PONCE DE LEON vs. SANTIAGO SYJUCO INC.
HELD: The facts show that on Nov 1944, contrary to the
FACTS: PNB executed a contract to sell 2 parcels of land to Ponce de
Leon for the total price of 26,300.
Subsequently, Ponce de Leon obtained a loan from Syjuco, in
the amount of 200,000 Japanese Military Notes, payable within 1
year. It was also provided in the promissory note that if Ponce de
Leon could not pay, and the payee could not demand the payment of
the said loan except within the period. To secure the said obligation,
Ponce de Leon mortgaged in favor of Syjuco the parcels of land which
he agreed to purchase from the bank. Using the loan, Ponce de Leon
was able to pay the bank and a deed of absolute sale was executed
in his name.
Ponce de Leon obtained an additional loan from Syjuco. On
October 1944, Ponce de Leon tendered to Syjuco the total amount
including the interests of his loan which was refused by Syjuco which
Ponce de Leon deposited with Clerk of Court of the CFI.
He then filed a petition with the CFI for the reconstitution of
transfer of the certificates of lot in the name of the bank which was
granted by the court. Syjuco filed a second amended answer to Ponce
de Leon’s complaint claiming that Ponce de Leon, by reconstituting
the titles in the name of the bank, by causing the Register of deeds
to have the said titles transferred in his name, and by subsequently
mortgaging the said properties to the bank as a guaranty for his
overdraft account, had violated the conditions of the mortgage which
Ponce de Leon has executed in its favor during the Japanese
occupation. Syjuco prayed that the mortgage executed by Ponce de
Leon in favor of the bank be declared null and void.
The lower court rendered a decision absolving Syjuco from
Ponce de Leon’s complaint and condemning Ponce de Leon to pay
Syjuco the total amount of 23,130 with interest at the legal rate from
May 1949 until fully paid. Both Ponce de Leon and Syjuco file their
appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the consignation made by Ponce de Leon is valid
stipulations, Ponce de Leon offered to pay the defendant the
principal amount and all the interest which the principal amount may
earn up to the date of maturity of the two notes.
SC ruled that the consignation made by the plaintiff was not
valid. In order that a consignation may be effective the debtor must
comply with certain requirements prescribed by the law. The debtor
must show 1. that there was a debt due; 2. The consignation had
been made because the creditor refused to accept it, or because he
was incapacitated or absent, or because several persons claimed to
be entitled to receive the amount due; 3. The previous notice of
consignation had been given to the person interested in the
performance of the obligation; 4. The amount was placed at the
disposal of the court; 5. After the consignation had been made the
person interested was notified thereof.
In the case at bar, it was admitted that there was a debt, that
the consignation was made because the creditor refused to accept it,
and filing of the complaint serves as sufficient notice of the
consignation to the creditor. Two requirements have not been
complied with. Before making the consignation the debtor failed to
give previous notice and the obligation was not yet due and
demandable. The failure of these two requirements is enough ground
to render the consignation ineffective.
Under the law, in a monetary obligation with a period, the
presumption is that the period was made for the mutual benefit of
the parties. The creditor may want to keep his money invested safely
instead of having it in his own hands, the creditor protects himself
against sudden decline in the purchasing power of the currency.
Unless the creditor consents, the debtor has no right to accelerate
the time of payment even if it included a payment for the interest.
BUCE vs. CA
FACTS: Buce leased a parcel of land located at Pandacan, Manila. The
lease was for a period of 15 years to commence on June 1, 1979 and
subject to renewal for another 10 years, under the same terms and
conditions. Respondent Jose Tiongco, demanded a gradual increase
in rental until it reached P400 in 1985. For July and Aug 1991, Buce
paid P1,000 as monthly rentals.
ISSUE: W/N the parties intended an automatic renewal of the lease
contract
HELD: The court ruled that there is nothing in the contract that shows
that the parties intended an automatic renewal or extension of the
term of contract. The fact that the lessee was allowed to introduce
improvements on the property is not indicative of the intention of
the lessors to automatically extend the contract.

