Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997

LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive

Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and
VICTORIA DE GUZMAN,respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action

for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative
forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section
68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?

Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.

The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent
Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao,
Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products
found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of
the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the
truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required
explanation. On June 22, 1989,1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained
petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section
68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents
filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director
Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.2 Subsequently, the
case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents'
statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be
denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary."3 Pending resolution
however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private
respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan4 with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private
respondents.6Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the
trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated
December 28, 1989.7 Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition
for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the
trial court's order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question.8 Hence, this present
petition,9 with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993.
By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993,10 the prayer for the issuance of temporary
restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court
could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure
proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents,
on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case
falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated
because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful
on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the
truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.

Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we
are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's
judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause
of action.11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal
for lack of cause of
action.12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal
reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for
a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons
of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate
that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an
ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when
there is a violation of due process,13 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,14 (3) when
the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,15 (4) when
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,16 (5) when there is irreparable
injury,17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,18 (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable,19 (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim,20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,21 (10) when the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.22

In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of
DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,23 private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an
administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The
letter, reads, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter
should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary.24

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review
and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate
and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they
cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's
intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an
administrative proceedings.

Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and
the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the
replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of
the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court
to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.25 In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary,26 which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS
vs. Vasquez,27 this Court held:

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems
caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A
long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training
of such agencies.

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the
pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted
cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not
but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there
was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of
petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean
or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.28 One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral
argument, through pleadings.29 In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense.30 Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration,31 as in
the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their
side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in
an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan, In Navarro III vs. Damasco,32 we ruled that
:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of
notice or hearing.

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck
because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts
under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances
used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section
68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:

Sec. 68. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipments,implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the
area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not
only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include "conveyances" that
can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private
respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and
inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below:

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized

Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Emphasis
ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating
the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad
enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is
that it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." In
the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected
in the statute.33 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or
mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.34 In this wise, the observation of the
Solicitor General is significant, thus:
 But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more responsive to present
situations and realities" and in view of the "urgency to conserve the remaining
resources of the country," that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This
amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from
criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the
inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions.
The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most
revealing:

"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest

resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and

protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our
forestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from

technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize

certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities;"

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to
confiscate, not only "conveyances," but forest products as well. On the other
hand, confiscation of forest products by the "court" in a criminal action has long been
provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation
cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section
68-A would have no Purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have
provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.35

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners
themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck
of private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was
given to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part, viz.:

. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission
of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and
in no case could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .36

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously
misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated
that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the
commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner
thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate
the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach
of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners
pointed out:
 . . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further amended by
Executive Order No. 277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance
used in the transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents.
She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in
question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is
therefor liable. . .37

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under
Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order
that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act
constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D.
705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the
aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license.
— Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands,
or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license
or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 68, P.D. 705 before
its amendment by E.O. 277)

Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended

to read as follows:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest

products without license. — Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall bepunished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section
68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of
cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a
distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated
the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there
is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.38

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings
in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of
cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should
have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the
case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies
in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and
more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant to be
waylaid by the lower court.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the
defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.39 "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in
custody,"40 and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling
with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or
right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.41 Under the Rules of Court, it is
indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is
entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant,
alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized
under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual
value of the property.42 Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful
detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized
by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the
DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of
P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the
Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the
petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful
detention exists in the case at bar.

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of
confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705,
as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to
review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:

Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to
review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty
(30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to
the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The
Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through
a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED;
the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the
Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39537 March 19, 1985

IRENE REYES (alias IRENE RAMERO, alias IRENE DELGADO), MOISES VILLANUEVA and
GENOVEVA RAMERO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PLACIDA DELGADO, DOMINGO DELGADO, PAULA DELGADO and
MAXIMINA DELGADO, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the of the Court of Appeals Special Division of Five dated
October 7, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. L-44964-R, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas Branch I, dated December 26, 1969 in Civil Case No. 1144 dismissing the action for
reconveyance.

On January 29, 1967, private respondents as plaintiffs a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas praying that the defendant Irene Reyes, alias Irene Ramero or Irene Delgado, be ordered
to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado, and
Paula Delgado over four parcels of land located in Tayabas, Quezon, and one parcel of land located
in Pagbilao, Quezon, and another deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiff Maximina Delgado over
three parcels of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas.

