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THE ONGC:
CHARTING A NEW COURSE?
BY
SUMIT GANGULY
INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON
© 2007 BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY
Of world proven oil reserves of 1,148 billion barrels, approximately 77% of these resources are
under the control of national oil companies (NOCs) with no equity participation by foreign,
international oil companies. The Western international oil companies now control less than 10%
of the world’s oil and gas resource base. In terms of current world oil production, NOCs also
dominate. Of the top 20 oil producing companies in the world, 14 are NOCs or newly privatized
NOCs. However, many of the Western major oil companies continue to achieve a dramatically
higher return on capital than NOCs of similar size and operations.
Many NOCs are in the process of reevaluating and adjusting business strategies, with substantial
consequences for international oil and gas markets. Several NOCs have increasingly been
jockeying for strategic resources in the Middle East, Eurasia, and Africa, in some cases knocking
the Western majors out of important resource development plays. Often these emerging NOCs
have close and interlocking relationships with their national governments, with geopolitical and
strategic aims factored into foreign investments rather than purely commercial considerations. At
home, these emerging NOCs fulfill important social and economic functions that compete for
capital budgets that might otherwise be spent on more commercial reserve replacement and
production activities.
The Baker Institute Policy Report on NOCs focuses on the changing strategies and behavior of
NOCs and the impact NOC activities will have on the future supply, security, and pricing of oil.
The goals, strategies, and behaviors of NOCs have changed over time. Understanding this
transformation is important to understanding the future organization and operation of the
international energy industry.
CASE STUDY AUTHORS
NELSON ALTAMIRANO
ARIEL I. AHRAM
JOE BARNES
DANIEL BRUMBERG
MATTHEW E. CHEN
JAREER ELASS
STACY L. ELLER
RICHARD GORDON
ISABEL GORST
SUMIT GANGULY
PETER HARTLEY
DONALD I. HERTZMARK
AMY MYERS JAFFE
STEVEN W. LEWIS
DAVID R. MARES
KENNETH B. MEDLOCK III
FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN
EDWARD MORSE
G. UGO NWOKEJI
MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT
NINA POUSSENKOVA
RONALD SOLIGO
THOMAS STENVOLL
AL TRONER
XIAOJIE XU
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy would like to thank Japan
Petroleum Energy Center and the sponsors of the Baker Institute Energy Forum for
their generous support in making this project possible.
SUMIT GANGULY
RABINDRANATH TAGORE PROFESSOR OF INDIAN CULTURES AND CIVILIZATIONS
INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON
Sumit Ganguly is the Rabindranath Tagore Professor of Indian Cultures and Civilizations and a
professor of Political Science at Indiana University. Dr. Ganguly’s research and writing interests
are focused on South Asia. He has published extensively in the areas of ethnic conflict, inter
state war and defense, and security policy. His most recent work, published by Columbia
University Press and Oxford University Press (New Delhi), is entitled Conflict Unending: India
Pakistan Tensions Since 1947. He also recently published The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of
War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge University Press and The Woodrow Wilson Center Press,
1999). Dr. Ganguly serves on the editorial boards of Asian Affairs, Asian Survey, Current
History and the Journal of Strategic Studies. He is also the founding editor of Asian Security and
editor of The India Review. Dr. Ganguly is currently working on a book, India Since 1980, under
contract with Cambridge University Press. He was previously a visiting fellow at the Center for
International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and a senior fellow at the
Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Dr. Ganguly received his PhD in
Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign in 1984.
ABOUT THE ENERGY FORUM AT THE
JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
The Baker Institute Energy Forum is a multifaceted center that promotes original, forward
looking discussion and research on the energyrelated challenges facing our society in the 21 st
century. The mission of the Energy Forum is to promote the development of informed and
realistic public policy choices in the energy area by educating policy makers and the public about
important trends—both regional and global—that shape the nature of global energy markets and
influence the quantity and security of vital supplies needed to fuel world economic growth and
prosperity.
The forum is one of several major foreign policy programs at the James A. Baker III Institute for
Public Policy at Rice University. The mission of the Baker Institute is to help bridge the gap
between the theory and practice of public policy by drawing together experts from academia,
government, the media, business, and nongovernmental organizations. By involving both policy
makers and scholars, the Institute seeks to improve the debate on selected public policy issues
and make a difference in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of public policy.
The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy
Rice University – MS 40
P.O. Box 1892
Houston, TX 772511892
http://www.bakerinstitute.org
bipp@rice.edu
ABOUT THE
JAPAN PETROLEUM ENERGY CENTER
The Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC) was established in May 1986 by the petroleum
subcommittee in the Petroleum Council, which is an advisory committee to the Minister of
International Trade and Industry. JPEC's mission is to promote structural renovation that will
effectively enhance technological development in the petroleum industry and to cope with the
need for the rationalization of the refining system. JPEC's activities include the development of
technologies; promotion of international research cooperation; management of the information
network system to be used during an international oil crisis; provision of financial support for the
promotion of high efficiency energy systems and the upgrading of petroleum refining facilities;
and organization of research surveys.
JPEC's international collaborations cover joint research and exchange of researchers and
information with oil producing countries and international institutions and support for
infrastructure improvement and solving environmental problems of the petroleum industries in
oil producing countries.
Japan Petroleum Energy Center
Sumitomo ShinToranomon bldg. 39
Toranomon 4choume
Minatoku Tokyo 1050001, Japan
http://www.pecj.or.jp/english/index_e.html
THE ONGC: CHARTING A NEW COURSE?
Sumit Ganguly, Indiana University, Bloomington
INTRODUCTION
The importance of petroleum to India’s energy needs cannot be overstated. Currently, oil
comprises approximately 34 percent of India’s total energy consumption and has been growing
gradually as a share of the country’s energy consumption in recent years. India has roughly 5.4
billion in oil reserves, the bulk of which are located in the Mumbai (Bombay) High, Upper
Assam, Cambay, KrishnaGodavari, and Cauvery basins. India’s average oil production level
imports of almost 1.7 million b/d in 2005. Future oil consumption is expected to show strong
growth, up to 3.1 million b/d by 2010, from 2.5 million b/d in 2005. 1
only 5.4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and a further 10.6 billion barrels of undiscovered
1
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief – India, (2007):
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/India/Oil.html.
and probable reserves. At current production rates, India will exhaust its proven oil reserves in
just over 20 years. 2
The largely stateowned, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) dominates India’s
energy sector. It has 38,033 employees (2005) and produces 77 percent of India’s domestic
and its profits for 2004 were $2.16 billion. The market value of the firm is estimated to be around
$27.86 billion. Based on six different operational criteria, the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
(PIW) ranked the ONGC as the 32 nd largest oil company in the world, 3 remaining flat in the
ranking from the year before. The 2006 Fortune Global 500 rankings placed the ONGC as 402 nd
in terms of sales revenues, up from a 544 th ranking the year before. 4
The importance of the ONGC to international energy markets cannot be overstated. As
country’s longterm energy security. India is already the world’s sixth largest energy consumer
and imports close to 70 percent of its oil needs. Nearly 60 percent thereof comes from Saudi
Arabia, Nigeria, Kuwait and Iran. 5 Given India’s current rate of economic growth, which is
hovering around seven percent annually, these needs are unlikely to diminish. Extrapolating from
current trends, India is expected to become the fourth largest consumer of energy in 2010. 6 In an
overseas exploration and energy projects. 7
2
“India Indepth,” Offshore Rig Review, May 4, 2006, http://www.rigzone.com/analysis/rigs/insight.asp?1_id=211.
