Retroactivity.
The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. (3)
Article 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid
down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall have
no retroactive effect.
For the determination of the applicable law in cases which are
not specified elsewhere in this Code, the following articles shall
be observed: (Pars. 1 and 2, Transitional Provisions).
Article 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws
shall govern rights originating, under said laws, from acts done
or events which took place under their regime, even though this
Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not
recognize them. But if a right should be declared for the first
time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the
act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or
may have occurred under prior legislation, provided said new
right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right,
of the same origin. (Rule 1)
Article 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or
omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the
rights of others. (n)
Article 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts
with a condition or period, which were executed or entered into
before the effectivity of this Code, even though the condition or
period may still be pending at the time this body of laws goes
into effect. (n)
Article 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of the old
laws, if they are valid in accordance therewith, shall continue to
be fully operative as provided in the same, with the limitations
established in these rules. But the revocation or modification of
these acts and contracts after the beginning of the effectivity of
this Code, shall be subject to the provisions of this new body of
laws. (Rule 2a)
Article 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil
sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or
omissions which were not penalized by the former laws, are not
applicable to those who, when said laws were in force, may have
executed the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or
condemned by this Code.
If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation,
the less severe sanction shall be applied.
If a continuous or repeated act or omission was
commenced before the beginning of the effectivity of this Code,
and the same subsists or is maintained or repeated after this
body of laws has become operative, the sanction or penalty
prescribed in this Code shall be applied, even though the
previous laws may not have provided any sanction or penalty
therefor. (Rule 3a)
Article 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but
were not exercised before the effectivity of this Code, shall
remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation; but
their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall
be regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the
exercise of the right or of the action was commenced under the
old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect, and
the procedure was different from that established in this new
body of laws, the parties concerned may choose which method
or course to pursue. (Rule 4)
Article 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts
and contracts is governed by this Code, even if her marriage
was celebrated under the former laws. (n)
1
Article 2260.
take place according to this Code, even if the child was born
before the effectivity of this body of laws. (n)
Article 2261. The exemption prescribed in article 302 shall
also be applicable to any support, pension or gratuity already
existing or granted before this Code becomes effective. (n)
Article 2262. Guardians of the property of minors, appointed
by the courts before this Code goes into effect, shall continue to
act as such, notwithstanding the provisions of article 320. (n)
Article 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died,
with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be
governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and
by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or
without a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of this
Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with
this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the
testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may
be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments,
legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount
shall be reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory
heir be given his full share according to this Code. (Rule 12a)
Article 2264. The status and rights of natural children by legal
fiction referred to in article 89 and illegitimate children
mentioned in article 287, shall also be acquired by children
born before the effectivity of this Code. (n)
Article 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property
arising after this Code becomes effective, includes those things
which came into the creditor's possession before said date. (n)
Article 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but
also retroactive effect:
(1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a
criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants;
(2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of
legal separation and annulment of marriage;
(3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of
illegitimate filiation;
(4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of
the testator himself;
(5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of
instruments;
(6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title;
(7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote
compromises. (n)
Article 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to
future cases but also to those pending on the date this Code
becomes effective:
(1) Article 29, Relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the
accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt;
(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries. (n)
Article 2268. Suits between members of the same family which
are pending at the time this Code goes into effect shall be
suspended, under such terms as the court may determine, in
order that compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case of
legal separation proceedings, for the purpose of effecting, if
possible, a reconciliation. (n)
Article 2269. The principles upon which the preceding
transitional provisions are based shall, by analogy, be applied to
cases not specifically regulated by them. (Rule 13a)
RPC- Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time
of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
GENERAL RULE- Laws are to be construed as having only
prospective application
EXCEPTIONS:
1. When the law itself provides for its retroactivity, unless the
retroactive application of a statute will make it an ex post facto
law or will result in the impairment of obligation of contracts, in
which case, it cannot be given retroactive effects.
2.When penal law is favorable to the accused, unless the
convicted felon is a habitual delinquent, in which case, it
cannot be given RE.
3. When the law is remedial or procedural in nature because no
vested right may attach nor arise from Procedural Laws.
4. When the law is curative in character.
5. When the law creates new substantive rights provided it has
not prejudiced another acquired right of the same origin. (
Usonvs Del Rosario )
Usonvs Del Rosario
Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which
are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even
though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new
rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same
origin
the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and
this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which
commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from
the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right
recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate
children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the
impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in
dispute.
Jose PuzonvsAlejandra Abellaraand TomasaDomondon
FACTS: The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera (substituted
upon her death by Domondon) was the owner of the subject 2-
hectare parcel of land situated in Baguio City, a land which was
previously part of the public domain but was titled pursuant to
RA 931. In another case Republic v Pio Marcos, the Supreme
Court declared that all titles issued under RA 931 are null and
void since the said Act was applicable only to places covered by
cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of Baguio which was
covered by a townsite reservation.
This same ruling was subsequently incorporated into a
law, P.D. 1271 with the title "An act nullifying decrees of
registration and certificates of title covering lands within the
Baguio Townsite Reservation pursuant to RA 931 which took
effect on December 22, 1977. PD 1271 considered as valid
certain titles of lands that are alienable and disposable under
certain conditions and for other purposes. Hence, the lot in
question was reverted to the public domain.
The subject lots were sold in an auction sale due to the non-
payment of taxes. Petitioner took interest and subsequently won
the bid. A year after, a certificate of sale was issued. In this
connection, the petitioner filed a case to consolidate his
ownership of the lots. Meanwhile, Domondon found out
about the auction sale and filed an opposition to the petition for
consolidation filed by petitioner. The trial court ruled that said
auction sale is null and void and that the assessments were
illegally made. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence
this petition with petitioner contending that the tax
assessments were valid and that PD 1271 has a curative effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied retroactively
HELD: YES. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the
retroactive application of laws unless expressly provided
therein, such rule allows some exceptions and PD 1271 falls
under one of the exceptions. The intent of PD 1271 is
necessarily to make such titles valid from the time they were
issued. This implies that the intent of the law is to recognize the
effects of certain acts of ownership done in good faith by
persons with Torrens titles issued in their favor before the cut-
off date stated, honestly believing that they had validly acquired
the lands. And such would be possible only by validating all the
2
said titles issued before 31 July 1973, effective on their
respective dates of issue. However, the validity of these titles
would not become operative unless and after the conditions
stated in PD 1271 are met.
Spouses Augusto G. Dacudao and Ofelia R.
Dacudao, Petitioners, vs. Secretary of Justice Raul M.
Gonzales of the Department of Justice, Respondent
G.R. No. 188056; January 8, 2013
Facts: The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against
Celso Delos Angeles and his associates after the petitioners
were defrauded in a business venture. Thereafter, the DOJ
Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all
prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed
against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the
secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate action. However, in
a separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it
was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et.
al of the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City
need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila.
Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of petitioners was
forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in
Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the
respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the department Order and the Memorandum, which
according to the violated their right to due process, right to
equal protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of the
cases. The petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional
or exempting from coverage cases already filed and pending at
the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended
that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases
against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being
investigated. They maintained that DO 182 was issued in
violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive
effect.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given
retroactive effect.
Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive
effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception
concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that
a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of
procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights
but operates only in furtherance of the remedy or the
confirmation already existing rights. The retroactive application
is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, for, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from
procedural law.
MRCA, INC., petitioner,
vs. CA, SPOUSES DOMINGO SEBASTIAN, JR. & LILIA
TIOSECO SEBASTIAN, and EXPECTACION P.
TIOSECO, respondents. G.R. No. 86675 December 19, 1989
CA Affirmed decision of RTC, dismissing the complaint for
non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the
complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses
sought to be recovered by it from the defendants, but left them
"to the discretion of this Honorable Court" or "to be proven
during the trial."
Invoking the decision of this Court in Manchester Development
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562, the private
respondents (defendants in Civil Case No. 55740 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, entitled MRCA, Inc. vs.
Spouses Domingo Sebastian, Jr., et al." filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on July 15, 1988. The petitioner opposed
the motion, but the trial court granted it in its order of August
10, 1988 (p. 54, Rollo). The Court of Appeals upheld the trial Petitioners - residents of Davao City - were among the investors
court, hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the
of Court. Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded
through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned
them check payments that were dishonored. After their written
Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not
demands for the return of their investments went unheeded,
yet been published in the Official Gazette when its
they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against
complaint was filed, the ruling therein was ineffective; that
Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
said ruling may not be given retroactive effect because it
Davao City on February 6, 2009.
imposes a new penalty for its non-observance; the dismissal of
the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and, that it should not
apply to the present case because the petitioner herein (plaintiff On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department
in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive the of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all
government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
case where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos
body of the complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in
the prayer thereof, to mislead the clerk of court in computing Manila for appropriate action.
the filing fees to be paid.
DO No. 182 reads:2
Petitioner's argument regarding the need for publication of the
Manchester ruling in the Official Gazette before it may be
All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy
applied to other cases is not well taken. As pointed out by the
Group of Companies, may be filed with the docket section of the
private respondents in their comment on the petition,
National Prosecution Service, Department of Justice, Padre
publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the
Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the Secretariat of the
effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule of
Special Panel for assignment and distribution to panel
procedure, for "it is a doctrine well established that the
members, per Department Order No. 84 dated February 13,
procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become
2009.
effective at once, so long as it does not affect or change vested
rights." (Aguillon vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 508). In a later
case, this Court held thus: However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr.
et al. of Legacy group of Companies in your respective offices
with the exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and
which is covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should
to that extent,it is applicable to cases pending in courts at the
be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel at Room
time of its adoption; but it can not be invoked in and applied to
149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for proper
the present case in which the decision had become final before
disposition.
said resolution became effective. In this case, the motion for
reconsideration filed by the defendant was denied on July 17,
1944, and a second motion for re-hearing or consideration For information and guidance.
could not be filed after the expiration of the period of fifteen
days from promulgation of the order or judgment deducting the
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were
time in which the first motion had been pending in this Court
forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to
(Section 1, Rule 54); for said period had already expired before
the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.3
the adoption of the resolution on October 1, 1945. Therefore,
the Court cannot now permit or allow the petitioner to file any
pleading or motion in the present case." (People vs. Sumilang, Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come
77 Phil. 765- 766.) to the Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave
abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that
Intent to cheat the government of the proper filing fees may not
DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the
be presumed from the petitioner's omission to specify in the
equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy
body and prayer of its complaint the amounts of moral and
disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an
exemplary damages and attorney's fees that it claims to have
obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against
suffered and/or incurred in its transaction with the private
enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
respondents. The petitioner might not have computed its
damages yet, or probably did not have the evidence to prove
them at the time it filed its complaint. In accordance with our Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of
ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., the petitioner may be DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the
allowed to amend its complaint for the purpose of specifying, in coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa
terms of pesos, how much it claims as damages, and to pay the already filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
requisite filing fees therefor, provided its right of action has not Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum dated
yet prescribed. This the petitioner is ready to do. March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the
Constitution.
The petition for review is granted. It reinstated and the
petitioner is allowed to amend the same by specifying the The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
amounts of damages it seeks to recover from the defendants respondent Secretary of Justice, maintains the validity of DO
(private respondents) and to pay the proper filing fees therefor No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and
as computed by the Clerk of Court. prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.

Spouses Augusto G. Dacudao and Ofelia R. Issue: Did the respondent violate the rule against
Dacudao, Petitioners, vs. Sec of Justice RAUL M. GONZALES enactment of laws with retroactive effect?
of DOJ Respondent. G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
Ruling:

3
No. Petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover the CFI decision absolving the bank from liability on the fourth
only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those cause of action.
already being investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182 was
issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with
Undaunted, the bank comes to this Court praying that it be
retroactive effect.
totally absolved from any liability to Zshornack. The latter not
having appealed the Court of Appeals decision, the issues facing
Petitioners’ assertion is baseless. this Court are limited to the bank's liability with regard to the
first and second causes of action and its liability for damages.
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect.However,
exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is 1. We first consider the first cause of action, On the dates
procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a material to this case, RizaldyZshornack and his wife, Shirley
statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not Gorospe, maintained in COMTRUST, Quezon City Branch, a
create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates dollar savings account and a peso current account.
in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already
existing rights.25 A statute or rule regulating the procedure of
On October 27, 1975, an application for a dollar draft was
the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
accomplished by Virgilio V. Garcia, Assistant Branch Manager
and undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural
of COMTRUST Quezon City, payable to a certain Leovigilda D.
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
Dizon in the amount of $1,000.00. In the application, Garcia
retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person
indicated that the amount was to be charged to Dollar Savings
who may feel adversely affected, for, verily,no vested right
Acct. No. 25-4109, the savings account of the Zshornacks;
generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.
There was no indication of the name of the purchaser of the
dollar draft.
Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO
No. 182 constituted obstruction of justice. This ground of the
On the same date, October 27,1975, COMTRUST, under the
petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
signature of Virgilio V. Garcia, issued a check payable to the
order of Leovigilda D. Dizon in the sum of US $1,000 drawn on
Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the the Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, with an indication that
Secretary of Justice to assume jurisdiction over matters it was to be charged to Dollar Savings.
involving the investigation of crimes and the prosecution of
offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the
When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from
Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over all
his account, he demanded an explanation from the bank. In
the regional, provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has
answer, COMTRUST claimed that the peso value of the
broad discretion in the discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and
withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., brother of
administers the DOJ and its adjunct offices and agencies by
Rizaldy, on October 27, 1975 when he (Ernesto) encashed with
promulgating rules and regulations to carry out their objectives,
COMTRUST a cashier's check for P8,450.00 issued by the
policies and functions.
Manila Banking Corporation payable to Ernesto.

