CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
(Act No. 3815 as amended)
AN ACT REVISING THE PENAL CODE AND OTHER
PENAL LAWS
Preliminary Article – This law shall be known as “The
Revised Penal Code”.
BOOK ONE
General Provisions Regarding the Date of
Enforcement and Application of the Provisions of
This Code, and Regarding the Offenses, the Persons
Liable and the Penalties
Preliminary Title
DATE OF EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICATION OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE
CRIMINAL LAW – is that branch or division of law which
defines crimes, treats of their nature, and provides for their
punishment.
Crime – is an act committed or omitted in violation of a
public law forbidding or commanding it.
It provides for the legal definition of a crime.
Criminal Law axiom: nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege,
that is, there is no crime where there is no law punishing it.
It tells us what is punishable and what is not punishable.
The treats of their nature, whether a crime is
mala in se or mala prohibita, deliberate or intentional and
such, criminal law deals with that, the kind of crime
because it defines the set of rules applicable to it.
Crimes belong to different classes. In Book II
alone, crimes are divided or classified into 13 classifications
– from Crimes Against National Security and the Law of
Nations, to Quasi-Offenses, Crimes Against Honor, etc. And
there are many classifications of penalties, like the
consummated, attempted and frustrated, the grave, less
grave and the light. These are what you call the nature of
the crimes.
We are concerned not only of crimes under the
Penal Code, but these include those acts punishable under
special laws. So, you must understand the nature of each.
Each one has its own special rules to be followed.
Sources of Philippine Criminal Law:
1. Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) and its
amendments;
2. Special Penal Laws;
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3. Presidential Decrees; and
4. Executive Orders.
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
The Revised Penal Code originated from the old
Spanish Penal Code of 1887 which took effect in July 14,
1887. And that was the prevailing law up to the coming of
the Americans. The Americans did not touch the Penal Code
and the Civil Code. They introduced laws especially on
criminal procedure, but the substantive law remained the
same.
However, sometime in 1914, there was an attempt
by the government to change the old Spanish Penal Code.
And the government commissioned a Committee, chaired
by Rafael del Pan, to draft a new law. That Committee came
out with a proposed law to replace the old Penal Code. The
proposed law was called the Proposed Correctional Code of
del Pan. However, the draft was never acted upon by the
Philippine Legislature.
About ten years later, the government created
another Committee which was given instructions to revise
the old Penal Code. The Committee was chaired by
Anacleto Diaz, with the following members:
• Quintin Paredes
• Guillermo Guevarra
• Alex Reyes
• Mariano de Joya
The Committee came out with their draft and the
Philippine Legislature passed it into law on December 8,
1930 and became effective on January 1, 1932. It came to
be known as Act 3815, or the Revised Penal Code. It has
undergone several amendments, but the basic structure of
the law is the same.
During the late 1940’s, there was an attempt to
redraft the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The committee
charged come out with the proposed Code of Crimes which,
however, was not passed by Congress. And in the late
1970’s, the UP Law Center came out with another draft
which was also called the Code of Crimes. It was submitted
to the Batasang Pambansa but to no avail.
In 1995, the then Congress passed another bill – to
be called the Code of Crimes again. Although it is a different
one from the previous drafts, it was sponsored by
Congressman Sergio Apostol. He conducted public hearings,
including in Davao, but it still remains to be seen whether
the bill will be finally enacted into law.
In other words, there have been several attempts
to amend or replace the RPC. It has passed the test of time;
it is a very durable law.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Common Law Crimes – as known in the United States and
England as the body of principles, usages and rules of
action, which do not rest for their authority upon any
express and active declaration of the will of the legislature,
are NOT recognized in the Philippines.
There is NO such thing as a common law crime
because common law is based on customs and tradition.
There is no such thing as crimes by tradition in the
Philippines. Tradition or custom itself cannot create a
crime, but the law itself must provide and penalize an act as
a crime.
Note: Court decisions are not sources of criminal law,
because they merely explain the meaning of, and apply, the
law as enacted by the legislative branch of the government.
So as the Constitution because it does not defines
“crime” nor provides for a penalty. The Constitution is the
source of many rights of an accused, but you cannot find
any crime defined and penalized in the Constitution. So,
theoretically, the Constitution is not a source of criminal
law. The Constitution is merely a source of rights.
Art. 1. Time when Act takes effect. - This Code shall take
effect on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and
thirty-two.
Schools of Thought
Four (4) Schools Of Thought: [CPEU]
1. Classical (Juristic School of Thought)
2. Positivist (Realistic School of Thought)
3. Eclectic (Mixed)
4. Utilitarian
1. CLASSICAL (Termed as the 'juristic' school of thought)
Primary purpose: Retribution. “An eye of an eye, a tooth
for a tooth”
Basis of criminal liability: Human free will. Endeavored to
establish a mechanical and direct proportion between
crime and penalty; there is scant regard to human element.
Note: > It focuses on the nature of the act. The result of
the act, rather than the offender himself
> It believes that man has the capacity to choose
between good and evil. Whatever you do, it will have
consequences.
i.e. Fixed Penalties for specific crimes, depending on the
severity of your actions, there is a corresponding penalty.
Just like murder with reclusion perpetua, that is punished
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differently from homicide, which is reclusion temporal, or
theft, depending on the value of the item stolen.
2. POSITIVIST (or realistic school of thought)
Primary purpose: Reformation; prevention/correction.
Basis of criminal liability: The sum of the social, natural and
economic phenomena to which the actor is exposed.
The modern method of disciplining is correlated to
the positivist or realistic school of thought.
Note: > It focuses on the individual. The premise is man is
inherently good. It just so happens that the environment
leads him astray. The environment forces him to do evil.
> The law serves to lead the man back to the
correct path. It is very manifest in the Revised Penal Code
when you look at the reformative concepts of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law where if you have served a
certain amount of time, even if you have not served a full
term of imprisonment, you may be released on parole.
i.e. If the penalty is 8-10years, and the judge fixes a lower
penalty of 6 years. When you have reached the minimum of
6 years, even if you have not served 8-10 years, you may be
released on parole.
i.e. The Probation law, (R.A. 10707) where in lieu of
imprisonment, you will undergo probation, community
service, if you are qualified, you may opt not to be
imprisoned. You can be forced render community service in
your barangay in lieu of imprisonment.
Note: More than justice, it brings the offender, reforms
him, and enables him to become a member of society.
3. ECLECTIC/MIXED
It is merely a combination of both Classical and Positivist.
To a certain extent, the Revised Penal Code is Eclectic,
although it is more classical than positivist.
Crimes that are economic and social by nature should be
dealt with in a positivist manner; thus, the law is more
compassionate. Heinous crimes should be dealt with in a
classical manner; thus, capital punishment.
Note: The Revised Penal Code today follows the mixed or
eclectic philosophy. For example:
> Intoxication of the offender is considered to
mitigate his criminal liability, unless it is intentional or
habitual;
> Age of the offender is considered;
> A woman who killed her child to conceal her
dishonor has in her favor a mitigating circumstance.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
4. UTILITARIAN
Primary purpose: Protection of society from actual or
potential wrongdoers.
The purpose of the penalty is to deter and to have
a deterrent effect. That is why if you adopt the Utilitarian
school of thought, you may not approve of the death
penalty because there had been studies that the death
penalty has no deterrent effect.
CASE: (The Utilitarian school of thought is discussed)
MAGNO v. CA, G.R. No. 96132 (1992)
The court held Teng took advantage of Magno's
financial vulnerability which she already knew at the outset.
So she maliciously influenced him into entering into a
transaction which she knew that Magno could not comply
with and then she filed the case. The Supreme Court said
that it’s not Magno who is the wrongdoer. It is Teng who is
the complainant of this case. She should not be rewarded
with her wrongdoings. Therefore, applying the utilitarian
theory, the Supreme Court, among other grounds,
acquitted Magno because he is a victim in this case.
NOTE: When you look at the four schools of thought, it all
points to one thing—self-preservation of the state because
if you do not have criminal laws in the state then people
can just do whatever they can. It will lead to anarchy. And
so, there is criminal law. The state is very insecure, it has no
trust into its constituents and so it has to enact laws to save
it.
CASE: (Purpose of criminal law)
ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 369 SCRA 394 (2001)
The case deals between the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law (R.A. 7080).
The Supreme Court held that ultimately the
purpose of Criminal Law is self-preservation. It’s the effort,
the action of the state for self-preservation. Parallel to
individual liberty is the natural illimitable right of the state
to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining integrity
and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behoves the state to
formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to
its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-
observance.
STATE AUTHORITY TO PUNISH CRIME:
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The state through the legislature grants and drafts
the law. The power to define crimes is with congress, the
legislative branch of government.
Art. II, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Declaration of
Principles and State Policies. The maintenance of peace
and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
PEOPLE v. SANTIAGO, 43 Phil 120 (1922)
The State has the authority, under its police power,
to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of
criminal procedure. States, as a part of their police power,
have a large measure of discretion in creating and defining
criminal offenses.
U.S. v. PABLO, 35 Phil 94 (1916)
The right of the prosecution and punishment for a
crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs
to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the
common will of the members of society to look after, guard
and defend the interests of the community, the individual
and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the
guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
Characteristics of the Philippine Criminal Law
Three (3) characteristics of Criminal Law: [GTP]
1. Generality (Who?)
2. Territoriality (Where?)
3. Prospectivity (When?)
1. GENERALITY (Who?)
Basis:
Art. 14, Civil Code. Penal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn
in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of
public international law and to treaty stipulations.
Also flows from the attribute of sovereignty of the
State to enforce its laws on all persons who will be located
or situated within its territory regardless of a person’s
nationality, race, religion, and regardless where born.
When one commits a crime in the Philippines,
whether he is a resident citizen, alien, resident alien, a
transient, or a tourist, he is subject to prosecution before
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Philippine courts. It applies with equal force upon who will
be situated in the Philippines, whether permanent or
temporary (“live or sojourn”).
EXCEPTIONS to Generality:
1) Article 14, Civil Code. “subject to the principles of public
international law and to treaty stipulations.”
2) Article 2, RPC. “except as provided in the Treaties and
Laws of preferential application xxx”
A. Treaty Stipulation
When the Philippines enters into a treaty with a
foreign country and grants immunity from criminal
prosecution of its nationals by agreement – the best
example of such a treaty was the former US-Philippines
Military Bases Agreement where for certain crimes
committed in the Philippines by American Servicemen who
were discharging their official duties, they could not be
charged in Philippine Courts. They could be charged by the
United States under their laws. We cannot do anything
about that because we agreed to it. That is a treaty.
Other examples:
 Visiting Forces Agreement
 Vienna Convention
LIANG v. PEOPLE, 355 SCRA 125
Facts: Jeffrey Liang is an economist working in the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, he was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral
defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against
fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. Because of this, he was
arrested, but then, he was able to post bail, and so he was
released from custody. The next day, the MTC judge
received an “office of protocol” from the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered by
immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government. Because of this, the MTC judge dismissed the
two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution.
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it
was denied. It then filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
The latter set aside the MTC ruling and ordered for an
enforcement of a warrant of arrest. Liang filed a MR but it
was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review
Issue: Whether or not Liang is covered by immunity under
the Agreement?
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Held:
NO. The immunity mentioned in Section 45 of the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception
that the act was done in an “official capacity.” Slandering a
person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission
of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage
he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, a diplomatic agent enjoys immunity from
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case
of an action relating to any professional or commercial
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving
state outside his official functions. The commission of a
crime is not part of an official duty.
B. Principles of Public International Law
The following persons are exempt from the provisions of
the RPC:
(1) Sovereigns and other heads of state
(2) Ambassadors, ministers, plenipotentiary,
minister resident and charges d‘ affaires. (Article 31, Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations)
Notes: Consuls and consular officers are NOT exempt from
local prosecution. (See Article 41, Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations)
Public vessels of a friendly foreign power are not
subject to local jurisdiction. Generality has NO reference to
territoriality.
CASE: 2 exceptions were illustrated: treaty stipulations
(Vienna convention) and generally accepted principles of
international law
MINUCHER v. CA and ARTHUR SCALZO, G.R. No. 142396,
February 11, 2003
Facts: Khosrow Minucher is an Iranian national who came
to study in the RP in 1974 and was appointed Labor Attaché
for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila. When
the Shah (monarch title) of Iran was deposed, he became a
refugee and continued to stay as head of the Iranian
National Resistance Movement.
Scalzo, on the other hand, was a special agent of
the US Drugs Enforcement Agency. He conducts
surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the
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By: Tina Serrano
Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs
shipped to the US and make the actual arrest. In May 1986,
Minucher (and one Abbas Torabian) was charged with for
the violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
The criminal charge was followed by a “buy-bust operation”
conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his
house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been
seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private
respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution. They were acquitted.
On August 3,1988, Minucher filed a case before the
RTC for damages on account of what he claimed to have
been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo. According to Minucher, he and Scalzo
conducted some business. Minucher expressed his desire to
obtain a US Visa for him and his Abbas’s wife. Scalzo told
him that he could help him for a $2,000 fee per visa. After a
series of business transactions between the two, when
Scalzo came to deliver the visas to Minucher’s house, he
told the latter that he would be leaving the Philippines soon
and requested him to come out of the house so he can
introduce him to his cousin waiting in the cab. To his
surprise, 30-40 armed Filipino soldiers came to arrest him.
In his defense, Scalzo asserted his diplomatic
immunity as evidenced by a Diplomatic Note. He contended
that the US Government, pursuant to the Vienna
Convention, recognized it on Diplomatic Relations and the
Philippine government itself thru its Executive Department
and DFA. The courts ruled in favor of Scalzo on the ground
that as a special agent of the US Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RTC: decision in favor of plaintiff. CA: Reversed. Scalzo was
sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity pursuant to
the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Issue: WON Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity.
Ratio: Yes. The Vienna Convention lists the classes of heads
of diplomatic missions to include: (a) ambassadors or
nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys,
ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states;
and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of
foreign affairs. Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic)
mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff
and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of
missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff,
excluding the members of the administrative, technical and
service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank.
Scalzo was an Assistant Attaché of the US
diplomatic mission. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his
duties and are administratively under him, but their main
function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and
developments in their respective fields in the host country
and submit reports to their own ministries or departments
in the home government. These officials are not generally
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regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are
they normally designated as having diplomatic rank. While
the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain
contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he
worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and
was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug
activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this
case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was
acting well within his assigned functions when he
committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present
controversy could then be resolved under the related
doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the
courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary
international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of
a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although
not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his
official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the
immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be,
in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State,
in whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non
habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication
is that if the judgment against an official would require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be
regarded as being against the state itself, although it has
not been formally impleaded.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can
be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it
can be established that he is acting within the directives of
the sending state. The consent of the host state is an
indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the
two sovereigns. The “buy-bust operation” and other such
acts are indication that the Philippine government has given
its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within
Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance
activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of
his official function or duties.
C. Laws of Preferential Application
Examples:
 Members of Congress are not liable for libel or
slander for any speech in Congress or in any
committee thereof. (Sec. 11, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution)
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 Any ambassador or public minister of any foreign
State, authorized and received as such by the
President, or any domestic or domestic servant of
any such ambassador or minister are exempt
from arrest and imprisonment and whose
properties are exempt from distraint, seizure and
attachment.3 (R.A. No. 75)
 Warship Rule – A warship of another country, even
though docked in the Philippines, is considered an
extension of the territory of its respective
country. This also applies to embassies.
Jurisdiction of Military Courts
Sec. 1, R.A. No. 7055. Members of Armed Force of the
Philippines and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special
penal law, or local government ordinances, regardless of
whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or
offended parties which may be natural or juridical
persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, EXCEPT
when the offense, as determined before arraignment by
the civil court, is service connected, in which case the
offense shall the tried by court-martial: PROVIDED, That
the president before arraignment may, in the interest of
justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment
that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper
civil courts.
GENERAL RULE: Civilian courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with military courts or courts-martial over soldiers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. (That is, crimes performed
or committed by members of the military)
EXCEPTION: If the offense is service connected, the courts
martial have jurisdiction over them.
Note: When the military court takes cognizance of the case
involving a person subject to military law, the Articles of
War apply, NOT the RPC or other penal law.
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: That the president before
arraignment may, in the interest of justice, order or direct
at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or
offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
Note: The president may refer a crime to a civilian court as
long as it is covered by the Revised Penal Code or by any
Special law.
U.S. v. SWEET, 1 Phil 18
Facts: Sweet was an employee of the U.S. Army in the
Philippines. He assaulted a prisoner of war for which he was
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charged with the crime of physical injuries. Sweet
interposed the defense that the fact that he was an
employee of the U.S. military authorities deprived the court
of the jurisdiction to try and punish him.
Held: The case is open to the application of the general
principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is
unaffected by the military or other special character of the
person brought before them for trial, unless controlled by
express legislation to the contrary.
2. TERRITORIALITY (Where?)
Situs of the act
Basis:
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in
the treaties and laws of preferential application, the
provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within
the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its
interior waters and maritime zone, BUT also outside of its
jurisdiction against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or
airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of
the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued
by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the
introduction into these islands of the obligations and
securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should
commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national
security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of
Book Two of this Code.”
GENERAL RULE: Penal laws of the country have force and
effect only within its territory. It cannot penalize crimes
committed outside its territory.
Principle of territoriality in essence is ELIMINATION; it is
only up to the territorial borders of the Philippines.
Note: The territory of the country is not limited to the
land where its sovereignty resides but includes also its
maritime and interior waters as well as its atmosphere.
(1) Terrestrial jurisdiction is the jurisdiction exercised over
land.
(2) Fluvial jurisdiction is the jurisdiction exercised over
maritime and interior waters.
(3) Aerial jurisdiction is the jurisdiction exercised over the
atmosphere.
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Territory comprises:
1. ATMOSPHERE
Rules with Respect to Philippine Airspace:
Free Zone Theory: the atmosphere over the country is free
and not subject to the jurisdiction of the subjacent state
EXCEPT for the protection of its national security and public
order.
Relative Theory: the subjacent state exercises jurisdiction
over its atmosphere only to the extent that it can
effectively exercise control thereof. The jurisdiction only
extends to those acts upon which the Philippine authority
can control.
Absolute Theory: the subjacent state has complete
jurisdiction over the atmosphere above subject only to
innocent passage of an aircraft of foreign country.
Note: If the crime is committed in an aircraft, no matter
how high, as long as it can be established that it is within
the Philippine atmosphere, Philippine criminal will govern.
What is outer space?
Outer Space – is defined as the space surrounding the
planet that by United Nations Treaty is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of
use or occupation, or by any other means. It is a space
where no country can claim jurisdiction over.
Rule: country of registry of the vessel will exercise
jurisdiction over acts performed inside the vessel.
2. INTERIOR WATERS
Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution: Archipelagic Doctrine
According to the UNCLOS, internal waters are determined
by drawing outward baselines using the straight line
method.
All waters located inside the Philippines are internal waters,
therefore, the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction over
those waters.
3. MARITIME ZONES
In Magallona v. Ermita, SC laid down 3 Maritime zones:
Territorial Waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines;
Philippines can exercise sovereignty, including powers to
enforce penal laws
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Contiguous Zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines;
jurisdiction is to enforce customs, fiscal immigration and
sanitation laws
Exclusive Economic Zone – 200 nautical miles from the
baselines; merely the right to exploit the economic and
natural resources
EXCEPTIONS to Territoriality: (Principle of
Extraterritoriality)
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or
airship.
However, if the Philippine ship or airship is within the
territory of the other country, then that country exercises
jurisdiction over the ship or airship.
Country of registry of the ship or airship is considered,
when it is registered under the Philippines, it becomes an
extension of our country. (BAR exam question)
Foreign ships within Philippine territory.
PEOPLE v. WONG CHENG
SC: the pernicious effects of smoking opium extend to
Philippine territory; it is not merely an internal matter to be
resolved within the vessel and because it affects Philippine
territory, therefore SC said that Philippine territory has to
exercise jurisdiction over the act committed by Wong
Cheng following the English rule.
US v. LOOK CHOW
SC: selling of opium disturbs the security of the country,
therefore the Philippines exercises jurisdiction over the said
act.
French rule and English rule only applies to foreign
MERCHANT vessels.
The rules are not applicable to Warships. Warship is
immune from the jurisdiction of any country because it is
an extension of a political territory of its flag state.
Article 29
Definition of warships
For the purposes of this Convention, "warship" means a
ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the
external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality,
under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the
government of the State and whose name appears in the
appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a
crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.
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TITLE ONE – FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
CHAPTER 1. FELONIES
Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by
law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only be means of
deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
Felonies – are acts and omissions punishable under the
Revised Penal Code.
ELEMENTS, in general:
(1) That there must be an act or omission.
It must be an ACTUS REUS/PHYSICAL ACT to be considered
as a felony, there must be an:
Act – Any kind of body movement which tends to produce
some effect in the external world; includes possession; or
Omission – The failure to perform a positive duty which one
is bound to do under the law. It is important that there is a
law requiring the performance of an act; if there is no
positive duty, there is no liability.
 Examples: Failure to render assistance, failure to
issue receipt or non-disclosure of knowledge of
conspiracy against the government.
Mens Rea – "A guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent." Sometimes referred to in common
parlance as the gravamen of the offense (bullseye of the
crime), or criminal or deliberate intent.
NOTE: For an act to be punishable there must be a
CONCURRENCE BETWEEN THE ACT and the INTENT.
(2) That the act or omission must be punishable
by the RPC.
Acts punishable by RPC are called felonies - principle of
“nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege” WHILE, Acts
punishable by Special penal laws are called offenses.
Note: Crimes can be either felonies or offenses.
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(3) That the act is performed or the omission
incurred by means of dolo or culpa.
A. Dolo (Deceit) – is DELIBERATE INTENT otherwise referred
to as CRIMINAL INTENT, and must be coupled with freedom
of action and intelligence on the part of the offender as to
the act done by him.
NOTE: Deceit here does not mean fraud. Do not equate
deceit as means of fraud. That does not refer to fraudulent
concealment. Deceit refers to malice or wrongful intent.
EXCEPTIONS to the requirement of criminal intent:
(a) Felonies committed by CULPA.
(b) Offenses MALA PROHIBITA.
Intentional Felonies – The act or omission is performed or
incurred with deliberate intent (with malice) to cause an
injury to another.
Requisites:
i. Freedom – Voluntariness on the part of the person who
commits the act or omission.
If there is lack of freedom, the offender is exempt
from liability (i.e., presence of irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear)
ii. Intelligence – Capacity to know and understand the
consequences of one‘s act. This power is necessary to
determine the morality of human acts, the lack of which
leads to non-existence of a crime.
NOTE: No intelligence, no criminal liability. If there is lack of
intelligence, the offender is exempt from liability. (i.e.,
offender is an imbecile, insane or under 15 years of age)
iii. Criminal intent – Refers to the use a particular means to
effect a result.
Presumption of Intent: If a wrongful act is committed,
malicious intent is presumed.
The intent to commit an act with malice, being
purely a mental state, is presumed (but only if the act
committed is unlawful).
NOTE: malicious intent flows from the performance of the
wrongful act. At the very outset, the act is very wrongful in
itself.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
BUT such presumption arises from the proof of commission
of an unlawful act. HOWEVER, in some crimes, intent
cannot be presumed being an integral element thereof; so
it has to be proven.
As intent is an internal process, it is a mental
process thus it is difficult to determine whether there is
wrongful intent or malice in the performance of an act
because nobody can read the mind of another person.
Internal acts are not included; internal thoughts are beyond
the ambits of penal law.
Example: In frustrated homicide, specific intent to kill is not
presumed but must be proven; otherwise it is merely
physical injuries.
NOTE: There is no intent if there is no freedom and
intelligence. There would be freedom and intelligence even
if no intent; intent is dependent on the existence of the
two.
MANUEL v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
SC: Malice is presumed in the commission of the
unlawful act, so Manuel’s act of contracting a second
marriage is unlawful. Therefore wrongful intent is
presumed.
It was not up to the prosecution to prove wrongful
intent on the part of the husband. It was already presumed
from the act of contracting a second marriage without
having the previous marriage judicially declared null and
void or without having his first wife judicially declared
presumptively dead. It is presumed from the mere
performance of an unlawful act because intent is a mental
state. There is no way to look into the mind of another. It
has to be reduced from the overt acts and from the
external acts of a person. That is why there is a
presumption of intent when you perform an unlawful act.
Therefore, it is on the part of the accused to overcome the
presumption. However, in this case the accused failed to
overcome the presumption.
Ignorance of the law excuses no one. Definitely
mistake in the interpretation of the law cannot overcome
the presumption of malice; cannot be used as a defense to
establish the use of malice. But one of the ways to
overcome this presumption is mistake of fact.
Ignorance of Certain Facts:
Mistake of Fact (ignorantia facti excusat) – It is a
reasonable misapprehension of fact on the part of the
person causing injury to another. Such person is NOT
criminally liable as he acted without criminal intent.
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Under this principle, what is involved is the lack of
intent on the part of the accused. Therefore, the defense of
mistake of fact is an untenable defense in culpable felonies,
where there is no intent to consider.
REQUISITES:
(a) That the act done would have been lawful had
the facts been as the accused believed them to
be;
(b) That the intention of the accused in
performing the act should be lawful;
(c) That the mistake must be without fault or
carelessness on the part of the accused. When the
accused is negligent, mistake of fact is not a
defense.
NOTE: An honest mistake of fact destroys the presumption
of criminal intent which arises upon the commission of a
felonious act. Mistake of fact is a valid defense; it gives rise
to good faith and the conclusion that it overcomes the
presumption of malicious intent.
US v. AH CHONG, 15 Phil 488 (1910)
Issue: Whether the state of fact on the part of Ah Chong
will serve to exculpate him of criminal liability.
SC: Elements of the state of fact as a defense. The
most important element is that the act done would have
been lawful had the facts raised by the accused believed
them to be.
In this case, he was exercising his right of self-
defense to defend himself from unlawful aggression
without sufficient provocation on his part and by using
reasonable means to repel the aggression. All the elements
were present but the problem is Pascual did not turn out to
be the person feared by Ah Chong.
The SC said that is a mistake of fact and a source of
good faith. Therefore it neutralizes, it overcomes the
presumption of intent because intent is presumed when he
performed a wrongful act by killing a person. There was
malicious intent but because of mistake of fact, the
presumption of intent was overcome. Therefore the SC said
Ah Chong was innocent of the crime charged against him.
Is mistake in the identity of the victim a sufficient basis to
give rise to mistake of fact to counteract the presumption
of intent on the part of the accused?
PEOPLE v. OANIS, 74 Phil 257 (1943)
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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Thus, the SC said that the case of Ah Chong is inapplicable