3
“PIW’s Top 50: How the Firms Stack up,” Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, December 12, 2005.
4
“ONGC Moves up 52 Points in Fortune Listing,” The Hindu Business Line, July 18, 2006, http://www.thehindubusinessline.
com/2006/07/18/stories/20060718043800300.htm.
5
Manjeet Singh Pardesi, Amitav Acharya, Premarani Somasundram, Young Ho Chang, Joey Long Shi Ruey, Tang Shiping, Hiro
Katsumata and Vladimir I. Ivanov, Energy and Security: The Geopolitics of Energy in the AsiaPacific (Singapore: Institute of
Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2006).
6
Pramit Mitra, “Indian Diplomacy Energized by Search for Oil,” YaleGlobal Online, March 14, 2005,
http://www.yaleglobalonline (accessed March 15, 2005).
7
Aziz Haniffa, “”India Will Consume More Energy to Fuel Economic Growth,” India Abroad, August 12, 2005.
2
ONGC
There are a number of compelling reasons to study the organization and functions of the
ONGC. A virtual stateowned monopoly, it has had important successes as well as failures. Most
importantly, a detailed casestudy of the ONGC can generate important insights into the
workings of predominantly stateowned firms in an era of economic liberalization.
India is faced with mounting pressures from foreign investors and governments to
continue with its fitful efforts toward economic liberalization. The ruling coalition regime, the
United Progressive Alliance (UPA), has made only limited progress on the path of economic
liberalization. The dominant party in the coalition, the Congress, is acutely dependent on India’s
two Communist parties, the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India
(Marxist) for parliamentary support. 8 Both of these allies have periodically placed important
roadblocks on the road to economic liberalization. Most pertinent to our study, their ideological
positions and their political strategies constitute the principal impediment to the sale of large,
profitmaking stateowned enterprises. Indeed, in 2005 they successfully stopped the government
from selling a mere 10 percent of the shares of a large stateowned enterprise, Bharat Heavy
Electricals.
Despite many of the pathologies that afflict stateowned firms the ONGC has managed to
function in a reasonably efficient fashion. In recent years, as India’s energy needs have
the ONGC has become more nimble in its quest for greater access to energy resources.
Specifically, since 2001, the ONGC, through its international arm ONGC (Videsh) has increased
attempts to purchase offshore oilfields to meet India’s burgeoning energy needs. In this
endeavor, the Indian firm has only met with partial success and has been repeatedly sidelined by
8
The best treatment of the split in the Communist movement in India remains Bhabani Sen Gupta, Communism in Indian Politics
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
3
one of its principal and more formidable competitors, Chinese state oil firm China Petroleum and
Chemical Company (Sinopec). Despite these setbacks it is unlikely that the ONGC will drop its
ongoing efforts to purchase foreign, offshore oil blocks. 9
HISTORY
The history of the ONGC cannot be understood without some grasp of the political
climate that prevailed in India following its independence from the British Indian Empire in
1947. India’s principal policymakers, most notably, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, though a
committed democrat, was impressed with the Soviet Union’s strategy of forceddraught
industrialization. He abhorred the violence of the process but was nevertheless fascinated with
the ability of the Soviet Union to emerge as a major industrial state within a short time span.
Accordingly, he was keen on utilizing some features of the Soviet experience with rapid
industrialization. The two key elements of the Soviet experience that he incorporated into India’s
economic policymaking were the creation of a substantial public sector and the adoption of the
process of economic planning. 10 These two components of economic policy making dovetailed
into India’s larger strategy of importsubstituting industrialization. 11
The other reason for keeping the oil and natural gas sector in state hands stemmed from
India’s bitter colonial experience. From the standpoint of Indian nationalists, the expansion of
the colonial enterprise was inextricably linked to the development of capitalism. All the colonial
states had also been capitalist states. Consequently, there was a profound distrust of free market
policies. These deep misgivings also contributed to the creation of a substantial and powerful
state sector.
9
Edward Luce, “Head to Head in the Quest for National Energy Security,” Financial Times, November 17, 2004.
10
For an important set of discussions about planning and its consequences for the Indian economy, see Terence J. Byres (ed.) The
State and Development Planning in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994).
11
For an early, thoughtful but unsparing critique, see Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai, India: Planning for Industrialization
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970).
4
ONGC
In the aftermath of India’s independence in 1947 a number of the oil majors had
expressed limited interest in the Indian market. Some had also set up prospecting and refining
operations within India. However, Prime Minister Nehru and key members of his cabinet, most
notably, K.D. Malaviya, were convinced that the Western oil majors would not deal fairly with
the nascent state. They were also keen on developing India’s indigenous capacity in oil
prospecting and refining. To this end, they turned to the Soviet Union, which proved willing to
assist India. The Soviets completed a geophysical survey in December 1955. Subsequently, they
provided considerable advice on both technological and organizational matters.
Thus, the ONGC was formed during the heyday of India’s initial and nascent experiment
with the creation of a behemoth public sector. The exploration of oil and natural gas were
deemed to be part and parcel of the “commanding heights” of the Indian economy. 12 Indian
economic planners deemed it necessary and appropriate to create a public sector firm that would
Natural Gas Commission on August 14, 1956 as a department of the Geological Survey of India.
Subsequently, in 1959, was converted into a statutory body by an act of the Indian parliament. 13
In 1994, with an eventual eye toward privatization, thanks to India’s fitful embrace of the market
in the wake of a major financial crisis in 1991, it was renamed the Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation. 14
12
For a general discussion of India’s strategy of importsubstituting industrialization, see Francine Frankel, India Political
Economy, 19472004 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005); also see B.R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India:
18601970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
13
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation LimitedHistory, http://global.factiva.com/en/arch/print_results.asp accessed December 2,
2005.
