GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ. JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ. JOSEFINA GARCIA-
PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN, FABIAN C. VER, GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, and FIDEL V. RAMOS, and
LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.

Facts:

Nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were arrested on July 6, 1982 at about 1:45 p.m. when three (3)
teams of the PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya led by Lt. Col. Coronel, lst Lt. de Guzman and lst Lt. Baria, after
securing a Search Warrant No. S-82 issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya
conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong. Apprehended during the said raid were Dra. Aurora
Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto
Portuguese, and Mariano Soriano who were then having a conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's residence
which had been doing on since 10:00 a.m. of that same day.

The other four (4) detainees herein, namely: Imelda de los Santos, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanita Granada, and
Bienvenida Garcia, were arrested on the following day, July 7, 1982 by the same PC teams.

On July 15, 1982, Tom Vasquez was arrested, and his Volkswagen car, bearing Plate No. DAP 347, was seized by
the PC authorities.

The herein fourteen (14) detainees (hereafter referred to sometimes as petitioners) were all detained at the PC/INP
Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya from July 6, 1982 until their transfer on the morning of
August 10, 1982 to an undisclosed place reportedly to Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague, Isabela, and to
Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

This petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained
petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. on August 13, 1982. The mandamus aspect of the instant petition has, however,
become moot and academic, and whereabouts of petitioners having already become known to petitioner Josefina
Garcia-Padilla.

FACTS:
The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14 detainees. Sabino
Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were then having a conference in the dining room at Dr. Parong’s
residence. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under surveillance as they were then identified as members
of the Communist Party of the Philippines. engaging in subversive activities. They were arrested and later
transferred to a facility only the PCs know, hence, the present petition of Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ of
habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid

HELD:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and that
the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period. PD 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested, assuming a law is
necessary, in the President the power of preventive arrest incident to the suspension of the privilege of the
writ. In addition, however, it should be noted that the PCO has been replaced by Preventive Detention Action
(PDA) pursuant to PD 1877. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA constitutes an authority to arrest and
preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period of one year, with the cause
or causes of their arrest subjected to review by the President or the by the Review Committee created for the
purpose.
TOPIC: Proclamation of Martial Law
DOCTRINE: suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president
CASE Number (including date): G.R. No. L-61388 | 1983-04-20
CASE Name: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR
DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS
SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN,
BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ. JOSEFINA GARCIA-
PADILLA, petitioner, vs. MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER, GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT.
COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.
Ponente: DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS
● nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were arrested when three (3) teams of the PC/INP of conducted a
raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong who were having a conference. 4 other detainess were arested the next
day
● the (14) detainees were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya until their
transfer to an undisclosed places.
● petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained petitioner
Sabino G. Padilla, Jr.
● The mandamus aspect of the instant petition has, however, become moot and academic, the whereabouts of
petitioners having already become known to petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla.
● Petitioner: “arrest of petitioners was patently unlawful and illegal since it was effected without any warrant of arrest;
that the PC/INP raiding team which made the arrest were only armed with a search warrant “
o nowhere in said warrant was authority given to make arrests, much less detention; that the search warrant
which authorized respondents to seize "subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine and
other subversive paraphernalia" in the house and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong was a roving and general
warrant and is, therefore, illegal per se because it does not state specifically the things that are to be seized
o no criminal charges have as of yet been filed against any of the detainees; there is no judgment, decree,
decision or order from a court of law which would validate the continued detention of the petitioner; that
while it is true that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO)
was shown to the detainees on or about July 11 and 12, 1982, but counsel and the detainees have not yet
been given a copy of such PCO, nor notified of its contents, raising a doubt whether such commitment order
has in fact been issued.
o respondents are denying the detainees their constitutional right to counsel, averring that the detainees were
allowed regular visits by counsel and relatives during their period of detention

ISSUES
1. Whether or not petitioners' detention is legal
2. Whether or not the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided the legal basis of the
detention of herein detainees following their arrest for Proclamation No. 2045 covered offenses

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

● (1) Yes:
o Prior thereto to the arrest, the detainees were identified as members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CCP) engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra. Aurora Parong in
Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their headquarters.
o Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered towards different directions leaving
on top of their conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books,
correspondence, stationaries, and other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and
student sector (code-named YORK).
o Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for
M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos (P18,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds,
 assorted medicine packed and ready for distribution, and sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which
were then seized.
o There is no doubt that circumstances attendant in the arrest of the herein detainees fall under a situation
where arrest is lawful even without a judicial warrant as specifically provided for under Section 6(a), Rules
113 of the Rules of Court and allowed under existing jurisprudence on the matter. As provided therein, a
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when the person to be arrested
has committed or actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence.
o The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing
non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an
armed conflict, to quell the rebyellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses
which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a
judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a
judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against goarrest and detention of persons ordered by the President through the issuance of
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is merely preventivevernment forces, or any other milder acts
but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
o
● (2) No answer. Political Question
o reverting to the ruling of Montenegro vs. Castañeda that the President's decision to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons."
o under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the exclusive prerogative of
the President under the Constitution, may not be declared void by the courts, under the doctrine of "political
question," as has been applied in the Baker and Castañeda cases, on any ground, let alone its supposed
violation of the provision of LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not abandoning, the doctrine of the Lansang case.
The supreme mandate received by the President from the people and his oath to do justice to every man
should be sufficient guarantee, without need of judicial overseeing, against commission by him of an act of
arbitrariness in the discharge particularly of those duties imposed upon him for the protection of public
safety which in itself includes the protection of life, liberty and property. This Court is not possessed with
the attribute of infallibility that when it reviews the acts of the President in the exercise of his exclusive😨😨😨😨
power, for possible fault of arbitrariness, it would not itself go so far as to commit the self-same fault.
● From uber:
The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary
in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ 😨was a politicoal question to be resolved
solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus m😨😨ust,
indeed, carry with oj0ii0oj9oi the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to u8l3el3 the
rebelliono ios to be enhanced and rendered oeffective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance
of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without
the least doubt, rejoinooi90op90oooo090ioooo their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed.

Note from uber:

This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang
Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that “the right to bail shall not be impaired
even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.”

FACTS
● motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner Garcia Padilla.
● The stress is on the continuing validity of Garcia v. Lansang as well as the existence of the right to bail
even with the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
● The motion asserted further that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
vest the President with the power to issue warrants of arrest or presidential commitment orders, and that
 even it be assumed that he has such a power, the Supreme Court may review its issuance when
challenged.
● It was finally alleged that since petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto, their arrest was illegal and
void.

ISSUES
1. whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus vests the President with the power to
issue warrants of arrest or presidential commitment orders

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

● (1)
○ PCO has been replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA), pursuant to PD No. 1877.
■ a PDA constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons committing the
aforementioned crimes, for a period not exceeding one (1) year, with the cause or causes of their
arrest subjected to review by the President or by the Review Committee created for that
purpose."
○ the crimes of subversion and rebellion are continuing offenses.
○ Presidential Decree No. 1877 limits the duration of the preventive detention action for the period not
exceeding one year
○ The persons who were detained by virtue of Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12,
1982, and in whose behalf the above-captioned cases was filed have been released detention by the
military authorities concerned
○ There is no question, therefore, that the force and effectivity of a presidential commitment order issued as
far back as July 12, 1982 had ceased to have any force or effect.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and Section 8 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion for reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of
habeas corpus ordering the release of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued, but in the light of the foregoing
manifestation as to Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divinagracia, Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda,
Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan, Bienvenido Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada,
and Tom Vasquez, having been released, the petition as to them has been declared moot and academic. As to Dr.
Aurora Parong, since a warrant of arrest against her was issued by the municipal court of Bayombong on August 4, 1982,
for illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions, the petition is likewise declared moot and academic.
 G.R. No. 113539. March 12, 1998

CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID
REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO CATANIAG, Respondents.

DECISION

Facts:

Petitioners appealed from the decision of the MTC and RTC ruling that Helen Guzman’s (American citizen) waiver of her
inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien.

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced
heirs were his widow private respondent Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, private respondent David Rey Guzman,
both of whom are also American citizens.

On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights,
titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.

On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee [also herein private respondent]
Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT No. T-120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in the latters
name.

Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances — between
Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag — and
claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.

In its decision dated March 10, 1992, the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that Helen Guzmans waiver of her
inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since
the purpose of the waiver was simply to authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in accordance with the
Constitution and the laws of the Philippines, and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the subject land
was urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.

The Halilis sought a reversal from the Court of Appeals which, however, denied their appeal. Respondent Court affirmed
the factual finding of the trial court that the subject land was urban. Citing Tejido vs. Zamacoma and Yap vs. Grageda it
further held that, although the transfer of the land to David Rey may have been invalid for being contrary to the
Constitution, there was no more point in allowing herein petitioners to recover the property, since it has passed on to and
was thus already owned by a qualified person.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Were the petitioners entitled to a right of redemption?

2. Was the sale of the lot to defendant-appellee Cataniag valid?

WON Erred in affirming the conclusion of the trial court that the land in question is urban, not rural

WON Erred in denying petitioners right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code

WON Having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers Guzman to her son David Rey Guzman illegal, erred in not
declaring the same null and void

HELD:

1. NO. The petitioners were not entitled to a right of redemption. The subject land is urban. Thus, petitioners have no right to
invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural.
2. YES. The sale to Cataniag is valid. Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public
domain. But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen?
Jurisprudence is consistent that if the land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid. Since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer
can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provision — to keep our land in Filipino hands — has been
served.

Yes, because the prohibition in the constitution has already been served. Article XII, Section 7 provides that Non- Filipinos
cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold
title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. While it is true that the
transfer of Helen of his right to her son who is an American citizen contradicts the prohibition set forth in the Constitution,
the Supreme Court upheld the subsequent sale of the land to Catanig, a Filipino citizen. Jurisprudence is consistent that
“if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid.”
The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus “[I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not
only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation’s lands for
future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of
real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. “

Petition was denied.

The first two errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated -- the determination of the first being a prerequisite to the
resolution of the second -- shall be discussed together.

Subject Land Is Urban

Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a rule, is not reviewable by this
Court.[12] Basic and long-settled is the doctrine that findings of fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This admits of only a few exceptions, such as when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when an inference made by the appellate court from its factual
findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to
the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; when there
is a misappreciation of facts; when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which
they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence or are contradicted by evidence on record.[13]

The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited exceptions. In fact, the conclusion of the trial court -- that the
subject property is urban land -- is based on clear and convincing evidence,

In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have indeed no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the
Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits of
no ambiguity in construction:

ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when a piece of rural land, the
area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land.

Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal
succession.

The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus:

x x x [I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the
Krivenko case, is to preserve the nations lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization.[29]
Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid
transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provision -- to keep our land in Filipino hands -- has
been served.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 132231 March 31, 1998

EMILIO M. R. OSMEÑA and PABLO P. GARCIA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates the Constitution:

Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on
the second Monday of May 1992;

Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial, city and
municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;

The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local
officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;

Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial
elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title “Commission on Elections” of the Constitution;

The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and
local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification
for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution
itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least
minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the
Constitution for its amendment or revision.

On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this petition arguing that the question is
political in nature and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory
opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the merits, the SolGen contends that Republic
Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the
Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.

ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the instant petition?
HELD: Yes.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary to SolGen’s contention, the issue in this
case is justiciable rather than political. And even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within the
Court’s power considering the expanded jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding the challenge to the petitioner’s standing, the
Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners have no legal standing, the Court has the power to brush aside
technicalities considered the “transcendental importance” of the issue being raised herein.

MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides
for the synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-
synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of “synchronization” in
the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will
synchronize future elections to once every three years.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the local official first elected
under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local
officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and
qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that “it is not competent for the legislature to
extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the
constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the
official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the
successors fail to qualify within the time”.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office of all
elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday
of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from
November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.
The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA 7056
provides for a different campaign period, as follows:
a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial, city and municipal officials
forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections.
G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules
of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption
and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to
the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had
by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Arroyo v De Venecia

Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging
violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although
until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a
grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments
of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of
its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can
seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art.
VI, §§26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . .
It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an
act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that
such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".
In view of House Rules
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving
approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in
this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote,
except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.

In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial
or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are
conclusive of its due enactment.

This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic
theory: “Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle
and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators,
the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.”

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we
will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States,
the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on
cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even more just.
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001.]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES,
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE
VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG AND ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., Respondents.

[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001.]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-
President.

Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his
family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress.
Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative
Fuentebella.

Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.

When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained
evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and
private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By
midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the
petitioner and the 11 senators.

January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people holding
lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA
Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.

January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap
election for President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General
Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that
"on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
withdrawing our support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major
service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.

January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.
Petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.

January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of
the Presidency.

February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint
that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted."

February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner
to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of
his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

HELD:
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must
be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As
long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20,
2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President
xxx.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as
the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on
leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.
 Estrada vs Desierto
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life’s
adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998. From the beginning of his
term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from
power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis “Chavit” Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions
of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a
fiery privilege speech entitled “I Accuse.” He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor
Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise
tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon
Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for
joint investigation. The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by
Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson
Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner. Calls for the resignation of the
petitioner filled the air. Petitioner’s allies started to cut connections with him. The political temperature rose despite the cold December.
On December 7, the impeachment trial started. The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. The
dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She
testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature “Jose Velarde” on documents involving a
P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000. After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was
adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On
January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner’s Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner
jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading. Then came the fateful day of
January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained
evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The public and private
prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. The ruling made at 10:00 p.m.
was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA
Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators. At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice
Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left
Malacañang Palace. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by
Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers
Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct,
violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-001755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public
funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery,
plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B.
Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s allegation against respondent Ombudsman is meritorious.

Held: No. The evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot
be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice
and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory
of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit
they are reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal.
In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman
resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias,
he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show more weighty
social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases
against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent
Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already
been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise
the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco,
we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue “in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government.” Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr, there is a “textually demonstrable
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim
of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of
powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a coequal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
[G.R. NO. 184836 : December 23, 2009]

SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, Respondents.

DECISION

Facts:

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however,
subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan's suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and
finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr.,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo's certificate of candidacy or
to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore
violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

The COMELEC's Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo's favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It
reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term
because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Division's ruling in its October 7, 2008 Resolution; hence,
the PRESENT PETITION raising the following ISSUES:

1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and c ralawli bra ry

2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160

Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilo's preventive suspension constituted an interruption that
allowed him to run for a 4th term.

THE COURT'S RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

General Considerations

The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of the Constitution, but is the first on the
effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an elective official's term. To be sure, preventive suspension, as an
interruption in the term of an elective public official, has been mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on
Elections.2 Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with the
application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective official acquired by succession.

a. The Three-term Limit Rule:

The Constitutional Provision Analyzed

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in wording does not assume any
significance in this case.