Were all requisites of the elements of fact present? in this case.

First requisite: that the act done would have been lawful
had the facts raised by the accused believed them to be. Two Kinds of Intent:

The circumstances did not call for a drastic action,

while the first order was to capture Balagtas dead or alive. General Criminal Intent Specific Criminal Intent
The direct order to them was to employ force only when
necessary and only when Balagtas resist but they did not The intention to do The intention to commit
follow that order. There was no resistance because the man something wrong. a definite act.
was just lying face down and the man was not even Presumed from the mere Existence is not
Balagtas, even if it turned out to be him it is still unlawful doing of a wrong act. presumed.
because they did not follow the order to them.
The burden is upon the Since the specific intent
Second requisite: that the intention of the accused in wrong doer to prove that is an element of the
performing the act should be lawful is still not present. he acted without such crime, the burden is
criminal intent. upon the prosecution to
The intent was no longer to arrest but it was establish its existence.
already to gain, so the intent in performing the act was not
lawful at the very outset.
Note: If any of the elements is absent, there is no dolo. If
there is no dolo, there could be no intentional felony.
Third requisite: that the mistake must be without fault or
carelessness on the part of the accused.
CASE: (specific intent)
The police officers were at fault when they shot
the escaped convict who was sleeping, without first PEOPLE v. DELIM, G.R. No.142773 (2003)
ascertaining his identity. (It is only when the fugitive is
determined to fight the officers of law trying to catch him (When you read the criminal information in the case, it
that killing the former would be justified) involves two penalties. Kidnapping which involves restraint
in the freedom and liberty of the person and Murder or
There was carelessness because they had all the Homicide because the victim here was half tied, he was
opportunity to verify the identity of the victim as the victim grabbed, he was covered in a piece of cloth, he was
was only lying in bed, unarmed. They could have asked and abducted by the accused and after a couple of days he was
effected a bloodless arrest but they did not chose to do so, found as a rotting corpse. The court was confronted with
because they were so caught up with ___ and passion, the issue, what is the crime charged?)
blood lust which led them to fire bullets in the body of
Tecson which led to his death. The prosecutor upon entry charged two crimes. It
was stated 2 crimes, which is Kidnapping, in one hand, and
murder on the other.
CASE of AH CHONG and OANIS, Distinguished
Supreme Court said, to determine the proper
chargeable offense, you must look at the specific intent to
NOTE: The primary difference between the case of Ah determine. If that specific intent of the accused was to
Chong and Oanis is the presence of imminent danger in Ah restrain him his freedom and liberty, then it is kidnapping.
Chong. But if the specific intent is to kill, then it is murder. The
deprivation of liberty being merely incidental to the act of
In the case of Ah Chong: the accused had no time killing.
to verify the facts, no other alternative but to take the facts
as he believed them to be. He was at the instance of So the specific intent, as opposed to general intent:
panicking and he cannot be blamed by this because there the purpose of specific intent is to determine the exact
was history of robberies in their neighborhood so he has to felony committed from a certain set of facts. It is to point
be extra vigilant. WHILE, to which felony did the accused intend to commit, while
General intent, the purpose is to determine whether or
In the case of OANIS: there was no imminent not the intentional felony was committed. But to answer
danger, because the accused had all the time in the world, the question 'what kind of felony', you have to look at the
the opportunity to verify the facts but they did not do so. specific intent.

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 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano

CASE of MANUEL v. PEOPLE and PEOPLE v. DELIM,
Distinguished
NOTE: General intent must be discussed based on the case
of Manuel v. People. It is presumed that the performance of
an unlawful act. BUT in the case of People v. Delim, the
Supreme Court was categorical that in specific intent, it
must be proved by the prosecution. So it is not easily
presumed. The facts upon which it is based must be
conclusively shown by the prosecution. That is why the
Supreme Court said kidnapping and murder are specific
intent crimes. So the prosecution must in turn show that
intent was to deprive liberty or intent to kill. Depending as
to which the facts point to, then that is the felony charged
in the criminal information.
CASE of U.S. v. Ah Chong (to further understand the
distinction between general intent and specific intent):
Can there be specific intent without general
intent? Did he have an intention to do wrong when he
defended himself? NO.
Did he have an intent to kill the person or the
aggressor? YES.
There was specific intent to kill but there was no
general intent to do wrong. That is the distinction between
general intent and specific intent.
Intent is also situated with the concept of motive. How do
you distinguish intent from motive?
i.e. If you stab a person in the heart — What is your
intent? Your intent is to kill. Motive may be revenge or
because of spite or rejection.
NOTE: Motive is not an essential ingredient in a felony.
Regardless of whether or not you have a noble motive or
bad motive, the law does not look at that. The law looks at
your intent.
When Motive Becomes Material in Determining Criminal
Liability:
i. When the act brings about variant crimes (e.g.
kidnapping v. robbery)
ii. When there is doubt as to the identity of the
assailant.
iii. When there is the need to ascertain the truth
between two antagonistic versions of the crime.
iv. When the identification of the accused
proceeds from an unreliable source and the
testimony is inconclusive and not free from
doubt.
v. When there are no eyewitnesses to the crime,
and when suspicion is likely to fall upon a
number of persons.
vi. When the evidence on the commission of the
crime is purely circumstantial.
> Lack of motive can aid in achieving
acquittal of the accused, especially
where there is doubt as to the identity
of the accused. (People v. Hassan,
1988)

Intent Motive vii. Another case where motive gains significance is

Refers to the use of a It is the moving power in political crimes.
particular means to bring which entails a person to do
about the desired result; an an act; the reason behind i.e. Cases of rebellion, invasion. Rebellion is a
aim or purpose of the mind. your actions. political crime. There is under the law called
Generally, it is not an 'the absorption doctrine.' Rebellion is unique
essential element of a crime, because all acts committed in furtherance of
Establish the nature and rebellion is absorbed in rebellion. If you killed
hence, it need not be proved
extent of culpability in 20 people. Those are not 20 separate crimes of
for purposes of conviction.
intentional felonies. rebellion. It only constitutes one crime of
(except in certain cases
enumerated below) rebellion because of the absorption doctrine. It
states that all acts committed in furtherance of
Intent, simply stated, is merely the objective — What is rebellion with a political motive is absorbed in
your objective in performing that act? rebellion. For so long as the act is committed
with a political motive, it is deemed absorbed.
i.e. When you take the ball pen of your classmate This is where motive obtains significance
— What is your objective? What is your intent? The intent because you look at the motive of the act,
is to gain possession. Motive is like baka magpapansin ka whether or not the act is to be absorbed in the
lang. crime of rebellion. If it is a common crime,
which does not have a political motive, then it is
not to be absorbed. The political motive is to
destroy and weaken the forces of the state.
Even if legally speaking it constitutes a separate

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 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
crime, crime of homicide as the case may be, its
absorbed in rebellion because it is vested with a
political motive.
B. CULPA (Fault) – is CONSTRUCTIVE INTENT. The act
performed is attended with imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.
NOTE: Although there is no intentional felony, there could
be culpable felony.
To distinguish between felonies committed by
means of dolo and felonies committed by means of
culpa:
The malicious intent in dolo is replaced
by negligence, imprudence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill in culpa.
Culpable Felonies – The act or omission is not malicious;
the injury caused being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice.
Requisites:
i. Freedom
ii. Intelligence
iii. Negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight or lack
of skill
Negligence – indicates deficiency of perception, failure to
pay proper attention, and to use diligence in foreseeing the
injury or damage impending to be caused. Usually involves
lack of foresight.
Imprudence – indicates deficiency of action, failure to take
the necessary precaution to avoid injury to person or
damage to property. Usually involves lack of skill.
Reason for punishing acts of negligence or imprudence:
A man must use his common sense and exercise
due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful and prudent.
NOTE: To determine whether a felony is an intentional
felony or culpable felony, don’t look at the result. It is not
the result that matters, that’s for another issue. Look at the
nature of the act or omission.
If the act or omission is performed with malice, at
the outset, then it is intentional. But if there is no malice;
there is no wrongful intent; and it results to injury, then it
may be culpable. You have to justify that it is attended with
negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
PEOPLE v. GARCIA,
There are two siblings who crossed the street. The
brother goes first and was able to reach the center island.
12
His younger sister was on her way, and there was the
accused, Garcia, driving his vehicle. He bumped the girl. The
vehicle stopped when the girl fell down. The vehicle started
to move and ran over the girl. The girl was rushed to the
hospital and was declared dead four days later.
The driver of the vehicle, Garcia, was charged with
Murder. Murder is an intentional felony. When you look at
the case and the dispositive portion, the Supreme Court
said, it is not murder. It is reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide; a culpable felony.
What lead the Supreme Court to conclude that it is a
culpable felony rather than an intentional felony?
The Principle of In Dubio Pro Reo where, in case of
doubt, resolve the ambiguity in favor of the accused. But
the Supreme Court drew a line here between an intentional
felony and a culpable felony. In this case he was driving his
vehicle. Is there something wrong with driving your vehicle
in a public road? No. You’re performing a lawful act which is
driving a vehicle. It just so happens that you were driving
your vehicle too fast that it caused momentum when it
bumped a student. And you could no longer control the
result which killed her. At the outset, the accused was
performing a lawful act.
As opposed to another set of facts, the Supreme
Court entertained, where the accused had a deliberate
intent to run over the child at the outset then that is
intentional felony because it is committed with malice. BUT
the Supreme Court said there was no such intent when he
was driving his vehicle. Why? They looked at the
subsequent acts of the accused. He brought the child to the
hospital. He was the one who assisted despite numerous
opportunities to flee the scene. He stayed and assisted the
victim.
Supreme Court deduced that between interpreting
it as deliberate and interpreting it as attended with
negligence, it is more favorable to the accused in
interpreting it as attended with negligence. Therefore, it is
a culpable felony.
NOTE: The result is the same. The child died. The injury is
the same. The difference is the nature of the act or the
omission.
To determine what crime is committed:
Determine first whether it is intentional, culpable
or no crime at all.
(1) If it is intentional, you look at your recall of your
felonies.
(2) If it is culpable, just look at Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
In Art. 365, criminal negligence is an omission which the
article specifically penalizes.
Concept of criminal negligence – is the inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform an act.
Art. 365 creates a distinction between imprudence and
negligence; simple or reckless, one might think that criminal
negligence is the one being punished.
(3) When is there no crime?
When the act is committed lawfully without the
attendance of negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
i.e. When Garcia was not driving his car too fast at
the time. He was driving it slowly. And yet for
reasons that he cannot foresee, the child just
immediately ran to the center of the road. He
swerved and hit another pedestrian. There is no
negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of
skill. So, even if it leads to injury or death, there is
no crime committed.
PEOPLE v. ABARCA, G.R. No. 74433 (1987)
Abarca found his wife in the act of having sexual
intercourse with someone else. Subsequently, he went to
the house of his friend who was a Philippine Constabulary
and asked to borrow his gun. He caught the man in a
mahjong place. He shouted that 'everyone who is not
involved should get out'. Then he shot Co three times. Co
died. In an adjacent room, there were the spouses and the
wall was merely thin enough for the bullets to pass
through.
Abarca was charged with Murder with double
frustrated murder. These are intentional felonies. At the
end of the decision, the Supreme Court convicted him of
simple imprudence resulting in less physical injuries; it is a
culpable felony.
When he fired the gunshots at Co he was
performing a lawful act. According to Art. 247 entitles the
spouse who surprised his spouse in the act of sexual
intercourse to kill both the spouse and the partner at your
own option. You may kill them both. The law is strict — not
in the act of foreplay or cuddling but in the act of sexual
intercourse.
The Supreme Court applied Art. 247 because
Abarca was surprised by his wife having sexual intercourse
with Kingsley. Then he opted to kill Kingsley.
13
It is a lawful act, according to the Supreme Court.
In fact, the Supreme Court said it is not a crime. There is a
penalty of destierro.
Destierro means you are prohibited from entering a certain
area. This was imposed not to punish the accused but to
protect the accused from the relatives of the paramour. So
that is not a crime. It is for the protection of accused.
So in this case, he was performing a lawful act.
That is why when the Amparado spouses sustained injuries,
it could not be an intentional felony because the nature of
his act, which at the very outset, was not performed with
malice. What attended his act was negligence. It just so
happens that he was negligent because he only gave the
precaution saying 'Whoever is not concerned, get out.'
Supreme court said he should have ensured or peeked at
the wall if there were people. Supreme Court said that is
not enough warning. By merely being content in just saying
a few words, that is negligence on his part. That is why it is
serious imprudence resulting to less serious physical
injuries. That is why it is culpable felony and not an
intentional felony.
NOTE: The distinction between intentional felony and
culpable felony. Culpable— you look at the nature of the
act if its lawful at the very outset, no malice, no intent to do
wrong. The question is whether it is attended with
negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. In
this case, unfortunately for Abarca, there was negligence on
his part. Had he made necessary precautions that would
have alleviated, he would have been absolved. No crime
because no negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
PEOPLE v. PUGAY, G.R. No. L-74324 (1988)
Pugay and his friends made fun of Miranda. They
tickled him in the ass. Pugay found a bucket which was
filled with gasoline. He poured it at Miranda. Samson, one
of the accused, used and lit a match stick and then Miranda
engulfed in fire. Thereafter, he died.
The criminal liability of Pugay, according to the
Supreme Court, is reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, which is a culpable felony. The crime of Samson
is the crime of homicide, intentional felony.
Miranda died, but why is it that their crimes are
different from each other? Pugay's act was unintentional. It
was not attended with malice. He was just merely making
fun of Miranda. When you pour a substance which you
think is water, and you did not bother to check, at the
outset that is not unlawful. But because it was attended by
negligence; negligence because he should have known it
was gasoline. He did not care to check. He did not even
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
mind the smell. So it was attended with negligence. That is
why the crime he was convicted for is a culpable felony.
Samson was convicted of an intentional felony.
There was wrongful intent there, knowing that when you
light a matchstick and you throw it to a person, at the very
least, it would burn his or her clothes. And the burning of
the clothes will result to injury. Therefore, Supreme Court
said that in committing an unlawful act, the intent to do
wrong arises, it is already presumed. Therefore, it is
attended with malice. So, the Supreme Court said that he
should be liable for homicide, an intentional felony.
Note: So that is the difference between intentional and
culpable. You look at the intention. The result is the same.
Bayani still died. But the difference is, the nature of the act
or omission.
IVLER v. SAN PEDRO, G.R. No. 172716 (2010)
Note: The case of Ivler is more important in discussing the
case of culpable felony.
Ivler was charged with two separate crimes,
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property. Upon arraignment came, he pleaded guilty in this
case of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries. Then, they moved to quash this case for placing
him in double jeopardy for the same offense. They are
arguing that you cannot be charged twice one and the same
criminal offense— reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage of property— which arose from one
incident. Therefore, they are saying that this is one offense
and when I pleaded guilty to slight physical injuries, I was
already punished by meted out of public censure.
Public censure means you will just be scolded by the judge
not to repeat the same act or else you will be met with a
more severe penalty. So he was not imprisoned. Therefore,
now they invoked the concept of double jeopardy.
The issue is whether or not culpa is a means of committing
a felony, but whether or not culpa is a crime in itself.
Why is it so important? Because when you say
culpa, or culpable felony is a crime in itself, then double
jeopardy still applies. BUT when you say culpa is merely a
means in committing a felony, then those are separate
offense, therefore, double jeopardy will not apply.
PEOPLE v. BUAN, 22 SCRA 138 (1968)
14
Facts: The accused was driving a passenger bus. Allegedly
because of his recklessness, the bus collided with a jeep
injuring the passengers of the latter.
A case was filed against the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence for which he
was tried and acquitted. Prior to his acquittal, a case for
serious physical injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence was filed. Accused claimed that he was
placed in twice in jeopardy.
Held: The second case must be dismissed. Once convicted
or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for the same act.
For the essence of the quasi-offense under Art. 365
of the RPC lies in the execution of an imprudent act which
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the
negligent act and not the result. The gravity of the
consequences is only taken into account to determine the
penalty. It does not qualify the substance of the offense. As
the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense
remains one and the same, and cannot be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.
Justice Carpio said that culpa is not a means in the
commission of a felony. It is a crime in itself. Especially
when you look at art. 365, quasi-offenses. They are not
merely means in the commission of a felony. They are by
themselves crimes. Why? He cited three bases:
1. When you talk about culpable felonies, you talk
about culpa, negligence and imprudence, it is not
the result that is punished. It is the mind and
mental attitude of the offender —the recklessness
for which he performed the act.
2. If it is merely a means to commit a felony, then why
are there certain felonies in the Revised Penal Code
that cannot be committed through negligence. i.e.
Murder. You cannot commit murder through
negligence. It is deliberate by its very nature. i.e.
Theft. You can’t say I stole it accidentally. There
must be deliberate intent to take and take
possession of the object.
3.The penalty structure. If culpa is a means to commit
a felony, then you should look at the individual
penalties attached to the crime.
If culpa is a means, (for example murder, it is
punishable by reculsion perpetua, homicide is reclusion
temporal, serious physical injuries is prision mayor) then in
committing these crimes, the penalty should be whichever
is lower. You have to look at the imposable penalty and you
go one degree or two degrees lower.
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BUT that is not the case. When you look at Art.
365, there is a uniform penalty. These are all grave felonies.
Then you look at the penalties in arresto mayor maximum
to prision correccional medium. It is not based on the
imposable penalty of the intentional penalties. There is a
uniform set of penalties which gives support to the
conclusion that culpa is a crime in itself because it has a
fixed penalty. This gives credence to the argument that
what is punished in culpa is not the result. It is the mental
state of the offenders. The very nature of his punishment.
NOTE: In crimes mala prohibita: Dolo is not required; the act
alone irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense;
and Good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid
defenses.
ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 369 SCRA 394 (2001)
Estrada is was charged under the plunder law, not
under the revised penal code. R.A. 7080 — special penal
law. One of the issues he raised is whether plunder is a
malum prohibitum or malum in se.