The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al.

was ordered obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the
parties with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as
the cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt
with during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of
Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the
most feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public
resources and of having a comprehensive investigation of the
cases.
Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity. (4a)
Other Exceptions:
2. When the law makes the acts valid, but punishes the
violator.
3. When the law makes the act voidable, that is valid unless
annulled. ( Not void)
4. When the law declares the act void, but recognized legal
effects as arising from it
Bank Of The Philippine Islands, Petitioner,
vsThe Intermediate Appellate Court And
Zshornack respondents. G.R. No. L-66826 August 19, 1988
Trial and Appellate court ruled that .Petitioner must be held
liable for the unauthorized withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from
private respondent's dollar account.
In its desperate attempt to justify its act of withdrawing from its
depositor's savings account, the bank has adopted inconsistent
theories.
The two transactions appear entirely independent of each other.
Moreover, Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., possesses a personality
distinct and separate from RizaldyZshornack. Payment made to
Ernesto cannot be considered payment to Rizaldy.
As to the second explanation, even if we assume that there was
such an agreement, the evidence do not show that the
withdrawal was made pursuant to it. Instead, the record reveals
that the amount withdrawn was used to finance a dollar draft in
favor of Leovigilda D. Dizon, and not to fund the current
account of the Zshornacks.
2. AS FOR THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, the complaint
filed with the trial court alleged that on December 8, 1975,
Zshornack entrusted to COMTRUST, thru Garcia, US
$3,000.00 cash (popularly known as greenbacks)
for safekeeping, and that the agreement was embodied in a
document,

RizaldyZshornack initiated proceedings on June 28,1976 by It was also alleged in the complaint that despite demands, the
filing in the CFI of Rizal — Caloocan City a complaint against bank refused to return the money.
COMTRUST alleging four causes of action. Except for the third
cause of action, the CFI ruled in favor of Zshornack. The bank
appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which modified

4
In its answer, COMTRUST averred that the US$3,000 was company or corporation residing or located
credited to Zshornack's peso current account at prevailing within the Philippines, who acquires foreign
conversion rates. exchange shall not, unless authorized by the
Central Bank, dispose of such foreign
exchange in whole or in part, nor receive less
It must be emphasized that COMTRUST did not deny
than its full value, nor delay taking
specifically under oath the authenticity and due execution
ownership thereof except as such delay is
of the above instrument.
customary; Provided, That, within one
business day upon taking ownership or
During trial, it was established that on December 8, 1975 receiving payment of foreign exchange the
Zshornack indeed delivered to the bank US $3,000 for aforementioned persons and entities shall sell
safekeeping. When he requested the return of the money on such foreign exchange to the authorized
May 10, 1976, COMTRUST explained that the sum was agents of the Central Bank.
disposed of in this manner: US$2,000.00 was sold on December
29, 1975 and the peso proceeds amounting to P14,920.00 were
As earlier stated, the document and the subsequent
deposited to Zshornack's current account per deposit slip
acts of the parties show that they intended the bank to safekeep
accomplished by Garcia; the remaining US$1,000.00 was sold
the foreign exchange, and return it later to Zshornack, who
on February 3, 1976 and the peso proceeds amounting to
alleged in his complaint that he is a Philippine resident. The
P8,350.00 were deposited to his current account per deposit
parties did not intended to sell the US dollars to the Central
slip also accomplished by Garcia.
Bank within one business day from receipt.

Aside from asserting that the US$3,000.00 was properly

credited to Zshornack's current account at prevailing
conversion rates, BPI now posits another ground to defeat
private respondent's claim. It now argues that the contract
embodied in the document is the contract of depositum (as
defined in Article 1962, New Civil Code), which banks do not
enter into. The bank alleges that Garcia exceeded his powers
when he entered into the transaction. Hence, it is claimed, the
bank cannot be liable under the contract, and the obligation is
purely personal to Garcia.
Before we go into the nature of the contract entered into, an
important point which arises on the pleadings, must be
considered.
The second cause of action is based on a document purporting
to be signed by COMTRUST, a copy of which document was
attached to the complaint. In short, the second cause of action
was based on an actionable document. It was therefore
incumbent upon the bank to specifically deny under oath the
due execution of the document, as prescribed under Rule 8,
Section 8, if it desired: (1) to question the authority of Garcia to
bind the corporation; and (2) to deny its capacity to enter into
such contract. [See, E.B. Merchant v. International Banking
Corporation, 6 Phil. 314 (1906).] No sworn answer denying the
due execution of the document in question, or questioning
the authority of Garcia to bind the bank, or denying the
bank's capacity to enter into the contract, was ever filed.
Hence, the bank is deemed to have admitted not only Garcia's
authority, but also the bank's power, to enter into the contract
in question..
Otherwise, the contract of depositum would never have been
entered into at all.
Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling
them to the Central Bank within one business day from receipt,
is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20,
it must be considered as one which falls under the general
class of prohibited transactions. Hence, pursuant to Article 5
of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed against the
provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly, it
affords neither of the parties a cause of action against the other.
"When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or
object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal
offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
cause of action against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil
Code.] The only remedy is one on behalf of the State to
prosecute the parties for violating the law.
We thus rule that Zshornack cannot recover under the second
cause of action.
Petitioner is ordered to restore to the dollar savings account of
private respondent the amount of US$1,000.00 as of October
27, 1975 to earn interest at the rate fixed by the bank for dollar
savings deposits. Petitioner is further ordered to pay private
respondent the amount of P8,000.00 as damages. The other
causes of action of private respondent are ordered dismissed.

Note that the object of the contract between Zshornack and

COMTRUST was foreign exchange. Hence, the transaction was
covered by Central Bank Circular No. 20, Restrictions on
Gold and Foreign Exchange Transactions, promulgated on
December 9, 1949, which was in force at the time the parties
entered into the transaction involved in this case. The circular
provides:

Paragraph 4 (a) above was modified by Section 6 of Central

Bank Circular No. 281, Regulations on Foreign Exchange,
promulgated on November 26, 1969 by limiting its coverage to
Philippine residents only. Section 6 provides:

SEC. 6. All receipts of foreign exchange by

any resident person, firm, company or
corporation shall be sold to authorized agents
of the Central Bank by the recipients within
one business day following the receipt of such
foreign exchange. Any resident person, firm,

5
WAIVER OR RIGHTS
WAIVER OF RIGHGTS
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)
1. He must actually have the right, which he renounces.
2. He must have the capacity to make the renunciation
3. The renunciation must be made in clear and unequivocal
terms,
4. The waiver must not be contrary to lawetc.
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced; nor
can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be
compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor.
De Borjavs De Borja
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his
wife JosefaTangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the
probate of her will. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In
1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and
administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed
co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose
became the sole administrator of the testate estate of his
mother, JosefaTangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja
allegedly took unto himself a second wife, TasianaOngsingco.
Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings
in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955,
she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of
Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in said
proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and
TasianaOngsingco has been plagued with several court suits
and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some
eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts.
The testate estate of JosefaTangco alone has been unsettled for
more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all
these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into
on 12 October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of
Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
JosefaTangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
TasianaOngsingcoVda. deBorja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty.
Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the
compromise agreement are as follows:
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval
the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8
August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in
Special Proceeding No. 832.TasianaOngsingcoVda. dedeBorja
opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the
compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared
it void and unenforceable.Special
administratrixTasianaOngsingcoVda.dedeBorja appealed the
Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case
No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the
order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised
agreement of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity
is, nevertheless, attacked by TasianaOngsingco on the ground
that:(1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement
without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2)
6
that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the
marriage between Francisco de Borja and
TasianaOngsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has
ceased to have force and effect.
Court of Nueva Ecijarely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs.
Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the
view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and
that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of
intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and
public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant
TasianaOngsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised
Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial
settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs,
upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts,
and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco
de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and
still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made,
those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the
agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise
agreement, Jose de Borjastresses that at the time it was
entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision
was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of
1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a
will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice
Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was
expressed the view that if the parties have already divided the
estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the
will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in
a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to
the case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of the
terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and
TasianaOngsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically
stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to
TasianaOngsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete
payment — settlement of her hereditary share
in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as
well as the estate of JosefaTangco, ... and to
any properties bequeathed or devised in her
favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last
Will and Testament or by Donation Inter
Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly
conveyed to her for consideration or
otherwise.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate
of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the
probate of his will.The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by TasianaOngsingco of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of
Francisco de Borja and JosefaTangco. There is no stipulation as
to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted
or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or
his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the
actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by
and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of
the Testate Estate of JosefaTangco" on the one hand, and on
the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja
by his second marriage, TasianaOngsingcoVda. dedeBorja", it is
clear that the transaction was binding on both in their
individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even
without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same.
TasianaOngsingco further argues that her contract with
Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a
compromise as to her status and marriage with the late
Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very
opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja(Annex
"A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco
de Borja by his second marriage, TasianaOngsingcoVda.
dedeBorja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil
status. There is nothing in the text of the agreement that would
show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in
consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21
September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended
Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise
agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been abandoned,
as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had
declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by
the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17
June 1964, had stated that the proposed amicable settlement
"had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement
referred to in the order and motion above-mentioned was the
compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had
been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly
notarized. What the record discloses is that some time after its
formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out
from the compromise agreement, pleading various reasons
restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A"
(Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was
invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly intended resolutory
period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by
the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this
Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a
compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of
Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which objections have been
already discussed. It was natural that in view of the widow's
attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new
settlement or novatory agreement before seeking judicial
sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step
might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy.
That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent
from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted
in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No.
28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21
September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the
failure of the parties' quest for a more satisfactory compromise.
But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate
the original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose
de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and
enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as
heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately
performed within 120 days from the finality of the order, now
under appeal.
ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES CESARIO GRAVADOR
and NORMA DE VERA and SPOUSES EMMA CONCEPCION G.
DUMIGPI and FEDERICO L. DUMIGPI, Respondents. G.R. No.
186550 : July 5, 2010
7
On October 22, 1999, petitioner Asian Cathay Finance and
Leasing Corporation (ACFLC) extended a loan of Eight Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00)4cralaw cralawto respondent
Cesario Gravador, with respondents Norma de Vera and Emma
Concepcion Dumigpi as co-makers. The loan was payable in
sixty (60) monthly installments of P24,400.00 each. To secure
the loan, respondent Cesario executed a real estate mortgage
over his property in Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
Respondents paid the initial installment due in November 1999.
However, they were unable to pay the subsequent ones.
Consequently, on February 1, 2000, respondents received a
letter demanding payment of P1,871,480.00 within five (5) days
from receipt thereof. Respondents requested for an additional
period to settle their account, but ACFLC denied the request.
Petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage with the Office of the Deputy Sheriff of Malolos,
Bulacan.
On April 7, 2000, respondents filed a suit for annulment of real
estate mortgage and promissory note with damages and prayer
for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondents claimed that the real
estate mortgage is null and void. They pointed out that the
mortgage does not make reference to the promissory note dated
October 22, 1999. The promissory note does not specify the
maturity date of the loan, the interest rate, and the mode of
payment; and it illegally imposed liquidated damages. The real
estate mortgage, on the other hand, contains a provision on
the waiver of the mortgagor's right of redemption, a
provision that is contrary to law and public policy. Respondents
added that ACFLC violated Republic Act No. 3765, or the Truth
in Lending Act, in the disclosure statement that should be
issued to the borrower. Respondents, thus, claimed that
ACFLC's petition for foreclosure lacked factual and legal basis,
and prayed that the promissory note, real estate mortgage, and
any certificate of sale that might be issued in connection with
ACFLC's petition for extrajudicial foreclosure be declared null
and void.
On April 12, 2000, the RTC issued an Order,awdenying
respondents' application for TRO,.
On May 12, 2000, ACFLC filed its Answer, denying the material
allegations in the complaint and averring failure to state a
cause of action and lack of cause of action, as defenses. ACFLC
claimed that it was merely exercising its right as mortgagor;
hence, it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
RTC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint for lack of
cause of action. The RTC also upheld the interest rate and the
penalty charge imposed by ACFLC, and the waiver of
respondents' right of redemption provided in the deed of real
estate mortgage.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. It held that the
amount of P1,871,480.00 demanded by ACFLC from
respondents is unconscionable and excessive. Finally, the CA
invalidated the waiver of respondents' right of redemption for
reasons of public policy. Thus, the CA ordered:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Judgment is
2) Declaring par. 14 of the REM as null and void by reason of
public policy, and granting mortgagors a period of one year from
the finality of this Decision within which to redeem the subject
property by paying the redemption price as computed under
paragraph 1 hereof, plus one percent (1%) interest thereon from
the time of foreclosure up to the time of the actual redemption
pursuant to Section 28, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure.
The claim of the [respondents] for moral and
ACFLC is now before us, faulting the CA for reversing the
dismissal of respondents' complaint.
The appeal lacks merit.
It is true that parties to a loan agreement have a wide latitude
to stipulate on any interest rate in view of Central Bank
Circular No. 905, series of 1982, which suspended the Usury
Law ceiling on interest rate effective January 1, 1983. However,
interest rates, whenever unconscionable, may be equitably
reduced or even invalidated. In several
cases,10cralaw cralawthis Court had declared as null and void
stipulations on interest and charges that were found excessive,
iniquitous and unconscionable.
The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money
debt, even if knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral
and unjust. It is tantamount to a repugnant spoliation and an
iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common
sense of man. It has no support in law, in principles of justice,
or in the human conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever
which may justify such imposition as righteous and as one that
may be sustained within the sphere of public or private morals.
ACFLC next faults the CA for invalidating paragraph 14 of the
real estate mortgage which provides for the waiver of the
mortgagor's right of redemption. It argues that the right of
redemption is a privilege; hence, respondents are at liberty to
waive their right of redemption, as they did in this case.
Settled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and effective, it
must, in the first place, be couched in clear and unequivocal
terms which will leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to
give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
Additionally, the intention to waive a right or an advantage
must be shown clearly and
convincingly.cra13cralaw cralawUnfortunately, ACFLC failed to
convince us that respondents waived their right of redemption
voluntarily.
As the CA had taken pains to demonstrate:
The supposed waiver by the mortgagors was contained in a
statement made in fine print in the REM. It was made in the
form and language prepared by [petitioner]ACFLC while the
[respondents] merely affixed their signatures or adhesion
thereto. It thus partakes of the nature of a contract of
adhesion. It is settled that doubts in the interpretation of
stipulations in contracts of adhesion should be resolved against
the party that prepared them. This principle especially holds
true with regard to waivers, which are not presumed, but which
must be clearly and convincingly shown.[Petitioner] ACFLC
presented no evidence hence it failed to show the efficacy of this
waiver.
Moreover, to say that the mortgagor's right of redemption may
be waived through a fine print in a mortgage contract is, in the
last analysis, tantamount to placing at the mortgagee's absolute
disposal the property foreclosed.It would render practically
nugatory this right that is provided by law for the mortgagor for
reasons of public policy. A contract of adhesion may be struck
down as void and unenforceable for being subversive to public
policy, when the weaker party is completely deprived of the
opportunity to bargain on equal footing.cra14cralralaw
8
In fine, when the redemptioner chooses to exercise his right of
redemption, it is the policy of the law to aid rather than to
defeat his right.Thus, we affirm the CA in nullifying the waiver
of the right of redemption provided in the real estate mortgage.
Article 7.Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (5a)
NOTES:
Implied Repeal- provision of subsequent law are incompatible
with those an earlier law.
1. the law covers the same subject matter.
2. the latter is repugnant to the earlier.
Express- contained in the subsequent law.
Effect of Repeal of Repealing Law
- ER a prior law is itself repealed, the first law shall not
thereby be revived unless expressly so provided.
- ER a prior law is itself repealed, the first law shall
thereby be revived unless repealing law provides otherwise.
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines. (n)
-Supreme Court Decision
-Doctine of Stare Decisis- a point of law already established will
generally be followed by the same determining court and by all
court of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal
issue is raised.
Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application
of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
and justice to prevail. (n)
CONSTI Article 18 Section 3. All existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or
revoked.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. And Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr., Petitioners, Vs. Hon. Guillermo Carague, In His Capacity
As Secretary, Budget & Management, Hon. Rozalina S. Cajucom
In Her Capacity As National Treasurer And Commission On
Audit, Respondents. G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991
Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3
Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise
known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion,1 while the appropriations for the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.2
(27 Billion)
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized
by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as
Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177,
entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize
the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No.
1967, entitled "An Act Strenghthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed
Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the
Republic of the Philippines may bring this suit where a
constitutional issue is raised.3 Indeed, even a taxpayer has
personality to restrain unlawful expenditure of public funds.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The
petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service
under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. Respondent
defense that such suit is Political Question.
The questions raised in the instant petition are —
II. ARE PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967
STILL OPERATIVE UNDER THE
There is thus a justiciable controversy raised in the petition
which this Court may properly take cognizance of On the
first issue, the petitioners aver —
However, as against this constitutional intention, P86 Billion is
appropriated for debt service while only P27 Billion is
appropriated for the Department of Education in the 1990
budget. It plain, therefore, that the said appropriation for
debt services is inconsistent with the Constitution, hence,
viod (Art. 7, New Civil Code).7
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution Congress is mandated to "assign the highest
budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best
available talents through adequate remuneration and other
means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby
follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or
objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for
education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the
public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.008 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the
General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest
budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This is a
clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate
according highest priority to education.
Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to
education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not
without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide
an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous
debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the
previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to
protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the
very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process
Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than
the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds
9
that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional.
Now to the second issue. The petitioners made the following
observations:
To begin with, Rep. Act 4860 entitled "AN
ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND
CREDITS, OR TO INCUR SUCH FOREIGN
INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO
FINANCE APPROVED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO GUARANTEE, IN
BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
However, after the declaration of martial law, President
Marcos issued PD 81 amending Section 6, thus:
Sec. 7. Section six of the same Act is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
President Marcos also issued PD 1177, which provides
and PD 1967,
petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81,
P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster
of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section
3, Article XVIII which provides ––
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed, or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.)
They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent
with Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, i.e.,
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
(Emphasis supplied.)
whereby bills have to be approved by the President,10 then a law
must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic
appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate
Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as
follows ––
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and
exactness in an appropriation,11 otherwise it is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President who determines
in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.12
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that
"All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been There can be no question as to the patriotism and
adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that good motive of petitioners in filing this petition. Unfortunately,
legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues
Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are raised. As to whether or not the country should honor its
inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, international debt, more especially the enormous amount that
repealed or revoked. had been incurred by the past administration, which appears to
be the ultimate objective of the petition, is not an issue that is
presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the
is more of a political decision for Congress and the Executive to
clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the payment of
determine in the exercise of their wisdom and sound discretion.
the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those
guaranteed by the national government, should be made
available when they shall become due precisely without the
necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating
funds therefor, since both the periods and necessities are
incapable of determination in advance.