On Dec 1991, private respondent wrote petitioner informing
her of the increase in the rent to P1,576.58 effective Jan 1992
pursuant to Rent Control Law. Petitioner, however tendered checks
for only P400 each, payable to Jose Tiangco. Private respondents
refused to accept the same.
On Aug1993, Petitioner filed with RTC of Manila a complaint
for specific performance with prayer for consignation. She prayed
that the respondents be ordered to accepts the rentals in accordance
with the lease contract and to respect the lease of 15 years, which
was renewable for another 10 yrs, at the rate of P200 per month.
The period of lease contracts is deemed to have been set for
the benefit of both parties. Renewal of contract may be had only
upon mutual agreement. Since private respondents were not
amenable to a renewal, they cannot be compelled to execute a new
contract. It is the owner-lessor’s prerogative to terminate lease at its
expiration. The continuance, effectivity and fulfillment of a contract
of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the choice of the
lessee, completely depriving the owner of any say in the matter.

Respondents countered that the petitioner already paid the

monthly rental of P1,000 for July and Aug. 1991. They were justified
in refusing the checks for P400 that petitioner tendered. Moreover,
the phrase in the lease authorizing renewal for another 1 yrs does not
mean automatic renewal; it contemplates a mutual agreement
between the parties. Counsel for private respondents wrote
petitioner reminded her that the contract expired on June 1 1994,
and demanding that she pay P33,000.

RTC declared the contract automatic renewed. CA reversed

the decision of the RTC, and ordered petitioner to immediately
vacate the leased premises.
GREGORIO ARANETA vs. PHIL. SUGAR ESTATES HELD: If the contract so provided, that there was a period fixed, a
“reasonable time” and all that the court should have done was to
FACTS: J.M Tuason & Co., Inc is the owner of a big tract of land. On
determine if that reasonable time had elapsed when suit was filed. If
July 1950, through Gregorio Araneta Inc., it sold a portion thereof to
it had, then the court should declare that petitioner had breached
Phil. Sugar Estates Development. The parties stipulated in the
the contract. If the reasonable time had not yet elapsed, the court
contract of purchase and sale that the buyer will “build on said parcel
was bound to dismiss the action for being premature. But in no case
of land the Sto. Domingo Church and Convent” while the seller will
can it be logically held that under the plea, the intervention of the
“construct streets on the sides of the land”.
court to fix the period for performance was warranted.
The buyer, Phil. Sugar finished the construction of the Sto.
Art. 1197 involves a two-step process. The court must first
Domingo Church, but the seller, which began constructing the
determine that the obligation does not fix a period or the period is
streets, is unable to finish the construction of the street in the NE side
made to depend upon the will of the debtor, but from the nature and
because a certain Manuel Abundo, who has been physically
circumstance it can be inferred that a period was intended. The court
occupying a middle part thereof, refused to vacate the same.
cannot fix a period because in its opinion it is reasonable, but must
On May 1958, Phil. Sugar Estates filed its complaint against set the time that the parties are shown to have intended.
J.M Tuason Inc and Gregorio Araneta, seeking to compel the latter to
The trial court appears to have pulled the 2-year period out
comply with their obligation, as stipulated in the deed of sale, and/or
of thin air. This is not warranted by the NCC. It is to be borne in mind
to pay damages in the event they failed or refused to perform said
that the contract shows that the parties were fully aware that the
obligation.
land was occupied by squatters. As the parties must have known that
Defendants answered the complaint, setting up the defense they could not take the law into their own hands, but must resort to
that the action was premature since its obligation to construct the legal process in evicting the squatters, they must realized that the
streets in question was without a definite period which needs to be duration of the suits to be brought would not be under their control
fixed first by the court before a complaint for specific performance nor could be determine in advance.
will prosper.
There is no justification in law for setting the performance at
The lower court and the appellate court ruled in any other time than that of the eviction of the illegal settlers
favor of Phil. Sugar estates, and gave defendant Gregorio occupying the land.
Araneta, Inc., a period of two (2) years from notice hereof,
Decision of CA reversed and time for the performance is
within which to comply with its obligation under the
hereby fixed at the date that all illegal settlers are finally evicted.
contract.

