ARTICLE VII.

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

EXECUTIVE POWER
Scope:
1) Executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines.
2) The scope of this power is set forth in Art. VII of the Constitution. But this power is not limited
to those set forth therein. The SC, in Marcos v. Manglapus, referred to the RESIDUAL powers of
the President as the Chief Executive of the country, which powers include others not set forth in
the Constitution. EXAMPLE: The President is immune from suit and criminal prosecution while
he is in office.
3) Privilege of immunity from suit is personal to the President and may be invoked by him alone.
It may also be waived by the President, as when he himself files suit.
4) BUT The President CANNOT dispose of state property unless authorized by law.

Section 2. QUALIFICATIONS
1) Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2) Registered voter;
3) Able to read and write;
4) At least 40 years old on the day of election
5) Philippine resident for at least 10 years immediately preceding such election.
Note: The Vice-President has the same qualifications & term of office as the President. He is
elected with & in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from office in the same
manner as the President.

Section 4. MANNER OF ELECTION/ TERM OF OFFICE

Manner of Election
1) The President and Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people.
2) Election returns for President and Vice-President, as duly certified by the proper Board of
Canvassers shall be forwarded to Congress, directed to the Senate President.
3) Not later than 30 days after the day of the election, the certificates shall be opened in the
presence of both houses of Congress, assembled in joint public session.
4) The Congress, after determining the authenticity and due execution of the certificates, shall
canvass the votes.
5) The person receiving the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected.
6) In case of a tie between 2 or more candidates, one shall be chosen by a majority of ALL the
members of both Houses, voting separately. In case this results in a deadlock, the Senate
President shall be the acting President until the deadlock is broken.
7) The Supreme Court en banc shall act as the sole judge over all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.

Term of Office
1) President
a) 6 years beginning at noon on 30 June immediately following the election and ending at noon
on the same day 6 years later.
b) Term limitation: Single term only; not eligible for any reelection.
c) Any person who has succeeded as President, and served as such for more than 4 years shall
NOT be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

2) Vice-President:
a) 6 years, starting and ending the same time as the President.
 b) Term limitation: 2 successive terms.
c) Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time is NOT an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the Vice-President was elected.

Section 6. SALARIES AND EMOLUMENTS

1) Official salaries are determined by law.
2) Salaries cannot be decreased during the TENURE of the President and the Vice-President.
3) Increases take effect only after the expiration of the TERM of the incumbent during which the
increase was approved.
4) Prohibited from receiving any other emolument from the government or any other source
during their TENURE

Sections 7-12, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

1. Vacancies at the beginning of the term

VACANCY SUCCESSOR

VP-elect will be Acting President

President-elect fails to qualify or to until someone is qualified/chosen
be chosen as President.

President-elect dies or is
permanently disabled. VP becomes President.

- Senate President or
- In case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House shall act as President
until a President or a VP shall have
been chosen and qualified.
Both President and VP-elect are In case of death or disability of (1)
not chosen or do not qualify or and (2), Congress shall determine,
both die, or both become by law, who will be the acting
permanently disabled. President.
2. Vacancies after the office is initially filled:
VACANCY SUCCESSOR

President dies, is permanently Vice-President becomes President

disabled, is impeached, or resigns. for the unexpired term.

1.
Both President and Vice-President2.
die, become permanently
disabled, are impeached, or
resign.
Senate President or
In case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House shall act as President
until the President or VP shall have
been elected and qualif
3) Vacancy in office of Vice-President during the term for which he was elected:
a) President will nominate new VP from any member of either House of Congress.
b) Nominee shall assume office upon confirmation by majority vote of ALL members of both
Houses, voting separately. (Nominee forfeits seat in Congress)

4) Election of President and Vice-President after vacancy during tem

a) Congress shall convene 3 days after the vacancy in the office of both the President and
the VP, without need of a call. The convening of Congress cannot be suspended.
b) Within 7 days after convening, Congress shall enact a law calling for a special election to
elect a President and a VP. The special election cannot be postponed.
c) The special election shall be held not earlier than 45 days not later than 60 days from the
time of the enactment of the law.
d) The 3 readings for the special law need not be held on separate days.
e) The law shall be deemed enacted upon its approval on third reading.
BUT: No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the date
of the next presidential election.

5) Temporary disability of the President:

The temporary inability of the President to discharge his duties may be raised in either of two
ways:
a) By the President himself, when he sends a written declaration to the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House. In this case, the Vice-President will be Acting President until the
President transmits a written declaration to the contrary.
b) When a majority of the Cabinet members transmit to the Senate President and the Speaker
their written declaration.
(i) The VP will immediately be Acting President.
(ii) BUT: If the President transmits a written declaration that he is not disabled, he
reassumes his position.
(iii) If within 5 days after the President re-assumes his position, the majority of the Cabinet
retransmits their written declaration, Congress shall decide the issue. In this event, Congress
shall reconvene within 48 hours if it is not in session, without need of a call.
(iv) Within 10 days after Congress is required to assemble, or 12 days if Congress is not in
session, a 2/3 majority of both Houses, voting separately, is needed to find the President
temporarily disabled, in which case, the VP will be Acting President.

