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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDINO GAFFUD, JR., accused-appellant.
PUNO, C.J.:
For review before this Court is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00060 finding the accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. guilty of the complex crime of double murder and
sentencing him to death, affirming with modification the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated August
28, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 1125. IaTSED
The facts of this case were aptly summarized by the CA as follows:
Records show that accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr., along with two John Does were
indicted for Double Murder for the killing of Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador, under the
following Information:
"The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. and two (2)
JOHN DOES of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
'That on or about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of May 10, 1994 at Sitio Biton, Barangay Wasid,
Municipality of Nagtipunan, Province of Quirino, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and motivated by long standing
grudge, after conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of fire, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, shot and burn Manuel Salvador and Analyn
Salvador which caused their instantaneous death.'
CONTRARY TO LAW." (p. 15, Records)
It appears that Manuel Salvador and his daughter Analyn Salvador were killed when the house they were
staying in located at Sitio Biton, Barangay Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino was burned down while they were
inside. An eyewitness pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. as one of the arsonists.
Upon preliminary investigation, where appellant Gaffud, Jr. failed to appear despite being subpoenaed to
submit his counter-affidavit, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ferdinand Orias resolved that charges for
double murder by means of fire be filed against herein appellant and two John Does, (p. 14, Records).
When arraigned on June 6, 1995, accused-appellant Gaffud, Jr. entered a plea of Not Guilty, (p. 48, Records),
paving the way for his trial. ETIcHa
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses against appellant Gaffud, Jr., namely Dominga Salvador,
common-law wife of Manuel Salvador and mother of Analyn Salvador, Orly Salvador, nephew of Manuel
Salvador, Potado Ballang, Barangay Captain of Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino, Dan Dangpal, a neighbor of the
deceased, SPO2 Dominador Tabal, the investigating police, and Dr. Teodomiro Hufana who conducted the
autopsy on the deceased Manuel Salvador.
Evidence for the prosecution tended to prove that on the night of May 10, 1994, Orly Salvador was on his way
to the house of his uncle Manuel Salvador to fetch the latter as they were going to attend a wedding at the
nearby barangay hall. He suddenly heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he saw the house of his uncle burning.
Because of the glow emanating therefrom, he saw three persons within the vicinity of the burning house. He
saw them hurriedly leaving the place towards the direction of the Cagayan river. One of the three was
holding a flashlight, whom he identified as appellant Gaffud, Jr. He could not identify the two other persons.
After the house was burned, Orly went towards the barangay hall to see if his uncle Manuel Salvador was
there, but he met Barangay Captain Potado Ballang who informed him that his uncle was not at the barangay
hall. They then proceeded to the burned house, and found the charred remains of Manuel Salvador and
Analyn Salvador. (TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 3-8)
Barangay Captain Potado Ballang testified that he saw appellant Gaffud, Jr. on the fateful day at around 6:30
PM, along the riverbank, a few meters away from the house of Manuel Salvador. When Potado asked what he
was doing there, Gaffud, Jr. said he was looking for his boat. However, Potado knew that the appellant did
not own a boat. After a few minutes, Potado left to attend the wedding party being held at the barangay hall.
(TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 2-5)
Dan Dangpal's testimony was dispensed with, but the defense agreed to the nature of the testimony he would
have given, which tended to show that sometime at about 8:00 PM on the fateful evening, while inside his
house, he heard successive gunshots, and when he went out of his house, he saw the deceased's house
burning about 200 meters away. He heard persons laughing and saw the light of a flashlight and persons
moving away from the burning house. He could not recognize any of them. (TSN, February 24, 1997; Exhibit
"D", p. 8, Records) aEHADT
Dominga Salvador's testimony tended to show that the appellant Gaffud, Jr. was their neighbor. In the
morning of May 10, 1994, she went to the house of the appellant to see him about her husband's share in the
construction of the barangay hall, which was contracted to the appellant. Gaffud, Jr. told her that he would go
to her house that afternoon to introduce his in-law Balbino Bravo to her husband. Thereafter, she went home,
and left again at around 11:00 AM, leaving behind her husband Manuel Salvador and their daughter Analyn.
Later that night, she was at Natipunan, Quirino attending a seminar for "hilot", (TSN, July 4, 1995, pp. 3-15).
In her sinumpaang salaysay, offered in evidence as Exhibit "A", Dominga also related that she had earlier filed a
complaint in the barangay against the appellant and his brother for slaughtering her pig.
SPO2 Dominador Tabal was a police investigator who investigated the killing of Manuel and Analyn
Salvador. Thereat, he saw two dead bodies hanging from a Melina tree. They were put there so that they
would not be reached by the dogs. He saw that one of the victims had a fractured head, while the other had a
wound on the side. Pictures of the victims including the scene of the incident were taken by them. Among
those interviewed the appellant Gaffud, Jr. and his brother, (TSN, June 5, 1997, pp. 2-7).
Dr. Teodomiro Hufana's testimony was also dispensed with, (p. 127, Records) in view of the defense counsel's
admission of the contents of his Autopsy Report on Manuel Salvador, (Exhibit "C"), which reads in pertinent
part:
FINDINGS
— Cremated charcoaled, about 3 ft. long, stomach and intestine (Large) protruding from the abdomen.
— Presence of semi-burned rattan about 1 inch long about 1 cm. in diameter on the burned hand.
— Presence of a peculiar hole from the thoracic cavity directed downward to the body, probably gunshot wound.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
— CREMATION (Burned)
REMARKS: Cannot be identified if male or female
For the appellant's defense, the defense presented the appellant himself. His defense of
alibi was corroborated by his wife Juanita Gaffud and in-law Balbino Bravo. HEDaTA
Appellant denied the accusation leveled against him, and testified that the approximate
time of the burning of the victims' house, he was at home, entertaining his in-laws, Balbino Bravo
and Rufina Bravo, who was there for a visit. After eating dinner, he and Balbino Bravo talked. At
around 7:00 to 8:00 PM, he and Balbino Bravo saw a blaze coming from the other side of the
Cagayan River, about 50 to 80 meters away from the house of the Bravos. They did not mind the
blaze, and instead went to sleep. The next morning, they heard news about somebody being
burned, and because of this, he and Balbino Bravo hiked to the place of the incident. That's where
he found that his "pare" Manuel Salvador and his daughter were burned in their house. After
seeing the dead bodies, appellant went home. He went back later, and was even designated by
the Barangay Captain to guard the bodies of the deceased. Thereafter, he was forced to evacuate
his family from Nagtipunan, because the Ilongot tribe was forcing him to testify against someone
but he didn't want to. He was told that something might happen to his family if he didn't leave,
(TSN, June 3, 2002).
The appellant's defense was corroborated on its material points by the testimony of his
wife, Juanita Gaffud, and his in-law, Balbino Bravo, both of whom testified that on May 10, 1994,
the accused was at his residence entertaining visiting Bravo spouses and stayed there the whole
night, (TSN January 31, 2002 and March 18, 2002).
Juanita Gaffud also testified that during the pendency of the trial, she talked to Dominga
Salvador about the settlement of the case and even offered a certain amount for the said purpose,
(TSN, March 10, 2002, p. 12). 3
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of murder,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. GUILTY for two
(2) counts of murder and hereby sentences him as follows, to wit: DAESTI
a) Death penalty — for the death of Manuel Salvador;
b) Another death penalty — for the death of Analyn Salvador;
c) To pay the legal heirs of the victims:
c-1) SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) for each count or a total of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00) as death indemnities;
c-2) FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for each count or a total of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages;
c-3) TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000) for each count or a total of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages;
c-4) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as nominal damages; and
c-5) Costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
As the death penalty was imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. In his
Appellant's Brief, 5 accused-appellant argued that the RTC erred in: (i) failing to rule and resolve whether or not
conspiracy existed, as the information charged him with conspiracy with two others in the commission of the crime;
and (ii) convicting him despite the fact that conspiracy was not proven, and also despite the fact that there was no
proof whatsoever as to what overt act he committed which would constitute the crime of murder.
The case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition per Resolution 6 of this Court
dated August 24, 2004, in accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo. 7In disposing of the assigned errors, the CA
held that the lack of discussion of conspiracy among accused-appellant and his anonymous co-accused in the decision
of the RTC was not antithetic to his conviction for the crime of murder, since the charge that he was a principal
performer in the killing of the victims was spelled out in the Information 8 filed against him. 9Moreover, in the
absence of conspiracy, each of the malefactors is liable only for the act committed by him. 10 As to the sufficiency of
the evidence presented by the prosecution, the CA held that the circumstantial evidence in this case established
accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 11 Accordingly, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding
accused-appellant guilty of the complex crime of double murder, with the following modifications: HcaDIA
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED, although the
decision of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED, in that: The accused Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. is
hereby found GUILTY of the complex crime of double murder, and is hereby sentenced to the
supreme penalty of Death. He is also ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victims: (1) P100,000.00
or P50,000.00 for each victim, as civil indemnity for the death of the victims; (2) P100,000.00 or
P50,000.00 for each victim, as moral damages; and (3) P10,000.00 as nominal damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED. 12
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28,
2004, the case was elevated to this Court for review.
On the first assigned error, we concur with the CA that the failure to prove conspiracy in this case is not fatal.
The rule is that in the absence of evidence showing the direct participation of the accused in the commission
of the crime, conspiracy must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order to convict the accused. 13 In
the case at bar, however, we hold that the direct participation of accused-appellant in the killing of the victims,
Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador, was established beyond doubt by the evidence of the prosecution. Hence, a
finding of conspiracy in this instance is not essential for the conviction of accused-appellant.
On the second assigned error, we uphold the finding of both courts a quo that the evidence proffered by the
prosecution, although circumstantial in nature, leads to the conclusion that accused-appellant is the perpetrator of
the act resulting in the death of the victims.
It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one
circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 14
In this case, the following facts or circumstances were proven:
(i) Accused-appellant was near the place of the incident just a few minutes before the crime was
committed. Captain Potado Bollang testified that he saw the accused-appellant at the
riverbank, about 100 meters from the house of the victims, coming to and fro, allegedly
looking for his boat, when in fact, Captain Bollang knew that accused-appellant did not
own one. 15 EAIcCS
(ii) Accused-appellant, together with two unidentified persons, was near the house of the victims
at the time it was on fire. Accused-appellant was identified by Orly Salvador as one of the
three men he saw about 5 meters from the house of his uncle, Manuel Salvador, while it
was burning. Previously, he heard two gunshots as he was on his way towards the said
house. He also saw appellant fleeing with the other malefactors, while holding a
flashlight. 16 His testimony was corroborated by the admitted testimony of Dan Dangpal
who said that he heard two gunshots while he was at his home, which was near that of the
victims. When he went out, he also heard men laughing, and saw them fleeing from the
burning house, illumined by a flashlight. 17
(iii) Accused-appellant was in a hurry to leave the place of the incident without giving any help
to his kumpare Manuel Salvador and the latter's daughter, Analyn. Orly Salvador testified
that he saw accused-appellant holding a flashlight, in a hurry to leave the burning house of
the victim, going towards the direction of the river. 18
(iv) Accused-appellant had a motive to kill the victims because of the complaint filed by Manuel
Salvador's wife, Dominga Salvador, and the fact that he owed Manuel Salvador some
money. Dominga Salvador testified that she had filed a complaint against accused-
appellant and his brother in their barangay for their act of slaughtering her pig. Aside from
this, in the morning of the same fateful day, she went to the house of accused-appellant
aiming to collect her husband's share in the profits for the construction of the barangay hall
they had built, but the accused-appellant only told her that he and his in-law would see her
husband later that day. 19
These circumstances, when taken together, are enough to produce the conclusion that accused-appellant
was responsible for the killing of the victims by means of burning them inside their house. CIAHaT
Moreover, we sustain the following observation of the CA that against the convincing evidence of the
prosecution, accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi must fail:
The Court finds incredible appellant's story that after seeing the blaze across his house, he
merely slept with his in-laws without investigating. The Court finds it against human nature for
one to sleep soundly during a fire occurring just 50-80 meters from one's house, even though the
blaze is occurring across a river. Also, appellant must know, after seeing the location of the blaze,
that the house of his "pare", or close friend, was in danger, and his natural reaction at least was to
verify the object of the conflagration. Appellant's story that he only slept soundly after seeing the
blaze is therefore unbelievable, and taints the credibility of his alibi.
Another telling factor on the appellant's defense is his flight. Appellant admitted that in
his testimony that he fled Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino after he was investigated at the Municipal
Hall, (TSN, June 3, 2002, p. 19). Appellant said he fled because of threats from the Ilongots.
However, appellant said it never entered his mind to report the threats on him. Appellant's
explanation fails to convince. It bears stressing that appellant fled right after being investigated
and questioned by police authorities, and during the time that the preliminary investigation of
the case was ongoing. This is highly suspicious, as such time is the best time for him to defend his
innocence, if he is indeed innocent. As it is, appellant was arrested in San Vicente, Jones, Isabela, a
remote barangay by the elements of the NBI, (Id., at 23; reverse of p. 19, Records). Flight is
consistently held as and indication of guilt, (People v. Magaro, 291 SCRA 601 [1998]). There is no
showing why such conclusion should not be made in this case. 20
We now go to whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2) separate counts of
murder or for the complex crime of double murder.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, reads:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. TacSAE
In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime
in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the
commission of a complex crime. 21
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. 22
The classic example of the first of kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons.
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine
that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 23
In the landmark case People v. Guillen, 24 the Court held that the single act of throwing a grenade at
President Roxas resulting in the death of another person and injuring four others produced the complex crime of
murder and multiple attempted murders. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed when a person is
killed by means of explosion. Applying Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty for the crime committed is death, the
maximum penalty for murder, which is the graver offense. ASEIDH
More recently, in People v. Carpo et al., 25 we held that the single act of hurling a grenade into the
bedroom of the victims causing the death of three persons and injuries to one person constituted the complex
crime of multiple murder and attempted murder. Also, in People v. Comadre, 26 we held:
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows
the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of
the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single
criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by different
acts and several criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a
cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be
considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the
offender was impelled by a "single criminal impulse" which shows his lesser degree of perversity.
In light of these precedents, we hold that the single act of accused-appellant — burning the house of
Manuel Salvador, with the main objective of killing the latter and his daughter, Analyn Salvador, resulting in
their deaths — resulted in the complex crime of double murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is
committed by means of fire. Since the maximum penalty imposed for murder was death, when the case was
pending in the CA, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of death for the complex crime of double murder
instead of the two death penalties imposed by the RTC for two counts of murder. In view, however, of the
passage of Republic Act No. 9346 (otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines"), we reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. 27
Anent the award of damages, we increase the award of civil indemnity by the CA for the death of the
victims from P100,000 or P50,000 for each victim, to P150,000 or P75,000 for each victim in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence. 28 CHDAaS
As to the deletion of exemplary damages by the CA, we reinstate the award by the RTC of exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000, or P25,000 for each victim.
By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is
especially sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the
crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from capture. 29 In this case, the RTC correctly appreciated nighttime
as aggravating considering that nighttime was especially sought by accused-appellant to carry out his evil plan.
Evidence shows that accused-appellant waited for nighttime to consummate his plan. It should be noted that
accused-appellant was seen lurking near the house of the victims earlier in the evening. The fact that he brought
with him a flashlight clearly shows that he intended to commit the crime in darkness.
We sustain the award by the CA of moral damages in the amount of P100,000, or P50,000 for each victim,
in view of the grief and sorrow suffered by the heirs of the victims. We likewise affirm the award of nominal
damages in the amount of P10,000 for the value of the burned house as sufficiently explained by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM the March 31, 2005 decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00060 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2) the civil indemnity for the death of the victims is increased to P150,000, or P75,000 for each victim; and
(3) accused-appellant is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000, or P25,000 for each
victim. DTEAHI
SO ORDERED.
Case of appellant Moreno. — He relied on an alibi the details of which his counsel did not bother to discuss in his brief. He
testified that when the ambuscade was perpetrated, or in the evening of January 21, 1970, he was in the house of his sweetheart,
Maria Milan, at Barrio Dakit, Pinamungajan Maria Milan, Juan Dejito and Casiano Flores corroboratedMoreno's alibi. Dejito
and Flores are the brothers-in-law of appellant Nemenzo, who in turn is a first cousin of the brothers, appellants Rodrigo and
Elpidio Baricuatro.
However, Romula Gleocam, the mother of Maria Milan, who lived with her, contradicted her and testified
that Moreno called at their house at around nine o'clock in the evening of that day or after the ambuscade had been
perpetrated. Maria Portes corroborated Romula's testimony.
It may be recalled that Mrs. Cerna, Barrientos and Candida Comahig testified that, after the gunfire had ceased, they
heard the sound of the engine of a vehicle. They imagined that it was an oncoming truck. Actually, it was leaving the
scene of the crime. That sound came from that part of the highway near the schoolhouse or near Moreno's house at
Barrio Tutay (69 tsn, Exh. 2-Moreno).
At around eight-thirty of that night, as Jose Kyamko, the brother-in-law of Mrs. Cerna, was crossing the highway, a
jeep without any light passed by him. It came from Barrio Tutay and was driven to the poblacion. Kyamko
recognized it as the passenger jeepney which Leon Moreno, the father of Vedasto, had converted into a private
vehicle. When the jeep passed Kyamko, he noticed that it was driven by Moreno. Beside him was Rodrigo Baricuatro.
(See p. 37, Records of Crim. Case No. 95-Cebu.)
As already stated, according to Romula Gleocam, at around nine o'clock on that same night, Moreno, riding in a jeep,
went to the house of her daughter, Maria Milan, at barrio Dakit, which was near the poblacion (Exh. T). Romula
noticed that Moreno spoke in a quavering voice and that he looked untidy and ill-kempt. On prior occasions, he had a
well-groomed appearance. After talking with Maria for about an hour, Moreno (Vidi) departed in his jeep. llcd
Shortly thereafter, Romula heard again the drone of the jeep. Moreno called and asked Rufina Milan (Romula's sister)
that he be allowed to pass the night in her house because no one was allowed to pass Barrio Tutay. On that
night Moreno slept at Rufina's house. When Moreno was already inside the house, Romula heard a man's voice
outside callingMoreno and saying: "Boss, he is already dead". Moreno did not make any reply.
On the following morning, Moreno requested Luz, a daughter of Romula, to buy bread in the market and to listen to
the rumors being spread around. After Luz had returned, she told Moreno that some persons in the street corner were
saying that Moreno had killed Mayor Cerna. While Romula was preparing breakfast, she observed that Moreno was
always looking out of the window. After taking breakfast, he left the house together with Maria Milan.
They rode in the jeep. They passed by the store of Maria Portes where Moreno bought cigarettes. When she handed
the cigarettes to him, she noticed that he looked pale and that his hands were trembling. In fact, he dropped the
cigarettes on the ground. She asked Moreno what was wrong with him. He answered that he was being implicated in
the killing of Mayor Cerna. She said that if he had not done anything wrong, he had no reason to be afraid.
Moreno testified that after bringing Maria Milan to the high school, he went to his residence at Barrio Tutay and took
his lunch there. Then, he went to Barrio Pandacan and supervised the gathering of the coconuts, the cutting of the
bamboos and the plowing of the family lands. He went to the house of his aunt and passed the night there.
On the following day, January 23, his uncle, Francisco Gabante, arrived from San Carlos City. He went with his uncle
to Trozo, San Carlos City, arriving there by boat in the early morning of January 24, 1970. He visited his aunt, Victoria
Gabon. On the following day, January 25, he went to Bais City to visit his uncle, Felix Moreno. Then, the next day, he
went to the residence of a lawyer at Dumaguete City in order to seek legal advice.