14
Three factors had precipitated this unprecedented financial crisis. First, just prior to the first Gulf War India had purchased a
substantial amount of oil on the spot market thereby draining much of its carefullyhoarded foreign exchange reserves. Second, it
lost the remittances of some 130,000 expatriate workers in the Gulf states. Third and finally, just as oil prices skyrocketed, a
number of India’s external debt payments came due. These three factors, in concert, contributed to a major foreign exchange
crisis. On this crisis see Sumit Ganguly, “The Developing World and the New Oil Crisis: Between Iraq and A Hard Place,” The
International Executive, JanuaryFebruary 1991, 3738; for the efforts to unshackle the Indian economy from its hidebound
legacy of economic planning see Jagdish Bhagwati, India in Transition: Freeing the Economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
5
The historical backdrop has a profound impact on the company’s behavior. Since it was
started as a public sector firm, the ONGC has had significant advantages and disadvantages.
After 1981, it has virtually emerged as a monopoly as India moved to nationalize the few foreign
oil companies that were operating in the country. The disadvantage of being a public sector firm
is also equally apparent. On many an occasion, it has been subjected to political interference and
has had to adhere to government dictates on oil pricing policy.
Other serious ramifications come from being a large, unwieldy public sector firm set up
during the heyday of state intervention in the economy. For example, the ONGC, like the Indian
state itself, engages in a variant of indicative planning. The firm sets various goals and targets
with multiyear plans. These targets, all too often, are overly ambitious and are not reached in an
expeditious fashion. Furthermore, the management of the firm has to adhere to rigid rules of
promotion and hiring. Such rules often prevent the management from rewarding extraordinary
performance through merit increases. Simultaneously, they are also hobbled from shedding
excess labor capacity because of India’s sclerotic and antiquated labor laws.
Even in an era when India is steadily dispensing with its pseudosocialist legacy, there is
little or no immediate prospect of diluting the ONGC or selling off its component parts. It is
widely seen, across the political spectrum, as one of India’s stellar state enterprise performers,
one of the socalled “navaratnas”.
The ONGC has evolved into India’s largest energy upstream company, holding 57
percent of the country’s hydrocarbon acreage. 15 Despite efforts by the energetic (but
controversial) former ONGC Chairman and Managing Director Subir Raha to expand the
15
“Industry Briefing: ONGC,” Economist Intelligence Unit, http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=IWArticleVW3&article_id=
1261253711_id=280000028.
6
ONGC
company’s operations into the downstream sector, the Indian government has effectively stymied
those efforts, preferring that the company focus primarily on its exploration and production
(E&P) strengths. The Indian government is a majority stakeholder in the company: the
government, together with two state energy firms, maintains an 84.11 percent in the ONGC. 16
In November 2005, former Indian Oil Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar raised concerns
about the country’s future energy supplies, pointing a finger at falling ONGC output. The
minister was quoted as saying, “The decline in anticipated output from existing fields is going to
attention of the country to some of the alarming facts about the ONGC and energy security in the
immediate future.” Aiyar noted that 20 percent of India’s estimated oil reserves remain
undiscovered and he felt that the ONGC’s record in finding new reserves was poor. The ONGC
responded by stressing that the company had discovered five out of India’s six producing basins
and that prospects for future discoveries were “very encouraging.” 17
In mid2006, the Indian Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas set a crude production
target for the ONGC of around 550,000 b/d by the year ending March 2007, but the ministry
expressed its concern in November 2006 that the ONGC was likely to experience a shortfall of
nearly 30,000 b/d for fiscal 200607. The ONGC’s output for the first half of the fiscal year was
257,000 b/d, while projected output for the second half was 264,000 b/d. The company has
delayed a project to increase recovery rates in the Mumbai High offshore field and several others
as well, aiming to boost the overall recovery rate for its production assets from 28 percent to 40
percent. 18
16
ONGC, http://www.ongc.net/history.asp.
17
“Concerns Over Indian Oil Output,” BBC News, November 28, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4477676.stm.
18
“ONGC Short on Output Goal,” The International Oil Daily, November 6, 2006.
7
The Mumbai High field, which is the country’s largest offshore oil field, accounts for 14
percent of India's oil requirements and 38 percent of all domestic production. Mumbai High was
discovered by a Russian and Indian oil exploration team during the mapping of the Gulf of
Cambay between 1964 and 1967. The first well was sunk in 1974 and production began in 1976.
went into decline. To arrest the decline from its most prolific field, the ONGC has pumped in
more than 85 billion rupees to redevelop the field beginning in 2001. 19
Normal output at Mumbai High has averaged around 270,000 b/d but an offshore
gathering platform at the field was damaged in a fire in July 2005, temporarily dropping output
to just 140,000 b/d. Subsequent repairs and the introduction of a floating production storage and
offloading vessel brought the field’s output back to 270,000 b/d by the end of 2006, with the
company anticipating output from the field to rise to 300,000 b/d in 2007. 20
The ONGC operates 31 deepwater blocks, 18 off India’s east coast and 13 off the west. In
the east, the company has made 10 discoveries to date in the Mahanadi and KrishnaGodavari
areas, with exploration ongoing in the Cauvery region and seismic surveys under way in
Andaman Islands. In the west, exploration is continuing in the Gujarat, Saurashtra, Kerala and
Konkan areas, and also off Mumbai. In deepwater licenses in India, the ONGC's partners include
BG in three blocks, Cairn Energy in one block and ENI in two blocks plus another onshore. The
first five New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP) rounds offered up 144 exploration blocks,
of which 109 were awarded. Of these, 39 are deepwater blocks, split between the ONGC (22)
and Reliance (17) – the ONGC's other nine deepwater blocks were “nomination blocks”,
19
Himangshu Watts and Hiral Vora, “Fire destroys Bombay High platform, at least 3 dead,” Reuters, July 28, 2005.
20
Richa Mishra, “FPSO Vessel to be Operational by MonthEnd: ONGC,” The Hindu Business Line, October 4, 2006.
http://www.the indubusinessline.com/2006/10/05/stories/2006100503140300.htm.
8
ONGC
awarded before NELP. 21 Of the 109 blocks awarded in the first five rounds, the ONGC won 59
of them, either as the sole bidder or through a consortium. 22
In NELP’s Round 6, under which bids were received in September 2006, the ONGC
garnered 24 blocks, of which 12 are deepwater. 23 The oil firm is facing the problems of falling
output from maturing fields as well as a series of drilling failures. The ONGC’s expensive
deepwater drilling program has encountered more dry holes than discoveries in the last three
years. In addition, the loss of drilling expertise through the defection of key exploration
personnel to private oil firms has impacted the ONGC’s ability to effectively conduct future
drilling operations, according to technical consultants Gaffney Cline. 24
Indeed, the company is now opting to maximize production from its marginal fields,
having monetized 38 fields with another 94 fields under monetization. The ONGC intends to
develop 153 onshore and offshore marginal fields in the near future. A number of marginal fields
were awarded to ONGC before the launching of NELP in 1999, which effectively leveled the
playing field in the Indian hydrocarbon sector by opening the door to largescale private
investment, including from foreign firms. The ONGC’s marginal fields have the capacity to
produce less than 10,000 b/d and most are located far from the major oilproducing fields on the
western seaboard of India and remote locations in Assam in northeastern India. While ONGC
may develop some of the offshore marginal fields where it already has infrastructure, the
company will likely contract out for work on the onshore fields. 25
21
Terry Knott, “ONGC Looks Deep to Increase Resources,” OilOnline, August 24, 2006 http://www.oilonline.com/news/
features/aog/20060824.ONGC_loo.22015.asp.