6) Presidential Illness:
a) If the President is seriously ill, the public must be informed thereof.
b) Even during such illness, the National Security Adviser, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
and the Chief of Staff of the AFP are entitled to access to the President

Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state
of his health. The members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations
and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the
President during such illness.
Those who shall not be denied access to the President during illness:
 Secretary of the Department of National Defense
 Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs

Reason of the access. To allow the President to make the important decisions in those areas of
government.
 Section 12 envisions not just illness which incapacitates but also any serious illness which can be
a matter of national concern.

Reason for informing the public. To guarantee the people’s right to know about the state of
President’s health, contrary to secretive practice in totalitarian regimes.

Who has the duty to inform? The section does not specify the officer on whom the duty
devolves. It is understood that the Office of the President would be responsible for making the
disclosure.

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President
shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads
of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.

- This rule derived from Martial Law era where family and friends of Marcos enjoyed multiple
government offices.
-
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked
by the elected President, within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
- See De Castro v. JBC
-
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
- What is the power of control?
o The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify what a
subordinate officer had done in performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. In past cases it has been held that
"[t]he President can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify
any action, or decision, of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices under him. He can exercise this power motu proprio without need of any
appeal from any party. (Blaquera v. Alcala)
- The power of control include the power to reorganize subordinate offices.
- He who has the power to appoint, has the power to discipline or remove appointee.
- What is the power of supervision?
o It is the power of a superior officer to ensure that the “laws are faithfully executed”
by inferiors. The power of supervision does not include the power of control; but
the power of control necessarily includes the power of supervision. The power of
the President over local governments is only one of general supervision.

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular
or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
- For illustration, see Lagman v. Medialdea
- What is the significance of the commander-in-chief power?
- A civilian president holds supreme authority over the military and is the ceremonial, legal,
and administrative head of the armed forces. The commander-in-chief is authorized to
 direct the movements of naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to
employ them in a manner he may deem most effectual to harass, conquer, and subdue
the enemy of the state.
- Under Section 18, the President is allowed to
o Call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion.
o Suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
o Place the Philippines or any other part thereof under martial law.
- Martial law and judicial review are in Lagman v. Medialdea
-
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.

Unilaterally grant:
1. Reprieve (stay of execution)
2. Commutation
3. Pardon, (absolute or partial)
4. Remittance of fines and forfeiture

All after final judgment.

The grant of amnesty requires the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.
The difference between a pardon and an amnesty, is that a pardon is granted on a person with
certain conditions. Amnesties are granted to a group of people, absolute so as to forgive and wipe
off clean all forms of offenses made against the State. Irrevocable in nature, and a gesture of
goodwill. Looks backward and obliterates the offense, as if it did not happen in the first place. The
grant of amnesty may happen before arraignment, during trial, after final judgment.

Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every
quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on
applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned
and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and
containing other matters as may be provided by law.

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

What are the foreign relations power of the President?

1. The power to negotiate treaties and international agreements
2. The power to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers; and consuls
3. The power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers accredited to the Philippines
4. The power to contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the republic (Section 20)
5. The power to deport aliens.
6. The power to decide that a diplomatic officer who has become persona non grata be recalled. 

7. The power to recognize governments and withdraw recognition
What norm may be followed when determining whether a particular agreement may require
Senate concurrence?

Agreements that are binding and original need Senate concurrence. Less formal types of
international agreements, or greements which are temporary or are mere implementations of
treaties or statutes do not need concurrence.

Scope of the power to concur:

The power to ratify is vested in the President subject to the concurrence of Senate. The role of
the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in his behalf is a
serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the
President alone, which cannot be encroached by the Court via a writ of mandamus. (Pimentel v.
Executive Secretary, 2005)

The power of the Senate to give its concurrence carries with it the right to introduce amendments
to a treaty. If the President does not agree to any amendments or reservations added to a treaty
by the Senate, his only recourse is to drop the treaty entirely. But if he agrees to the changes, he
may persuade the other nation to accept and adopt the modifications.

Treaties v. Executive Agreements:

1. International agreements which involve political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character take the form or a treaty; while
international agreements involving adjustment of details carrying out well established national
policies and traditions and involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the
form of executive agreements
2. In treaties, formal documents require ratification, while executive agreements become binding
through executive action.
Treaties and other international agreements concluded by the President are also subject to check
by the Supreme Court, which has the power to declare them unconstitutional.
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of
every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and
sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

Budgetary Power:
This power is properly entrusted to the executive department, as it is the President who, as chief
administrator and enforcer of laws, is in best position to determine the needs of the government
and propose the corresponding appropriations therefor on the basis of existing or expected
sources of revenue

The budget of receipts and expenditures prepared by the President is the basis for the general
appropriation bill passed by the Congress.