On January 28, 1970, he was arrested in that city by three Constabulary sergeants of the Cebu City Constabulary
detachment. Moreno went to the Constabulary headquarters at Dumaguete City and slept there (Exh. 3-Moreno). He
and the Constabulary sergeants took a boat on the following day and arrived at Cebu City on January 30 (Exh. 5-
Moreno).
Maria Portes declared that after Moreno was arrested, he went to see her and requested her to testify that she saw him
at the house of Rufina Milan at six o'clock in the evening of January 21, 1970. He offered her money. She refused to
testify in his favor.
We are convinced that Moreno's complicity in the perpetration of the ambuscade was proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the testimonies of Mrs. Cerna and the driver, De los Reyes, and the declaration of Mayor Cerna to his wife,
the chief of police and Barrientos. The motive for the killing was sufficiently established. Moreno felt aggrieved by
Mayor Cerna's issuance of the warrant for his arrest and by his incarceration and posting of four bail bonds which
entailed the payment of a substantial amount as premiums.
Moreno's alibi, instead of showing his innocence, served to confirm ms guilt because, if he had no participation in the
ambuscade, there was no reason for him to sleep in his sweetheart's house, three kilometers away from his residence
in Barrio Tutay where the ambuscade was committed. His flight to San Carlos City clearly signified that he had guilty
conscience.
Case of Rodrigo Bancuatro. — This appellant was 44 years old when he testified in 1972. He was a Constabulary
sergeant connected with the reserve officers training corps (ROTC) unit of the University of the Visayas at Cebu City,
with training and experience in perpetrating ambuscades. He testified that in the afternoon of January 21, 1970, he
was given by his commandant a three day pass so that he could go to Pinamungajan and transfer to a new residence
on the lot of his parents. He arrived at Pinamungajan at past five o'clock. He and his wife took supper at six o'clock.
Then he allegedly went to the house of Tonying Batitay to play mahjong. He was accompanied by appellant Umbay,
his brother-in-law.
He stayed at Batitay's place until nine o'clock when the brothers Eleazar and Jose Peña came with the information that
Mayor Cerna had been ambushed at Barrio Tutay. Rodrigo Baricuatro, accompanied by Umbay and Loreto Quesido,
left Batitay's place, and went home.
Two days later, or on January 23, 1970; Coronel Jose Nazareno, the Constabulary zone commander who was in
Pinamungajan, took him into custody because of the suspicion that the firearms used in the ambuscade might have
come from the armory of the University of the Visayas. Rodrigo was in charge of the armory. LLjur
Upon his arrival at Cebu City, an inventory of the arms at the armory was made. He was later detained at the enlisted
men's quarters and then at the guardhouse after a criminal charge was filed against him. He denied any complicity in
the ambuscade. he refuted Norteza's statements implicating him in the assassination of Mayor Cerna.
However, and this is a decisive point, Antonio Batitay, the owner of the house where Rodrigo Baricuatro and Umbay
allegedly played mahjong from seven o'clock in the evening of January 21, 1970 (the night of the ambuscade), testified
that Rodrigo and Umbay did not play mahjong in his house at that time. They arrived in the mahjong den shortly before
nine o'clock or after the ambuscade was committed. The mahjong game was stopped after nine o'clock when news of
the ambuscade was relayed to the mahjong players (156-7, tsn March 6, 1972).
Batitay's testimony nullified Rodrigo Baricuatro's alibi and cancelled the testimonies of Eleazar Peña, Loreto Quesido,
and Beato Peña, and Sergeant Norberto Alvarado, supporting that alibi. The falsity of his alibi removes any doubt as
to his guilt.
Like Moreno, Rodrigo Baricuatro was identified by the eyewitnesses, Mrs. Cerna and De los Reyes, as being present
at the scene of the crime, and by Mayor Cerna himself in his declaration to them, to Barrientos and to the chief of
police. Rodrigo had reason to surmise to Mayor Cerna instigated the criminal action for grave threats filed against
him. Being a potential candidate of the Liberal Party for mayor in the 1971 election, he could believe that the
elimination of Mayor Cerna would insure his election.
Four prosecution witnesses, namely, Placido Mondejar, Angela Yanong, Lazaro Deroy and Sergio Perito. testified to
certain incidents which reveal that Rodrigo Baricuatro had nursed the design to kill Mayor Cerna before the 1971
elections and had recklessly made an open avowal of that intention. Rodrigo made a blanket denial of that
imputation.
It would seem that before the ambuscade Rodrigo Baricuatro and Moreno had already prepared their alibis. Rodrigo
would be in the mahjong den while Moreno would be in his girl friend's residence. What they did not foresee was
that, immediately after the ambuscade, the finger of suspicion would be pointed at them by their fellow townsmen as
individuals implicated in that iniquitous and dastardly deed.
Thus, Candida Comahig stopped her narrative about the ambuscade when she noticed that Rodrigo was among those
listening to her. And Fiscal Alfredo S. Pancho testified that on the day following the ambuscade a group of around
fifteen persons, some of whom were armed and drunked, stopped the Moreno bus at the public market of Pinamungajan
and wanted to be brought to Sitio Tubod where Rodrigo Baricuatro was residing The group harassed the bus driver and the
conductor, the employees of Vedasto Moreno's family.
That circumstance led Fiscal Pancho, a bus passenger bound for Aloguinsan, to conclude that it was dangerous
for Moreno to remain in Pinamungajan. Because of that incident, the bus could not proceed to Barrio Tutay. It had to
take a roundabout route (via Carcar) to Aloguinsan Fiscal Pancho rejected the offer that Moreno himself would drive
the bus to Aloguinsan by way of Barrio Tutay.
Case of Romeo Baricuatro. — This appellant, the nephew of Rodrigo Baricuatro, was thirty-three years old in 1970. He is
married with five children. He was a student of criminology at the University of the Visayas in Cebu City. He
declared in support of his alibi that in the afternoon of January 20, 1970 his wife came from Pinamungajan to inform
him at his boarding house in Cebu City of the warrant of arrest issued against him in the four criminal cases pending
in the municipal court. She also apprised him that Moreno had already been arrested. He testified that at around
noontime, he took his wife to the bus station for her return trip to Pinamungajan. At the station, he saw Avelino
Norteza who was working as a mason in Cebu City.
Romeo denied Norteza's testimony that he was in Barrio Tutay in the evening of January 21, 1970. Romeo's alibi is
that he was in the house of Atty. Rodolfo Acido in Cebu City at the time when the ambuscade was perpetrated.
Romeo conferred with Atty. Acido whom he had hired as his counsel in the four criminal cases. His landlord, Mario
Saromines, was with him when he conferred with Atty. Acido whom he had hired as his counsel in the four criminal
cases. His landlord, Mario Saromines, was with him when he conferred with Acido. Romeo returned to his boarding
house after nine o'clock in the evening. He was already in the boarding house when the whistle announcing the
curfew for minors was sounded at ten o'clock. LLpr
Romeo explained that Norteza testified against him because he Cerna family had helped Norteza in a certain case and
that Mrs. Cerna implicated him because she hated his uncle, Rodrigo.
Mario Saromines, a thirty-nine year old barber, corroborated Romeo's alibi. But Acido (Moreno's counsel in the
preliminary investigation), whose corroboration would be vital in establishing the truth of Romeo's alibi, did not
testify in court. Hence, Romeo's alibi cannot prevail against the testimonies of Mrs. Cerna and De los Reyes that he
was among those who ambushed Mayor Cerna.
After eluding arrest for more than twenty two months, Romeo was arrested by Sergeant Servando Tio in his house at
Sta. Cruz, Pinamungajan on November 20, 1971.
Cases of Emilio Generalao and Carlos Paslon. — Generalao, a resident of Barrio Tutay, was thirty-eight years old when he
testified in 1912. He reached the first year of high school. His alibi was that from January 6, 1970 to May 3, 1971, or for
about one year and five months, he was doing farm work in Barrio Calibasan, Toledo City which was fifteen
kilometers away from the provincial road at Matab-ang. To go to that place, one had to walk from Matab-ang. The
trip took more than six hours. Generalao stayed with his brother-in-law, Filomeno Cantutay, a resident of Calibasan.
Cantutay corroborated his alibi.
Generalao testified that in May, 1970, his wife went to Calibasan to inform him that he was implicated in the killing of
Mayor Cerna. He returned to Barrio Tutay on May 3, 1971 in order to confer with his brother and his wife regarding
his surrender. He denied that he was with Norteza in Barrio Tutay in the evening of January 21, 1970. His theory was
that Norteza was angry with him because he refused to help Norteza and his brother in gathering the coconuts of
Clemente Yanong.
He was arrested in his father's house on November 25, 1971 by certain Constabularymen named Aldaba, Nebres and
Carding and other whose names he did not know. He said that he was brought to the Constabulary station at
Pinamungajan where he was mauled by the Constabularymen and by Jesus Cerna and Jose Kyamko in the presence
of several persons. Then, he was taken to the Constabulary headquarters at Sibonga where he was again maltreated.
There, he signed an affidavit which he did not read.
The affidavit, Exhibit B-Generalao, was taken by Sergeant Benjamin Solante in the presence of Sergeants Nicanor E.
Bancog and Edmundo Panistante and sworn to before Fiscal Benicio Arzadon who prosecuted this case. Generalao,
on cross examination by Fiscal Arzadon, denied that he signed freely that affidavit.
In that affidavit, Generalao admitted that on January 2, 1970, he killed Juanito Gabonada; that, because of that killing,
he went into hiding at Sitio Calibasan and Barrio Guingkamote, Toledo City, staying with his brother-in-law
Cantutay, his friend Marcelo Tante and his mother's cousin, Felicisimo Maturam; that he returned to his father's
house at Sitio Santa Cruz, Barrio Sacsac, Pinamungajan on May 3, 1971 in order to surrender but he was not able to do
so because he feared that he might be killed, so he just laid low and talked from time to time with Carlos Paslon and
Romeo Baricuatro; that in November, 1971, in the course of an encounter with Constabulary soldiers, he threw away
ms Garand rifle and it was recovered by the Constabularymen, and that his companions in that encounter were
Carlos Paslon and Gavino Layar. (Translation.)
Carlos Paslon, married, with seven children, was thirty six years old in 1972. He finished the fifth grade. His alibi was
that from November, 1969 to February, 1970 he stayed in the house of his elder brother, Doming, in Barrio Lawaan,
Talisay, Cebu. He was working as driver at six pesos a day with the Cebu United Enterprises. Afterwards, he lived in
Duljo, Cebu City where his wife established a dress shop. He left Duljo in April, 1971 and returned to Pinamungajan.
Paslon testified that in the evening of January 21, 1970 he attended a party in the house of Eutiquio Cabuenas in
Barrio Lawaan. According to Paslon, the occasion was a "yearly devotion". According to Cabuenas, it was the
birthday of his wife. Paslon could not remember the birthdays of his children.
Cabuenas corroborated his alibi. However, on cross-examination, Cabuenas declared when he testified on August
26, 1972 that the current month was July. Cabuenas admitted that he was requested by the wife of Carlos Paslon to
testify that Carlos was in the house of Cabuenas in the evening of January 21, 1970. llcd
Carlos Paslon denied the imputation of Norteza that he was in Barrio Tutay on that date. Norteza was angry with him
because he refused to sell a pig to him.
He was arrested on November 24, 1971 in the house of Sabina Intong at Barrio Sambagon, Pinamungajan by certain
Constabularymen named Aldaba, Alpon and Carding who maltreated him. They stopped maltreating him when
Sergeant Nebres told them that according to Mrs. Cerna, Carlos Paslon would be a State witness. He was brought to
Sibonga where he signed an affidavit after having been mauled.
The alibis of Generalao and Carlos Paslon cannot be accorded any credence because they were positively identified by
Mrs. Cerna. And the fact that, like Romeo Baricuatro, they were fugitives from justice for around twenty-two months,
hiding in the mountain barrios of Pinamungajan, conveys the impression that they had a guilty conscience.
Appellants' criminal liability. — As to Mayor Cerna, the offense committed was correctly categorized as the complex
crime of murder with direct assault upon a person in authority (Arts. 48, 148 and 248, Revised Penal Code). The
killing of Mayor Cerna was indisputably treacherous. The ambuscade exhibited the characteristic features
of alevosia (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). Nocturnity is aggravating because the appellants took advantage of the
night for the consummation of their nefarious enterprise.
The killing constituted a direct assault against a person in authority (Art. 152, Revised Penal Code U.S. vs. Gumban,
39 Phil. 76), as charged in the information, because the rule is that the person in authority or his agent should have
been assaulted "while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion on such performance".
At the time Mayor Cerna was ambushed, he was returning from Cebu City where he had transacted official business
with the governor. The impelling motive for the direct assault was Mayor Cerna's performance of his official duty in
conducting the preliminary examination of the four criminal cases against appellants Moreno, Generalao, Romeo
Baricuatro and Carlos Paslon and the issuance of warrants of arrest which resulted in the incarceration of Moreno and
constrained him to pay P1,000 as premiums on his bail bonds. Undoubtedly, that caused resentment. (Justo vs. Court
of Appeals, 99 Phil. 453; U.S. vs. Garcia, 20 Phil. 358).
As the crime is complex, the penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to death for murder, the more serious offense,
should be imposed in the maximum period. Hence, the death penalty should be imposed on the principals. The trial
court correctly imposed the death penalty upon Moreno and Rodrigo Baricuatro, whose guilt as co-principals in the
assassination of Mayor Cerna, was established to a moral certainty.
For lack of the requisite votes, the death penalty cannot be imposed on appellants Generalao, Carlos Paslon and
Romeo Baricuatro. They should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
In this connection, it may be noted that in People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515, where Aureliano Carag, the mayor of Solano,
Cagayan, was killed by eight persons led by Tomas Ubiña, his political enemy, only Ubiña was sentenced to death
because he was the one who conceived the plan and utilized his influence to perpetrate the killing. "For him justice
cannot be tempered with mercy; the law must be applied to its full force and to its full extent." His four companions,
who were indebted to him for personal favors, were sentenced only toreclusion perpetua. Three others, who were
present at the killing but did not conspire with Ubiña, were considered accomplices. (See People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil.
27; People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82; People vs. Chua Huy, 87 Phil. 258, and People vs. Ging Sam, 94 Phil. 139, capital
cases, wherein not all those convicted as principals were sentenced to death.)
In the other four cases, the trial court convicted the appellant of frustrated murder. This is a glaring error. The trial
court overlooked that there were only two informations forfrustrated murder. These refer to the cases where the
victims were Lourdes Cerna and Jose de los Reyes. The other two informations charged attempted murder only in the
cases where the victims were Candida Comahig and Francisco Jabido. In these four cases, the crime committed is
attempted murder only because the injuries suffered by the victims could not have caused their death. Band (cuadrilla)
is aggravating in addition to nocturnity. LLphil
Only the five appellants originally charged should be held responsible for the attempted murders. We have already
ruled that the seven additional appellants implicated by Norteza should be acquitted.
However, Generalao, Romeo Baricuatro and Carlos Paslon cannot be held responsible for the attempted murder
committed against Jabido and De los Reyes because these two offended parties did not testify at their separate trial.
Neither did Doctors Florante Batucan and Ramon Arcenas, who examined the injuries of Jabido and De los Reyes and
issued the corresponding medical certificates (Exh. E and F), testify at the separate trial of Generalao, et al.
WHEREFORE, the trial courts decision is modified and the following judgment is rendered in these five cases:
1. In Criminal Case No. 95-Cebu, L-37801, appellants Vedasto Moreno, Rodrigo Baricuatro, Romeo Baricuatro, Carlos
Paslon and Emilio Generalao are convicted as co-principals in the crime of murder with assault upon a person in
authority.
Moreno and Rodrigo Baricuatro are each sentenced to death, while Romeo Baricuatro, Paslon and Generalao are each
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The five appellants are ordered to pay solidarily to the heirs of Mayor Samson Cerna
an indemnity of P50,000.
2. In the other four cases, Criminal Cases Nos. 129-Cebu, L-37802; 130-Cebu, L-37803; 131-Cebu, L-37804, and 132-
Cebu, L-37805, appellants Moreno and Rodrigo Baricuatro are convicted of four attempted murders and are each
sentenced to four indeterminate penalties each consisting of four (4) years of prision correccional medium, as
minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, minimum, as maximum, and to pay solidarily an indemnity of two
thousand pesos (P2,000) to each of the three victims, Candida Comahig, Francisco Jabido and Jose de los Reyes. The
same two appellants are further ordered to pay solidarily to Lourdes Cerna an indemnity of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000).
The penalty and civil liability in Criminal Cases No. 129, L-37802 and 130, L-37803, involving Candida Comahig and
Lourdes Cerna, are imposed upon appellants Generalao, Romeo Baricuatro and Carlos Paslon. These three appellants
have no liability in Criminal Cases Nos. 131 and 132, L-37804 and L-37805, involving Francisco Jabido and Jose de los
Reyes.
3. The other seven appellants, Crescencio F. Nemenzo, Elpidio Baricuatro, Ely Baricuatro, Salvador Peña, Rodulfo
Umbay, Roberto Paslon, and Victoriano Baraga, are acquitted in the five cases on the ground of reasonable doubt. The
convicted appellants will pay the costs.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998.]
ISABELITA REODICA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SYNOPSIS: In the evening of October 17,1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better
Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol that resulted to physical injuries to the
complainant and damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Consequently, an information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injuries docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919 was filed against her. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati convicted the petitioner as charged and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months
of arresto mayor. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision. Hence, this petition for review.
The court ruled that clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex
crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal
negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime.
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of
the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the
graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction
of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction
of the MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods —
the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months. Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; QUASI-OFFENSES; RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES;
PROPER PENALTY. — The penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto
menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed
deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1
day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under
the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the
proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower
in degree to arresto menor.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION. — As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is
punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law
carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25
of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a
penalty lower than arresto menor it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light
felony.
3. ID.; ID.; RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY; PROPER PENALTY; CASE AT
BAR. — As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article
365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to
property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional,
would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the
crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first
paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph,
then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i. e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its
maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the
imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4
months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties
therein provided "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64."
4. ID., ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION. — On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is,
as earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional
penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony — not a light felony as
claimed by petitioner.
5. ID.; ID.; WHERE ONE OF THE RESULTING OFFENSES IN CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE CONSTITUTES A LIGHT
FELONY, THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME. — Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave
or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio this Court declared that where one of the
resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; DUPLICITOUS CHARACTER THEREOF, MUST
BE RAISED BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT. — Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not
covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous
character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries This defect was deemed waived by her
failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the
court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
7. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; DETERMINING FACTORS. — The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed
to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. . . . The criminal jurisdiction of the lower
courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense
charged.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY CENSURE ARE COGNIZABLE BY MeTCs, MTCs AND MCTCs. —
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional
ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto
menorunder the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall
within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said
courts.
9. ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTION; THE REVISED PENAL CODE MUST PREVAIL OVER THE RULES ON SUMMARY
PROCEDURE. — It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rules on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and
the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal
Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco andCuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in
question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and
remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the
offense charged in the information in this case.
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue,
Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of
complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car
amounted to P8,542.00. cdphil
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint 1 against
petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.
On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as
Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Slight Physical Injury." The information read:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in
charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and
imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking
the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and injuries to person,
causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide
with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol,
thereby causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner,
in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.