ISSUE: W/N the parties agreed that the petitioner should have a
reasonable time to perform its part of the obligation
CENTRAL PHIL. UNIVERSITY vs. CA
FACTS: In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., executed a deed of
donation in favor of the latter of a parcel of land with the ff
conditions: (1) that the land shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively
for the establishment and use of a medical college with all its
buildings as part of the curriculum; (2). The said college shall not sell,
transfer or convey to any third party nor in any way encumber said
land; and (3) The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS",
and the said college shall be under obligation to erect a cornerstone
bearing that name. Any net income from the land or any of its parks
shall be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS
FUND" to be used for improvements of said campus and erection of
a building thereon.
On May 1989, private respondents, who are the heirs of Don Ramon
Lopez, Sr., filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance
and damages against CPU alleging that since 1939 up to the time the
action was filed the latter had not complied with the conditions of
the donation.
In its answer petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents
to file the action had prescribed; that it did not violate any of the
conditions in the deed of donation.
On 31 May 1991, the trial court held that petitioner failed to comply
with the conditions of the donation and declared it null and void. The
trial court directed petitioner to execute a deed of the reconveyance
of the property in favor of the heirs of the donor.
The appellate court also found that while the first condition
mandated petitioner to utilize the donated property, the donor did
not fix a period within which the condition must be fulfilled, hence,
until a period was fixed for the fulfillment of the condition, petitioner
could not be considered as having failed to comply with its part of the
bargain. Thus, the appellate court rendered its decision reversing the
appealed decision and remanding the case to the court of origin for
the determination of the time within which petitioner should comply
with the first condition annotated in the certificate of title.
ISSUE: W/N there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the
condition?
HELD: Under Art. 1197, when the obligation does not fix a period but
from its nature & circumstance it can be inferred that the period was
intended, the court may fix the duration thereof because the
fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the
court has fixed the period for compliance therewith & such period has
arrived. However, this general rule cannot be applied in this case
considering the different set of circumstances existing more than a
reasonable period of 50 yrs has already been allowed to petitioner to
avail of the opportunity to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do
so. Hence, there is no need to fix a period when such procedure
would be a mere technicality & formality & would serve no purpose
than to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive multiplication of
suits.
Under Art. 1191, when one of the obligors cannot comply
with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission
before the court unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a
period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine
the period of compliance there is no more obstacle for the court to
decree recission.
The petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable
length of time. It is only just to declare the subject donation already
ineffective.
MILLARE vs HERNANDO
FACTS: A five-year contract was executed between petitioner as
lessor and respondent as lessee. Under the written agreement, the
lessor agreed to rent out to the lessee at a monthly rate of P350 the
“People’s Restaurant” a commercial establishment located at the
corner of McKinley and Pratt Streets in Abra.
According to the Co spouses, sometime during the last week
of May 1980, the lessor informed them that they could continue
leasing the property so long as they were amenable to paying
increased rentals of P1,200 a month. A counter-offer of P700 a month
was made by the Co spouses. At this point, Millare allegedly stated
that the amount of monthly rentals could be resolved at a later time
since “the matter is simple among us”, which alleged remark was
supposedly taken by the spouses Co to mean that the Contract of
Lease had been renewed, prompting them to continue occupying the
subject premises and to forego their search for a substitute place to
rent. In contrast, the lessor flatly denied ever having considered,
much less offered, a renewal of the Contract of Lease.
On July 22 and 28, 1980, Millare sent demand letters
requesting them to vacate as she had no intention of renewing the
Contract of Lease, which had expired. The spouses Co signified their
intention to deposit the P700 monthly rental in court, in view of Mrs.
Millare’s refusal to accept their counter-offer.
The spouses Co filed a complaint with the CFI of Abra, and
Millare filed an ejectment case against the spouses Co.
The court rendered a judgment ordering the renewal of the
least for 5 years counted from the expiration of the contract, and
fixing a monthly rental of P700 a month.
ISSUE: W/N the court may order the renewal of Contract of Lease
for another 5 years
HELD: The court ruled that the court cannot order the renewal of the
lease. Par. 13 of the contract can only mean that the lessor and lessee
may agree to renew the contract upon reaching their agreement on
the terms and conditions to be embodied in such renewal of contract.
Failure to reach agreement on the terms and conditions of the
renewal contract will of course prevent the contract from being
renewed at all.
The lessor and lessee failed to reach agreement both on the
amount of rental to be payable during the renewal term, and on the
term of the renewed contract.
The parties do not pretend that the continued occupancy of
the leased premises after 31 May 1980, the date of expiration of the
contract, was with the acquiescence of the lessor. The implied new
lease could not possibly have a period of five years, but rather would
have been a month-to-month lease since the rentals (under the
original contract) were payable on a monthly basis. At the latest, an
implied new lease (had one arisen) would have expired as of the end
of July 1980 in view of the written demands served by the petitioner
upon the private respondents to vacate the previously leased
premises.
The respondent judge’s decision requiring renewal of lease
has no basis in law or in fact.
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CORP vs. DEL ROSARIO
FACTS: Spouses Del Rosario jointly and severally executed, signed
and delivered in favor of Radiowealth a promissory note. It was
stipulated in the promissory note that if default be made in the
payment, the total principal sum together with the late charges, shall
at once become due and payable without need of notice or demand.
The obligation had matured and they clearly defaulted when their checks
bounced. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one
month after the date of the note because the check representing their first
installment bounced.
The petition is granted and CA’s ruling was modified and the
respondents are ordered to pay.

Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly

installments. Despite repeated demands, they failed to pay their
obligations under their promissory note.

Petitioner filed a complaint for the collection of sum of

money. During the trial, the credit and collection officer presented in
evidence the respondents’ check payments, demand letters, and
Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips. The officer admitted that he did
not have personal knowledge in any of the documentary evidence, it
was merely endorsed to him. RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed
the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

According to the appellate court, the judicial admission of

respondents established their indebtedness to the petitioner, on the
ground that their only defense was the absence of an agreement on
when the installment payments were to begin.

ISSUE: W/N the obligation is due and demandable

HELD: The court ruled that the act of leaving blank the due date of the first
installment did not necessarily mean that the debtors were allowed to pay
as when they could. If this was the intention of the parties, they should have
indicated in the promissory note. However, it did not reflect any intention.

In this case, the conclusion that the installments had already

become due amd demandable is bolstered by the fact that the respondents
started paying installments on the note, even if the checks were dishonored.
INCHAUSTI & CO vs. YULO
FACTS: Suit is for recovery balance of a current account opened Inchausti &
Company with Teodoro Yulo and after his death continued with his widow
and children, whose principal representative is Gregorio Yulo. At the death
of widow, Gregoria Regalado, children preserved the same relations under
the name of HIJOS DE T. YULO
Continued current account with Inchausti & Company until balance
amounted to P200,000. In for the payment of the disbursements of money
which until that time it had been making in favor of its debtors, the Yulos.
1908, GREGORIO YULO (representing his brothers Pedro, Manuel
and Carme, executed notarial document whereby all admitted their
indebtedness to Inchausti & Company in the sum of P203,221.27. To secure
with 10% interest per annum, they mortgaged an undivided 6/9th of their 38
rural properties, remaining urban properties, lorchas, and family credits
which were listed.
They obligated themselves to make a formal inventory and to
describe all properties, and to cure all defects which might prevent the
inscription of the said contract in the registry of property and to extend by
the necessary formalities the aforesaid mortgage over the remaining 3/9 th
of all the property and rights belonging to their other brothers, the
incompetent Teodoro, and the minors Concepcion and Jose.
1909, GREGPRIO YULO, REPRESENTING HIJOS DE YULO ANSWERED
LETTER OF INCHAUSTI IN THESE TERMS: With your favor of the 2d inst. we
have received an abstract of our current account with your important firm,
closed on the 31st of last December, with which we desire to express our
entire conformity as also with the balance in your favor of P271,863.12.”
INCHAUSTI informed Hijos de T. Yulo of the reduction of balance to
P253,445.42.
HIJOS T. YULO expressed its conformity by means of a letter,
proving that mortgage credit was formalized.
1909, GREGORIO YULO, FOR HIMSELF AND REPRESENTING
MANUEL and PEDRO, FRANCISCO, CARMEN AND CONCEPCION in their OWN
BEHALF (now of legal age) executed affidavit ratifying their admission on
their indebtedness to INCHAUSTI: P253,445.42 with 10% interest per
annum. To be paid in 5 installments at the rate of P50,000, except last being
P53,445.42. Payment beginning June 30, 1910, continuing successively on
the 30th of each June until the last payment on June 30, 1914.
Among other clauses, they expressly stipulated the following:
1. Default in payment of any of the installments or the noncompliance of
any of the other obligations will result in the maturity of all the said
installments
2. INCHAUSTI may exercise at once all the rights and actions to obtain the
immediate and total payment of debt, in same manner that they would have
so done at the maturity of the said installments.
3. All the obligations will be understood as having been contradicted in
solidum by all of us, the Yulos, brothers and sisters.
4. Agreed that this instrument shall be confirmed and ratified in all its parts,