Difference between Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita: Held: Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof
of criminal intent. Precisely because the crimes constituting
Mala in Se Mala Prohibita plunder are mala in se the element of mens rea must be
Wrong because it proven in a prosecution for plunder. Because in plunder,
Wrong from its
As to nature is prohibited by you are hemorrhaging the treasury of the government. This
very nature.
law. is the lifeline of the citizens. If that is not inherently wrong,
As to use of GF a valid defense, then what is. Even if it is punished by a special law. It is
GF is not a considered a crime of mala in se.
good faith as unless the crime is
defense
defense the result of culpa.
Criminal intent is i. While intentional felonies are always mala in se,
As to WON it does not follow that prohibited acts done in violation of
Criminal intent is immaterial, BUT
criminal special laws are always mala prohibita.
an element. still requires
intent is an
intelligence &
element ii. Even if the crime is punished under a special law,
voluntariness.
As to degree if the act punished is one which is inherently wrong, the
Degree of The act gives rise same is malum in se, and, therefore, good faith and the lack
of
accomplish is taken to a crime only of criminal intent are valid defenses; unless it is the product
accomplishm
into account for the when of criminal negligence or culpa.
ent
punishment. consummated
As to Likewise, when the special laws require that the
mitigating punished act be committed knowingly and willfully, criminal
They are taken into They are not intent is required to be proved before criminal liability may
and
account in taken into arise.
aggravating
imposing penalty account.
circumstance
s NOTE: Where malice is a factor, good faith is a defense.
Degree of
When there is
participation is GARCIA v. CA, G.R. No. 157171 (2006)
more than one
generally not
offender, the
As to degree taken into The point there is vote (1:15:35). This is election
degree of
of account. All who offense punishable by law. So the petitioner filed a case
participation of
participation participated in the against the officer for allegedly reducing the number of
each in the
act are punished votes that he garnered.
commission is
to the same
taken into account.
extent. The Supreme Court said it is mala in se because it
Penalty is involves a certain element of being deliberate and
Penalty on
computed on the intentional. The act of reducing the vote of a candidate for
As to stage of offenders is same
basis of whether he the purpose of injuring him is intentional because if you are
accomplishm whether they
is a principal going to say that it is mala prohibita, it would make those
ent acted as mere
offender or merely who commit mere clerical error susceptible to prosecution.
accomplices or
an accomplice or Supreme Court said its mala in se.
accessories.
accessory.
As to what Generally, in the RPC, most are crimes mala in se while in
Generally, special
laws are Generally, the RPC. Special Penal Laws are mala prohibita.
laws.
violated

15
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Why is there a need to distinguish?
Because when you categorized a crime as mala in
se or mala prohibita, there are consequences. In mala in se,
there must be criminal intent. You must show that there is
malicious intent and therefore, good faith is a defense. In
mala prohibitum, intent is immaterial.
U.S. v. CHICO, G.R. No. 4963 (1909)
There is this law that prohibits the display of
banners which were used by revolutionary forces. He put
up a store which were selling these banners. The following
day he opened the store. Those banners were put on hold
and displayed in public. He was arrested and prosecuted by
violating the law. He said he just has the store and that he
did not have the criminal intent of influencing the people to
rise up against the government.
The Supreme Court said intent or good faith is
immaterial because this is a crime mala prohibitum. So he
cannot use good faith as a defense.
PEOPLE v. BAYONA, G.R. No. L-42288 (1935)
The accused was arrested for possessing a firearm
within the premises of an election precinct. The Solicitor
General came into his aid. The Solicitor General said he
should be acquitted because he did not have the intention
to influence the voters. In fact, he just passed by the
precinct because a friend called him. He could not leave the
gun in his car and he had to carry it.
The Supreme Court said this is a crime mala
prohibitum. Whether or not there was an intention to
influence the voters or to suppress the right to suffrage is
immaterial. What matters is — did he commit the act
penalized under the law? YES. He possessed a firearm
within the premises of the election precinct. That is already
an act which is criminally liable under the provision of a
crime mala prohibitum.
Why is there crimes mala prohibitum? Why did they see it
fit to convict these crimes?
Supreme Court said that it is necessary on the
grounds of public policy because sometimes the act sought
to be prevented is the crime itself. The mere performance
of that act already injures the public.
Just like in the case of Chico. The mere display of
the banners or emblems of revolutionary forces damages
public perception of the government. Regardless of your
intent. So there are those crimes that Congress sees fit to
punish without looking at the intent of the offender.
16
Can the court say that 'no this is wrong’, there
should be intent because this is inherently wrong'? No. If
congress says this is mala prohibita, the court does not
have authority to say otherwise.
So you look at the legislative intent. The intent is to
treat the law as mala prohibita, then you don’t look at the
intent of the anymore. Just answer the question whether or
not the act has been committed.
NOTE: To distinguish, in crimes mala in se, the question is 'is
there criminal intent?'. In crimes mala prohibita, ‘has the
act been committed?’.
Art. 4. Criminal Liability. – Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would
be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.
Par. 1 – By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
Rationale: el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado – he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused.
Requisites:
(1) An intentional felony has been committed.
(a) The felony committed should be one
committed by means of dolo (with malice)
because Art. 4, Par. 1 speaks of wrongful act
done different from that which he intended.
Note: When a person commits a felony with malice, he
intends the consequences of his felonious act.
(b) The act should not be punished by a special law
because the offender violating a special law may
not have the intent to do an injury to another.
(c) No felony is committed when:
i. the act or omission is not punishable by the RPC;
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
i.e. the act of committing suicide is NOT
a felony and not punishable because, if
committing such would then be successful then
no one will be imprisoned and because the law
says that the situation or circumstance is worse
than being imprisoned, but assisting to suicide is
punishable.
ii. the act is covered by any of the justifying
circumstances enumerated in Art. 11.
i.e. Acting in lawful self-defense is NOT
a felony – no general intent to commit a wrong.
(2) The wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the felony committed
by the offender.
Rule: The case must be the proximate cause of the injury.
Effect or Consequence: must be the direct, natural and
logical consequence
“Natural” – refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course
of human life or events;
“Logical” – means that there is a rational connection
between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or
damage.
Proximate Cause - that cause, which, in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury without which the result would
not have occurred.
NOTE: The consequence is considered NOT a direct, natural
and logical consequence when there is the occurrence of
the efficient intervening cause between the commission of
the felony and the results.
Efficient Intervening Cause – it must be an Active force and
it must be Absolutely foreign to the felony committed. It is
a matter of defense; a defense against the doctrine of
proximate cause.
GENERAL RULE: The offender is CRIMINALLY LIABLE for ALL
the natural and logical consequences of his felonious act,
although not intended, if the felonious act is the proximate
cause of the resulting harm.
Thus, the person is still criminally liable although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended
in the following cases:
(1) Error in personae - mistake in the identity of the
victim; injuring one person mistaken for another
17
(Art. 49 – penalty for lesser crime in its maximum
period)
(a) At least two subjects
(b) A has intent to kill B, but kills C
(c) Under Art. 3, if A, hits C, he should have no
criminal liability. But because of Art. 4, his act
is a felony.
(2) Aberratio ictus - mistake in the blow; when
offender intending to do an injury to one person
actually inflicts it on another (Art. 48 on complex
crimes – penalty for graver offense in its
maximum period)
(a) There is only one subject.
(b) The intended subject is a different
subject, but the felony is still the same.
(3) Praeter intentionem - injurious result is greater
than that intended (Art. 13 – mitigating
circumstance)
If A‘s act constitutes sufficient means to
carry out the graver felony, he cannot claim
praeter intentionem.
NOTE: Criminal liability exists from the concurrence of the
mens rea and the actus reus.
Criminal liability for some felonies arises only upon
a specific resulting harm:
(1) HOMICIDE AND ITS QUALIFIED FORMS requires
DEATH of the victim to be consummated.
(2) ESTAFA: requires that the victim incur damage
for criminal liability for the consummated felony to arise.
U.S. v. VALDEZ, G.R. No. L-16486 (1921)
Facts:
The deceased is a member of the crew of a vessel.
Accused is in charge of the crew members engaged in the
loading of cargo in the vessel. Because the offended party
was slow in his work, the accused shouted at him. The
offended party replied that they would be better if he
would not insult them.
The accused resented this, and rising in rage, he
moved towards the victim, with a big knife in hand
threatening to kill him. The victim believing himself to be in
immediate peril threw himself into the water. The victim
died of drowning.
The accused was prosecuted for homicide. His
contention that his liability should be only for grave threats
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
since he did not even stab the victim, that the victim died of
drowning, and this can be considered as a supervening
cause.
Held: The deceased, in throwing himself into the
river, acted solely in obedience to the instinct of self-
preservation, and was in no sense, legally responsible for
his own death. As to him, it was but the exercise of a choice
between two evils, and any reasonable person under the
same circumstance might have done the same.
This case illustrates that proximate cause does not
require that the offender needs to actually touch the body
of the offended party. It is enough that the offender
generated in the mind of the offended party an immediate
sense of danger that made him place his life at risk. In this
case, the accused must, therefore, be considered the
author of the death of the victim.
URBANO v. IAC, 157 SCRA 1 (1988)
Facts:
Urbano and Javier had a quarrel and Javier started
to hack Javier with a bolo. Javier was wounded at the back.
Upon intervention, the two settled their differences.
Urbano agreed to shoulder all the expenses for the
treatment of the wound of Javier, and to pay him also
whatever loss of income he may have suffered. Javier, on
the other hand, signed a statement of his forgiveness
towards Urbano and on that condition, he withdrew the
complaint that he filed.
After so many weeks of treatment in a clinic, the
doctor pronounced that the wound was already healed.
Thereafter, Javier went back to his farm. A month later, he
came home and was chilling. Before midnight of that day,
he died out of tetanus poisoning. The heirs of Javier filed a
case of homicide against Urbano.
Held: The Supreme Court held that Urbano is not
liable. He, if at all, is only liable for the physical injuries
inflicted upon Javier. The Court took into account the
incubation period of tetanus toxic. Medical evidence was
presented, that tetanus toxic is good only for two weeks. If,
indeed, the victim had incurred tetanus poisoning out of
the wound inflicted by Urbano, he would not have lasted
for around a month (22 days).
What brought about the tetanus to infect his body
was his work in the farm using his bare hands. The rule is
that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by
the accused. However, the act of Javier working in his farm
where the soil is filthy, using his own hands, is an efficient
supervening cause which relieves Urbano of any liability for
the death of Javier.
18
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to
take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the
petitioner had nothing to do.
PEOPLE v. VILLACORTA, G.R. No. 186412 (2011)
Supreme Court said that even if the accused is not
liable for the death of the victim, he is still liable for the
wounds sustained by the victim. Just because the act of the
accused is not the proximate cause of the death does not
mean that it will automatically be concluded that there is
no criminal liability. There is still criminal liability but you go
back to the original specific intent.
A presence of the efficient intervening cause in
finding that it is not the proximate cause is not automatic to
be the basis for acquittal. At most, it is a basis for the
reduction of criminal liability specific to the original intent
of the accused. The specific intent of the accused was not
to kill; it was merely to injure. Therefore, the Supreme
Court held that the accused is only liable for slight physical
injuries.
QUINTO v. ANDRES, 453 SCRA 511 (2005)
There was no felony, there was not enough
evidence to show that a felony was committed by Andres
and Pacheco, specifically, there was no sufficient evidence
to prove that the two of them performed an overt act
which led to the death of Quinto, there was no evidence to
show that either of them hit Quinto at the back of his head,
there was no felony to speak of in the first place.
The Supreme Court said that they did not incur any
criminal liability. There was no enough evidence to show
that they were the proximate cause, when they committed
a felony in the first place, so they were acquitted in this
case.
BELBIS v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 181052 (2012)
No enough evidence to show that at the time of
the infliction of the wounds to the victim was already
infected by bacteria. Was there enough evidence to show
that the victim when he was stabbed he was immediately
infected with bacteria. In fact, the Supreme Court said that
the wounds made the intention possible. The wounds
resulted to severe trauma on the kidneys which led to the
infection, it was not merely a general wound anywhere in
the body, and it was specific on the left and right lumbar
area which was the immediate cause of the death of the
victim.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
To dispel the notion that lack of medical
intervention is not an efficient intervening cause to break
the chain of the doctrine of proximate cause, because it is
not an active force. Lack of medical intervention,
predisposition of the victim, congenital conditions, existing
diseases are not efficient intervening cause, they are
merely passive forces. There must be an active force which
is absolutely foreign.
In this case, the wounds inflicted on the specific
area where the wounds were located were the direct
causes of the trauma of Belbis, now which led to severe
infection and which led to the death of the victim. Supreme
Court said that without the stab wounds, the victim could
not have been afflicted with an infection which later on
caused multiple organ failure that caused his death. The
offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his
delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the
death of the victim.
CASE of URBANO and VILLACORTA, distinguished:
Difference in the case of Urbano: there was a settlement
that took place.
Supreme Court said were it not for the settlement,
Urbano will be convicted for criminal liability based on the
wounds sustained by the victim WHILE in Villacorta there
was none.
Realization: just because the act of the accused is not the
proximate cause of the death does not mean that it will
automatically be concluded that there is no criminal
liability. There is still criminal liability but you go back to the
original specific intent. A presence of the efficient
intervening cause in finding that it is not the proximate
cause is not automatic to be the basis for acquittal. At most
it is a basis for the reduction of criminal liability specific to
the original intent of the accused.
CASE of URBANO, BELBIS and VILLACORTA, distinguished:
In URBANO: Javier, after so many weeks of treatment in a
clinic, the doctor pronounced that the wound was already
healed – this was an efficient intervening cause.
In BELBIS: No enough evidence to show that at the time of
the infliction of the wounds to the victim was already
infected by bacteria. Was there enough evidence to show
that the victim when he was stabbed he was immediately
infected with bacteria. In fact, the Supreme Court said that
the wounds made the intention possible.
In VILLACORTA: There was evidence to show that he
performed the activity between the incident and his death.
19
Supreme Court said that the wound was not the proximate
cause of the death.
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the
resulting injury when:
(1) There is an active force that intervened
between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and
the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign
from the felonious act of the accused; or
(2) The resulting injury is due to the intentional act
of the victim.
The following are not efficient intervening cause:
(1) The weak or diseased physical condition of the
victim, as when one is suffering from tuberculosis
or heart disease. (People v. Illustre)
(2) The nervousness or temperament of the victim,
as when a person dies in consequence of an
internal hemorrhage brought on by moving about
against the doctor‘s orders, because of his nervous
condition due to the wound inflicted on the
accused. (People v. Almonte)
(3) Causes which are inherent in the victim, such as
(a) the victim not knowing to swim
(People v. Valdez) and
(b) the victim being addicted to tuba
drinking. (People v. Buhay)
(4) Neglect of the victim or third person, such as
the refusal by the injured party of medical
attendance or surgical operation, or the failure of
the doctor to give anti-tetanus injection to the
injured person. (U.S. v. Marasigan)
(5) Erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical
treatment, as when the assault took place in an
outlaying barrio where proper modern surgical
service was not available. (People v. Moldes)
Par. 2 – By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account
of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Purpose of punishing impossible crimes: To suppress
criminal propensity or criminal tendencies. Objectively, the
offender has not committed a felony, but subjectively, he is
a criminal.
Requisites:
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano

no theft. There is legal impossibility because theft consists

(1) That the act performed would be an offense against in the unlawful taking of a property belonging to another
persons or property. without his or her consent. It must belong to another. How
can you steal something that is yours in the first place?
Felonies against persons: That's legal impossibility.

(a) Parricide (Art. 246) 2. Factual/Physical Impossibility – Extraneous

(b) Murder (Art. 248)
(c) Homicide (Art. 249)
(d) Infanticide (Art. 255)
(e) Abortion (Arts. 256, 257, 258 and 259)
(f) Duel (Arts. 260 and 261)
(g) Physical injuries (Arts. 262, 263, 264, 265 and
266)
(h) Rape (Art. 266- A)
Felonies against property:
(a) Robbery (Arts. 294, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302 and
303)
(b) Brigandage (Arts. 306 and 307)
(c) Theft (Arts. 308, 310 and 311)
(d) Usurpation (Arts. 312 and 313)
(e) Culpable Insolvency (Art. 314)
(f) Swindling and other deceits (Art. 315, 316, 317
and 318)
(g) Chattel Mortgage (Art. 319)
(h) Arson and other crimes involving destruction
(Arts. 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325 and 326)
(i) Malicious mischief (Arts. 327, 328, 329, 330 and
331)
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
3. Legal Impossibility – the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime. Legal
impossibility would apply to those circumstances where:
a. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform
an act in violation of the law;
b. there is intention to perform the physical act;
c. there is a performance of the intended physical
act; and
d. the consequence resulting from the intended act
does not amount to a crime. (Intod v. CA)
NOTE: There must be either legal impossibility or (2)
physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act.
In the Philippines, impossibility of accomplishing
the criminal intent is not merely a defense but an act
penalized by itself.
(4) That the act performed should not constitute a
violation of another provision of the RPC.

(2) That the act was done with evil intent. CASE: (Modified concept of impossible crime)

(3) That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or
that the means employed is either inadequate or
ineffectual.
Types of impossibility:
1. Inherent Impossibility - the act intended by the offender
is by its nature one of impossible accomplishment.
For example:
INTOD v. CA, 215 SCRA 52 (1992)
In this case, four culprits, all armed with firearms
and with intent to kill, went to the intended victim‘s house
and after having pinpointed the latter‘s bedroom, all four
fired at and riddled the said room with bullets, thinking that
the intended victim was already there as it was about 10:00
in the evening. It so happened that the intended victim did
not come home that evening and so was not in her
bedroom at that time.