That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol
suffered bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9)
days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of
time.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decisions 3 convicting petitioner of the "quasi
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries," and sentencing her:
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto
Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine
Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. 4
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical
injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is
not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eighth Edition 1988,
p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio's
book, p. 718). 5
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00).
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660.
After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for
Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellant's Brief. However, respondent
Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief. 6
After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus:
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND
MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO
BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS
BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A
PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR
LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS
RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS
IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR
THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON
THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.
A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A
QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF
SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS
GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE
THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR
COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE
EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF
PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise the ruling
of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty
for such quasioffense was arresto menor — not arresto mayor.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced that there
were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2)
reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she
insists, "do not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months," citing Lontok
v. Gorgonio, 12 thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries,
damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not
err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57
SCRA 363, 365).
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the
instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and
damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a
complex crime.
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information.
She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximum period and
computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower
courts."
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. Here,
since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months from the date the vehicular
collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesions leves through
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light
offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok's criminal liability therefor was already extinguished
(Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court).
The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to quash
that part of the information charging him with that light offense.
Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts do not
deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and
thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial
Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with
petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant
to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 14 which
frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to "complex" reckless imprudence
with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of
reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate informations.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to
impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of this case
because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to
thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG, cites Cuyos v. Garcia. 15
The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period here
was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident, pursuant to People
v. Cuaresma, 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in joining
cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSG's reliance on Buerano v. Court of
Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there validates the "complexing" of the crime of reckless imprudence with
physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations were filed — one for
slight and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two
informations should have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the
assumption that it was proper to "complex" damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with attempted
homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it would either
unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling inZaldivia 24 favorable to her.
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to
the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.
I. The Proper Penalty.
We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the
trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their
submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in
its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the
offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto
menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then
under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article
365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in
degree to arresto menor. 25
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of
Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not
result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arrest mayor in
its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless
imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to
the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of
the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2
months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the
penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth
paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum
period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the
imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would
be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1
day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that
in the imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to
the rule prescribed in article 64."
II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit
when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 26
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure
only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying the
penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of
the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as
a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized
with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Sincearresto mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25
of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony — not a light felony as claimed by
petitioner.
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code on
complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime
is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in
criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting
offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus,
the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act
of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information.
They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People
vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to
property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a
separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos
graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in physical injuries.
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the
information,i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed
waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and
proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them. 29
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Quasi Offenses in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions
pending before its enactment. 30
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2)31 thereof provided that except in cases falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive
original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months,
or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof."
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the
amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction
over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had jurisdiction
over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-
extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of
justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a
lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is
logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses
penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and
not under that of courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the
jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a
penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a
duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under
the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods — the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a
light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in
the amount of P8,542.00 being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether
the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in question tolled the running of the
prescriptive period.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or
investigation only or for an action on the merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 34 and People
v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's office suspends the running of
the statute of limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby,
such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the prosecution
commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a
prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said
cases may be commenced only by information." However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive
period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by
this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a violation of a
municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as
amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run." Under, Section 2 thereof, the period of
prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this
Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive
period there was only the filing of the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the
rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained
tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the
offenses charged in the information in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
That holding in the De los Santos case is buttressed by some precedents. Thus, in People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64 and
82, 102-103, where seventy-seven Constabularymen murdered six policemen (including the assistant chief of police)
and two private citizens and gravely wounded three civilians, they were convicted of multiple murder with grave
injuries, a complex crime. The eleven sergeants and corporals were sentenced to death while the sixty-six privates
were sentenced to reclusion perpetua. (See People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185, re sedition and multiple murder.)
In People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27, nineteen Moros, forming part of a band of one hundred, massacred fourteen
Constabularymen. They were charged and convicted of multiple murder, a complex crime. Their ring leader was
sentenced to death. The other eighteen accused were sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
In People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975, where on a single occasion around fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home
guards (formerly Constabulary soldiers), the killing was held to be only one complex offense of multiple homicide
because it "resulted from a single criminal impulse" and it was not possible to determine how many victims were
killed by each of the accused. (See U.S. vs. Fresnido, 4 Phil. 522 where the killing of three Constabulary soldiers on a
single occasion was punished as a single homicide.)
In People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831, around eighty persons stationed on both sides of the highway in Sitio Salabusab,
Bongabong, Nueva Ecija, fired at the group of Aurora Vda. de Quezon riding in five cars which were proceeding to
Baler, Quezon Province. The group was going to attend the inauguration of a monument in honor of President
ManuelL. Quezon.
Killed as a result of the ambuscade were eleven persons, namely, Mrs. Quezon, Baby Quezon, Felipe Buencamino III,
Mayor Ponciano Bernardo of Quezon City, Primitivo San Agustin, Antonio San Agustin, Pedro Payumo, two
Constabulary lieutenants, one corporal and a soldier. LLphil
Five persons were charged with multiple murder, a complex crime, for complicity in the ambuscade. The trial court
sentenced them to death. They appealed. The case as to three of the accused was dismissed on the ground that their
confessions were taken after they had been tortured.
Two other accused, Pedro Manantan and Raymundo Viray, executed extrajudicial confessions. At the trial, they relied
on alibis, which were not given credence.
This Court imposed upon Manantan and Viray only one death penalty for the multiple murder but for lack of
necessary votes, the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As persuasive authority, it may be noted that the Court of Appeals rendered the same ruling when it held that where
a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose "their individual acts in pursuance of that purpose are
looked upon as a single act — the act of execution — giving rise to a complex offense. The felonious agreement
produces a sole and solidary liability: each confederate forms but a part of a single being" (People vs. Leaño, 1 ACR
447, 461 perAlbert, J., with Justices Pedro Concepcion, Moran, Sison and Paras concurring)
In the Leaño case, a group of twenty-five persons armed with bolos, knives, sticks and other weapons, after shouting
to one another "Remember the agreement! Don't be afraid!", attacked a group of excursionists coming from the Vintar
Dam in Ilocos Norte, who were riding in a Ford coupe and omnibus.
As a result of the attack, one excursionist was killed, three suffered lesiones menos graves and four suffered light
injuries. The trial court convicted the assailants of homicide only. The Solicitor General recommended that they be
convicted of lesiones menos graves and lesiones leves in addition to homicide. The Court of Appeals held that the
appellants were guilty of the complex crime of homicide with lesiones menos graves.
The holding that there is a complex crime in cases like the instant case is similar to the rule in robbery with homicide,
a special complex crime, where the number of persons killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery does not
change the nature of the crime.
We have already stated that the conviction for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, as a complex crime,
qualified by treachery (absorbing abuse of superiority and cuadrilla) and aggravated by quasi-recidivism and evident
premeditation (offset by plea of guilty) and recidivism, as to some accused, as shown in the record, should be
affirmed.
The death penalty was properly imposed in conformity with articles 48, 160 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The
indemnity of six thousand pesos should be increased to twelve thousand pesos for each set of heirs of the fourteen
victims. Cdpr
However, justice should be tempered with mercy. Considering the circumstances which drove the accused to
massacre their fellow prisoners, they deserve clemency. The death penalty should be commuted to reclusion perpetua.
The following observations of this Court in the De los Santos case have some relevancy to this case:
"But the members of the Court cannot in conscience concur in the death penalty imposed, because they find it
impossible to ignore the contributory role played by the inhuman conditions then reigning in the penitentiary, vividly
described by the trial judge in his decision.
"It is evident that the incredible overcrowding of the prison cells, that taxed facilities beyond measure and the starvation
allowance of ten centavos per meal for each prisoner, must have rubbed raw the nerves and dispositions of the
unfortunate inmates, and predisposed them to all sorts of violence to seize from their owners the meager supplies
from outside in order to eke out their miserable existence.
"All this led inevitably to the formation of gangs that preyed like wolf packs on the weak, and ultimately to pitiless
gang rivalry for the control of the prisoners, abetted by the inability of the out-numbered guards to enforce discipline,
and which culminated in violent riots. The government cannot evade responsibility for keeping prisoners under such
sub-human and Dentesque conditions.
"Society must not close its eyes to the fact that if it has the right to exclude from its midst those who attack it, it has no
right at all to confine them under circumstances that strangle all sense of decency, reduce convicts to the level of
animals, and convert a prison term into prolonged torture and slow death." (See People vs. Dahil, L-30271, June 15,
1979.)
Justice Barredo believes that in a case like the instant case, where, since the commission of the multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder in 1965 or more than fourteen years ago, the accused have been in confinement and in fact
they have been in confinement for other offenses even prior to 1965, the death penalty should be commuted
to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, following the precedent established in the aforecited De los Santos case, the death penalty imposed by
the lower court is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of six thousand pesos is increased to twelve thousand
pesos. The indemnities for the frustrated murders are affirmed. Defendant Maximo Apolonias is acquitted on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. Cdpr
The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her and feasting their
eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the complainant, in all her
nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked up her clothes and left the room with his
other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to cover herself, but she could not find one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting on the bed trying
to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her. Instead of answering her, he
pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and
because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her several times on the stomach and
other parts of the body. The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them
open. Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the room.
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and Miss De la Riva,
during which he hit her on different parts of the body. LikeJose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The
girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped
her to revive her. Afterwards, three or the accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the complainant. After some
struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the
complainant went into a state of shock for the second time, the three other men went into the room, again poured
water on the complainant's face and slapped her several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to
revive her so she would know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now
appellant Cañal's turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before
him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of the four appellants was struggling with the complainant, the
other three were outside the room, just behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give
in because she could not, after all, escape, what with their presence.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes, told her to get
dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the impression that nothing had
happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that
when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was released without being harmed. She was warned not
to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt her up and
disfigure her face with acid. The appellant then blindfolded Miss De la Riva again and led her down from the hotel
room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, appellant Jose held her head down
on his lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by others.
Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They finally decided
on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it
appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a
taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from a well-known company. Jose did as requested, letting several
taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what
had happened to her, appellant Cañal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When
Miss De la Riva was already inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried.
She kept asking the driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative.
It was 6:30 o'clock — or some two hours after the abduction — when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her mother, her
brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her
mother, the complainant ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me."
The mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath
and a douche. The older woman also instructed her daughter to douche herself two or three times daily with a strong
solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned, treated the
complainant for external physical injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was
Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence
when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her
harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the
interrogation until she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do.
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant's family gathered to discuss what steps, if any, should be taken.
After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be informed. Thus, early on the
morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty.
Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family, went to the Quezon City Police Department Headquarters,
filed a complaint and executed a statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of the
four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the complainant submitted herself to a medico-internal
examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief Medico-Legal Officer.
During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also at the NBI
office. There he received a telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects had been
apprehended. That evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva
identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City
as one of the four men who abducted and raped her. She executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a
formal identification of Jose and related the role played by him.
At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I") before Pat. Marcos G. Viñas.
In his statement, which was duly sworn, Jose admitted that he knew about, and was involved in, the June 26 incident.
He named the other three appellants as his companions. Jose stated, among other things, that upon the initiative of
Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to
the complainant's car; that it was Pineda who blindfolded her; and that on]y Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted
the complainant.
After Exh. "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Viñas with a picture of appellant Edgardo Aquino.
The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the man in the
picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in another sworn statement
(Exh. "I-1"), identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and Cañal on July 1,
1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the evening of July 1, 1967, Miss De la
Riva pointed to Pineda and Cañal as among the four persons who abducted and raped her. She picked them out from
among several persons in the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De la Riva
executed a sworn statement (Exh. "B-2") wherein she made the same identification of the two appellants from among
a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Cañal had tatoo marks on
his right hip. After the identification, one of the policemen took appellant Cañal downstairs and undressed him, and
he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."
Appellant Cañal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest. In his statement
(Exh. "G"), appellant Cañal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss
De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Cañal
admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar
as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda
executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three companions went to the ABS Studio, and that, on
learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group
followed her car and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the
complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him.
In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and bruises on different parts of
the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the doctor was shown several photographs
of the complainant taken in his presence and under his supervision. With the aid of the photographs and the medical
reports, the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions or bruises on the complainant's chest, shoulders,
arms and fore-arms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also declared that when he was examining
her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sides of the
extragenital physical injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the part
of the subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused by blows administered by a closed fist or
by the palm of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's
opinion that they could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination,
the doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which court have been produced by sexual
intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa. He explained. however, that
spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three days from the last intercourse, not to mention
the possibility that the subject might have douched herself.
The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Cañal) took the witness stand. We quote hereunder
the portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the defense:
"Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail Lounge
somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until
closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had
listened to the music while enjoying some drinks. Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of
whisky, so much so that at least Aquino became drunk, according to his own testimony. They had been
joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that night. Come time to go home, their new
acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao. The five men piled into the red-bodied, black
topped two-door convertible Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to
Cubao. After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to España Extension to bring Aquino to his
home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in España Extension before the Rotonda a small car whizzed past
them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of
the small car he shouted, 'Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay.' The woman continued on her
way. Now Pineda saying, 'let us teach her a lesson,' sped after her and when she swerved ostensibly to
enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind hers, hurriedly got down, striding to the small car, opened the
door and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino confirm the presence of another woman
inside the girl's car, who helped the girl struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted
about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into the red convertible. All the three
accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda; but they also admit that they did nothing to stop him.
"Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to scare the girl
who was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and return her to her home. She turned
to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could not do anything as the 'boss' was Pineda. Aquino heard her
plead with Jose 'do you not have a sister yourself?' but did not hear the other plea 'do you not have a
mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street where he had forcibly snatched the girl
presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he said, 'why don't you do a strip tease for
us. I'll pay you P1,000.00' and the girl taunted, 'are you kidding?'; that after a little while she consented to
do the performance as long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were limited to the
four of them.
"Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted first, but not
before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as she went up the Hotel.
The three followed, and when they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused
testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows before
she undressed in front of them. They themselves also removed their clothing. Two of them removed their
pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Cañal stripped to the skin 'because it was hot.' The three
accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him promise her that he
would pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10 minutes began with
the naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This accomplished all of them dressed
up once more and the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal) left the room to wait
in the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of payment
of the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the question of
how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that
they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come from her work.
"Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia Avenue. Aquino
testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He did not have the P900.00 with which to
pay Maggie the balance of her 'show' and he was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie would have her
goons after him. He wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where he could
help raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and to make the company complete they invited Cañal to
join them. They used another car of Jaime Jose, different from the one they had used the day before. At
Lipa, Aquino detached himself from his companions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his
relatives. In the meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had, according to Cañal, gone
to live in a house very close to the municipal hall building. They later moved to another house where the
PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them. Aquino was the last to be apprehended, when
having read in the newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife
of the governor of Batangas."
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's credulity and reason, and
had failed utterly to counteract the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the complainant's testimony and Dr.
Brion's medical report and testimony. We quote with approval the able dissertation of the trial judge on this point:
"As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition that nothing
happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the complainant agreed to do for them for
a fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance to be paid 'later.' The flaw in this contention lies in its utter
inverisimilitude. The Court cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitually engaged in this kind
of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would consent (and as easily
and promptly as defense claims) to do a performance, not even for all money in the world after the rough
handling she experienced from these wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no
fury to match a woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen for money, and
her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the rudeness and meanness of these men
to her, Maggie would in so short an internal of time forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy
their immoral curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as a
weapon of revenge by denying them their pleasure.
"Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something beyond even the
wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused had abducted was in this kind of trade
and assuming that the price offered was to her satisfaction, what woman would be willing to perform first
and be paid later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consented to do a
strip-tease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid God knows when. Since
when are expositions of the flesh paid on installment basis? By the very precarious nature of their pitiful
calling, women who sell their attractions are usually very shrewd and it is to be expected that they would
demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she did not even know who
these men were, where they lived, whether they could be trusted with a promise to pay later (!) whether
she would ever find them again? If there is anything that has struck the Court about the complainant, it is
her courage, her intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one at that, could
have been persuaded to do what the defense wants this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.
"Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstance during their
interviews with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the persons who negotiated their
surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion that
this story is a last ditch, desperate attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly underscores the
hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more clearly their guilt.
"Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for this? The
Court realizes that in its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's positive identification of Cañal as
the man with a tatoo mark on his right buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly indecent story that
the four men removed their underclothing in the presence of a woman simply 'because it was hot.' What
kind of men were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding
insult to injury by not only inducing a woman to strip before them, but of forcing her to perform before
a naked audience? And then they have the gall to argue that 'nothing' happened. For males of cold and
phlegmatic blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men of the torrid regions like ours where
quick passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception!.
"All of these considerations set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the
defense has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of the prosecution which, if
unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical (external and internal)
examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the pertinent
findings of which are quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de
la Riva was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault.
"The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the following: (1) the
insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left behind in the hotel room the bruises and
the sexual attack could have taken place then. But then, the defense itself says that these two persons
rejoined the other three after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy
Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by the defense
that Maggie de Riva could have inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the
accused. The examining physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much
stretch of the imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose? Was P900.00
which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what about all the shame, embarrassment
and publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to? If she really had not been raped would
she have gone thru all of these tribulations?
"A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in the notoriety the
case will reap for her, her honor and that of her family, than in the redress she demands (Canastre, 82-480;
Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA O. G. 338; CA 55 O. G. 7666; Galamiton, L-6302, August
25, 1954); (3) it could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on Maggie
during her struggle with Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car. The
telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and
traumas were located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been caused by any
struggle save by those of a woman trying to resist the brutal and bestial attack on her honor.
"In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated testimony
should not be rated any credence at all as against the concerted declaration of the three accused. In the first
place, it is not correct to say that Maggie's declaration was uncorroborated — she has for corroboration
nothing less than the written extra-judicial statements ofJose and Cañal. But even assuming that Maggie
stood alone in her statements, the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which
the Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the
least vital element in gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which of the declarations
is the more credible, the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted. (Ricarte
44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should be borne in mind that in the most
detestable crime of rape in which a man is at his worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the
only one available to prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in
certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so that courts of justice are most
often placed in a position of having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in other regards
conclusive, logical and probable (Landicho, VIII ACE 530)."
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De la Riva. They
point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously contend that even as to
him the act was purged of any taint of criminality by the complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease
show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd design. This line of
defense has evidently no leg to stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated
in the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they
helped one another in dragging her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while
inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the farmer forcing his lips on
hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the
meanwhile being exchanged among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky
Hotel. This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than
suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that
they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been clearly
established Jose, Aquino and Cañal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the fact
of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not
usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself
within that period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the
complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does
not disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but
penetration (People vs. Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused by
the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is
absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane woman, who is single and earning as much as Miss De la
Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in
order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a strip-tease act.
Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would not result in the kind of
injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of successive rapes by the four
appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately told her
mother, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." This utterance, which is part of the res
gestae, commands strong probative value, considering that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in
cases of this nature, was the most logical person in whom a daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and Cañal
would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not
abused. Her statement to the press is understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her
family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not then in a
position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason why the complainant did not immediately
inform the authorities of the tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with disfiguration.
And there were, of course, the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could they,
too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone,
when the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in the hotel room for only three
or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they would picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the
complainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably presume her to
have come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to an
examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and
earnings as a movie actress.