It was alleged in the complaint that the defendants thru abuse of confidence, fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and other falsifications succeed in registering in the offices of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon and Batangas a document of self-adjudication (Exhibit "24"), wherein defendant
Irene Delgado alleged that she was the sole child of the deceased Francisco Delgado and entitled to
inherit the parcels of lands described in the complaint; that as a result thereof Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 were cancelled and new Transfer Certificates of
Title were issued in the name of Irene Delgado; that defendant Irene Delgado is not the illegitimate
daughter of Francisco Delgado, who died without issue, but is the legitimate daughter of Genoveva
Ramero and Justino Reyes; that plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado and Paula Delgado,
sisters and brother of the deceased Francisco Delgado are the heirs entitled to inherit from
Francisco Delgado; and that Paula, Placido and Domingo Delgado defrayed the expenses of the last
illness and the funeral expenses of Francisco Delgado and for the purpose they borrowed the sum of
P 7,000.00 from their niece, plaintiff Maximina Delgado, and to pay Maximina Delgado they
conveyed to her the three parcels of land described in subparagraphs (f) to (g) of paragraph 9 of the
complaint. They also alleged that the defendant spouses Irene and Moises Villanueva borrowed
from plaintiffs common fund the sum of P23,000.00 which they used in the purchase of a parcel of
land (pp. 1-14, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).

On or about March 2, 1967, defendant Irene Delgado, one of the petitioners herein, filed an answer
to the complaint and set up the affirmative defense that she is the illegitimate daughter of the
defendant Genoveva Ramero and the deceased Francisco Delgado; that for several years preceding
the birth of Irene Delgado, her mother Genoveva Ramero had separated from her lawful husband
Justino Reyes and never reconciled since then; and that Irene was born during the cohabitation of
Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero as common law husband and wife, and since her birth,
lived with Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero, who reared and treated her as their child,
maintaining her and sending her through college. Defendants also denied having contracted a debt
of P 23,000.00 from plaintiffs, or that plaintiffs spent for the last illness and funeral of Francisco
Delgado. Irene Delgado likewise set up a counterclaim, alleging that, as the illegitimate daughter of
Francisco Delgado, she has the right to represent her father to the inheritance left by her
grandmother (pp. 15-43, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).

On March 16, 1967, the plaintiffs thru counsel filed an answer to the counterclaim denying that the
defendant Irene Delgado was the illegitimate child of Francisco Delgado, and hence has no right to
claim from the estate of Francisco's mother, Benigna Castillo, and that the properties claimed by the
defendant Irene Delgado no longer formed part of the estate of Benigna Castillo as she had
previously disposed of them during her lifetime (pp. 43-46, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).

On August 15, 1967, a pre-trial in Civil Case No. 1144 was conducted.

On March 25, 1969, the plaintiffs filed a motion to admit an amended answer to the counterclaim
posed by defendant, wherein the plaintiffs alleged that the counterclaim of the defendant, in so far as
it would have the effect of being an indirect action for acknowledgment, has already prescribed (pp.
50-55, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).

On April 14, 1969, the lower court admitted the amended answer to the counterclaim over the
objections of the defendant (pp. 56-61, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).

After trial on the merits, the Court rendered its decision on December 26, 1969 dismissing the action
for reconveyance and declaring defendant Irene Delgado the lawful owner of the eight parcels of
land. The counterclaim of Irene Delgado was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (now IAC), the plaintiffs with respect to their complaint
and the defendants with respect to their counterclaim.

The then Court of Appeals sitting as a Special Division of Five rendered its decision on October 7,
1974, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Wherefore, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed. The deed of self-
adjudication executed by Irene Delgado is hereby declared null and void and set
aside. The transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Irene Delgado in lieu of
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 are hereby
cancelled, and T.C.T. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 are reinstated in the
name of Francisco Delgado. Likewise, the extrajudicial declaration executed by Irene
Delgado adjudicating to herself the 3 parcels of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas,
with Tax Declaration Nos. 8625, 8626 and 8627 are declared null and void. No costs
(pp. 58-59, rec.).

The then Court of Appeals in arriving at this decision found that, although Irene Delgado was the
spurious daughter of Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot inherit from the estate of the
deceased Francisco Delgado because she was not recognized either voluntarily or by court action
(pp. 52-53, rec.).
The titles to the questioned lot however cannot be executed in favor of the plaintiffs; because in so
doing it will be in effect a recognition by the court that the plaintiffs are the only heirs of Francisco
Delgado to the prejudice of other possible heirs or creditors of the deceased.