22
ONGC, “Chairman’s Speech at the 13th Annual General Meeting of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd,” September 19,
2006 http://www.ongcindia.com/featart1.asp?fold=feature_article&file=feature_article172.txt last updated December 13, 2006.
23
S.P.S. Pannu, “Bigger Oil India Role in Exploration,” The Telegraph, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1061213/
asp/business/story_7128189.asp December 2, 2006.
24
“India Tightens Control Over ONGC, Blocks Downstream Expansion,” International Oil Daily, July 20, 2006.
25
Rahul Wadke, “ONGC Seeks to Maximise Marginal Oilfields,” The Hindu Business Line, http://www.thehindubusinessline.
com/2006/10/14/stories/2006101403950300.htm, October 13, 2006.
9
India’s consumption of natural gas has grown faster than any other fuel in recent years.
From only 0.63 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year in 1995, natural gas use was nearly 0.96 Tcf in
2003 and is projected to reach 1.4 Tcf in 2010 and 1.8 Tcf in 2015. India's domestic natural gas
supply is not likely to keep pace with demand, and the country will have to import much of its
natural gas, either by pipeline or as liquefied natural gas (LNG). Most of India's current natural
gas production occurs in the Mumbai High basin and the state of Gujarat. Current projects
include enhancing natural gas production at the Tapti fields in Gujarat and recovering previously
meters (BCM) in fiscal year 200506, with the ONGC’s gas output accounting for 23 BCM. 27
In September 2006, the ONGC announced that it had made ten new oil and gas discoveries
during fiscal 200506. These included five discoveries in deepsea areas, all in the Krishna
Godavari (KG) basin. Another three finds were in shallow offshore areas of the Mumbai,
Saurashtra and KrishnaGodavari regions while two discoveries were made in onshore blocks of
the KG basin and the Assam shelf. 28
With the departure of the ONGC’s last chairman, Subir Raha, in May 2006, the Indian
government has moved to thwart Raha’s goal of seeing the ONGC become a fully integrated
company. In July, the government demanded that the ONGC stop developing retail outlets for
transport fuels after previously permitting the oil firm to set up 1,100 retail outlets. The
government reportedly changed its mind after recognizing that other state oil firms were losing
billions of dollars in revenues because of price controls. The ONGC had opened up just one
retail outlet in Mangalore, near its 250,000 b/d refinery, but had plans to open up some 40
26
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs: India, January 2007, http://www.eia.
doe.gov/emeu/cabs/India/Oil.html
27
“Reliance to Double KG Basin Gas Output,” The Hindu Business Line, November 1, 2006 http://www.thehindubusinessline.
com/2006/11/02/stories/2006110203930100.htm.
28
“ONGC's Huge Outlay for Mangalore SEZ,” The Hindu, September 20, 2006 http://www.hindu.com/2006/09/20/
stories/2006092006341700.htm.
10
ONGC
stations in 2006. Since Raha’s fiveyear contract was not extended, the company lacks autonomy
and is being more closely controlled by oil ministry officials. 29
Raha, who had helped steer the ONGC to becoming a global upstream player through a
series of overseas acquisitions, ran afoul of former Oil Minister Aiyar and former Petroleum
add to the country’s oil and gas reserves and Raha’s opposition to the increase of government
directors to the ONGC board. In addition, there had been criticism of how the ONGC
Mumbai High North oil field in July 2005. 30
Although ONGC signed a memorandum of understanding with Royal Dutch/Shell on
January 19, 2006 that covered cooperation in Indian and overseas upstream and downstream
activities including exploration and production, coal gasification, natural gas, oil products and
refining and petrochemicals – the two companies have been at loggerheads and no definitive
agreements have been signed. For example, while Shell reportedly wants to invest in an onshore
oil field in Gujurat in exchange for a share in the profit oil that will result from the use of Shell
technology, the ONGC does not want to part with any equity oil and would prefer a service
agreement. 31
DOWNSTREAM
Under Raha, the ONGC had very ambitious plans to beef up its refining business, with a
drive to increase its refining capacity to become the second largest refiner behind the Indian Oil
Co (IOC). The expansion of its activities, in all likelihood, stemmed from a single,
29
“India Tightens Control Over ONGC, Blocks Downstream Expansion,” International Oil Daily, July 20, 2006.
30
“No Extension for ONGC Chairman Subir Raha,” The Hindu, May 26, 2006 http://www.hinduonnet.com/2006/05/26/
stories/2006052615790100.htm.
31
Rakteem Katakey, “ONGC, Shell Fracas Continues,” Business Standard, December 14, 2006 http://www.business
standard.com/common/storypage.php?autono=267890&leftnm=1&subLeft=0&chkFlg=.
11
straightforward concern: namely, to make the ONGC a more significant player in India’s overall
energy infrastructure. The company had goals of expanding capacity of its only refinery at
Mangalore from 250,000 b/d to 300,000 b/d before building another 300,000 b/d refinery in
Mangalore. 32 The ONGC had purchased a 71.6 percent stake in the Mangalore Refinery and
Petrochemicals Ltd. (MRPL) in 2003, making it the company’s only refining subsidiary. At the
same time, the firm bought a 23 percent stake in the 364kmlong MangaloreHasanBangalore
product pipeline, connecting the refinery to the Karnataka hinterland. The Mangalore refinery
the refinery producing nearly 227,000 b/d of products. 33
The ONGC had also considered entering into a joint venture with the U.K.’s Cairn
Energy to construct a 150,000 b/d refinery at Barmer in Rajasthan. In addition, the company was
also eyeing the possibility of building a 100,000 b/d refinery at Kakinada in Andhra Pradesh. If
these projects were to come to fruition, the ONGC’s refining capacity would jump to 850,000
b/d, second only to IOC. 34
However, it appears that the Indian government put a stop to the proposed development
of the Kakinada refinery, asking the ONGC to reconsider its plans. The government cited a
surplus of refining capacity likely to occur on the Indian east coast in the coming years, with
Hindustan Petroleum Corp. and IOC both planning on building 300,000 b/d refineries in the area
and Chennai Petroleum looking to expand capacity at its 150,000b/d refinery in Manali. 35
32
“ONGC Charts Roadmap for Higher Oil Output, Refining Capacity,” The Hindu, September 22, 2005 http://www.hindu.com/
2005/09/22/stories/2005092206921900.htm,
33
ONGC, “Statement of Mr. R.S. Sharma, Chairman, Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd. at the 18th Annual General
Meeting of Shareholders at Mangalore,” September 16, 2006 http://www.ongc.net/featart1.asp?fold=feature_article&file=feature
_article171.txt, last updated December 13, 2006.
