N.B.

This is a Working Paper

c i r c u l a t e d f o r comment
m d c r i t i c i s m only.
It does not represent
the f i n a l viems of the
Lapl Commission.

THE LAW
COM M I S S I O N
PUBLISHED WORKING PAPER

F i r s t Progrcnme - Item X
FAIdILY LAV

N u l l i t y of Marriage

14th June, 1968

The Lam Commission will be

g r a t e f u l i f comments can be
.-- sent i n by 1st Januasy, 1969.
All correspondence should be
addressed to: -
E.G. Caldwell,
Law Commission
Lacon House,
Theobalds Road,
London, 7 . C . l
(Tcl: 01-405-8700, Ext; 230)
 N u l l i t y of t l a r r i a g e

Table of Contents

P a r w a p h Nose

Introduction 1 - 5
Scope of Paper 1 - 3
References and Abbreviations 4
S t a t i s t i c s on ITullity 5
Part I - E x i s t i n g Grounds of l f u l l i t y 6 36 -
S u n n a y of Grounds 6 - 8
Void Marriages 9 - 24
I n v a l i d Cerenony of Naxriage 3 - 10
Mon-age ll
P r o h i b i t e d Degrees 12 - 18
P r i o r E x i s t i n g 1.Tarriage 19
I n s a n i t 37 20 - 21
Lack of Consent 2 2 - 24
Vo idab 1e l!larriages 25 - 32
h p o t e n ce 25
Wilful Refusal t o Consumate 26 - 27
Grounds under Matrinonicil Causes A c t 1965?
s. 9 0 ) (b)? (4, (a> 28 '
.. 36
Part I1 - Approbation 37 - 42
Part 111 - Should I n s a n i t y mr?Lack of Consent nake
a l.'Iarricge VoidFwble instea6 of Void-? 43 - 49
Past IV - Should rn Under-Age EIarriwe b e Voidable o r
R a t i f i a b l e i n s t e a d of Void? 50 - 53
P,at V - Should the Concept of a Voidable b I a s r i B
be r e t a i n e d ? 54 - 59
Part VI - Should Inpotence mcl V i l f u l Xcfusd t o
C o n s m a t e Cease ,after Three Yems f r o n
fihrriage t o rmkc the llaxriagc Void-able? 60

P a t VI1 - Parties to a Kullity Suit 61 - 67

P a s t VI11 - Should I J u l l i t y Procecdinp be Combined n i t h
(1) Proceedings t o d c c l a r c t h e nasriage void,
and ( 2 ) L e g i t i m c y Proceedings? a - 71
Part IX - P o s s i b l e Addition,al Grounds of N u l l i t x 72 - 75
Put X - Collusion 75 - 77
Pmt XI - Sumary of Questions and P r o v i s i o n a l Conclusions 78
 NmLLITY OF I!.'LARRIAGE

Intrnduction

Scope of Paper

1. l'his Paper, i n accordance with t h e t e r n s of item XM of t h e Second

Programme o f Law Reform of the Law Commission, w i l l examine t h e existing
law of n u l l i t y of marriage, the division of annulled marriages i n t o void
and voidable onesp whether the e x i s t i n g law and this division are
s a t i s f a c t o r y and whether any a l t e r a t i o n i s desirable i n t h e status o r
e f f e c t o f voidable marriages. The l a w of marriage, ( i . e . t h e law
governing the rites and ceremonies o f marriag??), the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the
o o u r t s and the recognition of foreign decrees are outside the scope of
tho Paper. Polygamous marriages a r e a l s o outside i t s scopo.

2. 'Ghile the Law Commission has reached oonclusions on some matters

and ha3 put forward proposals i n t h i s Paper, such conclusions and
proposals a r e p r a v i s i o n d only and may well be modified i n the l i g h t of
the views expressed i n response t o this Paper. It i s not f o r the Law
Commission, but f o r Parliament i n t h e l i g h t of public opiniol?, t o
s e t t l e controversial s o c i a l questions and our function i s t o e x d n e
those questions i n order t o assist the l e g i s l a t u r e and t h e general
p u b l i c t o form an opinion as t o what a l t e r a t i o n s i n the law may be
necessary o r d e s i r a b l e , Ye have, thercforc, attempted t o s e t out the
ar,gxnents for and a g a i n s t d i f f e r e n t proposals and have ventured t o put
forward o u r omn provisional opinions and conclusions o n l y where we
considered that these might be helpful. Ve shall be g-ratcful if
comments can bc s e n t t o thc Lam Commission by 1 s t January, 1969.

3. r:c& coficlusion reached by the Law Commission so f a r is t h a t

the threefold d i s t i n c t i o n betneen v a l i d , voidable and void marriages
should be raaintained, because i t corresponds t o f a c t u a l differences i n
the s i t u a t i o n of the p a s t i e s which cc11 for d i f f e r e n t kinds of r e l i e f
from the courts. A void marriage, uhich the i n t c r e s t s of societ-; do
n o t perrnit t o be a marriage a t all, n o r n d l y requires no i n t e r v e n t i o n
by the courts ancl. the p a r t i e s are f r e e t o disregard i t nithout t a k i n g
any formal s t e p t o have i t s e t a s i d e , A t the othcr end of tho s c a l e
i s the v a l i d marriage which can only bc ended by death o r divorce.
If t h e Divorce Reform B i l l non before Parliament passes i n t o law, t h e
only ground f o r divorce a i l 1 be i r r e t r i e v a b l e breakdown of the marriage.
In between the void and the v a l i d m a r r i a g e s i s the voidable m a r r i a g e
which i s i n some way incomplete o r defective; i t d i f f e r s from a void
marriage i n t h a t t h e r e exists a legal t i e which cannot be disre,-dcd
without an order of t h e court terminating the t i e , and i t dii'fcrs from
a v a l i d marriage i n as much as i t would be inappropriate t o t a l k of the
breakdovn of something that had never been perfected and t h e parties
arguably have no duty t o seek t o be reconciled o r t o w a i t f o r a period
before seeking r e l i e f .

Ref crenccs and Abbreviations

4. The following abbreviations w i l l be used: -

~0re.11Commission Report of Royal Comnission on Divorce 'and
Matrimonial Causes 1912, Cd. 6478

Morton Commission Report o f Royal Commission on Marriage and

Divorce 1956, Cmd. 9678

Church Report ' Report. of Commission appaintcd by the

Archbishops o f Canterbury and York,
e n t i t l e d "The Church and the Law of
N u l l i t y of Xarriage, I' S .P. C.K. 1955

P u t t i n g . Asunder Eleport of n group appointed by t h e

Archbishop of Canterbury, S.P.C.K. 1966.

S t a t i s t i c s on N u l l i t y

5. The follotaing a r e the figures of n u l l i t y p e t i t i o n s f i l o d and

n u l l i t y decrees granted during the years 1961 t o 1966 inclusive:-

, .

- 2 -
 PETI T IO?TS
~~ ~

1961 1963 1964 1965 1966 Average

-I

73 03 72 69 76 75
Voidable 1,'Iarriages:
Incapacity 155 141 145 133 145 146 144
-iKlful Refusal 174 169 207 164 164 196 179
I n c a p a c i t y and
I'kilful R e h d 349 '363 471 453 499 530 444
Unsound Mind o r
Epilepsy 17 19 13 9 9 16 14
Pregmicy 8 18 17 16 21 23 17
Venereal Disease 5 3 3 - 3 12 4

To tal i 781 807 919 8 47 999 877

i

--
I
1961 1962 j
I
1963 1964 Average
!
-
. .- I I

32 52 61
-
Voidable Xmriages:
Incapacity 2 28 299 331 351-
Y i l f u l Refusal 234 176 319 295
Unsound Mind o r
Epilepsy 5
Pregnancy 6 8 17
Venereal Disease 1 2 2

Total 554 1
I 741 728
i I I I

By nay of comparison, i n 1966 t h e r e were s e t down 46,890 p e t i t i o n s for

d i v o r c e and there were made 41,081 d e c r e e s n i s i o f d i v o r c e , Accordingly
n u l l i t y i s o f much less importance than divorce. On t h e other hand t h e
lavi i s n o t wh:lly c l e a r o r s a t i s f a c t o r y i n all r e s p e c t s and i t s
c l a r i f i c a t i o n and refcrm i s a n e c e s s a r y p r e l i m i n a r y t o a c o d i f i c a t i o n of
Fznily Lav.

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 I EXISTIXG GROUXDS OF NULLITY
Summary of the Ground-s

6. The grounds on mhich a marriage i s void are:

' (1) invaJ-id ceremony of masriage;
(2) non-age;
(3) prohibited degrees (i.e. consanguinity and
affinity);
(4) p r i o r e x i s t i n g rilarricage;
(5) i n s a n i t y a t the ti--; of marriage;
(6) l a c k of consent. (1)
Grounds (1) t o (3) are governed by t'nc Narriage Act 19.19. Grounds (4)
t o (6) are grounds on vihich a marriage n a s void i n e c c l e s i a s t i c a l law,
which became a p a r t of o u r matrimonial law by v i r t u e of the I\'Iatrimonial
Causes Act 1857, s.22, now replaced by t h e Supreme Court of Judicature

- -
(Consolidation)
--. . _ _..__
_ A c t 1925, s.32.
.-_

7. The grounds on which 8 marriage i s voidable are:

(1) impotence;
(2) n i l f u l r e f u s a l t o consummate the marriage;
(3) unsoundness o f mind, mental d i s o r d e r o r epilepsy at
. the time o f the marriage!
(4) venereal disease i n n communicable form a t the t i m e of
- the marriage;
(5) pregnancy by a mm o t h e r than the husband at the time
of the marriage j
Ground (1) i s derived from e c c l e s i a s t i c a l law; grounds ( 2 ) t o ( 5 ) m e
s t a t u t o r y a d are governed by the Fatriiilonia.1 Causes Act 1965, s.9*

8. The e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s between void and voidable marriages are:

it void marriage i s n o t r e a l l y a marriage a t all, i n that i t never cane i n t o
existence because of a fundarficntzl dcfect; no decree of n u l l i t y i s
necessary t o n&e i t void and p a r t i e s c,m t&e the risk of t r e a t i n g the
. <

Q
mari-age as void n i t h o u t o b t a i n i n g a decree, vhich i s in e f f e c t a
declaration that t h e r e i s not and ncvcr was a marriage; m y person
having a s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t i n obtaining a declaration of n u l l i t y may

(1) There are, honever, recent d i c t a t o the e f f e c t that l a c k of consent

may m&e a marrizgc void&le m d not void, but the b e t t e r view i s
thoug-ht t o be o t h c n i s c ; s e e t h i s point discussed i n 'Void and
Voidable Marriages" by Dimitry Tolstoy, Q.C. (1964) 27 3'I.L.R. 385,

-4-
p e t i t i o n f o r a d e c r e e a t any t i n e , whether d u r i n g t h e l i f e t i m e o f the
spouses o r a f t e r t h e i r d e a t h , A v o i d a b l e narriage i s a v a l i d marriage
unless and. u n t i l i t i s annulled and i t CFJI o n l y b e a n n u l l e d at t h c
i n s t a n c e of one of t h e spouses d u r i n g t h e l i f e t i m e of b o t h , s o t h a t i f
no d e c r e e of n u l l i t y i s pronounced- d u r i n g t h e l i f c t i n e of b o t h spouses
the rxxcriage becomes uniupeachable as soon as one of t h e spouses d i m .

Vclicl Xarriages

Invalid Ccrcnony of FJerriag-

9. F o r m l i t i o s or” IiIarriaeg

We i n t e n d t o c i r c u l a t e l a t e r a paper d e d i n g g e n e r a l l y with t h e law

of marri‘age and, t h e r e € o r e , we do n o t propose t o comment i n this p a p e r
on t h e formCalities of marriage or on t h e circumstances i n which f a i l u r e
t o colilply with such f o r m a l i t i e s makes the ceremony void.

10. Narrisge of I n f a n t s
(lbj
An infant between the age of 1 6 and t h e age of m a j o r i t y ( a t p r e s e n t 21),
n o t b e i n g a widower o r widow’, r e q u i r e s t h e consent of h i s p a r e n t s , p a r e n t
o r g u a r d i m ’ , or o f t h e c o u r t , or of c e r t a i n o f f i c i a l s , as t h e c&se may b e ,
f o r marriage under t h e s c p e r i n t e n d e n t rcg5strar’s c e r t i f i c a t e o r b y
common l i c e n c e , ( 2 ) No consent i s r e q u i r e d b y lan t o =tn i n f a n t ’ s marria@
) i t i s c l e a r , from t h e i n f o r m a t i o n me
after pu’olication of b ~ m ? s ( ~and.
have o b t a i n e d , that i t i s a simple matter f o r m i n f a n t t o evade the ~ELTJ

and t o be married n i t h o u t the r e q u i s i t e p a r e n t a l consent. I f an i n f a n t

does succeed i n marrying w i t h o u t the r e q u i s i t e consent, his marria& i s
nevertheless valid. (‘) 1% t h i n k t h s t t h e law as t o p a r e n t a l c o n s e n t ,
c o n s i d e r i n g the ease mith which i t cCmbe evaded, i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y u ,dl
VJE i n t e n d t o cover these n a t t e r s i n a future paper on t h e l a w of marriage.

( 1 A ) “he L a t c y Comnittee on the Age of N a j o r i t y (1967, Cmnd 3342) h m

recommended that the age of m a j o r i t y shall be reduced to 18 and the
Government has announced t h a t i t a c c e p t s t h i s r c commendation.
(2) Narriage Act 1949, s,3(1), (2)
(3) The p a r e n t ‘ s o n l y remedy i s t o d e c l a r e his o p p o s i t i o n t o the
marriage i n church a t t h e time of t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f the banns;
i b i d . , s , 25( c >
(4) Mamiage Act 1949, s.48(1)

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Non-age

11. A mxriage betneen two persons e i t h e r of whom i s under the age of

s i x t e e n i s void, (5) The Lztey Coruxi,ttee(6) mas unaninous t h a t sixteen
should remain the n i n i n w age of narriage and t h i s i s a l s o our view,
Ve d e a l later ( p a r a s 50-53) with suggestions t o a l t e r t h e lag s o as t o
nake under-age rnasriages v a l i d i n c e r t a i n c".rcunstances.

P r o h i b i t e d Demees

12. The persons whom one may n o t m r r y by r e m o n of consanguinity o r

a f f i n i t y a r o s e t o u t i n t h e F i r s t Schedule t o the Narrictgc A c t 1949.
They aret
For a nan F o r a wonan

1. Xo ther 1. Father
2. Daughter 2, Son
3. Grandmother 3. G r mdf ather
4. Granddaughter 4* Grands on
5. Sister 5. Brother
6. AUl t 6. Uncle
7. Niece 7. Nephew
8. Father's son's 8. ?!IQ ,
t h e r s daughter s ,
grandfather's o r f;randnotlierf s o r .
grcandsont s wife gaiddaugh t e r s husband
9. Wife's n o t h e r , dau&ter, 9. Husband's father, son,
g m n l o t h e r or gradfather or gradson.
gmnddaught er.

(5) hlarriage Act 1949, s.2; t h i s s e c t i o n a p p l i e s t o a narriagc wherever

c e l e b r a t e d i f one of the p a r t i e s i s domiciled i n England: pU& v.
PUG [1951] P, 402,
I A narriage between p a r t i e s under the age of
s i x t e e n i s r e g a r d e d as v z l i d b y 3 n g l i s h law i f by t h e law of t h e i r
do@;il b o t h p a r t i c s have c a p a c i t y t o n a r r y under that age and if the
marriage i s c e l e b r a t e d i n a country nherc such a. narriage i s v a l i d :
-
N. V. s. (1968) Tines, 1.hrch 2 9 , It nay be o€ i n t e r e s t t o conparc
the nzrriage ag2 i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s ; the l o n e r figures in b r a c k e t s
show the n i n i m age a t a h i c h p e n f i s s i o n t o narry nay be g r a n t e d by a
c o u r t o r o t h e r p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y I-rith o r n i t h o u t p a r e n t a l consent.
Australia: 18 and 1 6 (16 md 14); N c n Zealmd: 16 f o r b o t h sexes;
Canada: 1 6 t o 14 according t o Province; F r m c e : 18 =and 15 with
permission t o n a r r y e a r l i e r p o s s i b l e ; Republic of Irelcmd: 14 ,ad 12;
I t a l y : 1 6 and 14 (14 wd 1 2 p o s s i b l e : 8 Japan: 18 and 16; Sneden: 2 1
and 18 with p e r n i s s i o n t o c a r r y e a r l i e r p o s s i b l e ; S-iJitzorland: 20 and
18, (18 and 1 7 ) ; U,S,A.: 20 t o 14 f o r n d c s a a d 18 t o 1 2 f o r fenales
according t o S t a t e a i t h pcrnissioui t o n n r r y under t h e p r e s c r i b e d age in
sone S t a t e s ; West Gem,my: 18 'and 1 6 , v i t h p e r n i s s i o n t o m a r r y e a r l i e r
possible, The Lntey C o r n i t t e e e x m i n e d t'ne a g e - l i m i t s i n f o r e i g n
c o u n t r i e s znd concluded t h a t "before one cod$. apply, as a p p r o p r i a t e t o
England, the age-liiiits i n a n o t h e r country one would have t o a s c e r t a i n
that the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s were broadly conparable:" Report of the
GOl;ll?ittee on t h e A s of X a j o r i t y 7 1967, Cmd. 3342, pasa. 52.
(6) Report of Conmittec on Age of N a j o r i t y , 1967, Cmnd, 3342, p a a s . 166-177-

-6-
 Thcsu p r o h i b i t e d degrees o f r e l a t i o n s h i p i n c l u d e half -blood(7) and
illc$itinntc(8) relationships. These p r o h i b i t i o n s apply t o all
uarria,ps i n England ,md t o t h e narriagc abroad of a person domiciled
i n B ~ g l m d(9)
.

13. An a d o p t e r and t h e person whon he a6opts under ED adoption o r d e r

itre decned t o b e n i t h i n t h c p r o h i b i t e d degrees and tlwy c o n t i n u e t o be s o
n o t a i t h s t a n 6 i n g t h a t soncone e l s e a d o p t s t h a t person by a subsequent
adoption order. The r e l a t i o n s h i p a r i s i n g b c t m c n persons as a
rcsult o f cm ado2tion i s cxaainci? i n parc. 18.

14. The p r o h i b i t e d degrees of r e l a t i o n s h i p f d l i n t o lmo c a t e g o r i e s :

c o n s a n g u i n i t y , i.e. r e l a t i o n s h i p by blood., ,ad a f f i n i t y , i . e . r e l a t i o n s h i p
b y marriage. The t v o c a t e g o r i e s nust be exanined s c p r r a t e l y nhen
discussing n h e t h e r the cxis t i n g p o h i b i t i o n s s h o u l d be nodificc?..

15 Cons anguini tx
There i s presunably 3 consensus o f opinion t h c t n nm should- n o t
n a r r y h i s d-aughtcr, gmulddaughtcr, mother, g m n b o t h c r o r sister. It i s
i n f a c t a c r i m i n a l offonce f o r a nan t o hcve S e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e with such
f e n d e r e l a t i o n s ( i n c l u d i n g half -blood mnd i l l c g i t i n a t e ) , w i t h the exception
of his granclnother. The remaining p r o h i b i t e d degrees of c c n s m g u i n i t y
arc i n t h e cclsc of a n m , his aunt ,me n i e c e a d , i n t h e c m e of a noman,
her uncle and r?cphcw. A nm 2nd h i s g r e a t - a u n t 2nd h i s g r e a t - n i e c e , o r L?
B O L ~m~d her g r e a t - u n c l e m d p c a t - n c p h e v 7 n e n o t w i t h i n the p r o h i b i t e d
degrees. The q u e s t i o n n h c t h c r t h e e x i s t i n g prohibitecl degrees of
c o n s a n g u i n i t y are adequate o r n h c t h c r they s h o u l d b e a l t e r e d i s p a r t l y
b i o l o @ c a l and p z r t l y s o c i a l m d norLa.
(1) In s o f n r as t h e q u e s t i o n i s b i o l o g i c d , t h e tinsuer w i l l
depend on an e v a l u a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c evidence. The
marriage of u n c l e 2nd n i e c e , o r nephew <mdaunt i s p e r m i t t e d
i n sone c o u n t r i e s md by sornc religions('*) md i t i.1ay be

(7) -
B. V. Brighton (Inhabitmts) (1861) 1 B. eS S. 447; It'ktrriage Act 1949,
s.7S(l); I'larriagc (lhabling) A c t 1960, s.1(2).
(8) R e s t a l l v. R e s t a l l (1929) 45 T.L.R. 518
(9) De Wilton V. Montefiorc [l900] 2 Ch. 481
(lb) Adoption Act 1958, s.13(3).
(11) S e x u a l Offences Act 1956, ss.10, 11.
(12) See f o r i n s t a n c e Choni V. Chcni E19651 P. 85 (marriage of uncle a d
n i e c e v a l i d by Egyptian mc? J e n i s h law); De 'Tilton V. K o n t e f i o r c
[lgOO] 2 k. @l(];larriage of m c l c aylcl n i e c e i n Gernsn-77.
P e d [1931] P, 97 (riariage i n I n d i a of ncphcw and aunt by half-blood
__.

t i i t h d i s i x x s a t i o n of Ronm C a t h o l i c Church) a

- 7 -
 that there i s no adequate b i o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i o n t o such
marriages, S i m i l a r l y , t h e r e ma47 be no adequate b i o l o @ c a l
o b j e c t i o n t o the marriage of a n , ~ nwith h i s p c m d p a r e n t f s
sister(13) o r of a norim v5th her g r a n d p a r e n t ' s b r o t h e r , and
t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s nay have been o n i t t e d fron t h e p r o h i b i t e d
clegrces for t h i s reason. If, honcver, there are b i o l o g i c a l
r e a s o n s age.ins t m y p r t i c u l a r union, t h a t nould- c o n s t i t u t e
a good! reason f o r p r o h i b i t i n g t h e union. We vould n e l c o n e
a d v i c e on these q u e s t i o n s : e.g. i s n a r r i a e between a u n c l e
,mc? n i e c e o f t h e h d f - b l o o d any nore o b j e c t i o n a b l e t h m a
narriage of first c o u s i n s ? Conversely, i s asrriage between
first cousins objectionable i f thcir r e s p e c t i v e parents m e
two b r o t h e r s who n a r r i e d t n o s i s t e r s ?