4. Jose and Cañal seek the exclusion of their extra-judicial statements from the mass of evidence on the grounds that
they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein were supplied by
the police investigators. We are not convinced that the statements were involuntarily given, or that the details recited
therein were concocted by the authorities. The statements were given in the presence of several people and
subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated
the use of inordinate methods by the police. They are replete with details which could hardly be known to the police;
and although it is suggested that the authorities could have secured such details from their various informers, no
evidence at all was presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statementsJose and Cañal
admitted having waited — together with the two other appellants — for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of
them attempted in the same statements to exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino
criminally abused the complainant; while appellant Cañal would make it appear that the complainant willingly
allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared by the authorities, they would
hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is significant, too, that the
said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives of the alleged use of force and
intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon City Police Department, who examined appellant Cañal
after the latter made his statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said appellant's body in spite of the
claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the
circumstances, and considering, further, that the police officers who took down their statements categorically denied
on the witness stand that the two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them
or by anyone other than the affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-considered
conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-custody statements
of Jose and Cañal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will suffice to secure the conviction
of the two.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other ground that he was
not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall . . . enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel . . ."
While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction the
term criminal prosecutionswas interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a
similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings
before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said constitutional provision,
We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be
entitled . . . (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from the
arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before
arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and
after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this
jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the
Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered. And even there
the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the members of
the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases.
5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage of justice.
He contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the amended
complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the
court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is
mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including
the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers
both the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-
15308, May 29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, 1-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961).
Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his
evidence, much less to require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to
allure him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the trial
court to grant his request. (Cf. People, vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31
Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court ordered a new trial because it found for a fact that the
accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not intend to admit that he committed the offense with the aggravating
circumstances" mentioned in the information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript
of the proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota, prefaced his client's plea of guilty
with the statement that
"I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the
contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get, and we have
given said accused time to think. After a while I consulted him — for three times — and his
decision was still the same."
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse to Pineda's idea of
pleading guilty, because "I know the circumstances called for the imposition of the maximum penalty considering the
aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his client's wish only after the fiscal had stated that he would
recommend to the court the imposition of life imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does
not bind the Court. The situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.
6. Two of the appellants — Jose and Cañal — bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case from the start of
investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the court a quo was able to give the
appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7) original accused were acquitted. For another
thing, Josehimself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments of
the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial."
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes imputed to them in
the amended information quoted at the beginning of this decision. There is no doubt at all that the forcible abduction
of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not indispensable means which
enabled them to commit the various and successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however, that even
while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so
that each of the three succeeding crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the
abduction — in other words, they should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible
abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.
What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended byRepublic Act No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and
which provides as follows:
"ART. 335. When and how rape committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
"1. By using force or intimidation;
"2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
"3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned
in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
"Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
"When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death."
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed, the latter
is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant to the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty
of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for
the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper penalty to be
imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite finding in this
connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended with the following aggravating
circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of
these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy
with one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering
the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about
a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With
respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal, none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any
mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed,
for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should
likewise be made to suffer the extreme, penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape. Art. 63(2) RPC
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court applied by analogy
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all the penalties therein
imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of
the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed forty years." The said court is of the opinion that
since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim
would be vindicated just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into account in
connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 Off.
Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should be imposed because man has only one life, the trial court
ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in
affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed
upon him two death sentences for the murders and a prison term for the homicide. In not applying the said
principle, the court a quo said that the case of Balaba is different from the present case, for while in the former case
the accused was found to have committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex.
As We have explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved. There is, therefore, no
substantial difference between the two cases insofar as the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact
remains that in the case of Balaba this Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the
accused by the trial court. In People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on
each of the six accused three death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that "since it
is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each
conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of
the nature and severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated
after the decision of the court a quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at length the legality and
practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:
"The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is
contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of
this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties
is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death
penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death
penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties;
(2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that
multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing
multiple death penalties.
"The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition
of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and
proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties
imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself with the
possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency subject to varied
factors like the successful escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All
that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of
the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
"Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously. A
cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two moves of serving two or more (multiple)
penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature
of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.
"The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance. The
sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity,
which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number
of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real
dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence,
the imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent to an improvident grant of
pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary authorities
would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.
"Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of the
presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to
multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum forty (40)
years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life
imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life
sentence."
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our finding as regards
the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the presence of aggravating circumstances, four death
penalties should be imposed in the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking for reversal of that
portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation of the car used by the appellants in abducting the
complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No.
2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171, alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto
San Diego of the Quezon City Police Department. The car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from the Malayan Motors
Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price of
P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4,
1969. The mortgage was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission and inscribed in the Chattel
Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value
received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as
well as the chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land Transportation
Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on July 5, 1967, an action
for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step to foreclosure
of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an order for the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however,
could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car was not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used
by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva,
as a result of which the car was seized by the Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who
refused to surrender it to the sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal case.
During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor filed with the said
court a petition for intervention. The said petition was not, however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the trial court
rendered its judgment in the present case ordering the car's confiscation as an instrument of the crime. Although not
notified of the said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the order of
confiscation; but the same was denied on October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over
the case in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for relief from
judgment, but the same was also denied.
On February 5, 1968, judgment was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the car to the
intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the intervenor the
sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's fees, and the
costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory. Attempts to execute the judgment against the properties of
Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the
present petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the
Solicitor General contends, among others, that the court a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car,
the order of confiscation is correct.
Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence of strong
evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of the court a quo in
concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were the latter's statements during the trial of the criminal case
to that effect; that the said statements were not, however, intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership
over the car adverse to his mother, but were made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole
purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by the appellants in the commission
of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car and its assignment in favor of the intervenor were made several
months before the date of the commission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the possibility of
collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final judgment in the replevin case can only be
executed by delivering the possession of the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and that
Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the
commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this
Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set, aside and that the said
car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993. xxx xxx xxx
Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on the part of the Solicitor
General to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result
of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr.,
and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and
every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is
hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant in the
sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of P40,000; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for its confiscation is
hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas
Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil
Case No. 69993 thereof.
4. Paylado (for James Anthony and James Andrew) August 20, 1998
10. De Jesus (for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel) October 12, 1998
11. Ypil (for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel) October 12, 1998 89
That the trial court imposed limitation on the length of time counsel for appellants may cross-examine Rusia cannot
be labeled as a violation of the latter's constitutional right. Considering that appellants had several lawyers, it was just
imperative for the trial court to impose a time limit on their cross-examination so as not to waste its time on repetitive
and prolix questioning.
Indeed, it is the right and duty of the trial court to control the cross-examination of witnesses, both for the purpose of
conserving its time and protecting the witnesses from prolonged and needless examination. 90 Where several accused
are being tried jointly for the same offense, the order in which counsel for the several defendants shall cross-examine
the state's witnesses may be regulated by the court 91 and one of them may even be denied the right to cross-examine
separately where he had arranged with the others that counsel of one of them should cross-examine for
all. 92 In People vs. Gorospe, 93 we ruled:
"While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is not absolute in the
sense that a cross-examiner could determine for himself the length and scope of his cross-
examination of a witness. The court has always the discretion to limit the cross-examination and to
consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of justice."
The transcript of stenographic notes covering Rusia's cross-examination shows that appellants' counsel had
ample chance to test his credibility.
Records show that the failure of the PAO lawyers to cross-examine some of the prosecution witnesses was
due to appellants' obstinate refusal. In its Order 94 dated September 8, 1998, the trial court deferred the cross-
examination in view of appellants' insistence that their new counsel de parte will conduct the cross-examination. So as
not to unduly delay the hearing, the trial court warned the appellants that if by September 24, 1998, they are not yet
represented by their new counsel de parte,then it will order their counsel de oficio to conduct the cross-examination.
Lamentably, on September 24, 1998, appellants' counsel de parte entered their appearances merely to seek another
postponement of the trial. Thus, in exasperation, Judge Ocampo remarked:
"Every time a defense counsel decides to withdraw, must an accused be granted one (1) month suspension of
trial to look for such new counsel to study the records and transcripts? Shall the pace of the trial of these cases be thus
left to the will or dictation of the accused — whose defense counsels would just suddenly withdraw and cause
such long suspensions of the trial while accused allegedly shop around for new counsels and upon hiring new counsels
ask for another one month trial suspension for their new lawyers to study the records? While all the time such defense
counsels (who allegedly have already withdrawn) openly continue to 'advise' their accused-clients and even file
'Manifestations' before this Court and Petitions for Certiorari, Injunction and Inhibition on behalf of accused before
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court?
"What inanity is this that the accused and their lawyers are foisting upon this Court? In
open defiance of the provisions of SC A.O. No. 104-96 that these heinous crimes cases shall undergo
'mandatory continuous trial and shall be terminated within sixty (60) days'?"
Still, in its Order dated October 8, 1998, the trial court gave appellants' new counsel de parte a period until
October 12, 1998 to manifest whether they are refusing to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses concerned; if so,
then the court shall consider them to have waived their right to cross-examine those witnesses. During the hearing on
October 12, 1998, Larrañaga's new counsel de parte,Atty. Villarmia, manifested that he would not cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses who testified on direct examination when Larrañaga was assisted by counsel de oficio only. The
next day, the counsel de parte of Josman, and brothers James Anthony and James Andrew adopted Atty. Villarmia's
manifestation. Counsel for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel likewise refused to cross-examine the same witnesses. Thus, in
its Order dated October 14, 1998, the trial court deemed appellants to have waived their right to cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses.
It appears, therefore, that if some of the prosecution witnesses were not subjected to cross-examination, it was
not because appellants were not given the opportunity to do so. The fact remains that their new counsel de
parte refused to cross-examine them. Thus, appellants waived their right "to confront and cross examine the witnesses"
against them.
C. Right to Impartial Trial
Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge Ocampo when he asked questions and made comments when
the defense witnesses were testifying.
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge may properly intervene during trial to promote
expeditious proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities. The
test is whether the intervention of the judge tends to prevent the proper presentation of a cause or the ascertainment of the truth
in the matter where he interposes his questions or comments.
Records show that the intervention by way of comment of Judge Ocampo during the hearing was not only
appropriate but was necessary. One good illustration is his explanation onalibi.Seeing that the appellants' counsel
were about to present additional witnesses whose testimonies would not establish the impossibility of appellants'
presence in the scene of the crime, Judge Ocampo intervened and reminded appellants' counsel of the requisites
of alibi,thus:
"Well, I'm not saying that there is positive identification. I'm only saying that in proving your
alibi you must stick by what the Supreme Court said that it was impossible if they are telling the truth, di ba?
Now with these other witnesses na hindi naman ganoon to that effect it does not prove that it was impossible,
e, what is the relevance on that? What is the materiality? Iyon ang point ko. We are wasting our time with
that testimony. Ilang witnesses and epe-present to that effect. Wala rin namang epekto. It will not prove that
it was not impossible for him to go to Cebu at 10:30 P.M.,of July 16, e, papano yan? We are being criticized
by the public already for taking so long a time of the trial of these cases which is supposed to be
finished within 60 days. Now from August, September, October, November, December and
January, magse-six months na, wala pa and you want to present so many immaterial witnesses."
Surely, we cannot fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding appellants' counsel of the parameters
of alibi to ensure that there will be an orderly and expeditious presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be
no time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of witnesses which are not relevant. Remarks which merely manifest
a desire to confine the proceedings to the real point in issue and to expedite the trial do not constitute a rebuke of counsel. 95
Appellants also decry the supposed harshness of Judge Ocampo towards the witnesses for the defense,
namely: Lourdes Montalvan, Michael Dizon, Rebecca Seno, Clotilde Soterol, Salvador Boton, Catalina Paghinayan and
Paolo Celso.
With respect to Lourdes Montalvan, Judge Ocampo expressed surprise on "how a 17-year-old girl could go to
a man's apartment all alone." He said that such conduct "does not seem to be a reasonable or a proper behavior for a
17-year-old girl to do." These statements do not really indicate bias or prejudice against the defense witnesses. The
transcript of stenographic notes reveals that Judge Ocampo uttered them, not to cast doubt on the moral character of
Lourdes Montalvan, but merely to determine the credibility of her story, thus:
"...But what I wanted to point out is the question of credibility. That is what we are here
for. We want to determine if it is credible for a 17-year-old college student of the Ateneo who belongs to a
good family, whose father is a lawyer and who could afford to live by herself in a Condominium Unit in
Quezon City and that she would go to the Condominium Unit of a man whom he just met the previous
month, all alone by herself at night and specifically on the very night July 16, 1997 ...That is the question that
I would like you to consider ... I assure you I have no doubts at all about her moral character and I have the
highest respect for Miss Montalvan ..."
Strong indication of Judge Ocampo's lack of predilection was his acquiescence for Lourdes Montalvan to
clarify during redirect examination why she found nothing wrong with being alone at Larrañaga's unit. We quote the
proceedings of November 19, 1998, thus:
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
Q When you went up you said you were alone. What was your feeling of going up to that room
alone or that unit alone?
PROS. GALANIDA
We object, not proper for re-direct. That was not touched during the cross. That should have been
asked during the direct-examination of this witness, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
We want to clarify why she went there alone.
COURT:
Precisely, I made that observation that does not affect or may affect the credibility of witness the fact that she
went there alone. And so, it is proper to ask her, di ba?
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
What was your purpose? Ask her now — what was your purpose?
/to the witness:
Q Will you answer the question of the Court/What was your purpose or intention in going in
Paco's room that night alone?
WITNESS:
A My purpose for going there was to meet Richard, sir, and to follow-up whether we will go out
later that night or not. The purpose as to going there alone, sir, I felt, I trusted Paco.
PROS. DUYONGCO:
May we ask the witness not to elaborate, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
That is her feeling.
COURT:
That was her purpose. It is proper." 96
Appellants consider as violation of their right to due process Judge Ocampo's remarks labeling Rebecca Seno's
and Catalina Paghinayan's testimony as "incredible;" 97 Clotilde Soterol as a "totally confused person who appears to be
mentally imbalanced;" 98 and Salvador Boton and Paulo Celso as "liars." 99
Suffice it to state that after going over the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes, we are convinced that
Judge Ocampo's comments were just honest observations intended to warn the witnesses to be candid to the court. He
made it clear that he merely wanted to ascertain the veracity of their testimonies in order to determine the truth of the
matter in controversy. 100 That such was his purpose is evident from his probing questions which gave them the
chance to correct or clarify their contradictory statements. Even appellants' counselde parte acknowledged that Judge
Ocampo's statements were mere "honest observations." 101 If Judge Ocampo uttered harsh words against those defense
witnesses, it was because they made a mockery of the court's proceedings by their deliberate lies. The frequency with
which they changed their answers to Judge Ocampo's clarificatory questions was indeed a challenge to his patience.
A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is proper for him to caution and admonish witnesses when necessary
and he may rebuke a witness for levity or for other improper conduct. 102 This is because he is called upon to ascertain the
truth of the controversy before him. 103
It bears stressing at this point that the perceived harshness and impatience exhibited by Judge Ocampo did
not at all prevent the defense from presenting adequately its side of the cases. IcHAaS
D. Right to Produce Evidence
Appellants assail the trial court's exclusion of the testimonies of four (4) airlines personnel 104 which were
intended to prove that Larrañaga did not travel to Cebu from Manila or from Cebu to Manila on July 16, 1997. The
trial court's exclusion of the testimonies is justified. By an alibi,Larrañaga attempted to prove that he was at a place
(Quezon City) so distant that his participation in the crime was impossible. To prove that he was not in the pre-flight
and post-flight of the four (4) major airlines flying the route of Cebu to Manila and Manila to Cebu on July 15 and 16,
1997 would not prove the legal requirement of "physical impossibility" because he could have taken the flight from
Manila to Cebu prior to that date, such as July 14, 1997. According to Judge Ocampo, it was imperative for appellants'
counsel to prove that Larrañaga did not take a flight to Cebu before July 16, 1997.
In the same way, we cannot fault the trial court for not allowing the defense to continue with the tedious process of
presenting additional witnesses to prove Larrañaga's enrollment at the Center for Culinary Arts, located at Quezon
City, from June 18, 1997 to July 30, 1997 considering that it would not also prove that he was not in Cebu on July 16 to
17, 1997. It is a known practice of students who are temporarily residing in Metro Manila to return to their provinces
once in a while to spend time with their families. To prove that Larrañaga was enrolled during a certain period of time
does not negate the possibility that he went home to Cebu City sometime in July 1997 and stayed there for a while.
Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
incompetent witness. 105 It is not error to refuse evidence which although admissible for certain purposes, is not
admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it. 106
To repeat, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy. 107 In the present case, there is no showing of violation of due process which
justifies the reversal or setting aside of the trial court's findings.
II. The Improper Discharge of Rusia as an Accused
to be a State Witness
Appellants argue that Rusia is not qualified to be a state witness under paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 9, Rule
119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads:
"Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness.— When two or more persons are jointly charged
with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the
court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be
witness for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is
satisfied that:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Said accused does not appear to be most guilty;
(e) Said accused has not at anytime been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
xxx xxx xxx"
Appellants claim that Rusia was the "most guilty of both the charges of rape and kidnapping" having admitted in
open court that he raped Jacqueline. Furthermore, Rusia admitted having been previously convicted in the United
States of third degree burglary.
It bears stressing that appellants were charged with kidnapping and illegal detention. Thus, Rusia's admission that
he raped Jacqueline does not make him the "most guilty" of the crimes charged. Moreover, far from being the
mastermind, his participation, as shown by the chronology of events, was limited to that of an oblivious follower who
simply "joined the ride" as the commission of the crimes progressed. It may be recalled that he joined the group upon
Rowen's promise that there would be a "big happening" on the night of July 16, 1997. All along, he thought the "big
happening" was just another "group partying or scrounging." In other words, he had no inkling then of appellants'
plan to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. Rusia retained his passive stance as Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy
and Jacqueline at the waiting shed of Ayala Center. He just remained seated beside the driver's seat, not aiding Rowen
and Josman in abducting the Chiong sisters. When Jacqueline attempted to escape 14 meters away from the waiting
shed, it was Josman who chased her and not Rusia. Inside the car, it was Rowen who punched and handcuffed the
Chiong sisters. At the safehouse of the "Josman Aznar Group," Rusia stayed at the living room while Larrañaga, James
Anthony, Rowen, and Josman molested Marijoy and Jacqueline on separate rooms. At Tan-awan, it was Josman who
ordered Rowen and Ariel to pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine. And Rusia did not even know what ultimately
happened to Jacqueline as he was the first to leave the group. Clearly, the extent of Rusia's participation in the crimes
charged does not make him the "most guilty."
The fact that Rusia was convicted of third degree burglary in Minnesota does not render his testimony
inadmissible. 108 In People vs. De Guzman, 109 we held that although the trial court may have erred in discharging the
accused, such error would not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the defendant. In Mangubat
vs. Sandiganbayan, 110 we ruled:
"Anent the contention that Delia Preagido should not have been discharged as a state witness because of a
'previous final conviction' of crimes involving moral turpitude, suffice it to say that 'this Court has time and
again declared that even if the discharged state witness should lack some of the qualifications enumerated by
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or
disregarded.In the discharge of a co-defendant, the court may reasonably be expected to err; but such
error in discharging an accused has been held not to be a reversible one. This is upon the principle
that such error of the court does not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the discharged
defendant."
Furthermore, it may be recalled that Rusia was extremely bothered by his conscience and was having nightmares
about the Chiong sisters, hence, he decided to come out in the open. 111 Such fact alone is a badge of truth of his
testimony.