34
“ONGC Charts Roadmap.”
35
Dinakar Sethuraman, “India’s ONGC Reconsiders East Coast Refinery,” International Oil Daily, August 7, 2006.
12
ONGC
The ONGC also appeared to be pulling out of its plans to construct a refinery at Barmer
and Panipat refineries in the region, and Hindustan Petroleum Corp.'s 180,000b/d refinery at
Bhatinda to be completed by 2010, there will be no market for the Barmer refinery. The ONGC
and Cairn Energy had sought to get fiscal incentives such as local tax exemption to build the
refinery from the Rajasthan government, but weren’t successful. The cost of the refinery is a key
issue because the two firms must build a pipeline to a port in Gujarat for the evacuation of
150,000 b/d of crude oil output expected from their jointlyoperated Rajasthan field, which is
expected to go on stream in late 2008 or 2009.
Because the proposed refinery would not be completed until 2011 with peak production
from the field coming to its end, the companies would prefer selling the crude to others. Indeed,
the ONGC and Cairn Energy hope to sell the Rajasthan crude to refiners such as Reliance
Industries and Essar Oil, requiring the ONGC’s MRPL subsidiary to be delisted as the official
offtaker of the crude produced from the field. Should the two energy firms decide not to build the
refinery, they would move the delivery point of the crude from the Barmer district to the
Mundra, Salaya or Kandla port in Gujarat and include the pipeline cost in the field development
cost, which would then be recovered from the revenues culled from the crude produced at the
field. Cairn Energy has found 3.6 billion barrels of oil in Rajasthan, with the U.K. firm holding a
70 percent stake in the oil developed there and the ONGC holding the remaining 30 percent
stake. 36 The ONGC also owns and operates more than 11,000 km of pipelines in India, including
nearly 3,200 km of subsea pipelines. No other company in India operates even 50 percent of this
route length. 37
36
Ammar Zaidi, “India’s ONGC Rethinks Downstream Plans,” International Oil Daily, December 5, 2006.
37
ONGC, http://www.ongc.net/profile.asp last updated, December 13, 2006.
13
The ONGC, along with IOC, the Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) and the Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Ltd (BPCL), has a 12.5 percent equity stake in the joint venture
company, Petronet LNG Ltd, which will handle LNG import and marketing within India. Gaz de
France is another partner with a 10 percent share in the company. Petronet LNG Ltd. has set up
its first LNG Terminal at Dahej in Gujarat with the capacity of 5 million tonnes a year. A second
terminal at Kochi in Kerala with an initial capacity of 2.5 million tonnes a year that could be
raised to 5 million tonnes a year is to be commissioned by the last quarter of 2009. 38
Petronet has a 25year contract to buy LNG from Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas Co
Ltd II (RasGas II), a joint venture between the staterun Qatar Petroleum and Exxon Mobil.
Through this contract, Petronet currently imports five million tonnes a year at its Dahej terminal
in Gujarat and would start importing 2.5 million tonnes a year more from 2009. India has begun
been pressing Qatar to raise the LNG supply to 17.5 million tonnes a year. 39
It is highly unlikely that the company will be privatized anytime in the foreseeable future.
The reasons for the small likelihood of privatization are compelling. First, the political arena in
India is still caught in a wrenching debate about privatization and economic liberalization. In
2005, the Congressled government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, remains acutely
dependent on India’s two Communist parties, the Communist Party of India and the Communist
Party of India (Marxist) for parliamentary survival. The leaders of these two parties have placed
a significant brake on the privatization process in general and on profitmaking stateowned
companies in particular. More to the point, oil and natural gas are still deemed to be vital sectors
38
“LNG Terminal by 2009end,” The Hindu, Februray 7, 2006 http://www.hindu.com/2006/02/07/stories/2006020719060300
.htm.
39
Richa Mishra, “Petronet May Source 1.25 mt LNG from Qatar,” The Hindu Business Line, November 16, 2006 http://www.
thehindubusinessline.com/2006/11/16/stories/2006111600660200.htm.
14
ONGC
of the economy and thereby unlikely to be sold off to the private sector unless a new consensus
on privatization can be forged in the future.
Within the ONGC, there was no compelling interest in privatization. As a monopoly, the
organization, was thriving and even though uppermanagement chafed under some government
regulations, the prospect of privatization was daunting. One must bear in mind that within the
context of India’s political culture and concomitantly, ONGC’s organizational culture, there is no
broadbased hostility toward public enterprise. The move toward privatization in India is
relatively new and has yet to acquire widespread acceptance in the country’s political culture.
In September of 2005, tensions emerged between the Minister for Petroleum, Mani
Shankar Aiyar and the ONGC chairman, Subir Raha about the composition of the governing
board of the firm. Aiyar, a highly energetic petroleum minister, was in favor of appointing one or
more bureaucrats to oversee the functioning of the firm. Raha, an equally driven and able
chairman, feared that the appointment of bureaucrats beholden to the minister would
compromise the autonomy of the organization. 40 In the end, Raha, lost the battle. Ministerial and
bureaucratic interests ensured that an independentminded chairman of a major public monopoly
would not be countenanced. Aiyar, on the other hand, was moved out of the ministry, in all
likelihood, because of his neuralgic opposition to the United States, stemming from his
commitment to atavistic Nehruvian ideals in domestic and foreign policy arenas.
40
Jo Johnson, “Indian Business Chief Hits at Minister,” Financial Times, September 23, 2005.
15
RELATIONSHIP TO GOVERNMENT AND OTHER POLITICAL ACTORS
The leadership of the company is in the hands of chairperson who is either hired laterally
or rises through the ranks. The last chair of the company is Subir Raha, an electronics engineer
leadership has varied over time. Two factors, in particular, explain the varying quality of the
relationship. At one level, the prevailing political climate in the country and the overall
directions of economic policymaking has had a profound impact on this relationship. At another
level, as was evident in the case of Raha, the personality and beliefs of the chair can also
influence the relationship. 41 Even with a powerful chair at the helm the ONGC is subject to
political demands and interference. Among other matters, it is expected to subsidize the price of
domestic petroleum products and not rely on marketdriven price mechanisms. 42
The members of the ONGC board of directors are drawn mostly from the upper echelons
of the civil service and from staterun corporations. The appointment process consists of an
amalgam of politics and merit. Most of the individuals who are appointed to the board have had
considerable, highlevel experience in other staterun firms. However, their political connections,
no doubt, play a role in their appointments. The public enterprise selection board, an apex,
governmentrun body, proffers potential names for the chair of the ONGC. The appointments
committee of the Cabinet makes the final selection. 43 This necessarily makes the process
somewhat political and any national government wants to appoint an individual who reflects its
policy preferences.