(2) I n s o far as the q u e s t i o n raises s o c i a l mC! n o r a l problems,

the astiler nust dcpend on p u b l i c o p i n i o n , Would p u b l i c
opinion t o l e r a t e or o b j e c t t o n n r r i a g e s between uncle mc?
n i e c e or nephen mc? aunt an2, i f i t o b j e c t s 50 s u c h u n i o n s ,
docs i t wish t o extend. t h e p o h i b i t i o n t o g r e a t - u n c l e znd
g r e a t - n i o c c and great-kephew &-id g r e a t - a u n t ? . l'bay p e o p l e
uould no doubt i n s t i n c t i v e l y h o l d the view that such marriages
arc unnatural 2nd wrong just as t h e y nould v i e n n i t h r e v u l s i o n
a narrisge between brother and s i s t e r even i f there ere no
b i o l o g i c d . r e c s o n s a g a i n s t such union. There are sone natters
of c o n v i c t i o n on n h i c h nen hold- s t r o n g f e e l i n g s o f right 'and-
wrong though t h e y ccmnot p l a c e t h e i r f i n g e r on m y p a r t i c u l a r
reason f o r t h i s conviction. Thus, thc p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t
t h e a d o p t e r n a r r y i n g t h e person d o p t c ? - i s bzse?, i n p c r t at
l e a s t , on noral grounds as t h e r e c m n o t be any biolo@ccal
r e a s o n for this p r o h i b i t i o n .

16. Affinity
!The p r o h i b i t e d degrees of a f f i n i t y f a l l i n t o t n o categcriesr
t h o s e which p r o h i b i t a am f r o = n a a r y i n g h i s father's o r grcandlfzther's
n i f e and his s o n ' s o r g r a n d s o n ' s wife an3 t h o s e n h i c h p r o h i b i t hin from
narrying h i s wife's mother,, g r a n d n o t h e r , d a u g h t e r o r granddcughter (md

(13) This i s a l e s s f m t s s t i c p o s s i b i l i t y than the mrriage of a nm

t o h i s ,-r,mdz?other which i s expressly f o r b i d d e n ; noreover the
g r e a t - a u n t nay b e consid-erably younger than t h e p m l l p a ; r e n t ,
particularly i f the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s h a l f - b l o o d o r illegitinate.

- 8 - . .
 the e q u i v a l e n t male r e l a t i o n s i n t h e c a s e o f a woman). The h i s t o r i c a l
o b j e c t i o n t o such unions w a s based on the p o u n d t h a t husband and wife
were one9 s o that r e l a t i o n s h i p by marriage was e q u i v a l e n t t o r e l a t i o n s h i p
by blood, This r e a s o n i n g i s u n l i k e l y t o appeal to-day and one must ask
n h e t h e r there e x i s t s o c i a l o r moral r e a s o n s against such unions, As i n
the c a s e of c o n s a n g u i n i t y , there are undoubtedly people who f e e l that
such unions are m o r a l l y wrong and s h o u l d n o t b e p e r m i t t e d , On t h e
o t h e r hand, there are o t h e r s who f e e l that s u c h unions are no more
o b j e c t i o n a b l e than what w a s p e r m i t t e d b y t h e Marriage ( P r o h i b i t e d Demees
of R e l a t i o n s h i p ) Acts 1907 t o 1931 and the Marriage (Enabling) Act 1960. (14)
17. The Morton Comrilission had 8s p a r t of t h e i r terms of r e f e r e n c e
" t o c o n s i d e r whether any a l t e r a t i o n should be made i n t h e lam p r o h i b i t i n g
marriage w i t h c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s b y k i n d r e d o r a f f i n i t y . t l ( l 5 ) The

Commission recommended t h a t the t h e n existing p r o h i b i t i o n against a man

marrying h i s d i v o r c e d wife's s i s t e r , n i e c e o r a u n t ( o r a woman marrying
h e r divorced husband's b r o t h e r , nepheu o r u n c l e ) should be removed (16)
and this recommendation r e s u l t e d i n t h e p a s s i n g o f the Ifarriage (Enabling)
A c t 1960.(17) I n a d d i t i o n t o this p r o p o s a l there were "a few witnesses"
who proposed that a l l p r o h i b i t i o n s on marriage w i t h r e l a t i o n s by a f f i n i t y
' s h o u l d be a b o l i s h e d , (I8) The Commission's Report does n o t s a y whether
there v i a s any evidence i n s u p p o r t of a l t e r i n g t h e p r o h i b i t e d degrees of
consan,guinlty and, i f t h e r e v ~ a ssuch evidence, i t cannot have been
r c g a r d e d as weighty. The Commission recommended t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be
no changc i n t h e law r d a t i n g t o t h o marriage o f persons w i t h i n t h e
p r o h i b i m d degrees of r e l a t i o n s h i p o t h e r than t h a t mentioned above and
n h i c h r e s u l t e d i n t'ie
1960 A c t . (I9) Unless t h e r e i s evidence t o show
that p u b l i c opinion has changed s i n c e 1955 and now d e s i r e s a r e v i s i o n of
the e x i s t i n g p r o h i b i t e d degrees, i t i s probably better t o make no f u r t h e r
a l t e r a t i o n i n them.

(14) See p a r a 17 and n o t e (17)

(15) Norton Commission, p. i v
(16) a i d , para. 1167
(17) The Deceased Wife's S i s t e r ' s Marriage A c t 1907 allomcd rnarriag'e
bet-srwn a m a n and h i s deceased wife's s i s t z r ; t h e Deceased
B r o t h e r ' s Widow's Nazriage A c t 1921, allowed m a r r i a g e betvrcon a
man and h i s deceased b r o t h e r ' s widow; the Marriage ( P r o h i b i t e d
Degrees of R e l a t i o n s h i p ) A c t 1931 a l l o v e d marriage b e t w e n persons
a d t h e i r deceased spouse's nephew, niece, uncle o r aunt and
between persons and t h e i r deceased nephew's, n i e c e ' s uncle's o r
a u n t ' s widow o r widower. These Acts have been r e p e a l e d and
re-enacted by t h e Narriage Act 1949 s,1(2) and First Schedule,
P a r t 11.
(18) B i d , para 1159
(19) I b i d , p m a 1170

- 9 -
Adoption

18. Adoption raises some d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n s and viems on them n o u l d

be much a p p r e c i a t e d :

(1) Adoption poses the problem of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e

adopted c h i l d and his b l o o d r e l a t i o n s , The p r o h i b i t e d
degrees of c o n s a n g u i n i t y and a f f i n i t y c o n t i n u e t o attach t o
a person n o t n i t h s t a a d i n g his adoption, though b o t h t h e c h i l d
and h i s a d o p t i n g p a r e n t s may b e , and f r e q u e n t l y are, unamare
of the i d e n t i t y of the c h i l d ' s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s ; likewise
t h e c h i l d ' s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s may be, and f r e q u e n t l y are,
mamare of t h e i d e n t i t y of the a d o p t i n g p a r e n t s and l o s e all
trace of t h e child i t s e l f . In the r e s u l t , the c h i l d may in
adult l i f e meet and marry r?, person w i t h i n the p r o h i b i t e d
degrees of r e l a t i o n s h i p m d perhaps d i s c o v e r a c c i d e n t a l l y
that his marriage i s v o i d , It i s i m p o s s i b l e t o s a y whether,
and i f s o how f r e q u e n t l y , there o c c u r t'nese consequences o f
adoption. I n s o far as t h e y do o c c u r , t h e y a p p e a r t o raise an
i n s o l u b l e problem t o iqhich we cannot a t p r e s e n t see any answer.

(2) Adoption a l s o poses the problem ;f the r e l a t i o n s h i p b c t n c e n the c

. adopted c h i l d and t h e I : m i l y c i r c l e i n t o which h e has been

adopted. If the purpose of adoption i s t,o p l a c e the adopted
c h i l d as nearly as p o s s i b l e i n t o the p o s i t i o n of a n a t u r a l
c h i l d of the a d o p t i n g p a r e n t s and as a f u l l member of h i s new
f a m i l y , the q u e s t i o n arises u h c t h c r t h e l a n s u f f i c i e n t l y
a c h i e v e s t h i s result i n the s p h e r e of matrimonial r e l a t i o n s h i p
v h e r e the adopted child i s treated d i f f e r e n t l y from n a t u r a l
children. The law a p p a r e n t l y o n l y p r o h i b i t s marriage between
the a d o p t i n g p a r e n t and the adopted c h i l d , s o that the adopted
son cm marry his "sister," i . e . t h c a d o p t c r ' s dmghter, whether
n a t u r a l or adopted, or h i s "niece"; l i k e w i s e , t h e a d o p t e r crm
marry his adopted s o n ' s widoa or d i v o r c e d n i f e (he cannot marry
his n a t u r a l s o n ' s widow o r d i v o r c e d wifc).(20) We nould l i k e

(20) It may b e o f i n t e r e s t t o compare the p o s i t i o n of t h e adopted c h i l d

i n some o t h e r European Countries: 1.3 F i n l a n d ,and P o l m d , marriage
is p r o h i b i t e d betmecn the adrJpter and t h e adopted c h i l d ; i n B e s t
Germany m d Greece, between the a d o p t e r and t h e adopted c h i l d o r
his o r her descendants; i n S w i t z e r l a n d , between the a d o p t e r and
thc adopted c h i l d o r the adopted c h i l d ' s spouse and between t h e
a d o p t e r ' s spouse a d t h e adopted c h i l d ; i n France and I t a l y
betvveen the a d o p t e r and the adopted- c h i l d , his o r her descendants
o r spouse, bettvocn the acfopterls spouse and t h e adopted c h i l d , and
betneen t h e adopted c h i l d sac! t h o a d o p t e r ' e n a t u r a l . and adopted
chilclren; i n I t a l y d i s p e n s a t i o n c2,n be gcantcd t o allow marriage
w i t h i n any of these p r o h i b i t e d d e g r e e s , b u t i n France a d i s p e n s a t i o n
can o n l y e x t e n d t o allo:rr marriage between m adopted c h i l d md the
a d o p t e r ' s n a t u r a l o r sdoptcG c h i l d r e n .

- 10 -
 t o lmov~whethcr t’nc g e n e r a l vievr i s t h a t t h i s state of t h i n g s
i s s a t i s f a c t o r y o r n h c t h c r t h e law s h o u l d go f u r t h e r and treat
t h e adopted c h i l d as i f , f o r tlic p.,wposes of marriage, he 17-

in f a c t a n a t u r a l c h i l d of t h c a d o p t i n g p a r e n t s , s o t h a t the
p r o h i b i t e d degrecs of c o n s m g u i n i t y m d a f f i n i t y a p p l i c a b l e
t o t h e a d o p t i n g p a r e n t s I natural c h i l d r e n s h o u l d l i k e w i s e
8pply t o t h e adopted c h i l d .

We ‘nould welcome a d v i c e on b o t h t h e s e matters.

P r i o r E x i s t i n g Ih,rria,-

19 It i s thought that no c o m e n t i s needed on t h i s grouncl.

Insanity

20. Consent i s an c s s c n t i a l ing=rcdient of a v a l i d marriage and a

marriagc i s v o i d i f a spouse i s i n c a p a b l e of g i v i n g h i s consent bocausc
o f his unsoundness of mind, A person i s regarded as b e i n g capable of
g i v i n g consent i f he i s capable o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h s n a t u r e of msmiagc,
which i n v o l v e s a mental c a p a c i t y t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
n o r m d l y attaching t o m a r r i a g e , ( 2 1 ) A person of unsound mincl may
c o n t r a c t a v a l i d marriaw d u r i n g a l u c i d i n t c r v a l vhen he u n d c r s t m d s
t h e n a t u r e of marriage, 422 1 b u t t h a t marriage may b c v o i d a b l e i n cert2”in
circumstances under t h e M e t r i m o n i d Causcs Act 1965, s.9. (23)

21. We t h i n k t h a t a t r - t of what c o n s t i t u t e s unsoundness of mind

rendering a marriage v o i d i s s a t i s f a c t o r y mc?s h o u l d n o t b e modified;
any h i g h e r t e s t night result i n e l c i e r l y 2nd n e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d persons
b e i n g i n c a p s b l e of c o n t r a c t i n g a v a l i d maxiage, n h i l e m y lesser t e a t
might r o s u l t i n persons of unsound n i n d b e i n g capable o f c o n t r a c t i n g a
v a l i d nxrriage, Hou~ever, c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h o u l d b e given t o t h e q u e s t i o n
whether porsons with s e r i o u s i n h e r i t a b l e m n t a l d e f e c t s s h o u l d n o t be
a l t o g c t h o r p r o h i b i t c d from marrying. T n c t h e r or n o t such a p r o h i b i t i o n
i s d e s i r a b l e and t h c d e f i n i t i o n of the class of persons t o whon i t should
apply i s a q u e s t i o n on which i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o cxpress a view i n the
absence of s c i e n t i f i c evidence and views are i n v i t e d on t h i s matter. ( 24)

(21) Re Park c.19541P. 112, C.A.; H i l l v, H i l l

7 [1959] 1 V.L.R. 127, P.C.
(22) Turner V. Myers (1808) 1 Hag, Con. 414
(23) See p a r a 29
(24) I Them was a p r e c e d e n t for a total p r o h i b i t i o n i n t h e Tllarriage of
Lunatics A c t 1811, ~:~hich p r o v i d c d t h a t t h e narriage of a l u n a t i c
s o found by i n q u i s i t i o n or of a person who or whose e s t a t e had been
committed t o the c a r e and custody of trustees under any statute was
v o i d , b u t t’nis Act was rcpcaloc? by the ?!ental B e a l t h Act 19599 and
there i s now no s t a t u t o r y p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t mariage by a perron
of unsound Find.

- 11 -
L a c k of Consent

22. A v a l i d narriage r e q u i r e s f r e e consent (a) t o marry and (b) t o

n a r y a p a r t i c u l a r person, Heads (a) a n 6 (b) p r e s e n t no d i f f i c u l t i e s
and i f a person goes throush a ceremony of m a r r i a g e n o t r e a l i s i n g that i t
i s such a ceremony, (25) o r i f he goes through a narriage ceremony with A
b e l i e v i n g hin t o b e B (26) the narriage i s void. A s t o f r e e consent,
threats o r duress c a engender s u c h fear its t o v i t i a t e consent, in VJhich
case the marriage i s void.

23. The v m i o u s f a c t o r s which do o r do n o t v i t i a t e consent must b e

exmined s e p a r a t e l y .
Fear v i t i a t e s consent i f i t i s of s u f f i c i e n t degree t o do s o ,
i f i t i s reasonably e n t e r t a i n e d ant! i f i t arises from c i r c u n s t a n c e s
f o r which t h e p e t i t i o n e r i s n o t himself Thus,
where a vdoman was f o r c e d by h e r f a t h e r ' s t h r e a t s t o marry (28) or

where a nam married through f e a r of €&se c r i n i n a l charges b e i n g

p r e f e r r e d against t h e marriage was in each c a s e void, but
in the l a t t e r case the narriage would a p p a r e n t l y have been v a l i d
i f the threats had been t o p r e f e r against the man charges i n
r e s p e c t of crines n h i c h the nCwhad i n f a c t c o m i t t e d .

Fraud does n o t v i t i a t e consent unless i t b r i n g s about a &stake

as t o the ceremony o r the p e r s o n s , Fraudulent n i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
o r concealnent which induces consent does n o t v i t i a t e the consent
provided t h e consent i s given f r e e l y and n o t under duress, even
though i t mould n e v e r have been given b u t for t h e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
o r con ccalnen t i ( 2 q ) t h u s , where the wife concealed f r o n her husband

(25) ldehta v. E2ehta [1945} 2 All X.R. 690.

P (wife thought marriage
ccrenony was ccrenony of conversion t o Hindu r e l i g i o n )
(26) -Re V. -
I i-I i l l i s (1844) 534, 785-6
10 c1 BC F i n
(27) B u c k l a d V. Bucklmd [I9671 2 7?.L.B. 1506
-1_1

(28) P a r o j i c V. P a r o j i c [1958) 1 V.L.R. 1280

I_-

(29) S n i f t V. Kelly (1835) 3 Ihapp 257 at 293: 'WO marriage shall be v o i d

merely upon proof that i t had been c o n t r a c t e d upon false r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ,
and that but f o r s u c h c o n t r i v a n c e s , consent would never have been
obtzined. Unless the p a r t y inposed upon has been deceived as t o the
person, and t h u s has given no consent at all, there is no degree of
deception which ccm a v a i l t o s e t ,aside a c o n t r a c t of m a r r i a g e
knowingly nade;" -
TAoss V. Xoss [lSg7] P. 263 at 267-269:
7 "No
fraudulent c o n c e d n e n t o r i n i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n enables the d-ef rauded
p a r t y nho has consented t o t h e n,?,rriage t o r e s c i n d i t
English law fraud i s spoken o f as a ground f o r a v o i d i n g a narriage,
.*... trhen in

t h i s does n o t include such fraud as induces a consent, but i s

l i n i t e d t o such f r a u d ES procures t h e appearcmce n i t h o u t the r e a l i t y
of consent. The s i n p l c s t i n s t a n c e of such fraud is p e r s o n a t i o n , "
 that a t t h e time of t h e marriage s h e c ~ a spregnant p e r a l i u m , t h e
n a r r i a e was v a l i d ( 3 0 ) (though i t n i g h t now b e v o i d a b l e under t h e
Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, s 9 ) .

A s regards mistake a s t o the o t h e r p z t y t o t h e marriage, o n l y

mistdse as t o t h e i d e n t i t y of t h a t p a r t y v i t i a t e s consent. A
mistake as t o f o r t u n e , h e a l t h , status, moral c h a r a c t e r o r o t h e r
q u a l i t y does n o t a f f e c t t h e v d i d - i t y of t h e mCvriage, e x c e p t that
mental d i s o r d e r , pregnancy p e r d i m , v e n e r e a l d i s e a s e cnd e p i l e p s y
are grounds on nhich a marriage i s v o i d a b l e under klatrimonial Causes
Act 1965, S. 9 (see p u a 28). A mistake as t o t h e n a t u r e of t h e
ceremony v i t i a t e s consent, (25) 3 u t a mistake ;LS t o the e f f e c t of the
m a r r i a g e does n o t v i t i a t e consent: thus a husbmd’s mistdwn
b e l i e f that a f o r e i g n marriage imposed a d u t y on t h e spouses t o l i v e
t o g e t h e r and that h i s n i f e nould b e ,allowed t o accompany h i m t o
Enghnd(3’)or t h e husband’s b e l i e f t h a t he was e n t e r i n g i n t o a
polyganous marriage whereas i n f a c t i t as ~ n o n o g m o u s ( ~ ~ ) ( o r ,
presumably, v i c e v e r s a ) , does n o t i n v a l i d a t e a marriage.