(1) when you stab a dead person. You cannot
commit homicide or murder. It was impossible because you
cannot kill a dead person. But take note that there is no
impossible crime when you stabbed that person and you
already knew that he was dead in the first place. Why?
Because there is no evil intent. There is no evil intent to
commit a crime. So when you commit a crime, you must
not be aware of its impossibility. Again, there must be evil
intent.
(2) You stole the watch of your friend. It turned out
it was a fake rolex and that it belonged to you. There was
Eventually the culprits were prosecuted and
convicted by the trial court for attempted murder. CA
affirmed the judgment but the Supreme Court modified the
same and held the petitioner liable only for the so-called
impossible crime.
Although there is a controversy arising this ruling,
because the rule that it was actually impossible to commit
homicide or murder as the case may be, because nobody
was present there. But what about the damages sustained
by the property. Because when we talk about impossible
crime, the fourth element mentioned is that it should not

20
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
be punished as an offense under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. But what about the damages sustained
by the house in result of the bullets fired in the house?
Another thing is, because it constitutes malicious mischief -
deliberately damaging the property of another. But there
was this specific intent to damage the property.
In this case, the specific intent was to kill and it was
not to damage the house. So it was an impossible crime
with respect to the commission of homicide. There was no
intent to cause damage to the house of the victim. That's
factual impossibility. He really wasn't present.
Other examples:
(1) When you are the manager of a shop. You were
given the code for the vault and then one day you
were tempted to steal from the vault. But that very
faithful day, when you open the vault, it was
empty. – Factual impossibility. You did not know it
was empty. But you have an evil intent to commit a
wrong —to steal the contents of the vault. But
because of circumstances that you were not aware
of, it was actually impossible to accomplish.
(2) Malicious mischief. What is malicious mischief?
It is the deliberate act of damaging the property of
another other than burning because that is arson.
It must be deliberate because if it is born out of if it
is only reckless imprudence resulting to damage in
properties, it is not deliberate.
(3) What is deliberate? Your classmate did not give
you a past exam. Everyone had past exams except
you. So you decided to get the cellphone of your
classmate and drowned it in water. But you did not
know that the phone of your classmate was water-
proof or water resistant. So it was not damaged.
But the intent was to damage, however, because
you were not familiar of the feature of the phone,
it was not damage, so it was impossible to
accomplish. BUT if you already knew that it was
water proof, then there is no evil intent to speak
of. That’s factual impossibility.
PEOPLE v. SY PIO, G.R. No. L-5848 (1954)
He stole a check and he did not know that the
check was unfunded. When he presented it for payment, it
bounced. It had no value because when you speak of theft,
the thing taken must be valuable. Why? Because there is a
necessity of intent to gain.
There is no intent to gain when the object taken is
without any value. He did not know that the check did not
have any funds or that the account had no funds, then it is
21
an impossible crime. He was not aware. The intention was
to steal the value stated on the face of the check. So it is
impossible.
Means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual – the
means employed were not enough to bring about the
accomplishment of a felony.
Example: you wanted to poison your boyfriend. So you go
to city hardware and bought raccumin. So you placed it in
his breakfast omelette. You were surprised, he did not die.
You forgot she placed pepper and not raccumin. So this is
ineffectual means. You wanted to poison him but he did not
die because of ineffectual means. The means for
employment were inadequate or ineffectual.
PEOPLE v. DOMASIAN, G.R. No. 95322 (1993)
Supreme Court here did not apply the concept of
impossible crime.
This concerns the topic of ransom. The accused
was arguing that the rule on impossible crime or that there
is an impossibility of committing the crime because when
he got the letter for ransom, the child who was kidnapped
had already escaped. He argued that Art. 4, Par. 2 was
applicable because kidnapping is a crime against liberty and
persons, there is no impossible crime, so he said “I should
be acquitted”
The court held that he is wrong. There is no
impossible crime to speak of it was already consummated
at the time he took the child. The consummation of
kidnapping is not dependent on whether the ransom is paid
or not. The reckoning point is at that point of that
deprivation of liberty. So the court said that there is no
room for application of Art., 4 (2) The court is applying Art.
4 (1) because a felony is committed.
Additional note:
Adultery is a crime against chastity. It is not a crime
against persons or property. Adultery is the act of a married
woman having sexual relations with a man other than her
husband. The statute is specific. The woman must have
relations with a man other than her husband.
Here comes the bar question. What is the crime committed
by the woman who has sexual relations with a fellow
woman? Married woman having sexual relations with a
fellow woman. Again, do not go to directly to impossible
crime first. Determine first whether the crime would have
been a crime against person or property. If it is not a crime
against persons or property, do not apply Article 4, par. 2.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano

The principle in this clause "taking into consideration the

Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which
should be repressed but which are not covered by the law,
and in cases of excessive penalties. — Whenever a court
has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons
which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement
of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.
This provision upholds the separation of powers of the
three branches of government.
It is not complete absolute independence but
interdependence— it is checks and balances. It is the
attempt to check and balance the actions of the body of
governments.
degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense"
refers to the conduct of the trial and actual case. It does not
refer to hypothetical questions or situations. You cannot
question the wisdom of the law. It is for the legislators to
determine. For so long as it is in accord to the constitution,
you cannot question the wisdom.
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.
— Consummated felonies as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs
all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly or over
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.

a. Where the court cannot convict the accused because the

act he committed is not punishable under the law, but the
court deems it proper to repress such act. Xxxxxxxx to be continued xxxxxxxx

 The proper judgment is acquittal.

 The judge must report to the Chief Executive that
said act be made subject of penal legislation and
the reasons therefore.

b. Where the court after trial finds the accused guilty, and
the penalty prescribed for the crime appears too harsh
considering the conditions surrounding the commission of
the crime,

 The judge should impose the law (not suspend the

execution of the sentence).
 The most that he could do is recommend to the
Chief Executive to grant executive clemency.

For example: The Anti-Distracting driving law. Its penalty for

first warning is 5,000. If the judge will say that it is too
expensive. The judge cannot suspend the case. You cannot
question the wisdom of the law. What this provision covers
are special cases where the criminal mind and the injury
caused is very minimal.

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 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano

THE CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY:

Art. 11. JUSTIFYING Art. 12. EXEMPTING Art. 13. MITIGATING Art. 14. AGGRAVATING Art. 15. ALTERNATIVE
NO WRONG THERE IS A WRONG THERE IS A FELONY THERE IS A FELONY THERE IS A FELONY
Decreased criminal Increased criminal Increased or decreased
No criminal liability No criminal liability
liability liability criminal liability
No civil liability With civil liability
With civil liability With civil liability With civil liability
EXCEPT: state of EXCEPT: accident;
necessity insuperable cause

Take note: Other ABSOLUTORY CAUSES (Arts. 6; 20; 124, last par.; 247, pars. 1&2; 280, par. 3; 332; 334, par. 4; etc.

Basis: LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT

CHAPTER 2. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
Imputability – is the quality by which an act may be
ascribed to a person as it author or owner. It implies that
the act committed has been freely and consciously done
and may, therefore, be put down to the doer as his very
own.
Responsibility – is the obligation of suffering the
consequences of crime. It is the obligation of taking the
penal and civil consequences of the crime.
Imputability distinguished from responsibility – while
imputability implies that a deed may be imputed to a
person, responsibility implies that the person must take
the consequences of such a deed.
Guilt – is an element of responsibility, for a man cannot be
made to answer for the consequences of a crime unless he
is guilty. (Reyes, Revised Penal Code)
I. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Justifying Circumstances – are those where the act of a
person is said to be in accordance with law, so that such
person is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is
free from both criminal and civil liability.
There is no civil liability except in par. 4, Art. 11, where the
civil liability is borne by the persons benefited by the act.
An affirmative defense is required; hence, it is incumbent
upon the accused to prove the circumstance by clear and
convincing evidence.
There is NO crime committed, the act being justified. Thus,
such persons cannot be considered criminals; considered
to have acted in accordance with law.
PEOPLE v. FONTANILLA, G.R. No. 177743 (January 25,
2012)
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla
admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death
of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution
for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal
injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove
by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the
justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal
liability.
Having thus admitted being the author of the
death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of
proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of
the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he
established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory
proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s
evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view
of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the
State until the end of the proceedings.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review
of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not commit
unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two,
Fontanillas act of hitting the victims head with a stone,
causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and
constituted an unreasonable response to the victims fistic
attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the
latter would have sustained some injury from the
aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind
or gravity was found on the person of Fontanilla when he
presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending
physician of the hospital did not issue any medical
certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to him.
In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of