41
Some of the Difficulties Between the ONGC and the Ministry of Petroleum are Captured in the ONGC’s Own FiftyYear
History, ONGC: The Energy of India (New Delhi: ONGC, 2005).
42
“India”, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, June 27, 2005.
43
Ammar Zaidi, “India Widens Search for New ONGC Boss,” International Oil Daily, February 8, 2007.
16
ONGC
The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas exercises oversight over the ONGC.
However, the ONGC as a majority stateowned enterprise is also subject to the needs and
concerns of other key ministries, most notably the Ministry of Finance. In the earlier years of the
formation of the ONGC, the Ministry of Finance was able to exercise greater oversight because
of the company’s dependence on the ministry to obtain scarce foreign exchange for the purchase
of new technology.
This dependence has decreased in the last several years as the ONGC has been able to
generate internal resources. Additionally, under the last chairman, Raha, the state firm sought to
develop links with major foreign firms. For example, the international arm of the ONGC, ONGC
Videsh, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.K.based, LN Mittal group,
it signed a contract with Royal Dutch Shell. This new contract envisages cooperation between
the ONGC and Shell in such areas as joint operations, including finding, securing, producing and
supplying oil and natural gas inside as well as outside India. 45
The ONGC engages in substantial noncommercial activities. For example it has long
been involved in research and development (R&D) in hydrocarbons. Much of this takes place at
the K.D. Malaviya Institute of Petroleum Exploration in Dehra Dun in Uttaranchal state. One of
the principal purposes of the institute is to develop and transfer technology which can contribute
to the country’s longterm quest for energy security.
The principal political role that it plays in the country is related to its organizational
imperatives and corporate interests. It seeks to fend off the efforts of both the Ministries of
Petroleum and Natural Gas and Finance to interfere in its affairs whether in the short or longer
44
Anupama Airy, “ONGC Mittal to Explore Jointly in 22 Countries,” The Financial Express, August 11, 2005.
45
Anita Jain, “Shell Signs WideRanging Deal with India’s ONGC,” Financial Times, January 20, 2006.
17
terms. As mentioned earlier, it is subject to enormous pressure from regimes of every political
stripe to provide petroleum products to the consumer at less than market prices. These demands
have led to periodic clashes between the management of the ONGC and various ministries.
Additionally, the ONGC faces a significant financial hurdle as a stateowned firm. It cannot
retain its own revenues or, for that matter, profits. All receipts are given to the central
government. Its budget and expenditures are subject to central government approval and
scrutiny. 46
The ONGC has no evident constraints on investment capital. In recent years, it has sought
to increasingly expand its foreign investments. However, its record of success has not been
undercut the ONGC in its bids in Kazakhstan and Angola. 47 Despite these setbacks, the ONGC’s
invest in. ONGC Videsh Limited which is a whollyowned subsidiary of the ONGC, was
formed in 1996 when its parent company decided to focus solely on managing its oil and gas
assets in India, and founded the subsidiary to oversee the international E&P business. With a
longterm target of acquiring 1.2 million b/d of equity oil and gas overseas by 2025, OVL is
currently working towards a goal of 400,000 b/d by 2010. 48 OVL now has 25 oil and gas
properties in fifteen countries. 49
46
Personal correspondence with Al Troner, February 7, 2006.
47
Enid Tsui, Francesco Guerrera, Khozem Merchant and Bernard Simon, “Chinese Oil Group in $4 billion Deal for Rival,”
Financial Times, August 23, 2005.
48
OVL, http://www.ongcvidesh.com/corp_profile.asp.
49
OVL, http://www.ongcvidesh.com/display1.asp?fol_name=News&file_name=news126&get_pic=ovl_news&p_title=News%
20::%20OVL%20News&curr_f=126&tot_file=128.
18
ONGC
Through OVL, the ONGC has invested as much as $3 billion since 2000 in overseas
exploration and energy projects.
OVL has assets in Asia/Pacific, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America in the
following countries: Myanmar; Vietnam; Australia; Russia; Iraq; Iran; Egypt; Syria; Qatar;
Libya; the Ivory Coast; Sudan; Colombia; Brazil and Cuba. In 2006 alone, OVL secured a
productionsharing agreement with Cuba for operatorship of two offshore blocks, and it entered
into a joint acquisition Sinopec for the Columbian oil and gas assets of Texasbased Omimex
Resources Inc. In addition, the Indian state oil subsidiary in 2006 signed Memorandums of
Understanding with the state oil firms of Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador for cooperation in E&P
activities in the hydrocarbon sector, both in those respective countries and elsewhere. 50
OVL considers one of its biggest achievements being its $1.7 billion investment in
Russia’s Sakhalin1 project, making it the largest investment of its kind by an Indian corporation.
Another impressive feat was securing a 25 percent share in the renowned Greater Nile Oil
Project fields of Sudan via a onetime investment of $690 million, yet another record for any
Indian corporation. 51
It is important to note that typical financial investments are not based upon ordinary
upon predictions of future prices. However, unlike China’s stateowned firms which have access
to substantial foreign exchange and can thereby arrange side payments (as in the case of the
acquisition of an Angolan oilfield in 2004), ONGC is forced to rely on any goodwill that India’s
Ministry of External Affairs can muster. 52
50
OVL, http://www.ongcvidesh.com/display.asp?fol_name=News&file_name=news&get_pic=ovl_news&p_title=News%20::%
20OVL%20News
51
OVL, http://www.ongcvidesh.com.corp_profile.asp
52
Personal correspondence with Dr. Rahul Mukherji, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi,
February 2007.