As to alleged loan contracted by Irene from the plaintiffs, the then Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision that it was without merit, because if it were true, the plaintiffs could have
demanded a receipt for such a big amount.

The counterclaim of Irene that she has the share to the inheritance of Benigna Castillo, Francisco
Delgado's mother, and her alleged share in the expenses for the sickness and funeral of Francisco
Delgado which was advanced by the plaintiffs, need not be ruled upon because of the findings that
Irene is not an heir of Francisco Delgado (pp. 57-58, rec.).

On December 2, 1974, defendants, petitioners herein, filed a petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals (pp. 2237, rec.).

On January 2, 1975, the plaintiffs, respondents herein, submitted their comment on the petition for
review filed by the petitioner (pp. 67-71, rec.).

On January 15, 1975, the petition for review filed by petitioners was denied in a resolution by the
First Division of the Supreme Court for lack of merit (p. 75, rec.).

On February 18, 1975, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 86-113, rec.).

On April 5, 1975, respondents filed their comments on the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners (pp. 130-134, rec.).

On April 23, 1975, petitioners filed their reply to respondents' comment (pp. 118-125, rec.).

On May 23, 1975, the Supreme Court reconsidered its resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration (p. 142, rec.).

In their petition, petitioners sought to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals raising the
following arguments:

1. There are strong and cogent reasons why this Honorable Court must return to and
even enhance the doctrine in Zuzuarregui vs. Zuzuarregui, considering serious flaws
in the reasoning of the currently prevailing doctrine, so that as arguendo and pro hac
vice that Irene was not duly recognized or acknowledged as illegitimate child, she is
nevertheless entitled to successional rights as sole heir of the late Francisco
Delgado, considering that her filiation as illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado
is undisputed and beyond question (p. 12, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.).

2. Upon the other hand, this time assuming arguendo and pro hac vice that under the
Civil Code recognition of an 'other illegitimate' is a pre-requisite to enjoyment of
rights, Irene Delgado was legally acknowledged by her father Francisco Delgado,
specially by his consent or advice to her marriage with Moises Villanueva contrary to
the erroneous conclusions of the Court of Appeals (P. 39, Petitioner's Brief, p. 164,
rec.).

The petition is without merit.

The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit must be first recognized
voluntarily or by court action is well settled in Our jurisprudence. (Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53
[1984]; Divinagracia vs. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307 [1976]; Clemeña vs. Clemeña, 24 SCRA 720 [1968];
Noble vs. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104 [1966]; Republic vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 13
SCRA 272 [1969]; Paulino vs. Paulino, 3 SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles vs. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522
[1960]).

There is no reason to overturn this doctrine and revert to what was enunciated in the case
of Zuzuarregui vs. Zuzuarregui (103 Phil. 346 [1958]); as suggested by herein petitioners in their first
assignment of errors.

It is the contention of the petitioners that the silence of the Civil Code as to the recognition of
illegitimate children other than natural, in contrast to natural children who are expressly required to
be recognized in order to inherit, only meant that illegitimate children need not be recognized in
order to inherit from his or her alleged parent (p. 13, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.). Petitioners also
raised the argument that under Article 287 of the New Civil Code which reads: "Illegitimate children
other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are
entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in this, code." The term "other
illegitimate children" refers not only to those who are not natural or merely adulterous or incestuous
but also includes natural children who were not acknowledged or recognized (p. 18, Petitioner's
Brief; p. 164, rec.). In other words, unrecognized natural children can inherit not the share of a
natural child but the share of a spurious child so long as his filiation shall be duly proved. So, in
effect, illegitimate children need only to prove his filiation to inherit and such does not place him in a
more advantageous position than natural children, as they are placed in the same situation.

WE do not find these arguments persuasive.

Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to spurious children as to their recognition, this Court, in
applying the rules of recognition, applicable to natural children, to said spurious children, declared
in Clemeña vs. Clemeña, supra, that:

The considerations of fairness and justice that underlie the time limit fixed in Article
285 of the Civil Code for actions seeking compulsory acknowledgment of natural
children are fully applicable, if not more, to actions to investigate and declare the
paternity of illegitimate children that are not natural. The motive that led the codifiers
to restrict the period for bringing action for compulsory recognition of natural children
were stated by this Court in Serrano vs. Aragon, 22 Phil. 18, to be as follows:

... the writers of the code no doubt had in mind that there would arise instances
where certain illegitimate children, on account of the strong temptation due to the
large estates left by deceased persons, would attempt to establish that they were
natural children of such persons in order to get part of the property, and furthermore,
they considered that it is nothing but just and right that alleged parents should have a
personal opportunity to be heard. It was for these reasons and others equally as well
founded that Article 137 was enacted (p. 724).