The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the

effective execution of debt management policies. Its political
wisdom has been convincingly discussed by the Solicitor
General as he argues —
. . . First, for example, it enables the Government to
take advantage of a favorable turn of market
conditions by redeeming high-interest securities and
borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from short-term to
long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements
that could lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-
to-equity, debt to asset, debt-to-debt or other such
schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation
obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing
arising from any deviation from what has been
previously programmed.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and
indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of
the person of President Marcos and his legislative
power goes against the intent and purpose of the law.
The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the
person of Marcos.13
DUTY TO RENDER JUDGMENT
Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
(6)
Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should
be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases
of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any
act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said
act should be made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense.

The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees Notes:

did not meet the requirement and are therefore inconsistent
with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which Nullumcrimen, nullapoena sine lege- there is no crime when
requires, among others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills there is no law punishing it
authorizing increase of public debt" must be passed by
Congress and approved by the President is untenable.
Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate
that existing laws in the statute books including existing
presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to
mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative
million The only reasonable interpretation of said
provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that
they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by
Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise
they should have expressed their decision in a more direct or
express manner.

Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by

implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the
principle that construction of the Constitution and law is
generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it
is so clearly stated.

The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended

by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967
constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless
they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The
Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement
the same.

10
APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMS noises, which frightened the horses attached to the
delivery wagon and they ran away,
Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or
public policy shall not be countenanced. (n)
The driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon
out through the rear upon the ground and was unable
Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the
to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on
rules of evidence. (n)
which street they came into collision with the
carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de
CONSTI ART. 12 SEC. 5
Martinez, was riding.
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national development policies and programs, The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in
shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to question.
their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary
negligence and gave judgment against him for P442.50, with
laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
17th day of October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The
case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
ROC- RULE 129