19
OVL’s principal competition stems from China’s stateowned oil firms which have
consistently managed to outbid and undercut its efforts to obtain access to foreign oil and gas
fields. In an attempt to dampen this seemingly relentless competition the two national
governments created a bilateral agreement. In January 2006, in an effort to contain the bidding
wars between their respective state energy firms, India and China entered into an accord to co
operate in their efforts to secure overseas crude oil supplies. Despite this agreement, it remains to
be seen if the process of outbidding actually stops. 53 This agreement came in the wake of the
successful joint bid on the part of ONGC Videsh and China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) to acquire a 38 percent stake in Al Furat Production Company, Syria’s largest oil
producer. 54 On the other hand, as an Indian strategic analyst has underscored, China may be able
to preempt India in its efforts to obtain natural gas from Burma/Myanmar. 55
The ONGC does have access to international capital markets and the organizational
structure of the firm does not inhibit raising funds in global markets. In late 2005, the ONGC
was engaged in an effort to obtain a rating from Moody’s to enhance its ability to raise funds
from commercial sources. 56
Oil prices have a significant impact on the ONGC’s decisionmaking about upstream
investment and oil sales levels. India still has a system of administered prices in a number of key
areas. 57 Consequently, the ONGC is forced to adhere to the expectations of the Petroleum
Ministry. This remains a source of contention as it invariably has an adverse impact on the
ONGC’s revenue stream. Currently, the ONGC has to subsidize the Indian consumer to the tune
53
Richard McGregor, Jo Johnson and Carola Hoyos, “China and India Forge Alliance on Oil Supplies,” Financial Times,
January 13, 2006.
54
Francesco Guerrera, “Chinese Link with Indians to Bid for Oil Field Stake,” Financial Times, December 14, 2005.
55
B.Raman, “China Beats India to the Myanmar Gas,” South Asia Analysis Group, http://www.saag.org/papers17/paper1676.htm
accessed January 13, 2006.
56
Interview with Subir Raha, Chairman and Managing Director of the ONGC, New Delhi, December 23, 2005.
57
The issue is complex. The Administered Price Mechanism (APM) was formally abolished in April 2002. However, the
government still maintains substantial control over the price mechanism. For a discussion of this issue see Neha Misra, Ruchika
Chawla, Leena Srivastav and R.K. Pachauri, Petroleum Pricing in India (New Delhi: The Energy and Resources Institute, 2005).
20
ONGC
of $1 billion annually. The bulk of the subsidies are directed towards kerosene, diesel, gasoline
in the Ministry of Petroleum, indicated that the stateowned oil marketing companies were losing
as much as $51 million dollars a day. 59
Certain problems of technology acquisition and human resources also dog the firm
principally because of its status as a stateowned firm. One of the chief problems that the ONGC
faces as opposed to private counterparts is in the acquisition of new technology. As a
governmentrun firm, it has to purchase all cuttingedge technology through a cumbersome and
inefficient tendering process. Unfortunately, few firms wish to disburse cuttingedge
technologies through tenders. To obviate the tender process the company has to seek out
negotiated contracts. Thanks to the tender process senior management at ONGC believe that the
company is now facing at least a 5 to 10 year technology gap in particular sectors.
The other significant issue that the ONGC confronts stems from the existing labor laws.
It has no voice whatsoever in the appointment of its directors. Additionally, the firm is expected
talent, the existing, governmentdetermined salary structure makes it exceedingly difficult to
attract able and promising individuals. To compound matters, there is no scope for paying
additional financial incentives. (The government has long mandated uniform salary scales across
public sector firms). Finally, it is extremely difficult to remove individuals on the basis of
incompetent performance and promotion rules virtually dictate that every few years individuals
receive promotions regardless of their performance.
58
Interview with Subir Raha, Chairman and Managing Director, ONGC, New Delhi December 23, 2005.
59
“Burnout: Oilcos lose $51m/day,” The Economic Times, May 18, 2006.
21
FUTURE ROLE IN GLOBAL ENERGY SYSTEM AND OIL GEOPOLITICS
The ONGC does not shape or influence national oil policy except at the margins. The
Ministry of Petroleum makes fundamental decisions about national oil policy. In recent years, as
India’s appetite for oil and natural gas have grown dramatically, key members of the cabinet,
play a role in shaping national oil policy.
The External Affairs Ministry has increasingly been drawn into the making of national oil
policy as India seeks to pursue pipelines from Iran and from Myanmar. Interestingly enough,
apart from criticism from human rights groups, there is little or no great opposition to the ONGC
going into Myanmar. 60 The reasons for the lack of a public outcry require some explanation.
Questions of foreign and security policy, for the most part, remains an elite concern and within
the domain of India’s attentive public that section of the population composed of highlevel
journalists, former policymakers, academics at premier institutions and researchers at a small
handful of think tanks, primarily in New Delhi.
Despite American misgivings about India’s dealings with the military junta in Myanmar,
it is most unlikely that the efforts to court the regime will come to a close. India’s strategists and
policymakers are acutely concerned with what they perceive to be China’s steady penetration of
Myanmar. In addition to these strategic concerns, India’s acute energy needs will trump any
residual anxieties about the unsavory features of the Myanmar regime. Consequently, as long as
ONGC and other Indian companies can find technical means to circumvent Bangladeshi
territory, the gas pipeline project is likely to be pursued with some vigor.
60
Jo Johnson and Amy Kazmin, “India Under Fire for its Military Aid to Burma,” Financial Times, December 8, 2006.
22
ONGC
The pipeline project with Iran is far more fraught with problems. First, the U.S. is likely
to object with much greater vigor to the IndoPakistaniIranian pipeline. Having reached a major
civilian nuclear accord in December 2006 with theU.S., neither the present Congress Partyled
regime nor a future government is likely to pursue a course that brings it into direct confrontation
with Washington and possibly jeopardize the carefully drafted IndoU.S. civilian nuclear accord.
Second, IndoPakistani tensions still remain tense despite the efforts of Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh to improve relations. In a related vein, Pakistan cannot effectively guarantee
the safety and security of the proposed pipeline which is currently designed to pass through one
of its most troubled and restive provinces, Baluchistan. That said, discussions are still under way
with Iran about the pipeline. These discussions, despite provoking American annoyance, reflect
the deepseated propensity toward independence in India’s foreign policy. 61 Whether they will
result in bringing the pipeline project to fruition remains and open question.
The ONGC’s increasing willingness and ability to broker deals with oil majors, no doubt,
will have important consequences for the global oil market. Two factors in particular are likely to
drive this trend. First, India’s prodigious and growing appetite for petroleum and petroleum
based products is increasingly making it an important player. Second, the government’s
willingness open up new areas for exploration to the oil majors and its leeway to the ONGC to
forge partnerships will also affect the future of the global oil industry.
61
T.P. Sreenivasan, “Pranab’s Iran Visit a Signal to the U.S.,” February 12, 2007 http://www. Rediff.com/news/2007/feb/
12tps.htm.
23
REFERENCES CITED
Journals and News Agencies
BBC News
Business Standard
Economist Intelligence Unit
Financial Times
India Abroad
International Oil Daily
Offshore Rig Review
Oil Online
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
Reuters News Service
South Asia Analysis Group
The Economic Times
The Financial Express
The Hindu
The Hindu Business Line
The International Oil Daily
The Telegraph
U.S. Department of Energy
Yale Global Online
24
ONGC
APPENDIX
I. Active Assets
Estimated Estimated
Oil Output Gas Output
Country/Asset Acquired Notes
2006 2006
(MBD) (MM CFD)
SUDAN
Greater Nile Petroleum
Blocks 1, 2, 4
Talisman 400 Operating Company is joint
(25%)
operator; Buyin 2003.