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official's stay in office to
no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time - three years - during which an official has title to office and
can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,3 a Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a "term"
connotes, as follows:

The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon
expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer
must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to
be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied]. ???ñr?bl ?š ??r

[G.R. NO. 184836 : December 23, 2009]

SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, Respondents.

for the 1998-2001,

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms:
2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court,
however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his
office and finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino,
Jr., et al. sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been
elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

The COMELEC in Asilo’s favour. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to
render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the preventive suspension of an elected public official constitutes an interruption of the official’s
term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

The only interruption of a term that can exempt an elective official from the three-term limit rule is involuntary loss
of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an
effective interruption to the three-limit rule to occur.
However, a preventive suspension, by its nature, is only a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken
term. It does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while
retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law. The official is
reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity
in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what
exactly happened to Asilo.
Thus, the preventive suspension imposed on Asilo does not constitute an effective interruption of the three-term
limit rule. Asilo is disqualified by the Court to run in the immediate subsequent election following his three consecutive
terms of service.
[ GR No. 154512, Nov 12, 2002 ]

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES v. COMELEC +

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari[1] seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity) in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
The Antecedents
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly ("PRA" for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00
a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall[2] of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity)
who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M.
Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 ("Recall Resolution" for brevity) which declared its loss of
confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for
mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due
course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc[3] promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates' petition.
The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the calendar of activities and
periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period from
August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall
election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo ("Gilo" for brevity) filed a petition before
the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his
certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. ("Ollave" for brevity) filed a petition-in-
intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed
another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving the
same issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth
consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms
immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post." Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were
consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC's First Division [4] dismissed for lack of merit SPA Nos.
02-492 and 02-539. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC also reset
the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of
Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC)
which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the
following circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution:
(1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was
palpably and legally deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their
respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA
proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the public's constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it
fixed the recall election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the
COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the
candidates at least an additional 15 days to campaign.
In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
5673 insofar as it fixed the date of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to give the
candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving the candidates an
additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to
September 24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions dated September 20, 2002 and September 23,
2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They likewise
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall
election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor
in the recall election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for elective
local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any winning
candidate in the recall election until further orders from the Court. Petitioners were required to post a P20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking the same
reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Gilo and Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival
candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him
to assume office to give effect to the will of the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates' motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall
Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on
September 24, 2002.
In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing a campaign period
of only 10 days has become moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an
additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.
First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.
Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution
despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The
COMELEC, however, found that
"On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local
Government Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof of Service
for each of the said notices were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "G" of Volumes II and III of the Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the same were
attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "H". The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the
dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of provincial
elective officials, print and broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national officials,
and DILG officials].
xxx
The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10 July 2002 certified that upon a 'thorough and
careful verification of the signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all members of the PRA
concerned approved said resolution.' She likewise certified 'that not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or
objected as to the veracity and authenticity of their signatures.'
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, 'upon
proper review, all documents submitted are found in order.'
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted the following recommendations:
'This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient in form and substance. That the PRA
was validly constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of
Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.'
x x x ."
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise of the
COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC, [5] which also dealt with alleged
defective service of notice to PRA members, we ruled that
"Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the
determination of the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious
inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its
own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a
substantiated attack on the validity of the same."
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC's findings of fact are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a
majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002.
This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their
terms of office had not yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to
participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even
sending his representative and counsel who were present during the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall
election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA
assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto
Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of the COMELEC.
Socrates, however, does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in Socrates' claim that
respondents violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall
Resolution and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.
Second Issue: Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor
in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
which provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official was elected."
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot
serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the
three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt
the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any
subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent
election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening
period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked was whether
there would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after three
terms. This is clear from the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO:[6] We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the blackboard, and these are Alternative
No. I where there is no further election after a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2 where there is no immediate
reelection after three successive terms."[7]
The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation on the term of elective local officials:
"MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues on
the term of Representatives and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three
terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms)."[8]
The framers of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection" question in voting for the term limits of
Senators[9] and Representatives of the House.[10]
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent
election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the
immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year full term following the three-term
limit, then Senators should also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term following their two-
term limit. The constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of elective local
officials, thus:
"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." [11]
In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the Constitutional Convention is instructive:
"GASCON:[12] I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow the Senator to
rest for a period of time before he can run again?
DAVIDE:[13] That is correct.
GASCON: And the question that we left behind before - if the Gentleman will remember - was: How long will that period of
rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?
DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election following the
expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular
member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committee's stand.
GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at the least." [14] (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years[15] following his completion of
two terms. The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection, and
not to any subsequent election, during the six-year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did
not intend "the period of rest" of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding
term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after
his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred
Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three
consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could
no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn,
who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did
not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.[16] Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After
Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24,
2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During
the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of
Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn's
three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004
is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's
previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not.
An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive
character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,[17] the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this manner:
"x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years,
constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or
hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length of time," as long as the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local official's continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga,[18] a unanimous Court reiterated the rule that an interruption
consisting of a portion of a term of office breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. In Adormeo, Ramon
Y. Talaga, Jr. had served two consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena City. In his third bid for election as mayor in
1998, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, in the recall election of May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001. When Talaga ran again for mayor in the 2001 elections,
Raymundo Adormeo, the other candidate for mayor, petitioned for Talaga's disqualification on the ground that Talaga had
already served three consecutive terms as mayor.
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talaga's recall term was a continuation of his previous two terms so that he was
deemed to have already served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was qualified to run in the
2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the
continuity of his service as mayor. Talaga's recall term as mayor was not consecutive to his previous two terms because
of this interruption, there having been a break of almost two years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his service and
prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive terms. In
the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of
service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous three
consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo,
the interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened after the first
three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents were seeking election for a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after winning the recall election.
Talaga's recall term did not retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talaga's recall term was made to
so retroact, then he would have been disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he would already have served
three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of
his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official
holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the
recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness
of an elective official's terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can
only be disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001,
for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorn's recall term as a full term
of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is
to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually
are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of
the people to choose their leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign
will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest
possible effect to the sovereign will of the people. As this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
"Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner
Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local
and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such
officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third
consecutive term. Monsod warned against 'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose' as a result of the
proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions 'recognizing people's
power.'"[19] (Emphasis supplied)
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption.
An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one
term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional
Commission:
"SUAREZ:[20] For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve
the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered
one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned
from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of
that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House." [21]
Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and Representatives of the House, the same principle
applies to a recall election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for
more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full terms. A local official who serves
a recall term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years. This is the inherent
limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto
Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June
30, 2001;
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002
during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to
make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their
leaders.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto
Princesa in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., in the result.
Mendoza, J., in the result, without to the filing of separate opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
Corona, J., no part - prior consultation.
Azcuna, J., joins the separate opinion of C.J. Davide.
WENPHIL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ROBERTO MALLARE, respondents.

Private respondent was hired by petitioner on January 18, 1984 as a crew member at its Cubao Branch. He thereafter became the assistant head of the
Backroom department of the same branch. At about 2:30 P.M. on May 20, 1985 private respondent had an altercation with a co-employee, Job
Barrameda, as a result of which he and Barrameda were suspended on the following morning and in the afternoon of the same day a memorandum was
issued by the Operations Manager advising private respondent of his dismissal from the service in accordance with their Personnel Manual. The notice
of dismissal was served on private respondent on May 25, 1985.

Thus private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. After submitting their
respective position papers to the Labor Arbiter and as the hearing could not be conducted due to repeated absence of counsel for respondent, the case
was submitted for resolution. Thereafter a decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter on December 3, 1986 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

Private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) wherein in due course a decision was rendered on October 16, 1987
setting aside the appealed decision and ordering the reinstatement of private respondent to his former position without loss of seniority and other related
benefits and one (1) year backwages without qualification and deduction.

Hence the herein petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order wherein petitioner alleges that the public respondent NLRC
committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision contrary to the evidence on record.

On December 2, 1987, the court issued a restraining order as prayed for in the petition enjoining the enforcement of the decision dated October 16, 1987
of public respondent NLRC upon petitioner posting a bond of P20,000.00.

The theory of the petitioner is that on the aforesaid date, May 20, 1985, when private respondent and Barrameda had a misunderstanding about tending
the Salad Bar, private respondent slapped Barrameda's cap, stepped on his foot and picked up the ice scooper and brandished it against the latter.
Marijo B. Kolimlim who was a management trainee tried to pacify private respondent but he defied her so Kolimlim reported the incident to the assistant
manager, Delilah C. Hermosura, who immediately asked private respondent to see her. Private respondent refused to see Hermosura and it took the
security guard to bring him to her. Private respondent then shouted and uttered profane words instead of making an explanation before her. He stated
the matter should be settled only by him and Barrameda. The following day Kolimlim and Hermosura submitted a report on the incident and
recommended the imposition of the appropriate penalties on both. It was the store manager who issued a report meting out the penalty of suspension on
the two until further notice in the following morning. Later that day the Operations Manager issued a memorandum advising Barrameda of one (1) week
suspension and the dismissal of private respondent from the service.

The main thrust of the petition is that under the Personnel Manual of petitioner which had been read and understood by private respondent, private
respondent waived his right to the investigation. It is provided therein that -

INVESTIGATION

If the offense is punishable with a penalty higher than suspension for fifteen (15) days, upon the request of the erring
employee, there shall be convened an investigation board composed of the following

1. The Parlor Manager or Supervisor on duty when the incident occurred.

2. The General Manager or the Assistant Manager.

The investigation board shall discuss the merits of the case and shall issue a ruling, which shall be final and conclusive. (p. 3,
Personnel Manual: Emphasis supplied).

From the foregoing it appears that an investigation shall only be conducted if the offense committed by the employee is punishable with the penalty
higher than suspension of fifteen (15) days and the erring employee requests for an investigation of the incident. Petitioner alleges that private
respondent not having asked for an investigation he is thus deemed to have waived his right to the same. Petitioner avers that immediately after the
incident when private respondent was asked to see Hermosura, he was defiant and showed that he was not interested to avail of an investigation.

The contention of petitioner is untenable. The incident happened on May 20, 1985 and right then and there as afore repeated on the following day
private respondent was suspended in the morning and was dismissed from the service in the afternoon. He received an official notice of his termination
four (4) days later.

The defiant attitude of private respondent immediately after the incident amounted to insubordination. Nevertheless his refusal to explain his side under
the circumstances cannot be considered as a waiver of his right to an investigation.

Although in the Personnel Manual of the petitioner, it states that an erring employee must request for an investigation it does not thereby mean that
petitioner is thereby relieved of the duty to conduct an investigation before dismissing private respondent. Indeed said provision of the Personnel Manual
of petitioner which may effectively deprive its employees of the right to due process is clearly against the law and hence null and void. The security of
tenure of a laborer or employee is enshrined in the Constitution, the Labor Code and other related laws. 1

Under Section 1, Rule XIV of the Implementing Regulations of the Labor Code, it is provided that "No worker shall be dismissed except for just or
authorized cause provided by law and after due process." Sections 2, 5, 6, and 7 of the same rules require that before an employer may dismiss an
employee the latter must be given a written notice stating the particular act or omission constituting the grounds thereof; that the employee may answer
the allegations within a reasonable period; that the employer shall afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of
his representative, if he so desires; and that it is only then that the employer may dismiss the employee by notifying him of the decision in writing stating
clearly the reasons therefor. Such dismissal is without prejudice to the right of the employee to contest its validity in the Regional Branch of the NLRC.

Petitioner insists that private respondent was afforded due process but he refused to avail of his right to the same; that when the matter was brought to
the labor arbiter he was able to submit his position papers although the hearing cannot proceed due to the non-appearance of his counsel; and that the
private respondent is guilty of serious misconduct in threatening or coercing a co-employee which is a ground for dismissal under Article 283 of the
Labor Code.

The failure of petitioner to give private respondent the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right
to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. 2 The standards of due process in judicial as well as administrative proceedings have long been
established. In its bare minimum due process of law simply means giving notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. 3

The claim of petitioner that a formal investigation was not necessary because the incident which gave rise to the termination of private respondent was
witnessed by his co- employees and supervisors is without merit. The basic requirement of due process is that which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. 4

However, it is a matter of fact that when the private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner he was afforded the right to an investigation by the
labor arbiter. He presented his position paper as did the petitioner. If no hearing was had, it was the fault of private respondent as his counsel failed to
appear at the scheduled hearings. The labor arbiter concluded that the dismissal of private respondent was for just cause. He was found guilty of grave
misconduct and insubordination. This is borne by the sworn statements of witnesses. The Court is bound by this finding of the labor arbiter.

By the same token, the conclusion of the public respondent NLRC on appeal that private respondent was not afforded due process before he was
dismissed is binding on this Court. Indeed, it is well taken and supported by the records. However, it can not justify a ruling that private respondent
should be reinstated with back wages as the public respondent NLRC so decreed. Although belatedly, private respondent was afforded due process
before the labor arbiter wherein the just cause of his dismissal bad been established. With such finding, it would be arbitrary and unfair to order his
reinstatement with back wages.

The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement to the service of an employee without loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during
the period of his separation until his actual reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years without qualification or deduction, when it appears he was not
afforded due process, although his dismissal was found to be for just and authorized cause in an appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, should be re-examined. It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who has
been shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the undeserving, if
not undesirable, remains in the service.

Thus in the present case, where the private respondent, who appears to be of violent temper, caused trouble during office hours and even defied his
superiors as they tried to pacify him, should not be rewarded with re-employment and back wages. It may encourage him to do even worse and will
render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. Under the circumstances the dismissal of the private respondent for
just cause should be maintained. He has no right to return to his former employer.

However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his
dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due process. 5 Petitioner
committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an
investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment. Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the
private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of this award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by
the employer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the public respondent NLRC dated October 16, 1987 for the reinstatement with
back wages of private respondent is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the decision of the labor arbiter dated December 3, 1986 dismissing the
complaint is revived and affirmed, but with the modification that petitioner is ordered to indemnify private respondent in the amount of P1,000.00. The
restraining order issued by this Court on December 2, 1987 is hereby made permanent and the bond posted by petitioner is cancelled. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 80587 February 8, 1989
WENPHIL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ROBERTO MALLARE, respondents.
Renato B. Valdecantos & Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Diego O. Untalan for private respondent.
FACTS:
Private respondent Mallare had an altercation with a co-employee. The following day, the Operations Manager served
them memorandum of suspension and in the afternoon of that same day, Mallare was dismissed from work. Labor Arbiter
dismissed Mallare’s petition for unfair labor practice for lack of merit. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered the
reinstatement of Mallare with full backwages of one year without qualification and deduction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employee dismissed for just cause but without due process be reinstated to work.

RULING:
The basic requirement of due proves is that which hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial. The dismissal of an employee must be for a just cause and after due process. Petitioner
committed an infraction of the second requirement thus it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice
and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing Mallare from employment. Petitioner must indemnify
the dismissed employee which depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the
employer.
Where the private respondent appears to be of violent temper, caused trouble during office hours and even defied his
supervisors as they tried to pacify him, he should not be rewarded with re-employment and backwages. The dismissal of
the respondent should be maintained.
GRN 117040 JANUARY 27, 2000
SERRANO VS NLRC / ISETANN
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department Store as the head of Security Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting
measure, Isetann phased out its entire security section and engaged the services of an independent security
agency. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal among others. Labor arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to
establish that it had retrenched its security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private respondent
failed to accord due process to petitioner; that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting
employees whose employment would be terminated. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered petitioner to be given
separation pay.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the private respondent to replace its current security
section a valid ground for the dismissal of the employees classed under the latter.

RULING:
An employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the
services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to promote economy and
efficiency. Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise of judgment by an employer.

If termination of employment is not for any of the cause provided by law, it is illegal and the employee should be reinstated
and paid backwages. To contend that even if the termination is for a just cause, the employee concerned should be
reinstated and paid backwages would be to amend Art 279 by adding another ground for considering dismissal illegal.
If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes mentioned in Art 282, the in accordance with that
article, he should not be reinstated but must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is
determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed
renders the termination without legal effect.
GRN 158693 NOVEMBER 17, 2004
[G.R. No. 117040. January 27, 2000.]

RUBEN SERRANO, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, Respondents.

DECISION

This is a petition seeking review of the resolutions, dated March 30, 1994 and August 26, 1994, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner Ruben Serrano’s complaint for illegal dismissal and denied his motion for
reconsideration. The facts are as follows:chanrobles virtua| |aw |ibrary

Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of
merchandise. 1 Initially hired on October 4, 1984 on contractual basis, petitioner eventually became a regular employee on April 4, 1985. In 1988, he
became head of the Security Checkers Section of private Respondent. 2

Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase out its entire security section and engage the services of an
independent security agency. For this reason, it wrote petitioner the following memorandum: 3

October 11, 1991

MR. RUBEN SERRANO

PRESENT

Dear Mr. Serrano,

In view of the retrenchment program of the company, we hereby reiterate our verbal notice to you of your termination as Security Section Head effective
October 11, 1991.

Please secure your clearance from this office.

Very truly yours

[Sgd.] TERESITA A. VILLANUEVA

Human Resources Division Manager

The loss of his employment prompted petitioner to file a complaint on December 3, 1991 for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, unfair labor practice,
underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of salary and overtime pay. 4

The parties were required to submit their position papers, on the basis of which the Labor Arbiter defined the issues as follows: 5

Whether or not there is a valid ground for the dismissal of the complainant.

Whether or not complainant is entitled to his monetary claims for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of salaries, 13th month pay for 1991 and
overtime pay.

Whether or not Respondent is guilty of unfair labor practice.

Thereafter, the case was heard. On April 30, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding petitioner to have been illegally dismissed. He ruled that
private respondent failed to establish that it had retrenched its security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private respondent
failed to accord due process to petitioner; that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees whose employment would
be terminated; that private respondent had not shown that petitioner and other employees in the security section were so inefficient so as to justify their
replacement by a security agency, or that "cost-saving devices [such as] secret video cameras (to monitor and prevent shoplifting) and secret code tags
on the merchandise” could not have been employed; instead, the day after petitioner’s dismissal, private respondent employed a safety and security
supervisor with duties and functions similar to those of petitioner.chanrobles.com : virtualaw library

Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter ordered: 6

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is hereby decreed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Finding the dismissal of the complainant to be illegal and concomitantly, Respondent is ordered to pay complainant full backwages without
qualification or deduction in the amount of P74,740.00 from the time of his dismissal until reinstatement (computed till promulgation only) based on his
monthly salary of P4,040.00/month at the time of his termination but limited to (3) three years;

(b) Ordering the Respondent to immediately reinstate the complainant to his former position as security section head or to a reasonably equivalent
supervisorial position in charges of security without loss of seniority rights, privileges and benefits. This order is immediately executory even pending
appeal;

(c) Ordering the Respondent to pay complainant unpaid wages in the amount of P2,020.73 and proportionate 13th month pay in the amount of
P3,198.30;

(d) Ordering the Respondent to pay complainant the amount of P7,995.91, representing 10% attorney’s fees based on the total judgment award of
P79,959.12.