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 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more
than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for
the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and
number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent
to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack
from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of
the wounds manifested the determined effort of the
accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.
SENOJA v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 160341 (October 19, 2004)
Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja (they were
brothers), Jose Calica and Miguel Lumasac were drinking
gin in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal. Leon Lumasac suddenly
barged in, holding a bolo and was looking for his brother
Miguel whom he suspected of drying up the ricefield he
was plowing. However, when Senoja (Exequiel)
approached Leon, the latter tried to hack him so he
embraced Leon and Jose took Leon’s bolo. After the
confrontation, Leon wanted to get his bolo back because
he wanted to go home. After getting it back, Leon walked
out of the place followed by Senoja. Suddenly, Senoja
stabbled Leon at the back. When Leon turned around,
Senoja continued stabbing him until he fell to the ground.
Then petitioner ran towards the barangay road and threw
away the knife he used to stab Leon.
Petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked
the affirmative defense of self-defense. His version said
that after the commotion inside the house, Leon left but
with a threat that something will happen to Senoja. Senoja
followed Leon as the latter was making his way home.
When Leon realized that Senoja was following him, Leon
walked back towards him and suddenly hacked Senoja at
the left side of his head and right thigh. Unable to evade
the treacherous attack by Leon, Senoja drew his colonial
knife and stabbed Leon in self-defense, inflicting upon him
multiple wounds which caused his death.
Issue: Whether Senoja merely acted in self-defense
Held: No, Senoja is guilty of HOMICIDE. The
affirmative defense of self-defense may be complete or
incomplete. It is complete when all the three essential
requisites are present; it is incomplete if only unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim and any of the two
essential requisites were present. Unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim is a condition sine qua non to self-
defense, complete or incomplete.
The right of self-defense proceeds from
necessity and limited by it. The right begins where
necessity does, and ends where it ends. There is however,
a perceptible difference between necessity and self-
defense. Selfdefense excuses the repulse of a wrong;
necessity justifies the invasion of a right. Hence, it is
essential to self-defense that it should be a defense
against a present unlawful attack.
24
Self-defense is an act to save life; hence, it is
right and not a crime. x x x It is a settled rule that to
constitute aggression, the person attacked must be
confronted by a real threat on his life and limb; and the
peril sought to be avoided in imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary. But what then is the standard? We rule
that the test should be: does the person invoking the
defense believe, in due exercise of his reason, his life or
limb is in danger? Hence, when an inceptual/unlawful
aggression ceases to exist, the one making a defense has
no right to kill or injure the former aggressor. After the
danger has passed, one is not justified in following up his
adversary to take his life.
IN THIS CASE, there were two events concerned:
1) The arrival of Leon who was armed with a bolo and 2)
When Leon demanded for his bolo because he wanted to
go home already after the commotion inside the house,
and then eventually left with a threat. Quoting the
appellate court, the SC said that the victim had already left
the hut. At that point in time, the victim was simply
walking toward his home; he had stopped being an
aggressor. It was Senoja who wanted a confrontation this
time. It was Senoja who was now the unlawful aggressor in
this second phase of their confrontation.
6 Types of justifying circumstances: [SD-DAFO]
1. Self defense
2. Defense of relatives
3. Defense of strangers
4. Avoidance of a greater evil
5. Fulfillment of duty
6. Obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do
not incur any criminal liability:
Par. 1 – Self-defense.
Reason why self-defense is lawful:
1) Admission on the part of the State that it
cannot protect its citizens at all times.
Because it would be quite impossible for the
State in all cases to prevent aggression upon its citizens
(and even foreigners, of course) and offer protection to
the person unjustly attacked. On the other hand, it cannot
be conceived that a person should succumb to an unlawful
aggression without offering any resistance. (Guevara)
2) Right to self-preservation (born to man and
part of his nature as a human being) – it finds justification
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
in man’s natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his
person or rights from impending danger or peril.
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur;
It includes not only the defense of the person or body of
the one assaulted but also that of his rights, the enjoyment
of which is protected by law.
Includes:
a. The right to honor – which is not the least
prized of man’s patrimony. Hence, a slap on the face is
considered as unlawful aggression since the face
represents a person and his dignity. (Rugas vs, People)
PEOPLE v. LUAGUE, 62 Phil 344
SC: An attempt to rape a woman constitutes an
aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate
defense inasmuch as a woman’s honor cannot but be
esteemed as a right as precious, if not more than her very
existence. The woman thus imperiled may kill her offender
if that is the only means left for her to protect her honor
from so grave an outrage.
PEOPLE v. JAURIGUE, 76 Phil 174
Facts: The deceased was courting the accused in
vain. One day, the deceased approached her, spoke to her
of his love which she flatly refused, and he thereupon
suddenly embraced and kissed her on account of which
the accused gave him fist blows and kicked him.
Thereafter, she armed herself with a fan knife, whenever
she went out. One week after the incident, the deceased
entered a chapel, went to sit by the side of the accused,
and placed his hand on the upper part of her thigh.
Accused pulled out her fan knife and with it stabbed the
deceased at the base of the left side neck, inflicting a
mortal wound.
Held: The means employed by the accused in the
defense of her honor was evidently excessive. The chapel
was lighted with electric lights, and there were already
several people, including her father and the barrio
lieutenant, inside the chapel. Under the circumstances,
there was and there could be no possibility of her being
raped.
The SC apparently considered in this case the
existence of unlawful aggression consisting in the
deceased’s placing his hand on the upper portion of her
right thigh (incomplete self-defense). The accused was not
given the benefit of complete self-defense, because the
means employed was not reasonable. If the accused only
gave the deceased fist blows or kicked him, to prevent him
from going further in his attempt to commit an outrage
25
upon her honor, she would have been completely justified
in doing so.
b. The defense of property rights can be invoked
if there is an attack upon the property although it is not
coupled with an attack upon the person of the owner of
the premises. All the elements for justification must
however be present. (People v. Narvaez)
US v. BUMANGLAG, 14 Phil 644
SC: Did not looked at the act of carrying the
palay the SC looked at the act or the absence thereof of
the victim in achieving his goal meaning for self-defense to
be valid, for the theory of the accused that he defended
his property to be valid, SC is saying that it must be
coupled with unlawful aggression against his person. In
this case where the victim was about to carry the palay
there was no unlawful aggression against the person of
the accused, SC did not appreciate defense of property in
this case.
PEOPLE v. NARVAEZ, 121 SCRA 339
The courts said that although the fencing of
Narvaez’ house was indeed a form of aggression against
him, this aggression was not done against his person but
rather on his rights to property. SC said that there could be
unlawful aggression without unlawful aggression against
the person of the one defending himself. SC found that
unlawful aggression on the property is sufficient in which
that is the unlawful aggression contemplated by law with
respect to defense of one’s property.
Bumanglag and Narvaez cases, distinguished
There is conflicting decisions in these cases, in
US v. Bumanglag which requires the presence of unlawful
aggression against the life and limb on the person
defending himself and in the case of People v. Narvaez,
which says that unlawful aggression is sufficient if it is
directed towards the property of the person defending
himself.
Which to follow?
PEOPLE v. IGNACIO
Settles the issue and rules that it must be
accompanied by aggression against the person of the one
defending himself. It is not enough that one’s property is
subjected to unlawful aggression, there must also be
unlawful aggression against his person in order for there
to be valid defense of property under Article 11 par. 1
(again this paragraph does not only apply to protect your
life and limb, it also extends its justifying effect on
defending you rights, particularly right to honor and
property)
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
PEOPLE v. APOLINAR, 38 OG 2870
Facts: The accused, armed with a shotgun, was
looking over his land. He noticed a man carrying a bundle
on his shoulder. Believing that the man had stolen his
palay, the accused shouted for him to stop, and as he did
not, the accused fired in the air and then at him, causing
his death.
Held: Defense of property is not of such
importance as right to life, and defense of property can be
invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is
coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted
with said property.
Had the accused, who wanted to stop the thief
then approaching him, been attacked, say with a bolo, by
that thief, he would have been justified in shooting him, if
the shotgun was the only available weapon for his
defense. In such case, there would be unlawful aggression
on the part of the deceased, which is required even in
defense of one’s property.
Note: where the accused invokes self-defense, it is his duty
to establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.
He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
on the weakness of the prosecution.
Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act of
2004 (R.A. 9262)
Battered Woman Syndrome- refers to a scientifically
defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering relationships as a result
of cumulative abuse.
Battered woman, defined
A woman who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in
order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do
without concern for her rights; it includes wives or women
in any form of intimate relationship with men.
In order to be classified as a battered woman,
the couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice.
Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once, if it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she
is defined as a battered woman.
Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-
survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and
26
civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense
under the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the
woman who was suffering from battered woman
syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the
courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/
psychologists [SECTION 26, RA 9262]
In People v. Genosa, the Court ruled that the battered
woman syndrome is characterized by a ―CYCLE OF
VIOLENCE‖, which is made up of three phases.
First Phase: Tension Building Phase
(1) Where minor battering occurs, it could be a verbal or
slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior.
(2) The woman tries to pacify the batterer through a show
of kind, nurturing behavior, or by simply staying out of the
way.
(3) But this proves to be unsuccessful as it only gives the
batterer the notion that he has the right to abuse her.
Second Phase: Acute Battering Incident
(1) Characterized by brutality, destructiveness, and
sometimes death.
(2) The battered woman has no control; only the batterer
can stop the violence.
(3) The battered woman realizes that she cannot reason
with him and resistance would only worsen her condition.
Third Phase: Tranquil Period
(1) Characterized by guilt on the part of the batterer and
forgiveness on the part of the woman.
(2) The batterer may show a tender and nurturing
behavior towards his partner and the woman also tries to
convince herself that the battery will never happen again
and that her partner will change for the better.
A battered woman usually believes that she is
the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer.
Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for
his well-being.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-
entrenched in a battered woman’s psyche. In this phase,
she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on
each other – she for his nurturant behavior, he for her
forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of “tension,
violence and forgiveness”, each partner may believe that it
is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may feel
independent, capable of functioning without the other.
(People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004)
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Four Characteristics of the Syndrome:
(1) The woman believes that the violence was her fault;
(2) She has an inability to place the responsibility for the
violence elsewhere;
(3) She fears for her life and/or her children‘s life
(4) She has an irrational belief that the abuser is
omnipresent and omniscient.
PEOPLE v. GENOSA, 419 SCRA 537 (BWS)
In any event, the existence of the battered
woman syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive
partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of
self-defense. The court reckons further that crucial to the
BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman
at the time of the offense -- she must have actually feared
imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed
in the need to kill him in order to save her life. Settled in
our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who
resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one's
life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent
and actual, not merely imaginary.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential
element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on
the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however,
according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of
Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been
able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently
ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the
imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether.
He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she
came out of their children's bedroom -- and based on past
violent incidents, there was a great probability that he
would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm --
then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would
not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is
already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required.
Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable
pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life
"would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by
installment.' Still, impending danger (based on the conduct
of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the
defendant's use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger. Considering such
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may
be appreciated.
27
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not
continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence
of such aggression, there can be no self-defense --
complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. Thus,
Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under
the circumstances.
ELEMENTS, requisites:
First. Unlawful aggression.
(1) It is a condition sine qua non. This is an indispensable
requisite because if there is no unlawful aggression, there
is nothing to prevent or repel, the second requisite of
defense will have no basis.
2 types:
1) Actual or material unlawful aggression – that
the danger must be present, that is, actually in existence;
an attack with physical force; an offensive act that
positively determine the intent of the aggressor to cause
injury, the danger must be directed at the life or limb of
the person defending himself.
DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 189405 (November 19,
2014)
Other than petitioner's testimony, the defense
did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey
condescendingly responded to petitioner's questions or
initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident;
that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot
petitioner but failed — an assault which may have caused
petitioner to fear for his life.
Even assuming arguendo that the gun originated
from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and therefore,
danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that
danger had already ceased the moment petitioner
disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After
petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer
any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have
necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey.
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has
begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-
defense has no right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor. To be sure, when the present victim no longer
persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the
object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no
more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-
defense on the part of the offender. Undoubtedly,
petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when
he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal
injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly unlawful
aggression had already ceased.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Petitioner's contention that Jeffrey's unlawful aggression
was continuous and imminent is, therefore, devoid of
merit.
Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is
indubitably absent in the instant case, the severe wounds
inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and,
therefore, cannot be considered a justifying circumstance
under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
2) Imminent unlawful aggression – the danger
or the attack is impending or at the point of happening.
Note: The law does not require you to wait for the danger
to actually arise, for it may be too late. You might not be
able to competently defend yourself, so you are entitled to
at a very limited point prevent the attack. When it is at the
point of happening, you can repel the aggression.
(2) Equivalent to an actual physical assault; OR threatened
assault of an immediate and imminent kind which is
offensive and positively strong, showing the wrongful
intent to cause harm.
MANABAN v. CA, G.R. No. 150723 (July 11, 2006)
When the accused invokes self-defense, he in
effect admits killing the victim and the burden is shifted to
him to prove that he killed the victim to save his life. The
accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence
that all the requisites of self-defense are present. Self-
defense is founded on the necessity on the part of the
person being attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression. Thus, without prior unlawful and unprovoked
attack by the victim, there can be no complete or
incomplete self-defense.
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault
or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon
a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is
not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is
offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful
intent to cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which
puts the defendant’s life in real peril.
In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the back
as evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet. Second,
when Bautista was shot, his gun was still inside a locked
holster and tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista
turned his back at Manaban, Manaban was already
pointing his service firearm at Bautista. These
circumstances clearly belie Manaban’s claim of unlawful
aggression on Bautista's part.
28
The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was
about to draw his gun when he turned his back at
Manaban is mere speculation. Besides, Manaban was
already aiming his loaded firearm at Bautista when the
latter turned his back. In that situation, it was Bautista
whose life was in danger considering that Manaban, who
had already fired a warning shot, was pointing his firearm
at Bautista. Bautista, who was a policeman, would have
realized this danger to his life and would not have
attempted to draw his gun which was still inside a locked
holster tucked in his waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really
feared that Bautista was about to draw his gun to shoot
him, Manaban could have easily disabled Bautista by
shooting his arm or leg considering that Manaban’s
firearm was already aimed at Bautista.
Aggression presupposes that the person
attacked must face a real threat to his life and the peril
sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not
imaginary. Absent such actual or imminent peril to one’s
life or limb, there is nothing to repel and there is no
justification for taking the life or inflicting injuries on
another.
PEOPLE v. NUGAS, G.R. No. 172606 (November 23, 2011)
Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack
that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not
consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be
merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively
strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to
shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to
attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his
right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to
throw a pot.
Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had
first punched him and then reached for his clutch bag on
the dashboard, making Nugas believe that he had a gun
there. For one, as the CA pointed out, Nugas admitted not
actually seeing if Glen had a gun in his clutch bag. And,
secondly, the CA correctly found and declared Nugas’
testimony about Glen punching him to be improbable, viz:
It is also highly improbable that the victim, in
relation to accused-appellant Nugas position, can launch
an attack against the latter. First, the victim was at the
driver’s seat and seated between him were his wife and
two children. Second, the victim was driving the FX
vehicle. Third, accused-appellant Nugas was seated
directly behind the victim. All things considered, it is highly
improbable, nay risky for the victim’s family, for him to
launch an attack.
Consequently, Nugas had absolutely no basis for
pleading self-defense because he had not been subjected
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
to either actual or imminent threat to his life. He had
nothing to prevent or to repel considering that Glen
committed no unlawful aggression towards him.
With unlawful aggression, the indispensable
foundation of self-defense, not having been established by
Nugas, it is superfluous to still determine whether the
remaining requisites of self-defense were attendant.
Unlawful aggression is the main and most
essential element to support the theory of self-defense
and the complete or incomplete exemption from criminal
liability; without such primal requisite it is not possible to
maintain that a person acted in self-defense.
(3) The aggression must constitute a violation of the law.
When the aggression ceased to exist (or when the
aggressor flees), there is no longer a necessity to defend
one‘s self.
EXCEPT: when the aggressor retreats to obtain a more
advantageous position to insure the success of the initial
attack, unlawful aggression is deemed to continue.
PEOPLE v. ALCONGA, 78 PHIL 366
There were two stages in the fight between
Alconga and the deceased. The initial stage commenced
when the deceased assaulted Alconga without sufficient
provocation on the part of the latter. Resisting the
aggression, Alconga managed to have the upper hand in
the fight, inflicting several wounds upon the deceased, on
account of which the latter fled in retreat. From that
moment there was no longer any danger to the life of
Alconga who, being virtually unscathed, could have chosen
to remain where he was. Resolving all doubts in his flavor,
and considering that in the first stage the deceased was
the unlawful aggressor and defendant had not given
sufficient provocation, and considering further that when
the deceased was about to deliver the third blow, Alconga
was still in a crawling position and, on that account, could
not have effectively wielded his bolo and therefore had to
use his "paltik" revolver — his only remaining weapon —
we hold that Alconga was then acting in self-defense.
But when he pursued the deceased, he was no
longer acting in self-defense, there being then no more
aggression to defend against the same having ceased from
the moment the deceased took to his heels. During
the second stage of the fight Alconga inflicted many
additional wounds upon the deceased. That the deceased
was not fatally wounded in the first encounter is amply
shown by the fact that he was still able to run a distance of
some 200 meters before being overtaken by Alconga.
Under such circumstances, Alconga’s plea of self-defense
in the second stage of the fight cannot be sustained. There
can be no defense where there is no aggression.
29
PEOPLE v. RAZON, G.R. No. 158053 (June 21, 2007)
Without scrutinizing Razon's assertion that he
was held up, and assuming the same to be true, there was,
indeed unlawful aggression when Gonzalo poked a knife
on Razon's neck. But, when Razon, in a Herculean feat,
was able to grab the knife from Gonzalo and freed his right
hand from the hold of Gonzalo's two companions, the
aggression no longer existed. In fact, Gonzalo's two
companions, went out of the taxicab and Gonzalo himself
went out also towards the canal of the road. At this point,
Razon could have started his taxicab and left the place
because he was left alone in the taxicab. But he did not.
He went after Gonzalo and his two companions and
started swinging the knife he grabbed from Gonzalo. He
even had time to go back to the taxicab and get his own
knife and then went back to the three men. He then was
holding two knives. There was no proof that Gonzalo's
companions were able to throw stones at him or the
taxicab to indicate perhaps, that his three passengers who
intended to hold him up continued their unlawful
aggression...
When Gonzalo and his two companions went
out of the taxicab, and Razon followed them outside,
Razon became the aggressor. The wounds sustained by
Gonzalo would clearly show that he was attacked by
Razon.
Petitioner unequivocally admitted that after the
three men went out of his taxicab, he ran after them and
later went back to his cab to get his colonial knife; then he
went down the canal to swing his knife at the victim,
wounding and killing him in the process. Such can no
longer be deemed as self-defense.
It is settled that the moment the first aggressor
runs away, unlawful aggression on the part of the first
aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression
ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or
wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and
not self-defense is committed. Retaliation is not the same
as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was
begun by the injured party already ceased when the
accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression
was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the
accused.
Even assuming that some danger did in fact
exist, the imminence of that danger had already ceased
the moment petitioner was able to disarm the victim by
wresting the knife from the latter. After the former had
successfully seized the weapon, and he as well as his
companions went out of the cab, there was no longer any
unlawful aggression to speak of that would have
necessitated the need to kill the victim.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
The defense employed by petitioner also cannot
be said to be reasonable. The means employed by a
person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to
the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be
averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or
repel an unlawful aggression.
The nature or quality of the weapon; the
physical condition, the character, the size and other
circumstances of the aggressor as well as those of the
person who invokes self-defense; and the place and the
occasion of the assault also define the reasonableness of
the means used in self-defense.
In this case, the deceased was a polio victim,
which explains the presence of the wooden cane at the
scene of the crime. Petitioner also admitted that when he
went after Gonzalo, he had in his possession two knives,
the Batangas knife he wrested from the hold-uppers and
the colonial knife which he took from his cab.
Other circumstances also render petitioner's
claim of self-defense as dubious and unworthy of belief.
The nature and location of the victim's wounds manifest
petitioner's resolve to end the life of the victim. Here, the
wound that killed Gonzalo was 12 cm. deep which was
directed inward and slightly upward, entering the
abdominal cavity, perforating the small intestines and
penetrating the pancreas and the abdominal aorta.
Petitioner also did not inform the authorities at
the earliest opportunity that he wounded Gonzalo in self-
defense; neither did he surrender right away the colonial
knife which he used in stabbing the victim. He only
invoked self-defense when he could no longer conceal his
deed. As testified to by Chopchopen, Razon was hesitant
at first to go to the place where he was allegedly held up.
Then when Chopchopen discovered the body of Gonzalo
and while they were bringing him to the hospital, he asked
Razon if he was the one who stabbed Gonzalo, to which
Razon answered in the negative. He only admitted to
having stabbed the victim at the police station after he
was investigated by police officers.
Petitioner's claim that he also suffered injuries
brought by the attack on him by the victim is belied by the
testimonies of police officers Chopchopen and Bumangil
who said that they did not see any injury on Razon on the
night in question.
With petitioner's failure to prove self-defense,
the inescapable conclusion is that he is guilty of homicide
as correctly found by the RTC.
(4) Must come from the person attacked by the accused.
30
(5) Unlawful aggression must also be a continuing
circumstance or must have been existing at the time the
defense is made.
Retaliation and Self-defense, distinguished
In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the
injured party already ceased to exist when the accused
attacked him, hence, it is not a justifying circumstance
while
In self-defense, the aggression was still existing when the
aggressor was injured or disabled by the person making a
defense.
PEOPLE v. BALTAZAR, G.R. No. 202847 (October 23, 2013)
SC: the accused-appellant, miserably failed to
discharge his burden of proving that unlawful aggression
justifying self-defense was present when he killed
Apolinario.
The aggression initially staged by Apolinario was
not of the continuous kind as it was no longer present
when the accused-appellant injured Apolinario.
As testified by the accused-appellant himself, he
was able to grab the bolo from Apolinario. From that point
on, the aggression initially staged by Apolinario ceased to
exist and the perceived threat to the accused-appellant’s
life was no longer attendant. Hence, the accused-appellant
was no longer acting in self-defense, when he, despite
having already disarmed Apolinario, ran after the latter for
about 20 m and then stabbed him.
When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender
no longer has any justification to kill or wound the original
aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense
but in retaliation against the original aggressor. Retaliation
is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the
aggression that was begun by the injured party already
ceased when the accused attacked him; while in self-
defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor
was injured by the accused.
(6) Rule “stand ground when in the right”
Reason: if one flees from an aggressor, he runs the risk of
being attacked in the back of the aggressor.
(7) Aggression must be real, not merely imaginary.
Note: Aggression that is expected is still real, provided it is
imminent.
(8) Aggression must be unlawful.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Note: No unlawful aggression when there was an
agreement to fight and the challenge to fight was
accepted. BUT aggression which is ahead of an agreed
time or place is unlawful aggression.
Examples of lawful aggression:
a) The fulfillment of a duty or the exercise of a right in a
more or less violent manner is aggression, but it is lawful
b) The act of the husband in killing the paramour and/or
his wife, there is no unlawful aggression on the part of the
husband but he exercised a lawful right for the reason that
it was made by a deceived and offended husband in order
to defend his honor and rights by punishing the offender
of his honor; such acts would have fallen within the
sanction of Art. 247 of the RPC
Unlawful aggression in defense of other rights:
1) Attempt to rape a woman – defense of right
to chastity.
2) Defense of property.
3) Defense of home.
NACNAC v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012
SC: Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court,
there is a difference between the act of drawing one’s gun
and the act of pointing one’s gun at a target. The former
cannot be said to be unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. The victim here was a trained police officer. He was
inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in order to
settle a score with someone using a police vehicle. A
warning shot fired by a fellow police officer, his superior,
was left unheeded as he reached for his own firearm and
pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore, justified
in defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient
colleague. Even if We were to disbelieve the claim that the
victim pointed his firearm at petitioner, there would still
be a finding of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim.
We quote with approval the OSG’s argument on this point:
A police officer is trained to shoot quickly and
accurately. A police officer cannot earn his badge unless
he can prove to his trainors that he can shoot out of the
holster quickly and accurately x x x. Given this factual
backdrop, there is reasonable basis to presume that the
appellant indeed felt his life was actually threatened.
Facing an armed police officer like himself, who at that
time, was standing a mere five meters from the appellant,
the [latter] knew that he has to be quick on the draw. It is
worth emphasizing that the victim, being a policeman
himself, is presumed to be quick in firing.
Hence, it now becomes reasonably certain that
in this specific case, it would have been fatal for the
31
appellant to have waited for SPO1 Espejo to point his gun
before the appellant fires back.
To successfully invoke self-defense, another
requisite is that the means employed by the accused must
be reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent
of the attack sought to be averted. Supporting petitioner’s
claim of self-defense is the lone gunshot wound suffered
by the victim. The nature and number of wounds inflicted
by the accused are constantly and unremittingly
considered as important indicia. The lone wound inflicted
on the victim supports the argument that petitioner feared
for his life and only shot the victim to defend himself. The
lone gunshot was a reasonable means chosen by
petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of
the armed victim, his drunken state, disobedience of an
unlawful order, and failure to stand down despite a
warning shot.
The last requisite for self-defense to be
appreciated is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself or herself. As gleaned from
the findings of the trial court, petitioner gave the victim a
lawful order and fired a warning shot before shooting the
armed and drunk victim. Absent from the shooting
incident was any evidence on petitioner sufficiently
provoking the victim prior to the shooting.
All told, We are convinced that petitioner was
only defending himself on the night he shot his fellow
police officer. The rule is that factual findings of the trial
court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal. We must, therefore, acquit
petitioner.
PEOPLE v. SAMSON, G.R. No. 214883 (September 2, 2015)
It must be noted that after she was able to take
hold of the knife from her husband, he did not stand down
but, instead, continued to move towards her despite her
plea that he should not come nearer. He grabbed her by
the arm which could have precipitated her well-grounded
belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able to
wrest the weapon from her. It was not farfetched to
presume that, being stronger, he could have easily
overpowered her and eventually killed her.
In that situation, Cristina had reasons to believe
that her life was still in danger. It is to be noted that before
she was able to take hold of the weapon, her husband
held the same knife and pointed it at her throat. So when
he, who was taller and stronger, approached her and
grabbed her by the arm, it was instinctive for her to take
the extreme precautionary measure by stabbing him
before he could get back the knife and make good his
earlier threat of putting a hole in her throat.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Now that unlawful aggression has already been
established, it is well to consider the other two requisites
in order to determine whether the self-defense is
complete or incomplete.
The lone stab wound located on the victim's
chest supports the argument that Cristina feared for her
life and this fear impelled her to defend it by stabbing him.
It was a reasonable means chosen by her in view of the
attending circumstances, to wit: that her stronger
husband, who had earlier pointed the said knife to her
throat, approached her and grabbed her arm, despite her
plea that he refrain from coming near her; and that she
had no other available means or any less deadly weapon
to repel the threat other than the knife in her hand. She
did not have the time or sufficient tranquillity of mind to
think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. In
predicaments like this, human nature does not act upon
the processes of formal reason but in obedience to the
instinct of self-preservation. When it is apparent that a
person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the
duty of the courts to sanction that act or to mitigate his
liability.
Moreover, the fact that Gerry was no longer
armed does not negate the reasonableness of the means
employed by Cristina. Perfect equality between the
weapon used by the one defending himself and that of the
aggressor is not required. What the law requires is a
rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will
enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the accused is exposed, and the instinct
more than reason, that moves or impels his defense; and
the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the
harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such injury.
The Court cannot sustain the trial court's
observation that it was Cristina who provoked her
husband when she suddenly pushed him. Her shoving him
cannot be considered a sufficient provocation
proportionate to the act of aggression. She merely
capitalized on a window of opportunity, when her husband
removed the knife away from her throat, to save herself
from what she had perceived to be a danger to her life.
Anybody, in her situation would have acted in the same
reasonable way.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it.
This requisite presupposes the existence of unlawful
aggression, which is either imminent or actual.
A threat to inflict real injury places us in imminent danger;
in making a defense, we PREVENT the aggression that
places us in such.
32
An actual physical assault places us in actual danger; in
making a defense, we REPEL the aggression that places us
in such.
It means that the test of reasonableness of either or both
such necessity depends on:
(1) There be a necessity of the course of action taken by
the person making a defense depend on the existence of
unlawful aggression.
a) Place and occasion of the assault considered.
b) The darkness of the night and the surprise
which characterized the assault considered.
(2) There be a necessity of the means used by the person
making a defense; must be rationally necessary to prevent
or repel an unlawful aggression; depends upon the nature
and extent of the aggression
Note: not the material commensurability but rational
equivalence.
The means employed depends upon: [NAPP]
(1) Nature and quality of the weapon used by
the aggressor
(2) Aggressor‘s physical condition, character,
size, and other circumstances
(3) And those of the Person defending himself
(4) the Place and occasion of the assault.
Note: the first 2 requisites are common to self-defense,
defense of a relative, and defense of a stranger. These 3
kinds of legitimate defense differ only in the third
requisite.
ESLABON v. PEOPLE, 127 SCRA 783
It has been held time and again that the
reasonableness of the means adopted is not one of
mathematical calculation or "material commensurability
between the means of attack and defense but the
imminent danger against the subject of the attack as
perceived by the defender and the instinct more than
reason that moves the defender to repel the attack. It has
further been stress in such cases that to the imminent
threat of the moment, one could not be hoped to exercise
such calm judgment as may be expected of another not
laboring under any urgency and who has sufficient time to
appraise the urgency of the situation.
Tested by these standards, Eslabon's acts
justified the knife thrust(s) that he delivered at the
deceased in order to stop the latter's attack against
Francisco who had already suffered a substantially serious
wound with the scythe imbedded in his right armpit which
the deceased did not let go. Since there is evidence that
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
the deceased aggressor was bigger than Francisco, he
could have inflicted with a little more effort a much more
serious, if not fatal, wound on Francisco. The stab wounds
inflicted by Eslabon on the deceased were all directed at
the left forearm of the deceased, sustaining Eslabon's
statement that he did not intend to seriously injure Harder
but merely wanted to release the latter's hold on Francisco
because the scythe was stuck under the latter's armpit. In
view of the fact that Francisco and Harder were grappling,
it is entirely credible that the same knife thrust at Harder's
left arm caused the wound on Harder's left chest as
testified by the attending doctor, which wound
unfortunately proved fatal. Under the emergency situation
confronting the Eslabon, who feared for the life of
Francisco, it would have been rash and unnatural on his
part, as rationalized by respondent court, if he were yet to
look for a police officer instead of rushing to the defense
of Francisco who was under serious attack and in grave
danger. In this case there was reasonable necessity of the
course of action employed by Noli Eslabon.
NACNAC v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012
To successfully invoke self-defense, another
requisite is that the means employed by the accused must
be reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent
of the attack sought to be averted.
Supporting petitioner’s claim of self-defense is
the lone gunshot wound suffered by the victim. The nature
and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are
constantly and unremittingly considered as important
indicia. The lone wound inflicted on the victim supports
the argument that petitioner feared for his life and only
shot the victim to defend himself. The lone gunshot was a
reasonable means chosen by petitioner in defending
himself in view of the proximity of the armed victim, his
drunken state, disobedience of an unlawful order, and
failure to stand down despite a warning shot.
PEOPLE v. SAMSON, G.R. No. 214883 (September 2, 2015)
The lone stab wound located on the victim's
chest supports the argument that Cristina feared for her
life and this fear impelled her to defend it by stabbing him.
It was a reasonable means chosen by her in view of the
attending circumstances, to wit: that her stronger
husband, who had earlier pointed the said knife to her
throat, approached her and grabbed her arm, despite her
plea that he refrain from coming near her; and that she
had no other available means or any less deadly weapon
to repel the threat other than the knife in her hand. She
did not have the time or sufficient tranquillity of mind to
think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. In
predicaments like this, human nature does not act upon
the processes of formal reason but in obedience to the
instinct of self-preservation. When it is apparent that a
person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the
33
duty of the courts to sanction that act or to mitigate his
liability.
Moreover, the fact that Gerry was no longer
armed does not negate the reasonableness of the means
employed by Cristina. Perfect equality between the
weapon used by the one defending himself and that of the
aggressor is not required. What the law requires is a
rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will
enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the accused is exposed, and the instinct
more than reason, that moves or impels his defense; and
the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the
harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such injury.
PEOPLE v. RAZON, G.R. No. 158053 (June 21, 2007)
SC: the victim was a polio victim, there is no
chance in hell that there is proportionality in this case
because not only that the victim was a polio victim, the
accused was using 2 knives to butcher the victim, so there
is no reasonable necessity in this case.
Even assuming that he was repelling the alleged
unlawful aggression employed by the victim, there was no
unlawful aggression because of the physical attribute of
the victim as a polio victim and the number of weapons at
his disposal (2 knives).
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
To be entitled to the benefit of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, the one defending himself
must not have given cause for the aggression by his unjust
conduct or by inciting or provoking the assailant.
The 3rd requisite of self-defense is present –
1) When no provocation at all was given to the
aggressor by the person defending himself; or
2) When, even if a provocation was given, it was
not sufficient; or
3) When, even if the provocation was sufficient,
it was not given by the person defending
himself; or
4) When, even if a provocation was given by the
person defending himself, it was not proximate
and immediate to the act of aggression.
Par. 2 – Defense of relatives.
2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of
his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate,
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natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by
affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and
second requisites prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in
case the revocation was given by the person attacked,
that the one making defense had no part therein.
Basis of justification:
The justification of defense of relatives, by
reason of which the defender is not criminally liable, is
founded not only upon a humanitarian sentiment, but also
upon the impulse of blood which impels men to rush, on
the occasion of great perils, to the rescue of those close to
them by ties of blood. (Albert)
The law acknowledges the possibility that a
relative, by virtue of blood, will instinctively come to the
aid of their relatives.
Elements:
(1) Unlawful aggression
(2) Reasonable necessity of means employed to
prevent or repel it
Note: the first 2 requisites are the same as those of self-
defense.
(3) In case person the provocation was given by
the person attacked
Note: the phrase “in case” means “in the event that” there
is still a legitimate defense of relative even if the relative
being defended has given provocation, provided that the
one defending such relative has no part in the
provocation.
Reason: Although the provocation prejudices the person
who gave it, its effects do not reach the defender who took
no part therein, because the latter was prompted by some
noble or generous sentiment in protecting and saving a
relative
Relatives entitled to defense:
1) Spouse
2) Ascendants
3) Descendants
4) Legitimate, natural or adopted Brothers/Sisters or
5) Relatives by affinity in the same degrees
6) Relatives by consanguinity w/in the 4th civil degree
The fact that the relative defended gave provocation is
immaterial.
34
Illustration: The sons of A honestly believe that their father
was the victim of an unlawful aggression when in fact it
was their father who attacked B. If they killed B under
such circumstances, they are justified.
Par. 3 – Defense of stranger.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a
stranger, provided that the first and second requisites
mentioned in the first circumstance of this Article are
present and that the person defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
Elements:
(1) Unlawful aggression;
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it;
Note: the first 2 requisites are the same as those of self-
defense.
(3) The person defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment or other evil motive.
This Code requires that the defense of a stranger
be actuated by a disinterested or generous motive, when it
puts down “revenge, resentment or other evil motive” as
illegitimate. (Albert)
Note: Any person not included in the enumeration of
relatives mentioned in the par. 2 of this Article, is
considered a stranger for the purpose of par. 3. Hence,
even a close friend or a distant relative is a stranger within
the meaning of par. 3.
Basis: What one may do in his defense, another may do for
him. The ordinary man would not stand idly by and see his
companion killed without attempting to save his life
Example of defense of stranger:
A heard screams and cries for help. When A
responded, he saw B attacking his (B’s) wife with a dagger.
A approached B and struggled for the possession of the
weapon, in the course of which A inflicted wounds on B. In
this case, A acted in defense of a stranger.
Par. 4 – Avoidance of greater evil or injury.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury,
does not act which causes damage to another, provided
that the following requisites are present;
The evil or injury sought to be avoided must not have been
produced by the one invoking the justifying circumstances.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Damage to another covers injury to persons and damage
to property
GENERAL RULE: No civil liability in justifying circumstances
because there is no crime.
EXCEPTION: There is CIVIL LIABILITY under this paragraph.
Persons benefited shall be liable in proportion to the
benefit which they have received.
Elements:
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Note: if the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected
or anticipated or may happen in the future, par. 4 of Art.
11 is not applicable
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done
to avoid it;
Illustration:
Examples of injury to person
1) A person driving his car on a narrow road with due
diligence and care when suddenly he saw a “six by six”
truck in front of his car. If he should swerve his car to the
left he would fall into a precipice, or if he would swerve it
to the right he would kill a passer-by. He was forced to
choose between losing his life in the precipice or
sacrificing the life of the innocent bystander. He chose the
latter, swerved his car to the right, ran over and killed the
passer-by. (Guevarra)
2) The killing of the foetus to save the life of the mother
may be held excusable – this is based on the instinct of
self-preservation which will always make one feel that his
own safety is of greater importance than that of another.
Examples of injury to property
1) Fire breaks out in a cluster of nipa houses, and in order
to prevent its spread to adjacent houses of strong
materials, the surrounding nipa houses are pulled down.
(Albert)
2) During the storm, the ship which was heavily loaded
with goods was in danger of sinking. The captain of the
vessel ordered part of the goods thrown overboard. In this
case the captain is not criminally liable for causing part of
the goods thrown overboard.
Note: The greater evil should not be brought about by the
negligence or imprudence of the actor.
Illustration: A drove his car beyond the speed limit so
much so that when he reached the curve, his vehicle
35
skidded towards a ravine. He swerved his car towards a
house, destroying it and killing the occupant therein. A
cannot be justified because the state of necessity was
brought about by his own felonious act.
Additional notes: 1) when the accused was not avoiding
any evil, he cannot invoke the justifying circumstance of
avoidance of a greater evil or injury.
2) the evil which brought about the
greater evil must not result from a violation of law by the
actor. Thus, an escaped convict who has to steal clothes in
order to move about unrecognized does not act from
necessity. He is liable for the theft of the clothes.
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful
means of preventing it.
TAN v. STANDARD VACUUM OIL CO., 91 Phil 672
Where a truck of the Standard Vacuum Oil Co.
delivering gasoline at a gas station caught fire and, in order
to prevent the burning of the station, the truck was driven
to the middle of the street and there abandoned, but it
continued to move and thereafter crashed against and
burdened a house on the other side of the street, the
owner of the house had a cause of action against the
owner of the gas station under par. 2 of Article 101, in
relation to par. 4 of Article 11.
SC: Article 11 par. 4 is applicable in this case that
they acted to avoid a greater evil or injury so there is no
criminal liability. However, there is civil liability, it is not
necessarily the person who caused the injury, but it is
actually the person for whose benefit the harm is being
prevented. In this case the harm prevented was the
explosion of the truck owned by Rural in Transit Company,
so it is the company who is the beneficiary in this case;
therefore it is the company who shoulder the civil liability.
Par. 5 –Fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or
office.
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office.
The public officer acting in the fulfillment of a duty may
appear to be an aggressor but his aggression is not
unlawful, it being necessary to fulfill his duty – legitimate
performance of duty.
Requisites:
(1) Offender acted in performance of duty or
lawful exercise of a right or office
(2) That the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
due performance of duty or the lawful exercise
of such right or office.
Note: If the first condition is present, but the second is not
because the offender acted with culpa, the offender will
be entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance. The
penalty would be reduced by one or two degrees.
Lawful exercise of right
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force
as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property. (Art. 429, Civil Code)
If in protecting his possession of the property he
injured (not seriously) the one trying to get it from him, he
justified under this paragraph – but it is not necessary that
there be unlawful aggression against the person charged
with the protection of the property otherwise par. 1
applies, it being a defense of right to property.
Lawful exercise of office
The executioner of the Bilibid Prison cannot be
held liable for murder for the execution performed by him
because he was merely acting in the lawful exercise of his
office. (Guevarra)
A surgeon who amputated the leg of a patient to
save him from gangrene is not liable for the crime of
mutilation, because he was acting in the lawful exercise of
his office.
PEOPLE v. OANIS, 74 Phil 257
That the injury caused or the offense committed
be the necessary consequence of the due performance of
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
In this case, the first requisite is present, because
the accused peace officers who were trying to get a
wanted criminal, were acting in the performance of a duty.
The second requisite is not present, because through
impatience, over-anxiety, or in their desire to take no
chances, the accused exceeded in the fulfillment of their
duty when they killed a sleeping person whom they
believed to be the wanted criminal without making any
previous inquiry as to his identity.
Par. 6 – Obedience to an order issued for some lawful
purpose.
36
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued
by a superior for some lawful purpose.
Requisites:
(1) Order must have been issued by a superior
(2) The order is for some lawful purpose
(3) The means used to carry it out must be lawful
Example of absence of the 3rd requisite:
The court ordered that the convict should be
executed on a certain date. The executioner put him to
death on a day earlier than the date fixed by the court.
The execution of the convict, although by virtue
of a lawful order of the court, was carried out against the
provision of Art. 82. The executioner is guilty of murder.
Note: A subordinate is not liable for carrying out an illegal
order of his superior if he is not aware of the illegality of
the order and he is not negligent.
PEOPLE v. BERONILLA, 96 Phil 566
SC: When the accused acted upon orders of
superior officers, which he, as military subordinate, could
not question, and obeyed the orders in good faith, without
being aware of their illegality, without any fault or
negligence on his part, he is not liable because he had no
criminal intent and he was not negligent.
PEOPLE v. BARROGA, 54 Phil 247
One who prepared a falsified document with full
knowledge of its falsity is not excused even if he merely
acted in obedience to the instruction of his superior,
because the instruction was not for a lawful purpose.
JUSTIFYING EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCE CIRCUMSTANCE
It affects the act, not the It affects the actor, not the
actor. act.
The act is considered to
have been done within the The act complained of is
bounds of law; hence, actually wrongful, but the
legitimate and lawful in actor is not liable.
the eyes of the law.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano

Since the act is considered
lawful, there is no liability.
There is no criminal or civil
liability.
Since the act complained
of is actually wrong, there
is a crime but since the
actor acted without
voluntariness, there is no
dolo or culpa.
There is a crime, although
there is no criminal
liability, there is civil
liability (Except: Art. 12,
par. 4 and 7 where there is
no civil liability.
When the imbecile or an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of
the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
Note: the court has no power to permit the insane person
to leave the asylum without first obtaining the opinion of
the Director of Health that he may be released without
danger.
Basis for pars. 1 - 3: COMPLETE ABSENCE OF
INTELLIGENCE, an element of voluntariness.

IMBECILITY INSANITY

II. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES An imbecile is one who,

while advance in age, Insanity exists when
has a mental there is a complete
Exempting Circumstances – (non-imputability) are those development deprivation of
grounds for exemption from punishment because there is
comparable to that of intelligence in
wanting in the agent of the crime any of the conditions
which make the act voluntary or negligent. children between two committing the act.
to seven years of age.
Basis: COMPLETE ABSENCE OF INTELLIGENCE, FREEDOM
OF ACTION, OR INTENT, OR ON THE ABSENCE OF No lucid interval There is lucid interval
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED.
Excempt from criminal Not excempt from
Note: Technically, there is a crime committed but no liability in all cases; he criminal liability if it is
criminal liability arises because of the complete absence of is deprived completely shown that he acted
the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of
of reason or during lucid interval
the act.
discernment and because during this
Burden of proof – any of the circumstances is a matter of freedom of the will at period, the insane acts
defense and the same must be proved by the defendant to the time of the with intelligence.
the satisfaction of the court. commission of the
crime
6 Types of exempting circumstances: [IMACIL]

1. Imbecility/Insanity Complete deprivation of intelligence while committing

2. Minority the act – that the accused be deprived of reason ; that he
3. Accident acts without the least discernment; or that there be a total
4. Compulsion of irresistible force deprivation of freedom of the will.
5. Impulse of uncontrollable fear
6. Lawful or insuperable cause Mere abnormality of mental faculties is not enough,
especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his
acts. At most, it is only a mitigating circumstance. (Art. 13,
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal par. 9)
liability. — the following are exempt from criminal
liability: i.e. if the mental disease or mental defect of the accused
only diminishes the exercise of his will-power (ex.
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has kleptomania), and did not deprive him of the
acted during a lucid interval.chanrobles virtual law library consciousness of his acts, it is only a mitigating
circumstance
Procedure:

37
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Note: Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and
avoidance and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt –
the presumption is always in favor of sanity, burden of
proof to show insanity is on the defense.
2 Tests to know the gravity required in insanity to be
exempt from criminal liability:
1. Cognition Test – refers to the act without the least
discernment of your action. Complete absence of
discernment, the ability to distinguish between right and
wrong. Mostly this test is followed by the SC.
2. Volition Test – complete deprivation of your will.
PEOPLE v. AMBAL, 100 SCRA 325
Honorato Ambal was married with Felicula for 15
yrs. She appeared to be a shrew and neglectful wife. She
stayed away from the conjugal home at times. He killed
her when the latter failed to buy a medicine for Ambal
who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a
heated altercation. Felicula told her husband that it would
be better if he were dead. That remark infuriated Ambal
and impelled him to attack his wife.
He went to the barangay captain and informed
that he killed his wife. After making that oral confession,
Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and
surrendered to a policeman.
During the trial, he pleaded not guilty and, thru
his counsel de oficio, the defense of Ambal was insanity.
Dr. Balbas stated during trial: Before the commission of
the crime, he was normal. After the commission of the
crime, normal, but during the commission of the crime,
that is what we call “Psychosis” due to short frustration
tolerance.
SC: Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation
in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or
a more or less permanently diseased or disordered
condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered
function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or
by impaired or disordered volition"
The law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The law
always presumes all acts to be voluntary and the burden is
upon the defendant to overcome this presumption. It is
improper to presume that acts were executed
unconsciously. Without positive proof that the defendant
had lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior
to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
presumed that he was in a normal condition.
38
In order that insanity may be taken as an
exempting circumstance, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or
that the accused acted without the least discernment.
Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude
imputability.
In this case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was
not substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The
presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not
completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom
of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not
suffering from any mental disease or defect.
The fact that immediately after the incident he
thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing authorities is
incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done
was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.
PEOPLE v. PUNO, 105 SCRA 151
When insanity is alleged as a ground for
exemption from responsibility, the evidence on this point
must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S.
vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547). Insanity should be proven by
clear and positive evidence.
The defense contends that Puno was insane
when he killed Francisca Col because he had chronic
schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from
schizophrenia, when he liquidated the victim, and
schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a
person of discernment and freedom of will.
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code exists when there is complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is
deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment
because there is complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the
will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability." (People v. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325)
After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions
in the light of the strict rule just stated and the
circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the
conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed
the hapless and helpless victim. The facts and the findings
of the psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he
was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of
will.
Evidence of insanity must refer to:
a. the time preceding the act under prosecution
or
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
b. at the very moment of its execution.
Note: Insanity subsequent to commission of crime is not
exempting.
If insanity is only occasional or intermittent in its
nature, the presumption of its continuance does not arise.
But a person who has been adjudged insane, or who has
been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the
insane, is presumed to continue to be insane.
Cases covered by the term insanity:
(1) Dementia praecox – an irrisistible homicidal impulse is
common because of delusions that he is being interfered
with sexually, or that his property is being taken. During
this period of excitement, such person has no control
whatever of his acts.
Note: Cited in OLD cases, it is the most common form of
psychosis, but the term is now Schizophrenia – a chronis
mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish
between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions.
(2) Kleptomania – if found that his unlawful act is due “to
his mental disease or a mental defect, producing an
irresistible impulse, as when the accused has been
deprived or has lost the power of his will which would
enable him to prevent himself from doing the act”
(3) Epilepsy is a chronic nervous disease characterized by
fits occuring at intervals, atended by convulsive motions of
the muscels and loss of consciousness.
Cases of lack of intelligence:
(4) Somnambulism: sleep-walking – the act of the person
is not voluntary when he does not have intelligence and
intent while doing the act; SC recognized this as having
acted without the least discernment.
(5) Malignant malaria: which affects the nervous system
and causes among others such complication as acute
melancholia and insanity at times.
Cases not covered under this article:
Feeblemindedness is not imbecility, not an exempting,
because the offender could distinguish right from wrong.
Pedophilia is a sexual behavior wherein the subject has
strong, recurrent and uncontrollable sexual and physical
fantasies about children which he tries to fulfill, especially
when there are no people around. However, it is a mental
disorder not synonymous with insanity.
39
Amnesia is not proof of mental condition of the accused,
in ans of itself is no defense to a criminal charge.
2. A person under nine years of age.
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A.
9344); also refer to Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D.
603, as amended) raised the age of absolute
irresponsibility from yeas to 15 years of age.
Under Section 6 of said law, child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However,
the child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of the same law.
What is the Juvenile Justice and Welfare System?
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare System" refers to a system
dealing with children at risk and children in conflict with
the law, which provides childappropriate proceedings,
including programs and services for prevention, diversion,
rehabilitation, reintegration and aftercare to ensure their
normal growth and development. (See Title V: Juvenile
Justice and Welfare System of RA 9344).
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen,
unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such
minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally
irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the
provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall
commit him to the care and custody of his family who
shall be charged with his surveillance and education
otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some
institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.
a. Minimum age of criminal responsibility
RA 9344, SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.
- A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to
an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
b. Periods of criminal responsibility
(1) the age of absolute irresponsibility – 15
years and below (infancy); there is a
conclusive presumption means that no
matter what evidence is presented against
the child, the law presumes that he/she
acted without discernment.
(2) the age of conditional responsibility – 15
years and 1 day to 18 years; the
presumption here is disputable;
How to dispute the presumption? – When
proved of discernment.
(3) the age of full responsibility – 18 years or
over (adolescence) to 70 (maturity);
(4) the age of mitigated responsibility – over 70
years of age (senility). 15 years and 1 day to 18
years, the offender acting with discernment;
c. Definition of child in conflict with the law
"Child in conflict with the law" – a child who is alleged as,
accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense
under Philippine laws. [Section 4 (e), R.A. 9344]
A child in conflict with the law is a person who at the time
of the commission of the offense is below 18 years old but
not less than 15 years and 1 day old. (Sec. 1, A.M. No. 01-
1-18-SC, Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law)
Discernment – mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong and the
coonsequences of the wrongful act as determined by the
child‘s appearance , attitude, comportment and behavior
not only before and during the commission of the offense
but also after and during the trial.
It is manifested through:
1) Manner of committing a crime – Thus, when the minor
committed the crime during nighttime to avoid detection
or took the loot to another town to avoid discovery, he
manifested discernment.
2) Conduct of the offender – The accused shot the victim
with his sling shot and shouted ― ”Putang ina mo”. The
first part of the remark clearly manifested the perverted
character of the accused and the second part reflected his
satisfaction and elation upon the accomplishment of his
criminal act. These facts indicate discernment.
Note: The exemption from criminal liability shall not
include exemption from civil liability.
40
Intent and Discernment, distinguished
Intent refers to the desired act of the person while
Discernment relates to the moral significance that a person
ascribes to the said act.
d. Presumption of minority
The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy
1) the presumption of minority and
2) the rights of a child in conflict with the law
until proven to be 18 years old or older at the
time of the commission of the offense.
Note: In case of doubt as to the child‘s age, it shall be
resolved in his/her favor.
e. Determination of age (Sec. 7, RA 9344)
The age of a child may be determined from:
1) The child‘s birth certificate, NSO (now PSA)
2) Baptismal certificate, or
3) Any other pertinent documents that shows
the date of birth.
In the absence of these documents, age may be based on:
1) testimony of the child,
2) testmony of a member of the family related to
the child by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree,
3) testimonies of other persons,
4) the physical appearance of the child, and
5) other relevant evidence.
Note: any person alleging the age of the child in conflict
with the law has the burden of proving the age of such
child. If no other records, often resort to bone marrow
analysis to prove the age of the child but
SIERRA v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 182941 (July 3, 2009)
SC: testimonial evidence may be presented to
prove the age of the child subject to the following
conditions, first the absence of any other satisfactory
evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate
or similar documents that will prove the date of birth of
the child; second, the presence of testimony from the
accused and/or relative on the age and minority of the
accused at the time of the complete incident without any
object on the part of the prosecution.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Whenever the lack of any contrary evidence
showing that the accused’s and his relatives’s testimonies
are not proved, that is the time when testimonial evidence
will be competent to prove the age of the child in conflict
with the law.
The person alleging the age of the child in
conflict with the law has the burden the evidence to
support his/her assertion. However, in case of doubt there
is a presumption of minority and resolve the case in favor
the child in conflict with the law.
PEOPLE v. ESTEPANO, 307 SCRA 701
It is not the prosecution’s obligation to prove the
age but whether the child acted with discernment because
of the existing presumption is that the child, that at the
time he committed the crime, he acted without
discernment.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the
presence of discernment despite the lengthy cross-
examination by the prosecutor was not able to receive
enough facts to show the presence of discernment on the
part of the child, therefore the SC recognizes minority as
an exempting circumstance.
LLAVE v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 166040 (April 26, 2006)
Talks about the manner by which the
prosecution can prove the presence of discernment on the
part of the child. It can be prove either through the
manner the crime was committed or the conduct of the
offender after its commission.
A minor over 10 years of age and under 15 was
charged with raping a 7 years old minor. This was the time
when RA 9344 was not yet passed, the minimum age of
criminal responsibility is still 9 years old.
In this case, the child committed the crime
behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to
insure that passersby would not be able to discover his
dastardly acts. So when you look at the manner of
commmitting the crime, if he does not know the
consequences of the his action, why would he commit it
behind the pile of hollowblocks? It was to hide and conceal
his wrongful act. Therefore from that point, it can be seen
that he acted with discernment
Furthermore after the commission of the crime.
When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted
at him, he hastily fled from the scene and he hid in his
grandmothers house to avoid being arrested by policemen
and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and
took him into custody.
JARCO v. CA, 321 SCRA 375
41
Talks about the conclusive presumption in favor
of children below 9 years of age but now below 15 years is
presumed to have acted without discernment.
In this case, the conclusive presumption is
against negligence. The mother was in the act of paying
the goods that she pruchased from a store, as she was
signing her credit card, her daughter climb a structure in
the department store where there was a gust of wind
causing the the structure to fell on the child. The child died
14 days after.
SC: Children are incapable of negligence that
they are even incapable of discernment, how much more
of negligence and the presumption again is conclusive
under the law.
GUEVARRA v. ALMODOVAR, 169 SCRA 476
SC: The terms intent and discernment are not
synonymous. While both are products of the mental
process withing a person, “intent” refers to the desired act
of the person while “discernment” relates to the moral
significance that a person ascribes to the said act. Hence, a
person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware
of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause
injury to the same person negligently handling an air rifle.
It does not mean that if you acted with intent
automatically you acted with discernment, one may exist
wothout the other. Both concepts are different from each
other.
DECLARADOR v. GUBATON, G.R. No. 159208 (August 18,
2006)
Supended Sentence – If convicted or pleaded
guilty he/she can avail of suspended sentence for so long
as the child is between 18 and 21 years of age.
The law before RA 9344, children in conflict with
the law who are convicted for an offense punishable by
death or life imprisonment that availing of suspended
sentence. Under PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code),
this is a precursor of RA 9344, you cannot avail of
suspended sentence if you are convicted with crime
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Upon the amendment of RA 9344 it did not
reproduce this provision.
So while the case was pending, RA 9344 was
passed, the issue was whether or not this disqualification
still applies against CICL who are convicted with crimes
punishable by death or life imprisonment.
SC: The disqualifications still applies despite the
amendment of RA 9344, because it did not expressly
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
repeal the said provision, it merely amended PD 603.
Therefore the provision is still operational up to the
effectivity of RA 9344. (But this decision was reversed in
the case of People v. Sarcia.)
PEOPLE v. SARCIA, G.R. No. 169641 (September 10, 2009)
SC said that under the words of RA 9344, the law
does not make any distinction. With respect as to who
may avail suspended sentence, the law does not
distinguish whether you are convicted of an offense
punishable by life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua or
death or whether it is a minor offense. And because the
law does not distinguish neither should we. So this reverse
the previous ruling in the case of Declarador v. Gubaton.
SC held that regardless of the imposable penalty,
if at the time of your conviction you are below 21 years of
age, you may avail of suspended sentence.
PEOPLE v. MANTALABA, G.R. No. 186227 (July 20, 2011)
SC emphasize the concept that persons who may
avail the benefit of minority under exempting
circumstance or the benefits of RA 9344, the reckoning
point is not your age at the time of the rendering of
judgment, it is the age at the time you committed a
crime. If you commited a crime while you are a minor,
regardless of judgment (i.e. 54 years old ka na) you can still
avail of the benefits of RA 9344.
ORTEGA v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 151085, (August 20, 2008)
This involves a case between 2 minors. Ortega
was then about 14 years old, was charged with the crime
of rape and the victim who was 8 years of age. If the victim
and the accused are both minors, do you still apply RA
9344?
SC: Yes, regarldess of the age of the victim, if the
offender is a minor, he may avail of the benefits of RA
9344. This is no longer the subject of judicial discretion
that will be submitted to legislative amendment. So SC
cannot do anything but to apply the lawwith respect to
RA9344 in fvor of the offender, for so long as the offender
is a minor.
PEOPLE v. ANCAJAS, G.R.No. 199270 (October 21, 2015)
The accused while he was still a minor (17 years
old) when he committed the crime and when the
judgment was rendered against him, he was already 34
years old.
SC held that he can no longer avail of suspended
sentence because again he was already beyond 21 years
old but he can be confined in an agricultural camp or other
training facilities in accordance with RA 9344.
42
HUBILLA v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 176102 (November 26,
2014)
SC held that in the absence of agricultural camp
or any other training facility, the court may resort to
imprisonment. Imprisonment is not altogether prohibited
under RA 9344, provided that the imprisonment is
resorted to as a disposition of last resort and the detention
or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate
period of time.
In this case SC, he may avail of imprisonment for
so long as the term of his imprisonment was for the
shortest duration.
PEOPLE v. HIDALGO, G.R. No. 203313 (September 2,
2015)
SC just reiterates the principle that what is
controlling is not the age at the time of promulgation of
judgment but the age at the time that the offense was
committed in order for the accuse to vail the benefits of
RA 9344.
f. Exemption from criminal liability
(1) 15 yrs old or below at the time of commission of
offense: absolutely exempt from criminal liability but
subject to
INTERVENTION Program –
Return the child to the parents, guardian and the
community based intervention program by
DSWD, SWDO.
If no parent/guradian, turnover to the BRGY.,
NGO, Church and also to the community based
intervention program.
If abandoned child, neglected or abused,
turnover to the Bahay Pag-asa, a youth care
facility.
Note: there must be an intervention program.
(2) Over 15 yrs old but below 18: exempt from criminal
liability & subject to intervention program if the child
acted without discernment.
If he/she acted w/ discernment look at the imposable
penalty, if not more than 6 years the child is subject to
diversion program.
Diversion program – release the child to the
parents/guardian as well as to the DSWD, SWDO, if it is
victimless; If there is a victim, go to the Brgy. for
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By: Tina Serrano
conciliation, mediation, settlement of disputes, family
conferencing to correct the reasons why the child acted
that way.
- If the penalty is more than 6 years, elevate the
case to court.
- if not more than 12 years, again diversion but
the court initiates diversion; persons who
conduct diversion are the clerk of court,
prosecutor, public attorney and SWDO.
- if more than 12 years, proceed to trial,
presentation of evidence against the child in
conflict with the law (CICL), referred to as such
because they are treated in a special manner not
the same as the accused – adult.
o If acquitted, no criminal liability
o If convicted or pleaded guilty he/she
can avail of suspended sentence for so
long as the child is not more than 21
years of age - meaning you will not be
imprisoned, only undergo disposition –
rehabilitation methods to identify the
defects in his character; if disposition
fails, the sentence will be executed but
not imprisonment, only agricultural
camps or other training facility in lieu
of imprisonment.
(3) Below 18 yrs are exempt from:
1) Status offense
2) Vagrancy and Prostitution
3) Mendicancy (PD 1563)
4) Sniffing of Rugby (PD 1619)
Automatic Suspension of Sentence – Once the child who
is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment
of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of
sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after
considering the various chcumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as
provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law. (Sec. 38)
43
Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Upon the
recommendation of the social worker who has custody of
the child, the court shall dismiss the case against the child
whose sentence has been suspended and against whom
disposition measures have been issued, and shall order the
final discharge of the child if it finds that the objective of
the disposition measures have been fulfilled.
The discharge of the child in conflict with the law
shall not affect the civil liability resulting from the
commission of the offense, which shall be enforced in
accordance with law. (Sec. 39)
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault
or intention of causing it.
Basis: LACK OF NEGLIGENCE AND INTENT; a persons does
not commit either an intentional or culpable felony.
Elements: [PW-CW]
(1) A Person is performing a lawful act;
(2) With due care;
(3) He Causes an injury to another by mere
accident;
(4) Without fault or intention of causing it.
Note: no civil liability; no lack of foresight because the act
done cannot be foreseen.
Accident – something that happens outside the sway of
our will, and althoug it comes about through some act of
our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly forseeable
consequences.
– pressuposes lack of intention to commit the
wrong done.
Note: a. If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will
be a case of negligence. (Albert);
b. Accident and self-defense are mutually exclusive.
POMOY v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 150647 (September 29, 2004)
In this case the accused was a member of the
Philipiine constabulary, he was an investigator. The victim
was arrested, he was accused of robbery. The accused
invited the victim for interrogation, the victim attempted
to get hold of his handgun placed in his holster. In the
course grappling, the accused defended himself and
prevented the efforts of the victim to get his handgun
when 2 shots fired hitting the victim in the chest and in the
abdomen causing the death of the victim.
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Issue: Whether it was an accident.
SC said it was an accident, it went back to the
definition of accident – which is an event that occurs or
takes place beyond the sway of our will.
SC just asked 1 simple question: was the accused
in control of the handgun at that time? Because if he was
not in control of the handgun at that time, then the firing
occured beyond his will, outside of his control. In this case,
he did not have control of the handgun, because at the
time several witnesses were able to see the occurence
that at the time the shots were fired they were still in the
process of grappling with each other. There was no
certainty who had control of the handgun at that time.
What about the 2 shots fired? SC said that the
handgun was a caliber 45 pistol which is semi automatic
that is why it was susceptible of 2 shots.
The ELEMENTS of ACCIDENT WERE ALL PRESENT
in this case.
The elements of accident are as follows:
1) the accused was at the time performing a
lawful act with due care;
2) the resulting injury was caused by mere
accident; and
3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault
or no intent to cause the injury.
From the facts, it is clear that all these elements
were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was
an investigator for the PNP. Thus, he was in the lawful
performance of his duties that, under the instructions of
his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for
a routine interrogation. Also, it was in the lawful
performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner
tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the
victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an
enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent
the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially
by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was
likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim
persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised
all the necessary precautions to prevent his service
weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so
assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun locked
when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all
times, especially within the premises of his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit
to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill
him.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the
victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in the
course of the lawful performance of his duties as an
44
enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its
holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the
two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of the
victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been
consequences of circumstances beyond the control of
petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances
create serious doubt on the latter’s culpability.
The SC said that Self-defense is inconsistent with
the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is
no intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense
necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in
order to defend oneself from imminent danger.
Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not
occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to
overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose of self-
defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared to
be the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties’
attempts to possess the firearm. Since the death of the
victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service
gun of petitioner -- an exempting circumstance as defined
in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code -- a further
discussion of whether the assailed acts of the latter
constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of
irresistible force.
Basis for pars. 5 & 6: COMPLETE ABSENCE OF FREEDOM,
an elemenr of voluntariness.
“Actus me invito factus non est meus actus.” (“An act done
by me against my will is not my act.”)
Elements:
(1) That the compulsion is by means of physical
force.
(2) That the physical force must be irresistible.
(3) That the physical force must come from a
third person
Note: Before a force can be considered to be an irresistible
one, it must produce such an effect on the individual that,
in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere
instrument and, as such, incapable of committing the
crime.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, is similar to the one who acts under the
impluse of uncontrllable fear of equal or greater injury.
The force must be irresistible to reduce the actor
to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will.
US v. CABALLEROS, 4 Phil 350
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Baculi, one of the accused who was not a
member of the band which murdered some American
school-teachers, was in a plantation gathering bananas.
Upon hearing the shooting, he ran. However, Baculi was
seen by the leaders of the band who called him, and
striking him with the butts of their guns, they compelled
him to bury the bodies.
Held: Baculi was not criminally liable as
accessory for concealing the body of the crime (Art. 19) of
murder committed by the band, because Baculi acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
This article presupposes that a person is compelled to
commit a crime by another, but the compulsion is by
means of intimidation or threat, not force or violence.
Elements:
(1) That the threat which causes the fear is of an
evil greater than or at least equal to, that which
he is forced to commit;
(2) That it promises an evil of such gravity and
imminence that the ordinary man would have
succumbed to it.
Note: A threat of future injury is not enough. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in
equal combat.
Illustration: A is forced at gun point to forge the signature
of B. in this case, A is exempt from criminal liability for the
reason that the threat which causes the fear is of an evil
greater than or at least equal to, that which he is forced to
commit.
But if A threatened to burn the house of B should the
latter not kill his (B’s) father, and B killed his father for fear
that A might burn (B’s) house, B is not exempt from
criminal liability for the reason that the evil which he was
threatened was much less than that of killing his father.
Irresistible force and Uncontrollable fear, distinguished
Irresistible force (par. 5) – the offender uses violence or
physical force to compel another person to commit a
crime;
Uncontrallable fear (par. 6) – the offender employs
intimidation or threat in compelling another to commit a
crime.
US v. EXALTACION, 3 Phil 339
45
Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco
were compelled under fear of death to swear allegiance to
the Katipunan whose purpose was to overthrow the
government by force of arms.
In this case, the accused cannot be
held criminally liable for rebellion, because they joined the
rebels under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by
law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable cause.
Basis: LACK OF INTENT, the 3rd condition of voluntariness
in intentional felony.
Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom and the use of
intelligence.
Requisites:
(1) That an act is required by law to be done;
(2) That a person fails to perform such act;
(3) That his failure to perform such act was due
to some lawful or insuperable cause
Insuperable means insurmountable.
Illustration: Person was arrested for direct assault at 5:00
pm after government offices close. Under the law, a
person arrested must be delivered to the nearest judicial
authority at most within 18 hours (now 36 hours, Art 125
RPC, as amended) otherwise, the public officer will be
liable for arbitrary detention. The circumstance of time of
arrest may be considered as an insuperable cause.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSES – those where the act committed is
a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment
there is no penalty imposed.
4 Types of absolutory circumstances: [IP-OA]
1. INSTIGATION – it is the employment of means,
methods, force to persuade a person to commit a crime
for the purpose of arresting him and subsequently
prosecuting him.
The manner by which instigation is committed is
exempting or absolutory because the criminal intent
comes from the person seeking to arrest the offender, not
from the offender himself because it is very unfair for the
State to persuade a person to commit a crime and arrest
him later, if the State induces a person to commit a crime,
the criminal intent comes from the State not from the
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
person, so the State cannot use its resources to trap an
innocent.
Note: the person inducing must be a representative of the
State. The person inducing is a principal by inducement,
even a co-conspirator.
e.g.: in a conduct of buy-bust operation (drugs) a police
approached A and persuaded him to act as a seller of
shabu to B in exchange for a commission. – here the
criminal intent comes from the police officer, not from the
suspect. If the suspect is arrested later on, he can claim
that there is instigation (undue influence) on the part of
the law enforcer, in that case he is exempt from criminal
liability, it is an absolutory cause on account of public
policy.
ENTRAPMENT – not an absolutory cause. There is
entrapment when the criminal intent comes from the
suspect himself, the State agent merely furnishes he
opportunity to commit the crime.
e.g.: A, a police officer, acted as a poseur buyer of shabu
and negotiated with B, a suspected drug pusher who is
unaware that A is a police officer. A then paid B in marked
money and the latter handed over a sachet of shabu. Upon
signal, the cops closed in on B.
PEOPLE v. DORIA, 301 SCRA 668
SC: Entrapment necessarily entails some form of
deceit on the part of the law enforcement agent but the
important consideration is the criminal intent must come
from the person arrested.
Standards to determine whether it is valid
entrapment or instigation, 2 tests:
(1) Subjective test or otherwise termed as
predisposition test
- It looks at the predisposition of the person
sought to be arrested;
- It looks at his past record, character, previous
incidents of committing a crime; and
- It focuses itself on the inclination or
susceptibility of the person sought to be arrested to
commit a crime.
(2) Objective test
- it looks at the behavior of the police officer,
whether or not the behavior of the police officer merely
furnishes the opportunity to commit a crime or whether
there is undue persuasion on the part of the police officer.
Which test to follow?
The premise is because of the public policy
considerations, it treat instigation as absolutory because
46
we want to prevent abuse on the part of the State.
Therefore the SC, as time and again, applies the objective
test in determining whether there is valid entrapment
operation or whether there is instigation.
SC recognizes entrapment as a valid form of
addressing criminality, particularly in view of crimes which
involved narcotics, contrabands because these crimes are
victimless crimes, there is no private complainant, so the
law enforcement agents must take the initiative to identify
the perpetrators of these crimes coupled with the
consideration that these crimes are committed
underground (discreetly), so the law enforcement agents
must resort to methods or means in order to properly
detect the perpetrators.
2. PARDON
General rule: Pardon does not extinguish criminal action
(Art 23).
Exception: Pardon by marriage between the accused and
the offended party in cases of SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION,
RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS (Art 344).
3. ACTS NOT COVERED BY LAW AND IN CASE OF EXCESSIVE
PUNISHMENT (ART. 5)
Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be
repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of
excessive penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any
act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should
be made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as
may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense.
4. OTHER ABSOLUTORY CAUSES:
Art. 6. The spontaneous desistance of the person who
commenced the commission of a felony before he could perform
all the acts of execution.
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The
penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon
those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and
sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the
single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
Art. 19. Par. 1 – “By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders
to profit by the effects of the crime.”
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
Art. 124, last par. – The commission of a crime, or violent insanity
or any other ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of the
patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for the
detention of any person.
Art. 247, pars. 1 & 2. Death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person who
having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon
them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of
destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any
other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
Art. 280, par. 3. The provisions of this article shall not be
applicable to any person who shall enter another's dwelling for
the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself, the
occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be
applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the
purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to
anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public
houses, while the same are open.
Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No criminal,
but only civil liability, shall result from the commission of the
crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives
by affinity in the same line.
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property
which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall
have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-
in-law, if living together.
Note: reason here is that there is IMPLIED OWNERSHIP.
Art. 344, par. 4. – In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-
mentioned crimes.
Note: reason here is that there is IMPLIED FORGIVENESS.
CHAPTER 3. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MITIGATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
III. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Mitigating circumstances or causas attenuates - are those
which, if present in the commission of the crime, do not
entirely free the actor from criminal liability, but serve
only to reduce the penalty.
47
Basis: DIMINUTION OF EITHER FREEDOM OF ACTION,
INTELLIGENCE OR INTENT OR ON THE LESSER PERVERSITY
OF THE OFFENDER.
However, voluntary surrender and plea of guilt
which, being circumstances that occur after the
commission of the offense, show the accused‘s respect for
the law (voluntary surrender) and remorse and acceptance
of punishment (plea of guilt), thereby necessitating a
lesser penalty to effect his rehabilitation (based on the
Positivist School)
Classes of mitigating circumstances
1. Ordinary mitigating – (generally) those circumstances
under Article 13 (subsections 1-10)
However (exception), paragraph 1, is treated as
a privileged mitigating circumstance if majority of the (or 2
of the 3) requisites concurred, otherwise, it will be treated
as an ordinary mitigating circumstance. (Reyes, citing Art.
69).
2. Privileged mitigating –
a. Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under
eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor
under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. A person under fifteen but over fifteen years
of age, and a person over fifteen and under eighteen years
of age who acted without discernment, are exempt from
criminal liability;
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under
eighteen years of age who acted with discernment, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period. (As amended by
R.A. No. 9344)
b. Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime
committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by
one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of
the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the
same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several
cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the
majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall
impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed
proper, in view of the number and nature of the
conditions of exemption present or lacking.
c. Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which
contain three periods. — In cases in which the penalties
prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano

single divisible penalty or composed of three different

penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall
observe for the application of the penalty the following
rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating
or aggravating circumstances:
xxx.
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are
mitigating circumstances;
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all
the requisites necessary to justify or to exempt from
criminal liability in the respective cases are not
attendant.

5. When there are two or more mitigating Basis: DIMINUTION OF INTELLIGENCE, a condition of
circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are voluntariness.
present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem Incomplete Justifying and Exempting Circumstances
applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances. The circumstances of justification or exemption which may
give place to mitigation, because not all the requisites
xxx. necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal
liability in the respective cases are attendant, are the
following:
Note: mitigating circumstances only reduce the penalty,
but do not change the nature of the crime. (1) Self-defense (Art. 11, par. 1)
(2) Defense of relatives (Art. 11, par. 2)
(3) Defense of strangers (Art. 11, par. 3)
Ordinary and Privileged Mitigating, distinguished (4) State of necessity (Art. 11, par. 4)
(5) Performance of duty (Art. 11, par. 5)
Ordinary Mitigating Privileged Mitigating (6) Obedience to the order of superiors (Art. 11, par. 6) (7)
Minority over 15 years of age but below 18 years of age
Can be offset by any (Art. 12, par. 3, as amended by R.A. No. 9344)
Cannot be offset by
aggravating circumstance. (8) Causing injury by mere accident (Art. 12, par. 4)
aggravating (9) Uncontrollable fear (Art. 12 par. 6)
circumstance.
Note: pars 1 & 2 of Art. 12 cannot give place to mitigation,
If not offset by aggravating because, as stated by the SC of Spain, the mental condition
The effect of imposing of a person is indivisible; that it, there is no middle ground
circumstance, produces
upon the offender the between sanity and insanity, between presenceand
the effect of applying the absence of intelligence.
penalty lowers by one or
penalty provided by law
two degrees than that
for the crime in its But if the offender is suffering from an illness which would
provided by law for the
minimum period in case of diminish the exercise of his will-power without however
crime. depriving him of the consciousness of his acts is
divisible penalty.
considered a mitigation under par. 9 of Art. 13.

i. Incomplete justifying circumstances:

12 Types of mitigating circumstances: [I-UNSIP-VVP-PIA]
a. Incomplete self-defense, defense of relatives, defense
of stranger
1. Incomplete Justification and Exemption
2. Under 18 or Over 70 years of age
In these 3 classes of defense, UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION
3. No intention to commit so grave a wrong
must always be present, it is an indispensable requisite.
4. Sufficient Provocation or Threat
5. Immediate vindication of a grave offense
Par. 1 of Art. 13 is applicable only when
6. Passion or obfuscation
7. Voluntary surrender
(1) Unlawful aggression is present
8. Voluntary plea of guilt
(2) but one or both of the other 2 requisites are not
9. Plea to a lower offense
present in any of the cases referred to in circumstances
10. Physical defect
number 1, 2 and 3 or Art. 11.
11. Illness
12. Analogous Circumstances