within the present week, by our brother Don Mariano Yulo y Regalado who
resides in Bacolod, otherwise it will not be binding on INCHAUSTI who can
make use of their rights to demand and obtain immediate payment of their
credit without any further extension or delay, in accordance with what we
have agreed.
5. This instrument was neither ratified nor confirmed by Mariano Yulo.
YULOS did not pay the first installment of the obligation. INCHAUSTI brought
an ordinary action against Gregorio Yulo for the payment of P253,445.42
with 10% interest per annum on that date aggregating P42,944.76.
1911, FRANCISCO, MANUEL, and CARMEN Yulo executed another
affidavit in recognition of the debt and obligation of payment in the
following terms:
a. Debt is reduce for them to P225,000
b. Interest is reduced 6% per annum from March 15, 1911
c. Installments are increase to eight, 1st of P20,000,
beginning on June 30, 1911, and the rest of P30,000 each
on the same date of each successive year until the total
obligation shall be finally and satisfactorily paid on June
 30, 1919 present suit. August 12, 1909 affidavit, was novated by that of May 12, 1911,
d. If any of the partial payments specified in the foregoing executed by Manuel, Francisco and Carmen Yulo. COURT DECIDED IN FAVOR
clause be not paid at its maturity, the amount of the said OF GREGORIO/MARIANO YULO. INCHAUSTI pay with costs.
partial payment together with its interest shall bear 15% ISSUE: W/N INCHAUSTI can sue Gregorio alone, here being other obligors
interest per annum from the date of said maturity, HELD: The court ruled that the debtors having consolidated themselves in
without the necessity of demand until its complete solidum, the creditor can bring action against any one of them. This was
payment surely its purpose in demanding that the obligation contracted in its favir
e. If during 2 consecutive years the partial payments agreed should be solidary having in mind the principle of law that “when the
upon be not made, they shall lose the right to make use of obligation is constituted as a conjoint and solidary obligation each one of the
the period granted to them for the payment of the debt debtors is bound to perform in full undertaking which is the subject matter
or the part thereof which remains unpaid, and INCHAUSTI of such obligation”.
may consider the total obligation due and demandable, And even though the creditor may have stipulated with some of the
and proceed to collect the same together with the interest solidary debtors diverse installments and conditions, this does not lead to
for the delay above stipulated through all legal means. the conclusion that the solidarity stipulated in the instrument is broken. The
f. ADDITION STIPULATION: Inchausti & Co. should include in law provides that “solidarity may exist even though the debtors are not
their suit brought in the CFI of Iloilo against Gregorio Yulo, bound in the same manner and for the same periods under the same
his brother and joint co-obligee, Pedro Yulo: conditions.”
FRANCISCO, MANUEL AND CARMEN will procure by all legal means
and in the least time possible a judgment in their favor against the said Don
Gregorio and Don Pedro, sentencing the later to pay the total amount of the
obligation acknowledged by them in August 12, 1909 affidavit
If they should deem it convenient for their interests, Don Francisco,
Don Manuel, and Doña Carmen Yulo may appoint an attorney to cooperate
with the lawyers of Inchausti & Company in the proceedings of the said case.
GREGORIO YULO ASNWERED THE COMPLAINT: An accumulation of
interest had taken place and that compound interest was asked for the
Philippine currency at par with Mexican
IN August 21, 1909 affidavit, 2 conditions were agreed (one
approved by Court of First Instance) and the other ratified and confirmed by
the other brother Mariano Yulo, neither of which was complied with
With regard to the same debt claims were presented before the
commissioners in the special proceedings over the inheritances of Teodoro
Yulo and Gregoria Regalado, though later they were dismissed, pending the
QUIOMBING vs CA
FACTS: Nicencio Quiombing and Dante Bischocho, jointly and severally
bound themselves to construct a house for private respondents Francisco
and Manuelita Saligo. Quiombing and Manuelita Saligo entered into a
second agreement under which the latter acknowledged the completion of
the house and undertook to pay the balance of the contract price.