But, more importantly, what makes Rusia's testimony worthy of belief is the marked compatibility between such
testimony and the physical evidence. Physical evidence is an evidence of the highest order. It speaks eloquently than a
hundred witnesses. 112 The presence of Marijoy's ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on
her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusia's testimony on what actually took place from Ayala
Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court were of such nature and quality that only a
witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. What is more, his testimony was corroborated
by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated, thus: (1) Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza saw
Jacqueline's two failed attempts to escape from appellants; (2) Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he bought barbeque
and Tanduay at Nene's Store while the white van, driven by Alfredo Caño, was waiting on the side of the road and he
heard voices of "quarreling male and female" emanating from the van; (3) Manuel Camingao testified on the presence
of Larrañaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997; and lastly, (4) Benjamin Molina and Miguel
Vergara recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for hire, on the
evening of July 16, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusia's narration. With such strong anchorage
on the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, how can we brush aside Rusia's testimony?
Rusia's discharge has the effect of an acquittal. 113 We are not inclined to recall such discharge lest he will be placed
in double jeopardy. Parenthetically, the order for his discharge may only be recalled in one instance, which is when he
subsequently failed to testify against his co-accused. The fact that not all the requisites for his discharge are present is
not a ground to recall the discharge order. Unless and until it is shown that he failed or refused to testify against his co-
accused, subsequent proof showing that any or all of the conditions listed in Sec. 9 of Rule were not fulfilled would not wipe away
the resulting acquittal. 114
III. Appreciation of the Evidence for the
Prosecution and the Defense
Settled is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is left largely to the trial court because of its
opportunity, not available to the appellate court, to see the witnesses on the stand and determine by their demeanor
whether they are testifying truthfully or lying through their teeth. Its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is well-
nigh conclusive on this Court, barring arbitrariness in arriving at his conclusions. 115
We reviewed the records exhaustively and found no compelling reason why we should deviate from the findings of
fact and conclusion of law of the trial court. Rusia's detailed narration of the circumstances leading to the horrible
death and disappearance of Jacqueline has all the earmarks of truth. Despite the rigid cross-examination conducted by
the defense counsel, Rusia remained steadfast in his testimony. The other witnesses presented by the prosecution
corroborated his narration as to its material points which reinforced its veracity.
Appellants proffered the defense of denial and alibi.As between their mere denial and the positive identification and
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we are convinced that the trial court did not err in according weight to the
latter. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was in another place at such a period of time
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its
commission. 116 These requirements of time and place must be strictly met. 117 A thorough examination of the evidence
for the defense shows that the appellants failed to meet these settled requirements. They failed to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the
Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto. James Anthony
and James Andrew were all within the vicinity, of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larrañaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical impossibility. During
the hearing, it was established that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are four
(4) airline companies plying the route.One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to
Cebu each morning, afternoon and evening. Taking into account the mode and speed of transportation, it is therefore
within the realm of possibility for Larrañaga to be in Cebu City prior to or exactly on July 16, 1997. Larrañaga's
mother, Margarita Gonzales-Larrañaga, testified that his son was scheduled to take a flight from Manila to Cebu on
July 17, 1997 at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, but he was able to take an earlier flight at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Margarita therefore claimed that his son was in Cebu City at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of July 17, 1997 or the
day after the commission of the crime. However, while Larrañaga endeavored to prove that he went home to Cebu
City from Manila only in the afternoon of July 17, 1997, he did not produce any evidence to show the last time he went to
Manila from Cebu prior to such crucial date.If he has a ticket of his flight to Cebu City on July 17, 1997, certainly, he
should also have a ticket of his last flight to Manila prior thereto. If it was lost, evidence to that effect should have
been presented before the trial court.
Indeed, Larrañaga's presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. No less
than four (4) witnesses for the prosecution identified him as one of the two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on
the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larrañaga
approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center.The incident reminded her of Jacqueline's prior story
that he was Marijoy's admirer. She (Shiela) confirmed that she knows Larrañaga since she had seen him on five (5)
occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 o'clock, she saw Marijoy and
Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center.She recognized them as Larrañaga and Josman, having
seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard
Redobles,the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and
Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio,a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larrañaga at Tan-awan at
about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a white van. 118
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses and that of Rusia, it is reasonable to conclude that Larrañaga
was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes and was one of the principal perpetrators.
Of course, we have also weighed the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by appellants in support of
their respective alibi.However, they proved to be wanting and incredible.
Salvador Boton,the security guard assigned at the lobby of Loyola Heights Condominium, testified on the entry of
Larrañaga's name in the Condominium's logbook to prove that he was in Quezon City on the night of July 16, 1997.
However, a cursory glance of the entry readily shows that it was written at the uppermost portion of the logbook and
was not following the chronological order of the entries. Larrañaga's 10:15 entry was written before the 10:05 entry
which, in turn, was followed by a 10:25 entry. Not only that, the last entry at the prior page was 10:05. This renders the
authenticity of the entries doubtful. It gives rise to the possibility that the 10:15 entry was written on a later date when
all the spaces in the logbook were already filled up and thus, the only remaining spot was the uppermost portion.
Surprisingly, the alleged arrival of Larrañaga and his friend Richard Antonio at the Loyola Heights Condominium in
the early evening of July 16, 1997 was not recorded in the logbook.
Rowena Bautista, a teacher at the Center for Culinary Arts, Quezon City, testified that Larrañaga attended her lecture
on Applied Mathematics on July 16, 1997 from 8:00 o'clock to 11:30 in the morning. 119 This runs counter to
Larrañaga's affidavit 120 stating that on the said date, he took his mid-term examinations in the subject Fundamentals
of Cookery from 8:00 o'clock in the morning to 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
With respect to Larrañaga's friends, the contradictions in their testimonies, painstakingly outlined by the Solicitor
General in the appellee's brief, reveal their unreliability. To our mind, while it may be possible that Larrañaga took the
mid-term examinations in Fundamentals of Cookery and that he and his friends attended a party at the R and R Bar
and Restaurant, also in Quezon City, however it could be that those events occurred on a date other than July 16, 1997.
Clotilde Soterol,in defense of Ariel and Alberto (the driver and the conductor of the van) attempted to discredit Rusia's
testimony by testifying that the white van with plate no. GGC-491 could not have been used in the commission of the
crimes on the night of July 16, 1997 because it was parked in her shop from 7:00 o'clock in the evening of the same
date until 11:00 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1997. What makes Soterol's testimony doubtful is her contradicting
affidavits. In the first affidavit dated July 28, 1997, or twelve (12) days from the occurrence of the crime, she stated
that Alberto took the van from her shop at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 16, 1997 and returned it for repair only on July
22, 1997. 121 But in her second affidavit dated October 1, 1997, she declared that Alberto left the van in her shop at
7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1997 until 11:00 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1997. 122Surely, we cannot
simply brush aside the discrepancy and accept the second affidavit as gospel truth.
Appellants attempted to establish their defense of alibi through the testimonies of relatives and friends who obviously
wanted them exculpated of the crimes charged. Naturally, we cannot but cast an eye of suspicion on their testimonies.
In People vs. Ching, 123 we ruled that it is but natural, although morally unfair, for a close relative to give weight to
blood ties and close relationship in times of dire needs especially when a criminal case is involved.
Rusia positively identified the appellants. The settled rule is that positive identification of an accused by credible
witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime demolishes alibi,the much abused sanctuary of felons. 124 Rusia's testimony
was corroborated by several disinterested witnesses who also identified the appellants. Most of them are neither
friends, relatives nor acquaintances of the victims' family. As we reviewed closely the transcript of stenographic notes,
we could not discern any motive on their part why they should testify falsely against the appellants. In the same vein,
it is improbable that the prosecution would tirelessly go through the rigors of litigation just to destroy innocent lives.
Meanwhile, appellants argue that the prosecution failed to prove that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in
Tan-awan, Carcar was that of Marijoy. We are not convinced. Rusia testified that Josman instructed Rowen "to get rid"
of Marijoy and that following such instruction, Rowen and Ariel pushed her into the deep ravine. Furthermore,
Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, 125 a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse matched those of
Marijoy. 126 The packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy
and Jacqueline while they were being detained. 127 The body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she
was abducted. 128 The members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy 129 which
they eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every place which
mattered to Marijoy. Indeed, there is overwhelming and convincing evidence that it was the body of Marijoy that was
found in the ravine.
Appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in two (2) Informations and were
convicted thereof. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, reads:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.— Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer.
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
"When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts,the maximum penalty shall be imposed."
The elements of the crime defined in Art. 267 above are: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be
illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four (4) circumstances mentioned above is present. 130
There is clear and overwhelming evidence that appellants, who are private individuals, forcibly dragged Marijoy and
Jacqueline into the white car, beat them so they would not be able to resist, and held them captive against their will. In
fact, Jacqueline attempted to free herself twice from the clutches of appellants — the first was near the Ayala Center
and the second was in Tan-awan, Carcar — but both attempts failed. Marijoy was thrown to a deep ravine, resulting
to her death. Jacqueline, on the other hand, has remained missing until now.
Article 267 states that if the victim is killed or died as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People vs. Ramos, 131 citing Parulan vs.
Rodas, 132 and People vs. Mercado, 133 we held that this provision given rise to a special complex crime, thus:
"Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the rule was that where
the kidnapped victim was subsequently killed by his abductor, the crime committed would either
be a complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, or two (2)
separate crimes of kidnapping and murder. Thus, where the accused kidnapped the victim for the
purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime committed was the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as the
kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of committing the murder. On the other hand,
where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was subsequently slain as
an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were committed.
However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a last
paragraph which provides —
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime' of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts
between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely
an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended
by RA No. 7659."
The prosecution was able to prove that Marijoy was pushed to a ravine and died. Both girls were raped by the gang.
In committing the crimes, appellants subjected them to dehumanizing acts. Dehumanization means deprivation of
human qualities, such as compassion. 134 From our review of the evidence presented, we found the following
dehumanizing acts committed by appellants: (1) Marijoy and Jacqueline were handcuffed and their mouths
mercilessly taped; (2) they were beaten to severe weakness during their detention; (3) Jacqueline was made to dance
amidst the rough manners and lewd suggestions of the appellants; (4) she was taunted to run and forcibly dragged to
the van; and (5) until now, Jacqueline remains missing which aggravates the Chiong family's pain. All told,
considering that the victims were raped, that Marijoy was killed and that both victims were subjected to
dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the death penalty on the appellants is in order.
Thus, we hold that all the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 wherein Marijoy is the victim;
and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the
victim.
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or
more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes
under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, 135 (2) robbery with rape, 136 (3) kidnapping with
serious physical injuries, 137 (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, 138 and (5) rape with homicide. 139 In a special
complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be
necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints.As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed;and that this
provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the
Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in connection" with her detention
and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof." Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each
of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape. It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there
is a "direct relation, and intimate connection" 140 between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be
considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the herein special
complex crime. It bears reiterating that in People vs. Ramos,141 and People vs. Mercado, 142 interpreting Article 267, we
ruled that "where the person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought,the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor
be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267." The
same principle applies here. The kidnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be
treated as separate crime but shall be punished as a special complex crime. At any rate, the technical designation of the crime is of
no consequence in the imposition of the penalty considering that kidnapping and serious illegal detention if complexed with either
homicide or rape, still, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed.
Anent Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the victim, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon appellants considering that the above-mentioned component offenses were not alleged in the
Information as required under Sections 8 and 9, 143 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consistent
with appellants' right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,these attendant circumstances or
component offenses must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the
trial. Otherwise, they cannot give rise to a special complex crime, as in this case. Hence, the crime committed is only
simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no doubt that all the appellants conspired in the commission of the
crimes charged. Their concerted actions point to their joint purpose and community of intent. Well settled is the rule
that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from
the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such point to a joint design and community of interest. 144 Otherwise stated, it may be shown by the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. 145 Appellants' actions showed that they have the
same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline from the
vicinity of Ayala Center. Larrañaga, James Andrew and James Anthony who were riding a red car served as back-up
of Rowen and Josman. Together in a convoy, they proceeded to Fuente Osmeña to hire a van, and thereafter, to the
safehouse of the "Jozman Aznar Group" in Guadalupe, Cebu where they initially molested Marijoy and Jacqueline.
They headed to the South Bus Terminal where they hired the white van driven by Alberto, with Ariel as the
conductor. Except for James Andrew who drove the white car, all appellants boarded the white van where they held
Marijoy and Jacqueline captive. In the van, James Anthony taped their mouths and Rowen handcuffed them together.
They drank and had a pot session at Tan-awan. They encircled Jacqueline and ordered her to dance, pushing her and
ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile, Larrañaga raped Marijoy, followed by Rowen, James Anthony,
Alberto, and Ariel. On other hand, Josman and James Andrew raped Jacqueline. Upon Josman's order, Rowen and
Ariel led Marijoy to the cliff and pushed her. After leaving Tan-awan, they taunted Jacqueline to run for her life. And
when Rusia got off from the van near Ayala Center, the appellants jointly headed back to Cebu City.
Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the "conspiracy" as they were merely
present during the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein, is bereft of merit. To hold an
accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the complicity. 146 There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. 147 Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended. 148 As shown by the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto
were not merely present at the scene of the crime.
Indeed, all appellants, except James Anthony who was 16 years old when the crimes charged were committed, share
the same degree of responsibility for their criminal acts.Under Article 68 149 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty on James Anthony, by reason of his minority, is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. This means that
he stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 and twelve (12) years of prision
mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304. The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua. 150 On the
other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree
lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. 151 There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the
penalty to be imposed on James Anthony is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum
period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. 152
As for the rest of the appellants, the foregoing established facts call for the imposition on them of the death
penalty in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304. It is therefore clear
that the trial court erred in merely imposing "two (2) Reclusiones Perpetua," rationalizing that justice must be tempered
with mercy. We must be reminded that justice is not ours to give according to our sentiments or emotions. It is in the
law which we must faithfully implement.
At times we may show compassion and mercy but not at the expense of the broader interest of fair play and
justice. While we also find it difficult to mete out the penalty of death especially on young men who could have led
productive and promising lives if only they were given enough guidance, however, we can never go against what is
laid down in our statute books and established jurisprudence.
In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline are entitled to the amount of
P100,000.00 in each case by way of civil indemnity ex delicto. 153 As regards the actual damages, it appears that the
award of P200,000.00 is not supported by evidence. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable to the injured party. 154 Thus, in light of the recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo, 155 we grant the award of
P25,000.00 as temperate damages in each case, in lieu of actual damages. There being proofs that the victims' heirs
suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury, we award an equitable amount of P150,000.00
as moral damages, also in each case. Exemplary damages is pegged at P100,000.00 in each case156 to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of the
victims and as punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-
45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY;" ALBERTO CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias
"MM," are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY;" ALBERTO CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias
"MM," are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY, who was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is
likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he
is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
MAXIMUM.
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d) P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes
the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the
finality of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the
possible exercise of Her Excellency's pardoning power, SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107799. April 15, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLITO NANG "alias Batutto", (at large) SUMINA GAMO and
LUMUNSOG GABASAN alias "Dodong”
SYNOPSIS: Pablito Nang and accused-appellants Sumina Gamo and Lumonsog Gabasan were charged with robbery with
homicide. Of the three accused, only Gamo and Gabasan were apprehended, while Pablito Nang remains at large to this day. Upon
arraignment, both accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty. They interposed the defense of denial and alibi. The trial court
found Gamo and Gabasan guilty of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal. Appellants insist on their innocence. THCASc
The appeal is devoid of merit. The core issue raised is factual and involves the credibility of the testimonies of witnesses. This
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misapprehended or misinterpreted. While this Court agrees that the trial court may have committed some errors, these lapses are
not so grave as to reverse the verdict of conviction against accused-appellants who were positively identified by eyewitnesses as
the perpetrators of the crime being imputed to them.
There is no serious incongruence in the prosecution eyewitnesses' sworn declarations and their testimonies. What is material is that
their testimonies agree on the essential fact that the three accused were present and they participated in the commission of the
crime. As between sworn statements taken ex parte and testimonies given in open court, the latter are generally held to be
superior. AHDaET
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; AS A GENERAL RULE, THIS COURT WILL NOT
INTERFERE WITH THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN PASSING UPON THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. — The
appeal is devoid of merit. The core issue raised is factual and involves the credibility of the testimonies of witnesses. This Court
will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of witness, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misapprehended or misinterpreted. While this Court agrees that the trial court may have committed some errors, these lapses are
not so grave as to reverse the verdict of conviction against accused-appellants who were positively identified by eyewitnesses as
the perpetrators of the crime being imputed to them.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHILD'S COMPETENCE AS A WITNESS; REQUIREMENTS. — The requirements of a child's competence
as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation (b) capacity of recollection and (c) capacity of communication. The determination of
whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing requirements is addressed to the sound judgment of the trial
court. In the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the trial court's assessment regarding Elizabeth's credibility
as a witness. TAHCEc
3. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTIES FOR RECLUSION PERPETUA AND LIFE IMPRISONMENT, DISTINGUISHED. — The
special complex crime of robbery with homicide carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death under Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the proper imposable penalty upon accused-appellants is reclusion perpetua in the absence of
proven mitigating or aggravating circumstances. However, the trial court erroneously imposed on accused-appellants the penalty
of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not synonymous penalties — these are
distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties. This Court has distinguished between the two penalties in previous
decisions, going as far back as People v. Mobe [81 Phil. 58 (1948)] and, recently, in People v. Antonio Magana, G.R. No. 105673, July 26,
1996.
ROMERO, J p:
Pablito Nang alias "Batutto" (Batuto) and accused-appellants Sumina 1 Gamo and Lumonsog 2 Gabasan alias
"Dodong" were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City,
Branch 19. The information reads: Cdrep
"That on the 16th day of May, 1990 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening at Sitio San Pedro,
Barangay Lubusan, Municipality of Lapuyan, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, the two of said accused being armed
with a pistol and a knife respectively, with intent to gain and by means of violence did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and rob (sic) the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Nicanor
Gonzales of the sum of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos and pursuant to said conspiracy and by
reason and on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab and inflict injuries upon Nicanor Gonzales which caused the
latter's death immediately thereafter.
Act contrary to Article (sic) 293 and 294 of the Revised Penal Code." 3
Of the three accused, only herein accused-appellants Gamo and Gabasan, were apprehended, while Pablito Nang
remains at large to this day. Upon arraignment, both accused-appellants entered a plea of "not guilty."