All other claims of the complainant whether monetary or otherwise is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, in its resolution of March 30, 1994, reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered petitioner to
be given separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, unpaid salary, and proportionate 13th month pay. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.

The NLRC held that the phase-out of private respondent’s security section and the hiring of an independent security agency constituted an exercise by
private respondent of" [a] legitimate business decision whose wisdom we do not intend to inquire into and for which we cannot substitute our judgment" ;
that the distinction made by the Labor Arbiter between "retrenchment" and the employment of "cost-saving devices” under Art. 283 of the Labor Code
was insignificant because the company official who wrote the dismissal letter apparently used the term "retrenchment” in its "plain and ordinary sense: to
layoff or remove from one’s job, regardless of the reason therefor”; that the rule of "reasonable criteria” in the selection of the employees to be
retrenched did not apply because all positions in the security section had been abolished; and that the appointment of a safety and security supervisor
referred to by petitioner to prove bad faith on private respondent’s part was of no moment because the position had long been in existence and was
separate from petitioner’s position as head of the Security Checkers Section.

Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the following issue:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

IS THE HIRING OF AN INDEPENDENT SECURITY AGENCY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO REPLACE ITS CURRENT SECURITY SECTION
A VALID GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE EMPLOYEES CLASSED UNDER THE LATTER? 7

Petitioner contends that abolition of private respondent’s Security Checkers Section and the employment of an independent security agency do not fall
under any of the authorized causes for dismissal under Art. 283 of the Labor Code.

Petitioner Laid Off for Cause

Petitioner’s contention has no merit. Art. 283 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the establishment or undertaking unless
the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy,
the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or at least one-
half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole
year.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

In De Ocampo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 8 this Court upheld the termination of employment of three mechanics in a transportation
company and their replacement by a company rendering maintenance and repair services. It held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In contracting the services of Gemac Machineries, as part of the company’s cost-saving program, the services rendered by the mechanics became
redundant and superfluous, and therefore properly terminable. The company merely exercised its business judgment or management prerogative. And
in the absence of any proof that the management abused its discretion or acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the court will not interfere with the
exercise of such prerogative. 9

In Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 10 the Court likewise upheld the termination of employment of water pump
tenders and their replacement by independent contractors. It ruled that an employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not
necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to promote
economy and efficiency.

Indeed, as we pointed out in another case, the" [management of a company] cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy
by a study of what units are essential for its operation. To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel
or contracted to outside agencies . . . [While there] should be mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides." 11
Consequently, absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an
employer. 12

In the case at bar, we have only the bare assertion of petitioner that, in abolishing the security section, private respondent’s real purpose was to avoid
payment to the security checkers of the wage increases provided in the collective bargaining agreement approved in 1990. 13 Such an assertion is not a
sufficient basis for concluding that the termination of petitioner’s employment was not a bona fide decision of management to obtain reasonable return
from its investment, which is a right guaranteed to employers under the Constitution. 14 Indeed, that the phase-out of the security section constituted a
"legitimate business decision” is a factual finding of an administrative agency which must be accorded respect and even finality by this Court since
nothing can be found in the record which fairly detracts from such finding. 15

Accordingly, we hold that the termination of petitioner’s services was for an authorized cause, i.e., redundancy. Hence, pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor
Code, petitioner should be given separation pay at the rate of one month pay for every year of service.

Sanctions for Violations of

the Notice Requirementchanrobles.com.ph:red

Art. 283 also provides that to terminate the employment of an employee for any of the authorized causes the employer must serve "a written notice on
the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof.” In the case at bar, petitioner was
given a notice of termination on October 11, 1991. On the same day, his services were terminated. He was thus denied his right to be given written
notice before the termination of his employment, and the question is the appropriate sanction for the violation of petitioner’s right.

To be sure, this is not the first time this question has arisen. In Sebuguero v. NLRC, 16 workers in a garment factory were temporarily laid off due to the
cancellation of orders and a garment embargo. The Labor Arbiter found that the workers had been illegally dismissed and ordered the company to pay
separation pay and backwages. The NLRC, on the other hand, found that this was a case of retrenchment due to business losses and ordered the
payment of separation pay without backwages. This Court sustained the NLRC’s finding. However, as the company did not comply with the 30-day
written notice in Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the Court ordered the employer to pay the workers P2,000.00 each as indemnity.

The decision followed the ruling in several cases involving dismissals which, although based on any of the just causes under Art. 282, 17 were effected
without notice and hearing to the employee as required by the implementing rules. 18 As this Court said: "It is now settled that where the dismissal of
one employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the
twin requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the
requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process." 19

The rule reversed a long standing policy theretofore followed that even though the dismissal is based on a just cause or the termination of employment is
for an authorized cause, the dismissal or termination is illegal if effected without notice to the employee. The shift in doctrine took place in 1989 in
Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC. 20 In announcing the change, this Court said: 21

The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement to the service of an employee without loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during
the period of his separation until his actual reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years without qualification or deduction, when it appears he was not
afforded due process, although his dismissal was found to be for just and authorized cause in an appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, should be re-examined. It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who has
been shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the undeserving, if
not undesirable, remains in the service.

x x x

However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his
dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due process. Petitioner
committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus; it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an
investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment. Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the
private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of this award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by
the employer.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red

The fines imposed for violations of the notice requirement have varied from P1,000.00 22 to P2,000.00 23 to P5,000.00 24 to P10,000.00.25cralaw:red

Need for Reexamining the Wenphil Doctrine

Today, we once again consider the question of appropriate sanctions for violations of the notice requirement in light of our experience during the last
decade or so with the Wenphil doctrine. The number of cases involving dismissals without the requisite notice to the employee, although effected for just
or authorized causes, suggests that the imposition of fine for violation of the notice requirement has not been effective in deterring violations of the notice
requirement. Justice Panganiban finds the monetary sanctions "too insignificant, too niggardly, and sometimes even too late.” On the other hand, Justice
Puno says there has in effect been fostered a policy of "dismiss now, pay later” which moneyed employers find more convenient to comply with than the
requirement to serve a 30-day written notice (in the case of termination of employment for an authorized cause under Arts. 283-284) or to give notice
and hearing (in the case of dismissals for just causes under Art. 282).

For this reason, they regard any dismissal or layoff without the requisite notice to be null and void even though there are just or authorized causes for
such dismissal or layoff. Consequently, in their view, the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages.

Validity of Petitioner’s Layoff Not

Affected by Lack of Notice

We agree with our esteemed colleagues, Justices Puno and Panganiban, that we should rethink the sanction of fine for an employer’s disregard of the
notice requirement. We do not agree, however, that disregard of this requirement by an employer renders the dismissal or termination of employment
null and void. Such a stance is actually a reversion to the discredited pre-Wenphil rule of ordering an employee to be reinstated and paid backwages
when it is shown that he has not been given notice and hearing although his dismissal or layoff is later found to be for a just or authorized cause. Such
rule was abandoned in Wenphil because it is really unjust to require an employer to keep in his service one who is guilty, for example, of an attempt on
the life of the employer or the latter’s family, or when the employer is precisely retrenching in order to prevent losses.

The need is for a rule which, while recognizing the employee’s right to notice before he is dismissed or laid off, at the same time acknowledges the right
of the employer to dismiss for any of the just causes enumerated in Art. 282 or to terminate employment for any of the authorized causes mentioned in
Arts. 283-284. If the Wenphil rule imposing a fine on an employer who is found to have dismissed an employee for cause without prior notice is deemed
ineffective in deterring employer violations of the notice requirement, the remedy is not to declare the dismissal void if there are just or valid grounds for
such dismissal or if the termination is for an authorized cause. That would be to uphold the right of the employee but deny the right of the employer to
dismiss for cause. Rather, the remedy is to order the payment to the employee of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that
the dismissal was for a just cause. But, otherwise, his dismissal must be upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is because his dismissal is
ineffectual.

For the same reason, if an employee is laid off for any of the causes in Arts. 283-284, i.e., installation of a labor-saving device, but the employer did not
give him and the DOLE a 30-day written notice of termination in advance, then the termination of his employment should be considered ineffectual and
he should be paid backwages. However, the termination of his employment should not be considered void but he should simply be paid separation pay
as provided in Art. 283 in addition to backwages.

Justice Puno argues that an employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement constitutes a denial of the employee’s right to due process.
Prescinding from this premise, he quotes the statement of Chief Justice Concepcion in Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sengbengco 26 that "acts of
Congress, as well as of the Executive, can deny due process only under the pain of nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same flaw are
subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding.” Justice Puno concludes that the dismissal of an employee without
notice and hearing, even if for a just cause, as provided in Art. 282, or for an authorized cause, as provided in Arts. 283-284, is a nullity. Hence, even if
just or authorized causes exist, the employee should be reinstated with full back pay. On the other hand, Justice Panganiban quotes from the statement
in People v. Bocar 27 that" [w]here the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
Violation of Notice Requirement

Not a Denial of Due Process

The cases cited by both Justices Puno and Panganiban refer, however, to the denial of due process by the State, which is not the case here. There are
three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the
nullity of the employee’s dismissal or layoff.

The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power,
such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. This is plain from the text of Art. III, §1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . .” The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take the life, liberty, or property
of the individual. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered civilized
methods.

The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought to bear
upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of employment under Art. 283. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the
adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any
charge against him, for there is none.The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to
determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his employment.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

Even in cases of dismissal under Art. 282, the purpose for the requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. The time for notice and hearing is at the trial stage. Then that is the time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due
process. Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice requirement before he dismisses an employee does not foreclose the right of the latter to
question the legality of his dismissal. As Art. 277 (b) provides, "Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Indeed, to contend that the notice requirement in the Labor Code is an aspect of due process is to overlook the fact that Art. 283 had its origin in Art. 302
of the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1882 which gave either party to the employer-employee relationship the right to terminate their relationship by
giving notice to the other one month in advance. In lieu of notice, an employee could be laid off by paying him a mesada equivalent to his salary for one
month. 28 This provision was repealed by Art. 2270 of the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950. But on June 12, 1954, R.A. No. 1052,
otherwise known as the Termination Pay Law, was enacted reviving the mesada. On June 21, 1957, the law was amended by R.A. No. 1787 providing
for the giving of advance notice or the payment of compensation at the rate of one-half month for every year of service. 29

The Termination Pay Law was held not to be a substantive law but a regulatory measure, the purpose of which was to give the employer the opportunity
to find a replacement or substitute, and the employee the equal opportunity to look for another job or source of employment. Where the termination of
employment was for a just cause, no notice was required to be given to the employee. 30 It was only on September 4, 1981 that notice was required to
be given even where the dismissal or termination of an employee was for cause. This was made in the rules issued by the then Minister of Labor and
Employment to implement B.P. Blg. 130 which amended the Labor Code. And it was still much later when the notice requirement was embodied in the
law with the amendment of Art. 277(b) by R.A. No. 6715 on March 2, 1989. It cannot be that the former regime denied due process to the employee.
Otherwise, there should now likewise be a rule that, in case an employee leaves his job without cause and without prior notice to his employer, his act
should be void instead of simply making him liable for damages.

The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 can not be considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer cannot
really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. This is also the case in termination of employment for a just cause under Art. 282
(i.e., serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of the employer, gross and habitual neglect of duties, fraud or willful
breach of trust of the employer, commission of crime against the employer or the latter’s immediate family or duly authorized representatives, or other
analogous cases).

Justice Puno disputes this. He says that "statistics in the DOLE will prove that many cases have been won by employees before the grievance
committees manned by impartial judges of the company.” The grievance machinery is, however, different because it is established by agreement of the
employer and the employees and composed of representatives from both sides. That is why, in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of Appeals,
31 which Justice Puno cites, it was held that "Since the right of [an employee] to his labor is in itself a property and that the labor agreement between
him and [his employer] is the law between the parties, his summary and arbitrary dismissal amounted to deprivation of his property without due process
of law.” But here we are dealing with dismissals and layoffs by employers alone, without the intervention of any grievance machinery. Accordingly in
Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation, 32 although a professor was dismissed without a hearing by his university, his dismissal for having made
homosexual advances on a student was sustained, it appearing that in the NLRC, the employee was fully heard in his defense.

Lack of Notice Only Makes

Termination Ineffectual

Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process. Some are simply part of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to a party can be
exercised. Others are simply an application of the Justinian precept, embodied in the Civil Code, 33 to act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith toward one’s fellowmen. Such is the notice requirement in Arts. 282-283. The consequence of the failure either of the
employer or the employee to live up to this precept is to make him liable in damages, not to render his act (dismissal or resignation, as the case may be)
void. The measure of damages is the amount of wages the employee should have received were it not for the termination of his employment without
prior notice. If warranted, nominal and moral damages may also be awarded. ELC

We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a
denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely
ineffectual. It is similar to the failure to observe the provisions of Art. 1592, in relation to Art. 1191, of the Civil Code 34 in rescinding a contract for the
sale of immovable property. Under these provisions, while the power of a party to rescind a contract is implied in reciprocal obligations, nonetheless, in
cases involving the sale of immovable property, the vendor cannot exercise this power even though the vendee defaults in the payment of the price,
except by bringing an action in court or giving notice of rescission by means of a notarial demand. 35 Consequently, a notice of rescission given in the
letter of an attorney has no legal effect, and the vendee can make payment even after the due date since no valid notice of rescission has been given.
36
Indeed, under the Labor Code, only the absence of a just cause for the termination of employment can make the dismissal of an employee illegal. This is
clear from Art. 279 which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 37

Thus, only if the termination of employment is not for any of the causes provided by law is it illegal and, therefore, the employee should be reinstated and
paid backwages. To contend, as Justices Puno and Panganiban do, that even if the termination is for a just or authorized cause the employee
concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages would be to amend Art. 279 by adding another ground for considering a dismissal illegal. What is
more, it would ignore the fact that under Art. 285, if it is the employee who fails to give a written notice to the employer that he is leaving the service of
the latter, at least one month in advance, his failure to comply with the legal requirement does not result in making his resignation void but only in making
him liable for damages. 38 This disparity in legal treatment, which would result from the adoption of the theory of the minority cannot simply be explained
by invoking President Ramon Magsaysay’s motto that "he who has less in life should have more in law." That would be a misapplication of this noble
phrase originally from Professor Thomas Reed Powell of the Harvard Law School.

Justice Panganiban cites Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC, 39 in support of his view that an illegal dismissal results not only from want of legal cause but
also from the failure to observe "due process." The Pepsi-Cola case actually involved a dismissal for an alleged loss of trust and confidence which, as
found by the Court, was not proven. The dismissal was, therefore, illegal, not because there was a denial of due process, but because the dismissal was
without cause. The statement that the failure of management to comply with the notice requirement "taints the dismissal with illegality” was merely a
dictum thrown in as additional grounds for holding the dismissal to be illegal.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Given the nature of the violation, therefore, the appropriate sanction for the failure to give notice is the payment of backwages for the period when the
employee is considered not to have been effectively dismissed or his employment terminated. The sanction is not the payment alone of nominal
damages as Justice Vitug contends.

Unjust Results of Considering Dismissals/

Layoffs Without Prior Notice As Illegal

The refusal to look beyond the validity of the initial action taken by the employer to terminate employment either for an authorized or just cause can
result in an injustice to the employer. For not giving notice and hearing before dismissing an employee, who is otherwise guilty of, say, theft, or even of
an attempt against the life of the employer, an employer will be forced to keep in his employ such guilty employee. This is unjust.

It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary social economic force." 40 But so does it declare that it "recognizes the indispensable role of the
private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investment." 41 The Constitution bids the State to "afford full protection
to labor." 42 But it is equally true that "the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer."
43 And it is oppression to compel the employer to continue in employment one who is guilty or to force the employer to remain in operation when it is not
economically in his interest to do so.

In sum, we hold that if in proceedings for reinstatement under Art. 283, it is shown that the termination of employment was due to an authorized cause,
then the employee concerned should not be ordered reinstated even though there is failure to comply with the 30-day notice requirement. Instead, he
must be granted separation pay in accordance with Art. 283, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one month for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent
losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of
at least six months shall be considered one (1) whole year.

If the employee’s separation is without cause, instead of being given separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either case, whether he is reinstated or
only granted separation pay, he should be paid full backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days in advance.

On the other hand, with respect to dismissals for cause under Art. 282, if it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the just causes
mentioned in said Art 282, then, in accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid backwages from the time his
employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is
dismissed renders the termination of his employment without legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by ordering private respondent
Isetann Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, his unpaid salary, and his
proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time his employment was terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time the
decision herein becomes final. For this purpose, this case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for computation of the separation pay, backwages, and
other monetary awards to petitioner.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
AGABON VS NLRC
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum board and cornice installers from January 1992 to February 23,
1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was
decided in their favor by the Labor Arbiter. Riviera appealed to the NLRC contending just cause for the dismissal because
of petitioner’s abandonment of work. NLRC ruled there was just cause and petitioners were not entitled to backwages and
separation pay. The CA in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal because they have abandoned their work but
ordered the payment of money claims.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

RULING:
To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to
give the employee the right to be heard and to defend himself. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment. For a valid finding or abandonment, two factors are considered: failure to report for
work without a valid reason; and, a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more
intention to work.

Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the
dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became known as
the Wenphil Doctrine of the Belated Due process Rule.

Art 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not for any of the justifiable or authorized by law. Where the dismissal is
for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal but the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of
“dismiss now, pay later” which we sought to deter in Serrano ruling. The violation of employees’ rights warrants the
payment of nominal damages.
G.R. No. L-20479 February 6, 1925

YU CONG ENG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
W. TRINIDAD, Collector of Internal Revenue, ET AL., respondents.

Gabriel La O, Palma and Leuterio and Gibbs and McDonough for petitioners.
The City Fiscals Revilla, Guevara and Felix for respondents.

Facts
Act No. 2972 (An act to provide in what languages account books shall be kept, and to establish penalties for its violation), also
known as the “Chinese Bookkeeping Act,” was passed by the Philippine Legislature and approved in 1921. It provides:

 Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or
any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account books in any
language other than English, Spanish, or any local dialect.
 Section 2. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than ten
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the books of account of his lumber business in Chinese, as he cannot read, write nor
understand English, Spanish, or any local dialect. He was arrested for violating Act No. 2972, and his books were seized.

Trial was about to proceed when Yu Cong Eng and another petitioner Co Liam (on behalf of all other Chinese merchants in the
Philippines) filed a petition against the fiscal, the collector of internal revenue, and the presiding judge.

Arguments

 By the petitioner
 Even if he would employ a bookkeeper who could keep his books in English or Spanish, he would have no means
of verifying the correctness of the books. If he would employ a translator or interpreter, he might be at the mercy of his
employees if they might cheat and defraud him. According to the Act, he is prohibited from even keeping a duplicate set of
accounts in his own language and he will be compelled to remain in total ignorance of the status of his business.
 The enforcement of the Act would drive several Chinese merchants out of business (They do 60% of the business
in the country).
 The enforcement of the Act would deprive the Chinese merchants of their liberty and property without due
process of law, and deny them the equal protection of the laws.
 Under the treaty in force between US and China, petitioners are entitled to the same rights, privileges, and
immunities as the citizens and subjects of Great Britain and Spain.
 By the respondent
 The law is valid and necessary, and it is only the exercise of proper legislative power. Due to the inability of
internal revenue officials to check the books of the Chinese merchants, the treasury loses large sums of money corresponding to
taxes.
Pronouncements of the Philippine Court

 A literal translation of the Act makes it unlawful for any Chinese merchant to keep his account books in languages other
than those listed
 Another interpretation of the Act is that the Chinese merchant may keep his account books in Chinese, but he has to keep
another set of books in the prescribed languages
 A third construction is that the law only intended to require the keeping of such books to facilitate governmental
inspection of the same for tax purposes. However, the law does not specify what kinds of books shall be kept.
 The Act is not unconstitutional under the Court’s construction of the law. A literal interpretation would render it
unconstitutional, so the Court made a reasonable construction to preserve the law.
A writ of certiorari was filed before the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Philippine Supreme Court’s decision denying an original
petition for prohibition against the enforcement of criminal prosecution of Act No. 2972, on the ground of its invalidity.

Issues

 WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO

 WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES

Issue # 1
WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO

It is the duty of a court in considering the validity of an act to give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it
within the fundamental law. However, a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict with
constitutional limitation.

What the court did was to change a penal prohibitive law to a mandatory law of great indefiniteness to conform to what the court
assumes was, or ought to have been, the purpose of the legislature, and which in the change would avoid a conflict with
constitutional restriction. Such strained construction, in order to make a law conform to a constitutional limitation, cannot be
sustained.

“It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the
courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute
the judicial for the legislative department of the government.” (US v. Reese)

Issue # 2
WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES

The law is invalid because it deprives Chinese persons of their liberty and property without due process of law, and denies them
the equal protection of the laws.

Guarantees equivalent to the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment were extended to the PH; hence,
said guarantees are to be interpreted as meaning what the provisions meant at the time when Congress made them applicable to
the PH. (Serra v. Mortiga, citing Kepner v. US)

PH government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep records of their transactions. However, it is NOT
within the police power of the legislature to prohibit Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books in Chinese.

To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, 1) the interests of the public require such interference and 2)
the means are necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not oppressive upon individuals. The determination as to
what is a proper exercise of the legislature’s police power is subject to the courts’ supervision. (Lawton v. Steel)

We are likely thus to trespass on the provision of the Bill of Rights that the accused is entitled to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, and to violate the principle that a statute which requires the doing of an act so indefinitely described
that men must guess at its meaning violates due process of law.

Act No. 2972 deprives the Chinese merchants of something indispensable to the carrying on of their business, and is obviously
intended to affect them (as distinguished from the rest of the community) is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.

Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.

FACTS:

Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was interrupted
by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deed on ground
that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?

2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private
ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber, and mineral
lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
This means to say that, under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the
ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in
contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab
initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted
aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase "no land"
used in this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there
being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two
sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could
be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of
Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other
words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.

For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.

G.R. No. L-21163 May 17, 1972

PASCUAL LIBUDAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
JOSE L. PALMA GIL, oppositor-appellant.

G.R. No. L-25495 May 17, 1972

PASCUAL LIBUDAN, substituted by AWAD SAMAL, TAWANG SAMAL, INTOS SAMAL, DESTINO CORTES, TRINING CORTES & CAMAYAMA
PACAY, applicants-appellants,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE L. PALMA GIL, oppositors-appellees.

Mario E. Ongkiko for applicants-appellants.

M.B. Ruiz for oppositors-appellees.

ANTONIO, J.:p

From the orders of the Court of First Instance of Davao, dated September 10, 1962, in Land Registration case No. 281, denying the petition for review,
but granting the alternative petition for substitution, and ordering the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of the oppositors, heirs of Jose Palma
Gil, over 31,040 square meters of the 188,725 square meters of land involved in the proceedings, and the issuance of another decree in favor of the
applicants successors-in-interest of Pascual Libudan for the remainder, and that of October 27, 1962 denying applicants' motion for reconsideration, the
oppositors appealed directly to this Court on pure questions of law; 1 the applicants to the Court of Appeals insofar as the orders granted the alternative
petition for substitution.2 But the appellate Court certified the appeal to Us after it found that applicants raised only questions of law. 3 The dispositive
portion of the order of September 10, 1962 states:

WHEREFORE, the petition to review judgment is hereby denied, but the petition for substitution is granted.

The Commissioner of Land Registration shall issue the decree of registration for 31,040 square meters of the land subject matter of
this registration to the oppositors and another decree for the rest of the land to the successors-in-interest of Pascual Libudan.

The oppositors shall file a plan of the 31,040 square meters duly approved by the Director of Lands and shall pay the fees which the
Register of Deeds would collect in accordance with Section114 of this Act, as amended, if the instrument of conveyance had been
presented for registration in the office of the register of deeds after registration of the original certificate of title. 4

The cardinal questions raised by these two appeals are: (1) whether the facts alleged in oppositors' petition for review constitute fraud within the context
of Sec. 38, Act 496 to warrant the reopening and review of the Registration Court's final judgment which incidentally bears the imprimatur of affirmance
by the Appellate Court; and (2) whether the court a quo erred in granting without formal presentation of evidence but solely on the pleadings, the
alternative petition of the oppositors for substitution under Sec. 29, Act 496 with respect to the 31,040-square-meter portion of the land previously
adjudicated to applicants.

The factual setting stretches some 35 years back. On June 18, 1937, the late Pascual Libudan filed a petition for the registration of a 188,725-square-
meter land in Barrio Babac, Island of Samal, Davao, (described in Plan SWO, submitted as Exhibit A, in Registration Case 281), asserting title thereto by
inheritance from his late father, coupled with continuous, exclusive and notorious possession since time immemorial under a bona fide claim of
ownership.5 Jose Palma Gil claiming that he purchased the entire land from one Mangob (Samal), opposed the petition. 6 But later, or on August 3, 1939,
the oppositor amended his opposition by reducing his claim to only 15 hectares, delimited within points 1 to 4, 7 to 17 and 1 of the plan. 7

Three months after he filed his amended opposition in the registration case, Jose Palma Gil sought in Civil Case No. 204 before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Samal, the ejectment of Libudan from the 15-hectare area claimed by the former in the registration case. Judgment was rendered by the Justice
of the Peace Court on December 18, 1939 ordering Libudan (and his agents) to vacate the premises, restore the possession to Jose Palma Gil and pay
him P320 for the value of the products taken thereform plus P100 as damages for the illegal occupation. 8

Nine months thereafter, or on September 7, 1940, the Davao Land Registration Court rendered judgment confirming the title of Jose Palma Gil over the
15-hectare portion of the land, and awarding the remainder thereof or the 31,040-square-meter portion to Libudan.9

Libudan appealed to the Court of Appeals.

During the pendency of the appeal, the Sheriff of Davao, to satisfy the alias writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 204 (the judgment having already
become final) levied upon the 31,040-square-meter portion previously adjudicated to Libudan by the Registration Court, and on December 27, 1940,
sold it at public auction to Jose Palma Gil.10 Failure of Libudan to redeem the property within the one year statutory period resulted in the execution of
the final deed of sale, followed by the delivery of the possession of the property to Jose Palma Gil. The deed of consolidation was registered in the
Davao Registry of Deeds under entry No. 1297 on January 3, 1944. 11

Meanwhile during the Second World War, the records of the land registration case pending with the Court of Appeals were destroyed, and, as said Court
failed to reconstitute them, the case was remanded to the lower court for new trial on October 21, 1951.12
It is not clear from the records when the new trial in the registration case began. But in the interim, on February 21, 1950, the Administratrix of the estate
of Jose Palma Gil commenced, before the Davao Court of First Instance against Palinkud Samal (widow and successor-in-interest of the deceased
Pascual Libudan), and four others, an action for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the parcel of land located in Babac, Samal, Davao,
with an area of 31,040 square meters, which land was previously conveyed by the Davao Sheriff to Jose Palma Gil. It was therein alleged that after the
death of Palma Gil in December, 1944, the defendants, taking advantage of the chaotic conditions obtaining, illegally entered the land in question. This
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 458.

The Davao Court of First Instance dismissed the case on the procedural technicality: that the action should have been instituted against the judicial
administrator of the estate of the deceased Libudan. But on appeal, the Court of Appeals, reversed, after finding that "... the land ordered registered and
title issued in the name of the late Pascual Libudan in Registration Case No. 281, G.L.R.O. Record No. 51986 ... is the same as that described in the
complaint as well as in the certificate of sale issued in Civil Case No. 204."13

Not satisfied with this decision, Palinkud Samal appealed to Us, but we sustained the Court of Appeals. The pertinent findings of this Court are quoted
below for a more comprehensive overview of this case:

On February 21, 1950, Gregoria Vda. de Palma Gil, as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Jose L. Palma Gil, later
substituted by Emilio Palma Gil, as administrator of the same estate, commenced the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Davao to recover possession and ownership of a parcel of land located in Babac, Samal, Davao, with an area of 31,040 square
meters, against Palinkud Samal, widow of Pascual Libudan and four other defendants ...

In Civil Case No. 204 entitled "Jose Palma Gil vs. Pascual Libudan, et al." of the Justice of the Peace Court of Samal, to satisfy the
judgment obtained by plaintiff Palma Gil, the parcel of land in question was sold at public auction by the Acting Provincial Sheriff of
Davao to plaintiff Palma Gil himself on December 27, 1940. The land was supposedly the property of Pascual Libudan one of the
defendants in the said case. Becauseof his failure to redeem the property the Sheriff issued the final deed of sale in favor of Jose
Palma Gil sometime in December 1943, and posession thereof was delivered to him through his representative, said final deed of
sale being recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Davao. Palma Gil died in December 1944, and the herein defendants
taking advantage of his death and of the chaotic conditions therein obtaining just after the last Pacific war, illegally entered the land
in question and gathered the coconut fruits therein. Pascual Libudan died in 1946.

At the trial, the defense tried to prove that the land in question was covered by two free patent applications approved by the Director
of Lands way back in 1934 in favor of Pascual Libudan and one Estanislao Malise (Samal). The trouble according to the Court of
Appeals is that the defense did not present any oral evidence to identify the land said to be covered by said two free patent
applications to establish their relation, if any, to the land in question. The Court of Appeals further found that as a result of the
application for registration filed by Pascual Libudan in Registration Case No. 281, G.L.R.O. Receipt No. 51986, the Court of First
Instance of Davao in an order dated September 7, 1940, decreed the registration and issuance of a title in the name of said Pascual
Libudan over a parcel of land, which judging from the boundary owners indicated in the Surveyor's Plan, is the same parcel now in
litigation; that although as already stated, this land was sold to Jose Palma Gil by the Acting Provincial Sheriff in the execution sale
in 1940, and the final sale was issued to him in 1943, followed by the delivery of possession. Pascual Libudan up to his death in
1946, did not contest the regularity or validity of the execution sale nor his heirs do so up to the filing of the complaint in this case.
From all this, it is clear that regardless of the claims of the defense that Pascual Libudan and Estanislao Malise (Samal) had filed
free patent applications later approved by the Director of Lands in 1934, the fact is that the land in question was decreed and
registered in the name of Pascual Libudan in the Court of First Instance of Davao in September 1940, and it was sold in December
of the same year as his property by the Acting Provincial Sheriff to Jose Palma Gil, the final certificate of sale having been issued in
1943, followed by the delivery of possession to Jose Palma Gil. It is also clear that the defendants herein, particularly Palinkud
Samal, had no right to enter the land in 1945 because all rights and interest thereto of Pascual Libudan had been legally transferred
to Jose Palma Gil.14

Two years before the aforequoted decision of the Supreme Court was promulgated, or on May 29, 1954, the Davao Registration Court, after holding a
new trial in G.L.R.O. 281, adjudicated to Pascual Libudan's heirs, the entire parcel of land applied for (18.8725 heactares), thus:

POR TANTO, el Juzgado decreta el registro y titulacion del terreno descrito en el plano-SWO (Exh. "A"), con todas las mejoras y
edificaciones existentes dentro del mismo, a nombre de los herederos del finado Pascual Libudan alias Libudan (Samal), residentes
en Babac, Davao. (Record on Appeal in C.A. G.R. No.14628, p. 58). 15

The Registration Court rejected the claim of oppositor Jose Palma Gil that the property claimed by him is part of the land he bought from Mongob. Thus:

A la luz de los hechos obrantes en autos el Juzgado opina y asi declara, que el terreno objeto de esta solicitud no es parte del
terreno adquirido en compra de Mangob por el oppositor; que Libudan adquirio esta terreno en concepto de herencia de su finado
padre; que su possesion del terreno, unida a la de sus predecesores data desde tiempo inmemorial, de manera publica, abierta, en
concepto de due_¤_o, y adversa contra toda reclamacion; ... (Emphasis supplied) (Record on Appeal, L-21163, p. 4)

This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated on May 6, 1961, or five years after the Supreme Court confirmed Jose Palma Gil's
ownership over the 31,040-square-meter portion of the land in controversy.

Parenthetically, on July 25, 1958, or during the pendency in the Court of Appeals of the registration case, Awad Samal, Tawang Samal, Intos Samal,
Trining Cortes and Camayama Pacay, representing themselves to be the heirs of Pascual Libudan, were substituted as applicants.16

On December 6, 1961, or seven months after the affirmance by the Appellate Court of the judgment in the registration case, the substituted applicants
filed two motions in the court below: one, for issuance of a registration decree; and, two, for a writ of execution. 17 But before the Court could act on
those motions, the heirs of Jose Palma Gil filed a "Petition to Review Judgment and/or Substitution", dated Janaury 5, 1962, and later amended on
February 27, 1962.18
The first of the alternative remedies, i.e., review of judgment is based on alleged fraud and deceit recited as follows:

(1) The applicant Pascual Libudan, while working as a mere laborer for the oppositor Jose Palma Gil on the subject parcel of land,
surreptitiously with abuse of confidence of the latter who was then studying in Manila, procured the survey thereof in his own name
way back in 1915 or 1916, and to hide the fact of survey from the real owner, the oppositor Jose L. Palma Gil, falsely placed the
adjoining owner on the northern periphery of the said property as one Placida Quiñes, knowing fully well that the adjoining property
on the north was (Still) the property of the oppositor Jose L. Palma Gil, of which the subject parcel of land is a part;

(2) At the new trial decreed by the Court of Appeals, supra, the herein applicant and his successor-in-interest, Palinkud Samal,
fabricated an entirely new Tax Declaration No. L-048, showing a greater area and improvements than the original Tax Declaration
No. 1003, attached to the application in a determined effort to counteract the finding of this Court in its original decision dated
September 7, 1940 that the property of the applicant actually contained only 3 hectares, 10 acres and 40 centanares as declared in
the earlier tax declaration;

(3) The applicant Pascual Libudan and the present substituted applicants fraudulently based their claim of ownership on an alleged
continuous and uninterrupted possession from time immemorial, when in truth and in fact, neither the applicant nor his alleged
successor-in-interest have been in possession thereof. The indubitable proof of the applicant's prevarication is that motion filed by
the applicant's counsel, dated December 6, 1961, supra for the issuance of a writ of possession for the subject parcel of land.