I n t o x i c a t i o n t o t h e e x t e n t o f i n d u c i n g i n a person a “want of
reason o r t o l i t i o n mounting t o 2 1 i n c a p a c i t y t o consent’’ w i l l
make a mLarria.ge void. ( 3 3 ) A rnoclr merriage i n a aasquerade i s
v o i d for n m t of r e a l consent. (34)

There are two a s p e c t s o f thc law on l a c k of consent a r i s i n g from

d u r e s s o r m i s t a k e on which ne vdould F q p r c c i a t c views:
(1) A s s t a t e d i n p c r a 23(1) fear does n o t v i t i a t e consent u n l e s s
( i n t e r a l i a ) i t a r i s e s from circumstances f o r which t h e
p e t i t i o n e r i s n o t himself r e s p o n s i b l e . Thus, i f t h e p e t i t i o n e r
has i n f a c t comnitted a crime and i s t h r e a t e n e d with exposure
unless he m m r i e s and i f he, through f e a r of exposure, does
marry, t h e marriage i s v a l i d n o t n i t h s t m d i n g t h e t h r e a t ,
because, in such event thc pctitioncr’s fcm zrises f r o m
c i r c u m s t m c e s for which he i s himself r e s p o n s i b l s . We t-dould-
l i k e t o have views as t o whether the e x i s t i n g l a w on t h i s

(30) -
rdioss V. MOSS L-18971 P. 263
(31) &I V. [l,950] P. 71, 79-80; o v e r r u l e d on o t h e r p o i n t s
a. -nom. Kenward v. Kenward [1951] P, 124, 135, 136, C . A .
(32) Kass,im V. Kassim
-1 [1962] I?. 224
(33) S u l l i v a n v* S u l l i v a n (1818) 2 Hag. Con. 238, 246
(3.1) lloss V.
II) cl8971 P. 263, 269

- 13 -
 p o i n t i s r e g a r d e d as b e i n g s a t i s f a c t o r y , o r a h e t h e r the test
of duress vitiating consent s h o u l d n o t depend on the e f f e c t
of the d u e s s on t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s mind; that i s t o s a y , if
the p e t i t i o n e r has c o n n i t t e d sone misdeed and i s t h r e a t e n e d
with exposure unless he n a r r i e s , s h o u l d t h e threat amount t o
duress i f in the c i r c w t a n c c s of the case i t d e p r i v e s the
p e t i t i o n e r of f r e e l y c o n s e n t i n g t o t h e marriage? Whichever
s o l u t i o n i s adopted, i t w i l l s t i l l be n e c e s s a r y , f o r d u r e s s
t o be e s t a b l i s h e d , t o show that the fear was of a s u f f i c i e n t
?
degree t o v i t i a t e consent and that i t mas r e a s o n a b l y entertained.
If the threat of exposing t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s conduct nere nade
c a p a b l e of m o u n t i n g t o ?Lwcss, s h o u l d the n a t u r e of the
conduct in r e s p e c t of which exposure i s t h r e a t e n e d b e
relevant? For i n s t a c e , should t h e consequence o f t h e
-threat be d i f f e r e n t a c c o r d i n g t o v h e t h e r (1) the p e t i t i o n e r
i s threatened n i t h exposure of a crime which he has i n f a c t
conmitted unless he narries the wonan i n q u e s t i o n , o r ( 2 )
the p e t i t i o n e r i s t h r e a t e n e d v i t h a f f i l i a t i o n proceedings
unless h e marries the moman by whom he h a s had a c h i l d ?

(2) As stated in para 2 3 ( 3 ) , a mistake a s t o the e f f e c t of the

ccrenony (as opposed t o a m i s t d c e as t o the n a t u r e of the
cercnony) does n o t v i t i a t e consent. The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s
whether the d e should- rernain as i t i s o r n h c t h e r 3 mistake
as t o the e f f e c t o f t h e ceremony s h o u l d i n v a l i d a t e t h e marriage
f o r l a c k of consent. For i n s t a n c e , should a person uho thinks
that the marriage vihich he i s c o n t r a c t i n g i s monogmouk, whcreas
i t i s in f a c t po1ygmous9( 3 2 ) be a b l e t o hzve the marriage avoided?
Should a ridstdsen b c l i c f t h a t a marriage imposes a d u t y t o
c o h a b i t (31) c n t i t l e a p a r t y t o hzve the narriagc avoided?
If nist&e as t o t h e e f f e c t of thc ccreraony aere a ground f o r
Elvoidin$ the n a r r i a g c , i t nould be n c c e s s a r y t o determine what
nistzkes are s u f f i c i c n t l y funclarmntd t o e n t i t l e a p a r t y t o
r e l i e f , f o r i t would be going t o o f a r t o suggest t h a t m y m i s t & @ ,
however i n s i g x i f i c a n t , as t o the mtuz.1 o b l i g a t i o n s of tlie spouses
would s u f f i c e f o r t h i s purposc. One s o l u t i o n might be t o e n a c t
t h a t a nistakc as t o t h e effect o f t h e ceremony, i f s u f f i c i e n t l y
f u n d m e n t a l as t o t h e o b l i g a t i o n s of marriage, would suffice,
leaving the c o u r t t o d e c i d e each case on i t s merits and, i n duc
course, t o formulate a p r i n c i p l e . Another s o l u t i o n night be t o
c o n f i n e r e l i e f t o ceases where thc raistake cas t o the e f f e c t of the

- 14 -
 ceremony \ v a s induced by fraud. Yet m o t h e r s o l u t i o n might be t o
c o n f i n e mistake t o thc c c s e a h c r c a person b c l i e v e s the marriage
t o b e monogmous, whereas i t i s i n f a c t polyg,mous, and v i c e versa.

Impotence

25. Impotcnce ( o r i n c z p s c i t y ) i s i n a b i l i t y t o conswnmzte t h o marriage,

Such i n a b i l i t y c,m a r i s c from a p h y s i c a l d e f c c t o r from a mental c o n d i t i o n ,
such as i n v i n c i b l e repugnance t o t h e scxu,al sct; i t also hzppens t h e t a
person may b e generally c q a b l c of h a v i n g sexual i n t e r c o u r s e , but, o n i n g
t o some cause s u c h os h y s t c r i e , i s i n c q a b l e of performing i t w i t h t h e
o t h e r spouse. (35) I n d 1 s u c h c a s e s t h e marriage can b e annulled on t h e
p e t i t i o n of e i t h e r p a r t y p r o v i d e d the h p o t e n c c e x i s t s at t h e time of
marriage (36) m d i s i n c u r a b l e or c u r e b l c o n l y by a i operation cttended

with danger;(37) i n t h e case of a respondent, a d e f e c t which i s c u r a b l e

b u t n h i c h the respondent r e f u s c s t o h w e cured i s rcgarded as b e i n g
i n c u r a b l e . (37)

S t e r i l i t y per sc i s n o t impotence, so t h a t voluntary

s t e r i l i s a t i o n b e f o r e marriage i s no ground f o r r c l i e f . (39)

Respondent's Wilful 3e€uscl t o C o n s m z t e t h e &Iarriage

26. This ground w a s i n t r o d u c e d as a ground for n u l l i t y by t h e

& , t r i m o n i d . Causes Act 1937, and h a s i n c e beon f r e q u e n t l y c r i t i c i s e d
bccausc, as a ground €or n u l l i t y , i t o f f e n d s a g a i n s t tlie p r i n c i p l c that
tlic inpediincnt a v o i d i n g the T;IarritLgc must e x i s t a t t h c t i m c of t h c marriage.
The Morton Comnission, (40) t h e Church Report (41) and P u t t i n g b u n d c r (42)
all advocated t h a t wilful refus,al t o c o n s m a a t e s h o u l d , for t h i s reL?son,
cease t o be a ground for n u l l i t y and be t r e a t e d as r e l e v a n t t o divorco. (43)

This i s known a s impotitnce quoad hunc o r quoad hanc.

Impotence a r i s i n g a f t e r marriage i s no ground o f complaint either in
n u l l i t y (Bronn V. Brown (1823) 1 I-Iag, Ecc. 523) o r d i v o r c e E. v. E.
Cl9651 1 Y.L.R. 963, 968; Sheldon v. Sheldon [I9661 P. 52, 78).
-S. v, S. [1956] p . 1, I n the casc o f elderly people wherc a p a r t y
i s i n p o t e n t bccausc of a d v m c c d age, thc right t o have t h e marriage
a n n u l l e d may b e barred by approbation: H o r g q 7 1 , [1959] P. 92.
-L. v. &. 38 T.L.E. 697
(1922)
Baxter v. Baxtcr [1948] A.C. 274, o v e r r u l i n g J. v. J. cl9471 9. 158
Paras 88, 89, 283
Pages 38, 48
Pages 67, 124-125
Wilful refusal t o consumate i s a ground f o r d i v o r c e i n Australia an$-
t h c r e s t r i c t i o n on presenting p e t i t i o n w i t h i n thrcc y c m s o f
nasri,o,gc does n o t apply t o t h i s ground: 1:Istrimonial Causes Act (Amt. )
1959, SS. 28, 43(2).

- 15 -
27. Hotwithstanding these views, me think that w i l f ' u l refusal t o
consunmate should renain a ground f o r r u l l i t y . Our reasons are:
(1) Wilful refusal. t o consunmato i s i n most cases the a l t e r n a t i v e
allegation t o imp0 tence (44) as i t is often uncertain whether
the respondent's failure t o consunmate i s due t o one came
o r the other; the p e t i t i o n e r may not know whether the
respondent refuses t o consunnatc the narriage because he is
impotent and is unable t o have sexua3 intercourse o r whether
because, though able t o have sexual intercourse, he does not
want t o have it; i n such cases the court m u s t &am an inference
from the evidence before i t and i t seem unreal t h e t the r e l i e f
-
granted t o the p e t i t i o n e r n u l l i t y o r divorce -
should depend
i n any given case on the court's view o f the reasons nhich
prevented the rcspondcnt from consumating the mxrriage.

(2) Failure t o consunmate, whether it be because the respondent

is unable o r because he is u n w i l l i n g t o have sexual intercourse,
deprives the marriage of one of i t s e s s e n t i a l purposes and, in
e i t h e r case, precludes the marriage from becoming a reality.
P a r t i e s vould think i t strange that the nature of the :@lief
should depend on the court l s decision whether non-consummation
was due t o the respondent's i n a b i l i t y o r whether it was due to
his unwillingness. Frcm t h e i r point of view the relevant
f a c t would be t h a t the marriage had never become a complete
one. To t e l l them t h a t , in the eyes of the l a w , if f a i l u r e
t o complete i t wsts due t o one cause they can have t h e i r
marriage annulled, whereas i f i t was due t o another they must
have it dissolved, wodd seem a strange quirk of the law.

( 3 ) "he circumstmces in which the court c m entertain suits f o r

n u l l i t y and divorce a t present (45) are not the sane: f o r
instance, the court has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear a suit f o r n u l l i t y
where, irrespectivc of domicile, both p a r t i e s are, o r the
respondent alone i s , resident i n England, but there is no
j u r i s d i c t i o n (except under the provisions of the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1965, s.40) t o hear a suit for'divorce unless both
p a r t i e s we domiciled i n England? therefore, i f wilful refusal

(44) Soo the s t a t i s t i c s s e t out i n para 5

(45) The question of j u r i s d i c t i o n i n divorcc and n u l l i t y i s under
consideration by the Law Commission, but i t would be unsafe t o
assume t h a t the grounds of jurisdiction f o r both r e l i e f s would
be nade identical.

- 16 -
 t o consummate were t o become a ground for divorce n h i l e
impotence remained a ground for n u l l i t y , a petitioner might
f i n d himself unable t o a l e @ the two grounds i n ti?e a l t e r n a t i v e ,
although he h i n s e l f may not know which i s the e f f e c t i v e cause
preventing consummation of his m a r i z g e .

A p e t i t i o n f o r divorce nay n o t be preuonted u n t i l three years

have elapsed from the date of marriage, unless the court gives
leave t o present an earlier p e t i t i o n on the ground of
exceptiond. h a d s h i p suffered by t h e p e t i t i o n e r o r of
exceptional depravity on t h e p a r t of t h e respondent. (46)
The need t o w d t three yecars before being able t o start
proceedings t o terminate the marriage nould be a s u b s t a n t i a l
(though not n e c e s s a r i l y an exceptional) har&k'.p on a young
man or zrloman whose p a r t n e r i s unable or unwilling t o consummate
the marriage.

Grounds under Matrimonial Causes A c t 1965, s.g(l), ( b ) , ( c ) and (d)

28. The grounds under s . g ( l ) ( b ) are t h a t a t t h e t i n e of the marriage

e i t h e r party t o the marriage
(1) w a s of unsound mind, o r
( 2 ) was s u f f e r i n g from mental disorder n i t h i n the meaning
of t h e Ilcntal Health Act 1959(47) of such a kind o r t o
such an extent as t o be u n f i t t e d for narriage and t h e
procreation of children, o r
(3) was s u b j e c t t o recurrent attacks of i i l s m i t y o r epilepsy.

29. Ground (1) appears a t Zirst s i g h t t o cover the sane s i t u a t i o n as

docs i n s a n i t y as a ground f o r declaring a marriage void ( p a r a 20).
W s , however, i s n o t SO. For a uarri,age t o be void on the ground of
i n s a n i t y the spouse must be incapable of underst,mding the nature of
marriage, whereas s.g(l)(b) is wider i n i t s connotation. The expression
"of unsound raincl" appezring iri s . l ( l ) as a ground f o r divorce ( a d the
same expression i n s . g ( l ) ( b ) has prcsumably the same meaning) h a been
construed t o designate a person vrho is incapable o f nanag'ing himself and
his affairs including the problem o f work, s o c i e t y and marriage judged

(46) Natrinonial Causes Act, 1965, s.2

( 4 7 ) Mental Health Act 1959, s.41): "In t h i s Act 'mcntd disorder'
mans mental I l l n e s s , . a r r e s t e d o r inconplcte development of mind,
psychopathic disorder, ms! any o t h e r disorder o r d i s a b i l i t y of
mind. 'I

- 17 -
by t h e a b i l i t y of t h e reasonable person t o msge his affairs. (48)
A spouse nay vrell understand tho nature of narriage a t the tine of its
celebration, but be incapable generally o f nclnag5ng himself and his affairs,
"he Morton C o m n i ~ s i o n ( ~rccomiended
~) t h a t t h i s p c r t of s , g ( l ) ( b ) should be
re-drafted "so as t o make i t c l e a r t h a t i t r e f e r s only t o a person mho has
gone through a cerenony of marriage a i t h full understanding of the nature
a,

of t h a t cerenony and idhat i t imports b u t who newxcthcloss was of unsound

nind a t the tine." "his i s in l i n e with t'ne view of the Gore11 C o d s s i o n (50)
who first reconmended t h e addition of t h i s ground of n u l l i t y t o cover the
case %here the o t h e r party, thowh of s u f f i c i e n t understavlding t o consent
t o a marriaw9 i s , a t the t i n e o f t h e narriage .....
of unsound mind in
other respects." We think t h a t the rcconnendations of t h e Morton Conmission
should be adopted - c e r t a i n l y mhen the law i s codified, i f n o t before.

30. No a l t e r a t i o n is recornended in s.9(l)(c) and (a) (the respondent a t

the tine of the m r r i a g e s u f f e r i n g from a venereal. disease i n a cornmicable
f o m o r being pregnant per a l i u n ) . "he provision of Nem Z e a l a d Law (51)
t h a t t h e mifc should be a b l e t o have. the marri-w annulled on t h e ground
t h a t a t the t i n e of the marriago some womm o t h e r than the w i f e mas
p r e g a n t by t h e husband i s not recomended. There is no analogy between
such a cc?se and the case of the wife mho enters the naxriage carrying i n
her body Lw d i e n c h i l d who i s t o be born i n t o the f m i l y which t h e
narriage has created.

l i m i t a t i o n s contained i n s. 9( 2) :

(1) t h o p e t i t i o n e r nust a t the time of the narriage be i g n o r a n t

of thc f a c t s alleged;
(2) proceedings nust be i n s t i t u t e d within a year from t h e date
of the ncwriageg
( 3 ) u a r i t d intcrcoursc a i t h the consent of the p e t i t i o n e r must
n o t have taken place s i n c e the p e t i t i o n e r discovered the
existence of t h e grounds f o r a decree.

%sal1 - V. Cl.9601 P.
Vl~,~a,l.l 52; Robinson V. Robinson Cl9651 P. 192;
Voolley V. Woolley [1968) P. 29.
p- 275 * _

Para 353
N a t r i n o n i a l Proceedings Act (N.Z.) 1963, se7(1)(a).
Sec para 28.

- 18 -
32. L b i t a t i o n (1) i s r e a s o n a b l e , The p e t i t i o n e r who enters t h e
narriage u i t h knowledge t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a p a r t i c u l a r d e f e c t i n one o r
o t h e r of t h e spouses s h o u l d n o t bc able t o c l a b t h a t t h c nsrriage i s
i n v d i d on account o f that v e r y d c f e c t .

33. L i m i t a t i o n ( 2 ) l a y s do:m a t i n e U n i t f o r b r i n g i n g procecdings and

t h i s l i n i t a t i o n s h o u l d be r e c o n s i d e r e d . ?"ne c o u r t h s no d i s c r c t i o n t o
enlarge t h c t i n e linit, even i n the case of f r m d on t h e respondent's p a r t .
(53)
Thc Norton C o m i s s i o n heard evidence t h c t t h i s r c s t r i c t i o n rcsults in
h a r d s h i p i n that a nould-be p e t i t i o n e r m y n o t beconc aware of t h e f a c t s i n
tine t o cnablc h i n t o take proceedings; f o r instrance when he goes abroad
imxd.iatcly after thc narrias, !Rio n3in p r o p c s a l s were s u g g e s t e d f o r
nodifying tho present tine-linit: f i r s t , that t h o c o u r t should have a
d i s c r e t i o n t o enlarge t h e t i m e - l i ~ t secondly, that the t i n e - 1 h i - t
s h o u l d be r e t a i n e d b u t should- m from t h e d a t e of d i s c o v c r y Gf t h e n a t t e r
o f c o n p l a i n t a d n o t fron t h e d a t e of narriage, The Morton C o d s s i o n
"on balance" p r c f c r r c d t h e f i r s t p r o p o s a l on t h e ground t h a t i t aoulil
produce ,mater c e r t a i n t y . But i t seem t o us t h a t u n c e r t a i n t y i s
i n h c r w t in b o t h p r o p o s d s . The e x i s t e n c e of a d i s c r e t i o n a r y ponar t o
enlarge the t i m e f o r i n s t i t u t i n g proceedings of n e c e s s i t y means t h a t the
s t a t u s of t h c marriage r e n a i n s u n c e r t a i n s o l o n g cts i t i s open t o a p a r t y
t o apply f o r lcave t o p r c s c n t a p e t i t i o n n o t w i t h s t m G i n g the e x p i r y of the
tino-linit,

34. Wevertheless, VIC ,agree v i t h t h e Xorton Cormission t h a t i t i s

preferable t o h w e a tinic-1ini.t f r o n thc date of narriage. B u t we t h i n k
that the e x i s t i n g t i n e - l i n i t of one y c a r f r o n i>arriagc i s t o o s h o r t . In
a d d i t i o n t o t h e exaiiple g i v e n by t h o :!orton Cormission (rvhere a p e t i t i o n e r
goes abroad), t h c r e aay b e c i r c u m t m c c s nhcre one year does n o t a v e
s u f f i c i e n t t i n e f o r discovery o f tlie d-cfcct and t h c i n s t i t u t i o n of
proceedings, a lSl o w i n g
~ T J Z ~ for t n c hurim e l m e n t of h e s i t a t i o n CIS t o
whether, havine; d i s c o v e r e d t h o d c f e c t , t o b r i n g proceoding-s o r n o t .
Onc n e t h o d of e n l a r g i n g t h e tine-limit i s by expanding t h e soope of the
L i n i t a t i o n ( b e n i e s and Tar P r i s o n e r s ) Act 1945, (55) which suspends the
tine-1ini.t under s , 9 ( 2 ) v!hil,e c i t h e r p a r t y is an eneny or i s d e t a i n e d i n
enemy t e r r i t o r y . The proceedings i n s u c h a cas2 nay b e i n s t i t u t e d n i t h i n

( 5 3 ) Chaplin v. Chaplin cl9491 P. 7 2

(54) P a r a s 284, 285
(55) The Act i s s t i l l law by v i r t u e of thc t r a n s i t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s
thc M a t r i n o n i a l C m s e s Act 1950, s , 3 4 ( 2 ) ( c ) and the TktrinoniaJ.
Cmses Act 1965, Sch. 1 para l ( b ) a l t h o u g h i t woulC o n l y becono
a p p l i c a b l e i n t h c c v c n t of' var.

- 19 -
a year fron the date when thet p a r t y ceased t o be m eneny o r t o be s o
detained. Other circunstances, such rls a p a r t y g o i n g abroad o r being
c o n f i n d t o h o s p i t a l , could bc added t o ' the 1945 Act a d . hme a l i k e
suspensory e f f e c t . This nethod a o u l d not cover all causes f o r excusable
delay (e.g. where the p e t i t i o n e r hes discovercd the dcfect b u t has n o t
apprecieted its s i g n i f i c m c e ) and we think t h a t i t would be norc s a t i s f a c t o r y
t o s u b s t i t u t e , s ~ y , three years f o r the e x i s t i n g t i n e - l i m i t of one ye=,
Tie think, too, that t h e t h r e c years should run frou the date of narri'qe,
as ve agree with the Norton Comission t h a t i t would be undesirable t o
introduce the p o s s i b i l i t y of thc narriage being cvlnullcd becausc of the
discovery at a l a t e stage of f a c t s rendering the marriage voiddole, e.g. the
husbmd discovering a f t e r t h i r t y years t h a t the f i r s t c h i l d n o t his.