Section 2.Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)
Section 3.Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During
the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper
court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE
MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.WILLIAM VAN
BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-5691 December
27, 1910
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen
Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real,
district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of
the street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to
the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder
by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses,
came along the street in the opposite direction to that the in
which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the
driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the
delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed,
crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street
and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an
opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the
defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied
by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely
wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head,
and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the
horse which was drawing it.
Buskirk (Defendant) presented evidence to the effect
that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon
at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant
and was considered a safe and reliable cochero;
That for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero
driving the team as defendant's employee tied the
driving lines of the horses to the front end of the
delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon
for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered;
that while unloading the forage and in the act of
carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the
driver of which cracked a whip and made some other
11
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands
except that embodied in the Civil Code. The provisions of that
code pertinent to this case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another when there is fault or negligence
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article
is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are
liable for the damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when
the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has
furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable
driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions,
liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team, we
are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon
the ground that the evidence does not disclose that the
cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may
possibly be some what different from that in Anglo-Saxon
countries, a question we do not now discuss, the rules under
which the fact of negligence is determined are, nevertheless,
generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating
the person responsible for a negligent act may not be the same
here as in many jurisdictions, the law determining
what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as
elsewhere.
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which
caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the
cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of
the horses several years and the other five or six months; that
he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them
in the condition in which they were left on the day of the
accident; that they had never run away up to that time and
there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice;
that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the
merchandise in the manner described on the day of the
accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered
merchandise of the character of that which was being
delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in
question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent
in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence
in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the
respect in question, is to exercise reasonable care and
prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act
not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce damage to
others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact
ensues.
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the
manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the
performance of which has not proved destructive or
injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by
society for so long a time that they have ripened into
custom, can not be held to be themselves unreasonable or
imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been
permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than
prejudicial.itc-a
lf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the
most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or
customary results. To hold that, because such an act once
resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent,
is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any
sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at
most only creates aprima facie case, and that only in the
absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act
complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor
of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions
and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the
creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears.
This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard
Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p.
554):
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs
themselves, not only the fact of the runway and the accident
resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the
runaway occurred. Those conditions showing of themselves
that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the
management of the horse, the prima facie case in
plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is
the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of
the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the
manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is
the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in
which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the
custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or
injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such
practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the
public now, through the courts, without prior objection or
notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and
thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason
and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction
of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We
think not.
12
LEGAL PERIODS
Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or
nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four
hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed
by the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the
last day included. (7a)
Notes- Admin Code partially impliedly repeal Art. 13 of the
NCC. Declared by Supreme Court being more recent law. Now
govern the computing of period in respect to counting of year.
RAC- Section 31.Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to
be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it
refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be
computed according to the number of days the specific month
contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night," from
sunset to sunrise.
RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
CRISTITO MATA, and JUDGE L. D. CARPIO, in his capacity
as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur,
Branch V, respondents. G.R. No. L-50654 November 6, 1989
FACTS:
The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a
complaint against the herein petitioner with the Municipal
Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, for the collection of damages and
attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of
the private respondent and against the herein petitioner. A copy
of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June 1977,
and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal
with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he
completed the other requirements for the perfection of an
appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the payment
of the appellate court docket fee. However, when the case was
elevated to the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur (Branch
V) for the consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge
thereof ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the
reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal.
Whereupon, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,
mandamus with preliminary injunction with the Court of
Appeals, claiming that from 8 June 1977, when he received a
copy of the decision of the municipal court, to 24 June 1977,
when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed
so that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del
Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The
petitioner contended that the computation of the period to
appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of the
decision, so that the first of the 1 5-day period comprising 24
hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock
p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of
23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.
The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the novel interpretation
suggested as it would result in many confusing situations and
many unreliable testimonies as to the time a copy of a decision,
order or pleading is received, and cited the case of Republic of
the Philippines vs. Encarnacion, 1 where this Court held that
when a law was to be effective upon approval by the President
and the President signed the same on 16 June 1950, the law
should be considered to have taken effect not on the exact hour
when the President signed the same on 16 June 1950 but from
the very first minute or hour of said day of 16 June 1950.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
appellate court's decision, but his motion was denied in a
resolution promulgated on 7 December 1978.
Hence, the present recourse.
 We find no merit in the petition. The rule stated in
Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a
period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included" is similar, but not Identical to Section 4 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially
provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be
done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including
the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall
be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court
which stated that "In computing any period of time prescribed
or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a court, or by any
other applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default
after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to
be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be
included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which
event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is
neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this rule, the
Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and
we find no cogent reason to adopt a different view. the 15th
day shall be the 15 days after the appeal regardless of the
time when it was submitted.
Besides, human memory on dates or days is frail and
unless the day is an extraordinary one for a person, there is no
reasonable certainty of its correctness. What more for the exact
hour when a pleading, order or decision is received by a party?
Since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period laid down by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, and in the absence of any justifying
circumstance, the court has no jurisdiction to approve or admit
an appeal filed out of time. In the instant case, the petitioner
failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure to appeal on time
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
National Marketing Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vs. Miguel D. Tecson, Et Al., Defendants,
Miguel D. Tecson, Defendant-Appellee, The Insurance
Commissioner, petitioner. G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969
On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered judgment, , entitled "Price Stabilization
Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc.," Copy of this decision was, on November
21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case. On
December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as
successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in
action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that
case and judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a
complaint, against the same defendants, for the revival of the
judgment. Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said
complaint, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof and prescription of action.
Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription. As for
lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than P10,000
as actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued
by this same court, the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted.
But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the decision of this
Court became final on December 21, 1955. This case was filed
exactly on December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have
passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff
forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when this
present case was filed it was filed two days too late.
The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is,
therefore, dismissed as having prescribed.
The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order
to the Court of Appeals, which, on March 20, 1969t certified the
case to this Court, upon the ground that the only question
therein raised is one of law, namely, whether or not the present
13
action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of
limitations.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action
upon a judgment "must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art.
1152 of the same Code, "commences from the time the
judgment sought to be revived has become final." This, in turn,
took place on December 21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment — which was received by the defendants
herein on November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken
therefrom. 1 The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten
(10) years from December 21, 1955 expired.
Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but
appellee Tecson maintains otherwise, because "when the laws
speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days each" — according to Art. 13 of our Civil
Code — and, 1960 and 1964 being leap years, the month of
February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365
days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21,
1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court accepted
this view in its appealed order of dismissal.
Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is
erroneous, because a year means a calendar year (Statutory
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and
since what is being computed here is the number of years, a
calendar year should be used as the basis of computation.
There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December
21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. If the extra
day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is the
366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must
belong to the year where it falls and, therefore, that the 366
days constitute one year." 2
The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its
theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year"
— as the term is used in our laws — to 365 days.
Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the
Supreme Court thereof had held, on March 30, 1887, that,
when the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural" month or
"solar" month, in the absence of express provision to the
contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of
Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme
Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code,
"whenever months ... are referred to in the law, it shall be
understood that the months are of 30 days," not the "natural,"
or "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by
name," in which case "they shall be computed by the actual
number of days they have. This concept was later, modified in
the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to refer to
a calendar month." 4 In the language of this Court, in People vs.
Del Rosario, 5 with the approval of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a
month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and
not the solar or civil month," with the particularity that,
whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or
nights," ours has added thereto the term "years" and explicitly
ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days."
Although some members of the Court are inclined to
think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure to conform
with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-
appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not
nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of
the Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial
legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public
interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the
Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through
legislative process, not by judicial decree.
BINDING EFFECT
Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine
territory, subject to the principles of public international law
and to treaty stipulations. (8a)
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found. (10a)
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of
Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied
by the provisions of this Code. (16a)
Manuela Barretto Gonzalez, Plaintiff-Appellee, Vs. Augusto C.
Gonzalez, Defendant-Appellant. Augusto C. Gonzalez, Jr., Et
Al., Intervenors-Appellees. G.R. No. L-37048 March 7, 1933
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and
at present residents of the City of Manila, married, and lived
together as man and wife in the Philippine Islands until the
spring of 1926.
They voluntarily separated and since that time have not lived
together as man and wife. Of this union four children were
born. Negotiations between the parties, both being represented
by attorneys, continued for several months, whereupon it was
mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of
her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to
be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of
certain properties to be put in her name.
Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands,
betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction
an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion. Shortly
thereafter the defendant moved to California and returned to
these Islands in August 1928, where he has since remained.
On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went
through the forms of marriage with another citizen of these
Islands and now has three children as a result of that marriage.
Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced the
amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of his
wife and four minor children and has not made the payments
fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila requesting that the courts of the
Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of divorce
14
issued by the courts of the State of Nevada; that section 9 of Act
No. 2710.
She and the defendant deliver to the guardian ad
litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their
children as their legal portion from the respective estates had
their parents did intestate on November 28, 1927. It is also
prayed that the community existing between plaintiff and
defendant be declared dissolved and the defendant be ordered
to render an accounting and to deliver to the plaintiff her share
of the community property, that the defendant be ordered to
pay the plaintiff alimony at the rate of five hundred pesos (P500)
per month, that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff, as
counsel fees, the sum of five thousand pesos (P5000), and that
the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff the expenses incurred
in educating the three minor sons.
A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor
children, and they appear as intervenors and join their mother
in these proceedings. The Court of First Instance, after hearing,
found against the defendant and granted judgment as prayed
for by the plaintiff and intervenor. From this judgment
defendant appeals and makes the following assignment of
errors:
II. The lower court erred in holding that section 9 of Act No. 2710 (Divorce Law)
applies to the Nevada decree of divorce issued in favor of appellant Augusto C.
Gonzalez, said decree being entitled to confirmation and recognition.
While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial
matters they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of this
jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. On
the record here presented this can not be done. The public
policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set
forth in Act No. 2710, and the decisions of this court:
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their
separation until the case was submitted to this court, in which
they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and
confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the
laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to
secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and
under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the
matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the
Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of
Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce
was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction
upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony
in which he had entered in 1919.
Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity or persons, are binding upon
Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.
And article 11, the last part of which reads:
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their
property, and those intended to promote public order and good
morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws
or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered
into a foreign country.
Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts
to approve of their own actions or permit the personal
relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by
decrees of foreign courts in a manner which our
Government believes is contrary to public order and good
morals.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
must therefore be reversed and defendant absolved from the
demands made against him in this action. This, however,
without prejudice to any right of maintenance that plaintiff and
the intervenors may have against defendant. No special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. G.R.
No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
FACTS:
Missing her late afternoon classes in the University of San
Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second
year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age
(scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of
Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged
marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an
engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without
the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt.
Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said
city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair
and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage,
indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with a
friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they
had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be
the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a
piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their
engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring
and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate
the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the
room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the
elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicente
went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who
got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at
the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that
she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño
were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of
Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that
the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp.
1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought
priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to
validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the
standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from
the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not
take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was
handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not
remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college
students and disclosing an amorous relationship between
Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter
to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage.
Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs.
Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her
parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of
As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already
estranged .Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to
escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu
society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then
Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not
sign the petition. The case was dismissed without prejudice
because of her non-appearance at the hearing
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she
applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she
was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was
domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after
two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the
County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce,
15
"final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said
tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition
with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage
to Pastor. On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage.
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American,
Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating
her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment
of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff
and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell
Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation,
but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to
acquire property to the exclusion of his wife.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor
Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were
validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil
law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties
were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified;
and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a
Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was
not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical
authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only
because of the separation of Church and State but also because
Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage
law in force at the time) expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage
are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent.
(Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was
thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential
to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by
section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No
marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one
or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was
performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith
that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and
hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the
contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745;
Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448).
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she
contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of
Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with
appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the
truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not
render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the
marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil
court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid
marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At
the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not
admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact
does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive
policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation
that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the
wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of
divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal
separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that
case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not
be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give
recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce
betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the
declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the
third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes
the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order,
policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction
to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy
citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose
means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain
absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant
Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce
court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be
nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.);
and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-
resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court
originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a
necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta
Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents. G.R.
No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established
their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children
born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively;
that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
16
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner in RTC- Pasay
City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the
Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties,
and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of
that business, and that private respondent be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the
Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now
the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and
private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines
where petitioner is a Filipino citizen
HELD:
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no
community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had
obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as
No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding
that there were neither community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W.
Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What
he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, PETITIONER, VS. Hon. Corona
Ibay-Somera, IN HER CAPACITY AS Presiding Judge OF THE
Regional Trial Court OF Manila, Branch Xxvi; Hon. Luis C.
Victor, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE City Fiscal OF Manila;
AND Erich Ekkehard Geiling, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No.
80116 June 30, 1989
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private
respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before
the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler,
Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born
on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal
disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated
a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before
the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner
then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation
of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15,
1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. The records
show that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that
the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and
authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance
of the divorce decree private respondent filed 2 complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still
married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as
early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983”.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on
the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband
and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery
and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse and nobody else.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed
by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule
is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement
Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the
offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and
17
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as
he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and
rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended
spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation
to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and
capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such
status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring
the action would be determined by his
status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased
before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the
time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the
anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time
when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was
granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her
American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her
business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States
of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. ...
Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
HUMAN RELATIONS
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to
another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the
act or event he was benefited.
Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when
one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age
or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his
protection.
Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for
pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or
emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the
instance of any government or private charitable institution.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute
a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because
a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just
cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to
be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
18
Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand
civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case,
a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove
the act complained of.
Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is
taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies
for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition
the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any
form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced
by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a
judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force
refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case
of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall
be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings,
and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action.
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal
offense, charges another with the same, for which no
independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special
law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting
attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the
alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the
defendant in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an
information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney,
the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the
criminal proceedings.
Notes:
Damnum Absque Injuria- Proper exercise of lawful right cannot
constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although
the act result in damage to another, for no lehal right has been
invaded.
Principle of Abuse of Right- right exercise in bad faith and for
the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another- Exercise of
right ends when the right dissapears and it disappers when it is
abused especially to the prejudice of another.
Accion In Rem Verso- is an action for recovery of what has
been paid without just cause.
1. Defendant has been enrished.
2. Plaintiff has suffered loss.
3. Enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal grounds.
4. Plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi
contract, crimes and quasi-delict.
Solutio Indebiti- mistake is essential elements, in AIRV is not
necessary that there should be a mistake in the payment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant, G.R. No. 88582
March 5, 1991
FACTS:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a
young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped
and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her
vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide 10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, the accused with lewd design and with intent to kill
one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age,
carnal knowledge and inserted a foreign object into the vaginal
canal which caused her death.
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty".
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about
midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl
namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel
room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City.
These two (2) children were chosen from among a bunch of
street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told them
to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to
take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the
19
bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the
bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures depicting
dressed up young boys, and put them on top of the table. Other
things which were taken out and placed on top of a table were
three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a vicks
inhaler. One of these objects the accused played with his hands
and placed it on his palms. The color of which is grayish blue
which turned out later to be the foreign object which was
inserted inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects
were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers against
pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he
went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom,
accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did the
accused. He then started masturbating the young boy and also
guided the boy's hand for him to be masturbated, so that they
masturbated each other, while they were both naked, and he
gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came
out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by
accused and to join him in bed. The accused then placed
himself between the two (2) children and accused started
fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched
him to call his attention. He looked, and he saw accused placing
his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was trying to
penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw,
Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because he was sleepy
and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles
described as an "American, paid Ramirez alias"Egan" P200.00
and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After the
American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that
the American inserted something in her vagina. But they could
not do anything anymore, because the American had already
left, and neither did they report the matter to the police.
Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked
her whether the object was already removed from her body and
Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the
evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was
complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan asked her,
she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there
was another occasion wherein Jessie was summoned and when
he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried to
talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks.
Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore because he already
went home to his aunt's house who resided at Barrio Barretto
and resumed his studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense
witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of
the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the
Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by people because
Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious and foul
smelling. Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her
condition and brought her to the Olongapo City General
Hospital in an unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to
the Information desk and he was the one who gave the personal
circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as
Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as
"guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was already in the
emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did
not know the name of Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to
the hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the Information
clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that it
was Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of
Rosario.
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo
City General Hospital, nobody was attending to her since she is
a street child, having stowed away from the custody of her
grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong to religious
and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe
Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the
hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who was all alone with
no relatives attending to her and after finding out that she was
only 12 years old decided to help her. After a short interview
with Rosario, regarding her name and age only because she
clamped up about her residence and her relatives, they decided
to help her by providing her the medicine she needed during her
confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who
was able to get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from
Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first time.
For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an important
factor because their program assisted only indigent patients
from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General
Hospital was loose bowel movement and vomiting, which was
first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as
symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive infection in the
abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she
was examined by the physicians at the hospital, it was found
out that there was a foreign object lodged in her vaginal canal
and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul
smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the doctors who
attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal
tried to extract the foreign object by means of a forceps, but
several attempts proved futile because said object was deeply
embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her
abdomen was enlarged, tender and distended, symptoms of
peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent when she
was scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987, after the first
attempt for an operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly
because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director
was not obtained. The surgeon who operated on her was Dr.
Rosete himself. He testified that Rosario had to be operated
even in that condition in order to save her life. Her condition
was guarded. This was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the
anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was in the
evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened
her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her stomach. He
found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and
so with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches of
pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared
to have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and
septicemia were traced to have been caused through
infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in the
intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The foreign object which was
already agreed upon by both parties that it is a portion of a
sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while
under anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues, pus and
blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the assisting surgical nurse for
safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to the authorized
person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr.
Rosete considered the operation successful and the patient was
alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said
patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left.
The following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo
Cruz who pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the
afternoon of May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the
direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated therein that the cause
of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to
septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the intra
uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came
to her residence at Sta. Rita and asked her if she was interested
in filing a case against the person who caused the death of her
granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she was brought
to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused,
Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger came to her house
and told her that the accused was willing to settle the case, but
that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The old woman did
not accept it because she knows that the accused is liable to
pay damages anyway.. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the
records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and
Roberto Sundiam, an assistant barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and
while they were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law office.
Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom,
and thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told
20
The private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla because it was
she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita
Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their father Policarpio
Baluyot had left them under her custody. When this case was
filed, the father's whereabouts was unknown, and he only
appeared when the trial of this case before the Court was
already in progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own
admission, he only learned about the death of his daughter
Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long after Rosario was
already gone.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court
holds, that the prosecution has established the GUILT of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape with
Homicide as defined and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code,
.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the
age of the victim—whether or not Rosario Baluyot was less than
twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged incident happened
on October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining
whether or not there was statutory rape, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having
carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age, in which
case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious
state do not have to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when
she was sexually abused by the accused and, therefore, rape
was committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's
testimony pursuant to the ruling laid down in U.S. v.
Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted the
testimony of the mother that her daughter was 14 years old and
4 months old. The mother stated that she knew the age because
the child was born about the time of the cholera epidemic of
1889. This was not hearsay, but came from one who had direct
knowledge of the child's birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that
Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the time of the
alleged incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of
birth, much less offset a documentary record showing a
different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate
which the trial court rejected as being hearsay and of no value.
As against the oral declarations made by interested witnesses
establishing Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the
evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of belief.
(See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664,
673 [1990]).
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only
12 years old when the incident with Ritter happened. And that
Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence,
she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A
doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the
vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that
which caused her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the
following day that the object has been removed already. She
also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3
months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.
However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary
damages he must award to the victim’s heirs. It does not
necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
Ritter was deported.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is
also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is
that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly
liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC,
supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution
must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for
damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA
559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil
Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the
same act or omission, has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the
court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is
that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails
to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the
distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from
each other. One affects the social order and the other,
private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of
the offender while the other is for the reparation of
damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article
1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may
be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but
the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by
the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of
the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in
our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice—a
cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable
persons injured or wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from
her grandmother's house. Circumstances forced her to succumb
and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left
behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental anguish,
anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death
as reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting
the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize
that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is
only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the
failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful
conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the likelihood
that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside
Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have caused
her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or
possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of
indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.
21
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals,
good customs, public order or public policy (see Article 21
Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused
Filipino children, enticing them with money. We can not
overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in
the Philippines, including the appellant towards young children.
The sexual exploitation committed by the appellant should not
and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances
of the case, we are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario
Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER, vs. SPOUSES JAVIER
AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO
WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,
* JR., RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr.
Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at Emily
Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement selling, transferring and conveying in favor of
[respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and
interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in
consideration of ₱70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement
carries a stipulation:
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall
be for the account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide)
effective June 1, 1994." vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's
assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan secured by
Joyce Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in
the name of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed
until on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water connection
of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the
Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain, a certain
Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for
three (3) months corresponding to the months of December
1998, January 1999, and February 1999. Ma. Theresa argued
that the due date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet Mrs.
Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of Joyce
Ardiente that the water line was cut off .
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills. On
the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to
the COWD to explain who authorized the cutting of the water
line. On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager,
[respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated
March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of
Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off.
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide
[and her husband] filed [a] complaint for damages [against
petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez].
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties,
defendants did not act with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and
observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting the water
supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not
even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs as testified to by
Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial
Department of defendant COWD. There was one though, but
only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on March 12,
1999. The due date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly,
they did not act with justice. Neither did they observe
honesty. They should not have been swayed by the prodding of
Joyce V. Ardiente. They should have investigated first as to
the present ownership of the house. For doing the act
because Ardiente told them, they were negligent. Defendant
Joyce Ardiente should have requested before the cutting off of
the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell
plaintiffs but she did not have the patience of seeing them. She
knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the water four
(4) years ago and not hers. She should have been very careful. x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez]
to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following sums:
(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr.
Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The Court is not
swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs was
because they were influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente.
They were negligent too for which they should be liable.
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the awarded damages is
reduced to ₱100,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages,
while attorney's fees is lowered to ₱25,000.00. Costs against
appellants.
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal
duty to honor the possession and use of water line by Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of
Agreement" and "that when [petitioner] applied for its
disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and
[injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide."
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give
a notice of disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the
water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the
[respondent spouses Pastorfide]."
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with
this Court. However, based on technical grounds and on the
finding that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its
assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a Resolution
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who
were petitioner's co-defendants before the RTC and her co-
appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in the
instant petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-parties
before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant
petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez,
adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the part of
petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as
respondents.
However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm
another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party
will attach.16 In the present case, intention to harm was
evident on the part of petitioner when she requested for the
disconnection of respondent spouses’ water supply without
warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner
claims that her request for disconnection was based on the
advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to
compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement
that petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in
respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only
intention, then she should have advised respondent spouses
before or immediately after submitting her request for
disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to
force them to comply with their obligation under their
22
Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. There was
clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and
Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the
Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila
Chronicle Publishing Corporation17 is instructive, to wit:
xxxx
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in
the exercise of one’s rights as well as in the performance of its
duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and
observe honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article 19 "lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The
Court said:
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but
also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in
their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary
to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall
indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general
sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in
the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a
remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights
has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of
each case. x x x18
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the
abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of
having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected,
coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify
respondent spouses of such intention.
On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give
prior notice of the impending disconnection and their
subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water
supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent
account.
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on
the provisions of Article 2219,19 in connection with Articles
2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are
imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to
serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb
socially deleterious actions.22 In the instant case, the Court
agrees with the CA in sustaining the award of exemplary
damages, although it reduced the amount granted, considering
that respondent spouses were deprived of their water
supply for more than nine (9) months, and such deprivation
would have continued were it not for the relief granted by
the RTC.
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the
Civil Code provides, among others, that such fees may be
recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and evident
bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs’ plainly valid, just
and demandable claim.
Certiorari was denied.
_______________________________________________________________
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided
before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme
Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with
the.
Elements
1. The previously intituted civil action involes an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action., and
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may process.
● A prejudicial question is an issue involved in a civil case
which is similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action, the resolution of which determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed. (Sec. 7, Rule 111)
●There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil
action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. (Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13,
2010)
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE
FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN,
respondents. G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
ISSUE:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the
Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a
civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter
constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge
ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
FACTS:
On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru
Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for
bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The information was filed
based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment,
private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on
September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case
No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that
private respondent consented to entering into the marriage,
which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no
23
previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a
certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner
Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the
defense that his second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed
by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the
marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or
second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived
together and deported themselves as husband and wife without
the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as
evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September
26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was
dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code
pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case
No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings
of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the
annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent
raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or
decided before the criminal case can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied
the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the
ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order
further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can
proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru
counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of
proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De
la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that
cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise
denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
HELD:
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises
in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is one
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. A prejudicial
question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in a criminal case.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case
at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the
second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's
guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it
was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz
B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through
deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage
should have been declared null and void on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by
private respondent only sometime later when he was required to
answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage.
The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova
may be applied to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages
entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean
that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil
actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order
that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it
must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage
must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force
and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage
must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction
for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is
markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted
for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two
marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner
who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats
and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that
petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party
complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage
with her should be declared null and void on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first
marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner,
the fact would not be material to the outcome of the case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption
is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown
that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by
the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the
case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it
should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree.
The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the
aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was
charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage
while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was
also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of
duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein
it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second
wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through
deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was
still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was
already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage
of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the
present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova,
petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions
since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused
only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such
marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and
intimidation in order to establish that his act in the
subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such
the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in the case at bar.
24
ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO
RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. L-22579 February 23,
1968
ISSUE:
Whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of
marriage at the instance of the second wife against petitioner,
with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the
first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes
a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him.
FACTS:
On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, with the offense, of bigamy. It was
alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully
married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been
legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia."
On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent
Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to
petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged
use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by
petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character.
On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a
third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant
Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage
with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void,
on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation,
she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her
before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to
suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the
decision on the question of the validity of the two
marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent
Judge denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion
for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was
likewise denied. Hence this petition,
It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses
that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages
entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean
that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil
actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for
bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even on the assumption
that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged
by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of
the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties
to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, according to Viada, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in
this Article. . . ." 2
This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit
in authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3 what
was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which
must be determined before hand in the civil action before the
criminal action can proceed." According to the opinion of
Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of the
validity of the second marriage can be determined or must
first be determined in the civil action before the criminal
action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the
validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial
question because determination of the validity of the second
marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede
the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this
Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of
bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be
declared valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil
action, there must be a decision in such a case "before the
prosecution for bigamy can proceed."
To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta
v. Mendoza. 4 As explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We
have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which
arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. . . . The
prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative
of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same
must be lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are
present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment
of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the
evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of
duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was
involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for
the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of
petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. . . ."
The situation in this case is markedly different. At the
time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27,
1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15,
1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an
action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be
precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action,
filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse
alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null
and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation.
As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge
relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having
such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity
of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a
second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion
to indulge in the probability that the third-party complaint
against the first wife brought almost five months after the
prosecution for bigamy was started could have been inspired by
the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on
an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial decisions as
well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent
Judge abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in
failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
CIVIL PERSONALITY
o PERSONS AND PERSONALITY
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
(n)
Notes:
Personality- status of civil capacity.
Status- some total of person’s right and duties as determined
by the class to which he belonged.
Person whether he or she has less desirable human preferences
remains a person, no differ from others. All citizen equal before
the eyes of the law.
25
Juridical Capacity- synonymous with legal capacity , holding
and enjoyment of the right. Capacity to act- exercise of such
right.
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are
mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the
latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. (32a)
Notes:
Full Civil Personality – when endowed with both juridical
capacity and capacity to act.
Minor- does not have the right to vote, and enter into contact of
marriage.
Civil Interdiction- accessory penalty on those who have been
convicted on crime punishable by at least 12 years of
imprisonment.
o Deprives during the time of his sentence of the right to
dispose his property by any act or conveyance inter
vivos.
An imbecile, insane person or minor may be held civilly liable
for a crime for which he is criminally liable.
Insanity- includes the various forms of mental disease.
Insane or minor causing damage who has no parents or
guardian may be held answerable with his own property.
Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify
or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state
of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code,
other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to
act is not limited on account of religious belief or political
opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified
for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law. (n)
Notes:
Examples on limited capacity to act:
Deaf mutes cannot be witnesses to a will.
Person cannot marry collateral relatives up to 4th civil degree of
cansanguinity.
Insolvent- forbidden from transferring his property.
Woman in the last paragraph, for reassurance of equality.
COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY
1. NATURAL PERSON
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article. (29a)
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it
is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's
womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less
than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within
twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal
womb. (30a)
Notes:
Conception- is the meeting of egg and the sperm, marks the
beginning of the intra-uterine life.
Birth Det. Personality, and personality commences from the
moment of conception. From conception fetus is accorded a
presumptive personality.
Thus even before birth it may be recipient of donation, or
capable of succeeding or its filiation recognized, it may also be
the beneficiary of the support.
Constitution Article 2- Section 12- The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 603
THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE
Article 5. Commencement of Civil Personality. - The civil
personality of the child shall commence from the time of his
conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the
requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code.
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the
wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both
are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife,
provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed
by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall
be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth
certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)
REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK2
Art. 256. Intentional abortion. — Any person who shall
intentionally cause an abortion shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence
upon the person of the pregnant woman.chanrobles virtual law
library
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he
shall act without the consent of the woman.chanrobles virtual
law library
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the woman shall have
consented.chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be
imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by
violence, but unintentionally.
Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself of by her
parents. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a woman who
shall practice abortion upon herself or shall consent that any
other person should do so.
Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her
dishonor, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant
woman or either of them, and they act with the consent of said
woman for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the
offenders shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.
Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and
dispensing of abortives. — The penalties provided in Article
256 shall be imposed in its maximum period, respectively, upon
any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their
scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in
causing the same
Roe v. Wade, legal case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on
January 22, 1973, ruled (7–2) that unduly restrictive state
regulation of abortion is unconstitutional. In a majority opinion
written by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the court held that a set
26
of Texas statutes criminalizing abortion in most instances
violated a woman’s constitutional right of privacy, which it
found to be implicit in the liberty guarantee of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“…nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law”).
Jane Roe, a single woman who was residing in
Dallas County, Texas, instituted this federal action in
March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She
sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion
statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction
restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes.
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant;
that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion
"performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe,
clinical conditions"; that she was unable to get a "legal" abortion
in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the
continuation of her pregnancy; and that she could not afford
to travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal
abortion under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas
statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged
her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment
to her complaint Roe purported to sue "on behalf of herself and
all other women" similarly situated.
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought
and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his
complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for
violations of the Texas abortion statutes and [410 U.S. 113,
121] that two such prosecutions were pending against him. He
described conditions of patients who came to him seeking
abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a
physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within
or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196. He
alleged that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and
uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
they violated his own and his patients' rights to privacy in the
doctor-patient relationship and his own right to practice
medicine, rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a
companion complaint to that of Roe. They also named the
District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitutional
deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The
Does alleged that they were a childless couple; that Mrs. Doe
was suffering from a "neural-chemical" disorder; that her
physician had "advised her to avoid pregnancy until such time
as her condition has materially improved" (although a
pregnancy at the present time would not present "a serious
risk" to her life); that, pursuant to medical advice, she had
discontinued use of birth control pills; and that if she should
become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy
by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician
under safe, clinical conditions. By an amendment to their
complaint, the Does purported to sue "on behalf of themselves
and all couples similarly situated."
The two actions were consolidated and heard together
by a duly convened three-judge district court. The suits thus
presented the situations of the pregnant single woman, the
childless couple, with the wife not pregnant,[410 U.S. 113,
122] and the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the
attack on the Texas criminal abortion statutes. Upon the filing
of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary
judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her
class, and Dr. Hallford, had standing to sue and presented
justiciable controversies, but that the Does had failed to allege
facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have
standing. It concluded that, with respect to the requests for a
declaratory judgment, abstention was not warranted. On the
merits, the District Court held that the "fundamental right of
single women and married persons to choose whether to have
children is protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the
Fourteenth Amendment," and that the Texas criminal abortion
statutes were void on their face because they were both
unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad
infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment rights. The
court then held that abstention was warranted with respect to
the requests for an injunction. It therefore dismissed the Does'
complaint, declared the abortion statutes void, and dismissed
the application for injunctive relief. 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1225
(ND Tex. 1970).
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1253, have appealed to this Court from
that part of the District Court's judgment denying the
injunction. The defendant District Attorney has purported to
cross-appeal, pursuant to the same statute, from the court's
grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Both sides also
have taken protective appeals to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals
held in abeyance pending decision here. We postponed decision
on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 U.S. 941
(1971). [410 U.S. 113, 123]
Texas Contention
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth
Amendment, life begins at conception and is present
throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a
compelling interest in protecting that life from and after
conception. We need not resolve the difficult question of when
life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any
consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of
man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer.
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents. G.R. No. L-16439
July 20, 1961
ISSUE: Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician
who caused the same.
FACTS:
Respondent Oscar Lazo, husband of Nita Villanueva, against
petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits
of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court
rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant
Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages,
P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five,
sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as
against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for
the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In
1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before
they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy
from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had
herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the
plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed
in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant
in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again
repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez
streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his
wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in
consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The
plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not
know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis
in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of
the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
27
Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un
ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera,
"Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), (the abortive
creature does not reach the category of natural person
and is consequently a being not born into the life of Law)
being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it
is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same
was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission
to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity
to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of
the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later
with the condition specified in the following article". In the
present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead
when separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same
effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for the
death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co.,
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled
to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the
injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life
and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect
either help, support or services from an unborn child, they
would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal
arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was
the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to
its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations
(Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230).
But in the case before us, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of
moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to
the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant
herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he
appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the
appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His
only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from
the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for
P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an
"indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was
clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly
remarked that:
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint
ordered dismissed. Without costs.
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents,
ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-
appellants, vs. FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee. G.R. No.
26795 July 31, 1970
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued
Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was averred
that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close
and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although
married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with
plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and
without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant,
despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and
plaintiff had to stop studying.
Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month,
damages and attorney's fees.
ICAO CONTENTION- Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to
dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not
allege that the child had been born; and after hearing
arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and
dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint
to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later
given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's
objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the
plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to
be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes
favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right
to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-
appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of
the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en
ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet
unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of
the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his
testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls
the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child
should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil
Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children
may be accepted by those persons who would legally represent
them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to
the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of
the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents
and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides
imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article
291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus
be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's
womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to
the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.
Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding
Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son
simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la
moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen
un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas
por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos
28
(que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho
que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
the rights attributed to the nasciturus are not simple
expectations, even in the technical sense that modern doctrine
gives to this legal figure but rather constitute a case of the so-
called 'rights in a state of pendency'; the birth of the subject
under the conditions provided by art. 30, does not determine the
birth of those rights (which already existed beforehand), but it is
a fact that has declarative effects.
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that
for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to
his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case)
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same
Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was
carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages
under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it
for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
NOTES FORM INTERNET””””
The clear and unequivocal intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception
was to prevent the legislature from enacting a measure
legalizing abortion.
• The right to support. An unborn child has a right to support
from its progenitors. Support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,
vs. CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-39110
November 28, 1933
This action was instituted by Antonia Loanco de Jesus
in her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next
friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco,
infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of
recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty
thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named
plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the
defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural
children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the
maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos
per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after
answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring
the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child
and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per
month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects.
From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so
much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by
them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision which
required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his
maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the
defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three
years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in
Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his
own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of
a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed
to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia
Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years,
was taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not
long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations
resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with
child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The
defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the
early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote
and placed in her hands a note directed to the padre who has
expected to christen the baby
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was
on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan; and
while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to
Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation that had
developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good
condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be,
"Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them
soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary
anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this
he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at
the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the
mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where
she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her,
with her mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551
Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for
about a year in regular family style, all household expenses,
including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In
course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and,
when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the
defendant decamped, and he is now married to another
woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the time
came for christening the child, the defendant, who had charge of
the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as
was at first planned.
1st ISSUE: The first question that is presented in the case is
whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection
with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during
pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within
the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the
acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule
of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes
a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a
living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment
to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the
recognition of unborn child is really not different from that
presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child
already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and
resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a
living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular
individual intended with the name used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the
words of description used in the writings before us are not
legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael
Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded.
The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are
not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then
conceived which was expected to be born in June and which
would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came,
and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco
instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which
the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt
that might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit
F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated
reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the
letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the
writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order
that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J)
written only a few days before the birth of the child, the
defendant urged her to take good care of herself and
ofjunior also.
29
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as
to the sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the
acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of
the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be
made in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity,
written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of
the opinion that the recognition can be made out by
putting together the admissions of more than one
document, supplementing the admission made in one letter
by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case
before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to
the padre and the other letters suffice to connect that
admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de
Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall
be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely
required that the writing shall be indubitable.
(Unquestionable or impossible to doubt)
2nd ISSUE: The second question that presents itself in this case
is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco
had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a
natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and
that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be
compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2
of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are
sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial
court on this point, and we may add here that our conclusion
upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had
acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be
taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the
second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child
the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which
they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued
for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second
time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning
her. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in
the continuous possession of the status of a natural child;
and the period in this case was long enough to evince the
father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance
that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this
action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in
subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that
the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it
shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of
the defendant's appeal. With respect to the appeal of the
plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right
in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for
supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not
satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff
upon the faith of such promise.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize
the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying
the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance which the
trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we
merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First
Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF
PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent. G.R. No. L-
770 April 27, 1948
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission,
through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its
decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for
a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said
commission held that the evidence therein showed that the
public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper
and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and
maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½)
tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original
applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of
his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore,
overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that
under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No.
146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to
the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante,
authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily
productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from
said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City",
subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's
brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as
follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in
accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not
reasonably supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner
and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc.,
as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the
increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an
unwarranted departure from its announced policy with respect
to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2,
petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the
part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the
latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the
commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the
certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of
law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no
question that he would have had the right to prosecute his
application before the commission to its final conclusion. No
one would have denied him that right. As declared by the
commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in
question P 35,000, and from what the commission said
regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly
have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant
had he not died. His transportation business alone was
netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen
and continued to be such till his demise. The commission
declared in its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that
his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice
plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said
application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did
not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the
assets of his estate, for which a right was property despite the
30
possibility that in the end the commission might have denied
application, although under the facts of the case, the
commission granted the application in view of the financial
ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant.
Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page
3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a
rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such
certificate would certainly be property, and the right to
acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites
of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and
survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an
option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option he
died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of
business and not out of special consideration for his person,
there would be no doubt that said option and the right to
exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal
representatives. In such a case there would also be the
possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his
estate or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions
of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's
undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired
certificate of public convenience — the evidence
established that the public needed the ice plant — was
under the law conditioned only upon the requisite
citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate
the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such
certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure
its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but
the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from
that of the option in the illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator
may bring or defend actions, among other cases, for the
protection of the property or rights of the deceased which
survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or
defended "in the right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of
the executor or administrator, the making of an inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which
shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession
of any other person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II,
2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief Justice of this Court
draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any
action affecting the property or rights (emphasis supplied)
of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if
he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by
or against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery
of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature,
it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a
certificate of public convenience before the Public Service
Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions
and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by
their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part
and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under
the control and management of the executor or administrator,
can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate
for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and
the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to
consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an
application for a certificate of public convenience of the
deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical
that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in
behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that
proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334
and article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively, consider
as immovable and movable things rights which are not
material. The same eminent commentator says in the cited
volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been
deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all
incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical
purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of
the term, property includes, among other things, "an option",
and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the
operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume
we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest)
have also been declared to include every species of
title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in
contract, whether executory or executed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether
the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the
meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the
following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person,
a forgery committed after the death of the man whose name
purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as
with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107
Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had
before it a case of forgery committed after the death of one
Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection
was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery was
committed with the intent to defraud any person. The Court,
per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that
the law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a person.
This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the
decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word
"person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a
generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural
persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal.
304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said
in another work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and
artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial
persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural
persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property
to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights
and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized
only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a
bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954.
Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the
definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for
they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a
decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of
the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271.
Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a
failure of justice in cases where, as here, the forgery is
committed after the death of a person whose name is forged;
and this is a result to be avoided if it can be done
consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding
such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the
estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial
person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling
a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and,
although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors,
have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a
distinct legal entity. The interest which natural persons have
in it is not complete until there has been a due administration;
and one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument
purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having
intended to defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the
natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha cannot
be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what
was the nature of their respective interest. The fraudulent
intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — and not
the natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it.
(107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice
unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a
"person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason
than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment
31
amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not
counting the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding
can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let
alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction
there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a
deceased person is also considered as having legal
personality independent of their heirs. Among the most
recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs.
Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff
was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave
judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in
these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it
holds that defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to
he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person
were considered in contemplation of law as the
continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of
article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all
the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact
of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2
Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held
in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case,
as well as in many others decided by this Court after the
innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the
matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant
doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and
assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that
becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations
which survive after his demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the
decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not
have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature
of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs
succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent.
Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as
survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the
estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not
indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate,
represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise
those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased.
The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and
the same in both cases. This is why according to the Supreme
Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje &
L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by
law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes
the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the
estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the
Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public
Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof
expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission
to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of
public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the
Philippines or of the United States or to corporations,
copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies
constituted and organized under the laws of the
Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum
of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong
entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United
States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the
underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain
purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a
"person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting
from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and
fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived
after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially
the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the
jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs.
State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should
be regarded as an artificial person. it is the creation of law
for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be
properly made . . . .
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to
cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that
while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases
relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1)
and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons,
for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional
guarantee against being deprived of property without due
process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the
framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural,
persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of
similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure
estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the
framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O.
Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical
person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution
of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during
the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the
fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after
his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his
pending application before the Public Service Commission in the
instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to
its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue
from the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his
personality is considered extended so that any debts or
obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any
surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors
and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for
denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship,
and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes
of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service
Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful,
would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and
the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any
prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done
if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired
certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is
grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same
reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction
is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate,
creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of
the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already
made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses
occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service
Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the
intent of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine
citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above
adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law indulges the
fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate
of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusing
to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for
the purposes of this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had
lived, in view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained
from the commission the certificate for which he was applying.
The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his
death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic
ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain
the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the
decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which
does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also
Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple
expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from
inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of
the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service
Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality
and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed
32
extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public
Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution:
it is so adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason,
JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the
majority.
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as
Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria;
FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN
DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. QUALITY PLASTIC
PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente
Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag
and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products,
Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from
November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the
defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision
became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby
authorized to foreclose the bond, , in accordance with law, for
the satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four
sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for the
obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real
properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their
undertaking).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment
and after the decision had become final, the lower court, on
motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the
"foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public
auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as
security under the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by
Original Certificate of Title and has an area of nine and six-
tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at
public auction on September 24, 1962. The sale was confirmed
by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long
before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria's death
was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the
representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in
the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate
Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five
defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a
deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the bond, who
acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the
original summons in his own behalf and again signing for his
co-defendants.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and
Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in
Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc.,
also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio
Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's
testate estate).
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case No. T- 873). It was only
when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in
Civil Case No. T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead
at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was filed.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that
Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against Soliven and his
sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the
court's jurisdiction over Oria.
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired
jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants in Civil
Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It
reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not
apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that
"it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that
the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the
plaintiffs appealed.
ISSUES:
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be
boiled down to the issue as to the validity of the lower
court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who,
being already in the other world, was never served with
summons.
There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no
jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him
is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil.
447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68
Phil. 4).
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment
against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not
have been, validly served with summons. He had no more
civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness
to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.
(Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's
counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a
voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire
jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have
validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no
application to this case.
But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the judgment
against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim
attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties herein
agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products,
Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect
conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in joining Oria as
a co-defendant.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set
aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is
declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of
Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M.
VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN,
JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court,
Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the
petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus",
namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and
NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990. G.R. No. 85140 May 17,
1990
PADILLA, J.:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas
Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers and sisters, herein
private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27
September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging
that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his
palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her
desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty
without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it
was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living
with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988
issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned
unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana
(who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff,
reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had
already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace
33
quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary,
Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner)
is the Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to
toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As
her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of
her body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation
filed before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and
30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent court,
directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in
Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings)
filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming
lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action
under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the
Rules of Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus,
petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but
extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as
petitioners below) were granted leave to amend their
petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana
only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas
corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that
petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to
Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty
to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the
Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines,
they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister
Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to
dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October
1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court,
proceedings continued before the respondent court; the body
was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial
Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge
of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized
government pathologist. 4
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a
quo held in an order, 5 dated 17 November 1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first
amended petition, up to the second amended petition that the
ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns
out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the
petitioners as the persons entitled to the custody, interment
and/or burial of the body of said deceased. The Court,
considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already
dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on
September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of this case
because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in
the body of the petition on the determination as to who is
entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late
Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof,
for the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction to try this case. The authority to try the
issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the lawful
jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
and because of the allegations of the pleadings in this case,
which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in
due course, rendered a decision on 17 January
1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said
court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an
action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners
having to file a separate civil action for such relief, and
without the Court first dismissing the original petition
for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation
to Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that
the allegations in the original petition as well as in the two
amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been
restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was
prayed for the custody and burial of said dead person. The
amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the
ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly
finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit
on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead
body because the body of the petition controls and is binding
and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of
all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide
and dispose of this case. . . . . 10
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then
proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over the dead body,
(for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give
support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award.
Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or
descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over
petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter
being himself legally married to another woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application
for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were
pure questions of law, basically Identical to those raised in the
earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of
both cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent
motion for the issuance of an injunction to maintain status
quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution
dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far
failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody
of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent
burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision without
further pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues
are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102
of the Rules of Court to recover custody of the dead body of
a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving
claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a common
law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its
authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of
the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of
the new Family Code) which states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more
persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the following
order:
(1) From the spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases.
Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that
what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but
the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and
even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief
may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in
the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13
34
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a
quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was dead or alive.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a
matter of course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing
of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance,
and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom
the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle
the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant
the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the
writ should issue if the petition complies with the legal
requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for
relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas
corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for
very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The
latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment
or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in
the petition. 15
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain
custody of a minor sister, stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the
case should not have been dismissed. The court below should
not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was
virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and
scandalous relation between the minor and her married
employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all principles of
law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed
preference for remaining with said respondent, because the
minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals
and law repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the
court below should not allow the technicality, that Teofilo
Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of
its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas
corpus proceeding the court had power to award temporary
custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person,
after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What
matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the records
be not allowed to continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the
petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas
corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of
suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and
should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order
that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real
facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent
circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the
adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of
permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the
writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic
due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of
liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a
quo had to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294
of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being
preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such
qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed,
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A
man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not
in the Philippines. 19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact
that such relationships are present in our society, and that they
produce a community of properties and interests which is
governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that
such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice
Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of
Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of
Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with
respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse'
(not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for
purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused
mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes
no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are
husband and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to
the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the
Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in
Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-
wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to
marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded
to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section
1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The
immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person,
regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall
devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child,
and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the
nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the
Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the
necessary expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both
petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons
who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died
first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other,
shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed
that they died at the same time and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to the other. (33)
RULES ON EVIDENCE RULE 131 SEC 3(jj)(kk)
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons
perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or
conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are
no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the
survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting
from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the
following rules:
o If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is
deemed to have survived;
o If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed
to have survived;
o If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the
former is deemed to have survived;
o If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be
different, the male is deemed to have survived, if
the sex be the same, the older;
o If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other
between those ages, the latter is deemed to have
survived.
35
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons
who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died
first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be
considered to have died at the same time. (5a)
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO C.
NAVARRO, respondent. G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila in the summary settlement of states of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro,
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of them
having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a
single decision which was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
whose decision, modifying that the Court of First Instance, in
turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
The main question represented in the first two courts related to
the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife,
and their children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of
civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. The
trial court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in
this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and
Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de
Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals
concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to
Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the
latter was declared to have survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now
being contested by the petitioner. The importance of the
question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it
radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin,
the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural
child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased
spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of
Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and
Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar,
Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr.,
and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the
ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at
the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City.
During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells
were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire.
Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people
inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape.
The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the
entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to
abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not
convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the
latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor,
Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they
came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a
Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat
on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets.
Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed,
trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela
Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco
Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed
there about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they
were forced to leave the shelter be- cause the shelling tore it
open. They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San
Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who
fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his
daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70;
his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years
older than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and
Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony
of Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived the
holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that,
"as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and
insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be applied.
The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus
stated:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot
be established by proof of the death of only one of the parties;
but that there must be adequate proof that one was alive when
the other had already died. Now in this case before us, the
testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the
German Club in the company of his father and the witness, and
that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after the
shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence,
direct or circumstantial, from which we may infer the condition
of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable interval
from the instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to
the Club, until he died. All we can glean from the evidence is
that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape
from the German Club; but she could have died almost
immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might have
been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling
beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or
fatally struck by splinters from the exploding shells. We cannot
say for certain. No evidence is available on the point. All we
can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her
aside, and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this
circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died
latter than her son, and we are thus compelled to fall back
upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be said that
the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be
precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these. Hence
the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have
survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above
60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise
disposes of the question whether she and her deceased children
perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence to the
contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the deaths, which is
identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of Manila.
A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in
the same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same
calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death
can ( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. During
the same battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages,
fire, or drowning. It is clear that the law disregards episodic
details, and treats the battle as an overall cause of death in
applying the presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the
members of the Navarro-Joaquin family met their end is as
follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and
Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the son
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no
doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether
section 334(37) of Act No. 129, now section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of
the Rules of Court, has repealed article 33 of the civil code of
1889, now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is the contention
of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that
there is total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then
Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article
33, be held to have died at the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open
for the consideration when obsolute necessity there for arises.
We say irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the two
provisions is applicable for the reasons to be presently set forth.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck,
battle or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first,
36
and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can
be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities
resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes, according to
the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the
two or more persons who would inherent one from the other,
the persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the
allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that
they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from
one to the other shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended
as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be available when
there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of
Rule 123, "the situation which it present is one in which the
facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis,
there is no specific evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it
is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the
facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law
of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that
arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of
Appeals cited the applied with the respect to the deaths of the
Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken from the
Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said:
When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from
which it can be inferred" that one died before the other it means
that there are circumstances from which the fact of death by
one before the other may be inferred as a relation conclusion
from the facts proven. The statue does not mean circumstances
which would shown, or which would tend to show, probably
that one died before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs.
Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial
evidence alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to
the statutory presumption, the circumstances by which it is
sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are
competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of
evidence in civil cases. The inference of survivorship cannot rest
upon mere surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was said in
Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to probably,
then the statue of the presumption."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123
and of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of the
survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect,
circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made,
the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from which
reasonable inference of survivorship between Angela Joaquin
and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony
competent and sufficient for this purpose? For a better
appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and necessary to
detail the testimony, which was described by the trial court as
"disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as
"entitled to credence."
Lopez testified:
Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the
German Club with Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We
were out 15 meters away from the building but I could see what
was going on.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between
the two events, that is the shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and
the collapse of the German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I could not say
exactly, Occasions like that, you know, you are confused.
Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of
fifteen minutes? — A. Possible, but not probable.
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40
minutes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin
die? — A. Well, a few minutes after we have dashed out, the
German Club, which was burning, collapsed over them,
including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give
positive evidence to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion and
Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not
give the same positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin
also died? — A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her
actually die, but when the building collapsed over her I saw and
I am positive and I did not see her come out of that building so I
presumed she died there.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr.
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the
latter's wife? — A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the
Club and they were shooting people outside, so we thought of
running away rather than be roasted.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German
Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad,
were already wounded? — A. to my knowledge, yes.
Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground
near the entrance, because most of the people who were shot by
the Japanese were those who were trying to escape, and as far
as I can remember they were among those killed.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese
a few minutes before you left the place? — A. That is what I
think, because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the
people inside especially those trying to escape.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you
mean? A — . There were many people shot because they were
trying to escape.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside
the building, can you explain that? — A. They were trying to
escape probably.
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts
quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between
Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the
statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the
light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable
inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son
can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility is
entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational
deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around.
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while
running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still
in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in
five seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the
time he dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from the
clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that
the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along.
She could have perished within those five or fewer seconds, as
stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
True, people in the building were also killed but these,
according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip
away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very
likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to
escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband
and son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun
fire.
37
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she
was may well give an idea, at the same time, of a condition of
relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband,
son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove
that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from
staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr.
Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred
about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the
head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed
Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval
between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the
edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five
seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela
Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the
collapse of the building, by which Mrs. Navarro could have been
killed. All these are speculative , and the probabilities, in the
light of the known facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese
sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the
only remaining living members of her family, she could not have
kept away form protective walls. Besides, the building had been
set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity
for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those
who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely
to have been killed by falling beams because the building was
made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was
sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death;
certainly not within the brief space of five seconds between her
son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not
conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the
inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein
provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from
which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be
certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of
inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is
never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding
of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing
Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs.
Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California
courts have said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which
it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are
competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of
evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.) "Juries
must often reason," says one author, "according
to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue
existed from collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly
tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such cases
is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts.
How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the
primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts,
Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was
justified in drawing the inference that the person who was
caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was
the person who fired a shot about an hour before at the same
animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight, but
rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave
greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case
at hand.
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro
died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations,
or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. the
opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son — is
deduced from established facts which, weighed by common
experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability.
Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which
civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not
be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice
Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the
game laws it was suggested that the gun with which the
defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the bird
might have died in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on
Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
the appellant impugns, and which has been discussed, involves
findings of fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not, in
our judgment, well considered. The particular circumstances
from which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew
conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the
case, the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions
raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran
Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857,
"Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is
another. An incredible witness does not cease to be such
because he is not impeached or contradicted. But when the
evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not
questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed
thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an agreement of
facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the
issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the
question is one of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court."
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of
the statutory presumption is to be invoked is a question of
law.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on
questions of evidence refers to decisions supported by
substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant real
evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable men
may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the
general rule.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review,
and hold that the distribution of the decedents' estates
should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial
court. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the
question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the
hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded
that of her son. Without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista
Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as
soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member. (35a)
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the
preceding article are governed by the laws creating or
recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general
application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code concerning
partnerships. (36 and 37a)
Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property
of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or
criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization. (38a)
Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and
other entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2
of Article 44, their property and other assets shall be
disposed of in pursuance of law or the charter creating
them. If nothing has been specified on this point, the property
and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes for the
benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which during
the existence of the institution derived the principal benefits
from the same. (39a)
Notes:
38
Juridical Persons- is a being of legal existence, susceptible of
right and obligations or of being subject of juridical relations.
Political Subdivisions- provinces, municipalities and barangay.
Corporations- is an artificial being created by operations of law,
having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and
properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its
existence.
Public Corporations- formed and organized for the government
of a portion of the state.Purpose – general good and welfare
Partnership- two or more person binds themselves to contribute
money property or industry to a common fund with the
intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
The law merely recognized the existence of sole proprietorship
as a form of business organization hence does not possess
juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality
of the owner
SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), v JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD
40 PHIL 136
Facts:
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands. A majority
of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a
motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine
Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was
brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of
transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the
Islands. Application (Certificate of Philippine Regitry) was made
at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of
Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector
refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all
the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not
citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands under Act No. 2761 which provides:
SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon
registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than
fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be
issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen
tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine
register shall be optional with the owner.
SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. — No
application for a certificate of Philippine register shall be
approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an
inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be
engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership
as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and
seventy-two of this Code.
Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co.,
Ltd., the equal protection of the laws because it, in effect,
prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because
classification of corporations based on the citizenship of
one or more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act
No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its properly without due
process of law because by the passage of the law company was
automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership
in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not
use.
Issue: Whether the legislature through Act no. 2761 can deny
registry of vessel with foreign stockholders.
Ruling: Yes. We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell &
Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to
the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal
protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights,
nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in
denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the
right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does
not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which
must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized
exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and
so does not offend against the constitutional provision.
The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first
paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their
application to all person within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality.
The word "person" includes aliens. Private corporations,
likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so
far as their property is concerned. Classification with the end
in view of providing diversity of treatment may be made
among corporations, but must be based upon some
reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection.
A literal application of general principles to the facts before us
would, of course, cause the inevitable deduction that Act No.
2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a
corporation, some of whole members are foreigners, of the equal
protection of the laws.
To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits
corporations or companies to obtain a certificate of Philippine
registry only on condition that they be composed wholly of
citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or both,
as not infringing Philippine Organic Law, it must be done under
some one of the exceptions.
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and
far reaching in influence is, broad and comprehensive as it is,
nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the
power of the State, sometimes termed its `police power,' to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people, and legislate so as to
increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and
add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of
society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in
view, must often be had in certain districts. This is the same
police power which the United States Supreme Court say
"extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the
state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its
people." For quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the
Philippine Organic Law could could have had the effect of
denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting
through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power,
in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine
Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping act.
The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage
Philippine ship-building.
Rev Barlin held that the church and its adjuncts were a
property of the Roman Catholic Church, while Padre Ramirez
held that the town of Lagonoy was the owner of the property.
The court held that the church was a property of the Roman
Catholic Church. There was a law that states that all church
buildings were made by the Spanish government and
representatives in the Philippines using government and
private local funds, but the Spanish government implemented
this to the effect that the churches and its income were
dedicated for the propagation of the faith. Hence, its
properties were beyond the commerce of man. Priests held
them in the concept of guardians or stewards.
The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of
the Philippines to the United States, churches and other
consecrated objects were considered outside of the commerce of
man. They were not public property, nor could they be subjects
of private property in the sense that any private person could
the owner thereof. They constituted a kind of property
distinctive characteristic of which was that it was devoted to the
worship of God
Furthermore, the municipality cannot show evidence of title,
right of ownership or possession.
On the contention that the Roman Catholic Church no longer
had legal and juridical personality in the islands, since the
latter half of the third century, and more particularly since the
year 313, when Constantine, by the edict of Milan, inaugurated
an era of protection for the church, the latter gradually entered
upon the exercise of such rights as were required for the
acquisition, preservation, and transmission of property the
same as any other juridical entity under the laws of the Empire.
(atv) (recommended reading, very interesting case ;)