(4) The present substituted applicants named Awad Samal, Tawang Samal, Intos Samal, Trining Cortes and Camayama Pacay, in
connivance with one another fraudulently, and willfully misrepresented themselves before the Court of Appeals on July 25, 1958 as
the legal heirs of Pascual Libudan when in fact they are not; neither do they have any interest in the land subject of this registration.

The second alternative remedy — for substitution — is premised on the allegation that petitioner's predecessor Jose Palma Gil, acquired at the Sheriff's
public auction sale of December 7, 1940, all the rights, title, and interests of Libudan over the parcel of land applied for in the registration proceedings
and that this right of ownership was confirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court.

Pascual Libudan's heirs, on March 3, 1962, moved to dismiss the petition for review and/or substitution on the grounds that (1) the Petition for Review is
not based on actual fraud; (2) the judgment of the Land Registration Court rendered on May 29, 1954, adjudicating the land to Libudan antedated the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. 458 (CA-G.R. No. 10978-R) and, therefore,the matter was already res adjudicata, when the appellate
Court rendered its decision in the latter case; and (3) the petitioners are now estopped from claiming ownership over a portion of the land in question on
a ground different from that alleged previously in the opposition of Jose Palma Gil, their predecessor-in-interest's application.

After a pre-trial conference, the trial court decided first to resolve the oppositor's Petition for Review and/or Substitution before ruling on the applicants'
motions for issuance of registration decree and for writ of possession.19

We affirm the appealed order.

I. We resort to the law. The pertinent portion of Section 38 of Act 496, reads:

Sec. 38. ... Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decree; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land
or of any state or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition
for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. ..."

The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree, therefore, are: (1) that the petitioner has real or dominical right;20 (2) that
he has been deprived thereof; (3) through fraud;21 (4) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; 22 and (5) that the property
has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. 23

The purpose of the law in giving aggrieved parties, deprived of land or any interest therein, through fraud in the registration proceedings, the opportunity
to review the decree is to insure fair and honest dealing in the registration of land. But the action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud, would
be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral24 and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.25 Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme
executed by a prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party
is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such
as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony,which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just detemination of
the case."26

Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested
when in fact they are;27 or in applying for and obtaining adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows had not been
alloted to him in the partition;28 or in intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with the land inspector to include in the survey plan the bed of a
navigable stream;29 or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims;30 or in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice;31 or in
inducing him not to oppose an application;32 or in misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to
withdraw his opposition.33 In all these examples the over-riding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court or from presenting his case.34 The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court. 35

The reason for the rule is to put an end to litigations.

 ... In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing party could attack the judgment at any time by attributing imaginary falseshood to his
adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that judicial determination however erroneous of matters brought within the court's
jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in another proceeding. It is the business of a party to meet and repel his opponent's perjured
evidence.36

The averments in the petition for review (a) that the applicant Libudan, while working as mere laborer on the land of Palma Gil, surreptitiously procured
its survey in his own name in 1915 or 1916, (b) that at the trial, the applicant and his successor-in-interest, Palinkud Samal, submitted a fabricated new
tax declaration No. L-048, showing a greater area and improvement than that shown in the original tax declaration No. 1003, attached to the application,
to counteract the finding of the Land Registration Court in its original decision of September 14, 1940, that the property of the applicant actually
contained only 3 hectares, 10 ares and 40 centares, as declared in the earlier tax declaration, or (c) that neither the applicant nor his alleged
successors-in-interest have ever been in actual possession of the property in question since time immemorial, do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Neither is
the act of the substituted applicants of allegedly representing themselves as the true heirs of Pascual Libudan when in fact they are not, the fraud
envisaged by Sec. 38 of Act 496, as would warrant the reopening of the decree.

We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, 37 is intrinsic and
not collateral, 38 and has been controverted and decided.39 Thus we have underscored the denial of relief where it appears that the fraud consisted in the
presentation at the trial of a supposed forged document, 40 or a false and perjured testimony;41 or in basing the judgment on a fraudulent compromise
agreement ;42 or in the alleged fraudulent acts or omission of the counsel which prevented the petitioner from properly presenting the case.43

II. This brings us to the issue of substitution.

a. Applicants would find fault in the trial court's finding that the 31,040-square-meter lot purchased by Jose Palma Gil in the sheriff's sale on December
27, 1940, forms part of the 18.8725-hectare land applied for by, and adjudicated to the heirs of Pascual Libudan by final judgment of the court in the
registration proceedings, when no formal hearing and presentation of witnesses or submission of evidence was conducted in connection with the petition
for review and/or for substitution, and the factual finding based solely on the pleadings. It is applicants' posture, that the trial court's reliance on the
annexes to the petition for review and/or for substitution as basis of its factual findings is a reversible error, such annexes not having been formally
offered in evidence in accordance with Section 72, Rule 123 (now Rule 132, Sec. 35).

One cannot, of course, quarrel over the need for a formal offer of evidence, the purpose of which is to inform the court about what is expected to be
proved and "to preserve exceptions to the conclusion of the offered evidence." 44 Moreover, the judge has to build his factual findings and his judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.45 Hence, documents that form no part of the proofs before the court will not be
considered in disposing of issues before it.46

But that does not dispose of the question. For it should be noted that a pre-trial was held, and as a result thereof the trial court issued an order on July
28, 1962, granting the parties 20 days to file their respective memoranda, "after which the petition will be considered submitted for resolution."47 the
applicants concede that "the findings of fact of the Court as contained" in its order are not based "merely on the allegations of the appellants' petition for
review of judgment but on the set of facts brought out during the pre-trial." 48 Moreover, the applicants in their motion to dismiss did not deny the
oppositors' allegations on the identity of the land or of the fact that the land (the registration and issuance of title of which was decreed in favor of
Pascual Libudan by the Davao Registration Court in G.L.R.O. No.51986) was subsequently sold at a Sheriff's sale on December 27, 1940 to Jose Palma
Gil, and his title thereon confirmed by this Court. As a matter of fact, in their motion for reconsideration, dated October 18, 1962, applicants admitted that
"the 31,040 square meters, subject-matter of Civil Case 458, is part of the land applied for in the present registration proceedings ..."49 Admission by
parties in the pleading do not require proof and cannot be contradicted. 50

Aside from applicant's judicial admission, we have this Court's decision in Palinkud Samal vs. Court of Appeals. 51 There, we sustained Jose Palma's
ownership over the 31,040-square meter lot sold to him in 1940 at a public auction by the Sheriff of Davao to satisfy the judgment in his favor in Civil
Case No. 204. Referring to the identity of the land, We said:

... The Court of Appeals further found that a result of the application for registration filed by Pascual Libudan in Registration Case
No. 281, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 51986, the Court of First Instance of Davao in an order dated September 7, 1940, decreed the
registration and issuance of a title in the name of said Pascual Libudan over a parcel of land, which judging from the boundary
owners indicated in the Surveyor's plan, is the same parcel now in the litigation that although as already stated, this land was sold to
Palma Gil by the Acting Provincial Sheriff in the execution sale in 1940, and the final sale was issued to him in 1943, followed by
delivery of possession, Pascual Libudan up to his death in 1946, did not contest the regulairty or validity of the execution sale nor
did his heirs do so up to the filing of the complaint in this case. 52

This Court's finding in the Samal case that the 3-hectare land, the title of which was decreed to Libudan on Spetember 7, 1940, by the Court of First
Instance of Davao in Registration Case No. 281, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 51986, "is the same parcel now in litigation" or the same land involved in Civil Case
No. 458 has therefore judicially settled the question. We cannot now disregard this finding. This is the law of the case. 53 As previously held by Us, the
"law of the case does not apply solely to what is embodied in our decision but to its implementation carried out in fealty to what has been by Us
decreed."54

b. Applicants assail the lower court's reliance on Section 29, Act 496, in issuing the order of substitution on the theory that said section applies only to
voluntary dealings. To draw from the language of the statute the facile interpretation that it refers only to voluntary dealings, is to encase its application in
a semantic strait jacket. The use of the phrase "may be dealt with ... as if no application has been made" could not be construed to exclude from its
statutory context involuntary dealings of property for it makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary transacrions. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec
nos distinguire debemos, is a well known maxim in statutory construction.55

c. Applicants further insist that (1) the judgment of the Davao Land Registration Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 14628-R)
adjudicating the entire parcel of land to the heirs of deceased Pascual Libudan is res judicata on the question of title over the 31,040-square-meter
portion thereof; and (2) the decision rendered by the Court in Civil Case No. 458 on the reliance of which the order of substitution was granted, is null
and void, because the Land registration court having previously acquired jurisdiction over the res retained it, and had the sole and exclusive authority to
determine the question of title of the parties over the land involved to the exclusion of the other courts.
(1) Applicants' reliance on the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment is misplaced. At the time of the institution of Civil Case No. 458 on
February 21, 1950, there was yet no final judgment in the land registration case. On the contrary when the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 10978-R,
confirmed the oppositors' title and right of possession over the 3-hectatre land, which decision was affirmed by this Court in L-8579, on May 25, 1956,
the decision of the Davao Land Registration Court of May 29, 1954, was still pending in the Court of Appeals. As a matter of fact the Court of Appeals
only affirmed the Davao Land Registration Court's decision on May 6, 1961 or about four years after this Court's decision in L-8579 was published in the
Official Gazette (53 O.G. No. 3, February 15, 1957, p. 682). The doctrine of res judicata is predicated upon the existence of a prior final and conclusive
judgment over the same subject matter, cause of action and parties, at the time the second action is lifted. 56

Considering that the final jdgment of this Court confirming Jose Palma Gil's ownership over the 3-hectare lot antedated by five years the decision of the
Court of Appeals adjudicating the entire land to the successors-in-interest of Libudan, the effects of res judicata should be applied, if at all, in favor of the
oppositors and against the applicants. For undoubtedly a prior decision in a civil case may constitute as res judicata in a land registration
proceedings. 57 And again, "[i]t is the first judgment for the same cause of action that constitutes the effective defense without regard to the order of time
in which the suits were commenced or that they were both pending at the same time." 58

(2) We cannot, in absolute fidelity to our trust, accord our stamp of approval to the belated attempt of applicants to question the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Davao in Civil Case No. 458. Having voluntarily submitted their cause to said Court, they can not later on, after receiving an adverse
verdict, now question its jurisdcition or authority.59 The doctrine of estoppel by laches bars them now from raising the question. 60 Moreover, the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Insatance over the subject matter in Civil Case No. 458 cannot be seriously disputed. 61

d. On the claim of oppositors that they should be substituted to the entire 18-hectare land and not only to the 3-hectare portion thereof, 62 such claim,
involving as it does factual questions, is deemed foreclosed, oppositors having directly appealed to this Court on pure questions of law. 63

ACCORDINGLY, the orders of the court a quo, dated September 10, 1962 and October 27, 1962, are hereby affirmed. Without costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-16478 August 31, 1961
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MODESTO MALABANAN Y ARANDIA defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff- appellee.

Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for defendant-appellant.

RESOLUTION

BARRERA, J.:

Appellant Modesto Malabanan was charged in the Court of First Instance of Laguna (in Crim. Case No. B-108) with the crime of "double serious physical
injuries with damage to property thru reckless imprudence," under the following information:

That on or about January 20, 1957, in the Municipality of Biñan Province of Laguna, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused abovenamed, being then the driver and person in charge of a BTCO Bus No. 302 bearing Plate No. TPU-12502
(Batangas '56), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, recklessly and imprudently manage, operate and drive said vehicle while passing along the
National Highway within the said municipality in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and in
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law, and without taking the necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons and damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence, said truck being driven and operated by the herein accused, to hump strike and collide with a jeepney
bearing Plate No. TPU-4975 (Manila '56) thereby causing serious physical injuries to its driver, Prodito Rufon y Goyo and his lone passenger Honorato
Villarico which will require medical attendance for a period of at least ten 10 months and will incapacitate them to perform their customary labor for the
same period of time, and causing dam ages to the last named jeepney in the amount of P3,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of Januaria
Tanchingco, owner of said jeepney in the aforementioned sum of P3,000.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. The case was then tried and, while the prosecution was presenting its first witness, the injured parties
(Honorato Villarico and Prodito Rufon) reserved their right to file separate civil actions for damages arising from the criminal act. After trial, appellant was
found guilty as charged and sentenced as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds that the guilt of Modesto Malabanan of the complex crime of double serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence has been proven beyond reasonable doubt and there being present no modifying circumstances in the commission
thereof, the accused in accordance with the provisions of Article 365 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby sentenced to pay a
fine of P8,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency but not to exceed six (6) months, and to pay the costs. No pronouncement is herein
made regarding the civil liability of the accused for the reason that the offended parties reserved their right to file separate civil actions.

Dissatisfied with said judgment of the trial court, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, presenting factual and legal questions, but said court, on
October 31, 1959, elevated the case to us, on the ground that the appeal raises this legal issue. "The trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the offense charged in the information." chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense at bar, citing as authority the case of Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R.
No. L-6382, prom. March 30, 1954). It is urged that inasmuch as the crime with which appellant was charged is the complex crime of multiple serious
physical injuries with damages to property thru reckless imprudence, punishable pursuant to Article 48, of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article
365 of the same Code, with the penalty for the more serious offense to be imposed in its maximum period, he could only be properly tried by the Justice
of the Peace Court of Biñan Laguna, instead of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, for the reason that of the two resulting offenses in said complex
crime, namely, multiple serious physical injuries and damages to property, the former is graver or more serious than the latter; and, since said offense of
multiple serious physical injuries is punishable with a prison term of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, (a prison term the maximum of
which does not exceed 6 months), it is the justice of the peace court (pursuant to Sec. 87 [b] of the Judiciary Act)1 which has jurisdiction over the
offense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is true that, following the ruling of this Court in the case of Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-6382, March 30, 1954 (40 O.G. 18 Supp.). in
imposing the corresponding penalty, to the quasi-offense of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries and damage to property, Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code should be applied. However, there may be cases, as the one at bar, where the imposable penalty for the physical injuries charged
would come within the jurisdiction of the municipal or justice of the peace court, while the fine, for the damage to property would fall on the Court of First
Instance. As the information can not be split into two, one for damages and another for the physical injuries, the jurisdiction of the court to take
cognizance of the case must be determined not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged but by the fine imposable for the damage
to property resulting from the reckless imprudence. (Angeles, etc., v. Jose, et al. G.R. No. L-6494, Nov. 24, 1954). The reason for this rule was given in
the recent case of People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-15014, promulgated April 29, 1961, when this Court said:

Considering that it is the court of first instance that would undoubtedly have jurisdiction if the only offense that resulted from appellant's imprudence were
the damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00, it would be absurd to hold that for the graver offense of serious and less serious physical injuries
combined with damage to property through reckless imprudence, jurisdiction would lie in the justice of the peace court. The presumption is against
absurdity, and it is the duty of the courts to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd results......chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Moreover, we cannot discard the possibility that the prosecution may not be able to prove all the supposed offenses constituting the complex crime
charged. Where we to hold that it is the justice of the peace court that has jurisdiction in this case, if later the prosecution should fail to prove the physical
injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00, the inferior court would find itself without jurisdiction to
impose the fine for the damage to property committed, since such fine can not be less than the amount of the damage. Again, it is to avoid this further
absurdity that we must hold that the jurisdiction lies in the court of first instance in this case. (Emphasis supplied.)
We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly took cognizance of this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Considering that the jurisdictional issue raised by appellant is already a settled matter since the promulgation in 1954 of our decision in the case of
Angeles v. Jose, (supra), and, consequently, unsubstantial as to bring his appeal within our appellate jurisdiction (See People v. Cuello, G.R. No. L-
14307, prom. March 27, 1961) and that the review of the decision of the trial court in question would require a determination or revision of the factual
findings of the trial court, as disclosed in Errors Nos. II to VI (See Appellant's Brief)2 assigned by appellant, we are constrained to remand the case to the
Court of Appeals for determination and disposition, in accordance with law. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Parades, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. L-6379 September 29, 1954

In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be admitted a citizen of the Philippine. WILFRED
UYTENGSU, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Manuel A. Zosa for appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellant.

Facts:

This is an appeal taken by the Solicitor General from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, granting the application of
Wilfred Uytengsu, for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines.

Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927. He began his primary education
at the Saint Theresa's College in said municipality. Subsequently, he attended the Little Flower of Jesus Academy, then the San Carlos
College and, still later the Siliman University — all in the same locality — where he completed the secondary course.

Early in 1946, he studied, for one semester, in the Mapua Institute of Technology, in Manila. Soon after, he went to the United States,
where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California, and was graduated, in 1950, with the
degree of Bachelor of Science.

In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation.

On July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a post-
graduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He finished this course in July
1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the hearing of the case, originally scheduled to take place on
July 12, 1951, had to be postponed on motion of counsel for the petitioner.