35. L i n i t a t i o n (3) has been construed t o nean t h a t a p e t i t i o n e r mho has

before h i n f a c t s fron ahich he, as a reasonable am, knoxw or ought t o know
of the existence of grounds f o r a decree, has "discovered" t h e i r existence,
s o that mrital intercourse t h e r e a f t e r will debar h i a f s o n a decree. ( 5 6 )
The point vhcther knowledge o f t h e l m , as ne11 as o f the f a c t s , i s necessary
before a p e t i t i o n e r can bc s a i d t o knov of the existence of grounds f o r a
decree has becn l e f t open. (57) This l i d t a t i o n works harshly f o r i t
inposes an objectivc test i n vhat i s e s s e n t i d l y a personal md subjective
rclationship. If t h i s l i r i i t a t i o n i s t o rcnain and narital intercourse with
knowledge of the defect i s t o bt? a n absolute b a r , such knouledge should not
be the knovledge. o f the hypothctic,d rcasonzblc nan on the Claphari ormibus,
b u t r c a l knonledgc on the petitioner's p a r t and a f u l l appreciation by h i n
t h a t the d e f e c t i s a ground f o r t e r n i n s t i n g the marriage. Otherwise it i s
unjust t o deprive h i n of r e l i e f ncrely because, n o t r e a l i s i n g t h a t he has
grounds f o r t c r n i n a t i n g the n a r r i a g e , he t r i e s t o rnake the b e s t of i t an?^
does not in;l?cdiately bredc o f f narital r e l a t i o n s . 15orcovcr, t h o lam
encourages r c c o n c i l i a t i o n , a f a c t o r strongly s t r e s s e d i n racent l e g i s l a t i o n
on condonation and desertion, (58) ana i f a p e t i t i o n e r discovers tlie existence
o f a defect, c.g, epilepsy o r pregmucy per dim,he should n o t be placed

(56) S n i t h v, S n i t h E19481 P. 77
( 5 7 ) Stocker V. Stocker [1966) 117.L.R. 190
(58) Matrinonial Causes Act 1965, ss. 1(2), 4 2 ( l ) and ( 2 ) . See a l s o
the Divorce Refom B i l l , c l . 3. Alternatively, i f i t i s f e l t t h a t
narital intercourse should- remain t h e e f f e c t i v e t e s t , thcre could be
introd-uced a provision on the l i n e s o f s.42(1) of the 1965 Act, which
reads: "Any presmption of condonation which a r i s e s f r o n t h e
continuance o r r c s w p t i o n of m a r i t a l intercourse may bo rebutted by
evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o negative t3c necessary i n t e n t . ''

- 20 -
 i n the position t h a t i f he attempts a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and i t f a i l s he
thereby l o s e s a l l right t o r e l i e f . If the b a r t o a decree were t o be
approbation (as t o which see para 37) r a t h e r than m a r i t a l intercourse,
the d i f f i c u l t i e s outlined above would largely disappear. The marriage
. i n question being voidable, presunably approbation i n any case applies,
b u t the question does n o t i n p r a c t i c e a r i s e i n view of the s t r i c t
requirements of s ,9( 2).

36. Tie, therefore, recommend t h a t s,9(2) should be amended s o t h a t a

decree of n u l l i t y would not be p a n t e d unless
(1) the p e t i t i o n e r was a t the time o f the marriage ignorant
of the f a c t s alleged; and
(2) p r o c e e d i n p were i n s t i t u t e d wi<,hin three years of the date
of marriage; and
( 3 ) the p e t i t i o n e r has n o t approbated the marriage a f t e r
discovery of the f a c t s .

I1 APPROEATION

37. The doctrine o f approbation applies t o voidable narriages only,

i.e. t o marriages voidable on the grounds of impotence and w i l f u l
rsfusal t o consummate; and, presumakly, t o t h e grounds under t h e
Matrimonial Causcs Act, s.g(l)(b), (c) and ( d ) , ( 6 0 ) though the
l i m i t a t i o n of one year fc-:: bringing proceedings and of no m a r i t a l
intercourse taking place a f t e r discovery sf the defect mdke the point
largely academic. No comment i s thought necessary on the doctrine
i t s o l f except in r e l a t i o n t o the b i r t h o f a child o r ay1 attempt t o have
a child, Approbation means the existence of f a c t s and circumstances
which s o p l a i n l y imply on the p a r t of the complaining spouse a recognition
of the existence and v a l i d i t y o f the marriage as t o render i t unjust
between t h e p a r t i e s and contra:;. t o public p o l i c y t o permit h i m or her
%o challenge i t s v a l i d i t y . (61) But a spouse c a m o t be s a i d t o have
recognised t h e existence and v a l i d i t y 5X the marriage unless he has
Isnodedge both of the f e c t s and of the law, s o t h z t his igflorancc t h a t

- 21 -
i n law he would be e n t i t l e d on the f a c t s t o h m e the marriago m u l l e d ,
prevents his conduct from mounting t o approbation, ( 6 2 ) %us, there
was no approbation where a wife, n o t r e a l i s i n g a t the time t h a t t h e
marriage could be annulled, was artific?:.iLly inseminated by a donor and,
when she f a i l e d t o conceive, the p e r t i e s adopted a child. (63) b.,,':even
with hornledge of the l a w the p m t y mho consents t o a r t i f i c i a l insemination
cannot be s a i d t o approbate the marriage i f he takes t h i s s t e p in t h e hope
of producing normality i n sexual r e l a t i o n s and n o t as acquiescence i n the
abnormal mzrriage ,(64)

38. Both the I b r t o n Commission(65) and the Church Report. ( 6 6 ) d e a l t a i t h

the point and expressed t h e i r conclusions somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y . The
Norton Commission said:

"Consent t o an a c t which i s l i k e l y t o produce a c h i l d of the

wife i s i n o u r view s o fundamental a s t e p t h a t i t must be
taken t o mean t h a t the p,u'tics acquiesce i n t h e marriage.
Accordingly, Tie recommend t h a t the f a c t t h a t the p a r t i e s t o
a marriage have consented t o thc a r t i f i c i a l insemination of
t h e wife, with the seed of e i t h e r the husband o r a donor,
should be a bar: t o proceedings by e i t h e r spouse for n u l l i t y
of marriage on the g ~ o u n dof inpotencc."

The Church Report said:

'We are concerned a t the way i n ahich decrees o f n u l l i t y have

been granted on proof o f incapacity t o penetrate notwithstanding
t h e f a c t t h a t a c h i l d h m been born EB 3 r e s u l t of imperfect
intercourse o r of a r t i f i c i d insemination n i t h the seed of
some o t h e r man but with the husbmdls consent ,....
t h i n k t h a t mnulment should b e p e r n i t t e d on grounds of
We do n o t

impotence nhere a c h i l d has r e s u l t e d from the j o i n t a c t o r n i t h

the mutual consent o f both p a r t i e s ..... We recommend t h z t the
doctrine o f approbation should be invoked whenever a c h i l d has
r e s u l t e d from the j o i n t a c t , o r n i t h the consent of both p a r t i e s
( e . g . by a r t i f i c i a l inseminztion or l c g a l adoption) and t h a t i n
such cese t h e marriage should not be voidable even thou& the
legal test of capacity h,zs not been s a t i s f i e d , ' '

It will be noted t h a t whereas the Morton Commission think t h a t

a r t i f i c i a l i n s w i n a t i o n of tho wife n i t h the husbandts consent should be
s u f f i c i e n t t o prevent annulnent of the narriage, t h e Church Report thinks
t h a t t h i s consequence should n o t follow unless Ita c h i l d has r e s u l t e d from
the j o i n t a c t , o r with the consent of both p a r t i e s . "
-
(62) Tinddl V. Tindall cl9531 P. 63; Slater V. Slater cl9531 P. 235
(63) S l a t e r V. S l a t e r , supra
(64) R.E.L. v. 9 .E19491 P. 211
(65) Paras 286, 287
(66) Pages 39, 47

- 22 -
39. The arguments i n f a v o u r of the k u r c h Rcport nay b e expcmded as
follons , The Idlorton C o m i s s i o n has s c l e c t e d a r t i f i c i a l i n s e n i n a t i o n
as a b a r t o n u l l i t y without regard t o i t s consequences., i , e . vthether i t
results i n t h e b i r t h of a c h i l d o r n o t , Except 'chat a r t i f i c i a l i n s e m i n a t i o n
r e q u i r e s o u t s i d e assistance, i n what way i s i t any d i f f e r e n t i n q u a l i t y o r
e f f e c t f r o n t h e act of a husband, ivho w h i l e u n a b l e t o p e n e t r a t e the wife,
i s a b l e t o e j a c u l a t e i n t o h e r vagina? This d o u b t l e s s happens i n many
marriages when one or o t h e r of t h e spouses i s impotent, b u t no-one has
s u g g e s t e d that t h i s a c t s h o u l d n e c e s s a r i l y amount t o a p p r o b a t i o n , Even i f ,
as a r e s u l t o€ t h i s a c t , t h e n i f e g i v e s b i r t h t o a c h i l d , t h i s c i r c m s t a n c e
would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y amouiit t o approbation under t h e p r e s e n t la3. Is n o t
the b i r t h of a child. evcn a more fundamental s t e p than j u s t a r t i f i c i a l
insemination of t h e wifc? This i s n o t t o s z y that a r t i f i c i a l i n s e m i n a t i o n
of t h e wife n i l 1 n o t amount t o approbation; whether i t w i l l or n o t can b e
l e f t t o b e answered by the p r e s e n t laird of approbation. But t h e b i r t h of a
c h i l d , whether as a result of a r t i f i c i a l i n s e m i n a t i o n by t h e husband, or b y
a donor n i t l i t h e husband's c o n s e n t , o r as a result of t h e h u s b m d ' s
i n s e m i n a t i o n of t h e w i f c d u r i n g i m p e r f e c t i n t e r c o u r s e , amounts, as i t a e r c ,
t o s c t t i n g t h e s e d on t h e marriagc and t h e marriage should no l o n g e r b e
v o i d a b l e even i f t h c legal t e s t of c a p a c i t y h a s n o t becn s a t i s f i e d . It
s h o u l d m d m no d i f f c r e n c c whether insemin3,tion o f t h e n i f c by t h c husband
i s by mutual consent o r a c c i d e n t a l ; i P by mutual consent, then t h e c a s e
i s on a par v i t h , i f n o t s t r o n g e r t h m , n r t i P i c i a 1 insemination; if i t i s
a c c i d e n t a l i n thc course o€ a-Ltenpts at i n t e r c o u r s e , (67) i t s t i l l r e s u l t s
"from t h e j o i n t a c t , i- with t h e consent., of b o t h p a r t i e s " who do somethin3
which they must k;nom might l e a d t o t h z ri!ife becominy pregnant.

40 A s against t h i s PL-;-L-.- :C; i t may b e s a i d t h a t l o g i c a l l y zpprobation

must depend on t h e conduct of t h e p a r t i e s and n o t on tvhst may happen as a
result of t h e i r conduct. If t h e i r conduct i s such as might have produced
a c h i l d then c i t h e r this i s approbation or i t i s n o t : what happens
subsequently is l o g i c a l l y i r r e l e v a n t , And i f what happens s u b s e q u e n t l y i s
of m y r e l e v a n c e , VJhy s h o u l d n o t conception rather than b i r t h be t h e t e s t ?
Is n u l l i t y t o be p o s s i b l e o n l y i f the d e c r e e can b e o b t a i n e d b e f o r e the
b i r t h , o r i f t h e w i f e h a s a m i s c a r r i a g e or an a b o r t i o n ? Iqhy s h o u l d i t
make m y d i f f e r e n c e a h e t h c r t h e c h i l d d i e s b e f o r e b i r t h o r an h o u r
afterwards? Is i t i n d e e d i n the i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d that h i s p,?;rents
s h o u l d b e d e n i e d r e l i e f because he had been b o r n ?

F. 106; Clarke v. Clarke cl9431 2 All I3.n.540

- 23 -
41. f i l e we do n o t recommend any changs i n the law of approbation,
i n view of the importance of these arguments me i n v i t e views as t o the
p o i n t s made by the Morton Commission and the Church Report.

42. There a r e conflicti,,g a u t h o r i t i e s (68) on whether approbation i s an

absolute o r discretionary b a r , an6 me think t h a t i t should be an absolute
bar. It i s of general advantage t o knou as soon as possible and with as
much c e r t a i n t y as possible whether a marriage i s v a l i d o r not and undesirable
uncertainty may arise i f , notwithstanding apgrobation, the p a r t i e s a r e f r e e
t o challenge the marriage a t any time, i n the hope t h a t the court mill
exercise i t s d i s c r e t i o n t o declare t h e marriage invalid. The v a l i d i t y o r
i n v a l i d i t y of t h e marriage should n o t depend on the c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n , but
should be determined by the relevant f a c t s , We, therefore, recommend t h a t
approbation should operate as an absolute bar.

I11
I_ SHOULD IN'SANITY AND LACK OF CONSENT MaEcE A MARRIAGE
VOIDABLE msma OF VOID?

43. It was a doctrine of canon law(69) which was adopted by kiglish

e c c l e s i a s t i c a l l a w t h a t a marriage void on the ground t h a t there was no
consent at the time of the marriage could be r a t i f i e d by a consent
v o l u n t a r i l y given subsoquently, nheroupon t h e consent was deemed t o r e l a t e
back t o the t i m e of the marriage, The absence of consent could result from
a p a r t y ' s i n a b i l i t y t o consent because of h i s unsoundness o f mind o r from
being temporarily deprived o f h i s freedom of choice by compulsion o r through
a mistake o r o t h e r circumstances. I n t h e former case the void marriage
could be r a t i f i e d during a l u c i d i n t e r v a l o r when s n n i t y returned-(7O) and,
i n t h e lc?€ter case, when t h e compulsion or other circumstances were removed.(71)
By t h e Natrinonial Causes Act 1857, 2.22 and the Supreme Court of Judicature
(Consolidation) Act 1925, s , 3 2 (72) e c c l e s i a s t i c a l law i s administered by the

(68) Discretionary: Scott v o S c o t t [1959] 92; Copham V. Copham (1959)

Times, Jan. 15; v. - z,
B. (1961) lo5 S , J . 182; absolute: G. V . 2.
Cl9611 P. 87.
(69) Decretals of Gregory iX, Bk. IV, tit. 7, Ch. 2 , (1227)
(70) Y z s b h f s Case (1702) Frocman C.C. 259; Shelford's Law of lvlarriage
and divorce,^ 1841, p, 197. See a l s o E l l i s V. Bowman (1851)
17 L.T. (o.s,) io.
(71) Swinburnfs T r e a t i s e of Espousals, 1686, p.38, !.;?liffe's Parergon,
1726, p. 361; Poynter's Doctrine of Practfce o r the E c c l e s i a s t i c a l
Court, 1824, p. 138; Roger's E c c l e s i a s t i c a l Law, 1841, p, 564;
Shelford's Law o f Narrisge and Divorce, 1841, 2.214.
(72) Baxter V, Baxter [1948] A.C. 274, 285; Kiatalon V, Natalon Cl9521
P. 233, 237.

- 24 -
Divorce Court i n n u l l i t y proceedings and t h c d o c t r i n e of r s t i f i c z t i o n vms
aclmomledged by Lord I ~ I e r r i v s l c , P, i n a case where t h e g e t i t i o n e r went
through a ccremony of n,vriage b e l i e v i n g i t t o bc a b c t r o t h d ceremony. ( 7 3 )

44 The d o c t r i n e of r a t i f i c a t i o n i s i n c f f c c t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of the
d o c t r i n e of approbation t o m a r r i a g c s v o i d for absence of consent cand. i t hss
been ppoposed t o us t h a t s u c h marriagcs s h o u l d b e inade v o i d a b l e s o as t o
a l l o n f o r t h e i r approbation and s o t h a t t h e y could be v a l i d unless t h c
p a r t i e s themselves took s t e p s t o have thcm w-mulled. Thcrec?x 2" bigmous
narriagc o r one w i t h i n t h e p r o h i b i t e d d-cgcees can, b o t h i n t h e o r y and
p r a c t i c e , b c t r c a t c d as v o i d w i t h o u t t h c n e c e s s i t y o f a d c c r c e of n u l l i t y ,
a marria& alleged t o bc v o i d on t h c p o u n d of i n s a n i t y o r l a c k of conscnt
cannot i n p r a c t i c e b e t r e a t e d es a v o i d narriage n i t h o u t t h e c o u r t f i r s t
i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e circumstances and making a d e c r e e , s o t h c t t h c t r a n s f e r of
such a. n,?xriagc from the v o i d i n t o t h c v o i d a b l e c a t e g o r y of mrriages would-
n o t crcatc h a r d s h i p t o t h c p a r t i e s . The case f o r such t r a n s f e r i s nuch
s t r o n g e r i n t h e c a s e of a marriagc v o i d f o r l a c k of consent v h e r e a p a r t y
s h o u l d b e (and a l r e a d y i s under t h e d o c t r i n e of r 2 , t i f i c a t i o n ) f r e e t o
d c c i d e for h b s c l f vqhethcr he wishes tho marriage t o t,&e effect; why, if
the p a r t i e s wish t h e i r n a r r i a g c t o bc v a l i d , s h o u l d they run t h c r i s k of
h a v i n g t'nc narriagc inpeached by t h i r d p,arties? The c a s e of i n s a n i t y ,
i.e. i n c q m c i t y t o c o n s c n t , i s n o m d i f f i c u l t i n t h a t t h e i n s a n e p a r t y nay
be unable, by reason of h i s incntnl d i s a b i l i t y , t o i n s t i t u t e procacdin,r; t o
mnul his narriage. (74)

(73) V a l i e r v. V a l i e r (1925) 133 L.T. 830 (,I1 riust c o n s i d e r x h c t h e r t h c r e

has been m y t h i n g i n t h c p c t i t i o n c r ' s subsequent conduct v h i c h
mounted t o - a r a t i f i c a t i o n . The c a s e nould be a v c r y d i f f e r e n t caso
i f , af'tcr t h e p e t i t i o n e r r e a l i s e d . t h z t zo Piarrisgz cercr-lony had bcen
perfomcd, the p a r t i c s liad proceeded t o take each o t h c r as nan a d
wife.") The d o c t r i n c of r a t i f i c a t i o n i s p u r e l y c m o n i c a l i n o r i g i n
and cannot be e x p l a i n e d OE l o g i c a l grounds. I n t h e nords of
Lord O'Brien, C . J . , in Usshcr v. Ussher [1912J 2 I.R. 455, 480;
!!As vas asked with nuch e n p h a s i s b y counsel d u r i n g the a r b w e n t , hUi:
could the marriage bc v a l i d a t e d i f i t WEIS a l t o g e t h e r v o i d ? Such a
p r o p o s i t i o n i t ~ m scontcndcd, f i n d s no s u p p o r t from ' r e a s o n ' .
I am afraid there are many t h i n g s l y i n g at the r o o t , a t the
f o u n d a t i o n , o f t h e Christi,m r c l i g i o n , nysterics of f a i t h , €or
e l u c i d a t i o n of which we s h o u l d a p p e a l t o ' r e a s o n ' i n v a i n , "

(74) Though i n b o t h Australia and Xev Zealand abscncc of consent, ivhcther

by r e a s o n of i n s a n i t y or compulsion, nake t h e narriage v o i d , i n n o s t
states o f the U.S.A. absence of consent, for e i t h e r r c a s o n , nakes t h e
nCarricagev o i d a b l e ; i n Sout'n A f r i c a mental i n c a p a c i t y rxzkes t h e
marriage v o i d and l a c k of consent makes i t v o i d a b l c .

- 25 -
45. Wc t h i n k that lack of consent should r e n d e r a n a r r i a g e v o i d a b l e and
n o t v o i d and mc a l s o t h i n k t h a t there s h o u l d b e a t i n e - l i n i t f o r b r i n a n g
proceedings on t h i s ground. We, t h c r e f o r e , r e c o m e n d that l a c k of consent
be s u b j e c t t o the t h r e e - y e a s ' tine-liclit suggested i n p a r a 34 i n r e s p o c t of
t h e grounds o f n u l l i t y under t h e h h t r i r z o n i a l Causes Act 1965, s.g(l)(b), (~)~(d).

46. On b a l a n c e we t h i n k t h a t i n s a n i t y a t thc t i n e of n a r r i a g e - that is,

absence of Dental c a p a c i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e n a t u r c of marriage (see p a r a 20) -
s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o r e n d e r a marriage v o i d , O u r r e a s o n f o r t'nis view i s ,
first, that a m a r r i a g e , v h e r c onc of the p a r t i c s i s i n t h i s m e n t a l s t a t e and
does n o t understand n h a t he i s doing, i s n e a n i n g l e s s and, secondly, -that the
insane p a r t y i s , i n p n c r a l , u n a b l e t o c o n s u l t a s o l i c i t o r or take i n t e l l i g e n t
advice as t o n h a t a c t i o n he s h o u l d pursue with r s g a r d t o t h e narriage, i.e. he
cannot nakc a r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n n h c t h e r t o a c c e p t the marriage o r t o take s t e p s
t o have i t s e t aside. A t t h e sane t i n e , v e a p p r e c i a t c t h E t there arc argutlents
i n f m o u r of d c i n g i n s a n i t y E? ground f o r r e n d e r i n g a narriwe v o i d a b l e , which
n a y be surarilcd up as follows: -
(I) hdarriages are v o i d a b l e under the M a t r i n o n i a l Causes Act 1965,
s.9 on the ground of unsoundness of o r recurrent
attacks of i n s a n i t y and i s t h e r e any c o n p e l l i n g reason why
t h e s a x s h o u l d n o t a p p l y t o t h c unsoundness of a i n d ahich
now rn,zkes a,riarriage v o i d ?