Doctrine: As a person, a corporations is entitled to the

protection afforded by the due process of law and equal
protection of the laws clause in the PH Bill of Rights.

A very old case that happened in 1906, in the pueblo of

Lagonoy, province of Ambos Camarines. The Roman Catholic
Church which had been razed to the ground in 1869 was
reconstructed, from government funds and from “voluntary”
labor of the townspeople, upon orders of the town officials, also
based on general laws and guidelines of the Spanish
government. Reconstruction was completed in 1873, and until
1902 a Roman Catholic priest administered this church, until it
came under the care of P Vicente Ramirez.
In November 1902, a successor to Ramirez was appointed but
he refused to turn over the church, convent and other
properties. This was the point in history when Spain ceded
authority to the United States and all its property together with
it. Many Filipino clergy rebelled against the Roman Catholic
Church whom they said refused to recognize and grant the
rights of the Filipino priests. This Filipino priests joined
together and formed the United Filipino Church, who, though
not recognizing the Roman Catholic Church, nonetheless
continued to hold office and ceremonies in the Roman Catholic
tradition, on the condition that unless the Roman Catholic
Church recognized them, they will hold on to their church
properties and refuse to turn them over.
For reason, REV. JORGE BARLIN, in his capacity as apostolic
administrator of this vacant bishopric and legal representative
of the general interests of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
in the diocese of Nueva Caceres came to file a case against P.
VICENTE RAMIREZ, ex-rector of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Parochial Church of Lagonoy and the Municipality of Lagonoy.
39
RESTRICTION ON CAPACITY TO ACT
General Rule: Presumption of capacity
Case Digest on Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas (Capacity to Act)
Facts:
The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, including the
appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted as surety to the
loan. The CFI of Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly
and severally to the plaintiffs SOCNY. While the judgment was
in the course of execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente
appeared and alleged that her husband was declared insane on
July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was authorized by the
court as guardian to institute the proper legal proceedings for
the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a
state of insanity.
Issues:
(1)Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth
necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does not
have capacity to act.
(2) Whether or not the appellant, was incapable of entering into
contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15,
1908.
Held:
The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanueva
possessed the capacity to act. The SC held that there is no
evidence to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a
person suffering from monomania of wealth is really insane and
therefore is deranged and incapable of binding himself in a
contract. From the testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente
has the liberty to go wherever he wished, that he had property
of his own and was not deprived of its management, as well as
the fact that he had never squandered any large sum of money.
As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that showed that
at the date of the giving of the bond, December 15, 1908, the
appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity. The
witnesses who as physicians, testified that they observed insane
periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908, but
none at the time of the execution of the said bond on December
15, 1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to
legally deprive her husband management over his estate
knowing full well that he was insane.
Restriction on Capacity to Act
rt. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a
deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the
latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. (32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or
limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code,
other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to
act is not limited on account of religious belief or political
opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is
qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by
law. (n)
MINORITY
AGE OF MAJORITY RA 6809- Lowering the age of majority
from 21 to 18 years.
Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of
majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the
age of eighteen years."
40
FAMILY CODE ART 5.
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning,
whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public
policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)
SECTION 1 ART. V 1987 CONSTI
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not
know how to write. (1263a)
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable,
even though there may have been no damage to the contracting
parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving
consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable,
unless they are ratified:
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a
contract.
Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be
instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or
subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege
the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can
those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or
employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these
flaws of the contract. (1302a)
Art. 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the
incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not
obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has been
benefited by the thing or price received by him. (1304)
Art. 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to
obligate themselves, may enter into a contract of sale, saving
the modifications contained in the following articles.
Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or
other person without capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable
price therefor. Necessaries are those referred to in Article 290.
(1457a)
Art. 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one
years of age who has entered into a contract without the
consent of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of the
contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received,
notwithstanding the fact the he has not been benefited thereby,
there is no right to demand the thing or price thus returned.
Art. 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one
years of age, who has entered into a contract without the
consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of
money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the
obligation, there shall be no right to recover the same from the
obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith. (1160A)
Mercado and Mercado VS. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215
FACTS:
The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father
of Jose Espiritu, the defendant) and the heirs of his sister
Margarita Mercado; Domingo and Josepha Mercado, who
pretended to be of legal age to give their consent into the
contract of sale of the land they inherited from their deceased
mother Margarita Mercado (sister of Luis Mercado). The siblings
Domingo et. al., sought for the annulment of contract asserting
that Domingo and Josepha were minors during the perfection of
contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors
presented themselves that they were of legal age.
HELD:
The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if
it were made and entered into by minors, who pretended to be
of legal age. The court stated that they will not be permitted to
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them, or to have them annulled.
The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on law on
estoppel and Rule 123, Section 6 paragraph A which states that
“whenever a party has, by its own declaration, act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another party to believe a
particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, cannot
be permitted to falsify it.
xxx [T]he sale of real estate, effected by minors who have alread
y passed the ages ofpuberty & adolescence & are near the adult
age, when they pretend to have already reached theirmajority,
while in fact they have not, is valid, & they cannot be permitted
afterwards to excusethemselves fr. compliance w/ the obligatio
n assumed by them or seek their annulment. Thisdoctrine is e
ntirely in accord w/ the provisions of our law on estoppel. (Mer
cado vs. Espiritu, 37Phil. 215.But there is authority to the effec
t that misrepresentation of an incapacitated person doesnot bin
d him.
"xxx Misrepresentation made by a party as to his age does not
estop him fr. denying thathe was of age or fr. asserting that he
was under age, at the time he entered into the contract, forthe
breach of w/c an action is brought. Under the principle of
estoppel, the liab. resulting fr.misrepresentation has its
juridical source in the capacity of the person making
themisrepresentation to bind himself. If the person making
the misrepresentation cannot bind himself
by contract, he cannot also be bound by any misrepresentation
he may have made inconnection therew/. A person entering in
to a contract must see to it that the other party has
sufficient capacity to bind himself." (Young vs. Tecson, 39 OG
953.)
BAMBALAN v MARAMBA
FACTS:
Bambalan’s parents Paula Prado and her first husband, Isidro
Bambalan Y Calcotura received a loan from Genoveva Muerong
and German Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died leaving
Bambalan as the sole heir of his estate. In 1922, Muerong and
Maramba forced Bambalan, who was at that time, a minor, to
41
sell their land as payment for the loan. Bambalan signed, but
said that he was forced because they were threatening his
mother with imprisonment. Muerong and Maramba bought
Bambalan’s first cedula to acknowledge the document.
ISSUE:
Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid.
RATIO:
The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at
the time of execution. The Doctrine laid down in the case of
Mercado vs. Espiritu is not applicable to this case, because the
plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew
him as a minor.
Important Statutes:
Civil Code, Article 38.
Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the
capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person
from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts
or from property relations, such as easements.
Civil code, Art. 1327.
The following cannot give consent to a contract:
1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not
know how to write. (1263a)
Civil code, Art. 1390.
The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though
there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent
to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal
liability. — the following are exempt from criminal liability:
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he
has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be
proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80
of this Code.
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are
mitigating circumstances;
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over
seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.
CHAPTER III
Youthful Offenders
Article 189. Youthful Offender Defined. - A youthful offender is
one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense.
A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability and shall be committed
to the care of his or her father or mother, or nearest relative or
family friend in the discretion of the court and subject to its
supervision. The same shall be done for a child over nine years
and under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense, unless he acted with discernment, in which case
he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article 192.
The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be
deemed modified by the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 190. Physical and Mental Examination. - It shall be the
duty of the law-enforcement agency concerned to take the
youthful offender, immediately after his apprehension, to the
proper medical or health officer for a thorough physical and
mental examination. Whenever treatment for any physical or
mental defect is indicated, steps shall be immediately
undertaken to provide the same.
The examination and treatment papers shall form part of the
record of the case of the youthful offender.
Article 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or
Trial. - A youthful offender held for physical and mental
examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail,
shall from the time of his arrest be committed to the care of the
Department of Social Welfare or the local rehabilitation center
or a detention home in the province or city which shall be
responsible for his appearance in court whenever required:
Provided, That in the absence of any such center or agency
within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the
provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for
youthful offenders separate from other detainees. The court
may, in its discretion, upon recommendation of the Department
of Social Welfare or other agency or agencies authorized by the
Court, release a youthful offender on recognizance, to the
custody of his parents or other suitable person who shall be
responsible for his appearance whenever required.
Article 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of
Youthful Offender. - If after hearing the evidence in the proper
proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender
has committed the acts charged against him the court shall
determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability
chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing
judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further
proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or
care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training
institution operated by the government, or duly licensed
agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have
reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the
court may deem proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the
agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been
committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and
supervision by a representative of the Department of Social
Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as the
Court may designate subject to such conditions as it may
prescribe.
Article 193. Appeal. - The youthful offender whose sentence is
suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the same
manner as appeals in criminal cases.
Article 194. Care and Maintenance of Youthful Offender. - The
expenses for the care and maintenance of the youthful offender
whose sentence has been suspended shall be borne by his
parents or those persons liable to support him: Provided, That
in case his parents or those persons liable to support him can
not pay all or part of said expenses, the municipality in which
the offense was committed shall pay one-third of said expenses
or part thereof; the province to which the municipality belongs
shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne
by the National Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-
thirds of said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay
said expenses, part of the internal revenue allotments
applicable to the unpaid portion shall be withheld and applied
to the settlement of said indebtedness.
All city and provincial governments must exert efforts for the
immediate establishment of local detention homes for youthful
offenders.
Article 195. Report on Conduct of Child. - The Department of
Social Welfare or its representative or duly licensed agency or
42
individual under whose care the youthful offender has been
committed shall submit to the court every four months or
oftener as may be required in special cases, a written report on
the conduct of said youthful offender as well as the intellectual,
physical, moral, social and emotional progress made by him.
Article 196. Dismissal of the Case. - If it is shown to the
satisfaction of the court that the youthful offender whose
sentence has been suspended, has behaved properly and has
shown his capability to be a useful member of the community,
even before reaching the age of majority, upon recommendation
of the Department of Social Welfare, it shall dismiss the case
and order his final discharge.
Article 197. Return of the Youth Offender to Court. - Whenever
the youthful offender has been found incorrigible or has wilfully
failed to comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation
programs, or should his continued stay in the training
institution be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the
committing court for the pronouncement of judgment.
When the youthful offender has reached the age of twenty-one
while in commitment, the court shall determine whether to
dismiss the case in accordance with the next preceding article
or to pronounce the judgment of conviction.
In any case covered by this article, the youthful offender shall
be credited in the service of his sentence with the full time spent
in actual commitment and detention effected under the
provisions of this Chapter.
Article 198. Effect of Release of Child Based on Good Conduct. -
The final release of a child pursuant to the provisions of this
Chapter shall not obliterate his civil liability for damages. Such
release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of
execution for the recovery of civil damages.
Article 199. Living Quarters for Youthful Offenders Sentence. -
When a judgment of conviction is pronounced in accordance
with the provisions of Article 197, and at the time of said
pronouncement the youthful offender is still under twenty-one,
he shall be committed to the proper penal institution to serve
the remaining period of his sentence: Provided, That penal
institutions shall provide youthful offenders with separate
quarters and, as far as practicable, group them according to
appropriate age levels or other criteria as will insure their
speedy rehabilitation: Provided, further, That the Bureau of
Prisons shall maintain agricultural and forestry camps where
youthful offenders may serve their sentence in lieu of
confinement in regular penitentiaries.
Article 200. Records of Proceedings. - Where a youthful
offender has been charged before any city or provincial fiscal or
before any municipal judge and the charges have been ordered
dropped, all the records of the case shall be destroyed
immediately thereafter.
Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court
acquits him, or dismisses the case or commits him to an
institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to this
Chapter, all the records of his case shall be destroyed
immediately after such acquittal, dismissal or release, unless
civil liability has also been imposed in the criminal action, in
which case such records shall be destroyed after satisfaction of
such civil liability. The youthful offender concerned shall not be
held under any provision of law, to be guilty of perjury or of
concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his failure to
acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in
response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose.
"Records" within the meaning of this article shall include those
which may be in the files of the National Bureau of Investigation
and with any police department, or any other government
agency which may have been involved in the case.
Article 201. Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. - The civil
liability for acts committed by a youthful offender shall devolve
upon the offender's father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, upon the mother, or in case of her death or
incapacity, upon the guardian. Civil liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the
youthful offender.
Article 202. Rehabilitation Centers. - The Department of Social
Welfare shall establish regional rehabilitation centers for
youthful offenders. The local government and other non-
governmental entities shall collaborate and contribute their
support for the establishment and maintenance of these
facilities.
Article 203. Detention Homes. - The Department of Local
Government and Community Development shall establish
detention homes in cities and provinces distinct and separate
from jails pending the disposition of cases of juvenile offenders.
Article 204. Liability of Parents or Guardian or Any Person in
the Commission of Delinquent Acts by Their Children or Wards. -
A person whether the parent or guardian of the child or not,
who knowingly or wilfully,
1. Aids, causes, abets or connives with the commission by a
child of a delinquency, or
2. Does any act producing, promoting, or contributing to a
child's being or becoming a juvenile delinquent, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or both
such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.
file the proper petition with the Court of First Instance which
ordered the commitment.
Section 5. Assistance of fiscal in the proceeding. — It shall be
the duty of the provincial fiscal or in the City of Manila the fiscal
of the city, to prepare the petition for the Director of Health and
represent him in court in all proceedings arising under the
provisions of this rule.
DEAF-MUTISM
Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not
know how to write. (1263a)
Art. 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must
personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall
designate two persons to read it and communicate to him, in
some practicable manner, the contents thereof. (n)