48
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
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Example: When the one making defense against unlawful
aggression used unreasonable means to prevent or repel
it, he is entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance.
Note: When two of the three requisites mentioned therein
are present, the case must be considered as a privileged
mitigating circumstance referred to in Art. 69 of this Code.
(Article 69 requires that a majority of the conditions
required must be present.)
b. Incomplete justifying circumstance of avoidance of
greater evil or injury
Requisites under par. 4 of Art. 11:
(1) That the evil sought to be avoided actually
exists;
(2) That the injury feared be greater than that
done to avoid it;
(3) That there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.
Avoidance of greater evil or injury is a justifying
circumstance if all the three requisites mentioned in par. 4
of Art. 11 are present.
But if any of the last two requisites is lacking, there is only
a mitigating circumstance. The first element is
indispensable.
c. Incomplete justifying circumstance of performance of
duty
Requisites under par. 5, Art. 11
(1) That the accused acted in the performance of
a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office; and
(2) That the injury caused or offense committed
be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise
of such right or office.
PEOPLE v. OANIS, 74 Phil 257
In this case, where only one of the requisites was present,
Article 69 was applied.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the
crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating
circumstance defined in Art. 11, No. 5 of the RPC. There
are 2 requisites (mentioned above) in order that the
circumstance may be taken as a justifying one.
In the instant case, only the first requisite is
present – appellants have acted in the performance of a
duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime
49
committed iby them is not the necessaryconsequence of a
due performance of their duty.
Their duty was to arrest Balagtas, or to get him
dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are
overpowered. But through their impatience or over
anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have
exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the
person whome they believed to be Balagtas without any
resistance from him and withour makung any previous
inquiry as to his identity.
Note: The SC considered 1 of the 2 requisites as
constituting the majority. It seems that there is no
ordinary mitigating circumstance under Art. 13 par. 1
when the justifying or exempting circumstance has 2
requisites only.
d. Incomplete justifying circumstance of obedience to an
order.
Requisites under par. 6 of Art. 11:
(1) Order must have been issued by a superior
(2) The order is for some lawful purpose
(3) The means used to carry it out must be lawful
Note: When two of the three requisites mentioned therein
are present, the case must be considered as a privileged
mitigating circumstance referred to in Art. 69 of this Code.
(Article 69 requires that a majority of the conditions
required must be present.)
ii. Incomplete exempting circumstances:
a. Incomplete exempting circumstance of minority over
15 and under 18 years of age.
To be exempt from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344, 2
conditions must be present:
(1) that the offender is over 15 and under 18
years old; and
(2) that he does not act with discernment.
Therefore, if the minor over 15 and under 18 years of age
acted without discernment, he is entitled only to a
mitigating circumstance, because not all the requisites
necessary to exempt from criminal liability are present.
b. Incomplete exempting circumstance of accident
Requisites under par. 4 of Art. 12:
(1) A person is performing a lawful act
(2) With due care
(3) He causes an injury to another by mere
accident
(4) Without fault or intention of causing it
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If the 2nd requisite and 1st part of the 4th
requisite are absent, the case will fall under Art. 365 which
punishes a felony by negligence or imprudence (culpable
felony).
In effect there is mitigating circumstance, because the
penalty is lower than that provided for intentional felony.
If the 1st requisite and 2nd part of the 4th
requisite are absent, because the person committed an
unlawful act and has the intention of causing the injury, it
will be an intentional felony (Art. 4, par. 1). The 2nd and
3rd requisites will not be present either.
In this case, there is no mitigating circumstance.
c. Incomplete exempting circumstance of uncontrollable
fear.
Requisites under par. 6 of Art. 12:
(1) That the threat which caused the fear was of
an evil greater than, or at least equal to, that
which he was required to commit;
(2) That it promised an evil of such gravity and
imminence that an ordinary person would have
succumbed to it.
Note: If only one of these requisites is present, there is
only a mitigating circumstance.
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over
seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of
Art. 80.
This paragraph is impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 9344.
1) If a child is 15 and below - Exempt
2) Above 15 but under 18 years of age, also an exempting
circumstance,
if he/she acted without discernment, on the other hand,
if he/she acted with discernment, such child shall undergo
diversion programs provided under Chapter 2 of R.A. No.
9344.
3) Minor delinquent under 18 years of age, the sentence
may be suspended. (Art. 192, PD No. 603 as amended by
PD 1179)
4) 18 years or over, full criminal responsibility.
5) 70 years or over – mitigating, no imposition of death
penalty; if already imposed. Execution of death penalty is
suspended and commuted.
50
Diversion – refers to an alternative, child-appropriate
process of determining the responsibility and treatment of
a child in conflict with the law on the basis of his/her
social, cultural, economic, psychological, or educational
background without resulting to formal court proceedings.
(Sec. 4[j]. R.A. No. 9344)
Diversion program – refers to the program that the chils in
conflict with the law is require to undergo after he/she is
found responsible for an offense without resorting to
formal court proceedings. (Sec. 4[j], R.A. No. 9344)
System of Diversion. - Children in conflict with the law
shall undergo diversion programs without undergoing
court proceedings subject to the conditions herein
provided:
(a) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committee
is not more than six (6) years imprisonment,
1. the law enforcement officer or
2. Punong Barangay with the assistance of the
2.1. local social welfare and
2.2. development officer or
2.3. other members of the LCPC
shall conduct
1. mediation,
2. family conferencing and
3. conciliation and, where appropriate,
adopt indigenous modes of conflict
resolution in accordance with the best
interest of the child with a view to
accomplishing the objectives of
restorative justice and the formulation
of a diversion program.
The child and his/her family shall be present in these
activities.
(b) In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not
more than six (6) years imprisonment,
1. the local social welfare and
2. development officer shall meet with the child
and his/her parents or guardians for the development of
the
2.1. appropriate diversion and
2.2. rehabilitation program, in
coordination with the BCPC;
(c) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed
exceeds six (6) years imprisonment, diversion measures
may be resorted to only by the court. (Section 23, R.A. No.
9344)
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with
the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She
shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law
until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or
older. The age of a child may be determined from the
child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents,
age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In
case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved
in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with
the law prior to the filing of the information in any
appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding
for the determination of age before the Family Court
which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours
from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested
parties.
If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the
law and is pending in the appropriate court, the person
shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the
same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on
the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be
suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
judges and other government officials concerned shall
exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in
conflict with the law.
SEC. 24. Stages Where Diversion May be Conducted. -
Diversion may be conducted at the Katarungang
Pambarangay, the police investigation or the inquest or
preliminary investigation stage and at all 1evels and
phases of the proceedings including judicial level.
SEC. 25. Conferencing, Mediation and Conciliation. - A
child in conflict with law may undergo conferencing,
mediation or conciliation outside the criminal justice
system or prior to his entry into said system. A contract of
diversion may be entered into during such conferencing,
mediation or conciliation proceedings.
SEC. 26. Contract of Diversion.
SEC. 27&28. Duty of the Punong Barangay ot the Law
Enforcement Officer When There is No Diversion. (see R.A.
No. 9344)
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed. – (Praeter Intentionem)
Basis: DIMINUTION OF INTENT, an element of
voluntariness in intentional felony.
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There must be a notable and evident
disproportion between the means employed by the
offender and the resulting harm.
The intention, as an internal act, is judged (by external
acts)
1) not only by the proportion of the means
employed by him to the evil produced by his act,
2) but also by the fact that the blow was or was
not aimed at a vital part of the body;
3) this includes: the weapon used, the injury
inflicted and his attitude of the mind when the
accused attacked the deceased.
(1) The lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong can
also be inferred from the subsequent acts of the accused
immediately after committing the offense, such as when
the accused helped his victim to secure medical treatment.
(2) This circumstance does not apply when the crime
results from criminal negligence or culpa.
(3) Only applicable to offense resulting in death, physical
injuries, or material harm (including property damage). It
is not applicable to defamation or slander.
(4) This mitigating circumstance is not applicable when the
offender employed brute force.
(5) Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is not
appreciated where the offense committed is characterized
by treachery.
(6) When the victim does not die as a result of the assault
in cases of crimes against persons, the absence of the
intent to kill reduces the felony to mere physical injuries,
but it does not constitute a mitigating circumstance under
Art. 13(3).
PEOPLE v. CALLETO, G.R. No. 135701 (May 9, 2002)
Held: The lack of "intent" to commit a wrong so
grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the
weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury
inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the
accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim
from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend
himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he
actually did, and he must be held responsible therefor,
without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.
PEOPLE v. URAL, 56 S 138 (1974)
Held: The intention, as an internal act, is judged
not only by the proportion of the means employed by him
to the evil produced by his act, but also by the fact that the
 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano

blow was or was not aimed at a vital part of the body. c) then you use the criterion based on the time
Thus, it may be deduced from the proven facts that the element.
accused had no intent to kill the victim, his design being
only to maltreat him, such that when he realized the 2. If there is that time element and at the same time,
fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed the
victim to secure medical treatment at the municipal a) facts are given indicating that at the time the
dispensary. offender committed the crime, he is still
suffering from outrage of the threat or
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the provocation done to him
offended party immediately preceded the act. b) then he will still get the benefit of this
mitigating circumstance.
Provocation - Any unjust or improper conduct or act of the
offended part capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating Sufficient provocation as a Provocation as a
anyone. requisite of incomplete mitigating
self-defense circumstance
Basis: DIMINUTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND INTENT.
It pertains to its absence
Elements: It pertains to its
on the part of the person
(1) That the provocation must be sufficient; defending himself. (People
presence on the part of
(2) That it must originate from the offended v. CA, G.R. No. 103613,
the offended party.
party; and 2001)
(3) That the provocation must be immediate to
the act, i.e., to the commission of the crime by
the person who is provoked 5. That the act was committed in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the
Provocation in order to be mitigating must be SUFFICIENT felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by
and IMMEDIATELY preceding the act. (People v. Pagal) affinity within the same degrees.

“Sufficient” means adequate to excite a person to commit Basis: DIMINUTION OF THE CONDITIONS OF
a wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its VOLUNTARINESS.
gravity. (People v. Nabora).
Elements:
Sufficiency depends upon:
(1) That there be a grave offense done to the
a. the act constituting provocation one committing the felony, his spouse,
b. the social standing of the person provoked ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or
c. the place and time when the provocation is adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by
made. affinity within the same degrees.

Between the provocation by the offended party and the
commission of the crime, there should not be any interval
in time.
Reason: the law states that the provocation “immediately
preceded the act”. When there is an interval of time
between the provocation and the commission of the
crime, the perpetrator has time to regain his reason.
You have to look at two criteria:
1. If from the element of time,
a) there is a material lapse of time stated in the
problem and
b) there is nothing stated in the problem that the
effect of the threat of provocation had
prolonged and affected the offender at the time
he committed the crime
(2) That the felony is committed in vindication of
such grave offense. A lapse of time is allowed
between the vindication and the doing of the
grave offense.
(3) The vindication need not be done by the
person upon whom the grave offense was
committed
Note: Lapse of time is allowed. The word ― “immediate”
used in the English text is not the correct translation. The
Spanish text uses ― “proxima”.
Although the grave offense (slapping of the accused in
front of many persons hours before the killing), which
engendered the perturbation of mind, was not so
immediate, it was held that the influence thereof, by
reason of its gravity, lasted until the moment the crime

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 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano

was committed. In this case, mitigating circumstance was It is a mere spite against
considered; the act was committed in the immediate It concerns the honor of
the one giving the
vindication of a grave offense. (People v. Parana). the person.
provocation or threat.

PEOPLE v. DIOKNO, 63 Phil 601

Basis to determine the gravity of offense in vindication:
The lapse of time between the grave offense (abducting
the daughter of the accused by the deceased) and the
U.S. v. AMPAR, 37 Phil 201
vindication (killing of the deceased) was 2 or 3 days.
During a fiesta, an old man 70 years of age,
SC: the presence of the 5th mitigating circumstance of Art.
asked the deceased for some roast pig. In the presence of
13, RPC, that is, immediate vindication of a grave offense...
many guests, the deceased insulted the old man, saying:
may be taken into consideration in favor of the 2 accused,
“There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of
because although the elopement took place on January 4,
you”. A little, later, while the deceased was sqautting
1935, and the aggression on January 7, 1935, the offense
down, the old man came up behind him and struck him on
did not cease while (the abducted daughter’s)
the head with an axe.
whereabouts remained unknown and her marriage to the
deceased unlegalized. Therefore, therewas no interruption
Held: while it may be mere trifle t an average
from the time the offense was committed to the
person, it evidently was a serious matter to an old man, to
vindication thereof.
be made the butt of a joke in the presence of so many
guests. The accused was given the benefot of the
The accused belongs to a family of old customs
mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense.
to whom elopement of a daughter with a man constitues a
grave offense to their honor and causses disturbance of
In this casem the age of the accused and the
the peace and tranquility of the home and at the same
place were considered in determining the gravity of the
time spreads uneasiness and anxiety in the minds of the
offense.
members thereof.
Note: Vindication of a grave offense and passion or
The question whether or not a certain personal offense is
obfuscation cannot be counted separately and
grave must be decided by the court, having in mind
independently.
a. the social standing of the person,
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
b. the place and
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. –
c. the time when the insult was made.
(Arrebato y Obsecacion)
Provocation Vindication Elements:

It is made directly only to
the person committing
the felony.
The offense need not be
a grave offense.
The provocation or
threat must immediately
precede the act.
The grave offense may be
committed against the
offender‘s relatives
mentioned by law.
The offended party must
have done a grave
offense to the offender
or his relatives.
The grave offense may be
proximate, which admits
of an interval of time
between the grave
offense done by the
offended party and the
commission of the crime
by the accused.
(1) The accused acted upon an impulse
(2) The impulse must be so powerful that it
naturally produces passion or obfuscation in
him.
Requisites of the MC of passion or obfuscation:
(1) That there be an act, both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such condition of mind;
and
(2) That said act which produced the obfuscation
was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his normal
equanimity. (People v. Alanguilang)
Reason why passion or obfuscation is mitigating:

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 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
When there are causes naturally producing in a
person powerful excitement, he loses his reason and self-
control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power.
(U.S. v. Salandanan, 1 Phil 464, 465)
Note: Passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful
sentiments.
Passion or obfuscation not applicable when:
a. The act committed in a spirit of LAWLESSNESS.
b. The act is committed in a spirit of REVENGE.
Note: Passion and obfuscation may lawfully arise from
causes existing only in the honest belief of the offender.
U.S. v. HICKS, 14 Phil 217
Facts: For about 5 years, the accused and the
deceased lived illicitly in the manner of husband and wife.
Afterwards, the deceased separated from the accused and
lived with another man. The accused enraged by such
conduct, killed the deceased.
Held: Even if it is true that the accused acted
with obfuscation because of jealousy, the mitigating
circumstance cannot be considered in his favor because
the causes which mitigate criminal responsibility for the
loss of self-control are such which originate from
legitimate feelings, and not those which arise from vicious,
unworthy and immoral passions.
PEOPLE v. BELLO, G.R. No. L-18792 (February 28, 1964)
The defense submits that the accused is entitled
to the mitigating circumstance of having acted on a
provocation sufficiently strong to cause passion and
obfuscation, because the deceased’s flat rejection of the
entreaties of the accused for her to quit her calling as a
hostess and return to their former relation, agravated by
her sneering statement that the accused was penniless ans
invalid, provoked the accused into losing his head and
stabbing the deceased.
It appears that the accused had previously
reproved the deceased for allowing herself to be caressed
by a stranger. Her loose conduct was forcibly driven home
to the accused by the remark of one Marasigan on the
very say of the crime that the accused was the husband
“whose wife was being used by Maring for purposes of
prostitution,” a remark that so deeply wounded the
feelings of the accused that he was driven to consume a
large amount of wine before visiting Alicia (Deceased) to
plead with her to leave her work. Alicia’s insulting refusal
to renew her liaison with the accused, therefore, was not
motivated by any desire to lead a chaste life henceforth,
but showed her determination to pursue a lucrative
54
profession that permitted her to distribute her favors
indiscriminately.
It was held that the accused’s insistence that she
live with him again, and his rage at her rejection of the
proposal cannot be properly qualified as arising from
immoral and unworthy passions. Even without benefit of
wedlock, a monogamous liaison appears morally of a
higher level than gainful promiscuity.
U.S. v. DE LA CRUZ, 22 Phil 429)
De la Cruz, in the heat of passion, killed the
deceased who was his querida (lover) upon discovering
her in flagrante in the act of carnal communication with a
mutual acquaintance. He claims that he is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation and that
the doctrine in Hicks is inapplicable.
Held: US v. Hicks is not applicable to the case. In
Hicks, the cause of the alleged passion and obfuscation of
the aggressor was the convict's vexation, disappointment
and deliberate anger engendered by the refusal of the
woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him,
which she had a perfect reason to do.
In this case, the impulse upon which the
defendant acted was the sudden revelation that his
paramour was untrue to him and his discovery of her in
flagrante in the arms of another. This was a sufficient
impulse in the ordinary and natural course of things to
produce the passion and obfuscation which the law
declares to be one of the mitigating circumstances to be
taken into the consideration of the court.
PEOPLE v. ZAPATA and TUBADEZA, 107 Phil 103, 109)
Held: The belief entertained in good faith by the
defendants that the deceased cast upon their mother a
spell of witchcraft which eas the cause of her serious
illness, is so powerful a motive as to naturally produce
passion or obfuscation.
Passion and Obfuscation cannot co-exist with:
(1) Vindication of grave offense
Exception: When there are other facts closely connected
with the fact upon which 1 circumstance is premised, the
other circumstance may be appreciated as based on the
other fact.
PEOPLE v. DIOKNO, G.R. No. L-45100
Thus, where the deceased, a Chinaman, had
eloped with the daughter of the accused, and later when
the deceased saw the accused coming, the deceased ran
upstairs, there are 2 facts which are closely connected,
namely:

(1) elopement, which is a grave offense for the
family of old customs, and
(2) refusal to deal with him, a stimulus strong
enough to produce passion.
The court in considered both mitigating circumstances of
(1) vindication, and (2) passion in favor of the accused.
(2) Treachery
(3) Evident premeditation
Passion/Obfuscation and Irresistible Force, distinguished
(Reyes, Revised Penal Code)
Passion/Obfuscation
Mitigating Circumstance
Cannot give rise to
physical force because it
does not involves physical
force.
Passion/obfuscation
comes from the offender
himself.
Must arise from lawful
sentiments to be
mitigating.
Passion/Obfuscation and Provocation,
(Reyes, Revised Penal Code)
Passion/Obfuscation
Passion/obfuscation is
produced by an impulse
which may be caused by
provocation.
The offense which
engenders the
perturbation of mind need
not be immediate. It is
only required that the
influence thereof lasts
until the moment the
crime is committed.
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano
In both, the effect of the loss of reason and selfcontrol
on the part of the offender.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself
to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had
voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to
the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution;
Basis: LESSER PPERVERSITY OF THE OFFENDER.
Requisites:
(1) That the offender had not been actually
arrested
Irresistible force (2) That the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority or to the latter‘s agent
Exempting circumstance
(3) That the surrender was voluntary.
Physical force is a Two Mitigating Circumstances Under This Paragraph:
condition sine qua non.
(1) Voluntary surrender to a person in authority
or his agents;
(2) Voluntary confession of guilt before the court
Irresistible force comes
prior to the presentation of evidence for the
from a third person.
prosecution.
Irresistible force is Whether or not a warrant of arrest had been issued is
immaterial and irrelevant.
unlawful.
Criterion is whether or not
a. the offender had gone into hiding
b. and the law enforcers do not know of his
distinguished
whereabouts.
Provocation
Note: For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the
surrender must be spontaneous in such a manner that it
shows the interest of the accused to surrender
Provocation comes from unconditionally to the authorities, either because
the injured party.
(1) he acknowledges his guilt or
(2) wishes to save them the trouble and
expenses that would be necessarily incurred in
his search and capture. (People v. Gervacio,
August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 960).
Must immediately
If none of these two reasons impelled the accused to
precede the commission
surrender, the surrender is not spontaneous and therefore
of the crime.
not voluntary. (People v. Laurel).
The accused must actually surrender his own
person to the authorities, admitting complicity of the
crime. Merely requesting a policeman to accompany the
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 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER
By: Tina Serrano

accused to the police headquarters is not voluntary

surrender. (People v. Flores)
Effect of Arrest General Rule: Not mitigating
when defendant was in fact arrested. (People v. Conwi)
Exceptions:
(1) But where a person, after committing the
offense and having opportunity to escape, voluntarily
waited for the agents of the authorities and voluntarily
gave up, he is entitled to the benefit of the circumstance,
even if he was placed under arrest by a policeman then
and there. (People v. Parana)
3) that the confession of guilt was made prior to the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise
suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his
means of action, defense, or communications with his
fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the
exercise of the will-power of the offender without
however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.

(2) Where the arrest of the offender was after 10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar
his voluntary surrender or after his doing an act amounting nature and analogous to those above mentioned.
to a voluntary surrender to the agent of a person in
authority. (People v. Babiera; People v. Parana)

Person in Authority and his Agent Xxxxxxxx to be continued xxxxxxxx

Person in authority – is one directly vested with

jurisdiction, that is, a public officer who has the power to
govern and execute the laws whether as an individual or
as a member of some court or governmental corporation,
board or commission. A barrio captain and a barangay
chairman are also persons in authority. (Art. 152, RPC, as
amended by PD No. 299).

Agent of a person in authority – is a person, who, by

direct provision of law, or by election or by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order
and the protection and security of life and property and
any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority.
(Art. 152, as amended by RA 1978).

Time of Surrender The RPC does not distinguish

among the various moments when the surrender may
occur. (Reyes, Revised Penal Code).

The fact that a warrant of arrest had already

been issued is no bar to the consideration of that
circumstance because the law does not require that the
surrender be prior the arrest. (People v. Yecla and Cahilig).

Note: What is important is that the surrender be

spontaneous.

PEOPLE v. CRISOSTOMO, G.R. No. L-32243, April 15, 1988

Requisites of plea of guilty:

1) that the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;

2) that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that

is before the competent court that us to try the case; and

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