There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born
out of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the incestuous,
adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at
the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other
(Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children are those born of parents, who at
the time of their conception, are disqualified to marry each other on account of certain impediment.
Because of this basic distinction between these children, it is not legally possible to classify
unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children. Besides, commentators construe
the phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as excluding from the grants of rights under
Article 287 of the New Civil Code those children who are natural child proper by birth and who have
not secured voluntary or compulsory recognition (p. 276, An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and
R.C. Puno, Vol. 1). They fag within the scope of the definition of natural children enumerated in
Article 269, New Civil Code (p. 142, Civil Law Reviewer, D. Jurado, 1982 ed.). Lastly, to follow
petitioners' contention win not be in accordance with the consistent pronouncements of this Court. It
is an elementary and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural
child has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation
itself, but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural parent (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479
[1967]; Mise vs. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes vs. CA, 95 Phil. 797 [1954]; Candles vs.
Ugarte, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda vs. Malonda, 81 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5
Phil. 1 [1905]).

As to the second assignment of error raised by petitioners, We find that there was no sufficient legal
recognition of petitioner Irene Delgado by Francisco Delgado.

It can be seen from the record of birth (Exhibit "L-2") that the name of the petitioner was Irene
Ramero, and signed by Genoveva Ramero and of an unknown father. This was certified to by the
treasurer of the municipality of Alitagtag Batangas (Exhibits "L" and "L-1 "). Another certified copy of
another birth certificate issued by the municipal treasurer and local civil registrar of the municipality
of Alitagtag (Exhibit "20") stated therein that the name of the child is Irene Ramero, and the name of
the father is "Francisco" and the mother "Genoveva Ramero." Any of these records of birth cannot
be sufficient recognition under the law. The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition, must be
signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she
may be penalized (Sec. 5, Act 3753; Madredejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]); and if the alleged
father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or
registrar, is incompetent evidence of paternity of said child (Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984];
Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050 [1958]). Since any of the certificates of birth
presented were not signed by Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to prove
recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public
instrument. (Pareja vs. Pareja, 95 Phil. 167[1954]).

Irene's certificate of baptism (Exhibit "1") cannot be taken as proof of recognition (Bercilles vs.
GSIS, supra;People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968];
Vudaurrazaga vs. CA, 91 Phil. 492 [1952]; Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]). In the case of
Macadangdang vs. CA [100 SCRA 73 [1980]), this Court said that while baptismal certificates may
be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations
made therein with respect to his kinsfolk.

Irene's secondary student permanent record (Exhibits "12", "13", "15" and "16") nor the written
consent given by Irene to the operation of her alleged father (Exhibit "4") cannot be taken as an
authentic writing. An authentic writing does not have to be a public instrument; it is sufficient that it is
genuine and not a forgery. It must generally be signed by the alleged parent (Madredejo vs. De
Leon, supra) unless the whole instrument is in the handwriting of the alleged parent and the facts
mentioned therein correspond to actual and real facts (Varela vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248 [1954]).
Thus, Irene's secondary student permanent record and her written consent to the operation of her
father, not being signed nor written in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado, cannot be taken as an
authentic writing to prove her recognition by her alleged father.
The marriage contract (Exhibit "17") of Irene Delgado and Moises Villanueva, wherein it was stated
that Francisco Delgado gave his consent or advice for Irene Delgado to marry, and that he was her
father cannot be also taken as recognition in an authentic document because it was not signed nor
in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado It cannot also be taken as recognition in a public instrument
as held in the case of Lim vs. CA, (65 SCRA 161, 164 [1975]) wherein the Court said.

According to Article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, Public documents 'are those
authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities
required by law.' Thus, 'there are two classes of public documents, those executed
by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by
competent public officials by reason of their office.' "The public document pointed out
in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the
first class.

The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of
solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a
written act with the intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due
form before a notary and certified by him. The marriage contract is a mere
declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband
and wife, signed by signature or mark by said contracting parties and the said
witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage
contract does not possess the requisites of a public document of recognition...

