Facts:

On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by

management's failure to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings which had
become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance conference. As none was arranged,
and believing that their appeal would be fruitless, they grouped together after the end of their work
that day with other employees and marched directly to the management's office to protest its long
silence and inaction on their complaints.

On 12 April 1988, the management issued a memorandum to each of the private respondents, who
were identified by the petitioner's supervisors as the most active participants in the "rally", requiring
them to explain why they should not be terminated from the service for their conduct. Despite their
explanation, private respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations, more
specifically of the provisions on security and public order and on inciting or participating in illegal
strikes or concerted actions.

Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner and Mr.
Gavino Bayan with the regional office of the NLRC at the National Capital Region, Manila. After due
trial the labor arbiter ordered Aris (Phils.), Inc. to reinstate Leodegario de Guzman and company to
their former respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without
loss of seniority right and privileges.

On 19 July 1989, de Guzman and company filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution pursuant
to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 which provides that “In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned,
shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to
work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall
not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein."

On 21 July 1989, petitioner filed its Appeal. On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except Flor Rayos del
Sol, filed a Partial Appeal. On 10 August 1989, complainant Flor Rayos del Sol filed a Partial Appeal. On
29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of
R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the
time of its effectivity. Petitioner submitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September 1989. On 5
October 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order granting the motion for execution and the issuance
of a partial writ of execution "as far as reinstatement of herein complainants is concerned in
consonance with the provision of Section 2 of the rules particularly the last sentence thereof."

Unable to accept the above Order, petitioner filed the instant petition on October 1989.

Issue:

The main issue in this case is whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it relied on the constitutionality of the amendment introduced by Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6715 to Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD. No. 442, as amended)
and allowing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee and of Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals
under R.A. No. 6715 implementing the same. It also questions the validity of the Transitory Provision
(Section 17) of the said Interim Rules.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NLRC and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The SC held
that execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be divorced from
the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or a party who is not satisfied with a
judgment, while the former may be applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency of the
appeal. The right to appeal, however, is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory
privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law
may then validly provide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the
event an appeal is interposed by the losing party. Execution pending appeal is one such relief long
recognized in this jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal and the
grant thereof is left to the discretion of the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.

Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6716, Article 223 of the Labor Code already allowed
execution of decisions of the NLRC pending their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
These provisions are the quintessence of the aspirations of the workingman for recognition of his role
in the social and economic life of the nation, for the protection of his rights, and the promotion of his
welfare. The charge then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule is unconstitutional
is absolutely baseless. Laws are presumed constitutional.

Case No. 9

Radiola Toshiba Philippines vs Intermediate Appellate Court

GR No. 75222, July 18, 1991

Statutory rule: In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.

Facts:

The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan
was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. However, an insolvency
proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced four months after the
issuance of the said attachment. Petitioner contends that its lien on the subject properties overrode
the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.

Issue: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against the respondent
spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment.

Held:

No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period - one month in attachment
cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings.
Also, there is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than
one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction that will
render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.
KAREN E. SALVACION v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and
GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,
G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997

FACTS:

Karen E. Salvacion, herein petitioner, then 12 years old, was coaxed and lured by private respondent
Greg Bartelli y Northcott to go with him in his apartment, where she was detained for four days from
February 4 to 7, 1989; and was raped 10 times (once on February 4 and 3 times a day from February
5-7). Aside from the criminal case for serious illegal detention and 4 counts of rape filed by the Makati
investigating fiscal, the petitioner along with her parents, file in Regional Trial Court (RTC) a civil case
for damages with preliminary attachment against Bartelli, which the court then granted.

A notice of garnishment was served to China Banking Corporation, where the dollar account of the
private respondent was deposited, by the Deputy Sheriff of Makati. But respondent bank invoking
Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it and later on invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg
Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body. In a letter in response to the
inquiry of the counsel of petitioners to Central Bank, it is stated that the provision in Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 is absolute in application and that it does not admit of any exception,
nor has the same been repealed nor amended.

March 29, 1990, after hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners,
Petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit.

ISSUES:

Whether the dollar bank deposit of Greg Bartelli in China Bank Corporation be exempted from
attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body

HELD:

No, the provisions of Section 133 of CB Circular No. 960 are hereby held to be inapplicable to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances and the Court requires respondents to comply with the writ to
execution and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in
such amount as would justify the judgment. In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent
of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of CB Circular No 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court. Legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guessed like accused Greg Bartelli.
This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended for right and
justice to prevail. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA,

respondent and appellee.

FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was
interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register
of deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko
appealed to the Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private
ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. This means to say that, under the provisions of the
Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the
Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which
granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the
pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural,
residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any
of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two
provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express
authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire,
hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to
acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.