The phrase “sources of financing” has reference to sources other than taxation

The complete government budgetary process has been graphically described as consisting of
four major phases:
 Budget Preparation 

Legislative Authorization 

Budget Execution 

Budget Accountability 

The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the
operation of the Government as specified in the budget.

Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He
may also appear before it at any other time.
Although couched in mandatory language, the first sentence of this provision does not as a rule
impose a compellable duty on the President.
The President usually discharges the informing power through the state-of-the-nation address,
which is delivered at the opening of the regular session of the legislature.

CASES:

1. Estrada vs Desierto; Arroyo

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January
16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his
vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd
at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term
as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office.

ISSUE(S):
WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
WoN Estrada resigned as President.
WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II

- exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
- exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the -
government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.
- extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot
be the subject of judicial review intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject
to judicial review.
- presented a political question;
- involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II,
and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The
issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also
involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2 Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both
were present when President Estrada left the Palace.

3. Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing

material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive
resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed
by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and
that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before,
during and after January 20, 2001.
The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R.
178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR
No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear
is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has
clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign,
still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by
this Court.

The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries
the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He
cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping
him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not
acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any trespasser.

No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since
our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that
Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced
the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases
against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would
really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned
with justice and less with prosecution.

2. DE CASTRO VS. JBC

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010
and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because
the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers
intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers
also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to
appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes”
and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme
Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course,
whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision
of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would
have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.

3. Lagman v. Medialdea
FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

In accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President, on May 25, 2017,
submitted to Congress a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless
violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.

On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in his Report, the Maute terrorist group took over a
hospital in Marawi City; established several checkpoints within the city; burned down certain
government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces; and
started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby
indicating a removal of allegiance from the Philippine Government and their capability to deprive
the duly constituted authorities – the President, foremost – of their powers and prerogatives.

The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City; the role it plays in Mindanao,
and the Philippines as a whole; and the possible tragic repercussions once it falls under the control
of the lawless groups.

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate declared that it found “no
compelling reason to revoke Proclamation 216.
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned the Supreme Court,
questioning the factual basis of President Duterte’s Proclamation of martial law.

ISSUES:
[1] W/N the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by paragraph 3, Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court;

[2] A. Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of
facts? B. Is the President required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon bf the
Secretary of National Defense? C. Is the President is required to take into account only the
situation at the time of the proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to have
not been accurately reported?

[3] Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the
actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;

[4] W/N there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; A. What are the parameters for review? B. Who has
the burden of proof? C. What is the threshold of evidence?

[5] Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?

[6] W/N Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null and void:
a. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups;” or b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual
operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region;

[7] W/N the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President
to Congress are sufficient bases: a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or b. for a declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
region;

[8] W/N terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the
requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and

[9] W/N nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 will: A. have the effect of recalling
Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or B. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed
forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.

RULING:
1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from
those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding”
appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen
for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a
petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
2.
a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the
Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the
accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require
him otherwise would impede the process of his decision-making.

b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A plain reading of Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President’s power to declare martial law is not subject
to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety
requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is made
dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Only on the President can exercise of
the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the
review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the
determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such,
must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he
made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found in the proclamation as
well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation
existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should
be from the present depends on the President.

3. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke
the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. The
power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different
but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory,
which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation.

4. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows:
l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur;
and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the
existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable
cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which the President
can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of
martial law or suspension of the writ. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would
restrict the exercise of his emergency powers.

5. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of
the President’s decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation.
To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an
infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

6.
a.) Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. The term “other
rebel groups” in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words
that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to “other rebel groups” found in
Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.

b.) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague.
Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the proclamation.
There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or
operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the
proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Any act committed under the said orders in violation
of the Constitution and the laws should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a
risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere
that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.

7. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. By a review of the facts available to him that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his power and
prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of
rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime
of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact,
rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed.
Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. For a declaration of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence
of 1.) actual rebellion or invasion and 2.) the public safety requirement.

In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute
Group were directed not only against government forces or establishment but likewise against
civilians and their properties. There were bomb threats, road blockades, burning of schools and
churches, hostages and killings of civilians, forced entry of young male Muslims to the group,
there were hampering of medical services and delivery of basic services, reinforcement of
government troops, among others. These particular scenarios convinced the President that the
atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to
declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

9. a.) The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No.
216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55.

The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law. Even so, the
Court’s review of the President’s declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces
necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.

b.) Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of
the President done pursuant thereto. Under the operative fact doctrine,” the unconstitutional
statute is recognized as an “operative fact” before it is declared unconstitutional.
***
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region. The Court FINDS sufficient
factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL.
Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.