The family pictures (Exhibits "11" to "11-E") presented by Irene, showing Irene posing with Francisco
Delgado, cannot be a sufficient proof of recognition. In the case of Bercilles vs. GSIS, supra, it was
held that pictures do not constitute proof of filiation.

What Irene may have proved is that she had been in continuous possession of a status of an
illegitimate child who is not natural. But such fact alone without a valid recognition in a record of
birth, will statement before a court of record, or authentic writing does not make Irene a recognized
illegitimate child who is not natural. She nevertheless possesses the right to compel judicial
recognition and the action for this must be brought within the proper prescriptive period (Clemeña vs.
Clemeña, supra). Article 285 of the New Civil Code provides "that the action for the. recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except when the
father or mother dies during the minority of the child, the action shall be brought within four years
from the age of majority, or if after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear
of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child, the action
shag be brought within four years from the finding of the document." Since Irene was already of age
(35 years old) when her alleged father died, and she had not presented any discovered document
wherein her presumed father recognized her, the action to compel recognition is already barred
(Canales vs. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]).

WE affirm the findings of the then Court of Appeals that Irene Reyes alias Irene Delgado is not an
heir of the late Francisco Delgado.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE THEN COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN

TOTO, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS.

Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The spouses Justino Reyes and Genoveva Rameo, natives of Tayabas town, were
married there in 1906. They had seven children. An eighth child, named Irene, was born to
Genoveva, either on May 5, 1930 in Tayabas town, or on September 1, 1931 in Barrio Dalipit
Alitagtag, Batangas. Of course, the presumption under article 255 of the Civil Code is that Irene was
Justino's child. Was that presumption rebutted?

Joaquin Reyes, Irene's elder brother, testified that his parents, the Reyes spouses, separated in
1928 when his father surprised Francisco Delgado in his house. On that occasion, there was a
commotion in the house which was investigated by the police. Justino eventually decided to allow
Genoveva to go with Francisco. That testimony is sufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. It
shows that Irene was not Justino's child. Was Delgado her father?

Her birth certificate shows that she was born on September 1, 1931 as the child of Genoveva at
Barrio Dalipit Alitagtag, Batangas with an unknown (desconocido) father (Exh. L-2 or 22).

Since 1928, Genoveva lived with Francisco Delgado and was never reconciled to Justino who died
in 1935. Irene was educated at their expense.

Justino was not mentioned as the father of Irene in her record of birth. Among the eight children of
Genoveva, Irene's birth was the only one registered in Alitagtag Francisco's native town. Irene had
always lived with Genoveva and Francisco up to 1951, when she was 19 and she got married.

She was baptized in 1949, when she was 18. Francisco and Genoveva were listed as her parents in
the baptismal certificate, Exhibit 1. In the certificate of marriage of Irene and Moises Villanueva,
Francisco Delgado was mentioned as her father and as the one who gave consent to the marriage
(Exh. 17).

Irene consented to the operation of Francisco when he was submitted to an operation at the Family
Clinic in 1966 (Exh. 2). She paid his hospital bills (Exh. 4). She used the surname "Delgado" in her
school records and Francisco Delgado was indicated therein as her guardian (Exh. 12 to 16).

Francisco died intestate on October 28, 1966. On November 25, 1966 Irene adjudicated to herself
the lands left by Francisco (Exh. H or 9). On January 30, 1967, the brother, two sisters and a niece
of Francisco Delgado sued her for the annulment of said adjudication. They sought a declaration that
they are the nearest legal heirs of Francisco.

Judge Lorenzo Relova ruled that Irene's filiation was duly proven. The Appellate Court disagreed
because she was not duly acknowledged within the meaning of articles 278 and 283 of the Civil
Code. It held that the evidence submitted by her does not amount to voluntary and compulsory
recognition required of natural children.
In my opinion the rule requiring voluntary or compulsory recognition for the so-called spurious
children or bastards is not mandatory. Article 289 of the Civil Code does not make such recognition
mandatory.

Irene's status as an heir is governed by the Civil Code pursuant to its article 2264. To enjoy
successional rights, she has to prove her filiation as required in article 887 of the Civil Code.

To prove filiation, the rules on acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious
children. But there may be cases, where the filiation of an illegitimate child, other than natural, has
been duly proven and such proof does not satisfy the requirements of recognition under articles 278
and 283.