(2) It may seem a r t i f i c i d thzt t h e narriage of a person s u b j e c t

t o r e c u r r e n t a t t a c k s o f i n s a n i t y s h o u l d be a b s o l u t e l y v o i d if
the c e l e b r a t i o n of t h e narriage c o i n c i d e s w i t h an z t t a c k , but
i s v d i d , though v o i d a b l e , i f t h e a t t a c k t&cs p l a c e t h o dzy
b e f o r e or t h e d3y a f t e r t h e c e l e b r a t i o n .

(3) There are n a r r i a s s of i n s a n e persons n h i c h b e n e f i t s u c h

persons, I f , f o r i n s t m c c , a wonm narries an i n s a n e Dan
and- i s w i l l i n g t o l o o k a f t e r hin and her c a r e and p r e s e n c e
are b e n e f i c i a l t o thc .am, d i y s h o u l d the rxxrrisge be n u l l
and v o i d 2nd vhy s h o u l d t h i r d p a r t i e s be allowed t o i n t c r f c r e
with i t by h a v i n g i t declared t o be a n u l l i t y ?

(4) Under e x i s t i n g l a u a t h i r d p m t y can, w i t h l e a v e of t h e c o m t ,

i n s t i t u t e n u l l i t y (and d i v o r c e ) proceedin@ on b e h a l f of t h c
i n s a n e person 'as his -.;-$ f r i e n d ; ( 7 6 ) t h i s i s a safeguard i n
the e v e n t of i t s b c i n g i n the i n t c r e s t of t h e i n s a n e person t o
o b t a i n a decree of n u l l i t y , t h e i n s a n e person b c i n g hinsclf

(75) See para 29 as t o t h c iiesning of unsoundness of n i n d i n s.9.

(76) 1Jenta.l H c d t h Act 1959, s. 103

- 26 -
47. A f u r t h e r proposal which has been made t o us i s t h a t i n s a n i t y should
r e n d e r a narriage v o i d a b l e , but t h a t t h i r d p a r t i e s h z v i n g a suffi c i e n t
i n t e r e s t s h o d < - be a b l e (as t h e y a r e nom able bacausc t h e rnasriagc is v o i d )
t o a t t a c k the na.rriage. !his voulc! c o n s t i t u t e an e x c e p t i o n t o the rule
t h a t o n l y t h e p a r t i e s n q y cittack t h e v a l i d i t y of a v o i d a b l e marriage and
t h e e f f c c t of t h e exception would be t o nake t h e n a r r i a p v a l i d unless
avoidcd i n a n u l l i t y s u i t by a spouse or by a thirc! p c r t y n i t h a s u f f i c i e n t
i n t e r e s t , i n s t e a d of t h e ncrriage b e i n g void as i s now t h e case. If this
p r o p o s a l ucre adopted, i t vioulcl be n e c e s s a r y t o decide whether t h i r d p a r t i e s
should be able t o attack thc n,wriage:

(1) czt any time, whether d u r i n g t h c l i f e of t h e spouses o r

a f t e r the d e a t h of onc of t h e n ;

(2) o n l y d u r i n g t h e l i f e of tho spouscs, s o t h a t , as i n t h e

CLSO o f o t h e r v o i d a b l e n n r r i a g c s , t h e narriage c c a s c s
t o be s u b j e c t t o a t t a c k as soon as one p a r t y t o i t i s de?*d;

( 3 ) o n l y a f t e r the d e a t h o€ one of t h c s p o u s e s , t h e r e b y leaving

t h c spouses f r e e fron outside i n t e r f e r e n c e d u r i n g their
joint lives.

48, As a f u r t h c r a l t c i r r z t i v e , i n s a r , i t y could be governed by t h e

h h t r i n o n i d Causes A c t 1963, s.9 m c l t3c s u b j e c t t o t h e proposed t h r e e
y e a s s ' t i n e - l i n i t ( s e c p a r a 34 a d 3 6 ) , d t e r nliich the n a r r i a g c could
n o t be c h a l l e n g e d e i t h e r by a s p o u s e o r by a third p m t y . Thus, i t
::auld be knovn lyithin t h r c c years of mrricge a h c t h c r a nerrisge was
being c h a l l e n g e d ? a d once thrcc y e a r s had e l a p s e d f r o m the dcte of
n n r r i a g e , t h e o n l y v o i d a b l e n a r r i a s s vihicli coulc?. b e r n n u l l c d would b e
t h o s e v c i d a b l c for i n p o t e n c e o r 7 x i l f u l refusd t o c o n s u m a t e . ( 7 7 )

$9. We t h i n k t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n n h c t h e r i n s a n i t y which ~ a l c c sa person

i n c a p a b l e o f unders t m d i n g t h e n a t u r e of narrictge shoulrj r e n d e r t h e
narriagc v o i d o r v o i d a b l e i s a d i f f i c u l t one m d VJC lime a t t c n p t o d t o s e t
o u t t h e c o n s i 2 c r s t i o n s for and a g a i n s t several p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s .
1'Jhilo we have s t a t e d OUT p r o v i s i o n a l vier7 ( p a r a 46), we i n v i t e views on
this gues t i o n .

(77) In p a r a 60 we d i s c u s s t h c p o s s i b i l i t y of n a g t h e thrcc y e a r s '

tine-linit a p p l y t o thcse marriages.

- 27 -
 -
IT SHOULD AN UNi)ER-AGE W 3 I A G E BE VOIDABLE OR RATIFIABLE? *

50 It h a s been proposed t o us that a marriage i n which one spouse i s ,

o r b o t h spouses are, under t h e age of s i x t e e n a t t h e t i n e of clarriage,
s h o u l d b e e i t h e r v o i c h b l e o r r a t i f i a b l e , instead of being v o i d as i s t h e
case under e x i s t i n g l a v .
The d i s t i n c t i o n betneen these two p r o p o s a l s is:
if the under-age narriagc n e r c made v o i d a b l e , s u c h a nax-iage i;loUld be
v a l i d unless i t nere annulled; i f i t verc nade ratifi?-ble, i t would be
void unless t h e r a t i f y i n g act took p l a c e . ( T 8 ) Ve would welcone views on
both proposds.

51. The arguments i n f a v o u r of n,&ing the marriage v o i d a b l e nay be

s m a r i s e d as f o l l o w s : -
If t h e p a r t i e s narry genuinely b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h c y are b o t h
of narriageable age, i t i s hard on t h e n i f s u b s e q u e n t l y -
perhaps nmy y e a r s l a t e r - they discover t h a t t h e i r
narri,age was v o i d ; lilcemise, one p a r t y may f r a u d u l e n t l y
l e a d ’ t h c o t h e r p a r t y t o t h i n k that he o r she i s of
n a r r i a g e a b l c age and- t h e o t h e r p c r t y would b e l e d i n t o
e n t e r i n g a narriage b e l i e v i n g i t t o b e v a l i d n h e r e a s i t
nould i n fact be void. It nay b c p o s s i b l e f o r t h e
p a r t i e s , on d i s c o v e r i n g the true f a c t s t o n a r r y and
t h e r e b y rectify the p o s i t i o n , but t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y would
n o t b e a v a i l a b l e if t h c y had s e p a r a t e d and one or o t h e r
r e f u s e d t o narr;ir or if‘ one or b o t h nere dead; i n such
e v e n t c h i l d r e n e n 3 o t h e r persons night be a d v e r s e l y
aff e c t e d .

(2) S o c i e t y should n o t intcrrCere v i t h a narriage vrhich i s

vLiiid f r o n t h e c e r e i l o n i s l a s p e c t unless i t i s c o n t r a r y
t o p u b l i c p o l i c y t o regard the p a r t i c u l a r narriagc as
v‘did, and why s h o u l d i t bo c o n t r a r y t o p u b l i c p o l i c y
t o t r e a t as v a l i d c narjiage which b o t h p a r t i e s , now of
t h e age o f n a r i a g e , i d a n t t o p r e s e r v e ?

52. The argments against nrtlcing t h e und-er-age marriage v o i d a b l e

(instead of i t s being v o i d , as under e x i s t i n g lau) may b e surncnarised
;1s follows : - -.

(1) The narriage could n o t then bc a n n u l l e d i f i t had been

approbated. Where b o t h p a r t i e s know t h a t one or o t h e r

(78) I n sone c o u n t r i e s there i s p r o v i s i o n for narriagc b e l o n the s t a t u t o r y

marriage age anc? beloi-1 t h o ~ g oe f consent t o sexual i n t c r c o u r s e :
see n o t e 5.
 is, o r both are, under-age when e n t e r i n g i n t o the marriage,
both p a r t i e s m u s t s u r e l y be apprcbizting the marriage, s o
that no decree of n u l l i t y ryould be possible and the
marriage would be f o r all time valid. On the o t h e r hand,
i f one o r both of the p a r t i e s entered i n t o . t h e narriage
innocently believing t h a t both p a r t i e s were over s i x t e e n ,
there could not be approbation by the innocent p a r t y u n t i l
he o r she discovered the mistdce. Therefore, i n some
cases a p e t i t i o n mi&t be presented many years after the
marriage with the r e s u l t t h a t the very uncertainty a s t o
the status of the marriage which both we and the Norton
Commission want eliminated (see para 33) would be brought
i n t o existence. This d i f f i c u l t y could, however, be
overcome i f the under-age marriage were made s u b j e c t t o
the three-years' time limit which we suggest should be
applicable t o c e r t a i n p e t i t i o n s f o r n u l l i t y under t h e
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965, s.g(l)(b), ( c ) , (d) (see
paras 34 m d 48).

(2) The s u b s t a n t i a l objection t o ndcing an under-age marriage

voidable i s of a s o c i a l n a t m e . Does s o c i e t y think i t
right t o f i x w age below which, as,amatter o f public
policy, no person should be able t o m a r r y , or does i t
hold the viev t h a t i f tvo people nevertheless contrive
t o be married bclow t h a t age, they should be l e f t f r e e
t o decide whether t h e i r marriage i s t o be v a l i d o r void?

(3) Society has f i x e d the minimum age f o r marria@ a t sixteen.

U n t i l 1929 the m i n i m u m age was fourteen f o r a boy and tnelvc
f o r a girl, the reason f o r such ages being apparently due t o
the medieval conception t h a t a t those respective ages children
reached the agc when t h e y became capable of sexual intercourse
and e v i l would ensuc i f they were n o t then s b l e t o marry. (73)
"he Age of Marriage Act 1929( 8 0 ) r a i s e d the minimum age of
marriage t o s i x t e e n f o r both sexes, this age being chosen
because s e x u a l intercourse with a girl under sixteen na6
(and s t i l l i s ) a crinunal offence and i t m m considered

- ~ - .-

(79) Lords' Debates (on Age of JIsrriage Act) 1929, Vol. 72, Col. 961
(80) Repealed and reenacted in the !ilstrriage Act 1949, s . 2

- 29 -
 wrong f o r marriage t o t&e p l a c e a t an age e a r l i e r than
the age a t n h i c h the girl could l a w f u l l y consent t o &,mal
intercourse. The s u g g e s t i o n t h a t an under-age marriagc
s h o u l d be v o i d a b l e (and n o t v o i d ) was r e j e c t e d f o r t h i s
reason. To q u o t e from t h e speeches i n P a r l i a m e n t d u r i n g
the d e b a t e s on t h e 1929 A c t :

"Everybo&y w i l l agree t h a t something s h o u l d be

done t o p r c v e n t the c l o a k o f marriage bciiig throvn
over an act n h i c h i s d e c l a r e d t o b e a crime and
p u n i s h a b l e under our 1m .....
thing t o s a y thct we id11 n o t , from t h i s day
It i s a simple

f o m a r d , countenLance t h e marriage of a girl u n d e r

the age of s i x t e c n when we s a y that t h e ordin,ary
a c t [of sexual i n t e r c o u r s e ] n i t h h e r under the a@
of s i x t e e n i s m o€fence znd i s a c r i m i n d o f f e n c e
and that i t i s not- t o b e made an i n n o c e n t o f f e n c e
merely by mzrrizge ...,. A l l that t h e B i l l i s
a t t e n p t i n g t o do i s t o e n a c t t h a t t h a t which i s a
c r i m i n a l o f f e n c e should. n o t be r e n d e r e d an a c t f o r
which no punishment o r p e n a l t y can b e imposed
provided t h e r e i s marriage ..... If a t h i n g i s
a r o n g under tlie age of s i x t e e n , how can i t b e c o m
right i f i t i s clostked b y a marriage? (81)
That a man may i n s r r y CL girl and may under t h o
clo,Zk of marriage commit a g a i n s t h e r u h a t we a l l
nom a c c e p t as a d e f i n i t e wrong against the girlls
k , i a t u r i t y and against her i n z b i l i t y t o u n d e r t k e

man .....
the t e r r i f i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f r e l a t i o n s with a

the m e a s u r e .
is t o d e s t r o y t h e whole f o u n d a t i o n of
(82) We arc s a t i s f i e d that t o
l e m e the l a y ) as i t s t a n d s , that und-er t h e age of
s i x t e e n t h i s o f f e n c e i s a crime aqd y e t marriage
s h o u l d b e legal i s q u i t e i n d c f e n s i b l e . We do n o t
t h i n k i t i s p o s s i b l e t o d l o i v t h c ~ , T Jt o c o n t i n u e
ns i t i s now t h a t t h i s i l l e g a l a c t s h o u l d b e
condoned by marriage. I' (83)

(4) In 1967 t h o L a t c y Committee i-iere unanimously o f o p i n i o n that

i t i s " e s s e n t i d t h c t t h o minimwiz age f o r marriage and the
cage of consent t o sexual i n t e r c o u r s e s h o u l d be t h e same." (84)

(5) It may seen h a d on i n n o c e n t persons who &%ery e a r s of

marriage d i s c o v e r t h a t t h c marricge i s v o i d because a
p a r t y was under ace a t the time of marri,age, b u t t h i s
result f l o w s from the l m * s requirements as t o the
observance of f u n d m c n t d c o n d i t i o n s as a f o u n d a t i o n f o r

- -
(81) Lords' Debates, vol. 72, c o l s . 1211, 1213; v o l . 73, c o l s . 414, 415.
(Narcpis of Reading)
(82) -
I b i d . , vol. 72, col. 1209 (Lord Buckmaster)
(83) -
Ibid., v o l . 72,
Government )
c o l . 969 (Idzrquis of S d i s b u r y on b z h r l f of the

(84) Report of thc C o m i t t e c on t h e Age of IKajority, 1967, Cnnd, 3342,

para 177.

- 30 -
 a v a l i d marriage and i t s r e f u s d t o t r e a t cohabitation
as equivalent t o matrimony, The p a r t i e s m e i n a
similar predicLunent nhere a f t e r years o f "married l i f e "
the p a r t i e s discover t h a t t h e i r m a r r i q e i s void because
a former spouse was s t i l l d i v e a t the date o f nzrriage.

53. The a l t e r n a t i v e proposed t o us i s t h a t a wider-age marriage should

become v a l i d by r a t i f i c a t i o n if the p a r t i e s cohabit u n t i l the a@ of
majority. Ye have examined- t h i s proposd b u t have r e j e c t e d i t our
m a i n reasons f o r i t s r e j e c t i o n a r e :

(1) Allowing an e a r l i e r narriage t o be subsequently

v d i d a t e d would be tantamount t o condoning the
c r i x i n a l offence o f having sexual intercourse with a
girl under s i x t e e n , If the Police ~ ~ O tThJa t the girl
was rnazied under sixteen and t h c t the m
i m has had
sexual intercourse with her, are they t o prosecute o r
t o hold t h e i r hand t i l l i t i s known whether the
marriage h a been r a t i f i e d o r not? Is marriw t o a
girl under s i x t e e n t o be one way o f g e t t i n g round t h e
criminal l a u ?

Under the proposL;l the n m r i a g e remains void unless the

p a r t i e s cohabit u n t i l majority. It f o l l o r i s t h a t the
narri,age must be t r c c t e d as a void mrriqp, and no-one
ctul s a f e l y t r e a t i t ;ts a v a l i d n u r i a g e , unless m d
u n t i l r a t i f i c a t i o n i s established by some procedure,
p r e s w a b l y i n court, vdiich u o u l d provide f o r t r i a l of
t h e i s s u e nhere necessary. If s o , the p a r t i e s could
equally ne11 get n m r i c d wain. The only hardship would
be vJhcre one or both p a r t i e s d i e without discovering the
defect, but t h i s applios to d l cases of defects, e.g.
honest but mistaken b c l i c z t h a t a f o n i c r narriage has been
vcdidly dissolved by a foreign decree.

(3) Since the narriage i s void betr:,ccn t h e date of rnarriagc: and

attainment of m j o r i t y , the irate parent ( o r anyone e l s e
with a s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t ) can, during t h z t p e r i o d , obtain
a decree of n u l l i t y as o f r i g h t . ?hat is the l e g d position
t o be i f the p a r t i e s continue t o cohabit till majority
notwithstanding the decree?

- 31 -
 (4) What i s the p o s i t i o n t o be i f
(a) p a r t i e s i n t e n d t o r a t i f y t h e narriage by
c o h a b i t a t i o n b u t one o f t h e n dies on t h e
eve of a t t a i n i n g h i s o r her m a j o r i t y ?

(b) p a r t i e s c o h a b i t t i l l they are 20, then f a l l

a p a r t and r e s m e c o h a b i t a t i o n a t 22?

(5) How i s r a t i f i c a t i o n t o be proved i f y e a r s later, after

b o t h t h e p a s t i e s are dead, a c h i l d o f t h e i r s d i s c o v e r s
that one of t h e p a r t i e s was under sixteen a t marriage
and d l t h a t i s lrnoan i s that t h e y l i v e d t o g e t h e r f o r it

f e u y e a r s (but n o t 2 r e c i s e l y hon l o n g ) a x 3 then p m t e d ?

(6) To a l l o w r a t i f i c a t i o n of an under-age marriage a f t e r

r e a c h i n g t h e age of m r j o r i t y would be p l a c i n g i n t h e way
o f deternined young p c o p l e a t e m p t a t i o n t o get mzirried
under-age i n t h e knowledge t h a t t h e y have i t i n t h e i r
power t o v a l i d a t e t h e i:x~rriagc soon zs t h e y r e a c h
the r e q u i s i t e age. (85)

-V SHOULD THE CO%C%PTOF A VOIDABLE MARRIAGE BE XETAINED?

54. P r i o r t o the Reformation all marriages were e i t h e r v a l i d o r v o i d and

the concept of z v o i d a b l e narriagc? d i d n o t exist; a n u l l i t y d e c r e c could
be o b t a i n e d fron t h e E c c l e s i a s t i c a l Courts d e c l a r i n g a narriage v o i d on m y
ground ( i n c l u d i n g impotcnce) a t m y t i n e by my person w i t h a s u f f i c i e n t
interest. After t h c R c f o m a t i o n nsrriage ceased t o b2 2” s a c r L m e n t and t h e
Cormon Lavi c o u r t s f e l t f r e e t o i n t c r f e r e with t h e E c c l e s i a s t i c a l Courts’
power t o annul narriages. ‘hey conceded t h a t c e r t a i n nzrriages, e.g, where
there was a p r i o r e x i s t i n g aarriage o r l a c k of c o n s e n t , were no narriages
at all and r e f r a i n e d f r o n i n t e r f e r i n g i n such cc?scs, but i n t h e cCmc of
p r e - c o n t r a c t ( 8 6 ) marria@ w i t h i n p r o h i b i t e d degrees and impotence t h e y
used t h e r o y a l writ of p r o h i b i t i o n t o f o r b i d t h e E c c l e s i a s t i c a l Courts fron
a n n u l l i n g marrizges a f t e r t h e d e a t h of onc of t h e spouses. Hence narriqps
v o i d on one o f t h o s e gcounds becam uninpeachzble i m e d i a t e l y one of the

(85) The p r o v i s i o n of t h e French and I t e l i a n Civil Codes whereby t h e wife’s

prcgnancy v a l i d a t e s under-age narriage appears t o be an even vorsc
t e m p t a t i o n t o h e a d s t r o n g young people d e t e r n i n e d t o evade the lawa
(86) If A p r o n i s e d t o n a r r y B aiid then r x i r r i e d C w i t h o u t the promise t o
m,arry B h a v i n g been r e z c i n d e d u i t h B t s consent, A ’ s n a r r i q z t o C
was v o i d on the ground of p r e - c o n t r a c t .

8
- 32 -
spouscs died and i n t i n c such n m r i a g e s c m e t o be regarded as vcdicl
unless annulled 8uring thc l i f c t i n e of both spouses. Prc-contract nas
abolished by thc l h r r i a g e Act 1753 (Lord Iinu..dhicl-,rls Act) , an(? r?,arrisgcs
mithin the prohibited degrees ucrc nadz void by t h e Xarri-ge Act 1835, s o
t h a t t h e r e a f t e r impotence remained the only p o u n d on ahich a nsrriLge was
voidable. A voidzble maxiage nhich was annulled t r e a t e d as beiRg void
ab i n i t i o m d t h e i s s u e as i l l e ~ ~ t i m a t e . The decree, i n t h e cLwe both of
a void and voidable marricage, was a n 2 s t i l l i s the s m e ; i t declares the
marriage "to have been and t o be zbsolutcly n u l l and void t o 311 i n t e n t s
and purposes i n the l m nhatsoever." Tkis wording i s misleading i n thc
case of a voidable marriage, but i s understandable on h i s t o r i c a l grounds.