Startup mid2005 Thar Jath
discovery. Operator Petronas.
Block 5A (24%) OMV 25 Known as ‘White Nile’
project; Buyin completed
2004.
KarthoumPort Service contract, no formal
Sudan Products equity, 1,235 km pipeline, 56
CNPC
Pipeline; Khartoum MBD capacity, option to buy
Refinery Upgrade into project at later date.
Mangalore Partial buyin in 2003; Sole
Refinery (not an Mangalore owner by 2004. Has proposed
184
overseas asset, but Refining 150 MBD JV refinery with
fits with above) Cairn at Barmer.
RUSSIA
Reserves of at least 2.5 BN
BBLs of liquids and 9 TCF of
gas. First phase peak at 250
MBD; 708 MBD gas output.
Buyin
Initial cost $1.7 BN.
Sakhalin1 ExxonMobil 40 177
ExxonMobil is operator.
PSA
Farmin 2001; First
production 3Q, 2006.
Considering buyin for
SakhalinIII exploration tract.
VIETNAM
Holds 45% of upstream; 51%
Condensate:
Blocks 61 and 63 Partner 280 of South Con Son gas
4
gathering system
SYRIA
200 MM BOE reserves;
Consists of Dair alZoar, Deir
AlFurat Gas & EZ, Deir EZ Annex (37.4%)
Petroleum Petrocanada NGLs: 20 140 & AlShaun tracts. Also gas
Company pipeline, NGL plant. Jointly
held with CNPC; Bought in
early2006.
25
I. Active Assets (Cont.)
Estimated Estimated
Oil Output Gas Output
Country/Asset Acquired Notes
2006 2006
(MBD) (MM CFD)
COLUMBIA
Untested gross reserves of
more than 300 MM BBLs.
First joint purchase with
Sinopec. Tracts include 100%
Omimex de Ominex
20 Velasquez production area,
Columbia Resources
50% Nare & Cornica blocks,
where Ecopetrol is operator.
Includes 190 km crude
pipeline. Purchase mid2006.
BRAZIL
By 2008, output of 60100
MBD. Shell operator; four
commercial finds in block;
Will produce from FPSO –
good experience for ONGC
for technically challenging
BC10 Block (30%) ExxonMobil
project. Crude heavy (1724
API), sweet & waxy and
similar to Indian grades. Later
signed strategic cooperation
accord with Brazil’s
Petrobras.
II. Acreage
Country/Asset Acquired Type Notes
SUDAN
Petronas operator; Seismic done exploration
Block 5B (24%) OMV Exploration
drilling underway.
MYANMAR
Farmin with Indian company GAIL; Daewoo
has remained operator. Gas finds include
Exploration/
Block A1 (20%) Daewoo Shwee, Shwee Phu & MYA totaling at least
Development
5.7 TCF gas. Development options, pipeline,
LNG or CNG undecided.
VIETNAM
Block 127, 128 Three—year exploration phase, with three
Bid Award Exploration
(100% and operator) well commitment; Blocks 16,000 sq km each
26
ONGC
II. Acreage (Cont.)
Country/Asset Acquired Type Notes
NIGERIA
First acquisitions by ONGC/Mittal JV. In
conjunction with $6 BN infrastructure
investment promised with JV, Nigeria will
give further access to upstream tracts with
OPL 209 & 212;
Bid Award Exploration production of up to 650 MBD; guaranteed
OPL 279 & 285
120 MBD term crude sales and share of new
LNG output. Signed by ONGC Mittal Energy
Limited (EMEL), one of two ONGC/Mittal
JV companies.
CUBA
N34, N35 Bid Award Exploration 100% PSC and operator; 4,300 km sq total
ONGC 30% share; Norsk Hydro remains
Blocks 2529, 36 Farmin Exploration
operator.
QATAR
Awarded in 2005; ONGC has 70% equity, if
Najwat Najen PSC Appraisal of
Bid Award commercial oil found; 300 MM BBLs
(70%) block
reported in place.
EGYPT
Joint operator wit IPR Red Sea for 290 sq km
tract. Oil in place of 600 MM BBLs
Block 6 (70%) Bid Award Exploration estimated in the North Ramadan block. Half
dozen prospects identified.; Signed mid
2005.
IRAN
Exploration ONGC operator with IOC (40%) and OIL
Farsi Block (40%) Bid Award under buy (20%) partners. 4well program and seismic
back contract required; Signed end2004.
Development
rights
Yadavaran Upstream contracts were quidproquo for
Govt. to field; India buying 7.5 MM MTA of LNG. LNG
Pending
Govt. Buyback sale appears shelved and upstream projects in
contract for limbo.
Jefeyr oil
field.
IVORY COAST
Vanco is operator in 4,116 km sq offshore
CI112 (23.5%) Vanco Farmin block. OIL and Sinopec also partners. One
well drilled in 2005.
LIBYA
Onshore blocks totaling 8,646 km sq; TPOC,
Nc188 & 189 TPOC Farmin the Turkish national oil company, remains
operator.
27
II. Acreage (Cont.)
Country/Asset Acquired Type Notes
AUSTRALIA
ONGC bought 55%, but Canada independent
Block WA 306P Antrim
Farmin Antrium still operator. Block is in prospective
(55%) Energy
Browse Basin.
IRAQ
Status of contract awarded under Hussain
regime uncertain. Untested reserves in range
Block 8 Bid Award Exploration
of 645 MM BBLs in onshore block bordering
Kuwait.
III. Failed Attempts 20052006
Country/Asset Type Notes
NIGERIA
Indian cabinet rejected $2 BN bid as “too
OPL 246 Exploration risky”; OPL 246 was hived off of Akpo
find now under development offshore
Encana Assets Production & Lost out to China consortium at bid of
Half dozen tracts
Exploration Tracts $1.42 BN. Crude output of 90 MBD.
KAZAKHSTAN
Lost PetroKazakhstan to China’s CNPC
$3.6 BN bid. Kumkol produced 150
Acreage & Kumkol MBD in 2005 of light sweet crude. First
Exploration & Production
Production attempt to bid with Mittal JV. ONGC still
negotiating for two separate exploration
blocks.
ANGOLA
Sale by Shell nullified by Angola
government and awarded to Chinese
Acquisition 50% of Block Exploration & Part of Project
interests by 2004. Part of BP’s Greater
18 under Development
Plutonio development, which will pump
200 MBD by 2009.
28
ONGC
(Derived from: http://ongcindia.com/iorganogram.asp)
29