Manuelita Saligo signed a promissory note representing the

amount still due from her and her husband payable on or before Dec. 31
1984 to Quiombing.

Quiombing filed a complaint for recovery of the said amount, plus

charges and interests, which the respondents acknowledged and promised
to pay- but had not, despite repeated demands. Instead od filing an answer,
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Biscocho was
an indispend=sable party and therefore should have been included as co-
plaintiff. This was granted by the trial court.

Quiombing chose to appeal the order of dismissal, where he argued

that as a solidary creditor he could act by himself alone in the enforcement
of his claim. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: W/N one of the two solidary creditors sue by himself alone for the
recovery of amounts due to both of them without joining the other creditor
as a co-plaintiff?

HELD: The court ruled that it did not matter who as between them filed the
complaint because the private respondents were liable to either of the two
as a solidary creditor for the full amount of the debt. Full satisfaction of a
judgment obtained against them by Quiombing would discharge their
obligation to Biscocho, and vice versa; hence, it was not necessary for both
creditors Quiombing and Biscocho to file the complaint. Inclusion of
Biscocho as a co-plaintiff when Quiombing was competent to sue by himself
alone, would be a useless formality.
INCIONG JR. vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner liability resulted from the Promissory note in the amount
of 50K which he signed with Naybe and Pantanosas, holding themselves
jointly and severally liable to PBC. The note was due on May 5, 1983.
Said due date expired without the promisors having paid their
obligaton. PBC sent telegrams demanding payments. PBS also sent by
registered mal a final letter of demand to Naybe. Since obligors did not
respond to the demands made, PBC filed a complaint for collection of the
sum against the three obligors.The lower court dismissed the case against
Pantanosas and Naybe. Only the summons addressed to Inciong Jr. was
made. Petitioner alleged that he was approached by his friend, who told him
that he was a partner of Pio Tio, in the falacta logs operations business.
Campos then persuaded him to act as a co-maker in a loan. He acceded with
the understanding that he would only be a co-maker for the loan of P5,000.
Petitioner alleged that 5 blank copies of note were brought to him, he
affixed his signature and indicated in one copy that he bound himself for
only 5k. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud, and misrepresentation that he was
made liable for 50k .
property of the principal debtor has been exhausted, retains all the other
rights, actions and benefits which pertain to him by reason of the fiansa;
while a solidary co-debtor has no other rights than those bestowed upon
him.
Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states that the
three signatories therein are jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all
of them may be proceeded against for the entire obligation. The choice is
left to the solidary creditor (PBC) to determine against whom he will enforce
collection. Consequently, the dismissal of the case against Pontanosas may
not be deemed as having discharged Inciong from liability as well. As regards
Naybe, suffice it to say that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him.
Inciong, therefore, may only have recourse against his co-makers, as
provided by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Inciong should be held liable.

HELD: Yes. Inciong is considering himself as a guarantor in the promissory

note. And he was basing his argument based on Article 2080 of the Civil Code
which provides that guarantors are released from their obligations if the
creditors shall release their debtors. It is to be noted however that Inciong
did not sign the promissory note as a guarantor. He signed it as a solidary
co-maker.

A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor does not
become a solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes. There is a
difference between a solidary co-debtor and a fiador in solidum (surety).
The latter, outside of the liability he assumes to pay the debt before the