Issue:

whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted?

ISSUE + RULING: Whether petitioner complied with the requirements of Sec. 7, CA 473

NO. Residence and domicile are not to be held synonymous. Residence is an act. Domicile is an act coupled with an intent. A man may
have a residence in one state or country and his domicile in another, and he may be a nonresident of the date of his domicile in the sense
that his place of actual residence is not there. Hence the great weight of authorities. — rightly so, as we think — that a debtor, although
his legal domicile is in the state, may reside or remain out of it for so long a time and under such circumstances as to acquire so to speak,
an actual nonresidence within the meaning of the attachment statute.

The question of domicile is not involved in determining whether a person is a resident of a state or country. The compatability of domicile
in one state with actual residence in another has been asserted and acted upon in the law of attachment by the Courts of New York, New
Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, Mississippi and Wisconsin.

In this case, the Government has not had any chance whatsoever to thus keep a watchful eye on petitioner herein. Immediately after the
filing of his application — and notwithstanding the explicit promise therein made by him, under oath, to the effect that he would reside
continuously in the Philippines "from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship" — he
returned to the United States, where he stayed, continuously, until October 13, 1951. For this reason, when this case was called for
hearing, for the first time, on July 12, 1951, his counsel had to move for continuance.

Moreover, considering that petitioner had stayed in the United States, practically without interruption, from early in 1947 to late in 1951,
or for almost five (5) years, over three years and a half of which preceded the filing of the application, it may be said that he resided —
as distinguished from domiciled — in the United States at that time and for over a year subsequently thereto.

the length of petitioner's habitation in the United States amply justifies the conclusion that he was residing abroad when his application
for naturalization was filed and for fifteen (15) months thereafter, and that this is precisely the situation sought to be forestalled by the law

It should be noted that to become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization, one must reside therein for not less than 10 years, except in some special cases, in
which 5 years of residence is sufficient (sections 2 and 3, Commonwealth Act No. 473). Pursuant to the provision above quoted, he must, also, file an application
stating therein, among other things, that he "has the qualifications required" by law. Inasmuch as these qualifications include the residence requirement already
referred to, it follows that the applicant must prove that he is a residence of the Philippines at the time, not only of the filing of the application, but, also, of its
hearing. If the residence thus required is the actual or constructive permanent home, otherwise known as legal residence or domicile, then the applicant must be
domiciled in the Philippines on both dates. Consequently, when section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 imposes upon the applicant the duty to state in his sworn
application "that he will reside continuously in the Philippines" in the intervening period, it can not refer merely to the need of an uninterrupted domicile or legal
residence, irrespective of actual residence, for said legal residence or domicile is obligatory under the law, even in the absence of the requirement contained in
said clause, and, it is well settled that, whenever possible, a legal provision must not be so construed as to be a useless surplusage, and, accordingly,
meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon. This consequences may be avoided only by construing the clause
in question as demanding actual residence in the Philippines from the filing of the petition for naturalization to its determination by the court.

Indeed, although the words "residence" and "domicile" are often used interchangeably, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different from that
of the other.

Residence and domicile are not to be held synonymous. Residence is an act. Domicile is an act coupled with an intent. A man may have a residence in one state
or country and his domicile in another, and he may be a nonresident of the date of his domicile in the sense that his place of actual residence is not there. Hence
the great weight of authorities. — rightly so, as we think — that a debtor, although his legal domicile is in the state, may reside or remain out of it for so long a time
and under such circumstances as to acquire so to speak, an actual nonresidence within the meaning of the attachment statute.

Domicile is a much broader term than residence. A man may have his domicile in one state and actually reside in another, or in a foreign country. If he has once
had a residence in a particular place and removed to another, but with the intention of returning after a certain time, however long that may be, his domicile is at
the former residence and his residence at the place of his temporary habitation. Residence and habitation are generally regarded as synonymous. A resident and
an inhabitant mean the same thing. A person resident is defined to be one "dwelling and having his abode in any place," "an inhabitant," "one that resides in a
place." The question of domicile is not involved in determining whether a person is a resident of a state or country. The compatability of domicile in one state with
actual residence in another has been asserted and acted upon in the law of attachment by the Courts of New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina,
Mississippi and Wisconsin.

Residence indicates permanency of occupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or temporary occupation. It does not include as much as domicile, which
requires intention combined with residence." ... "one may seek a place for purposes of pleasure, of business, or of health. If his intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent be to leave as soon as his purpose is accomplished, it is his residence."

The derivation of the two words "residence" and "domicile" fairly illustrates the distinction in their meaning. A home (domus) is something more than a temporary
place of remaining (residendi) however long such stay may continue.

"While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing, residence combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an
established abode, fixed permanently for a time [!] for business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent, existing all the while, to
return to the true domicile."

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another."
"Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means necessarily
as, since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. (Kennan on Residence and Domicile, pp. 26, 31-35)

In the case at bar, the Government has not had any chance whatsoever to thus keep a watchful eye on petitioner herein. Immediately after the filing of his
application — and notwithstanding the explicit promise therein made by him, under oath, to the effect that he would reside continuously in the Philippines "from the
date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship" — he returned to the United States, where he stayed, continuously, until
October 13, 1951. For this reason, when this case was called for hearing, for the first time, on July 12, 1951, his counsel had to move for continuance. The
adverse effect of such absence upon the opportunity needed by the Government to observe petitioner herein was enhanced by the fact that, having been born in
the Philippines, where he finished his primary and secondary education, petitioner did not have to file, and did not file, a declaration of intention prior to the filing of
his petition for naturalization. Thus, the Government had no previous notice of his intention to apply for naturalization until the filing of his petition and could not
make the requisite investigation prior thereto.

Moreover, considering that petitioner had stayed in the United States, practically without interruption, from early in 1947 to late in 1951, or for almost five (5) years,
over three years and a half of which preceded the filing of the application, it may be said that he resided — as distinguished from domiciled — in the United States
at that time and for over a year subsequently thereto. In fact, under our laws, residence for six (6) months suffices to entitle a person to exercise the right of
suffrage in a given municipality (section 98), Republic Act No. 180); residence for one (1) year, to run for a seat in the House of Representatives (sec. 7, Art. VI, of
the Constitution); and residence for two (2) years, to run for the Senate (sec. 4, Art. VI, of the Constitution). In some states of the United States, a residence of
several weeks or months is enough to establish a domicile for purposes of divorce. Although in these cases the word "residence" has been construed, generally, to
mean "domicile" — that it to say, actual residence, coupled with the intention to stay permanently, at least at the time of the acquisition of said domicile — it would
seem apparent from the foregoing that the length of petitioner's habitation in the United States amply justifies the conclusion that he was residing abroad when his
application for naturalization was filed and for fifteen (15) months thereafter, and that this is precisely the situation sought to be forestalled by the law in enjoining
the applicant to "reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship," unless this
legal mandate — which did not exist under Act No. 2927, and was advisedly inserted, therefore, by section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 — were to be
regarded as pure verbiage, devoid, not only, of any force or effect, but, also, of any intent or purpose, as it would, to our mind, turn out to be, were we to adopt
petitioner's pretense.1âwphïl.nêt

In short, we are of the opinion that petitioner herein has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the
aforementioned promise made by him in his application, and, accordingly, is not entitled, in the present proceedings, to a judgment in his favor. Wherefore, the
decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the case dismissed, with costs against the petitioner, but without prejudice to the filing of another application, if he
so desires, in conformity with law. It is so ordered.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Reyes, J.B.L
G.R. No. L-29534 February 28, 1977
BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCES and SOFIA V. REYES, respondents.
William H. Quasha & Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent DANR
S. Fangonil & Associates for private respondent.

FERNANDO, J:

A more extensive appraisal of the controlling doctrine on the status of a department head as an alter ego of the President, with
particular reference to the broad competence enjoyed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the disposition of the
public lands and the wealth it contains, and a more careful reading of the specific provisions of the Mining Act, 1 not to mention the
explicit recital in the order challenge that the purpose thereof is to accord a party the "formal hearing" thereby complying with the
procedural due process requisite, ought to have cautioned against the filing of this certiorari petition against the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Petitioner is, a domestic mining corporation engaged in the exploration and development of certain
mineral claims. The records show that private respondent Sofia V. Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse claim against
petitioner's Lode Lease Application covering three mining claims in Benguet, Mountain Province. 2 That was countered by a motion to
dismiss, alleging as one of three legal objections the failure of such adverse claim to comply with the mandatory requirements of
Section 73 of the Mining Act. 3 The private respondent then submitted an opposition with the Bureau of Mines thereafter dismissing the
adverse claim. 4 The matter was taken up on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, private respondent
maintaining the sufficiency of its adverse claim under the law, a point disputed by petitioner, as could have been expected. 5 At first, the
action taken by respondent Department was the dismissal of such appeal, but on a second motion for reconsideration, an order was
issued with its dispositive portion reading thus: "Order of the Director of Mines dated September 15, 1966, and the Decision and Order
of this Office dated July 21, 1967 and December 11, 1967, respectively, should be, as hereby they are, set aside; and to abbreviate
proceedings, Atty. [Romulo A. Redula] of this Office is hereby directed to conduct a formal hearing of this case. 6 Hence this certiorari
petition.

As intimated at the outset, this petition lacks merit. It mast be dismissed.

1. Petitioner lost sight of the fundamental doctrine set forth in Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 7 decided in 1939, where Justice Laurel
categorically declared that acts of a department head and the challenged order in this case came from the then Acting Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, Isosceles Pascual, "performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumably the acts of the Chief Executive. 8 Not so long ago in Tecson v. Salas, 9 it
was affirmed that as far as the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices are concerned, "the Villena doctrine
applies with undiminished force."10 Since then, two other decisions did reiterate such a principle. 11 Moreover, petitioner likewise did not
take into account the doctrine announced by the leading case of Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion. 12 As stated by Justice Malcolm:
"Accordingly, to paraphrase the authorities and decisions coming principally from the United States Supreme Court, we deduce the rule
on the subject to be, that a decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the absence of a showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence,
regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of the evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon which the
finding in question could be made. 13 Here such a stage has not been reached. Precisely, the assailed order spoke of no "hearing on
the merits, [therefore] it is but right and proper in the interest of justice that a formal hearing on the merits be conducted. 14 There is,
therefore, an element of prematurity. That alone would have sufficed for the dismissal of this petition.

2. What appears to be the motivation behind this move of petitioner is to preclude the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
from conducting his own inquiry. He would thus be denied the power accorded a bureau director. In Pinero Jr. v. Director of
Lands 15 this Court, in an opinion by Justice Barredo, expressly referring to the Regalian doctrine, Pointed out that even a Torrens title
is not a bar to the power of the Director of Lands to investigate an allegation of fraud that could have led to the issuance of a free
patent. As stated by him "It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring a title to a public land Should not be
allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an ever-existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to inquire
into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other
officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain,
subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land
previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such
investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for
reversion may be filed by the Government." 16 If petitioner would prevail, such power of inquiry vested in a subordinate would be denied
a department head. That is to disregard a well-settled concept in public law. What is more, that is to be insensible to another facet the
jura regalia concept by virtue of which the Republic of the Philippines possessed of the attributes of imperium and dominium, acting
through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is given the utmost latitude in ascertaining which party shall enjoy the
privilege of exploiting the wealth that is found in its natural resources. 17 If petitioner were to prevail, there would be an undue diminution
of the broad competence conferred on the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as recognized in a host of cases notable for
their number and unanimity. 18
3. Petitioner would seek to weaken the force of the above authoritative doctrines as applied to it by the allegation that there is a failure
to abide by the statutory requirements in the Mining Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4388. Reference is made to Sections 61 and
73 as amended by Republic Act No. 4388. 19 The proviso in the former section which is relevant to the present controversy reads thus:
"Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
within thirty days from receipt of such decision or order. In case any one of the parties should disagree from the decision or order of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the matter may be taken to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case
may be, within thirty days from the receipt of such decision or order, otherwise the said decision or order shall be final and binding upon
the parties concerned. Findings of facts in the decision or order of the Director of Mines when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources shall be final and conclusive, and the aggrieved party or parties desiring to appeal from such decision or order
shall file in the Supreme Court a petition for review wherein only questions of law may be raised." What cannot be sufficiently stressed
is that only upon the affirmance of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources does the findings of fact become conclusive,
leaving only questions of law for this Court to decide. In the order complained of, the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources commendably sought to have a rational basis for the acceptance or rejection of the conclusion reached by the Director of
Mines. What was objected to was that it could no longer be done as the matter had reached the stage of finality, such order coming
only after a second motion for reconsideration. Petitioner would thus ignore the basic principle that unless the administrative procedure
followed conforms with the requirement of procedural due process the actuation could be stigmatized as void, a hearing being deemed
of the essence of such proceeding. As a matter of fact its absence would result in the loss of jurisdiction. As was state by Chief
Justice Concepcion in' Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda de Sengbenco, 20 acts whether of Congress or of the Executive, can deny due
process only under pain of nullity, ... 21 As a matter of law, to accept petitioner's claim that in thus issuing such an order the Acting
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources failed to abide by the requirements of the law would be precisely to cast doubt on the
validity of such sections of the Mining Act when all that was required by him was compliance with the requisite of a formal hearing. That
would be to incur the vice of the construction given such sections being repugnant to the due process clause. Certainly, between two
lines of interpretation, one of which would give it life and the other which would be fatal to its validity, the former should prevail. Thus
petitioner's first two errors assigned, which could be summed up in the proposition that Secretary Pascual should not have passed upon
the second motion for reconsideration are clearly without merit.

4. It is thus apparent that the third error assigned to the effect that the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when it arrogated the function of hearing the adverse claims is even more bereft of support in law. The very
provision of the Mining Act upon, as previously set forth, speaks of the findings of facts of the Director of Mines "when affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources being final and conclusive," in which case the aggrieved party may file a petition for
review with this Court where only questions of law may be raised. 22 To sustain the contention of petitioner would be to run counter to
what was held in the leading case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. 23 Justice Laurel specifically spoke of "cardinal primary
rights" embraced in "the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. 24 Here precisely, vital and essential facts remained at issue. It was the considered judgment of the Acting Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources that a hearing should be held to ascertain the truth of the matter. As set forth in the challenged
order: "It is but right and proper in the interest of justice that a formal hearing on the merits of this case be conducted. 25 In a subsequent
paragraph, such point of view was reiterated: "The reason for this ruling is that the proceedings before this Office is administrative in
character, and, therefore, the parties to the case must be given all the opportunity to be heard. 26 Hence, the dispositive portion
directing a certain Romulo A. Redula presumably of the staff of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, "to conduct a
formal hearing of this case and to submit his report relative thereto within thirty (30) days from the termination thereof. 27

Clearly, to repeat, the allegation in the last assignment of error that there was an arrogation of the Power on the part of respondent
department is devoid of any legal justification. Moreover had Petitioner taken into consideration the aforesaid landmark opinion of
Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations on the indispensability of complying with the due process requirement in an
administrative proceeding, it would have noted that one of the doctrines relied upon by this Court in that case is an opinion of Chief
Justice Hughes in Morgan v. United States. 28 It ought to be affirmed that in the two subsequent Morgan cases, the stress became even
more emphatic on the indispensability of complying with the due process mandate, characterized as "the rudimentary requirements of
fair play." 29 The relevance of the Morgan decisions should be evident, dealing as they do with the exercise of powers granted the
Secretary of Agriculture of the United States.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.

 G.R. No. 10858. October 20, 1915. ]

PEDRO M. DUARTE, Petitioner, v. WALTER H. DADE, Director of Prisons, Respondent.

Sanz, Opisso & Luzurulga for Petitioner.

Attorney-General Avancena for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. HABEAS CORPUS; STATE AND TERRITORIAL COURTS; JURISDICTION. — The exclusive and paramount authority of the
United States Government to determine by its own judicial tribunals whether persons held in custody by courts of the United
States or by commissioners of such courts, or by officers of the Federal Government, acting under its laws, are so held in
conformity with law, is not infringed when a court of a state or territorial government inquires into the legality of the
imprisonment or detention within its jurisdiction of a person held by virtue of a judgment or order of a court or officer of a
sister state or territory.

2. WAR; MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN CEDED TERRITORY; LIMITATIONS. — The limitations upon the power of a military
governor acting under authority of the United States are to be found in the Constitution of the United States, in treaties or
acts of Congress specifically relating to the particular possession, in instructions given to him by the President of the United
States or officers acting under his authority; and, in a wider sense, in certain fundamental principles of American government
and its declared policy toward newly acquired possessions.

3. ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWERS. — A military governor of newly ceded territory, acting under authority of the President of
the United States, has power to legislate for such territory, including the creation of courts and the enactment of procedural
laws. This power continues until it is taken away, either by the President himself or by the Congress of the United States,
acting in its legislative capacity.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FORMALITIES. — Such legislation, unless by special instructions from superior authority, is not required to
be promulgated in any particular form and may be special in character. Courts and criminal procedure being the mere
creations of the military governor, his power to withdraw a particular criminal case from the court which would ordinarily
have jurisdiction and cause it to be tried in some other court cannot be questioned.