INSANITY Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen
EFFECT ON MARRIAGE years or more, and not bind, deaf or dumb, and able to read
and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following in Article 805 of this Code. (n)
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party PRODIGALITY
after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
RULE 92 GUARDIANSHIP
Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not Section 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." — Under this rule,
know how to write. (1263a) the word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty
Art. 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals,
valid. Contracts agreed to in a state of drunkenness or during a deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are
hypnotic spell are voidable. (n) of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age,
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without
liability. — the following are exempt from criminal liability: outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property,
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
during a lucid interval.
CIVIL INTERDICTION
RULE 101
Art. 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive
Proceedings for Hospitalization of Insane Persons
the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of
Section 1. Venue, Petition for commitment. — A petition for the
parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or
commitment of a person to a hospital or other place for the
property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to
insane may be filed with the Court of First Instance of the
manage his property and of the right to dispose of such
province where the person alleged to be insane is found. The
property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
petition shall be filed by the Director of Health in all cases
where, in his opinion, such commitment is for the public
Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their
welfare, or for the welfare of said person who, in his judgment,
accessory penalties. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua
is insane and such person or the one having charge of him is
and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
opposed to his being taken to a hospital or other place for the
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the
insane.
case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
Section 2. Order for hearing. — If the petition filed is sufficient
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the
in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
purpose of the petition, shall fix a date for the hearing thereof,
remitted in the pardon.
and copy of such order shall be served on the person alleged to
be insane, and to the one having charge him, or on such of his
FAMILY RELATION
relatives residing in the province or city as the judge may deem
Art. 50. Family relations include those:
proper. The court shall furthermore order the sheriff to produce
(1) Between husband and wife;
the alleged insane person, if possible, on the date of the
(2) Between parents and children;
hearing.
(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-
Section 3. Hearing and judgment. — Upon satisfactory proof, in
blood. (217a)
open court on the date fixed in the order, that the commitment
applied for is for the public welfare or for the welfare of the
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct
insane person, and that his relatives are unable for any reason
or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be
to take proper custody and care of him, the court shall order his
void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each
commitment to such hospital or other place for the insane as
other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition
may be recommended by the Director of Health. The court shall
shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife
make proper provisions for the custody of property or money
without a valid marriage. (133a)
belonging to the insane until a guardian be properly appointed.
Section 4. Discharge of insane. — When, in the opinion of the
ABSENCE
Director of Health, the person ordered to be committed to a
Title XIV. - ABSENCE
hospital or other place for the insane is temporarily or
CHAPTER 1
permanently cured, or may be released without danger he may
43
PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN CASE OF ABSENCE
Art. 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his
whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to
administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an
interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to
represent him in all that may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when under similar
circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has
expired. (181a)
Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article
having been made, the judge shall take the necessary measures
to safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee and shall
specify the powers, obligations and remuneration of his
representative, regulating them, according to the
circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians. (182)
Art. 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse
present shall be preferred when there is no legal separation.
If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a
minor, any competent person may be appointed by the
court. (183a)
CHAPTER 2
DECLARATION OF ABSENCE
Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the
absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in
case the absentee has left a person in charge of the
administration of his property, his absence may be
declared. (184)
Art. 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic
copy of the same;
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;
(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some
right subordinated to the condition of his death. (185)
Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect
until six months after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. (186a)
CHAPTER 3
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE ABSENTEE
Art. 387. An administrator of the absentee's property shall be
appointed in accordance with Article 383. (187a)
Art. 388. The wife who is appointed as an administratrix of the
husband's property cannot alienate or encumber the husband's
property, or that of the conjugal partnership, without judicial
authority. (188a)
Art. 389. The administration shall cease in any of the following
cases:
(1) When the absentee appears personally or by means of an
agent;
(2) When the death of the absentee is proved and his testate or
intestate heirs appear;
(3) When a third person appears, showing by a proper
document that he has acquired the absentee's property by
purchase or other title.
In these cases the administrator shall cease in the performance
of his office, and the property shall be at the disposal of those
who may have a right thereto. (190)
CHAPTER 4
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of
five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened. (n)
44
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and
has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years. (n)
Art. 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his
existence is proved, he shall recover his property in the
condition in which it may be found, and the price of any
property that may have been alienated or the property acquired
therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents. (194)
INSOLVENCY TRUSTEESHIP
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through
the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who
may be under his guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have
been entrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has
been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate
under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of
any subdivision thereof, or of any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of
which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to
judges and government experts who, in any manner
whatsoever, take part in the sale;
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected
with the administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law. (1459a)
Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:
(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the
wards whom they represent suffer lesion by more than one-
fourth of the value of the things which are the object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the
latter suffer the lesion stated in the preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter
cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them;
(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been
entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and
approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority;
(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to
rescission. (1291a)
DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE  SC: There is no evidence to prove that the petitioner
JURIDICAL PERSON- temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte to
NCC Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any pursue any calling, profession or business. COMELEC
other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the relied on provisions of the Family Code.
same shall be understood to be the place where their legal ISSUE:
representation is established or where they exercise their Who is the rightful governor of the province of Leyte?
principal functions. (41a)
 1. Petitioner Adelina Larrazabal who obtained the
highest number of votes (declared winner but
NATURAL PERSON
subsequently disqualified by COMELEC)
Art. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their  2. Petitioner Benjamin Abella (2nd highest but not
habitual residence. (40a) proclaimed as gov after disqualification of Larrazabal)
 3. Leopoldo E. Petilla, Vice Gov of Leyte.
Art. 68. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the HELD:
marriage to furnish to either of the contracting parties one of  Article X of the Constitution is explicit that aside from
the three copies of the marriage contract referred to in Article highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose
55, and to send another copy of the document not later than charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
fifteen days after the marriage took place to the local civil elective officials are independent of the province.
registrar concerned, whose duty it shall be to issue the proper
receipt to any person sending a marriage contract solemnized  connotes 2 prohibitions. One, from running for, and
by him, including marriages of an exceptional character. The the second, for voting for any provincial elective
official, priest, or minister solemnizing the marriage shall retain official.
the third copy of the marriage contract, the marriage license  Resolution of COMELEC AFFIRMED. TRO issued
and the affidavit of the interested party regarding the against it was lifted. Costs against petitioners.
solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those  With regard to Abella, Larrazabal was voted for,
mentioned in Article 57 if there be any such affidavit, in the files and election proceeded. Net effect was that Abella
that he must keep. (16a) lost, and repudiated by the electorate.
 In the Firvaldo (governorship of Sorsogon) and
Art. 69. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare Labo(mayor in Baguio) cases, this is exactly the reason
the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to why the candidates obtaining second highest number
all interested parties without any charge in both cases. of votes were not allowed to assume the positions.
Abella vs COMELEC Records of this Office show that publication of "The Family Code
of the Philippines" in the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of
FACTS: general circulation, was completed on August 4, 1987.
Petition for certiorari challenging the resolutions of respondent Accordingly, "The Family Code of the Philippines" should have
COMELEC. taken effect as of August 3, 1988 (People vs. Ramos, No. L-
 Silvestre de la Cruz filed a petition for disqualification 25265, May 9, 1978), instead of on August 5, 1988, as was
against Larrazabal for alleged false statements in COC inadvertently declared in a Certification dated October 7, 1988.
regarding her residence.
 TRO was issued by SC against Larrazabal from being
proclaimed governor in the event that she obtains the
winning margin of votes. (Since COMELEC was not yet
fully constituted that time)
 Abella filed objections to COMELEC charging
Larrazabal with falsification and misrepresentation in
her residency.
 COMELEC lifted TRO upon motion of Larrazabal.
 Feb 14, 1991, Comelec 2nd Division, disqualified
L. (Held: Affirmed)
 July 18, 1991, Comelec en banc denied L’s petition
declaring decision void. – STILL DISQUALIFIED. (Held:
Affirmed)
 COMELEC, in the same decision disallowed Abella’s
proclamation as governor.
 Hence, the petitions.
 August 1, 1991 On petition by Larrazabal for the
issuance of TRO to COMELEC, SC: CEASE AND
DESIST from enforcing decision. (Held: Lifted,
disqualification enforced)
 Vice Gov took oath as governor thru COMELEC
resolution, Court further resolved that Petilla (Vice
Gov) should DESIST from assuming position.
 Position of petitioners against L: respondent is neither
a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as
she claimed, but a resident of Ormoc City, a
component city but independent of the province.
 L: she is a resident of Kananga, Leyte. She had intent
to return (animus revertendi) to Kananga even if she
physically transferred to Ormoc.

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