55. The r c s u l t of the h i s t o r i c a l dcvclopmcnt of the law was t h a t the

status of 3 voidable marriage - whether i t v i a s v d i d o r void - cm3 the
s t a t u s of the i s s u e were i n suspense u n t i l the decth of one of thc p a r t i e s .
?%ough uncertainty as t o the s t a t u s of' thc. i s s u c h?s becn rcmovcd by
legislation (SCC LEatrimonial Causes Act 1965 , s ,11,vhich enacts t h a t the
issue of a voidable masri2;e rirhich i s y m u l l e d arc 1egitii:late) , uncertainty
a t o the sba'kms of the marriage i t s e l f s t i l l remcins m r l the prcssnt 1a.u
n ~ be
~ ysummarised as f o l l o a s : s o long as a decree of n u l l i t y has n o t been
pronounccd, the marriage i s a v a l i d s u b s i s t i n g marriags, the spouses have
the stetus of husbmd and wife ( 8 7 ) m d the m a r i a g c must be trecltcd as
v a l i d by all p a r t i c s , b u t tz dzcree o f n u l l i t y , nhen made, i s r e t r o s p e c t i v e
and mounts t o a declaration t h z t there i s no marriqc.(88) Thus, xn
Lutc-nuptial settlement being i n consideration o f 2 contemplated valid.
marriage, f a i l s f o r l a c k o r consid-cration on a decrec of n u l l i t y being.
pronounced, ("' but a post-nuptial sct'ilcxent o r othcr t r m s a c t i o n
e f f e c t e d on the b a s i s that t h e r c i s a v d i d narriage i n cxistenco at t h c t
time cannot be sc-t aside upon the marriage boing 'wnullcd. ( 9 0 ) S i m i l a r l y ,
the m a r i a g c bcing v,?,lid, the v i f c a u t o m a t i c d l y acquires the husband's

.. -
(87) --
Re Wombvell*s Settlement [1922) 2 Ch, 298; Fovrlce v , Fowke [1?38] P

Ch. 774; D e Renevills v. Dc_Rcneville [1948] P. 100, C.A.

(88) Dormer V. Ward [IgOlJ P. 20, C . A . ; Re Eaves [1940] Ch. 109, COB.;
Re Adam c1951-J Ch. 716. nus a nidovi who remarries ?.nil whose
rcmsrrizge i s cvlnul$.ed"for impotcncc r e v e r t s tg her s t d x s of
mido;vhood: Re DevJhimt [1948] Ch. 198; Ne d l A l t r o y t s Will Trusts
[ ! ? 6 8 ] 1 W.L.R. 120
(89) R e Bonbnell's Settlement, supra; Clifton V. Clifton E19361 I?. 182;
The Divorcc Court can9 undcr the MatrimonitXL Causes Act 1965, s.17(1)
vary t h e s c t t l c n c n t by d i r e c t i n g t h z t i t docs not lapse, but t h i s
p o w r may n o t extend t o funds s e t t l e d by t h i r d p a r t i e s r i b i d .
(90) Re !Eaves , supra ( h m s a c t i o n bctntSen two bctief i c i a r i e s of trust )
Fonke V. Fonlce, s u rg. (separation r p c e r n c n t ) ; Ad'uns v, _Ad,uns [194l]
1 K.B. 3 6 , C.A. &e); Rc D e v r & i ~ ~ t sup=:
~, a t 205; Ee d'Altrog's : j i l L " _

Trusts [1968] 1 Y/.L.II. 120,

-I--

- 33 -
domicile and, on t h c marriage being annulled, she r e t a i n s i t u n t i l she
acquires m o t h e r o f h c r own v o l i t i o n . (91) The l m ~ ,hoaevcr, i s not nithout
doubts. Thus, i f a p m t y t o a voidpble marri,agc rcrilarrics during the
l i f e t i m e of the o t h e r party without a decrec of divorce or. n u l l i t y hzving
been madc, t h c t remarriage i s c l c x l y bigamous 2nd void, but i f t h e
voidable m,ariage i s subsequently ,ulnullcd, does the r e t r o s p e c t i v c e f f e c t
of the decree wipe o u t , as i t wem9 t e e voidable marriage and render the
remarriage v a l i d because, as a r e s u l t of t h c decree, no p r i o r marriage was
i n existcnce at the time of the renarriage? In V. 5!igeg5.ns (92)
it BCCS held t h e t the rem,vriage renained bigmous notnithstanding the
m u l m c n t of t'nc p r i o r ma.rriagc* But the court d c c l i n d t o f o l l o v thc
B. Irish czse of Mason V. I k s o n (93) nhere on sMlc?,rf a c t s the remarriage
mm held v d i d , and nnde no rcference t o ru'ewbould V. A,G. (34) where
Lord Ilerrivale's decision under t h c Legitimacy Act 1926 shons t h a t he nould
have found the renarriage t o have been vali0. Moreover, thc court pmpostci!
t o hold as i t d i d because of Idhat the Court of Appeal s a i d i n De Reneville V.
De Xawvil1.c. (95) But the Court o f Appcd. was n o t giving a decision on the
r e t r o s p e c t i v e e f f e c t of the decree, which, i n t h a t case, had n o t been illadet
n o r nm m y doubt c a s t by the Court of AppcCd on Nenbould v. A,G. I f the
rezsoning i n Iliason v, BImon i s prcferrcd t o the rccasoning i n v.
w,then t h e r e follows the odd consequence t h a t the renarriage would
be declared void i f a t the dztc of t h e p r o c e e d i n p t h e m had been no decree
of n u l l i t y i n respect of the prior n m r i s g c , but i t nould- be dcclarcd Pc23icl
i f before the d a t c o f the proceedings the p r i o r nzrriage had hccn annulled.
(96)

55. The present law i n r e l a t i o n t o the consequences o f a decree o f n u l l i t y

of 2. voidable marriage is unccrtain and inconvenient and me think th?,t t h i s
s i t u a t i o n could bc irnprovcd by l e g i s l z t i o n i n one of the f o l l o n i n g aays:

(1) The decree could annul the marriage f r o n the datc of

the decree. This i s thc Australian solution vherc t h e

R . .

-
De Reneville v, DC Rcneville, supra a t 111, 1 1 2
[1958] 1 V.L.R. 1013
[l944] N.I. 134; the judgment of Andrevis, C.J. was describcd by
B u c l a i l l , L.J. i n De Eenevi= v. De Rcneville [1948] P. 100, 120
as z "considered and helpful judgimnt."
Cl9311 p. 75
[1948] P. 100 C.A. '

The position seems t o be t h e sane i n the cese of a crb5xm.l

prosecution f o r bigmy: see the n o r d i n g o f the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861, S. 57 and Hason v. [1944] X.1. 134,
164-165,

- 34 - ..
 d e c r e e "annuls t h c narriage f r o n and i n c l u d i n g t h e d a t e
on which t h e d e c r e e bcconcs a b s o l u t e ''; Natrhonial
C a u c s Act 1959 ( A u s t . ) , s . 51.

(2) The d c c r e e could rcnain e x a c t l y as i t i s noid, t h a t i s

t o s a y , a n n u l l i n g t h e :icrriage, qua a- Liarria@?, ab i n i t i o ,
but t h e legal e f f e c t of t k o decree could e x p r e s s l y b c
nadc t h e s m c as i f t h e rn,wriqy had been d i s s o l v e d or
a n n u l l e d f r o n t h e d e t c of thc clccrec. (97) This seellls
50 be t h e Gerrnan s o l u t i o n . (381

( 3 ) Voidable aarriages c o u l d bc a b o l i s h e d m6- t h e e x i s t i n g

grounds riaking r?. marriage v o i d a b l e could be ncde & ~ o u n d s
f o r divorce.

57. Tlzc ar,gnents i n f m o u r of a l t c r n s t i v a ( 3 ) , thFut i s s u b s t i t u t i n g

d i v o r c c f o r n u l l i t y o f a voiiiable n n r r i o g e , ere, q u i t e simply, t h a t t h e tno
rcncdies arc i n s u b s t w c e sirxilar a n d thc d i f f o r c n c e bctzwcn t h e n i s r c a l l y
only a matter of f o r n ; (99) in each cgse t h e r e i s c n z r r i a g c v a l i d u n t i l
the dccrcc i s naJe ad t h a t d e c r c c t o r n i n z t e s t h e n a r r i a g c , b u t , i n t h e c m c
o f n u l l i t y , t h e d e c r e e m i s l e a d i n g l y declares t h e rxxriage t o h a w n c v c r
existed; t h a t b e i n g s o , i t i s more l o g i c a l t o t e r n i n a t e t h e narriage by a
divorce'') rihich r e c o r d s t h e r e a l i t i e s of t h c s i t u a t i o n , (2)

-
(97) This p r i n c i p l e has d r e s c t y been aclopted. . : i t h regard t o l e a t i n s c y of
c h i l d r e n ; see M a t r i n o n i n l Ca-aes Act 1965, s. 11: "&ere a decree
of n u l l i t y i s grczntec? iii r e s p e c t of a voidLble mrriage, ,my chili! aho
would- have been t h e l e g i t i s i a t c c h i l d of t h e p a r t i e s t o thc nsrriage i f
a t t h e d z t 2 o f t h e decree it had been d-issolved instead- of b e i n g
annulled shall be dcmcC t o be t h e i r l e g i t i n a t e c h i l d . "
(98) This s t a t e m e n t i s basecl on tlic thesis by Dr I. Manska ( I n s t i t u t e of
A&VIIYICC~ Legal S t u d i e s L i b r a r y ) ; A r t i c l e 29 of tlic Genitm I'iarriage
Laby No. 1 6 states o n l y t h a t t h e n a r r i a g c i s tcmxLnatec1 on t h e d a t e on
which the d c c r e c of n u l l i t y i s pronounced.
(99) Turner v. Turner (1888) 13 P.D. 37, 4.0; I n v c r c l y d c v, Invorclgdc.
L m ' p . 299 42.
(1) "It nay be t h a t i t would be nore l o g i c a l t o t r e a t i n p o t e n c e as a
ground of d i v o r c e , as i t i s i n A m r i c a , where t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n i s n o t
hmpcrcd by the rules of t h e Canon L m : " Eavcs V. Eaves [1940] 1 Ch.
109, 122.
(2) If the e x i s t i n g grounds f o r n u l l i t y of a v o i d a b l e n a r r i a g c were mcdc
grounds f o r d i v o r c e , i t v ~ o u l dn e v e r t h e l e s s b e n e c e s s a r y t o p l e c e t h e n
i n a c a t e g o r y s e p a r a t e f r o n t h e e x i s t i n g p o u n d s f o r d i v o r c e : It
would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o n&c a p e t i t i o n e r wait t h r e e y c a r s fron t h c
d a t e o f narrizge befcre p r c s e n t i n g a - p t i t i o n on t h e tground of
i n p o t e n c e o r wilful refusal. t o consw-mate, a l i n i t s t i o n vrhich a p p l i e s
t o t h e c x i s t i n g gcouids f o r divorce: I v k t r i m o n i d Causes Act 1965, s.2;
thc l h u t n t i o n -!hereby proceedings under s.9(1) ( b ) , ( c ) o r ( d ) nust be
i n s t i t u t c d n i t h i n one year 02 m,rriage, a p e r i o d 7:ihich vie sugL;Gst shoulJ.
be cxtcndcd t o t h r e e years, ( s c e p a r a s 34, 36) i ~ o u l dequally b e
i n a p p r o p i a t e i n t h e c o n t e x t o € t h e t h r m y e a r s l i n i t a t i o n a,pplic?-blc:
t o divorce suits.
- 35 -
 58. The arguncnts i n favour of r e t a i n i n g n u l l i t y of a void-eble marriage9
as i n d t e r n a t i v e s (1) and ( 2 ) are:
(1) It i s n o t true t o s a y t h e t t h e d-ifferericc bstneen a dkcree
of a voidable marriasc and a d-ccrcc o f divorce i s a inere
matter of f o r a It nay be t h a t the consequences of the
tvIo decrees are subs t e n t i d l y sinilar, but t h e concepts
giving r i s e t o t h c tv!o decrees are q u i t e d i f f c r e n t : the
decree of n u l l i t y recognises the oxistencc of an bipedinent
at the t i n e o f the marriage which prevents t h c mamiwe
f r o n bcing e f f e c t i v e , 17hile the decree of divorce records
that sone c z m c f o r tcrrninoting the marriage has a r i s e n
s i n c e the marriage.

(2) This d i s t i n c t i o n between 2 cause e x i s t i n g at t h e t i n e o f

*
m r i a g e , as a r e s u l t of vhich t h e marriage i s i n p e r f e c t
and could bc EtvoiiLcd, and a cause arising z f t e r a v a l i d
narriage has cone i n t o existence a s a r e s u l t of which
t h e marriagc could be dissolved, nay be of l i t t l e weight
t o the t h e o r e t i c a l l a u y e r , but i s a mntter of essence i n
t h e jurisprudence of tho Christian Church.

( 3 ) The Church of Zngland at-:aches considerable importmce

t o consent as a p r c r c q u i s i t c t o rnarri'age. Consent t o
marrizge i n c l u b s consent t o s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s and, hence,
impotence can be regarded! as having the e f f e c t of v i t i a t i n g
conscn t. (') Likevise, the ,--rounck under s , g ( l ) { b ) , ( c ) and
(CI) (mental- d i s o r $ e r , epilepsy, pregnancy per aliwii o r
venereal disease) f a l l under the head. of conditional consent (4)
and are acceptable t o the Cliurch. Except with regarc? t o
a i l f u l r e f u s a l t o conswnm,?,te, nhich t h c Church o f Lhglmd
considers should CCSC t o be a p o u n d f o r n u l l i t y mcl be a
gcound f o r divorce ( s e e para 26), t h e Church i s s a t i s f i e d
with t h e e x i s t i n g lzd of n u l l i t y . (5) Therefore, s o r a d i c a l
a change as i s involved i n the s u b s t i t u t i o n of a decree of
divorce f o r a decree of n u l l i t y i n respect o f n a t t c r s which
the Church regards rn relevant t o the formation of n z r r i a g e
and irrelevant t o divorce, is l i k e l y t o be unvielcomc t o the

(3) Church Report, .p, 30

(4) m, pp. 28, 38-33, 47-48

- 36 -

-. .
 Church, Such a change i s a l s o l i k e l y t o b e unwelcome
t o t h e Ronan C a t h o l i c Church. It i s also l i k e l y t o b e
r e s e n t e d b y people n o t n e c e s s a r i l y b e l o n g i n g t o e i t h e r
Church nho a s s o c i a t e a stigma(6) w i t h d i v o r c e and who
mould t h e r e f o r e p r e f e r t o see s u c h m a t t e r s as impotence,
e p i l e p s y and mental d i s o r d e r , a k h are i l l n e s s e s , remain
grounds f o r a n n u l l i n g the marriage r a t h e r t h a n causes
f o r d i s s o l v i n g it.

(4) It may b e t h a t many people do n o t a p p r e c i a t e the

d i s t i n c t i o n between d i v o r c e and n u l l i t y . They, presumably,
would n o t oppose t u r n i n g a n u l l i t y of a v o i d a b l e marriage
i n t o a divorce. I f , honcver, s u c h a change i s l i k e l y t o
cause o f f e n c e t o a s u b s t a n t i a l n i n o r i t y , then t h e p r o p o s a l
cannot be recormended u n l e s s some o o r t h w h i l e advantage i s
t o be gained from the change, n h c r e a s the only advantage
t o b e gained from t h e change i s t h a t the p r e s e n t v o i d a b l e
marriage n i l 1 f i t i n riiorc “ n e a t l y ” anong d i v o r c e s t h a n
among n u l l i t i e s . (7)

59. We are, t h e r e f o r e , opposed t o t h e a b o l i t i o n of v o i d a b l e marriages

and t h i n k that t h e y s h o u l d be r e t a i n e d b u t t h e e f f e c t of t h e d e c r e e of
n u l l i t y should be modified as p o s t u l a t e d i n p a r a 56(1) o r ( 2 ) , i . e . e i t h e r
(1) t h e d e c r e e s h o u l d annul t h e marriage f r o n t h e d a t e o f t h e d e c r e e , or
( 2 ) t h e decree s h o u l d annul t h e marriage ab i n i t i o (as non), b u t t h e legal
e f f e c t of t h e d e c r e e s h o u l d be the same as i t would b e i f t h e marriage had
been a n n u l l e d from t h e d a t e of the d e c r e e , A s betoeen t h c s c two a l t c r n a t i - r :
t h e p r i n c i p a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are:

(1) A l t e r n a t i v e (l)s by a b o l i s h i n g t h e legal f i c t i o n t h a t t h e r e

ncvci- had been a marriage, iiould r e f l e c t t h e f a c t u a l s i t u -
ation, i.e. t h e e x i s t e n c e of a v a l i d mzriage from t h e d a t e
of t h e marriage ceremony u r . t i l t h e d a t e of t h e d e c r e e and the
non-cxistcncc o f t h e marriage as f r o n t h e d a t e of t h e decree.

__-~- - ~

(6) The stigma a t t a c h e d t o d i v o r c e i s n o t l i k e l y -Jholly t o be rcnovcd by

t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Divorce Rcforn B i l l tihich r e q u i r e s proof t h a t
t h e marriage has broken donn oning t o & t e r a l i a t h e a d u l t e r y ,
behaviour o r d e s e r t i o n o f t h e spouse b e i n g divorced.
(7) I n Neii Zealand t h e d e c r e e of n u l l i t y of a voiclablc i,llarriage has been
r e p l a c c d b y a dccrcc. af “ d i s s o l u t i o n of a v o i d a b l e rilarriagel‘:
Natrimonial Proceedings Act 1963 (N.Z.) , s.J8. We have r e j e c t e d t h l ;
s o l u t i o n f o r t h c s a x r e a s o n s as we have r e j e c t e d - t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n 0.l
d i v o r c c for n u l l i t y o f a v o i d a b l e n a r r i a g c and f o r t h e a d d i t i o n a l
reason t h a t we t h i n k that a new f o r n of r e l i e f v h i c h combined i n i t s
terminology t h e concepts o f b o t h c!ivorcc and n u l l i t y m y c r e a t e
unnccessasy 6 i f f i c u l t i c s . I

- 37 -
 (2) Alternative ( 2 ) a o u l d have the sane l e g a l consequences
and e f f e c t as a l t e r n a t i v e (l), but as the decree would
declare (as i t does non) the narriage " t o have been and
t o be absolutely n u l l and void," the p a r t i e s could say
t h a t t h e i r union had never been a v a l i d fiiarriage and
t h a t they had never been inan and wife. This l a s t
consideration nay be o f iraportmce t o sone persons;
on the o t h e r hand, provided the decree i s a decree of
n u l l i t y , t h e date fron nhich i t amuls the narriage -
whether i t be ab i n i t i o or from the date of t h e decree -
nay D o t be o f importance. We would melcone views as
t o whether a l t e r n a t i v e (1) o r a l t e r n a t i v e ( 2 ) i s t o be
preferred. Our provisional view i s t h a t d t e r n a t i v e (1)
is t o be preferred.

60. It has been proposed t o us t h a t a marriage voidable for impotence

or w i l f u l r e f u s a l t o consuamate should be s u b j e c t t o the t h r e e years' tine-
Limit fron the date of narriage(8$o that the r-iarriage would cease t o be
voidablo at t h e end of t h a t period and would t h e r e a f t e r be a v a l i d narriage
terninable only by d.ivorce. The a r g m e n t in favour of t h i s proposal is
that all uncertainty as t o the stetus of thc n a r r i a g c would disappear after
three y o a r s when t h e marriage would becone indubitably valid. Beverthcless ,
having exauined t h i s proposal me do not favour i t , o u r p r i n c i p d reasons
being:
(1) The argunents s e t out i n paras 54-59 i n favour o f
r e t a i n i n g n u l l i t y of a v o i h b l c narriage apply t o
this proposal.

(2) The introduction of a three-years' t i n e - l i n i t i-rould

i n sone cmes place p a r t i e s i n a d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n .
Sone form of inpotence are incurable, but others,
p a r t i c u l a r l y i f they an? due t o i m n t d causes, a r e

(8) We have suggested t h a t t h i s t i n e l b i t should apply i n t h e case of

of a p e t i t i o n under the R h t r i n o n i a l Causes Act, 1965, s.g(l)(b), (c)
and (d) ( p a r a 34) and i n the case of l a c k or' consent i f this were
nade a ground f o r naking the mmriagc voidable ( p w a 48).