5. STATUTES; LEGISLATIVE POWER TO REPEAL. — Unless prevented by superior authority, the law-making power of any
government has plenary power to enact or repeal laws. The power to repeal a law is as complete as the power to enact it. A
legislative power cannot in and of itself enact irrepealable laws or limit its future legislative acts.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES. — The right of appeal in a criminal case may be granted or
withheld at the pleasure of a state or territorial government without infringing the "due process of law" clause of the United
States Constitution.

7. CRIMINAL LAW; SENTENCE AND PUNISHMENT; PLACE OF IMPRISONMENT. — A convicted person cannot object to
imprisonment in a penitentiary outside the jurisdiction of the government by whose authority he was tried and convicted on
the ground that officers of the government in whose territory the place of confinement is located are not authorized by the
laws of their government to accept prisoners from other jurisdictions. He is rightfully detained in such a prison as a prisoner
of the government which sent him there so long as the officers of the government which controls the place of imprisonment
do not object to keeping him there.

Per Johnson, J., dissenting

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEC. 5546 U. S. REVISED STATUTES. — An imprisonment at a place and in a prison not authorized by law is
illegal. There is no law in force in the Philippine Islands which authorizes the warden of Bilibid Prison to accept and hold
persons sentenced, except those who have been sentenced by the courts of the Philippine Archipelago. No law has been
cited, and it is believed there is none, which authorities the government of the Island of Guam to imprison its citizens in
prisons outside of its territory. Section 5546 of the Revised Statutes of the United States is not applicable either to the
Philippine Archipelago or the Island of Guam.

DECISION

TRENT, J. :

This is an original application in this Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner, Pedro M. Duarte, was tried in
the first instance over his objection by the court of appeals of the Island of Guam on the 1st day of March, 1915, and
sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of cadena temporal, to the accessory penalties provided by law, to
indemnify the Government of the United States in the sum of $40,944.20, and to the payment of the costs of the cause for
the crime of misappropriation of public funds while postmaster at Guam. The governor of Guam mitigated the term of
imprisonment to ten years and, under an agreement with the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, designated Bilibid
Prison, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, "as the place of the execution of so much of the sentence as relates to
confinement." Subsequent thereto the petitioner was sent to Manila and turned over to the respondent to be confined in
Bilibid Prison, where he now is.

This case presents only two questions. (1) Had the court of appeals of the Island of Guam jurisdiction legally to try and
sentence the petitioner in the manner and form above set forth? (2) Is the respondent authorized to hold the petitioner in
confinement in Bilibid Prison, Philippine Islands. The petitioner insists that both these questions should be answered in the
negative.

During the consideration of this case, it was suggested that this Supreme Court has no authority to inquire whether the court
of appeals of Guam had jurisdiction to try the petitioner or not, because Guam and the Philippine Islands are separate and
distinct governmental entities and it is our duty to accept without question the judgments of the courts of that Island.

Cases are cited from the United States Supreme Court reports in which it is held that state courts have no power to examine
into the regularity of Federal judicial process or judgments of Federal courts. If, for instance, as in the case of Ableman v.
Booth (21 How., 506, 16 L. ed., 169), a United States marshal makes return to a writ issuing out of a state court that the
petitioner is held on an order of a United States circuit court commissioner; or if, as in Booth v. United States (139 Fed.,
252; 71 C.C. A., 378), the petitioner is in custody in pursuance of a judgment upon an indictment, charging him with an
offense against the laws of the United States; or if, as in Tarble’s case (13 Wall., 397, 20 L. ed., 597), the person whose
discharge is sought is held as an enlisted soldier of the army by an officer of that army, acting directly under the Constitution
and laws of the United States, state courts have no power to go further in the premises. The return of the writ closes the
door to all investigation. If the petitioner would have a judicial determination of the legality of his detention, he must apply to
a Federal court. The reason for this is best stated in the language used by the court in Tarble’s case, where, after reviewing
both the other cases cited, it was said: "State judges and state courts, authorized by laws of their states to issue writs
of habeas corpus, have, undoubtedly, a right to issue the writ in any case where a party is alleged to be illegally confined
within their limits, unless it appear upon his application that he is confined under the authority, or claim and color of the
authority of the United States, by an officer of that government. If such fact appear upon the application the writ should be
refused. If it does not appear, the judge or court issuing the writ has a right to inquire into the cause of imprisonment, and
ascertain by what authority the person is held within the limits of the state; and it is the duty of the marshal, or other officer
having the custody of the prisoner, to give, by a proper return, information in this respect." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

These cases do not supply a precedent governing the case at bar. The analogy fails in most important respects. The cases
cited are, be it remembered, predicated upon the dual system of government in the United States where two governmental
entities, both supreme in their own spheres of action, have identical territorial jurisdiction. They simply observe the rule that
officers of the one cannot interfere with officers of the other in matters pertaining strictly to the latter. The governments of
Guam and of the Philippine Islands are two separate entities presiding over wholly separate and distinct territories and
neither has any control over the other, but both derive their powers from the central Government of the United States. Any
respect which is given to the official acts of the one government by the other is, in the absence of constitutional restrictions
and legislation by the Congress of the United States, purely a matter of comity and not of coercion. There is no compelling
reason, other than comity, why the courts of this country should give to judgments of courts of the government of Guam any
effect whatever, except in so far as our laws so direct. And the laws of this country treat judgments emanating from the
Island of Guam precisely as it does judgments from other territories or States of the United States. Section 309 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provides the effect of such a judgment in this country, and section 312 provides that "Any judicial record
may be impeached by evidence of a want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The whole purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine if the petitioner is legally held. According to the record before
us, the judgment of the Guam court is the first link in the chain that deprives the petitioner of his liberty. If we are to
determine the legality of his confinement, it seems to us that no valid reason can be assigned for not examining into the
jurisdiction of the Guam court.

This court is authorized to grant writs of habeas corpus. (Sec. 526, C. C. P.) The petitioner is being deprived of his liberty
within its territorial jurisdiction. His detention is not caused by the decree, order, or judgment of any Federal court or officer.
Hence, the jurisdiction of this court is complete. If he can show that his confinement is illegal his case is good. He is
attempting to do this by alleging a want of jurisdiction in the court which rendered judgment against him. If this is true, then
his confinement is strictly illegal, for any detention which starts with a void judgment is illegal. It is our right and our duty to
investigate the jurisdiction of the committing court.

The Island of Guam was occupied by the armed forces of the United States during the late war with Spain. By the Treaty of
Paris, Spain formally ceded the island to the United States. (Art. II.) On December 23, 1898, the President of the United
States issued the following Executive Order: "The Island of Guam, in the Ladrones, is hereby placed under the control of the
Department of the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy will take such steps as may be necessary to establish the authority of the
United States and to give it the necessary protection and government. (Sgd.) WILLIAM MCKINLEY." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

On January 12, 1899, the Secretary of the Navy wrote the following letter: jgc: chan roble s.com.p h

"SIR: 1. The Island of Guam, in the Ladrones, Pacific Ocean, having been, by Executive Order, dated December 23, 1898
(copy of which is inclosed herewith), made a naval station and placed under the control of the Department of the Navy, you
are hereby appointed naval governor of the Island of Guam, this duty being in addition to your duty as commander of a
division of the Asiatic Fleet.

"2. In taking control of the government of the Island of Guam, you will particularly assume control of all crown lands,
fortifications and public buildings of the Island, together with such archives as may be found there.

"3. You will, whenever opportunity affords, communicate with the Department, giving such suggestions as you may deem
advisable in reference to the naval, commercial, and civil control, and the development of the Island.

"Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) "JOHN D. LONG, Secretary." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

On the same date the Secretary of the Navy issued "Instructions for the military commander of the Island of Guam," which,
in general outline, are of a similar tenor to President McKinley’s instructions to the first Philippine Commission. Portions
thereof read as follows: jgc:chan rob les.com. ph

"In performing this duty, the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the
Island of Guam, that, in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political power, the authority of the
United States is to be exerted for the security of the persons and property of the people of the Island and for the
confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It will be the duty of the military commander to announce and proclaim
in the most public manner that we come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes,
in their employments and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission,
cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to those beneficent purposes, will receive the reward of its
support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but
without severity as far as it may be possible.

"Within the absolute domain of naval authority, which necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the
legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the territory, in respect to private rights and
property and the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in force, and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals, so far as practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may
accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen as far as may be practicable
from the inhabitants of the Island. . . .

x x x

"Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the naval administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection
of the inhabitants of the Island of Guam by assuring to them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and
liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of
benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild way of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high
mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously
maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings
of good and stable government upon the people of the Island of Guam under the free flag of the United States." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

So far as the record shows, neither the President of the United States nor the Secretary of the Navy has issued any
subsequent orders or instructions to the governor of Guam respecting the government of the civil population of that Island.

If we compare the government of Guam so constituted with the Government existing in the Philippine Islands from August
13, 1898, until September 1, 1900; or with the government existing in Porto Rico from July 25, 1898, until the Act of
Congress of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. at L., 77), became effective, we shall find that all three were similarly governed. In both
Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands there was first an entry of the armed forces of the United States, followed by a
resumption of civil government under the supervision and control of military governors who received their appointments and
their instructions from the President of the United States. So that, in discussing the powers and limitations of the governor of
Guam, we may rightly consider as precedents the powers exercised by the military governors of the Philippine Islands and
Porto Rico which were created by the President of the United States and were terminated by congressional legislation. All
doubt as to the legality of such governments are put at rest by the stamp of approval placed upon them both by the
legislative and judicial departments of the Federal Government. In the Organic Act of Porto Rico Congress recognized the
exercise of legislative powers by the military governor in section 8 in the following language: "That the laws and ordinances
of Porto Rico now in force shall continue in full force and effect, except as altered, amended or modified hereinafter, or as
modified by military orders and decrees in force when this act shall take effect." Congress approved of and consented to the
government established by the President in the Philippine Islands by the Act of March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. at L., 910), which
reads in part as follows: "All military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands, acquired from
Spain by the treaty concluded at Paris on the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and at Washington
on the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person
and persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of
civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and religion."
cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibrary
Still later, in the Act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L., 692), Congress again approved of the President’s administration of
government in the Philippines.

We quote rather fully from a late decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, owing to its peculiar fitness as a
precedent for the case at bar: jgc:chan rob les.com. ph

"By the ratifications of the treaty of peace, Porto Rico ceased to be subject to the crown of Spain, and became subject to the
legislative power of Congress. But the civil government of the United States cannot extend immediately and of its own force
over conquered and ceded territory. Theoretically, Congress might prepare and enact a scheme of civil government to take
effect immediately upon the cession, but, practically, there always have been delays and always will be. Time is required for
a study of the situation, and for the maturing and enactment of an adequate scheme of civil government. In the meantime,
pending the action of Congress, there is no civil power under our system of government, not even that of the President as
civil executive, which can take the place of the government which has ceased to exist by the cession. Is it possible that,
under such circumstances, there must be an interregnum? We think clearly not. The authority to govern such ceded territory
is found in the laws applicable to conquest and cession. That authority is the military power, under the control of the
President as Commander in Chief. In the case of Cross v. Harrison (16 How., 164, 14 L. ed., 889), a situation of this kind
was referred to in the opinion of the court, where it is said: ’It [the military authority] was the government when the territory
was ceded as a conquests and it did not cease as a matter of course, or as a necessary consequence of the restoration of
peace. The President might have dissolved it by withdrawing the army and navy officers who administered it, but he did not
do so. Congress could have put an end to it, but that was not done. The right inference from the inaction of both is that it
was meant to be continued until it had been legislatively changed. No presumption of a contrary intention can be made.
Whatever may have been the causes of the delay, it must be presumed that the delay was consistent with the true policy of
the government.’ (pp. 193, 194.) And see Leitensdorfer v. Webb (20 How., 176, 15 L. ed 891), and opinion of Mr. Justice
Gray in Downes vs Bidwell (182 U. S., 244, 345, 45 L. ed., 1088, 1128, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep., 770).

"The authority of a military government during the period between the cession and the action of Congress like the authority
of the same government before the cession, is of large, though it may not be of unlimited, extent. In fact, certain limits, not
material here, were put upon it in Dooley v. United States (182 U. S., 222, 45 L. ed., 1074 21 Sup. Ct. Rep., 762), and
Lincoln v. United States (197 U. S., 419, 49 L. ed., 816, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 455), though it was said in the Dooley case, page
234: ’We have no doubt, however, that, from the necessities of the case, the right to administer the government of Porto
Rico continued in the military commander after the ratification of the treaty, and until further action by Congress,’ — citing
Cross v. Harrison, supra.

"But, whatever may be the limits of the military power, it certainly must include the authority to establish courts of justice,
which are so essential a part of any government. So it seems to have been thought in Leitensdorfer v. Webb, supra. With this
thought in mind, the military power not only established this particular court in Porto Rico, but as well a system of courts
which took the place of the courts under Spanish sovereignty, and were continued by the organic act. The same course was
pursued in the Philippine Islands." (Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U. S., 260, 53 L. ed., 989.)

When New Mexico was conquered by the United States, the executive authority of the United States properly established a
provisional government, which ordained laws and instituted a judicial system; all of which continued in force after the
termination of the war, and until modified by the direct legislation of Congress, or by the territorial government established
by authority of Congress. In Leitensdorfer v. Webb (20 How., 176, 178) the Supreme Court of the United States, in speaking
of the military government thus established, said: jgc:chan robles. com.p h

"Accordingly we find that there was ordained by the provisional government a judicial system, which created a superior or
appellate court, constituted of three judges; the circuit courts, in which the laws were to be administered by the judges of
the superior or appellate court, in the circuits to which they should be respectively assigned. By the same authority the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts to be held in the several counties was declared to embrace, first, all criminal cases that shall
not be otherwise provided for by law; and second, exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases which shall not be cognizable
before the prefects and alcaldes. (Vide Laws of New Mexico, Kearney’s Code, p. 48.) Of the validity of these ordinances of the
provisional government there is made no question with respect to the period during which the territory was held by the
United States as occupying conqueror, and it would seem to admit of no doubt that during the period of their valid existence
and operation those ordinances must have displaced and superseded every previous institution of the vanquished or deposed
political power which was incompatible with them. But it has been contended that whatever may have been the rights of the
occupying conqueror as such, these were all terminated by the termination of the belligerent attitude of the parties, and that
with the close of the contest every institution which had been overthrown or suspended would be revived and reestablished.
The fallacy of this pretension is exposed by the fact that the territory never was relinquished by the conqueror nor restored
to its original condition or allegiance, but was retained by the occupant until possession was matured into absolute
permanent dominion and sovereignty; and this, too, under the settled purpose of the United States never to relinquish the
possession acquired by arms. We conclude, therefore, that the ordinances and institutions of the provisional government
would be revoked or modified by the United States alone, either by direct legislation on the part of Congress or by that of the
Territorial government in the exercise of powers delegated by Congress." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

The above citations and quotations are sufficient to dispel all doubt as to the legality of military governments from the time a
particular territory is acquired by the United States until Congress chooses to legislate for it and the power of such
governments to create courts of justice. Aside from the establishment of judicial machinery by the military governments of
Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands, as referred to in the quotation from Santiago v. Nogueras, supra, we find two very
notable pieces of legislation in the Philippine Islands promulgated in the form of military General Orders and which to this
day have the force of law and are administered as such by all departments of the present Civil Government. They are
General Orders No. 58, series of 1900, which still constitutes the bulk of our criminal procedure; and General Orders No. 68,
under date of December 18, 1899, making radical changes in the marriage law, and which is still in effect without material
amendment. Hence, we may conclude that the powers of a military governor to issue orders, decrees, regulations, etc.,
which have the force of law in the territory over which he has jurisdiction is beyond question. Therefore, the governor of
Guam had power to recognize the courts by his General Order No. 69 of 1903; No. 89 of 1905; and his Executive General
Order No. 158 of 1910.

But it is objected that he had no power to issue the following communication or order:

"From: Governor of Guam.

"To: The court of appeals, Guam.

"SUBJECT: Pedro M. Duarte, charges against.

"1. The court of appeals of Guam shall take original jurisdiction in this case.

(Sgd.) "W. J. MAXWELL.