The prosecution's version of the crime, as testified to by the deceased victim's wife, Epifania Gonzales, and daughter,
Elizabeth, is as follows:
At around 7:00 o'clock p.m. on May 16, 1990, farmer Nicanor Gonzales, his wife Epifania and six of their eleven
children, namely: Monina, Celso, Elizabeth, Basilio, Ambrosio and Ronnie were in their house at Sitio San Pedro,
Lubosan, Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur. Feeling the urge to relieve himself before going to bed, Nicanor proceeded
downstairs to the comfort room adjacent to the house. Since it was already dark, Epifania placed a lighted gas lamp
on the windowsill overlooking the toilet to illuminate the place. 4 After a while, Nicanor called for his daughter
Elizabeth to take her turn in using the toilet. Forthwith, Elizabeth went downstairs and walked towards the direction
of the toilet. 5
To her surprise, she saw her father being attacked by three masked men. As Nicanor struggled with the assailants,
their T-shirt masks dropped, enabling Elizabeth to recognize them with the aid of the light emanating from the gas
lamp on the window overlooking the toilet and the scene of the crime. She recognized the two culprits who held her
father's hands accused-appellants Sumiba Gamo and Lumonsog Gabasan, and the third who stabbed her father, as
accused Pablito Nang. Elizabeth positively identified the three assailants because she was familiar with their faces
since they used to pass by their place. 6
After stabbing Nicanor, the three malefactors rushed inside the house. Out of fear, Elizabeth followed them, only to be
hit on the head by Gabasan who then stood as lookout beside the stairs. 7 Having subsequently eluded Gabasan,
Elizabeth managed to reach the upper floor of the house where she saw her mother Epifania struggling against
Pablito Nang and Sumiba Gamo. 8
Earlier Epifania Gonzales, having heard the commotion coming from the direction of the comfort room, decided to
investigate. Before she could even step out of the door, two masked men she met immediately grabbed her by the
hands and poked knives at her. In the ensuing scuffle, she was able to pry loose their masks. Aided by the light
coming from the gas lamp on the window, Epifania recognized the two who gripped her hands as Pablito Nang and
Sumiba Gamo, both of whom were then armed with hunting knives. She also saw Lumonsog Gabasan standing by the
stairs. The three intruders were familiar to her as Lumonsog Gabasan used to sell copra to them and buy on credit
from her store. Nang was known as "bugoy," being notorious in the community. 9
Gabasan demanded money from Epifania who replied that they had no money. She pleaded with them to spare her
life. The two men warned her, instead, to keep quiet. But as Epifania continued to struggle with the two, she sustained
wounds on her left wrist and neck. While Pablito Nang was restraining her, Sumiba Gamo searched their trunk, took
the money in it, and told Nang about it. 10 As the three intruders fled, one of them shouted threateningly that they
would come back. After the three had left, Epifania immediately shouted for help crying out, "Tabang mo kay gitulis
me!" (Help us, we were robbed!)
There being no immediate response to her cries for assistance, Epifania, hurriedly scampered downstairs. As she left
the house, she saw her husband Nicanor seriously wounded beside the mango tree. When she asked him to identify
his assailants, he named Pablito Nang and Sumiba Gamo and could make no more utterance as he was choking in his
own blood due to his grave condition. 11 When the neighbors arrived, they placed the wounded Nicanor on a bench
which they carried towards the road to bring him to a doctor. Unfortunately, however, Nicanor expired after only a
few minutes. 12
When Epifania inspected the family trunk that was ransacked by the intruders, she found out that the money
consisting of paper bills and coins totalling some P500.00 were taken by the three men. 13
The following day, Patrolman Alfren Humpa and Pfc. Ansaling Lingating conducted an investigation and drew a
sketch of the crime scene 14 which indicated the window of the Gonzales house overlooking the toilet, the one meter
distance of the toilet from the house, the four-meter distance of the toilet from the mango tree where the bloodstains
were found and the distance of the house from the road where the victim died.
The post mortem examination prepared by Rural Sanitation Inspector George Bayamban revealed that Nicanor
Gonzales sustained the following injuries:
1. One stab wound at the middle of the chest measuring 1 3/4 inch in length and 1 inch wide and 4 inches
deep;
2. One stab wound at the middle of his back measuring 1 3/4 inch in length and ½ inch wide and 4 inches
deep. 15
Hemorrhage due to stab wounds at middle back and chest was the cause of Nicanor's death. 16
The defense had an altogether different version of the occurrence. Accused-appellants Sumiba Gamo and
Lumonsog Gabasan interposed the defense of denial and alibi. In the morning of May 16, 1990, they were hired by
Lamberto Lingating Lusay to make copra at Guili-an, Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur. They started making copra after
breakfast at about 7:00 o'clock a.m. After they had finished their work at about 4:00 o'clock p.m., they decided to go to
the house of Lumonsog Gabasan in order to rest. While there, Ernie Gandamon arrived and summoned Temie
Gabasan, the brother of accused-appellant Lumonsog Gabasan, to discuss the impending marriage between Temie
and Ernie's cousin Myrna. The father of Lumonsog Gabasan agreed to go to the house of Myrna in Sitio Guili-an,
Poblacion, Lapuyan. He was accompanied by accused-appellants Lumonsog Gabasan and Sumiba Gamo, Dugang,
Temie and Mamerto Masulog. The group brought two chickens to symbolize the plighted troth between Temie and
Myrna.
Upon arrival at their destination, accused-appellants cooked and prepared the chickens for supper, after
which a wedding covenant was forged between the father of the prospective groom and Mamerto Masulog, the
guardian of the bride-to-be. While having dinner, they heard gunshots coming from the neighboring barangay,
thereby prompting the father of accused-appellant Lumonsog and his younger brother to go home at once out of
concern for the rest of the family. Accused-appellants Lumonsog Gabasan and Sumiba Gamo, together with Temie,
stayed behind and slept at the house of Ernie that evening. Upon waking up at 7:00 o'clock a.m., they then returned to
their place of work. 17 The defense presented Ernie Gandamon, Mamerto Masulog and Pendatun Bandatun to
corroborate accused-appellants' alibi. 18
On February 21, 1992, the trial court 19 rendered its judgment of conviction, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt accused
SUMINA GAMO and LUMONSOG GABASAN of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
sentences them to RECLUSION PERPETUA or LIFE IMPRISONMENT, with all the accessory
penalties prescribed by law and to return the sum of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS to the heirs
of victim Nicanor Gonzales which is the amount taken by them and to pay FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS as to compensation for the death of the victim Nicanor Gonzales to the latter's
heirs without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Both accused Sumina Gamo and
Lumonsog Gabasan having been in prison since June 5, 1990, are hereby credited FOUR-FIFTH
(4/5) of such preventive imprisonment in the service of their sentence herein imposed.
SO ORDERED." 20
Hence, this appeal. Appellants insist on their innocence and contend that the trial court erred:
"I . . . WHEN IT IGNORED MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION AND MADE FINDINGS OF FACT THAT ARE
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORDS AND THE EVIDENCE; Cdrep
II . . . WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE AND FULL WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WIFE
AND THE DAUGHTER OF THE DECEASED VICTIM NICANOR GONZALES;
III . . . WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS WERE GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE." 21
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Clearly, the core issue raised is factual and involves the credibility of the testimonies of witnesses. It is doctrinal that
this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of witnesses, unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misapprehended or misinterpreted. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. 22 There is no cogent reason for the Court to depart from this well-settled rule.
Accused-appellants point to certain errors committed by the trial court in its "findings of fact . . . that are not
supported by the records . . . (and thus) . . . greatly prejudiced their constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial."
They, therefore, submit that this case comes within the exception to the rule that the findings of the trial court with
regard to the credibility of the witnesses and the findings as to facts are not to be disturbed on appeal. 23 These
supposed errors are: (1) that the daughter of the deceased victim, Elizabeth, was hit on the head with a gun by one of
the three assailants, 24 but the records show that she only testified that she was hit on the head without mentioning a
gun; 25 (2) that Pablito Nang was identified by Epifania because he removed his mask while ransacking the family
trunk, 26 but witness Epifania said that she was able to remove the masks of the culprits while she was struggling
with them; (3) that Epifania was grabbed by two masked men and a third masked person followed and entered the
house and then ransacked the trunk, 27 but in the testimony of Epifania, only two persons entered their house and it
was appellant Gamo who opened the trunk, while the third, appellant Gabasan, was waiting by the stairs; 28 (4) that
the victim's wife, Epifania, did not identify Lumonsog Gabasan while the victim's daughter Elizabeth did not identify
Sumina Gamo, because they did not know them, hence the two told the truth, 29 but in their respective testimonies,
wife and daughter categorically identified all three accused as the ones who killed Nicanor, attacked them and robbed
them of their money. 30 Accused-appellants, therefore, conclude that because of these errors in its factual findings and
appreciation of the evidence, the lower court failed in its duty to conduct a real examination as to the credibility of the
testimony of the two key witnesses for the prosecution.
Upon careful examination of the assailed decision and the evidence on record, this Court agrees with accused-
appellants' observation that the trial court may indeed have committed some errors, but these lapses are not so grave
as to suffice to reverse the verdict of conviction against accused-appellants, who, as the records show, were
categorically and positively identified by eyewitnesses as the perpetrators of the crime being imputed to them.
More important, all the elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are shown to exist. The crime of robbery with
homicide is primarily classified as an offense against property and not against persons. It is therefore incumbent upon
the prosecution to establish that: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a
generic sense, was committed. 31 This Court is satisfied that all the elements of the crime attributed to accused-
appellants had been adequately established.
Accused-appellants attempt to discredit the testimonies of prosecution witnesses by pointing out certain alleged
inconsistencies and contradictions between their affidavits or sworn statements given to the police investigators vis-a-
vis their testimonies in open court. They allege that in Epifania's affidavit, nothing was mentioned about her being
stabbed by her attackers. What she stated was that Sumiba Gamo pointed a knife at her while Pablito Nang ransacked
the trunk. In court, however, she testified that Nang stabbed her and that Gamo was the one who opened the trunk,
and that she recognized them as she was able to snatch their masks. As regards the affidavit of Elizabeth, accused-
appellants point out that what was stated therein was that Lumonsog Gabasan whipped her with a pistol but she
made no mention about the gun in her court testimony, only her allegation that she was whipped by Lumonsog
Gabasan.
Contrary to what accused-appellants assert, there is no serious incongruence in the prosecution eyewitnesses' sworn
declarations and their testimonies. What is material is that their testimonies agree on the essential fact that the three
accused were present and they participated in the commission of the crime. It bears stressing that ex parte affidavits
are generally incomplete. Hence, inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiants in their sworn statements and
those in court do not necessarily discredit them. The infirmity of affidavits as evidence is a matter of judicial
experience. 32
In People v. Miranda, this Court observed thus:
". . . Predictably, testimonies given during trials are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in
sworn statements. Ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for varied reasons,
at times because of partial and innocent suggestions or for want of specific inquiries. Witnesses cannot be
expected everytime, except when told, to distinguish between what may be inconsequential and what may
be mere insignificant details."
In the same vein, this Court noted in People v. Reyes, 34 viz.:
". . . Differences in the narration of an incident between the sworn statements and the testimony of a
witness are not unknown. The infirmity of an extrajudicial statement is a matter of judicial experience. An
extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiant's statement; hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer
are not infrequent."
Thus, as between sworn statements taken ex parte and testimonies given in open court, the latter are generally held to
be superior. The rationale is that affidavits are oftentimes executed when an affiant's mental faculties are not in such a
state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident that has transpired. 35 Affidavits are not
complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind because the administering officer generally prepares them
and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to him. 36
In the case at bar, the alleged inconsistencies between the affidavits and testimonies of witnesses are minor and do not
affect their credibility as witnesses. They merely show that their affidavits are incomplete with respect to certain
details that do not in any way detract from the overall veracity of their testimonies. Minor inconsistencies serve
instead to strengthen their credibility as they are badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood. The most candid
witnesses oftentimes make mistakes and fall into confused and inconsistent statements but such honest lapses do not
necessarily affect their credibility. Far from eroding the effectiveness of the testimonies of the two witnesses, such
trivial differences in fact constitute signs of veracity. What is clear is that their affidavits and testimonies concur on all
material points and establish the presence of accused-appellants at the scene of the crime and the manner in which
they executed the same.
Accused-appellants also assail the trial court's utmost reliance on the testimony of 11-year-old Elizabeth considering
her tender age and alleged low level of understanding, intelligence and common sense. On this score, it is well-
established that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined. 39
The requirements of a child's competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation (b) capacity of recollection and
(c) capacity of communication. The determination of whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the
foregoing requirements is addressed to the sound judgment of the trial court. In the instant case, this Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the trial court's assessment regarding Elizabeth's credibility as a witness.
Accused-appellants' defense of alibi is, as repeatedly pronounced, one of the weakest defenses an accused can
invoke. 40 Accordingly, courts have invariably looked upon it with caution, if not suspicion, not only because it is
inherently unreliable but because it is rather easy to fabricate. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused by the prosecution's witness who has no motive to testify falsely against them. For alibi to be believed,
credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime is indispensable.
The accused must show that he was at such other place for such a period of time that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission.
Evidence of physical impossibility had not been adduced in the case at bar. Barangay Guili-an where Lumonsog
Gabasan and Sumiba Gamo claimed to be at the time of the commission of the crime is not far from Sitio San Pedro,
Brgy. Lubosan where the crime was committed. According to defense witness Ernie Gandamon, the distance between
Guili-an and San Pedro Lubosan, Lapuyan, can be negotiated in 20 minutes by riding a carabao or by hiking.
Moreover, accused-appellants' alibi cannot prevail in light of the positive identification of prosecution eyewitnesses
Epifania and Elizabeth Gonzales who have not been proved to harbor any ill-motives in testifying against the
accused-appellants.
Challenge is also made as to the credibility of the key witnesses being the wife and child of the deceased victim.
Relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses. Indeed, it would be unnatural for the
relatives of the victims who seek justice to commit another injustice by imputing the crime on innocent persons and
not on those who were actually responsible therefor.
Moreover, the delay of witnesses in revealing to the authorities the identities of the accused may be attributable to
trauma, confusion, and grief. It is quite understandable when the witnesses do not immediately report the identity of
the offender after a startling occurrence more specifically when they are related to victim as they just had a traumatic
experience.
The trial court correctly found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide as defined in Article 294(I) of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution has established with moral certainty
through the eyewitness testimonies of Epifania and Elizabeth that accused-appellants used violence and intimidation
against the members of the Gonzales family in carrying out their intention to rob them. They stabbed to death Nicanor
Gonzales to facilitate the commission of the robbery and attacked his wife Epifania and 11-year-old child Elizabeth
causing them injuries, in carrying out their intention to rob them of their money. It was likewise amply shown
through eyewitness testimony that accused-appellants took away some P500.00 from the Gonzales family trunk.
There being proof of asportation, animus lucrandi is presumed. 49
In the crime of robbery with homicide, the homicide may precede robbery or may occur after robbery. What is
essential is that there is a nexus, an intimate connection between robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior or
subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.
Likewise, the rule is well-established that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it
clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. Such exception does not apply in the instant case. By
their concerted action, accused-appellants and Pablito Nang obviously conspired to rob the Gonzales family, on which
occasion they killed Nicanor to facilitate their criminal intent. It is immaterial, therefore, that accused-appellants
merely held the arms of Nicanor Gonzales while Pablito Nang stabbed him. In view of the presence of conspiracy, all
the perpetrators of the crime shall bear equal responsibility.
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death under Article
294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the proper imposable penalty upon accused-appellants is reclusion
perpetua in the absence of proven mitigating or aggravating circumstances. However, the trial court erroneously
imposed on accused-appellants the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." Reclusion perpetua and life
imprisonment are not synonymous penalties — there are distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties.
This Court has distinguished between the two penalties in previous decisions, going as far back as People v. Mobe and,
recently, in People v.Antonio Magana, thus:
"The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of 'life imprisonment' for any of the felonies
therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the . . . Code
but by the special law. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least (30) years, after which the
convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special
disqualification, etc. It is not the same as 'life imprisonment' which, for one thing, does not carry with it any
accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting accused-appellants Sumina Gamo and Lumunsog Gabasan of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the phrase "or life imprisonment"
in the dispositive portion thereof is DELETED. Cdrep
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation which
shall effect with dispatch the arrest of Pablito Nang in order that he may be put on trial for the crime charged and
duly proved here. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 147678-87. July 7, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.EFREN MATEO
VITUG, J p:
On 30 October 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, allegedly committed on ten different dates — 07
October 1995, 14 December 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 29 February 1996, 08 May 1996, 02 July 1996, 18
July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996 — were filed against appellant EFREN MATEO. Except for the variance
in dates, the ten informations, later docketed Criminal Cases No. 9351 to No. 9360, inclusive, in the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac, uniformly read —
"The undersigned OIC Provincial Prosecutor upon preliminary investigation conducted by
the MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1, accuses Efren Mateo of Brgy. Buenavista, Tarlac, Tarlac of the
crime of Rape, committed as follows:
"That on or about January 12, 1996, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Efren Mateo y
Garcia, who is the guardian of the complaining witness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with said Imelda C.
Mateo in their house against her consent." 1
The trial ensued following a plea of "not guilty" entered by appellant to all the charges.
According to Imelda Mateo, she was born on 11 September 1980 to the spouses Dan Icban and Rosemarie Capulong.
Rosemarie Capulong and appellant started to live together without the benefit of marriage when private complainant
was only two years old. Imelda stayed with her mother and appellant in a house in Buenavista, Tarlac, and adopted
the surname of appellant when she started schooling.
Imelda recalled that each time the ten rape incidents occurred her mother, Rosemarie, was not at home. On 07 October
1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie went to Bamban and returned home only the next day. The second rape was
said to have occurred on 14 December 1995, while her mother was attending a seminar for day-care workers. Imelda
recalled the third rape to have been committed on 05 January 1996, the same day her mother resigned from her job
and left for Manila. The fourth rape, she said, happened a week later, on 12 January 1996, when Rosemarie Capulong
was attending yet another seminar for day-care workers. The fifth incident was on 29 February 1996, when Rosemarie
left for Manila to follow-up her application for an overseas job. The sixth rape took place on 08 May 1996 when
Rosemarie was once again in Manila to attend to her application papers. On 01 July 1996, Rosemarie and appellant left
for Manila as Rosemarie was scheduled to depart for Jeddah. Appellant returned home in the evening of the next day,
02 July 1996, the same day the job recruiter relayed the news that Rosemarie Capulong could not yet leave for Jeddah.
During the night, appellant again molested Imelda. With Rosemarie finally away, appellant frequented his nocturnal
visits. On the night of 18 July 1996, appellant went into her room and abused her while her siblings were sleeping in
the sala.The same incident was repeated on the night of 16 August 1996 when appellant, already naked, entered the
room and sexually assaulted Imelda. The last rape was committed on 28 August 1996. According to private
complainant, she never reported any of the ten incidents to anybody because the accused had threatened to kill her
and her mother if she were to disclose the matter to anyone.
Imelda stated that each of the ten rape incidents were committed in invariably the same fashion. All were perpetrated
inside the house in Buenavista, Tarlac, during the night and, each time, she would try to ward off his advances by
kicking him but that he proved to be too strong for her. These incidents occurred in the presence of her three sleeping
siblings who failed to wake up despite the struggles she exerted to fend off the advances. She recalled that in all ten
instances, appellant had covered her mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting. Subsequently,
however, she changed her statement to say that on two occasions, particularly the alleged sexual assaults on 02 July
1996 and 18 July 1996, appellant had only covered her mouth with his hands. Still much later, Imelda testified that he
had not covered her mouth at all.
The predictable pattern of the rape incidents testified to by Imelda prompted the defense to ask her whether she had,
at any one time, taken any protective measure in anticipation of the rape incidents. She replied that once she had
requested her brothers and sister to keep her company in the bedroom at night but appellant had scolded them. On
the night of the fourth rape, she narrated that she armed herself with a knife but, when appellant entered her room
that night, she was not able to retrieve the bladed weapon from under the bed as appellant was sitting right on top of
it. CcTHaD
Dr. Rosario Fider, the second witness for the prosecution, stated that she had physically examined private
complainant on 14 October 1996 and found superficially healed lacerations at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 positions on her
private organ that could have been caused by an insertion of an instrument or by sexual intercourse. According to Dr.
Fider, the lacerations pointed to possibly one or two, and at most three, incidents of rape, which had happened not
earlier than two weeks before the date of the physical examination.
Appellant denied each of the charges. On 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, he claimed that he was
in Barangay Talaga, Capas, to pick up newly hatched ducklings, numbering about a thousand, which had to be
properly fed, kept warm and constantly cared for that required him to be around the entire day and night for two
weeks. The fowls had then to be brought into an open field located one and a half kilometers away which could be
traversed by foot. He continued to tend to the animals from 20 October 1995 until sometime in February 1996. During
the period, he was able to go home only once a week or three times a month.