- 38 -
 curable o r -+ss nith t h e . Even i f the inpotence i s
incurable, t h i s nay n o t bc knOF7n t o the aggrieved p a r t y who,
wanting t h e narriage t o succeed, nzy continue t o hope that
c o n s m a t i o n ni&t be possible i n t i n e , S b i l a r l y , milful
refusal t o consmmcte rx.y be overcone by perseverance, as
where a wife throu&. f r i g i d i t y or nervousness refuses t o
a l l o w intercourse f o r a long period =after m r r i a g e ,
Even a f t e r the aggrieved party has cone t o r e a l i s e t h a t
the non-consmation i s due t o thc o t h e r pasty's w i l f u l
refusal, i t frequently happens t h a t he nevertheless s t i l l
continues h i s z t t e n p t s t o have the narriage consumnated
h o p i n g t h a t h i s e f f o r t s w i l l eventually overcome t h e
other p a r t y ' s reluct,wce. ,U1 such a t t e n p t s by the
aggrieved pasty a r c ' s u r e l y t o be comenZed ancl shouli! n o t
be discouraged by an d k i t r a r y time-li I t , the e f f e c t of
which would be t o place the %grieved party i n - t h e Ciilerma
of e l e c t i n g betmeen giving up h i s e f f o r t s t o n&e a success
of the a a r r i a g e and t a k i n g his decree o f n u l l i t y , o r
continuing his e f f o r t s ai(1 l o s i n g h i s decree.

(3) If a f t e r three years the marria@ ceased to be voidzble

and could t h e r e a f t e r only be terminated by divorce, the
aggrieved party who l c f t the non-consummating spouse
a f t e r the three years night be obliged t o wait a further
three years beforc a divorce 011 t h e grouni! of desertion
( i f t h e r e i s no other growncl-) became possible. (9 1
The p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t n i g h t be t h a t a young man o r woman,
who continued h i s o r her e f f o r t s t o donsunnate the
narriage beyond three years, moult! be unable t o have the
marriage tcrclinatcd t i l l at l e a s t s i x years had elapsed
from the date of marricage.

(4) If a f t e r 'the three y e a m ( i . e , a f t e r the mar?d.age had

ceased t o be voidable), the aggrieved p a r t y left t h e
inpotent spouse, the Pggrieved party would then be i n
desertion (since inpotcnce i s an i l l n e s s which does n o t
j u s t i f y a p a r t y leaving thc impotent spouse: (10) and
-_ --- - _

(9) If the Divorce Reform Bill becomes law i n , i t s present fora, it may
s t i l l be necessary t o m i i t two years under clause
- _ 2 ( l ) ( c ) (desertion)
o r 2(1)(d) (separation)o

(10) See footnote 36, supra

- 39 -
 I -.

a f t e r m o t h e r threc y c a s , t h e i n p o t e n t spouse would

be able t o ctivorcc t h e aggrieved p a r t y on that ground.
On t h e o t h e r hcani!, i f t h c r e f u s d t o consmzmte was Cuc
t o w i l f u l r e f u s a l , the z.gbgr5evecl p a r t y could leave and-
d l e g e c o n s t r u c t i v e ?-esertion o r , p o s s i b l y , c r u e l t y .
I n the rcsult, i f a f t c r thc threc y e n s t h e aggcieved
p a r t y l e f t because t h e marriage had n o t becn c o n s m a t e c l
but d i d n o t know v h e t h e r t h e n o n - c o n s u m t i o n was due t o
i n p o t c n c e or w i l f u l r e f u s a l , he or she viould b e g u i l t y
of a n a t r i m o i i i a l o f f e n c e i f t h e c o u r t found i n p o t e n c e
t o b e t h e cmse o f n o n - c o n s m a t i o n , b u t h e or she would
be blaneless i f the c o u r t found t h e cause t o bc m i l f u l
refusal t o c o n s m i a t e .

I
-
VI1 PARTIES TO A NlTLLITy SUIT

Voic? N a r r i a g e
-*

61. I n a d d i t i o n t o the spouses t h c m e l v e s , anyone n i t h a s u f f i c i e n t

i n t c r e s t i n o b t a i n i n g a d e c l z r s t i o n of n u l l i t y nay p e t i t i o n ; a slight
p e c u n i m y i n t c r e s t i s s u f f i c i e n t (I2)c731i? anyone mhosc t i t l e t o p r o p c r t y
aoulcl bc R f f e c t e d , or on ahon a legal l i a b i l i t y night be cast by the naturp;.
r e s u l t o f t h e nnrriage - the b i r t h o f i s s u c - h s s a ri.&t t o c o n t c s t i t s
v a l i d i t y (I3) Thus, a s i s t e r having a contingent i n t c r c s t un2er a s e t t l e i n
i f her b r o t h e r d i e d w i t h o u t issue can c o n t c s t t h e valic-lity o f h e r brother':;
narriagx (I2)and f o r n e r l y a father c o u l C c o n t e s t h i s s o n ' s o r d a u $ t t e r ' s
nar?-iagc because he slight be l i a b l c t o s u p p o r t his ,-rand-children undcr t h c
Poor Rclicf Act 1601, s.7. (13) I n t h e l a t t e r casc t h e P r i v y Council, thc.?
, thc f i n a l c o u r t i n u a t r i n o n i a l natters, saic? t h a t any IC@ i n t e r c s t , hoacvc:
srml1 w a s unques t i o n c b l y suf f i c i c n t even i f t h e i n t e r c s t was o f an cxtrerne1-y
minute ancl c o n t i n g e n t c h a r a c t e r ; (") indeed, they n e n t on t o s a y t h a t the

!
i n h a b i t , m t s of a p a r i s h , mho ni$t b e l i a b l e t o s u p p o r t t h c issue of the
narriagc, n i g h t p o s s i b l y have hci! s u c h an i n t c r c s t . I n t h a t sane cx3e9
the lowor c o u r t helif (I5)that t h e father of an i n f a n t c h i l d hac? a rzornl
i n t e r e s t e n t i t l i n g hiri t o p c t i t i o n and thct such ncral i n t o r c s t oxtcn2ecl t o
a d - u l t chilcren r e s i d i n g i n t h e i r f z t h c r t s house, but the P r i v y Council,

(11) Two y e a r s i f t h e Divorce R d & a S i l l bcconcs law.

~~
. _..-. .
(12) Farenouth V. Watson (1211) 1 Phil, 355
(13) v. Shemood (1837) 1 1100. P.C. 353 a t 399,400
I (14) Ibid. at 402
(15) Ray V. Shemoo.' (1836) 1 Curt. 193 a t 227

- 40 -

t
v h i l e expressly r e f r a i n i n g from dealing with e i t h e r p o i n t , p r c f e r r e d t o
r c s t t h e i r case on t h e grow.d o f t h c g a n d f a t h z r ' s possible l i a b i l i t y t o
support h i s g r a ~ d c h i l d r e n . I n vien of the l n s i g n i f i c a n t ncture of t h e
pccuniary i n t c r c s t nccdcd t o give the p e t i t i o n e r t h e r i g h t t o suc i t i s
perhaps s u r p r i s i n g t h a t a r e l a t i v e ' s spes succcssicnis,the r i g h t t o inherit;
on a n i n t e s t a c y , vrhich could be defeated by a mlid m r r i a g e 9 i s n o t a
s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t e n t i t l i n g t h e r c l a t i v c t o contest the marriage during
the spouse's l i f e t i m e . 'I6) But d t e r t h c spouse's death thc r e l a t i v e has
such an i n t e r e s t if h i s r i g h t of succession i s a f f e c t e d by the v a l i d i t y of
the spouse's marriage. (17)

62. The respondent t o the s u i t i s the othcr spouse, o r both spouses arc
respondents i f t h e s u i t i s brought by a t h i r d party; i n addition, m y
person nay be given lcavc t o intervene i n the s u i t . (19)

Vo idab 1e I.lmr iages

63. I n the case of inpotence no-one othcr than one of thc spouses i s
allooed t o p e t i t i o n . The general vicw i s t h z t the s m c applies i n t h c
case of grounds other th'an inpotence, and t h i s vien i s supported by o b i t e r _I_-

-
dicta i n the House of Lords. (*') Thc o t h e r spouse i s rcsponc'ent and t h e
court hes p o m r (as i t has i n all matrinonial s u i t s ) t o give t h i r d p a r t i e s
lcave t o intervene. ( 1 9 )

64. Ve think th2,t i n the casc of a voidable nasriage the position shoulc
remain as i t nOi7 i s , t h a t i s t o s a y the s u i t must be brought during t h e
l i f e t i n e of both p m t i c s ( 2 2 ) and the grounds o f n u l l i t y should be t r e a t e d E,

----- I- .
(16) v. Shcrnood (1835) 1 Curt. 173; 193 at 225; but the Frivy Counc- L
expressly l e f t the point open: (1836) 1l.foo. P.C. 353 a t 390; i n
-
J . v. J.E19531 P.186, vlhich TJL?.S a n i e c e ' s p e t i t i c n , t h e point nas
not clecided as the niece attempted t o p e t i t i o n as the a i f e ' s next
f r i e n d and not' i n her own r i g h t .
(17) R e Pmk [1954] P.112, C.A.
(18) Wells v. Cothan (1863) 3 Svs& Tr. 364.
(19) Matrinonial Causes Act 19659 s.44.
(20) v. B. (1868) 1 P. 8s D. 559; Invcrclydc v. Invcrclyde [1931) P.29,
41; HGthsn V. H m t h m [1949] P.115, 132,
(21) Ross-Snith V. Ross-Snith (19631 A.C. 280 a t 306, 348. I n the case of
n u l l i t y on grounds s e t out i n ~ , 9 ( 1 ) ( b )(~c ) ancl (d)' ( n c n t a l disorder,
epilepsy, vencreal disease znd ?regnancy pcr d i m ) the l i n i t a t i o n s
i n s . 9 ( 2 ) , nanely t h a t t h e court nust be s z t i s f i c c l t h a t the p e t i t i c n c r
a s ignorant of t h e defect at t h e t i n e of t h e m r r i a g e 2nd t h a t no
,
semal i n t e r c o u r s e took plzcc after' hc discovered i t i n d i c a t e tha-1:
the l e g i s l c t u r e had i n mind t h a t no-one but a spouse could be
petitioner.
(22) Subject t o m y s t a t u t o r y t i n e - l i n i t : Sec 2Iatrinonial Causcs Act 'Or'

s.q(Z) and our proposZA i n par?, 34.

- 41'-
natters of p c r s o n d conpltlint, s o thL?rt only a spouse should be able t o
p e t i t i o n t o hcvc the o e r r i a g c annulle;?, (23) Only the other spouse should
be respondent t o the s u i t , though t h e court should- r e t a i n i t s existing
power t o d l o a~ t h i r d party t o intcrvene.
.
65. Yho should be able t o p e t i t i o n i n a void narriage? The e x i s t i n g
l m i s t h a t , i n addition t o t h e spouscs t h e m c l v c s , any person who has a
pecuniary i n t c r c s t i n having a, Ceclaration of n u l l i t y s h o d 2 be zble t o
pctiticn. It i s tcripting t o exclui?e pcrsons with i n s i g n i f i c m t i n t e r e s t s ,
but i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see nhcre thc l i n e could bc &ram, (24) our provisional
vicn i s t h a t the lax7 slioulc? rcixsin as i t i s , We n o u l d taelcone views cas t o
vrhcthcr the law should be altcrccl.

66. VTho should be made a party t o a p e t i t i o n i n a void marriage?

A decree d e c l a r i n g a marriage t o be void a f f e c t s the children of the tr?ouses
who may be bastardised and l o s e ri&ts of property a s a r e s u l t of a f i n d i n g
t h a t a marriage i s void; (25) y e t children a r e not given any n o t i c e of t h e
proceedings and nay not even know t h a t proceedings are on f o o t . The children
of a void mwriage are l e g i t i m a t e i f at the time of the a c t of intercourse
resulting i n the b i r t h (or at t h e t i m e of the rnarriage i f l a t e r ) one spo:?se
o r both reasonably believed t h a t thc marriage was v a l i d . (z6) merefore,
t h e i s s u e s determining whether a c h i l d i s l e g i t i m a t e are: F i r s t , i s the
marriage v a l i d o r void? And, secondly, if t h e Iilarriage i s void, d i d the
spouse or spouses rcasonably believe i t t o be v a l i d a t the relevcant time?
As t o t h e f i r s t i s s u e , a decree o f n u l l i t y i s a judgment i n rem which i s ,
thereforc, conclusive on the children. A s t o t h e second i s s u e , a f i n d i n g
t h a t the spouse had o r had not the r e q u i s i t c b e l i e f could only be binding

See paras 47 t o 43 wherc w e i n v i t e views as t o c r e a t i n g a possible

exception i n thc case o f insanity.
In some countries p c r s o n s vith a moral i n t e r e s t c m also p c t i t i o n :
e.g. i n France: the asccndants o r the family ccuncil, thc lav!€ul
spousc i n the case o f bigmy by the other spouse, the public
prosecutor; i n Tlcst Gcrramya the lawful spouse i n thc casc of b i b m y
and the public prosecutor; i n Snitzerland: the public a u t h o r i t y .
F o r an example of what can happen, see Plurnrncr V. P l w c r [1917] P. 163,
C.A. where a f t e r a dccrec o f n u l l i t y hcd been pronounced a guardian 4
litera of t h e c h i l d of the nzrriage was appointed, the c h i l d was givcn
leave t o intorvenc! f o r t h e purpose of appealing against thc dccrce and
the decree t o a s rcscindcd on appe,d.
Legitiraacy Act 1959, s.2. A furthcr prercquisitc t o lcgitination i s
that t h e c h i l d ’ s f a t h e r Eiust bc domiciled i n Engl,und a t thc child’u
b i r t h , or, i f the f a t h e r d-icd before b i r t h , i m e d i a t e l y bcfore h i s
death: i b i d .

- 42 -
( i f a t all9 since l e g i t i n a c y i s not an i s s u e i n the suit and a custody
order caa be nsde nhcther Gr n o t the children a e l e g i t i n a t e ) bctncen t h e
p a s t i c s t o thc proceedings, nancly the spouses, However, i f the court
f i n d s t h a t one spouse or both had- t h e r e q k s i t e b e l i e f ( 2 7 ) t h s t nould f o r
p r a c t i c a l p w o s c s go a l o n g way tonards, i f not be conclusive as, a f i n d i n g
of lcgitinacy. S i n i l a r l y , i f the court mde 2. finding, a l b e i t o b i t e r ,
that n e i t h c r spouse had thc r c q u i s i t e b e l i e f , such f i n d i n g would presunably
be a r e f l e c t i o n of t h e evidence <and thc existence o f such e-sridcncc would be
a s u b s t m t i a l , i f n o t conclusive, obstacle t o a subsequent l o g i t i u a c y p e t i t i o n .
E i t h e r f i n d i n g nould bc aade on the b,wis of thc spouses' evidence untested
by cross-exmination on the question of l c g i t i n a c y ( o r , i f t h e p e t i t i o n is
undefended, completely untested) and, possibly i n the absence of other
r e l o v m t evidence. YIorccver, i f the children were o f tcnder years a t the
t i n e of the n u l l i t y suit and i f z f t c r reaching t h e i r najoority they found i t
advisable t o i n i t i a t e l e g i t i n a c y proceed-ins, t h e i r parents night by then
not be avcilable t o give evidence.

67. We, therefore, recornend- t h c t the children (if m y ) of the spouses

should be uadc p 8 r t i e s t o a p e t i t i o n for n u l l i t y of a void- n a r r i z p ,
Ye appreciate that t h i s nould add sorilenhat t o the expense of the proceedin@
and t h n t i n rxmy cases the i n t e r e s t s of tlic childrcn nould n o t suffer even
i f they ncrc not nadc p a r t i e s and sep,mately represented. But i n View of
thc s r . i d l nwnber of p e t i t i o n s ( 2 8 ) vJe do n o t rsgard the additional expense
cs adcquatc reason f o r dispensing n i t h i3, SdcgCLard uhich can only be certzin
of operating when needed i f i t i s rmd-c nandatory i n d l cmcs.

(1) PROCEEDINGS TO DECLARE T 3 IURRIAGE VALID, AJXD

( 2) LEGITIEMACY PZOmEDDTGS ? -
68. There a r i s e s a f u r t h e r question: should- n u l l i t y proceedings be
conbined v i t h proceedings f o r a ctccrec of v a l i d i t y o f the mrriage, s o that
t h e r e s u l t of the proceedings nould be a declaration t h a t the narriage is
c i t h e r v a l i d o r void? If t h o t verc done ani! thc sane proceedings investigated
the question of l c g i t i n s c y of children, thcn the r e s u l t of the s u i t f o r
n u l l i t y xoulcl. be t o s o t t l c once ancl f o r d l both the status of the n a z r i c ~ o
and the stctus of .t .h e .childrcn. Proceedings f o r declaration of v a l i d i t y of
. -

(27) Sec, f o r instance, C o l l e t t v. C o l l c t t [1967] 3 7;L.R. 280 a t 287 uherc

the court m d c t h i s finding.
(28) An avcragc of 75 a year: scc p z r a 5

- 43 -
 8 nctrriage o r of l e g i t i n a c y m e governed by the MatriLlonial Causes Act 1965,
s.39, v~hichr e q u i r e s t h a t the Attorney-General be nzdc c: p a r t y and provides
t h a t thc court s h a l l d i r e c t vrhat other persons nust be given n o t i c e of t h e
application s o that they may ep$ly t o intervene i f t h e i r i n t e r e s t s are
affected, This i s z valuable safeguard (29) f o r t h i d p m t i e s nay be
adversely affected i f a narriage i s declared t o be v a l i d o s i f children are
. h e l d t o bc l e g i t i n a t e , e.g. they nzy have rights under a s e t t l c n e n t contingent
, on a spouse dying urmarried a n d o r viithout l e g i t i n a t e issue. The Attorney-
Goneral. i s a d o a p a r t y as "thc repository o f the public conscience" (301
and h i s presence has the a&vants,ge t h a t he can investigate the issues
b p a r t i j l l y a d the result of h i s investigztions could be of a s s i s t a n c e t o
the court, i n the' scwc v~ayas where the O f f i c i a l S o l i c i t o r appccws f o r a
respondent of unsound nind.

69. The disadvantages of coribining j u r i s d i c t i o n s are:

(1) Under existing proceclure the court, on a n u l l i t y p e t i t i o n ,
has only t o consider -the one i s s u e r a i s e d by the p e t i t i o n h g
spouse, i.e. i s the nnrriage void on t h e ground d-legec??
If t h a t g o u n d i s cstc&lished the court declares the naxriage
t o be void. If the ,~ou.n?- i s n o t established, the court
d i s n i s s e s the p e t i t i o n b u t a i t h o u t pkoceeding t o declare
the n u r i a g c v a l i d , though tho d i s n i s s a l of the petition
nay rcnove the o n l y doubt as t o thc v a l i d i t y of the
nmriage and i n p r a c t i c e generally anount t o a f i n d i n g
t h a t . t h e nnrriage i s v a l i d . But t h i s i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
s o as t h e r e nay be sone other ground on which t h e n a r i a g e
could be attacked by the p e t i t i o n e r and the court would
need t o have evidence t h a t mne of these grounds e x i s t s
before i t rmde a d-eclmation that the narriage is vclid.
This should nornally present no d i f f i c u l t y , b u t nhat i s
the court t o do i€the p e t i t i o n e r , n o t a t all anxious t o
have his mrriage declared v a l i d , refuses o r i s unable t o
give the aclditiond evidence? Supyosc the p e t i t i o n e r
fails t o e s t a b l i s h the ground he had alleged, but i t
appears t h a t the marriage night be void on sone other
ground, such as a f f i n i t y or b i g m y , rahich for the

. (29) Co1lett.v. C o l l e t t cl9671 3 T.L.X. 280, 287 ("These are i n p o r t a n t

safeguards because the r i g h t s of t h i r d p a r t i c s nz,y be adversely
affe&ed by a declaration t h c t a narriage i s v a l i d a n c l , consequentlg,
that t h e chilc?rcn o f the rmrriage arc l e g i t i n a t e . I,)

(30) ECwards, The L m Officers of the Crown, 1964, p. 287

- 44 -
 nornent hc i s unablc t o e s t a b l i s h b u t which he 17mts to
keep i n rcscrvc hoping t h a t evidence -.Jill beconc available
later - hoa ccw the court declare the mm5.8.ge t o be valid-
knoriing t h a t t h e r e i s a re,d r o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i t i s void?
"he court n o t being s a t i s f i e d t h a t the narriage i s void
i s n o t the s a x as the court being s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e
m r i a g c i s vdic?.

(2) If l e g i t i n a c y proceedings viere conbincd with t h e n u l l i t y

suit, the children, i f i n f z n t s , would be rcpresentcd by
t h e i r guardian 4 1itc;l vho a o u l d sec t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s
arc safeguarclecl. If, hor-icver, the children are of a s 8nd
take no part 5x1 thc yroceeclins, is the court t o make a
f i n d i n g of lcgitimacy or i l l e a t i m a c y on what mzy be
incompl e t e e v i don cc?