It may be admitted that under Executive General Order No. 158 of 1910, which embodies the last reorganization of the
judiciary of the Guam government, original jurisdiction of the crime with which the petitioner was charged was vested in the
"Island court of Guam" and not in the "court of appeals." But while much stress is laid upon the absolute lack of power on the
part of the governor of Guam to issue this order, we are referred to nothing except previous orders of the governor himself
relating to the establishment of courts, to which we have referred above, and to the ordinary criminal procedure observed in
the Island, which is also embodied in an executive order of the governor of Guam. Certainly, these general orders, deriving
their force as law from the governor himself, are liable to repeal by him at any time and cannot of themselves prevent the
governor from trying an accused person in some other manner. It is fundamental that what legislators have the power to
enact they have the power to repeal. In speaking of the powers of legislative bodies, it is said in Lewis’ Southerland on
Statutory Construction, section 244: "A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether
pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless
prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its
successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts
passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was
passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature
to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes."cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

These principles must necessarily apply to the military governor of Guam. A military governor is not, of course, restrained by
any laws of the territory which he governs. As to the people within that territory, "the will of the conqueror is the law."
Limitations upon his powers must be looked for in the laws of his own government and the instructions handed him by his
superiors. Therefore it is in order to determine whether the action of the military governor of Guam in ordering his court of
appeals to take original jurisdiction in the petitioner’s case and in denying him the right of appeal conflict with the
constitution or laws of the United States, or with instructions emanating from his superiors. The President of the United
States and the Secretary of the Navy, who are the superiors of the governor of Guam, are bound to observe the Constitution
and laws of the United States in any instructions they give to him. It seems proper, therefore, to first determine whether the
Constitution and law prohibit the action taken by the governor of Guam in the petitioner’s case. It is now pretty well settled
that the Constitution of the United States does not extend ex proprio vigore to newly acquired possessions of the United
States until they are formally incorporated into what Chief Justice Marshall has called the American Empire." (Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U S 244, 276, 45 L. Ed., 1088, 1102.) But in the case cited, Mr. Justice Brown, in announcing the judgment of
the court, intimated that possibly some of its provisions limited the powers of Congress to legislate for such possessions.
Among these he mentioned the prohibition against passing ex post facto laws, laws granting titles of nobility, laws restricting
religious freedom, free speech, and others. If these are restrictions upon the powers of Congress to deal with newly acquired
possessions, there is good reason to suppose that they operate in a similar manner upon the executive department of the
government in its administration of a military government. But, obviously, the action of the governor of Guam in the Duarte
case does not touch any of these points. The treaty of peace with Spain is a law of the land. (Const., Art. VI.) There are
various provisions of this treaty which the President of the United States. the Secretary of the Navy, and the governor of
Guam must recognize and obey. For instance, Articles IV and XV provide for the entry of Spanish ships and merchandise on
the same terms as American ships and merchandise for a period of ten years. These provisions are now, of course, obsolete.
Article VIII protects private property rights generally, and Article XIII property rights in copyrights and patents, and provides
for the free admission of Spanish scientific, literary, and artistic works for a period of ten years, the latter provision now
being obsolete. Article X provides that the inhabitants of the ceded territories shall be secured in the free exercise of their
religion. All these are restrictions upon the authority of the President of the United States and his subordinates in their
administration of the Guam government, but they do not approach the facts of the petitioner’s case.

In a recent case, the Supreme Court of the United States, in referring to the military government of Porto Rico, said that the
limitations upon the powers of the military governor must be looked for in the instructions given to the governor by his
superiors, which were founded on the "general rules of international law, and from fundamental principles known wherever
the American flag flies." (Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U. S., 139, 57 L. ed., 1427.) The Hague Conference Code of
1899 contains much that robs martial law and military government of their terrors. Assuming that the President of the United
States is bound by this international treaty, there is nothing contained therein which prohibits the actions taken in the
petitioner’s case.

Chief Justice Marshall said in American Ins. Co. v. Canter (1 Pet., 511, 7 L. ed., 242): "The usage of the world is, if a nation
be not entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere military occupation, until its fate shall be
determined at the treaty of peace. If it be ceded by treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a
part of the nation to which it is annexed; either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as its new master
shall impose. On such transfer of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other
undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them
and the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country transfers the allegiance of
those who remain in it and the law, which may be denominated political, is, necessarily, changed; although that which
regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals remains in force until altered by the newly created power of the
state."
cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

There is no doubt that this correctly states the policy of the United States as is attested by the history of successive additions
to its territory, and may be said to control military governments inaugurated by the President of the United States. But it
cannot be said this policy has been violated in the petitioner’s case.

If we examine the legislation of Congress relating to Guam, we find that it has to do almost wholly with appropriations for
improvements either of a public or of a military character. There has been an annual appropriation for the care of lepers, a
considerable amount has been. allotted to an agricultural experiment station, for the building of roads, a water supply
system, etc. The last two Tariff Acts have applied to the Island of Guam. The Immigration Act of 1908 was extended to
Guam. United States Army transports were authorized to carry passengers and freight destined to Guam. The government of
Guam was directed to keep certain trade statistics. By Act of June 28, 1906, deeds and other instruments affecting land
situated in the District of Columbia or any territory of the United States may be acknowledged in the Island of Guam before
any notary public or judge appointed by the proper authority. This act and the acts appropriating monies afford some
considerable ground for the argument that Congress has tacitly recognized and approved of the existing government of
Guam. By the Act of August 22, 1912 (37 Stat. at L., Congress decreed: "The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to transfer
all lepers of Guam now segregated, and other cases that may later appear, to the Island of Culion in the Philippines, and to
pay the cost of their transfer and maintenance from . . ." (the appropriation included in the Act).

It will be noted that Congress has never exercised its undoubted right to change or alter the form of government established
on the Island of Guam by the executive department of the Federal Government. And none of these acts limit the power of
the governor of Guam to take the action he did in the case of this petitioner.

To the argument that section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which extends the Constitution and laws of
the United States not locally inapplicable to all organized territories, it is sufficient to say that Guam is not an organized
territory. Until it becomes one, a blanket extension to it of the Constitution and laws of the United States by virtue of section
1891 of the Revised Statutes is an academic question.

As a check upon the excesses of a military governor, we must not forget his responsibility to his superiors. Birkhimer, in his
Military Government, has the following to say upon this point: "310. . . . very general belief, it will be found, when attentively
considered, that military government, arbitrary though it be in its essential features, is far from being the mere will of the
commanding general to be enforced by him without responsibility, either directly or through the medium of subordinates who
themselves are answerable only to that commander. His responsibility is both military and civil; the former complete, the
latter qualified by circumstances.

"311. First, the responsibility to military superiors extends wherever commanders may go. How extensive soever may be
their operations, how far soever conducted from the territory of their own government, they, and of course their
subordinates as well, are never independent of that authority which sent them forth." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

Lieber’s Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, known in Army circles as General Orders
No. 100, 1863, contains much that limits the will of military commanders in directions they ought not to go, and the
governor of Guam is, possibly, bound thereby. But they do not prohibit the action taken by him in the petitioner’s case.

Finally, it may be added that the executive branch of the Federal Government cannot collide with public opinion in its
administration of dependencies without serious consequences. Bryce, in his American Commonwealth (vol., 2, chap. 78),
truly says: "Towering over Presidents and State governors, over Congress and State legislatures, over conventions and the
vast machinery of party, public opinion stands out, in the United States, as the great source of power, the master of servants
who tremble before it." cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibra ry

It is urged that the governor of Guam violated the instructions to him by the Secretary of the Navy under date of July 12,
1899, special stress being laid on the last paragraph of the quotation therefrom which we have inserted above. In the first
place, we are clearly of the opinion that these very general instructions are not opposed to the particular act complained of,
and that, therefore, the governor of Guam did not violate his instructions. But assuming, for the moment, that his action in
the petitioner’s case was violative of those instructions, the Secretary of the Navy specifically ratified the disposition of the
Duarte case under date of June 4, 1915, as appears from the somewhat lengthy cablegram inserted in the record. It will
hardly be denied that the Secretary of the Navy could thus ratify an act of his agent, the governor of Guam.

From the above authorities, it will be observed that the military governor of Guam and his superiors, the Secretary of the
Navy and the President of the United States, are all limited and restricted in the administration of the civil affairs of the
Island of Guam by the Constitution of the United States; by the Treaty of Paris; by international law with respect to
conquered or ceded territory; by the declared policy of the United States with respect to such territories; by national and
international codes of war; and, ultimately, by the judgment which public opinion must pass upon their administration of the
civil government of Guam; and that the governor of Guam is directly and speedily answerable to his superiors for any ill-
advised or arbitrary official act or conduct. These authorities require a government by the military authorities which will
secure to the inhabitants of the territory over which they preside protection for life, liberty, and property. This is the task set
for a military government, but in its accomplishment there are no instructions as to the procedure which they must observe.
Civil governments under military authority will naturally assume a quite close resemblance to civil government as it exists in
the homeland. The whole government machinery and its methods of doing business will be made to conform to the
sovereign’s standards of government. If the administration of justice under the laws of the foreign sovereign is not in
harmony with the rest of the newly organized government, the courts and procedural law are remodeled to the extent that
may be necessary. When these matters are satisfactorily adjusted, the military governor will permit the civil officials
appointed by him or elected by the people with his permission, to administer the new government. With the exception of
these administrative duties retained by himself, he will ordinarily allow the civil authorities to enforce the law and maintain
order according to their best judgment and discretion without hindrance from him. But the military governor has it in his
power to at any time summarily dismiss any such official who incurs his displeasure or to immediately modify or annul an
order or law promulgated by him which does not appear to be accomplishing its purpose. All the power of the new
government comes from him and what he has created he can destroy. His official acts, his decrees or laws and his
administration of justice are not tested by laws of procedure. In observing those substantive principles which make
government tolerable, he may adopt any procedure which will the more speedily gain the desired end.

In the case at bar, if the governor’s order to his court of appeals were tested by what is required of lawmakers in
governmental entities of the United States, where the ultimate power resides in the people, who, by written constitutions,
require their lawmakers to mould their laws into certain specific forms; prohibit them from passing retroactive laws; from
enacting local or special laws; it is true that the said order would have to be declared invalid. It violates all of these rules of
lawmaking which are so generally observed throughout the United States. But where in the authorities we have discussed
above is there limitation of this sort upon the lawmaking powers of a military governor? We have not discovered any such
restrictions, and, in the lengthy argument for the petitioner, it seems that these restrictions are assumed to exist. The fallacy
of such argument is apparent. Such restrictions upon legislative power have never been assumed to exist in the United
States. The people have only succeeded in incorporating these requirements into written constitutions after long and bitter
struggles with selfish interests. A military governor is not obliged to put expressions of his will into any particular form in
order that they may have the effect of law. He may, for the sake of convenience, adopt the practice of recording his
legislative acts in a numbered series of formal orders or decrees. But this does not imply that he shall not, if he so desires,
inform the people within his jurisdiction by some other method which may, in his judgment, be more desirable. It is objected
that the order to the court of appeals to try the case is not law. It comes from the same source as General Orders No. 58.
We can conceive of no reason why it has not the same sanction as that general order; and, it being a later expression of the
governor’s will, must overrule all previous proclamations, orders, or regulations of the governor to the extent necessary to
give it its full effect.

Nor, indeed, is it the first time in the history of the United States that military governors by a special order have compelled a
defendant to stand trial in a court different from that which would ordinarily take cognizance of his case. In 1867 Congress
enacted what are known as the Reconstruction Acts (14 Stat. at I:., 428; 15 Stat. at L., 14), dividing the States which had
participated in the late rebellion into five military districts, each governed by a military governor. These governors were
authorized among other things to "allow local civil tribunals to take jurisdiction of and to try offenders, or, when in his
judgment ’it may be necessary for the trial of offenders, he shall have power to organize military commissions or tribunals for
that purpose, and all interference under color of State authority with the exercise of military authority under this act, shall be
null and void." These laws were in effect sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States in White vs Hart (13 Wall.,
646, 20 L. ed., 685); Texas v. White (7 Wall., 700, 19 L. ed., 227). Birkhimer, in his Military Government, says: jgc:chanrob l es.com.ph

"As observed by Chief Justice Chase, the military existed only to prevent illegal violence to persons and property, and to
facilitate the restoration of the States, and this fact district commanders constantly sought to impress upon the people
interested. This appears from their orders, as, for instance, that the military courts convened under these laws were to be
’governed by the rules of evidence prescribed by the laws of the State in which the case was tried’ (Second District, G. O. 18,
1868); that it was the purpose of the commanding general ’not to interfere with the operation of the State laws, as
administered by civil tribunals, except where the remedies thereby afforded are adequate to secure individuals substantial
justice’ (First District, G. O. 24, 1868); that ’the trial and punishment of criminals was to be left to the civil authorities so
long as the said authorities are energetic, active, and do justice to the rights of persons and property without distinction of
race or color’ (Third District, G. O. 10, 1868)." Birkhimer, p. 486.)

The Military Governor of the Philippine Islands issued a general order (No. 22) on June 17, 1899, in which, after referring to
the re-establishment of the civil courts by previous orders, he said: "The jurisdiction of the courts specified in paragraph 1 of
this order, and of other civil courts which may hereafter be reestablished, shall not extend to and include crimes and offenses
committed by either citizens of or persons sojourning within the Philippine Islands, which are prejudicial to military
administration and discipline, except by authority especially conferred by the military governor." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
In General Orders No. 24 [23], issued on June 24, 1899, the Military Governor said: "The provost courts named will take
cognizance of only such civil causes as are referred to them for trial by the authority appointing them, or the successor to
that authority; and their decrees and judgments, when approved by that authority, shall be final; . . . ." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

In General Orders No. 30, of July 22, 1899, which created a civil government for the Island of Negros under military
supervision, it was said with reference to the judiciary of that government: "XIX. The jurisdiction of these courts shall not
extend to nor include crimes and offenses committed by either citizens or persons sojourning within the Island of Negros
which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by authority especially conferred by the military
governor." cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibra ry

By General Orders No. 64, dated December 5, 1899, civil courts were given jurisdiction of "the class of offenses specified in
Rule 12, article 53, of the reformed compilation of provisions of Spanish law as to criminal procedure, under the usual
procedure as to jurisdiction and appeal, excepting only such of these offenses as are, under provisions of law of the United
States, within the jurisdiction of its military or naval courts martial, or are reserved by the military authorities for trial by
other military tribunals; . . . ." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

In his General Orders No. 64, dated August 10, 1900, the Military Governor said: "I. During the existence of military
government in these Islands the duty devolves upon the military authorities to protect all persons in their rights of person
and property, to suppress insurrection, disorder and violence and to punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers of the
public peace, and criminals. To this end local civil tribunals, where the same have been reconstituted, may take cognizance
of and try offenses within their jurisdiction, or, when in their judgment it may be expedient, the Department Commanders
may cause such offenses to be brought to trial before duly constituted military commissions or provost courts; . . . .

"II. Criminal cases arising within the city of Manila and lawfully cognizable by the civil courts of the Province of Manila, will be
reserved for trial by military commission only by authority of these headquarters; . . . ." cralaw virtua1aw l ib rary

In all these general orders, it will be noted that the right is asserted to remove any particular case from the court which
would have jurisdiction under the general orders in question, as a matter of expediency, if the military governor deemed it
necessary. If time and opportunity were available to inspect the records of the military government of the Philippine Islands,
no doubt letters or communications of precisely the same nature as the one directed by the governor of Guam to his court of
appeals could be found, taking from a court of original jurisdiction a particular case and causing it to be tried by some other
court.

Some discussion has been indulged in of the deprivation of the defendant’s right to appear before the court of appeals as an
appellant from the judgment of the inferior court, the "island court of Guam." In McKane v. Durston (153 U. S., 684,38 L.
ed., 866) it was said: "An appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute right, independently of
constitutional or statutory provisions allowing such appeal. A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal
case, however grave the offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law and is not necessary element of
due process of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the state to allow or not to allow such a review. A citation of
authorities upon the point is unnecessary." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

This case has been frequently affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States and state courts, and has been approved
by noted constitutional writers, and is, without doubt, the accepted doctrine on the point. Duarte had no inherent right, as
seems to be argued by his counsel, to have his sentence reviewed by an appellate court of the Island of Guam.

Finally, it is urged that the respondent, the warden of Bilibid, has no legal authority to hold the petitioner. We presume that
this objection is based upon the lack of authority of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to enter into a contract or
agreement with the governor of Guam to keep Guam convicts in Bilibid Prison at Manila. Upon this point, we think it sufficient
to quote from Ex parte Karstendick (93 U. S., 396, 23 L. ed., 889). In this case, a federal prisoner was sentenced to
imprisonment in the State penitentiary of West Virginia. The court said: "It is further insisted, on behalf of the petitioner,
that the legislature of the State of West Virginia has not given its consent to the use of the penitentiary of the State by the
United States for the punishment of their criminals, and that for this reason the order for his confinement there is void. The
petitioner is actually confined in the penitentiary, and neither the state nor its officers object. Congress has authorized
imprisonment, as a punishment for crimes against the United States, in the State prisons. So far as the United States can do
so, they have made the penitentiary at Moundsville a penitentiary of the United States, and the State officers having charge
of it their agents to enforce the sentences of imprisonments passed by their courts. The question is not now whether the
State shall submit to this use of its property by the United States, nor whether these state officers shall be compelled to act
as the custodians of those confined there under the authority of the United States, but whether this petitioner can object if
they do not. We think he cannot. So long as the State permits him to remain in its prison as the prisoner of the United
States, and does not object to his detention by its officers, he is rightfully detained in custody under a sentence lawfully
passed." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Writ denied and prisoner remanded, with costs.