In such exceptional cases, article 278 and 283 should not be applied. If sufficient proof to satisfy the
judicial mind has been adduced to prove the spurious child's filiation, he or she should be entitled to
successional rights. This is justified by the liberal policy of the Civil Code towards illegitimate
children.

The natural child needs acknowledgment because he may become a legitimated child. The spurious
child will never attain the status of a legitimated child.

I agree with Judge Lorenzo Relova that Irene's filiation as Francisco Delgado's child was duly proven
within the meaning of article 887. She is the nearest compulsory and legal heir of Francisco. She
excludes the brother, two sisters and niece of Francisco (Art. 988, Civil Code).

I vote to reverse the decision of the Appellate Court and affirm the decision of Judge Relova.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The spouses Justino Reyes and Genoveva Rameo, natives of Tayabas town, were
married there in 1906. They had seven children. An eighth child, named Irene, was born to
Genoveva, either on May 5, 1930 in Tayabas town, or on September 1, 1931 in Barrio Dalipit
Alitagtag, Batangas. Of course, the presumption under article 255 of the Civil Code is that Irene was
Justino's child. Was that presumption rebutted?

Joaquin Reyes, Irene's elder brother, testified that his parents, the Reyes spouses, separated in
1928 when his father surprised Francisco Delgado in his house. On that occasion, there was a
commotion in the house which was investigated by the police. Justino eventually decided to allow
Genoveva to go with Francisco. That testimony is sufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. It
shows that Irene was not Justino's child. Was Delgado her father?

Her birth certificate shows that she was born on September 1, 1931 as the child of Genoveva at
Barrio Dalipit Alitagtag, Batangas with an unknown (desconocido) father (Exh. L-2 or 22).

Since 1928, Genoveva lived with Francisco Delgado and was never reconciled to Justino who died
in 1935. Irene was educated at their expense.
Justino was not mentioned as the father of Irene in her record of birth. Among the eight children of
Genoveva, Irene's birth was the only one registered in Alitagtag Francisco's native town. Irene had
always lived with Genoveva and Francisco up to 1951, when she was 19 and she got married.

She was baptized in 1949, when she was 18. Francisco and Genoveva were listed as her parents in
the baptismal certificate, Exhibit 1. In the certificate of marriage of Irene and Moises Villanueva,
Francisco Delgado was mentioned as her father and as the one who gave consent to the marriage
(Exh. 17).

Irene consented to the operation of Francisco when he was submitted to an operation at the Family
Clinic in 1966 (Exh. 2). She paid his hospital bills (Exh. 4). She used the surname "Delgado" in her
school records and Francisco Delgado was indicated therein as her guardian (Exh. 12 to 16).

Francisco died intestate on October 28, 1966. On November 25, 1966 Irene adjudicated to herself
the lands left by Francisco (Exh. H or 9). On January 30, 1967, the brother, two sisters and a niece
of Francisco Delgado sued her for the annulment of said adjudication. They sought a declaration that
they are the nearest legal heirs of Francisco.

Judge Lorenzo Relova ruled that Irene's filiation was duly proven. The Appellate Court disagreed
because she was not duly acknowledged within the meaning of articles 278 and 283 of the Civil
Code. It held that the evidence submitted by her does not amount to voluntary and compulsory
recognition required of natural children.

In my opinion the rule requiring voluntary or compulsory recognition for the so-called spurious
children or bastards is not mandatory. Article 289 of the Civil Code does not make such recognition
mandatory.

Irene's status as an heir is governed by the Civil Code pursuant to its article 2264. To enjoy
successional rights, she has to prove her filiation as required in article 887 of the Civil Code.

To prove filiation, the rules on acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious
children. But there may be cases, where the filiation of an illegitimate child, other than natural, has
been duly proven and such proof does not satisfy the requirements of recognition under articles 278
and 283.

In such exceptional cases, article 278 and 283 should not be applied. If sufficient proof to satisfy the
judicial mind has been adduced to prove the spurious child's filiation, he or she should be entitled to
successional rights. This is justified by the liberal policy of the Civil Code towards illegitimate
children.

The natural child needs acknowledgment because he may become a legitimated child. The spurious
child will never attain the status of a legitimated child.

I agree with Judge Lorenzo Relova that Irene's filiation as Francisco Delgado's child was duly proven
within the meaning of article 887. She is the nearest compulsory and legal heir of Francisco. She
excludes the brother, two sisters and niece of Francisco (Art. 988, Civil Code).

I vote to reverse the decision of the Appellate Court and affirm the decision of Judge Relova.