(3) It nould be necessary t o serve dl persons vho mi@t be

affected as provided i n s, 39, thereby incre'asing the costs,

70 The adv,wtages o f combining j u r i s 6 i c t i o n s are:

In ,dnost a l l cases there u i l l be no L?oubt as t o the

nazriagc being v a l i d once the c o u r t hcas i?isposec? of the
gcouni? o r g ~ o u n ? ~nhich
s zrc d1egcc-t t o make i t voic?
i t w i l l only be i n a sinal1 u i n o r i t y of c&ses t h a t t h e
f c e l u n d ~ l ct o ponounce t h e narriage t o
court TJOU~J.
be v d i d . The s t c t u t c could guard r?,-czinst such casea
by providing t h n t on $&missing a p e t i t i o n the COL&,

only i f s a t i s f i e d t h z t tho marri,a&c i s v a l i d , should

declare i t s o t o bc. S i n i l m l y , the court could- be
l e f t x i t h c l i k e ctiscrction i n respect of the i s s u e of
logitinacy.

(2) Thc pcrsons who, i n addition t o thc Attorncy-Gcnerjl,

nould need t o be @veri n o t i c e o f the proceedin@ a r e
probably thc smie both i n p r o c e e d i n s t o e s t a b l i s h the
v'didity of a marriage aid i n l c g i t i n s c y proccccling;
there n u t be few marriage8 i n ahich property ri.ghts of
pcrsons other than tlic spouses mil the chilS-ren xi11 be
affected by the va,lic?ity of the nt?rria.@ o r t h e l c g i t i n a c y
of t h e children.

- 45 -
 s t of giving n o t i c e t o the pcrsons a f f e c t e d woull!
be'snall; thcre would- bc t h e c o s t of nzking t h e
Attorney-General a p a r t y but hc nccd not i n c u r f u r t h e r
costs i f on i n v e s t i g a t i o n hc i s of opinion that hi:
cannot help thc. court by being rcprescnted.

71 On balance, we think t h a t 2 combination of j u r i s d i c t i o n s mould

c r e a t e a o r c problcns than i t vioul~lsolvc, 2nd w o u l d ncedlcssly conplicatc
a n u l l i t y s u i t and woulcl incrcasc i t s cost, Suits of n u l l i t y of void
narriagp arc very f e n (31) ,andL the prcscnt systen a p p e m t o work
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y and should n o t be d t c r e d , Is there a norc c o r q e l l i n g
reason for d e c l a r i n g t h e h a r r i a g c t o bc v d i d a f t e r the d i s n i s s a l of a
p e t i t i o n f o r n u l l i t y of a void narriage t h m therc i s d t e r disnissal of
a p e t i t i o n f o r divorce? Thou& i n "heory the nmriag@,i n e i t h e r WSC,

night s t i l l bc inpcached, i n p r a c t i c e the p a r t i e s leave the court hovling

t h a t t h e i r n a r r i a g e i s valid.

-
IX POSSIBLE ADDITICNJVI GROUNDS OF l!suLLITI
I_

72 Three possible additional grounds o f n u l l i t y nere exmined by the

Norton Cornfission: (32)

(1) frlzud-dent o r w i l f u l conccdnent of rmteria1 f a c t s

vhich if known t o the p e t i t i o n e r eat have caused
hin t o forego n a r i a g e ;

( 3 ) treatment, ncdical o r s u r g i c a l , :.Jhi.ch has r c s u l t c d i n

sterility.

73. The nlorton Comussion r c j e c t e d all three p o u n d s f o r t h e following

reasons: Ground (1) nas thought t o bc t o o wide, s o t h a t i t would cause a
p e a t deal o f uncertainty. It nould givc risc t o d i f f i c u l t i e s of
i n t c q r c t a t i o n md there v~oulclbe danger t h a t a widening i n t e r p c t n t i o n
night in t i n c allow narriages t o be annullei! on the f l i n s i e s t p r e t e x t .
Ground (2) w a s thou&t t o be lacking i n precision mi?, thou& the court
ni&t i n t i n c evolve sone norkin;. r u l e , this t r o u l d a h o s t ccrta3nly be
arbitrary i n its results. Grounc? (3) was r e j e c t e d p r i n c i p a l l y because
sone kinds of t r e a t n c n t nake a person s t e r i l e , Iihereas o t h e r kin& n&e
..
(31) Thc avcrage i s 75 a year: sec para 5
(32) P a r a s 267-272

- 46 -
i t uncertain whether or not the person t r e a t e d becomes s t e r i l e , and G a t
d i f f i c u l t y and unhappiness might a r i s e i f the second cate@ry of treatment
were excluded from r e l i e f , because o f the element of doubt present, and
the first category provided f o r , The Morton Commission's conclusions w a s
t h a t the e x i s t i n g grounds of n u l l i t y cover the major cases of h a d a h i p and
t h a t an extension would c r e a t e more d i f f i c u l t i e s than i t would remove.
The Church of England i s s a t i s f i e d mitn the e x i s t i n g grounds of n u l l i t y
and is opposed t o extending them. (33)

74. Ve are i n c l i n e d t o think that the Morton Cemmission came t o the

right conclusion. Ground (1) amounts t o a n a l l e g a t i o n o f fraud and the
ease with which such a ground can be extended t o include minor complaints
w7as shown, f o r example, by the Nen York lam which had fraud as a ground
f o r annulling a marriage; t h i s as i n t e m r c t e d as meaning a y suppression,
evasion o r representation w t o health, status, wealth, character, criminal
convictions, c h a s t i t y , pregnancy, p r i o r mrriage, c i t i z e n s h i p or drug
addiction. (34) Ground (2) is too vague t o be g a t i s f a c t o r y . Ground ( 3 )
is a p o p o s a l uhich, i f accepted, must logically include natural
s t e r i l i t y as a p o u n d of n u l l i t y and t h i s has nevor been a ground f o r
n u l l i t y ; t h e Church Report d s o r e j e c t s p o u n d ( 3 ) . ( 3 5 ) Other grounds
examined and r e j e c t e d by the Chursh Rcport were homosexuality and
defective i n t e n t i o n , the former f o r the reason t h a t i t should bo f u r t h e r
examined from t h e medical point of view ( 3 6 ) and the L a t t e r for the rcason
t h a t i n a s o c i e t y vhcre marriage m u s t be contracted in s e t forms the
consent expressed by going through the ceremony of marriage must p r c v d l .
(37)

75. Our provisional vien is th,o.t there i s no need f o r adding nerr gounds
of n u l l i t y , NeverthelcSs, me s c t o u t below f u r t h e r possible groulds of
n u l l i t y f o r considoration and viens are i n v i t e d as t o vhcthcr these o r m y
o t h e r grounds should be added t o t h e e x i s t i n g grounds o f n u l l i t y ,
We think that any a d d i t i o n a l s o u n d s should be s p e c i f i c and thtlt a & n e r d
ground based on fraud o r concealment of a material fact should n o t be
adopted f o r t h e reasons s t a t e d above, Consideration might, horiever, be
given t o the inclusion i n the Matrimonial Causes A c t 1965, S. 9(l)(b), (e),
(a) (see p a r a s 28, 30) of the following grounds:
(I) Certain i l l n e s s
!&e i l l n c s s e a si are at present g ~ o u n d sf o r n u l l i t y
are mental. disorder, epilepsy and venerojl disease a t

1
(35) Church Report, PP. 39-40
(36) Church Report, pp, 40-4
(37) chusch Report, PP. 26-28, 4 l

47 -
 t h e tine of the marriage. Consideration could be
given t o other i l l n e s s e s , i f any, rihich on medical
evidence, either because of t h e i r e f f e c t on the o t h e r
spouse o r because they are h c r e d i t a g , are sufi'iciently
d i s r u p t i v e of marital l i f e , t o bc made express p o u n d s
f o r mnulling the marriage.

A spouse being a h a b i t u a l d m k a r d o r drug addict.

This i s a ground f o r a separation oriier i n the nagistrates'
- ,and considcrztion could- bc given t o n&ing it
court (38)

a ground- f o r n u l l i t y aherc, unbeknown t o t h e o t h e r party,

a spouse is a h a b i t u a l d-rmnk,mcl o r clrug addict .zt t h e
tiiac o f marriage.

(3) A spouse having been convicted-. of certcain offences o r

served a c e r t a i n term of iny5sonnent. This ground
viotild- n o t elininr,tc t h e hmc? CESC o f a vrife nho f i n d s
herself married t o II rim vho i s "on t h e m,."b u t aho
has not been convicted of any offence. Such a case
'
vas S p i t d n i c k V. S p i t d n i c k (39) where the husbmd v i a s
a r r e s t e d on th; w e d d i n g q z y , There, hoxever, the '

non-disclosure o f h i s crirnincd p z s t aggmvated the

-iJifc's shock ,and vas hnlc? t o b e c r u e l t y , s o t h a t she
obtained a divorce on t h t p o u n d . On the other hand,
t h i s ground aould e l i n i n a t e the hardship of such a case
as P r i e s t l e y v. P r i e s t l e y (40) nhcre, ,?fter narriagc, the
husbmd c?iscloscd t o t h o :life t h a t hc was B convicted
c r i n i n a l , but i t was he12 t h a t no exception coulct be
taken t o the n,mn(sr OP h i s $-isclosure an? 'there aas,
therefore, no c r u e l t y on h i s ?art.

(38) l k t r i n o n i a l Procoociings (1"hgistrntes Courts) Act 1960, s .1(1) ( f ) .

S. 1 6 of the Act ctcfincs a ''h?-bitud drunkard" o r "drug cdclict" as
a pcrson ( n o t being a ricntnlly ?-isordered pcrson mithin t h e n e m i n g
o f the T.'icntal Bcalth Act 1959) T&O, by reason of h a b i t u a l
i n t c n p c r a t e drinking of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r , or o f h a b i t u a l t a k i n g
o r u s i n g , otherwise th,m upon modicd xlvicc, of m y drug t o which
any of' the provisions o f thc D , ~ Y @ T ~ u s Drugs Act 1951, f o r the t i n e
being a p p l i e s , - i s . at tirics i b g e r o u s to h i n s c l f c r others, o r i s
i n c q a b l c of r-ianaging h i n s c l f o r h i s affairs, o r s o conducts h i r s e l f
t h e t i t would n o t be reasonable t o expect 3, spouse of orctinary
s e n s i b i l i t i e s t o continue t o cohzbit vim hin.
I.__,. __ "& . ---- -* .- * - -
-*--

-cj9T "he Tines Ncvspoper, 24 Ehy 1956,

(40) The Tines Nenspa;per, 7 Novcnbcr 1958; i b i d . 19 June 1959,- C.A.

- 48 - .-.. L

".. ... i , ' .

.. . . -
&-

(4) A spouse c o n c e d i n g h i s n a t r i n o n i c l status, e , ~ ; .whether

he had- been narricc? b e f o r e . '-'hnBre P, wife d i s c o v e r e d a f t e r
nzrrizgc t h a t her husbmcl h d - been t , i i c e narricd- cznd +nice
clivorced, t h E t he hacl chil,?rcn by b c t h n a r r i z g c s mil ,an
i l l c g i t i z a t e c h i l d by a n o t h c r -conan, t h i s n o n - d i s c l o s u r e
d i d n o t of i t s e l l : g i v e h c r any ground sf conplpLnt, b u t
she o b t a i n e d a itivorcc on t h e p o u n d of c r u e l t y i n t h z t
t h c husbanc?, by S i s z p p e o r i n g znd l d m i n g her t o d i s c o v e r
his p z s t , cggrcvatecl the shock s h e as bound t o s u f € c r by
hcr <-iscovery ,(
'
I
) "he :-,ifc c o u l d have ha2 no rcnedy a t
all ( e x c e p t p o s s i b l y on d c s c r t i o n i n due course) i f ,
because of a r o b u s t c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e shock fzilec? t o
cmsc i n j u r y or apprchcnsion of i n j u r y t o her h e a l t h . (42)

-x COLLUSION

76, I n thc E c c l e s i a s t i c a l Court (43) c o l l u s i o n nas X I z b s o l u t e b a r t o

obtainins a d e c r e e of n u l l i t y ; ] h e t h e r o€ 3. v o i d o r v o i d a b l e narria,ne a d i t
c o n t i n u e s t o be Lm a b s o l u t e b a r i n n u l l i t y s u i t s to-clay. (44) Nou t h a t
c o l l u s i o n hm been naJc a d i s c r e t i c n m y b c r i n suits f o r G-ivorcc nnd
jucli c i d s cpara t i o n and- i t i s b e i n g proposcd t h a t i n t h o s e suits i t
should be abolished c l t o g e t h e r , (46) the q u e s t i a n rzrises as to n h a t p a r t ,
if m y , c o l l u s i o n shoul? play i n s u i t s f o r n u l l i t y . Collusion nc,?~lsan
a g e c n e n t o r b a r g a i n betwx?n the y s r t i c s :)hereby t h e i n i t i a t i o n o€ t h e
s u i t i s procurci? or i t s cmCuct providccl f o r i t ranges f r o r i ngrcerients
i n v o l v i n g naiiitcncmcc t o arrangcxmts t o p e r v e r t t h e course o f j u s t i c e by
p r c s c n t i n g a f,dse c s c . There appears t o b e no goo2 reason I J ~ J

a r r c u g e n e n t s with r e g a r d t o i.1nimtcnzacc i f t'ney 60 n o t i n v o l v e d e c e p t i o n

Carpenter V. Carpenter cl9551 1 V.L.II. 669

If the Divorce Rcforn Bill bccoxzs law, the n i f c 1770u1:? probably bc
able t o o b t a i n a 2 i v o r c c on these facts w i t h o u t Shoving i n j u r y o r
apprchcnsion o f i n j u r y t o h e a l t h ; see cl. 2 ( l ) ( b ) .
-
Crene V. C r e w (1800) 3 Hag, Ecc, 123. D o n e e d V. Donegal (1621)
3 P h i l . 597; Poll,?sc? Wyb5urn (1828) 1 Hag. Ecc. 725
V.

N e , t r i n o n i a l Czvuses Act, 1857, s s , 22, 41; Judicature (Consoli&xtion)

A c t 1925, S. 32; "c cl9001 P. 180, 205, 206. See a l s o
X a t r i a o n i a l Causes% ;t?firr.i 2 a h i c h ri?quired t h e p e t i t i o n t o
s t e t c whether t h e m i s c o l l u s i o n .
I J a t r i n o n i j l Clauses Act 1965, s.5, r c - e n a c t i n g t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e
U a t r i n o n i c l Causes Act 1963, s.4.
Divorce BeforEl B i l l , cl. 9(3)
of t h e court, should be a b a r t o obtaining a decree of n u l l i t y of a
voidable marriage, and s t i l l less s o a decree o f a void marriage.
On the o t h e r hand, obtaining a decree by the prescntation of a false c m e
i s obviously objectionable. This, honever, does not n e c e s s a r i l y have
anything t o do with collusion; i n an undefcnded case the p e t i t i o n e r may
present a f a l s e c m e without t h c r c n e c e s s a r i l y being .my collusion n i t h
the respondent. I n Scotland t h e r e has never been m y b a r based on
collusion o r d e c e i t and apparently t h e need has n e w ? been f e l t . If i t
i s discovered t h a t i n t r u t h there vere no grounds for the decree, the
decree n i l 1 not be made absolute - not because of d e c e i t b u t because of
the absencc of grounds. If, d e s p i t e the d e c e i t , there b y x x ? good p o u n d s
for annulment i t may be more aTpropriatc t o punish the decoivcr by some
such means i19 a prosecution f o r perjury, r a t h e r than by refusing a decree.

77. We think that the c f f e c t of collusion on proceedings f o r n u l l i t y

must depend on vJhat i s decided i n r e l a t i o n t o divorce. Should’collusion
remain a d i s c r e t i o n a q b a r i n divorce s u i t s , i t should equally be a
discretions= bar i n n u l l i t y suits, If i t should be abolishcd i n r e l a t i o n
t o divorce i t should equCdly be 5bolishcd i n r e l a t i o n t o n u l l i t y .

-
XI SUhEIARY OF QmSTIOPTS AND PROVISIOl?AL CcR\TCZUSIOES

78. (1) While we do n o t ourselves rccorxend any a l t e r a t i o n i n

t h e prohibited d-epces ahich rcndcr a n,mriage void,
ne i n v i t e views on t h i s ,ancl on the application of
p r o h i b i t c d degrees i n r e l a t i o n t o adopted children.
( p a r a s 12-18) .-
(2) Viens arc i n v i t e d on rlhcther persons n i t h c e r t a i n Dental
def c c t s should be inczpable of c o n t r a c t i n g marriage
(para 21).

(3) Viens m e i n v i t e d on-vhother the law concerning duress

ancl n i s t n k c in r e l a t i o n t o lack of consent should be
a l t e r e d ( p a r s 24).

(4) V i l f u l refusal t o consunnnzte the nsrriagc should renain

a ground f o r n u l l i t y ( p a r s 26, 27).

(5) The M a t r i n o n i d Causes Act 1965, S. g ( l ) ( b ) should be

r e d r a f t e d t o m k e c l e a r t h a t i t r e f e r s t o n p a r t y who,
though of s u f f i c i e n t und-crstan&ng t o consent t o a
marriage, i s o f wnsoun:? nind i n o t h e r respects (pma 29).

-50-
 I n the M a t r i n o n i a l Causes Act 1965, s. 9(2) threc y e a r s
and approbation of i-iarriagc s h o u l d b e s u b s t i t u t e d for
one yc,v 2nd absence of noritd i n t c r c o u r s e a f t e r
discovory of the d e f e c t (par?! 33, 34, 3 6 ) .

(7) Views are i n v i t o d on n h e t h c r c v t i f i c i c i l i n s e n i n a t i o n

o f thc wife or adoption or b i r t h of a c h i l d r e s u l t i n g
f r o n thc j o i n t a c t or Y J i t h t h e consent of b o t h p a r t i e s
s h o u l d n o t per se c o n s t i t u t e a bar t o t h e Lznnulncnt of
a v o i d a b l e inasringe (para3 38-41),

Approbation s h o u l d b e nn a b s o l u t e b a r t o t h c mnulnent
of a v o i d a h l c marriage ( p a r a 42),
Lack of c o n s e n t ( o t h c m i s e than by r e a s o n of i n s a n i t y
r e n d e r i n g a person i n c c p a b l c o f c o n s e n t i n g t o r m r r i a g e )
should rendcr a narrisge voiclablc ani! n o t v o i d ancl t h e r e
should be a t i n e - l i n i t of three years for i n s t i t u t i n g
proceedings ( p a r s 4.4,45). There should n o t be m y
tine-1kxi.t i n t h e c w c o€ r.larrisges v o i d a b l e f o r
i n p o t e n c e o r nilfa r c f u s d t o c o n s m u a t e ( p a s 60).
Bc are i n c l i n e d t o t h e v i e a t l i a t i n s m i t y r e n d e r i n g a
person i n c a p a b l e of c o n s c n t i n g t o Liarriage s h o u l d c o n t i n u e
t o rcndcr a narriage vsicl, b u t vicvls are i n v i t e d on t h i s
s u b j e c t ( p a r a 46-49).

Our v i e u is t h a t i t i s n o t practic;.,l f o r a marriage

where onc p a r t y i s , or b o t h m x 9 mCer s i x t e e n t o be
r s t i f i b 3 l c (para 53). Yc i n v i t e v i e w as t o v h e t h e r
such ;?, n a r r i q e s h o u l d rcnain m i d o r be v o i d z b l e
(paras 51, 52).

Voiclsoblc nsrriagcs s h o u l d b e r e t a i n e d , b u t n o t n i t h s t a n d i n g
the mnulmnt, t h c morrisge s h o u l d bc t r e a t e d CLS h a v i n g
bccn vKLiCi u n t i l t h e clecrcc a n d v i e w arc i n v i t e d as t o
t h e forr.1 o f t h o clecree (paras 54-59).

Vhile our view i s t h c t i n t h c c a s e of a v o i d narriage

the only t h i r d p a r t i e s who s h o u l d be able t o obt,’- i n a
d e c l a r a t i o n of n u l l i t y are t h o s c a h o havc a pecuniary
i n t c r c s t , we i n v i t e v i e w v h e t h e r t h e 1~ i n t h i s
r c s p c c t s h o u l d be a l t e r e d (para 65).

In t h e cLwc o€ c v o i d r . i a r r i a g e .any c h i l d of t h e p a r t i e s
s h o d $ - b c ?.iade a p r t y t o t h e s u i t (paras 6 6 , 67).

- -51-
 (15) Proceedings f o r n u l l i t y of a v o i d narriage should- n o t
be conbincd T:itli proceedings t o declare a narriage
v a l i d o r the c h i l d r c n l e g i t i r - m t e , both o f ahich should-
r e n a i n s c p a z a t c proceedings ( p m m 68-71).

(16) rrThile our view i s thC3rt there sho?dcl n o t be m y

e x t e n s i o n of t h e e x i s t i n g p o u n d s of n u l l i t y , ride i n v i t e
v i c a s as t o p o s s i b l e ndL?itional grounds ( p a r a s 72-75).

(17) Collusion shoul? n o t b e m zbsolute b s r i n n u l l i t y but,

at the n o s t , a d i s c r e t i o n a r y b a r cvldshould be a b o l i s h e d
i f it i s Ebolishcd i n d i v o r c e proceedings (parits 76, 7 7 ) .

- 5 2 - .