On 14 December 1995, the supposed date of the second rape, appellant admitted that he had temporarily left the care
of his ducks to go caroling with his wife, their daughter Imelda and some friends. He immediately returned to care for
his ducks, located some 500 meters from their residence, that kept him busy and away from home when the third,
fourth and fifth rape incidents were said to have taken place on the 5th and 12th of January and 29th of February of
1996. While he admitted to leaving occasionally the animals in order to go home, these visits, however, were said to be
brief and mainly for getting some food and fresh clothes. Appellant could not recall when exactly he sold the ducks
but it was definitely prior to 08 May 1996, the day he was accepted and reported for work at the LA Construction of
Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac, located some three kilometers away. On 08 May 1996, the date of the sixth rape, he was at
work from seven o'clock in the morning until the following day to finish a rush job.
On 01 July 1996, he accompanied his wife, Rosemarie, to Manila who was scheduled to leave for Jeddah the following
day. Upon being advised that her flight was postponed, the couple stayed in the house of one Luding Sevilla in
Caloocan. On 03 July, he returned to Tarlac. From 15 July to September, 1996, he was given the nightshift at the LA
Construction. Appellant asserted that it was impossible for him to have raped private complainant on 28 August 1996
because at six o'clock that evening, his friends Boy Botio, Boy Pineda, Marvin Dalangin and Nelson Castro had picked
him up at his house to attend the fiesta at BarangayMurcia, Concepcion, Tarlac, where they spent the night.
Appellant dismissed the charges against him as being the malicious "retribution" of a vengeful stepdaughter.
Allegedly, on 11 October 1996, he took private complainant to task after his son, Marlon Mateo, who had reported
seeing her engaged in sexual intercourse with one Pikong Navarro inside the room of their house. Earlier, on 05
August 1996, he also learned that Sharon Flores, a neighbor and a friend of private complainant, had caught his
stepdaughter and Navarro in a very compromising position. In anger, he hit Imelda twice with a piece of bamboo. He
then forbade her from going out at night and leaving her siblings alone in the house. HTcADC
Rosemarie Capulong, the mother of private complainant, rose to testify in defense of her common-law husband.
Capulong asserted that she had not at any time, prior to her departure for Jeddah, spent any night outside their house.
Rosemarie said that she was a day-care teacher from June 1990 until June 1996. On 07 October 1995, the date of the
supposed first rape, she was at home and did not go to Bamban as so claimed by private complainant. Capulong
disputed the claim of private complainant that she attended a seminar for day-care workers on 12 January 1996 since
her job did not require her to attend seminars except for regular meetings held on the last Friday of every month, with
each meeting lasting for only half a day. The last seminar she had attended was in June of 1990 in Tarlac. On 29
February 1996, Rosemarie was also certain that she spent the night at home as she had to report for work the
following day. She started obtaining documents for her planned employment abroad only on 12 February 1996, when
she secured her birth certificate in Bamban as so attested by the date appearing on the certification from the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Bamban. On 08 May 1996, she admitted being away from home while attending a general assembly
of day-care workers in Zambales. On that day, appellant was likewise not at home due to his overtime work up until
about three or four o'clock in the early morning. Imelda herself, Capulong testified, had attended on that day the San
Miguel fiesta.Contrary to the allegation of private complainant, the witness was not in Manila on the 5th and 12th of
January 1996 because, at that time, she had yet no plans of working overseas. She denied the assertions of private
complainant that Capulong had resigned from her day-care work on 05 January 1996, saying it was actually months
later, or in June of 1996, when she quit her job. It was on 13 February 1996 when she went to Manila for the first time
to attend to her application for a possible overseas work. She made subsequent trips to the city, that is, on the 3rd, 5th,
8th and 24th of the month of June, to follow-up her employment papers and to submit herself to a medical check-up.
All these visits only took a day, and she would always be home in Buenavista at nightfall. On 01 July 1996, appellant
accompanied her to Manila but, upon learning that her flight was postponed, they spent the night in Caloocan. The
couple stayed together in Manila until 03 July 1996, when appellant decided to return to Tarlac. Rosemarie worked in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, until 11 November 1996 when she decided to return home.
Rosemarie Capulong corroborated the testimony of appellant regarding his whereabouts from October 1995, when
the ducks were first brought to the field, until 15 December 1995, when appellant had joined her and their friends
caroling. Capulong believed that the charges may have been fabricated by her relatives who were "jealous" of
appellant because it was he, not they, who had been receiving the remittances of her earnings from Saudi Arabia.
Sharon Flores, a neighbor, testified that, about noontime on 05 August 1996, she repaired to the house of private
complainant to investigate rumors regarding a man seen entering the Capulong residence. When she went in, she saw
private complainant and Pikong Navarro lying on the bed, embracing each other under a blanket.
Anselmo Botio, a friend of appellant, and Marlon Mateo, a brother of private complainant, corroborated
appellant's alibi.Botio said that on 28 August 1996, at six o'clock in the evening, he, together with appellant and some
friends, went to attend the fiesta in Barangay Murcia upon the invitation of one Ruben Santos. The group arrived in
Murcia at seven o'clock that evening and promptly had dinner and a drinking spree which lasted until the morning of
the next day.
Marlon Mateo testified that one day in October 1996, while his mother was working overseas, he arrived home from
school, and saw Pikong Navarro and private complainant, both naked, on the bed. Navarro was on top of private
complainant and was making thrusting motions. Marlon Mateo hurriedly left to report the incident to his father.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision, dated 23 January 2001, finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape —
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and to indemnify the complainant the sum
of P50,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape." 2
More often than not, the Court has deemed it sufficient to convict an accused for rape solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim. 3 The heavy reliance normally given by the Court on the narration of the victim finds
justification on the fact that, generally, she would be the sole witness to the incident and the shy and demure character
of the typical Filipina would preclude her from fabricating that crime. It is imperative, nonetheless, that the testimony
must be convincing and straightforward in order to avoid any serious doubt from being cast on the veracity of the
account given.
Relative to the first supposed rape incident, private complainant categorically stated that she had slept in the lone
bedroom of the house while her siblings and her stepfather slept in the sala —
"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?
"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q. How did (sic) he able to take you out from the room? In what way?
"A. She (sic) lifted me and still my mouth was covered, my hands were stocked and I cannot move, sir.
"Q. She (sic) lifted you by his two hands, is that right? AaITCH
"A. Yes, sir." 4
"Q. You testified on direct examination that there is only one room in your house, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And you were then sleeping inside your house in that one room, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. While your brothers as well as your stepfather were then sleeping outside your room, you [were]
also sleeping, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir." 5
In the next breath, however, she testified that all her three siblings were sleeping with her on the night of 07
October 1995 —
"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?
"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.
"Q. Do you want to tell this Honorable Court that he brought you to the sala where your brothers Ryan and
Marlon and your sister Iris were then sleeping?
"A. My brothers and sister were sleeping in the room, sir.
"Q. Is it not a fact that there was only one room in your house?
"A. But they slept there on that night, sir.
"Q. In other words, Madam Witness, you were sleeping together with Ryan, Marlon, and Iris by that time in one
room together in one bed?
"A. Yes, sir." 6
Still, later, Imelda changed her testimony and said that her brothers were in the sala and that it was only her sister
Iris who was with her in the bedroom when the rape incidents were committed —
"Q. How about your brother Ryan where did he sleep on October 7, 1995?
"A. At the sala, sir.
"Q. Who was with him in the sala?
"A. He [was] sleeping with my stepfather and my brother Marlon, sir.
"Q. How about Iris, where was she sleeping? aCTcDH
"A. She was with me, sir.
"Q. You mean to imply to the Court that according to you the accused abused you on October 7, 1995, Iris [was]
with you in the room?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Are you sure of that?
"A. Yes, sir.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q. You stated in your direct testimony that on October 7, 1995 your father entered your room where you were
sleeping, covering your mouth and forced you to go to the sala, do you recall that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember that you have testified that he was able to take you to the sala?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And then when you reached the sala, you stated that the accused criminally abused you? IaSAHC
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember having been asked by the prosecutor examining you, and now I cite to you your
statement; 'Q — Public Prosecutor Llobrera, 'Now, let us make it clear. You said you were brought to the
sala and your answer, 'Yes, sir.''' Do you not remember having made that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And another question, 'When you reached the sala what were the first things he did to you and your answer,
'He kissed me, sir." Do you remember that?
"A. No, sir. The first time he abused me was in the room, sir." 7
The Solicitor General would posit that the claim of private complainant that she had the sole privilege of sleeping in
the lone bedroom of their house while the rest of the family, namely both her parents and her three siblings, had to
squeeze themselves in the sala strained credulity, and that the testimony of her mother, Rosemarie Capulong, to the
effect that the couple were the occupants of the single bedroom while their children stayed in the sala where the
television was located, made more sense. EADCHS
Imelda testified that her three siblings — Marlon, Ryan and Iris — were sleeping inside the house every time the rape
incidents were committed. The identical testimony of everyone else in the Mateo household, including her mother
Rosemarie Capulong and brother Marlon Mateo, exposed such assertions to be a blatant lie and categorically stated
that Ryan himself had never stayed in the Mateo residence because he was living with his grandparents since
childhood.
Private complainant testified that during the rape incidents she was gagged with a handkerchief which rendered her
unable to shout for help. Later on, however, she gave different versions on whether appellant covered her mouth with
his hand or with a handkerchief during the rape incidents occurring on 07 October 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January
1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996. Eventually, she repudiated her earlier testimony by stating
that appellant had never covered her mouth, either with a handkerchief or with his hand —
"Q. Both the incidents of July 2 and July 18, according to you, he only covered your mouth on both occasions?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. He did not tie your mouth with anything?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Miss Witness, in your statement also on August 20, 1997, you stated that the accused covered your mouth
and tied your mouth with a handkerchief on both occasions. Do you remember having given that
statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. So, you do not remember having made that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Recalling your testimony you gave on August 20, 1997, for the July 2 occasion and the testimony that you
gave as appearing on page 18 of the transcript of stenographic notes. These questions and answers were
given and answered by you. 'Q. While he was doing all these things to you, did you call for help? A. I
cannot shout because my mouth was covered with a handkerchief, sir. Q. Was he holding that
handkerchief? A. It was tied, sir.' On July 17, 1997, you said that the accused tied your mouth on July 2,
1996, and you said that you cannot shout because your mouth was tied with a handkerchief. Do you
remember having stated that?
"A. No, sir.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q. On the July 18 occasion, you also stated in your direct testimony on August 29, 1997, when asked these
following questions appearing on page 21 of the transcript of stenographic notes. 'Q. Tell the Court how
did he rape you on that night? A. On that night while I was sleeping in my room, he tied a handkerchief
in my mouth so I could not shout, sir.' Do you remember having stated that?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And also you were asked this question: 'Q. After tying this handkerchief to your mouth, what did he do to
you?' You said that he raped you. Do you remember having given this statement?
"A. No, sir." 8
Also quite telling were some discrepancies in the testimony of private complainant regarding the whereabouts of her
mother Rosemarie Capulong on the dates of the incidents. According to private complainant, it was when her mother
Rosemarie was not at home when appellant would commit the dastardly crimes. Not only did the account of Imelda
contradict that of Rosemarie but that Imelda herself would appear to have made irreconcilable statements. According
to her, on 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie had gone to Bamban to visit her mother. Subsequently,
however, she said that Rosemarie went to Bamban because she worked there, only to later say that, at that time,
Rosemarie had already resigned from work. Imelda would further change her story by stating that Rosemarie
Capulong did not report for work that day; then, in a quick turnaround, she remarked that her mother did go to
Bamban not to work but to get her birth certificate. Interestingly, Imelda said that 07 October 1995 was a working day,
and that she had gone to school the following day. Judicial notice could be taken of the fact, however, that 07 October
1995 was a Saturday and that the following day, a Sunday, could not have been a school day. With respect to the rape
committed on 12 January 1996, Imelda testified that Rosemarie was attending a seminar; yet, when cross-examined,
she told the trial court that on that day Rosemarie went to Manila to borrow money from her cousin.
The subsequent conduct of a victim could also either confirm or negate her claim of rape. 9 The human nature,
characterized by an instinct for self-preservation and an aversion to humiliation, would dictate that a typical victim of
rape could display changes in behavior, erratic mood swings and an alteration in her daily routine. No such changes
were observed in the case of private complainant. She testified that on the day after the first incident on 07 October
1995, she woke up at six o'clock in the morning, washed her face, and went to school. There was no apparent attempt
on her part to run away from home despite every chance to escape from her tormentor or to exercise every means
available to ensure that the incidents would not be repeated. At fifteen years old, already old enough to think of her
safety and well-being, Imelda Mateo went about her usual business as if nothing unusual had occurred. She
continued to sleep in the same bedroom with nary any precaution against the bestiality she was sure would come
everytime her mother was away.
While it may be argued that appellant's moral ascendancy over Imelda was enough to intimidate her to suffer in
silence; still, it could well be improbable for a victim who had been raped no less than ten times not to make a simple
outcry against her unarmed rapist when she had every opportunity to do so.
The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal of appellant.
The records would disclose that the first half of the trial, from 17 July 1997 until 15 October 1997, was conducted by
Judge Lino L. Diamsay. Judge Edgardo F. Sundiam conducted the trial from 14 January 1999 until 24 February 1999.
From 11 May 1999 until the day of the last hearing, it was Judge Arsenio P. Adriano who heard the case. While this
change of the presiding judges would not invalidate the proceedings, it did deny to the deciding magistrate the
opportunity to observe in entirety the demeanor of the witnesses which could well be vital to the decision-making
process, particularly where credibility would, by and large, constitute the singular issue.
The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same
occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution —
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher."
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, 10 as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule
122, 11 Section 10 of Rule 122, 12 Section 13 of Rule 124 13 and Section 3 of Rule 125 14 of the Rules of Court. It
must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not
necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or
review in favor of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of
unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would
appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on
the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical
dilemma, i.e.,the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to
face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to
review factual issues.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua,life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review.
If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed,
the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the
case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior
determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error
of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it
could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from
entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition. 15
Statistics would disclose that within the eleven-year period since the re-imposition of the death penalty law in
1993 until June 2004, the trial courts have imposed capital punishment in approximately 1,493, 16 out of which 907
cases 17 have been passed upon in review by the Court. In the Supreme Court, where these staggering numbers find
their way on automatic review, the penalty has been affirmed in only 230 cases comprising but 25.36% of the total
number. Significantly, in more than half or 64.61% of the cases, the judgment has been modified through an order of
remand for further proceedings, by the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or by a reduction of the
sentence. Indeed, the reduction by the Court of the death penalty to reclusion perpetua has been made in no less than
483 cases or 53.25% of the total number. The Court has also rendered a judgment of acquittal in sixty-five (65) cases. In
sum, the cases where the judgment of death has either been modified or vacated consist of an astounding 71.77% of
the total of death penalty cases directly elevated before the Court on automatic review that translates to a total of six
hundred fifty-one (651) out of nine hundred seven (907) appellants saved from lethal injection.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the Supreme
Court —
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts."
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the Supreme
Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate
review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on
automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10
of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc,dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules
of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with the discussions
hereinabove set forth. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; THERE IS NO ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE THAT NON-FLIGHT IS AN INDICATION OF
INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners likewise aver that they did not flee when the law enforcers arrived, and even
voluntarily reported to the Ivisan Police Station the following morning. They submit that their alleged non-flight should strengthen
their claim of innocence. We disagree. There is no established doctrine to the effect that, in every instance, non-flight is an
indication of innocence. Moreover, even if they wanted to, petitioners could not have possibly eluded the law enforcers who were
in two pump boats. Attempts to flee would also have been useless since petitioners were already identified by the barrio captain.
2. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ASSESSMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF
PROSECUTION IS ACCORDED GREAT RESPECT BY APPELLATE TRIBUNALS; CASE AT BAR. — In fine, we find no reason to
disturb the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso.
Its findings are accorded great respect by appellate tribunals since trial courts have the advantage of examining the witnesses'
testimonies and observing their demeanor first hand.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 704; ILLEGAL FISHING HAS BEEN COMMITTED WHEN FISH CAUGHT OR
KILLED WITH THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES, OBNOXIOUS OR POISONOUS SUBSTANCE OR BY ELECTRICITY ARE FOUND IN
THE FISHING BOAT; CASE AT BAR. — In Hizon vs. Court of Appeals (265 SCRA 517 [1996]), this Court held that the law, as
contained in the last paragraph of Section 33, creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when fish caught or
killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. In this case, it
cannot be denied that the fishes found in petitioners' banca were caught or killed by the use of explosives.
4. ID.; ID.; PENALTIES; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FOR FAILURE TO APPLY AND
IMPOSE AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE WITH A DEFINITE MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM TERM; CASE AT BAR. — The
penalty imposed by law for illegal fishing if explosive is actually used is imprisonment ranging from twenty (20) years to life
imprisonment. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if, as in this case, the offense is punished by a law other than the
Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. The
trial court therefore erred when it sentenced petitioners to "suffer a straight penalty of twenty (20) years imprisonment." In Spouses
Jose and Trinidad Bacar vs. Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. (271 SCRA 328 [1997]), we held that it was erroneous to impose a straight
penalty of six (6) years imprisonment on the accused for homicide. . . . Accordingly, the proper penalty to be imposed upon the
accused should be an indeterminate penalty which is hereby set at twenty (20) years as minimum to twenty-five (25) years
asmaximum.
KAPUNAN, J p:
This is a petition to review the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15, 2 finding petitioners herein guilty of "illegal fishing with the use of an
explosive," the dispositive portion of which reads: LexLib
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo and Richard Balbona,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal fishing with the use of an explosive punishable
under Section 33 in relation to Section 38 of Presidential Decree No. 704 dated May 16, 1975 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058 dated December 1, 1976and each shall suffer a straight penalty of
twenty (20) years imprisonment.
However, accused, Johnson Sucgang, Elvis Villar and Efren Alvaro, are acquitted for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The fish sample is forfeited in favor of the government.
Considering the penalty imposed upon the accused, Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo and Richard
Balbona, the bail bond for their provisional liberty is increased to Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos each
effective immediately upon promulgation. They shall not be released from detention until they put up an
appropriate bail bond for their provisional liberty.
The property bond of accused, Johnson Sucgang, Elvis Villar and Efren Alvaro, are deemed cancelled.
Costs against the convicted accused.
SO ORDERED. 3
On August 1, 1990, an Information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz charging Johnson Sucgang, Policarpio
Umiten, Elvis Villar, Santiago Argoncillo, Richardo Balbona and Efren Alvaro with illegal fishing (with the use of
dynamite), as follows: cdtai
That at or about 6:30 o'clock [sic] in the evening of May 7, 1990, in the sea water of Barangay Basiao,
Ivisan, Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
catch, take, gather and have in their possession and control different species of fish with the use of
explosives. 4
Upon arraignment on September 11, 1990, the accused, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the
offense charged. Trial ensued thereafter.
The lower court synthesized the evidence presented by the prosecution as follows: 5
Due to reports of rampant illegal fishing at Barangay Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz, personnel from the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources specifically from the Bureau of Fisheries as well as the
Barangay Captain of said place assisted by the local policemen created a team to conduct surveillance within the
Ivisan Bay. Thus, around 5:30 in the afternoon of May 7, 1990, a team riding in two (2) pumpboats from the
Barangay Basiao wharf proceeded along the waters of Ivisan Bay. Riding in one pumpboat were Persinefles U.
Oabe, the Barangay Captain of said place; Rolando Amoroso, an employee of the Bureau of Fisheries; Pat. Rafael
Tupaz, a member of the local Integrated National Police and Remegio Unasin, a barangay councilman who acted
as the pilot. In the other pumpboat were Joey de la Cruz, a co-employee of Rolando Amoroso; Pat. Reggie Uadan
and Enido Baldesimo. Now and then, the team had to stop and listen for possible occurrences of illegal fishing
within their vicinity. Around 6:30 of the same evening while standing by with their engines off, in a place facing
Barangay Culasi, they heard an explosion. Sensing it was caused by dynamite, they proceeded to the area around
five hundred meters (500 m.) away from them.
After ten minutes of navigation, the team arrived at the scene in question which was near an islet. They
surrounded the area. At a distance of around ten meters, Joey de la Cruz, an employee of the Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources, saw three persons diving into the water. Thereafter, they would surface and throw their
catch of fish to the unmotorized banca around four meters long nearby. In the seashore of said islet, around three
to four meters away from these three persons float in the water, were three other persons standing in the rocky
portions around three meters apart. These six persons tried to escape but Rolando Amoroso, the co-employee of
Joey de la Cruz, advised them not to do so and introduced themselves as law enforcers. The team found out that
the fishes they caught were deep sea fish of four kinds locally known as "vulgan," "bulawis," "pacol," and "bag-
angan." Joey de la Cruz gathered seven fish samples from their banca while Rolando Amoroso went down from
the pumpboat and proceeded to the islet. However, upon inspection, he failed to find any explosive (dynamite)
either on the seashore or on the banca. No paraphernalia used in dynamite fishing were found. Both Joey de la
Cruz and Rolando Amoroso recognized the six persons as the herein accused by their faces.
Persinefles U. Oabe, barangay captain of Barangay Basiao, who was with the team riding in a pumpboat
with Rolando Amoroso identified the three persons retrieving fish from the water as Policarpio Umiten, Santiago
Argoncillo and Richard Balbona while the other three persons standing on the rocky portions of the islet as
Johnson Sucgang, Elvis Umiten and Efren Alvaro.
The team apprehended the six accused and brought them to the fish cage of the barangay captain located
within the same barangay. While on their way, Joey de la Cruz externally examined the fish samples.
Upon their arrival at the fish cage, another external examination was conducted by Joey de la Cruz and
Rolando Amoroso. In both external examinations, the two found out that the fishes were caught with the use of
explosives because blood was oozing from their operculums and their eyes were protruding.
An on-the-spot investigation was conducted but the accused denied any culpability. They were then
released on the strength of their promise to report to the local police the following day.
The fish samples were then placed in a plastic bag filled with ice at the house of Barangay Captain
Persinefles U. Oabe that evening. In the morning, Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso brought the fish samples
to their office in Roxas City where they conducted an internal examination. The examination revealed that the fish
samples were caught with the use of explosives because their air bladders were raptured and deeply stained with
blood; the vertebral columns were broken but with bloodstains; their ribs were broken; and there were blood clots
in their abdomens. Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso rendered a written report of their internal examination
to the Provincial Agricultural Officer.
The testimonies of Joey de la Cruz, Rolando Amoroso, and Persinefles U. Oabe above were corroborated
by Pat. Rafael Tupaz, one of the police escorts of the team.
Sgt. Sergio Ordales, a member of the local police of the municipality of Ivisan testified that while on duty
in the morning of May 8, 1990, herein six accused arrived at their station. He asked why they were there and they
answered that they were told to report to the police station. He learned from them that they were arrested for
illegal fishing with the use of explosives.
On the other hand, the lower court portrayed the evidence presented by the version of the defense, thus:
All the accused denied the imputation of the prosecution.
Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo, Richard O. Balbona were uniform in alleging that around 4:00 in
the afternoon of May 7, 1990, they dropped a fishnet about two hundred (200) 'armslength' and one (1) meter in
width at the scene where they were apprehended. This method they locally call "patuloy" requires that the fishnet
be retrieved every hour to collect its catch. The trio went back to the place near the islet in question around 6:30 in
the evening for the purpose of collecting their catch from the fishnet. They had not been able to collect all their
catch from the net when the team of law enforcers, prosecution witnesses herein, arrived. They were asked
whether they heard an explosion. After they denied having heard any, Barangay Captain Persinefles U. Oabe, told
the accused to go with them. The team got seven pieces of fish samples. The accused left around one and one-half
kilos of fish they had gathered at the time the team of law enforcers arrived. They were then brought to the fish
cage owned by Persinefles U. Oabe at Barangay Basiao.
Above three accused would like the Court to believe that the seven pieces of fish samples taken by the
team of fishing law enforcers were the catch of their fishnet they locally called "patuloy."
On the other hand, Elvis Villar testified that he and Efren Alvaro were together in going to the islet in
question, riding in an unmotorized banca to gather shells locally called "suso" and "butlogan" for viand. Both
started gathering shells under the stones in the islet around 5:30 in the afternoon. While they were preparing to go
home at around 6:30 in the evening, the team of law enforcers riding in motorized pumpboats arrived. The
barangay captain and the personnel from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources asked them whether they
heard an explosion. After they denied having heard any, they were told by the barangay captain to board their
pumpboats. They obliged, leaving the shells they had gathered. They were then brought to the fish cage of the
barangay captain.
Although accused Johnson Sucgang admitted his presence in the islet in question, he offered a different
explanation. He testified that he went to said place to look for "Pulutan" requested by his customer, Wilfredo
Arcangeles. Being an operator and manager of Virgen Beach Resort located at Sitio Manangkalan, he obliged.
Thus, between 5:00 to 5:30 in the afternoon of May 7, 1990, he left his resort riding in a banca. He paddled his way
towards the islet where he saw two persons at the bank while the other three were on the water. He went ashore.
Later, the barangay captain and his companions riding in two pumpboats arrived. Like his co-accused, he was
asked if he heard an explosion. After he denied hearing any, the barangay captain told him to go with them. They
were all brought to the fish cage of the barangay captain for questioning.
Wilfredo Arcangeles corroborated the claim of Johnson Sucgang. He confirmed that he requested the
latter to look for "pulutan" since he had visitors from Bacolod City prompting Johnson Sucgang to look for some.
He saw the accused leave in a banca and affirmed that he had no dynamite with him. 6
On September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision which, as stated at the beginning, was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners point out that the fact that neither explosives nor related paraphernalia were found in their
possession is an indication of their innocence.
We do not agree. First, it is quite probable that petitioners dumped these materials into the sea while the
raiding party was approaching. Moreover, Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1058, provides:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; . . . — It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather, or
cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the
use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in
paragraphs (l), 7 (m) 8 and (d), 9 respectively, of Sec. 3 hereof . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds containing
combustible elements, or obnoxious or poisonous substance, or equipment or device for electric
fishing in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman shall constitute a presumption that
the same were used for fishing in violation of this Decree, the discovery in any fishing boat of fish
caught or killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or by electricity shall
constitute a presumption that the owner, operator or fisherman were fishing with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity. LexLib
In Hizon vs. Court of Appeals, 10 this Court held that the law, as contained in the last paragraph of Section
33, creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when fish caught or killed with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. In this case, it cannot
be denied that the fishes found in petitioners' banca were caught or killed by the use of explosives.
The Report 11 of Bureau of Fisheries employees Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Agriculture
Roxas City
1990-05-08
The Provincial Agricultural Officer
Department of Agriculture
Roxas City
Sir:
I have the honor to submit to this office the result of the scientific fish examination conducted on the
fish samples taken from the possession of Mr. Johnson Umiten Sucgang, 38 years old, married and resident of
Barangay Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz and company on May 7, 1990, 6:30 PM by combined elements of the
Department of Agriculture, PC/INP Unit of Ivisan, Capiz and Barangay officials, of Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz
conducting sea borne patrol on illegal fishing.
Source of fish samples Sea water of Brgy., Basiao,
Ivisan, Capiz
Fish samples taken from Johnson U. Sucgang, 38 years old,
married, of Brgy., Basiao, Ivisan,
Capiz, et. al.
Date fish samples taken May 7, 1990 at 6:30 PM
Date fish samples examined May 7, 1990 at 7:00 PM
Name of fish samples taken Number Weight Value
Local Name
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the
assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their
demonstrated capability for serious wrongdoing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the
offense they might further commit. 15The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been
convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, 16 and not
necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less
perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the
concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not
generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
To demonstrate the point, let us take for instance one who is convicted in a single decision of, say, thirteen
(13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals in one outburst) and sentenced
to a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who has been found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum. Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is disqualified
from availing of probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he could not have
availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he did not, his appeal now precludes him from
applying for probation.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be, that the penalties
imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have qualified under the Decision rendered by the
RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is
multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total imposable penalty, would be ten (10) years and eight (8) months, which is
still way beyond the limit of not more than six (6) years provided for in the Probation Law, as amended. To
illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128 months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years
and 8 months, hence, following his argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as the total of his
penalties exceeds six (6) years.
The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times since there are only
four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for probation, instead of sixteen (16) times, is quite
difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot be any clearer — "one (1) year and one (1) day
to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged
in the information(s)." Hence, petitioner should suffer the imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand,
the RTC affirmed the judgment of conviction and merely reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by the
MeTC "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" on account of a mitigating
circumstance for each case, count or incident of grave oral defamation. There is no valid reason therefore why the
penalties imposed by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16) times, considering
that the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases
and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed therein. Thus —
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is AFFIRMED
with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance which is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said
accused in each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs. 17
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was acquitted or absolved in
any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4) Informations, or that any part of the judgment of conviction
was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed. Otherwise, we will have to account for
the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that the judgment of conviction
rendered by the MeTC was affirmed with the sole modification on the duration of the penalties. cdll
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as the
totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately filed an application for probation as
he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled was ready to
unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of
the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation
mutually exclusive remedies. 18
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed by the MeTC, but to assert
his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole
purpose of reducing his penalties to make him eligible for probation — since he was already qualified under the
MeTC Decision — but rather to insist on his innocence. The appeal record is wanting of any other purpose. Thus,
in his Memorandum before the RTC, he raised only three (3) statements of error purportedly committed by the
MeTC all aimed at his acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has been established because of his
positive identification by the witness for the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and credence to the bare
statements of the private complainants despite the absence of corroborating testimonies; and, (c) in not acquitting
him in all the cases, 19 Consequently, petitioner insisted that the trial court committed an error in relying on his
positive identification considering that private complainants could not have missed identifying him who was
their President and General Manager with whom they worked for a good number of years. Petitioner further
argued that although the alleged defamatory words were uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly private
complainants' co-employees and clients, not one of them was presented as a witness. Hence, according to
petitioner, the trial court could not have convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of private
complainants. 20
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence,
and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, the accused never manifested that he
was appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty — to reduce it to within the probationable range. Hence,
upon interposing an appeal more so after asserting his innocence therein, petitioner should be precluded from
seeking probation. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative remedy of availing of
the Probation Law the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
accused who although already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but doing so only after failing in his
appeal.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to the Court of
Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely to reduce his penalties. Conversely, he
was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties, which could be worse for him. Besides, the
RTC Decision had already become final and executory because of the negligence, according to him, of his former
counsel who failed to seek possible remedies within the period allowed by law.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par. (e), Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, 21 should have moved to quash as each of the four (4) Informations filed against him charged
four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation, committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so
however may now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule 22 and he can be validly convicted, as in the
instant case, of as many crimes charged in the Information. cdrep
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital and crucial.
From the records it is clear that the application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of
petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" 23 of the RTC. This is a
significant fact which militates against the instant petition. We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit
assailed, ponencia of now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific issue
—
. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time. The law in point,
Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:
'SECTION 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by
said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal . . . place the defendant on
probation . . .'
Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation from one who had
appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by law, the petitioner's plea for probation was filed
out of time. In the petition is a clear statement that the petitioner was up for execution of
judgment before he filed his application for probation. P.D. No. 968 says that the application for
probation must be filed "within the period for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for
appeal had passed, meaning to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had attained finality,
and no appeal therefrom was possible under the law. Even granting that an appeal from
the appellate court's judgment is contemplated by P.D. 968, in addition to the judgment rendered by
the trial court, that appellate judgment had become final and was, in fact, up for actual execution
before the application for probation was attempted by the petitioner. The petitioner did not file his
application for probation before the finality of the said judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt
at probation was filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on the proposition that an application for probation may yet be
granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction already set for execution and a
warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be
after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation with the trial court, is
to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been
perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already
probationable and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of
the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting
an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 152044. July 3, 2003.]
DOMINGO LAGROSA and OSIAS BAGUIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
APPEALS
SYNOPSIS
Record showed that petitioners were found guilty of violation of the Revised Forestry Code. Petitioners appealed to the
CA which affirmed their conviction, but reduced the penalty imposed. Subsequently, petitioners applied for probation with the
trial court, but was denied. The CA affirmed the trial court's denial of their application for probation because PD 968expressly
prohibits the grant of probation to those who have appealed their convictions.
On appeal, petitioners asked not to apply the letter of the law because they appealed for the purpose of reducing an
incorrect penalty.
In denying their petition, the Supreme Court held that petitioners were clearly precluded from the benefits of probation
because they have appealed from the judgment of the trial court and have applied for probation only after the CA had affirmed
their conviction. The fact that they put the merits of their conviction in issue on appeal belied their claim that they simply assailed
the propriety of the penalties imposed.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; P.D. NO. 968 (PROBATION LAW); GRANT OF PROBATION IS PROHIBITED TO AN ACCUSED
WHO HAS APPEALED HIS CONVICTION; CASE AT BAR. — The law that is at the heart of this controversy is Presidential
Decree No. 968, also known as the Probation Law. . . Under Section 9 (a) of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to
serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years are disqualified from seeking probation. It should also be noted
that P.D. 968 expressly prohibits the grant of probation to those who have appealed their convictions. In this case, there is no
question that petitioners appealed from the decision of the trial court. This fact alone merits the denial of petitioners' Application
for Probation. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of
Appeals had affirmed their conviction, petitioners were clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. TEcCHD
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED NOT BARRED FROM APPLYING FOR PROBATION IF APPEAL WAS SOLELY RAISED TO
REDUCE THE PENALTY TO WITHIN THE PROBATIONABLE LIMIT; CASE AT BAR. — The fact that petitioners put the merits
of their conviction in issue on appeal belies their claim that their appeal was prompted by what was admittedly an incorrect
penalty. Certainly, the protestations of petitioners connote a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not
simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, petitioners never manifested that they were appealing only for the
purpose of correcting a wrong penalty — to reduce it to within probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so
after asserting their innocence therein, petitioners should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal,
petitioners ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to
prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation,
but did so only after failing in his appeal.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67308, 1 which affirmed
the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, denying petitioners' Application for
Probation, and its Order denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 2
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On October 29, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, rendered a decision in Criminal
Case No. 8243, 3 finding petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin guilty of violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705,
as amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for having in their possession forest products without the requisite permits.
The trial court sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the decision 4 was denied by the trial court on November 21, 1996. 5
Petitioners appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20632. 6 On March 14, 2000, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of the petitioners, with the modification as to
the penalty imposed, which was reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional, as
maximum. 7 The decision became final and executory on April 12, 2000.
On August 29, 2001, petitioners filed an Application for Probation with the trial court, 8 which, as mentioned
at the outset, was denied. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court. Hence,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67308. 9 On
January 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the questioned resolutions of the trial
court.
Hence this petition, raising the following arguments:
1) That Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended by PD No. 1990, is very absurd and
illogical considering that petitioners were not given the opportunity to apply for probation
when they were convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, because the
penalty imposed by said court is more than six (6) years and therefore non-probationable.
That the first opportunity for herein petitioners to apply for probation was when the Court of
Appeals modified the sentence imposed by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, from two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as maximum, to six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, eight (8) months
and twenty one (21) days as maximum which is clearly probationable.
2) That the ruling of this Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Pablo Francisco versus Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 108747, is not applicable to the instant case because in the
said Francisco case the accused therein can apply for probation because the penalty imposed
by the lower court was already probationable but the accused instead appealed the decision
but in the case of herein petitioners they cannot apply for probation when they were
convicted because the penalty imposed by the lower court was more than six (6) years and
therefore non-probationable.
3) That the decision of the Court of Appeals herein sought to be reviewed is clearly contrary to the
purpose of the Probation Law. 10
The law that is at the heart of this controversy is Presidential Decree No. 968, also known as the Probation
Law, as amended by P.D. 1990, the pertinent provision of which reads:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may,
after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. (italics ours)
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine
only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application
shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Under Section 9 (a) of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years are disqualified from seeking probation.
It should be noted that before P.D. 968 was amended by P.D. 1990, the accused was allowed to apply for
probation even after he had already filed an appeal, as long as he had not yet begun to serve his sentence. 11
Petitioners contend that they should be allowed to apply for probation even if they had already appealed the
decision of the trial court. They argue that their case should be considered an exception to the general rule which
excludes an accused who has appealed his conviction from the benefits of probation. In the case at bar, the trial court
sentenced petitioners to a maximum term of eight years, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They
only became eligible for probation after the Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court and reduced the
maximum term of the penalty imposed on them to one year, eight months and twenty-one days. 12 They submit that
the ruling in the case ofFrancisco v. CA 13 is not applicable because in that case, the accused appealed their conviction
notwithstanding the fact that the maximum term of the prison sentence imposed on them by the trial court was less
than six years. 14
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the express provision of P.D. 968 prohibiting the
grant of probation to those who have appealed their convictions. 15 It argues that, even if the petitioners have
appealed for the purpose of reducing an incorrect penalty, this fact does not serve to remove them from the
prohibition in Section 4 of P.D. 968for the law makes no such distinction. 16
There is no question that petitioners appealed from the decision of the trial court. This fact alone merits the
denial of petitioners' Application for Probation. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having
applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed their conviction, petitioners were clearly
precluded from the benefits of probation. 17
However, petitioners now ask us not to apply the letter of the law, claiming that their situation should be
considered an exception to the rule. Their petition is without merit.
Petitioners repeatedly assert that their application for probation was made at the "first opportunity,"
undoubtedly invoking the fourth "whereas" clause of P.D. 1990, which reads:
WHEREAS, probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to
obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first opportunity by
offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated; . . . .
To bolster this assertion, petitioners claim that what prompted them to appeal the decision of the trial court
was the erroneous penalty imposed by the trial court. 18
Petitioners are not being very candid. In their appellant's brief filed in CA-G.R. CR No. 20632, they raised the
following assignment of errors:
I.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM LACKS MORAL CERTAINTY.
II.
IF EVER ACCUSED ARE GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PROPER PENALTY AS
PROVIDED BY LAW.
The fact that petitioners put the merits of their conviction in issue on appeal belies their claim that their
appeal was prompted by what was admittedly an incorrect penalty. Certainly, the protestations of petitioners connote
a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not simply assail the propriety of the penalties
imposed. For sure, petitioners never manifested that they were appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong
penalty — to reduce it to within probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting their
innocence therein, petitioners should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso
facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent
speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for
probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. 19
Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the
appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, 20 we are not yet prepared to
accept this proposition, specially given the factual circumstances of this case. Had the petitioners' appeal from the
decision of the trial court raised the impropriety of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole issue, perhaps this
Court would have been more sympathetic to their plight. Unfortunately, their misrepresentation has led to their own
undoing.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 11, 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 67308, which affirmed the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
Branch 2, denying petitioners' Application for Probation, and its Order denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.